Federal Agency for Education

Stavropol State University

Department of Russian History

Thesis on the topic:

Creation and functioning of the Supreme Privy Council

4th year students of the Faculty of History

Group "B"

Durdyeva Guzel

Supervisor:

T.V. Belikova KIN, associate professor

Stavropol2007

Content.

Chapter 1.

Struggle for power after the death of Peter I in 1725.

The causes and composition of the Supreme Privy Council.

Chapter 2. The politics of the Supreme Privy Council.

Correction of Peter's reforms.

Power Struggle in the Supreme Privy Council.

An attempt to limit the autocracy.

Introduction .

Relevance of the problem:

The period of palace coups has not been sufficiently studied in Russian historiography. There is very little special research on the work of the state apparatus during this period, in particular of various state institutions, including the Supreme Privy Council. In addition, there are diametrically opposite assessments, directions of the essence of the policy of this supreme body of power during the reign of Catherine 1 and Peter 2. The debatableness of various aspects of the topic, the poor degree of study of the problem of the functioning of state institutions during the period of palace coups dictate the need for further comprehensive research of our topic.

Purpose of work: study the activities of the Supreme Privy Council

Tasks determined by the goal:

Find out the circumstances of the emergence of the Supreme Privy Council;

Analyze its composition;

Reveal the main focus of specific measures in the Supreme Privy Council, their relationship with Peter's reforms;

Consider the course of the struggle for power in the Supreme Privy Council, defining the reasons and results;

Analyze the attempts of the Supreme Privy Council to limit the autocracy, while clarifying the circumstances of the fall of the Supreme Privy Council.

An object - history of state institutions of Russia.

Item - the policy of the Supreme Privy Council.

Study degree:

I analyzed the degree of study of the problem according to the problem-chronological principle, that is, I proposed the most important problems that were in the center of attention of pre-revolutionary, Soviet and modern researchers of the topic and tracked how they tried to solve them in historiography. These are the following problems:

1.The reasons for the emergence of the Supreme Privy Council;

2. Evaluation of the "trick of the leaders" associated with the development of "Konditsiy";

3. Correlation of Peter's reforms and the policy of the Supreme Privy Council, its effectiveness and necessity for the further progressive development of Russia.

In the studies of pre-revolutionary and Soviet historians, based on the study of official legislative acts, the history of the creation and functioning of the Supreme Privy Council has been studied in sufficient detail.

In the opinion of Eroshkin, Peter 1, and after him, Catherine, tended to think about reorganizing the top management by forming a body narrower than the Senate. Apparently, it is no coincidence that Lefort's report of May 11, 1725 informs about plans being developed at the Russian court "on the establishment of a secret council", which included the Empress, Duke Karl Friedrich, A.D. Menshikov, P.P. Shafirov and A.V. Makarov.

On May 3, this message was repeated almost word for word in the report of Kompredon. The origins of the emergence of the Supreme Privy Council should be sought not only in the "helplessness" of Catherine. The message of August 12, 1724 casts doubt on the common thesis about the emergence of the council as some kind of compromise with the "clan nobility" personified by D.M. Golitsyn. Anisimov's point of view can be considered a kind of compromise attempt. However, his position is very contradictory. Researchers such as Golikova N.B., Kislyagina L.G. believe that over the course of a number of years, since the time of Peter the Great, “the lack of efficiency of the Senate began to be felt more strongly, and this could not but lead to the creation of a more flexible permanent body. This was the Supreme Privy Council, which arose on the basis of meetings of advisers, systematically gathered by Catherine I. " The above thesis most adequately reflects the reasons for the changes in top management in 1726 and is confirmed in a specific material.

Gradovsky A.D. believed that "the establishment of the council belongs to the category of the most unexpected and sudden coups d'état." The activities of the Supreme Privy Council led to the fact that “soon the entire system created by Peter collapsed so much that it was already difficult to find the starting point of the administration”, and “looking at the historical significance of the Supreme Council, one cannot fail to notice in it a strong attempt old personal beginning.

Klyuchevsky wrote that by creating the Supreme Privy Council