The purpose of the GKChP was. The secrets of the GKChP over the years have acquired a large number of versions

The August coup, the creation and inglorious decline of the State Emergency Committee in August 1991, have acquired a huge number of versions of "what it was" and "why it happened." Can the actions of the GKChP be called a coup d'état, and what did the putschists actually achieve?

Despite the ensuing years of litigation, numerous public performance participants in the coup and its opponents, the final clarity is still missing. And probably never will.

In fact, the State Committee for the State of Emergency in the USSR was active from 10 to 21 August 1991. The main declared goal at first was to prevent the collapse of the USSR: the exit to the members of the GKChP was seen in the new Union Treaty, which Gorbachev planned to sign. The treaty provided for the transformation of the Union into a confederation, and not from 15, but from nine republics. Not without reason, the putschists saw this as the beginning of the end of the Soviet state.

And this is where the differences begin. It would seem that Mikhail Sergeevich Gorbachev was the main supporter of the Union Treaty. The main opponents are members and supporters of the State Emergency Committee. But later, at the trial and beyond, one of the leaders of the putsch, Vice-President of the USSR Gennady Yanaev, argued that "the documents of the GKChP were developed on behalf of Gorbachev," and other participants in that process generally noted that the prototype of the GKChP was created on March 28, 1991 on meeting with Gorbachev and with his "blessing".

next moment- this is the behavior of the putschists already in the course of the events themselves in relation to the then head of the USSR. It is worth recalling that in those days he went on vacation to the Foros dacha in the Crimea. Knowing at the same time that everything is completely restless in the country, that the people and a huge part of the party and state nomenclature are dissatisfied with "Perestroika", and, moreover, knowing the attitude towards the reformatting of the USSR, in which the citizens of the Union saw simply the dismantling of the country. The referendum on the preservation of the USSR was held on March 17, 1991, and most of citizens spoke out for the territorial integrity of the state.

By the way, this is exactly why the terms "putsch", "revolution" and "coup" in the strict sense are in no way suitable for defining the activities of the State Committee. The participants of the GKChP just advocated the preservation of the country, its integrity, sovereignty and the preservation of the staus quo, with the curtailment of the most odious perestroika initiatives.

Moreover, when it finally became clear that the GKChP case was lost, the putschists first of all sent a delegation back to Gorbachev at Foros, and some of them were arrested at the moment when they got off the plane in Moscow, which flew with Gorbachev.

The events of the three days of August themselves also represent something devoid of logic at first glance. On the one hand, members of the State Committee for the State of Emergency declare that Mikhail Gorbachev is unable to govern the country for health reasons, and so on. about. Yanaev becomes the President of the USSR, but at Gorbachev's dacha they turn off the telephone connection only in his office. Communication worked perfectly not only in the guard house, but also in the cars of the presidential motorcade. And, moreover, it later turns out that at the dacha "Mikhail Sergeevich has been actively working all these days and signing decrees."

Another goal was the removal from power of Boris Yeltsin, the then president of the RSFSR and, it seems, already at that time a political opponent of Gorbachev. But this elimination did not happen either by detention or by ambush in the forest along the route of the presidential cortege from the dacha to Moscow.

It did not happen in Moscow either, although there were all the possibilities. Troops had already been brought into the capital, and the people had not yet begun to gather around the White House, where Yeltsin had arrived. Moreover, according to some versions, Yeltsin's guards, consisting of KGB officers, were ready to "localize the object", but did not receive the corresponding order, although one of the putschists was the head of the KGB of the USSR Vladimir Kryuchkov.

In general, the very composition of the participants in this State Committee leads to complete bewilderment as to why they did not succeed in what they had planned. Among the "putschists" were the head of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and the minister of defense, and, as mentioned above, the head of the KGB, and the prime minister with the vice president. But the coup failed and they all ended up in the dock.

There are, of course, a number of conspiracy theories. One of them was once voiced by Mikhail Poltoranin, the Minister of Press and Yeltsin's supporter during the coup. It boils down to the fact that the putsch was Gorbachev's greatest provocation.

According to this Soviet and Russian official, "Gorbachev used them (GKChP. - Ed.) in the dark. In his characteristic manner, he said or hinted: men, we are losing power, the country. I myself cannot return the USSR to desired mode functioning, I have an image of a democrat in the world. I'm going on vacation, you tighten the screws here, close the newspapers. I'll be back, I'll unscrew some nuts, the world will calm down. The people who got into the GKChP sincerely wanted to save the country. When everything started spinning, they rushed to him: come back, Mikhail Sergeyevich. And he washed his hands: I don't know anything. The Moors have done their job."

This version finds indirect confirmation in Gorbachev's policy towards the CPSU. The fact is that Mikhail Sergeevich tried with all his might to reduce the influence of the party both on himself and on the state as a whole. And as a result of the suppression of the GKChP, the activities of the CPSU were suspended, and then, literally a few months later, the party was completely dissolved. But the problem is that the presence of the Communist Party did not suit not only Gorbachev, but also Yeltsin, who, apart from the party, was not satisfied with Gorbachev himself.

And on this occasion, there is another version in which it was Yeltsin who became the main beneficiary of the putsch and it was he who, at least, knew about the upcoming events, as he knew that nothing bad would happen to him. Mikhail Vasilyev writes about this in his investigative material.

According to him, “Gorbachev in 1991 as a leader suited only an insignificant group of bureaucrats. Patriots who could not forgive him for scandalous concessions to the West, and democrats who dreamed of overthrowing the central government, and the rapidly impoverished people dreamed of his departure. one powerful force without a clear leader, but with great potential.

Part of the party elite and special services took a clear course towards the capitalization of the USSR in order to privatize its immense resources. And they didn't need the talker Gorby. But who will replace him? Where can one find such a leader of "one blood" who would speak the same language with them, but be popular among the people? After all, otherwise the change of the social order would be impossible.

The answer lies on the surface - it's Boris Yeltsin.

Further, the author leads to the fact that the head of the KGB and one of the putschists, Kryuchkov, was in collusion with Yeltsin and understood how everything would end in the end. However, this version has one very significant inconsistency, namely, Yeltsin's hot, to the point of exceeding his own authority, desire to condemn and imprison the putschists.

In general, it’s worth starting with the fact that no one was eager to plant putschists. And at the first opportunity, the prisoners were released on bail. As a result, of course, they spent from a year to a year and a half in Matrosskaya Tishina, but upon leaving, they were able not only to participate in rallies and demonstrations, but also to run and be elected to the Russian parliament. And then to fall under the amnesty, with which everything was also more than interesting. First and foremost, the amnesty was announced even before the completion of the trial, in violation of both procedural norms and formal logic. How can amnesty be given to people for whom a court verdict has not yet been announced? As a result, an additional meeting had to be held in order to settle all legal norms.

Secondly, according to the memoirs of the then Prosecutor General of the Russian Federation Kazannik, he called and warned Yeltsin that the State Duma would include putschists in the lists of amnestied putschists. To which, according to Kazannik, Yeltsin sharply replied: "They won't dare!" Nevertheless, they dared, and Yeltsin imposed his own resolution on this decision, which read "Kazannik, Golushko, Yerin. Do not release anyone from those arrested, but investigate the criminal case in the same order." But Kazannik refused to follow the resolution, despite telephone conversations in which Yeltsin again declared: "You wouldn't dare to do that." By the way, under that amnesty, the defenders of the White House in 1993 were also released.

Well, and most importantly, one of the members of the State Emergency Committee, Valentin Varennikov, refused the amnesty and eventually won the case in 1994. However, the rest of the putschists, even agreeing to an amnesty, in the end did not plead guilty to "high treason", and on the whole it is clear why.

As for Yeltsin's desire for a final investigation and, apparently, a guilty verdict for the members of the GKChP, there was a certain political symbolism in this. It was necessary to show that the return to the USSR is so marginal that it is simply criminal, that there is simply no turning back. Well, the demonstration that now he is the sovereign master in the country was also useful. However, it didn't work out. And it did not turn out so well that many high-ranking government officials, even of that time, called this court a "farce."

By the way, later the fate of most of the putschists was favorable. For the most part, they occupied high positions in state, public and commercial structures. In general, they quickly turned from the Soviet into the new Russian elite. Some of them, even despite their more than respectable age, continue to work actively until now.

Is in history Russian state another year that can be called revolutionary. When the country escalated to the limit, and Mikhail Gorbachev could no longer influence even his inner circle, and they tried in every possible way to resolve the current situation in the state by force, and the people themselves chose whom to give their sympathy to, the 1991 putsch took place.

old state leaders

Many leaders of the CPSU, who remained committed to conservative methods of government, realized that the development of perestroika was gradually leading to the loss of their power, but they were still strong enough to prevent the market reform of the Russian economy. By this they tried to prevent the economic crisis.

And yet, these leaders were no longer so authoritative as to impede the democratic movement by persuasion. Therefore, the only way out of the current situation, which seemed to them the most possible, was to declare a state of emergency. No one then expected that the 1991 putsch of the year would begin in connection with these events.

The ambiguous position of Mikhail Sergeevich Gorbachev, or the removal of the leadership

Some conservative figures even tried to put pressure on Mikhail Gorbachev, who had to maneuver between the old leadership and representatives of the democratic forces in his inner circle. These are Yakovlev and Shevardnadze. This unstable position of Mikhail Sergeevich Gorbachev led to the fact that he began to gradually lose the support of both sides. And soon information about the upcoming putsch began to penetrate into the press.

From April to July, Mikhail Gorbachev was preparing an agreement, called "Novo-Ogarevsky", with the help of which he was going to prevent the collapse of Soviet Union. He intended to transfer the main part of the powers to the authorities of the Union republics. On July 29, Mikhail Sergeevich met with Nursultan Nazarbayev and Boris Yeltsin. It discussed in detail the main parts of the agreement, as well as the upcoming removal from their posts of many conservative leaders. And this became known to the KGB. Thus, the events were increasingly approaching the period that in the history of the Russian state began to be called "the August putsch of 1991."

Conspirators and their demands

Naturally, the leadership of the CPSU was concerned about the decisions of Mikhail Sergeevich. And during his vacation, she decided to take advantage of the situation with the use of force. Many people took part in a kind of conspiracy. famous people. This is who at that time was the chairman of the KGB, Gennady Ivanovich Yanaev, Dmitry Timofeevich Yazov, Valentin Sergeevich Pavlov, Boris Karlovich Pugo and many others who organized the 1991 putsch.

On August 18, the GKChP sent a group representing the interests of the conspirators to Mikhail Sergeyevich, who was resting in the Crimea. And they presented him with their demands: to declare a state of emergency in the state. And when Mikhail Gorbachev refused, they surrounded his residence and cut off all types of communications.

Provisional Government, or Expectations Not Justified

In the early morning of August 19, about 800 armored vehicles were brought into the Russian capital, accompanied by an army of 4,000 people. In all means mass media It was announced that the State Emergency Committee was created, and it was to him that all the powers to govern the country were transferred. On this day, waking up people, turning on their TVs, could only see an endless broadcast of the famous ballet called "Swan Lake". This was the morning when the August 1991 coup began.

The people responsible for the conspiracy claimed that Mikhail Sergeevich Gorbachev was seriously ill and temporarily unable to govern the state, and therefore his powers were transferred to Yanaev, who was vice president. They hoped that the people, already tired of perestroika, would take the side of the new government, but the press conference they organized, where Gennady Yanaev spoke, did not make the proper impression.

Yeltsin and his supporters

A photograph of Boris Nikolayevich, taken at the moment of speaking to people, was published in many newspapers, even in Western countries. Several officials agreed with Boris Yeltsin's opinion and fully supported his position.

Putsch 1991. Briefly about the events that took place on August 20 in Moscow

A huge number of Muscovites took to the streets on August 20. All of them demanded to dissolve the GKChP. The White House, where Boris Nikolayevich and his supporters were located, was surrounded by defenders (or, as they were called, resisting the putschists). They set up barricades and surrounded the building, not wanting the old order to return.

Among them were a lot of native Muscovites and almost the entire color of the intelligentsia. Even the famous Mstislav Rostropovich flew in from the United States on purpose to support his compatriots. The August putsch-1991, the reasons for which are the unwillingness of the conservative leadership to voluntarily give up their powers, rallied great amount of people. Most countries supported those who defended the White House. And the ongoing events were broadcast abroad by all leading television companies.

The failure of the plot and the return of the president

The demonstration of such massive disobedience caused the putschists to decide to storm the White House building, which they appointed for three in the morning. This terrible event resulted in more than one victim. But on the whole, the coup failed. Generals, soldiers, and even most of the Alpha fighters refused to shoot ordinary citizens. The conspirators were arrested, and the President safely returned to the capital, canceling absolutely all orders of the State Emergency Committee. Thus ended the August putsch of 1991.

But these few days have greatly changed not only the capital, but the whole country. Thanks to these events occurred in the history of many states. ceased to exist, and the political forces of the state changed their alignment. As soon as the putsch of 1991 ended, on August 22 rallies were again held in Moscow, representing the democratic movement of the country. On them, people carried panels of the new tricolor national flag. Boris Nikolaevich asked the relatives of all those who died during the siege of the White House for forgiveness, as he could not prevent these tragic events. But in general, the festive atmosphere was preserved.

Reasons for the failure of the coup, or the final collapse of communist power

The 1991 putsch is over. The reasons that led to its failure are fairly obvious. First of all, most people living in the Russian state no longer wanted to return to the times of stagnation. Distrust of the CPSU began to be expressed very strongly. Other reasons are the indecisive actions of the conspirators themselves. And, on the contrary, quite aggressive on the part of the democratic forces represented by Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin, who received support not only from the numerous masses of the Russian people, but also from Western countries.

The putsch of 1991 had not only tragic consequences, but also brought significant changes to the country. It made the preservation of the Soviet Union impossible, and also prevented the further expansion of the power of the CPSU. Thanks to the decree signed by Boris Nikolayevich on the suspension of its activities, after some time all Komsomol and communist organizations throughout the state were dissolved. And on November 6, another decree finally banned the activities of the CPSU.

Consequences of the tragic August coup

The conspirators, or representatives of the State Emergency Committee, as well as those who actively supported their positions, were immediately arrested. Some of them committed suicide during the investigation. The putsch of 1991 claimed the lives of ordinary citizens who stood up to defend the White House building. These people were awarded titles. And their names entered the history of the Russian state forever. These are Dmitry Komar, Ilya Krichevsky and Vladimir Usov - representatives of Moscow youth who got in the way of moving armored vehicles.

The events of that period forever crossed out the era of communist rule in the country. The collapse of the Soviet Union became obvious, and the main public masses fully supported the positions of the democratic forces. The coup that took place had such an impact on the state. August 1991 can safely be considered the moment that abruptly turned the history of the Russian state into a completely different direction. It was during this period that the dictatorship was overthrown. populace, and the choice of the majority was on the side of democracy and freedom. Russia has entered a new period of its development.

The events that took place from August to December 1991 in the USSR can safely be called the most important in the entire post-war world history. Russian President Vladimir Putin has rightly described the collapse of the Soviet Union as the biggest geopolitical catastrophe of the century. And to a certain extent, its course was determined precisely by the putsch attempt by the State Committee for the State of Emergency (GKChP). 25 years have passed, new generations of Russian citizens have grown up, for whom these events are exclusively history, and those who lived in those years must have forgotten a lot. However, the very fact of the destruction of the USSR and the timid attempt to save it still cause lively controversy.

Weakening of the USSR: objective and artificial causes

Centrifugal tendencies in the USSR clearly began to be seen already in the late 80s. Today we can confidently say that they were the consequences of not only internal crisis phenomena. The course for the destruction of the Soviet Union immediately after the end of World War II was taken by the entire Western world and, first of all, by the United States of America. This was fixed in a number of directives, circulars and doctrines. Fabulous funds were allocated annually for these purposes. Since 1985 alone, about $90 billion has been spent on the collapse of the USSR.

In the 1980s, the US authorities and intelligence agencies were able to form in the Soviet Union a fairly powerful agency of influence, which, although it did not seem to occupy key positions in the country, was capable of exerting a serious influence on the course of events at the national level. According to numerous testimonies, the leadership of the KGB of the USSR repeatedly reported on what was happening to the Secretary General Mikhail Gorbachev, as well as about the US plans to destroy the USSR, take control of its territory and reduce the population to 150-160 million people. However, Gorbachev did not take any actions aimed at blocking the activities of supporters of the West and actively opposing Washington.

The Soviet elites were divided into two camps: the conservatives, who offered to return the country to traditional tracks, and the reformers, whose informal leader was Boris Yeltsin who demanded democratic reforms and greater freedom for the republics.

March 17, 1991 An all-Union referendum on the fate of the Soviet Union was held, in which 79.5% of citizens who had the right to vote took part. Nearly 76.5% of them supported the preservation of the USSR , but with a cunning wording - like "renewed federation of equal sovereign republics".

On August 20, 1991, the old Union Treaty was to be canceled and a new one was signed, giving a start to an actually renewed state - the Union of Soviet Sovereign Republics (or the Union of Sovereign States), whose prime minister he planned to become Nursultan Nazarbaev.

The members of the State Committee for the State of Emergency, in fact, spoke out against these reforms and for the preservation of the USSR in its traditional form.

According to information actively disseminated by Western and Russian liberal media, KGB officers allegedly overheard a confidential conversation about the creation of the JIT between Gorbachev, Yeltsin and Nazarbayev and decided to act. According to the Western version, they blocked Gorbachev in Foros, who did not want to introduce a state of emergency (and even planned to physically liquidate him), introduced an emergency situation, brought army and KGB forces to the streets of Moscow, wanted to storm the White House, capture or kill Yeltsin and destroy democracy. Printing houses mass-printed arrest warrants, and factories produced huge quantities of handcuffs.

But this theory has not been objectively confirmed by anything. What actually happened?

GKChP. Chronology of major events

August 17 part of the leaders of law enforcement agencies and executive authorities held a meeting at one of the secret facilities of the KGB of the USSR in Moscow, during which they discussed the situation in the country.

August 18 some future members and sympathizers of the GKChP flew to the Crimea to Gorbachev, who was ill there, to convince him to introduce a state of emergency. According to the version popular in Western and liberal media, Gorbachev refused. However, the testimonies of the participants in the events clearly indicate that Gorbachev, although he did not want to take responsibility for making a difficult decision, gave the go-ahead to the people who arrived to him to act at their discretion, after which he shook hands with them.

In the afternoon, according to the well-known version, communications were cut off at the presidential dacha. However, there is information that journalists managed to get through there by regular phone. There is also evidence that government special communications were working at the dacha all the time.

On the evening of August 18, documents on the creation of the State Emergency Committee are being prepared. And at 01:00 on August 19, Vice-President of the USSR Yanaev signed them, including himself, Pavlov, Kryuchkov, Yazov, Pugo, Baklanov, Tizyakov and Starodubtsev in the committee, after which the State Emergency Committee decided to introduce a state of emergency in certain areas of the Union.

On the morning of August 19th The media announced Gorbachev's inability to perform duties for health reasons, the transfer of power to Gennady Yanaev and the creation of the State Committee for the State of Emergency throughout the country. In turn, the head of the RSFSR Yeltsin signed a decree "On the illegality of the actions of the State Emergency Committee" and began to mobilize his supporters, including through the radio station "Echo of Moscow".

In the morning, units of the army, the KGB and the Ministry of Internal Affairs are moving to Moscow, which take a number of important objects under protection. And at lunchtime, crowds of Yeltsin's supporters begin to gather in the center of the capital. The head of the RSFSR publicly demands "to repulse the putschists." Opponents of the GKChP begin to build barricades, and a state of emergency is introduced in Moscow.

August 20 large-scale rally near the White House. Yeltsin personally speaks to its participants. Participants of mass actions are beginning to be frightened by rumors about the impending assault.

Later, the Western media will tell heartbreaking stories about how the putschists were going to throw tanks and special forces at the "defenders of democracy", and the commanders of the special forces refused to carry out such orders.

Objectively, there is no data on the preparation of the assault. Special Forces officers subsequently denied both the existence of orders to attack the White House, and their refusal to carry them out.

In the evening, Yeltsin appoints himself and. about. Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces on the territory of the RSFSR, and Konstantin Kobets- Minister of Defence. Kobets orders the troops to return to their places of permanent deployment.

Evening and night from 20 to 21 August in the capital, there is a movement of troops, there are local clashes between protesters and the military, three participants in mass actions are killed.

The command of the internal troops refuses to advance units to the center of Moscow. Armed cadets educational institutions The Interior Ministry arrives to protect the White House.

Toward morning, the troops begin to leave the city. In the evening, Gorbachev already refuses to accept the delegation of the State Emergency Committee, and Yanaev officially dissolves him. Prosecutor General Stepankov signs a decree on the arrest of members of the committee.

August 22 Gorbachev returns to Moscow, interrogations of members of the State Emergency Committee begin, they are relieved of their posts.

August 23"Defenders of Democracy" demolish the monument Dzerzhinsky(doesn't it remind you of anything?), the activities of the Communist Party are prohibited in Russia.

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On August 24, Gorbachev resigned as General Secretary of the CPSU and proposed that the Central Committee dissolve itself. The process of the collapse of the USSR became irreversible, culminating in the well-known events of December 1991.

Life after the USSR. Assessment of the events of 1991

Judging by the results of the referendums and elections that took place at the end of 1991 in various parts of the USSR, most of the population of the Union then actually supported its collapse.

On the territory once As a united state, wars and ethnic cleansing began to flare up one after another, the economy of most republics collapsed, crime increased catastrophically and the population began to decline rapidly. The "dashing 90s" burst into people's lives like a whirlwind.

The fate of the republics was different. In Russia, the era of the aforementioned "dashing 90s" ended with the coming to power Vladimir Putin, and in Belarus - Alexander Lukashenko. In Ukraine, the drift towards traditional ties began in the early 2000s, but was interrupted by the Orange Revolution. Georgia moved away from the general Soviet history in jerks. Relatively smoothly out of the crisis and rushed to the Eurasian integration of Kazakhstan.

Objectively, nowhere in the post-Soviet territory the population has social guarantees of the level of the USSR. In most of the former Soviet republics, the standard of living did not come close to the Soviet one.

Even in Russia, where people's incomes have risen significantly, social security problems call into question the thesis of rising living standards compared to those that existed before 1991.

Not to mention the fact that a huge superpower ceased to exist on the world map, which shared the first place in the world in terms of military, political and economic power only with the United States, which the Russian people have been proud of for many years.

It is indicative how Russians assess the events of 1991 today, 25 years later. The data of the study conducted by the Levada Center, to some extent, sum up the numerous disputes about the State Emergency Committee and the actions of the Yeltsin team.

So, only 16% of the inhabitants of Russia said that they would come out "to defend democracy" - that is, they would support Yeltsin and defend the White House - in the place of the participants in the events of 1991! 44% categorically answered that they would not defend the new government. 41% of respondents are not ready to answer this question.

victory democratic revolution the events of August 1991 are named today by only 8% of the inhabitants of Russia. 30% characterize what happened as a tragic event that had disastrous consequences for the country and people, 35% - just as an episode in the struggle for power, 27% found it difficult to answer.

Speaking of possible consequences after the victory of the State Emergency Committee, 16% of respondents said that given the current development of events, Russia would live better today, 19% - that they would live worse, 23% - that they would live the same way they live today. 43% could not decide on an answer.

15% of Russians believe that in August 1991 the representatives of the State Emergency Committee were right, 13% - that Yeltsin's supporters. 39% say that they did not have time to understand the situation, and 33% do not know what to answer.

40% of the respondents said that after the events of August 1991 the country went in the wrong direction, 33% - that in the right direction. 28% found it difficult to answer.

It turns out that about a third to a half of Russians are not sufficiently informed about the events of August 1991 and cannot unequivocally assess them. The rest of the population is moderately dominated by those who evaluate the "August revolution" and the activities of the "defenders of democracy" negatively. The vast majority of Russian citizens would not take any action to counter the GKChP. In general, few people today rejoice at the defeat of the committee.

So what really happened in those days and how to evaluate these events?

GKChP - an attempt to save the country, an anti-democratic coup or a provocation?

On the eve it became known that the CIA predicted the emergence of the State Emergency Committee in April 1991! An unknown speaker from Moscow informed the secret service leadership that the "hard-liners", the traditionalists, were ready to remove Gorbachev from power and reverse the situation. At the same time, Langley believed that it would be difficult for Soviet conservatives to retain power. A Moscow source listed all the leaders of the future GKChP and predicted that Gorbachev, in the event of a potential rebellion, would try to maintain control over the country.

It is clear that there is not a word about the US response in the information document. But, of course, they should have been. When the GKChP arose, the US leadership severely condemned it and did everything in order to achieve similar actions from other Western countries. The position of the heads of the United States, Great Britain and others Western states was voiced by journalists directly in the Vesti program, which, in turn, could not but affect the consciousness of doubting Soviet citizens.

Throughout the history of the GKChP, there is whole line oddities.

Firstly, the leaders of the powerful power structures of the USSR, undisputed intellectuals and excellent organizers of the old school, for some reason acted spontaneously, uncertainly and even somehow bewildered. They have not been able to decide on the tactics of action. Yanaev's shaking hands went down in history while speaking to the camera.

From which it is logical to assume that the creation of the State Emergency Committee was a completely unprepared step.

Secondly, Yeltsin's team, which did not consist of such experienced and powerful people as their opponents, worked like clockwork. Warning schemes, transport, communications were effective; the defenders of the barricades were well fed and watered; leaflets were printed and distributed in huge numbers; their own media worked.

Everything indicates that Yeltsin was well prepared for such a development of events.

Thirdly, Mikhail Gorbachev, who continued to be the official head of the USSR, fell ill at the right time and left Moscow. Thus, the country was deprived of supreme power, and he himself remained as if he had nothing to do with it.

Fourth, the president of the USSR did not take any measures to try to stop the leaders of the GKChP. On the contrary, with his words he gave them complete freedom of action.

Fifth, today it is known that back in June 1991, the US authorities discussed the prospect of a putsch in the USSR with Gorbachev and the leadership of the USSR Foreign Ministry. Wouldn't the president of the Union, if he wanted to, have prevented it in two months?

All these strange facts raise questions and doubts about the official interpretation of the victorious side, according to which the GKChP was an illegal military junta that, without the knowledge of Gorbachev, tried to stifle the germs of democracy. Moreover, all of the above suggests the version that Gorbachev and Yeltsin could deliberately provoke their political opponents to take action at an inconvenient time for them.

On the one hand, the signing of the new Union Treaty was a victory for the reformers. But the victory, to put it mildly, half-hearted. The traditionalists, who occupied almost all key positions in the state, if they were well prepared, had all the necessary tools to disrupt the signing of the treaty during the event itself by political means and to politically counterattack during the crisis that would inevitably follow the signing itself. In fact, the traditionalists were forced to act without preparation, at an inconvenient time for themselves against opponents who, on the contrary, were well prepared for the fight.

Everything indicates that Gorbachev and Yeltsin could banally lure the organizers of the State Emergency Committee into a trap, after falling into which they were forced to act according to someone else's scenario. Everyone who could stop the death of the USSR in 1991 was thrown out of the game overnight.

Some of the members of the GKChP and those who sympathized with the committee died soon after the coup under mysterious circumstances, committing strange suicides, while the other part was quietly amnestied in 1994, when it no longer posed any threat. The gekachepists were set up, but when it became clear it was too late to do anything.

The events of August 1991 fit perfectly into the scheme of color revolutions, with the only difference that the head of state actually played on the side of the "revolutionaries - defenders of democracy." Mikhail Sergeevich Gorbachev could probably tell a lot of interesting things, but he is unlikely to do it. A man whom fate has elevated to the very heights of world politics, the head of a superpower, has exchanged all this for an advertisement for pizza and a bag. And the citizens of Russia, even after 25 years, perfectly understand this and evaluate it accordingly.

Those who propose to forget the history of August 1991 as a nightmare are categorically wrong. Then we experienced one of the most tragic events in our history, and it is simply vital to work on the mistakes in this regard. The bloody consequences of the collapse of the USSR still have to be disentangled - including in Ukraine: in the Donbass they are now being killed largely due to the fact that the State Emergency Committee could not stop the local princes who wanted to break the state for the sake of personal power.

At the same time, the supporters of the other extreme, denying the right to exist, are also wrong. Russian Federation because of the tragedy of August 1991. Yes, the USSR was destroyed contrary to the will of the people, expressed at the referendum on March 17, but this is not a reason to refuse Russia to have the current statehood - a guarantee of the sovereign existence of the Russian people. On the contrary, everything must be done to develop the Russian Federation as an internationally recognized successor to the USSR. And the most important task is to restore the former greatness of our Fatherland on its basis.

Source - Wikipedia

The State Committee for the State of Emergency is a self-proclaimed authority in the USSR that existed from August 18 to August 21, 1991. It was formed from the first state and officials of the Soviet government, who opposed the reforms of Perestroika and the transformation of the Soviet Union into a new “Union of Sovereign States”, which was becoming a confederation consisting of part of already sovereign republics, carried out by the President of the USSR M. S. Gorbachev.
The forces under the leadership of the President of Russia (RSFSR) B. N. Yeltsin refused to obey the State Emergency Committee, calling their actions unconstitutional, there was an attempt to go on strike. The actions of the GKChP led to the events that became known as the "August Putsch".
From August 22 to 29, 1991, former members of the dissolved GKChP and those who actively assisted them were arrested, but from June 1992 to January 1993, they were all released on bail. In April 1993, the trial began. On February 23, 1994, the defendants in the GKChP case were amnestied State Duma Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation, despite Yeltsin's objection. One of the defendants, Valentin Varennikov, refused to accept the amnesty and his trial continued. August 11, 1994 Military Collegium Supreme Court Russia acquitted Varennikov.

By the beginning of 1991, the situation in the USSR had become critical. The country has entered a period of disintegration. The leadership began to work on the issue of introducing a state of emergency.
From the "Conclusion on the materials of the investigation of the role and participation of officials of the KGB of the USSR in the events of August 19-21, 1991":

Marat Nikolaevich asked my advice on what type of helicopter to choose - Mi-8 or Mi-24. Naturally, I advised the Mi-24, since it was armored against 12.7 mm bullets, and all the tanks that were in the White House area had machine guns of this caliber. But in the event of failure of one of the engines, the Mi-24 helicopter could not continue flying. Mi-8 could fly on one engine. Tishchenko agreed with me. However, less than an hour later, he called back and happily announced that, according to the information he received from the same KGB department, all the tanks and infantry fighting vehicles brought into Moscow did not have ammunition, so he was preparing the Mi-8. And after some time, a message came that the commander of the Airborne Forces, General Grachev, stopped the division in Kubinka. By evening, it became clear that the GKChP had shamefully failed, and by noon on August 21, all the media loudly announced this. The bacchanalia of victory began.

Unfortunately, it was overshadowed by the death of three people under the wheels of an infantry fighting vehicle in the tunnel between Vosstaniya Square and Smolenskaya Square. It all seemed strange to me. Why bring troops and armored vehicles into Moscow without ammunition? Why is the Moscow department of the KGB trying to save Yeltsin, and why is the chairman of the KGB Kryuchkov a member of the GKChP? It all felt like some kind of farce. Subsequently, in 1993, Yeltsin really stormed the White House, and the tanks fired direct fire and by no means blank charges. And in August 1991, all this looked like a grandiose performance or monstrous stupidity on the part of the leadership of the State Emergency Committee. However, what happened happened. I'm only expressing my opinion. Further events developed at lightning speed: the return of Gorbachev from Foros, the ban and dissolution of the CPSU, the Belovezhskaya agreement on the liquidation of the USSR, the creation of the Union of Independent States on the basis of the former republics of the USSR.

The most absurd, of course, seemed to be the collapse of a single Slavic core: Russia, Ukraine and Belarus. It seemed that some kind of insanity had occurred among the leaders of these republics, who demonstrated complete ignorance of the history of the creation of Russian statehood. But the most striking thing was that all this was supported by the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, which hastened to dissolve itself, and the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation ratified the Belovezhskaya conspiracy.

I recalled the words of Denikin and Wrangel, who, after the defeat of the white movement in the Civil War of 1918, addressing their descendants in their memoirs, noted the historical merit of the Bolsheviks in that they basically preserved Great Russia. Modern Bolsheviks, dressed in national clothes, completely destroyed the great power, completely disregarding the opinion of its peoples.

Some time later, it became clear that all these processes were headed by the apparatus of the Central Committee of the CPSU, headed by Politburo member A.N. Yakovlev, and with the very dubious and incomprehensible role of Gorbachev. Most of the rulers in the new states belonged to a cohort of workers in the CPSU party apparatus, and most of the oligarchs and "new" Russians in the past belonged to the party or Komsomol elite. Before the eyes of the whole people, active supporters of the policy of the CPSU turned into its fierce enemies. Calls for a "witch hunt" began, however, they were soon suspended, since this clearly could affect them themselves.

The people were deceived.

Links:
1. Ogarkov and operation "Herat"
2. Akhromeev Sergey Fedorovich
3. Gorbacheva Raisa Maksimovna (ur. Titarenko)
17.

August coup
Mass demonstrations in Moscow against the August 1991 coup
	The planned transformation of the USSR into the Union of Sovereign States with the initial participation of only the RSFSR and the Kazakh SSR./p>
The main goal:	Stop the collapse of the USSR and prevent its transformation into a confederation.
	The failure of the putsch. The political victory of Boris Yeltsin, the failure to sign a new Union Treaty between the republics of the USSR, a significant weakening of the position of the CPSU, the formation of the State Council, consisting of the President of the USSR and the heads of the Union republics.
Organizers:	USSR State Emergency Committee
Driving forces:	GKChP Political support in the RSFSR: Liberal Democratic Party of the Soviet Union Russia communist party RSFSR Union republics that supported the GKChP: Azerbaijan Azerbaijan SSR Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic Byelorussian SSR International support for the GKChP: Iraq Iraq Libya Libya Serbia Serbia Sudan Sudan Flag of Palestine PLO
Enemies:	RSFSR: Russia Defenders of the White House Russia Supreme Council of the RSFSR Russia Council of Ministers of the RSFSR Russia Administration of the President of the RSFSR Russia Lensoviet and its defenders Republics who rejected the acts of the State Emergency Committee: Latvia Latvian SSR Lithuania Lithuanian SSR Moldova Moldavian SSR Estonia Estonian SSR International condemnation of the State Emergency Committee: Flag of the EU European Parliament United States of America USA
Dead:
Injured:	unknown
Arrested:

August coup- an attempt to remove M. S. Gorbachev from the presidency of the USSR and change his course, undertaken by a self-proclaimed State Committee State of Emergency (GKChP) - a group of conservative conspirators from the leadership of the Central Committee of the CPSU, the government of the USSR, the army and the KGB on August 19, 1991, which led to radical changes in the political situation in the country.

The actions of the GKChP were accompanied by the declaration of a state of emergency for 6 months, the entry of troops into Moscow, the reassignment of local authorities to the military commandants appointed by the GKChP, the introduction of strict censorship in the media and the prohibition of a number of them, the abolition of a number of constitutional rights and freedoms of citizens. The leadership of the RSFSR (President B. N. Yeltsin and the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR) and some other republics, and later also the legal leadership of the USSR: President M. S. Gorbachev and the Supreme Soviet of the USSR qualified the actions of the State Emergency Committee as a coup d'état.

The goal of the putschists

The main goal of the putschists was to prevent the liquidation of the USSR, which, in their opinion, was to begin on August 20 during the first stage of the signing of a new union treaty, turning the USSR into a confederation - the Union of Sovereign States. On August 20, the agreement was to be signed by representatives of the RSFSR and the Kazakh SSR, the rest of the future components of the commonwealth during five meetings, until October 22.

One of the first statements of the GKChP, distributed by Soviet radio stations and central television, indicated following goals, for the implementation of which a state of emergency was introduced in the country:

It is worth noting that in the event of the signing of a new agreement and the abolition of the existing management structure of the USSR, the members of the State Emergency Committee could lose their top government positions.
According to sociological surveys of the Public Opinion Foundation conducted in 1993, the majority (29% of respondents) stated that the purpose of the GKChP was to seize power, and for this they wanted to “overthrow Gorbachev” and “prevent Yeltsin from power” (29%) . 18% express the idea that the members of the State Emergency Committee wanted to change the political structure of society: "preserve the Soviet Union", "bring back the old, socialist system", and for this "establish a military dictatorship."
In 2006 former chairman The KGB of the USSR Vladimir Kryuchkov stated that the GKChP did not aim to seize power:

Timing choice

The members of the State Emergency Committee chose the moment when the President was away - on vacation in the state residence "Foros" in the Crimea, and announced his temporary removal from power for health reasons.

Forces of the State Emergency Committee

Active members and supporters of the State Emergency Committee

• Achalov Vladislav Alekseevich (1945-2011) - Deputy Minister of Defense of the USSR
• Baklanov Oleg Dmitrievich (b. 1932) - First Deputy Chairman of the USSR Defense Council
• Boldin Valery Ivanovich (1935-2006) - Chief of Staff of the President of the USSR
• Varennikov Valentin Ivanovich (1923-2009) - Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces - Deputy Minister of Defense of the USSR
• Generalov Vyacheslav Vladimirovich (b. 1946) - head of security of the residence of the President of the USSR in Foros
• Kryuchkov Vladimir Alexandrovich (1924-2007) - Chairman of the KGB of the USSR
• Lukyanov Anatoly Ivanovich (b. 1932) - Chairman Supreme Council the USSR
• Pavlov Valentin Sergeevich (1937-2003) - Prime Minister of the USSR
• Plekhanov Yuri Sergeevich (1930-2002) - Head of the Security Service of the KGB of the USSR
• Pugo Boris Karlovich (1937-1991) - Minister of Internal Affairs of the USSR
• Starodubtsev Vasily Alexandrovich (b. 1931) - Chairman of the Peasant Union of the USSR
• Tizyakov Alexander Ivanovich (b. 1926) - President of the Association of State Enterprises and Objects of Industry, Construction, Transport and Communications of the USSR
• Shenin Oleg Semenovich (1937-2009) - member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU
• Yazov Dmitry Timofeevich (b. 1923) - Minister of Defense of the USSR
• Yanaev Gennady Ivanovich (1937-2010) - Vice-President of the USSR

Power and information support of the State Emergency Committee

• The GKChP relied on the forces of the KGB (Alpha), the Ministry of Internal Affairs (Division named after Dzerzhinsky) and the Moscow Region (Tula Airborne Division, Tamanskaya Motorized Rifle Division, Kantemirovskaya Division). In total, about 4 thousand military personnel, 362 tanks, 427 armored personnel carriers and infantry fighting vehicles were brought into Moscow. Additional units of the Airborne Forces were deployed in the vicinity of Leningrad, Tallinn, Tbilisi, and Riga.

The troops of the Airborne Forces were commanded by Generals P. S. Grachev and his deputy A. I. Lebed. At the same time, Grachev maintained a telephone connection with both Yazov and Yeltsin. However, the GKChP did not have full control over its forces; so, on the very first day, parts of the Taman division went over to the side of the defenders of the White House. From the tank of this division, Yeltsin delivered his famous message to the assembled supporters.

• Informational support for the State Emergency Committee was provided by the State Television and Radio Broadcasting of the USSR (for three days news releases invariably included exposure of various acts of corruption and violations of the law committed as part of the “reformist course”), the State Committee for the State of Emergency also enlisted the support of the Central Committee of the CPSU, but these institutions were unable to exert a noticeable influence on the situation in the capital, and the committee could not mobilize that part of society that shared the views of the members of the State Emergency Committee.

Leader of the State Emergency Committee

Despite the fact that G. I. Yanaev was the nominal head of the GKChP, according to a number of experts (for example, the former deputy of the Leningrad City Council, political scientist and polytechnologist Alexei Musakov), the real soul of the conspiracy was V. A. Kryuchkov. The leading role of Kryuchkov is repeatedly mentioned in the materials official investigation conducted by the KGB of the USSR in September 1991.

Despite this, according to the President of Russia Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin:

Opponents of the State Emergency Committee

The resistance to the GKChP was headed by the political leadership of the Russian Federation (President B. N. Yeltsin, Vice President A. V. Rutskoi, Prime Minister I. S. Silaev, Acting Chairman of the Supreme Council R. I. Khasbulatov).
In an address to the citizens of Russia, Boris Yeltsin on August 19, describing the actions of the State Emergency Committee as a coup d'état, said:

Khasbulatov was on the side of Yeltsin, although 10 years later, in an interview with Radio Liberty, he said that, like the State Emergency Committee, he was dissatisfied with the draft of the new Union Treaty:

As for the content of the new Union Treaty, besides Afanasiev and someone else, I myself was terribly dissatisfied with this content. Yeltsin and I argued a lot - should we go to the meeting on August 20? And, finally, I convinced Yeltsin, saying that if we don't even go there, if we don't form a delegation, it will be perceived as our desire to destroy the Union. There was a referendum, after all, in March on the unity of the Union. Sixty-three percent, I think, or 61 percent of the population, were in favor of maintaining the Union. I say: "You and I have no right ...". Therefore, I say: "Let's go, make up a delegation, and there we will motivatedly state our comments on the future Union Treaty."

White House defenders

By call Russian authorities, masses of Muscovites gathered at the House of Soviets of the Russian Federation (“White House”), among whom were representatives of various social groups- from the democratically minded public, student youth, intellectuals to veterans of the Afghan war.

According to the leader of the Democratic Union party, Valeria Novodvorskaya, despite the fact that she was kept in a pre-trial detention center during the coup, members of her party took an active part in street actions against the State Emergency Committee in Moscow.

Some of the participants in the defense of the House of Soviets, who were part of the Living Ring detachment on August 20, 1991, formed the social and political organization of the same name, the Living Ring Union (leader K. Truevtsev).

Another socio-political association that was formed near the Council House during the days of the coup is the "Social-Patriotic Association of Volunteers - Defenders of the White House in Support of Democratic Reforms - Detachment" Russia "".

Among the defenders of the White House were Mstislav Rostropovich, Andrei Makarevich, Konstantin Kinchev, Margarita Terekhova, the future terrorist Basayev and the head of the Yukos company Mikhail Khodorkovsky

background

• On June 17, Gorbachev and the leaders of nine republics agreed on a draft Union Treaty. The project itself caused a sharply negative reaction from the security officials from the USSR Cabinet of Ministers: Yazov (Army), Pugo (MVD) and Kryuchkov (KGB).
• July 20 - Russian President Yeltsin issued a decree on departization, that is, on the prohibition of the activities of party committees at enterprises and institutions.
• On July 29, Gorbachev, Yeltsin and the President of Kazakhstan, N.A. Nazarbayev, met confidentially in Novo-Ogaryovo. They scheduled the signing of a new Union Treaty for 20 August.
• On August 2, Gorbachev announced in a televised address that the signing of the Union Treaty was scheduled for August 20. On August 3, this appeal was published in the Pravda newspaper.
• On August 4, Gorbachev went to rest in his residence near the village of Foros in the Crimea.
• August 17 - Kryuchkov, Pavlov, Yazov, Baklanov, Shenin and Gorbachev's assistant Boldin meet at the ABC facility - a closed guest residence of the KGB at the address: Academician Varga Street, possession 1. Decisions are made to introduce a state of emergency from August 19, form the State Emergency Committee, demand from Gorbachev to sign the relevant decrees or resign and transfer powers to Vice President Gennady Yanaev, detain Yeltsin at the Chkalovsky airfield upon arrival from Kazakhstan for a conversation with Yazov, then proceed depending on the results of the negotiations.

The beginning of the coup

• On August 18, at 8 o'clock in the morning, Yazov informs his deputies Grachev and Kalinin about the imminent introduction of a state of emergency.
• 13:02. Baklanov, Shenin, Boldin, General V. I. Varennikov and the head of the security of the President of the USSR Yuri Plekhanov take off from the Chkalovsky airfield on a military aircraft TU-154 (tail number 85605), assigned to the Minister of Defense Yazov, to the Crimea for negotiations with Gorbachev, in order to obtain his consent to the introduction of a state of emergency. At about 5 p.m. they meet with Gorbachev. Gorbachev refuses to give them his consent.

• At the same time (at 16:32), all types of communications were turned off at the presidential dacha, including the channel that provided control of the strategic nuclear forces of the USSR.
• August 19, at 4 o'clock in the morning, the Sevastopol regiment of the KGB troops of the USSR blocks the presidential dacha in Foros. By order of the Chief of Staff of the USSR Air Defense Forces, Colonel-General Maltsev, two tractors blocked the runway on which the President's flying equipment is located - the Tu-134 aircraft and the Mi-8 helicopter.

G. Yanaev's version

• According to GKChP member Gennady Yanaev, on August 16, at one of the special facilities of the KGB of the USSR in Moscow, a meeting was held between the Minister of Defense of the USSR Yazov and the Chairman of the KGB Kryuchkov, at which the situation in the country was discussed. On August 17, a meeting was held at the same facility in the same composition, to which Chairman of the USSR Government Valentin Pavlov was also invited. It was decided to send a group of members of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU to Foros in order to demand that Mikhail Gorbachev immediately introduce a state of emergency and not sign a new Union Treaty without an additional referendum. On August 18, at about 20:00, at the invitation of Kryuchkov, Yanaev arrived in the Kremlin, where a meeting was held with a group of Politburo members who had returned from Foros from Gorbachev. Yanaev was asked to head the GKChP. After a long discussion, he agreed only at about 1:00 am on 19 August.

White House defenders

August 19

• At 6 o'clock in the morning, the USSR mass media announce the introduction of a state of emergency in the country and the inability of the President of the USSR M. S. Gorbachev to perform his functions "for health reasons" and the transfer of all power into the hands of the State Emergency Committee. At the same time, troops were sent to Moscow.
• At night, Alpha advanced to Yeltsin's dacha in Arkhangelskoye, but did not block the president and was not instructed to take any action against him. Meanwhile, Yeltsin urgently mobilized all his supporters in the upper echelon of power, the most prominent of which were R. I. Khasbulatov, A. A. Sobchak, G. E. Burbulis, M. N. Poltoranin, S. M. Shakhrai, V. N. Yaroshenko. The coalition drafted and faxed out an appeal "To the citizens of Russia." B. N. Yeltsin signed a decree "On the illegality of the actions of the State Emergency Committee." Ekho Moskvy became the mouthpiece of the opponents of the putsch.
• B. N. Yeltsin's condemnation of the State Emergency Committee during a speech from a tank of the Taman division at the White House. President of Russia Boris N. Yeltsin arrives at the White House (Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR) at 9 o'clock and organizes a center of resistance to the actions of the State Emergency Committee. Resistance takes the form of rallies that gather in Moscow near the White House on Krasnopresnenskaya Embankment and in Leningrad on St. Isaac's Square near the Mariinsky Palace. Barricades are erected in Moscow, leaflets are distributed. Directly at the White House is the armored vehicles of the Ryazan regiment of the Tula airborne division under the command of Major General AI Lebed] and the Taman division. At 12 o'clock from the tank, B. N. Yeltsin addresses those gathered at the rally, where he calls the incident a coup d'état. From among the protesters, unarmed detachments of militia are created under the command of deputy K. I. Kobets. Afghan veterans and employees of the private security company "Alex" take an active part in the militia. Yeltsin prepares space for retreat by sending his emissaries to Paris and Sverdlovsk with the right to organize a government in exile.
• Evening press conference of the State Emergency Committee. V.S. Pavlov, who developed a hypertensive crisis, was absent from it. The members of the GKChP were visibly nervous; the whole world went around the footage of G. Yanaev's shaking hands. Journalist T. A. Malkina openly called what was happening a “coup”, the words of the members of the State Emergency Committee were more like excuses (G. Yanaev: “Gorbachev deserves all respect”).

At 23:00, a company of paratroopers of the Tula Airborne Division on 10 BRDM arrived in the vicinity of the House of Soviets. Together with the fighters, the deputy commander of the Airborne Forces, Major General A. I. Lebed, arrived.

The plot in the program "Time"

• In the evening edition of the Vremya program, the Central Television of the USSR unexpectedly broadcasts a story prepared by its correspondent Sergei Medvedev about the situation near the White House, into which Yeltsin finds himself, reading out the Decree “On the illegality of the actions of the State Emergency Committee” signed the day before. In conclusion, there is a comment by S. Medvedev, in which he directly expresses doubts about the possibility of this story being aired. Nevertheless, the story was seen by a huge audience of television viewers throughout the country, it contrasted sharply with the rest of the content of the program (with stories in support of the actions of the State Emergency Committee) and made it possible to doubt the actions of the State Emergency Committee.
• The author of the plot, Sergei Medvedev, explains his exit as follows:

It is worth noting that in 1995, Sergei Medvedev became the press secretary of President Boris Yeltsin and held this post until 1996.

August 20

• By order of the State Emergency Committee, officers of the Ministry of Defense, the KGB and the Ministry of Internal Affairs V. A. Achalov, V. F. Grushko, G. E. Ageev, B. V. Gromov, A. I. Lebed, V. F. Karpukhin, V. I. Varennikov and B.P. Beskov prepared the previously unplanned seizure of the building of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR by units of law enforcement agencies. According to experts, the capture plan they developed was irreproachable from a military point of view. For the operation, units with a total number of about 15 thousand people were allocated. However, the generals responsible for preparing the assault began to have doubts about the expediency. Alexander Lebed goes over to the side of the White House defenders. The commanders of "Alpha" and "Vympel" Karpukhin and Beskov ask the Deputy Chairman of the KGB Ageev to cancel the operation. The assault was cancelled.
• In connection with the hospitalization of V. Pavlov, the temporary leadership of the Council of Ministers of the USSR was entrusted to V. Kh. Doguzhiev, who did not make any public statements during the putsch.
• Russia creates an interim republican ministry of defense. Konstantin Kobets is appointed Minister of Defense.
• At 12:00, a rally sanctioned by the city authorities of Moscow begins near the House of Soviets. It was attended by several tens of thousands of people. The rally was organized by the movement "Democratic Russia" and the Soviets of labor collectives of Moscow and the Moscow region. The official slogan of the rally is "For law and order"
• At 15:00 on the first channel of the Central Television of the USSR in the program "Time", in the conditions of strict censorship on other channels, an unexpected story was released, later described as follows by the famous journalist E. A. Kiselev:

I then worked in "Vesti". Vesti was taken off the air. We are sitting, watching the first channel (...) And an announcer appears in the frame, and suddenly begins to read news reports: President Bush condemns the putschists, British Prime Minister John Major condemns, the world community is outraged - and at the end: Yeltsin outlawed the GKChP, prosecutor Russia, then there was Stepankov, initiates a criminal case. We are shocked. And I imagine how many people, including participants in the events, who at that moment caught the slightest hint of which way the situation had swayed, ran to the White House to Yeltsin to sign their loyalty and loyalty. On the third day, in the evening, I meet Tanechka Sopova, who then worked in the Main Information Office of Central Television, well, hugs, kisses. I say: “Tatyan, what happened to you?” - “And I'm a bad boy, says Tanya. I was the responsible graduate." That is, she collected a folder, picked up news. And there was an order: to go and coordinate everything. “I go in,” he says, “once, and there the whole synclite sits and some people who are completely unfamiliar. They are discussing what to broadcast at 21 o'clock in the Vremya program. And here I am, little, poking around with my papers. She really is such a tiny woman. “They tell me in plain text where I should go with my three-hour news:“ Type it yourself! ”- well, I went and typeset it.”

According to Kiselyov, Tatyana Sopova is "a little woman, because of whom, perhaps, the coup in August 1991 failed."

August 21

• On the night of August 21, tank units controlled by the State Emergency Committee carry out maneuvers in the area of ​​the White House (the building of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR). There are clashes between supporters of Boris Yeltsin and a military convoy in a tunnel under Novy Arbat. (see Incident in the tunnel on the Garden Ring)
• Alpha Group is not ordered to storm the White House.
• At 3 o'clock in the morning, Air Force Commander Yevgeny Shaposhnikov suggested that Yazov withdraw his troops from Moscow and that the GKChP "be declared illegal and dispersed." At 5 o'clock in the morning, a meeting of the collegium of the USSR Ministry of Defense was held, at which the commanders-in-chief of the Navy and the Strategic Missile Forces supported Shaposhnikov's proposal. Yazov gives the order to withdraw troops from Moscow.
• On the afternoon of August 21, the session of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR begins under the chairmanship of Khasbulatov, which almost immediately accepts statements condemning the GKChP. Vice-President of the RSFSR Alexander Rutskoi and Prime Minister Ivan Silaev fly to Foros to see Gorbachev. On another plane, some members of the State Committee for the State of Emergency take off to Crimea for negotiations with Gorbachev, but he refuses to accept them.
• A delegation of the State Emergency Committee arrived at the presidential dacha in Crimea. M. S. Gorbachev refused to accept it and demanded to restore contact with the outside world. In the evening, M. S. Gorbachev contacted Moscow, canceled all orders of the State Emergency Committee, removed its members from government posts and appointed new heads of the USSR law enforcement agencies.

August 22

• Mikhail Gorbachev returns from Foros to Moscow together with Rutskoi and Silaev on a Tu-134 plane. Members of the GKChP were arrested.
• Mourning for the dead has been declared in Moscow. A mass rally was held on Krasnopresnenskaya Embankment in Moscow, during which the demonstrators carried out a huge panel of the Russian tricolor; At the rally, the President of the RSFSR announced that a decision had been made to make the white-azure-red banner the new state flag of Russia. (In honor of this event, in 1994, the date of August 22 was chosen to celebrate the Day of the State Flag of Russia.)
• New state flag Russia (tricolor) for the first time installed on the top point of the building of the Council House.
• The White House defenders are supported by rock bands (Time Machine, Cruise, Shah, Metal Corrosion, Mongol Shuudan), which will organize the Rock on the Barricades concert on August 22.

August 23

At night, by order of the Moscow City Council, with a massive gathering of protesters, the monument to Felix Dzerzhinsky on Lubyanka Square was dismantled.

Live Yeltsin, in the presence of Gorbachev, signs a decree on the suspension of the Communist Party of the RSFSR

Further developments

On the night of August 23, by order of the Moscow City Council, with a massive gathering of protesters, the monument to Felix Dzerzhinsky on Lubyanka Square was dismantled.

Live, Yeltsin, in the presence of Gorbachev, signs a decree on the suspension of the Communist Party of the RSFSR. The next day, Gorbachev announces the resignation of the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU. The statement in this regard stated:

The secretariat, the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU did not oppose the coup. The Central Committee failed to take a resolute position of condemnation and opposition, did not rouse the communists to fight against the violation of constitutional legality. Among the conspirators were members of the party leadership, a number of party committees and the media supported the actions of state criminals. This put the communists in a false position. Many members of the party refused to cooperate with the conspirators, condemned the coup and joined the fight against it. No one has the moral right to indiscriminately accuse all communists, and I, as the President, consider myself obliged to protect them as citizens from unfounded accusations. In this situation, the Central Committee of the CPSU must take a difficult but honest decision to dissolve itself. The fate of the republican communist parties and local party organizations will be determined by them themselves. I do not consider it possible for myself to continue to perform the functions of the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU and I am resigning the relevant powers. I believe that democratically minded communists, who have remained faithful to constitutional legality and the course of renewing society, will come out in favor of creating a party on a new basis, capable, together with all progressive forces, of actively engaging in the continuation of fundamental democratic changes in the interests of working people.

Opposition to the putschists in Leningrad

Despite the fact that the main events took place in Moscow, the confrontation between the State Emergency Committee and democratic forces in the regions, especially in Leningrad, also played an important role.

On the morning of August 19, the city radio and television broadcast: The GKChP's appeal to the Soviet people, Anatoly Lukyanov's statement in support of them, and after them the appeal of Colonel-General V.N. In it, Samsonov announced the introduction of a state of emergency and special measures in the city and adjacent territories, which included:

• a ban on holding meetings, street processions, strikes, as well as any public events (including sports and entertainment);
• prohibition of dismissal of workers and employees own will;
• a ban on the use of duplicating equipment, as well as radio and television transmitting equipment, the seizure of sound recording, amplifying technical means;
• establishing control over the media;
• introduction special rules communication use;
• restriction of the movement of vehicles and their inspection;

And other measures.

General Samsonov also announced the creation of an emergency committee in the city, which, in particular, included the first secretary of the regional committee of the CPSU Gidaspov.

The building of the Lensoviet (Mariinsky Palace), in which the democratic faction was the strongest, on August 19 turned into a headquarters for countering the putsch, and St. Isaac's Square in front of it - into a permanent spontaneous rally. Megaphones were installed on the square, transmitting the latest reports on events and speeches from the meeting of the Presidium of the Leningrad City Council, which opened at 10 o'clock. The square and the streets adjacent to the palace, as well as the streets near the television center, were covered with barricades.

Mayor A. A. Sobchak arrived in Moscow the day before to participate as part of the Russian delegation in the planned signing of a new Union Treaty. Together with B. N. Yeltsin and other leaders of the democratic resistance, he compiled the text of the Address to the Citizens of Russia, and at about 2 p.m. he flew to Leningrad. Immediately upon arrival, he did not go to the Mariinsky Palace, as expected, but to the headquarters of General Samsonov, where he persuaded the latter to refrain from sending troops into the city. Then he spoke at an emergency session of the Lensoviet, which opened at 16:30, and later addressed the townspeople on television (August 19, 1991, Leningrad television was the only one in the USSR that managed to air a program directed against the putschists). Together with Sobchak in the studio were the chairman of the Leningrad City Council Alexander Belyaev, the chairman of the Regional Council Yuri Yarov and vice-mayor Vyacheslav Shcherbakov. They ended their speech with a call to the townspeople: to come out on the morning of August 20 to Palace Square for a protest rally.

On August 20, at 5 am, the Vitebsk division of the Airborne Forces of the KGB of the USSR and the Pskov division of the USSR Ministry of Defense made their way to Leningrad, but they did not enter the city, but were stopped near Siverskaya (70 km from the city). The movement of military units in the vicinity and pulling them up to the city continued on the night of August 21 (Radio Baltika regularly reported about them), but in the end V. N. Samsonov kept his word given to A. A. Sobchak, and they were brought into the city did not.

At the rally on August 20 on Palace Square, which was attended by about 400 thousand people, along with the leaders of the city A. Belyaev, V. Shcherbakov and A. Sobchak, many prominent figures of politics and culture condemned the GKChP ( people's deputies M. E. Salie and Yu. Yu. Boldyrev, poet and composer A. A. Dolsky, academician D. S. Likhachev and others).

The free radio stations Baltika and Open City continued to broadcast in the city.

Victims

• Architect of the design and construction cooperative "Kommunar" Ilya Krichevsky
• Participant of the war in Afghanistan, forklift driver Dmitry Komar
• Economist of the Ikom joint venture, son of Rear Admiral Vladimir Usov

All three died on the night of August 21 during an incident in a tunnel on the Garden Ring. On August 24, 1991, by decrees of the President of the USSR M. S. Gorbachev, all three were posthumously awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union "for courage and civic prowess shown in the defense of democracy and the constitutional order of the USSR."

Suicide of the leaders of the USSR

The Minister of Internal Affairs of the USSR (1990-1991), a member of the State Emergency Committee B.K. Pugo, committed suicide by shooting himself with a pistol when he learned that a group had come to him to arrest him.
According to the founder of the Yabloko party, Grigory Yavlinsky, on August 22, 1991, he personally participated in the operation to arrest Pugo, along with CEO Agencies federal security RSFSR Viktor Ivanenko:

Three shell casings were found at the site of Pugo's death. Grigory Yavlinsky, referring to these investigations, says that the last shot was fired by Pugo's wife, Valentina Ivanovna, who also shot herself and died three days later without regaining consciousness.
August 24, 1991 at 21:50 in office room No. 19 "a" in building 1 of the Moscow Kremlin, the duty security officer Koroteev discovered the corpse of Marshal of the Soviet Union Akhromeev Sergey Fedorovich, who worked as an adviser to the President of the USSR. According to the version of the investigation, the marshal committed suicide, leaving a suicide note in which he explained his act as follows:

At about five in the morning on August 26, 1991, N. E. Kruchina, the manager of the affairs of the Central Committee of the CPSU, under unclear circumstances, fell from the balcony of the fifth floor of his apartment in Pletnev Lane and crashed to death. According to the data cited by the journalists of the Moscow News newspaper, Kruchina left a suicide note on the table, in which he wrote the following:

According to the journalists of Moskovskiye Novosti, Kruchina left a thick folder with documents containing detailed information about the illegal commercial activities The CPSU and the KGB, including the creation of offshore enterprises with party money outside the USSR last years. An interesting fact: on October 6 of the same year, Georgy Pavlov, 81-year-old Georgy Pavlov, the 81-year-old Georgy Pavlov, falls from the window of his apartment.

Symbolism

The symbol of victory over the putschists was the Russian tricolor, which was widely used by the forces opposing the GKChP. After the defeat of the State Emergency Committee, by a resolution of the Supreme Council of the RSFSR of August 22, 1991, the white-blue-red historical flag of Russia was recognized as the official national flag of the RSFSR.

Another symbol of the coup was the ballet "Swan Lake", which was shown on television between breaking news releases. IN mass consciousness The putsch was associated with the Chilean putsch by Pinochet. So Anatoly Alexandrovich Sobchak called the GKChP a junta, and Yazov tried to distance himself from this image, saying: "I will not be a Pinochet."

August coup in culture

• In 1991, the Pilot studio filmed the short animated film Putsch.
• Alexander Prokhanov's novel "The Last Soldier of the Empire" was completely devoted to the August events of 1991.
• 2011 - on the 20th anniversary of the putsch, the documentary film "Tomorrow will be different" was released on Channel One.
• 2011 - on the 20th anniversary of the putsch, the Rossiya channel aired the documentary film August 1991. Versions".

The theory of Gorbachev's participation in the activities of the State Emergency Committee

It has been suggested that M. S. Gorbachev himself was in collusion with the GKChP, who knew about the conservative lobby in the Kremlin leadership. So, A. E. Khinshtein in the book “Yeltsin. Kremlin. Medical history" writes:

However, Khinshtein does not indicate the source of this information. On February 1, 2006, in an interview with the Rossiya TV channel, Boris Yeltsin stated that Gorbachev's participation in the State Emergency Committee was documented.

Role of Alpha

Alpha did not trust the GKChP because of the "betrayal" of the KGB leadership after the events in the Baltic states, when one of its fighters died. Therefore, "Alpha" hesitated, actually maintaining neutrality. In an interview, the then commander of Alpha stated that they could easily have captured the White House. But, according to him, no orders were received from above. Otherwise, the White House building would have been seized.

Former leader Presidential Security Service Alexander Korzhakov, in his book of memoirs “Boris Yeltsin: From Dawn to Dusk,” claims that in the early morning of August 19, 1991, about 50 special forces of the USSR KGB group “Alpha” arrived at Yeltsin’s dacha in Arkhangelskoye and guarded near the highway, but did not took no action when Yeltsin's cortege left the dacha in the direction of Moscow. Already after the departure of the president, at about 11 o'clock, according to Korzhakov, armed men approached the gates of the dacha, led by a man who introduced himself as a lieutenant colonel of the Airborne Forces, who stated that they allegedly arrived on behalf of the Minister of Defense to strengthen the security of the village. However, one of Yeltsin's security officers recognized him as an Alpha officer who taught at KGB courses. Yeltsin's guards invited the Alpha fighters to dine in the dining room. After lunch, the commandos sat in their bus for several hours, and then left.

According to the BBC radio, during the three days of the coup, Alpha carried out only one order: on August 21 at 08.30, Karpukhin called the commander of the Alpha department, Anatoly Savelyev, ordering him to go with people to Demyan Bedny Street, where the radio transmitting center and “shut down the Ekho Moskvy radio station” because it “transmits disinformation.” At 10.40 the station was silent for several hours.

Opinions of event participants

In 2008, Mikhail Gorbachev commented on the August 1991 situation as follows:

A member of the State Emergency Committee, Marshal Dmitry Yazov in 2001 spoke about the impossibility of managing public opinion in 1991:

Alexander Rutskoy:

Meaning

The August putsch was one of those events that marked the end of the CPSU and the collapse of the USSR and, according to popular belief, gave impetus to democratic change in Russia. In Russia itself, changes took place that contributed to the expansion of its sovereignty.

On the other hand, supporters of the preservation of the Soviet Union argue that a mess began in the country associated with the inconsistent policy of the then authorities.

Curious facts

• On the seventh anniversary of the events, in 1998, none of the representatives of the Russian authorities took part in the mourning events dedicated to the memory of the dead. By that time, over seven years, the number of supporters of the GKChP in Russia, according to the Institute of the Sociology of Parliamentarism, had increased from 17% to 25%.

• According to polls by the Sociological Opinion Foundation in 2001, 61 percent of the respondents could not name a single member of the GKChP. Only 16 percent were able to name at least one surname correctly. 4 percent remembered the head of the State Emergency Committee Gennady Yanaev.

• In 2005 for a meeting former members events on the Gorbaty Bridge and the event at the Vagankovsky cemetery in memory of those killed in the incident in the tunnel on the Garden Ring, only about 60 people came. The then leader of the Union of Right Forces, Nikita Belykh, said at the mourning event:

• In 2006, according to a sociological survey by the Public Opinion Foundation, 67 percent of Russian residents (including 58 percent of young people) found it difficult to give any assessment - about the benefits or harms of the State Emergency Committee.

• In 2009, the Moscow mayor's office and the government of St. Petersburg completely banned the procession and rally dedicated to the anniversary of August 1991, motivating this in Moscow by the fact that for its sake it would be necessary to block the streets and thereby create inconvenience to Muscovites, and in St. Petersburg - by the fact that these measures will interfere with the work on the pipeline.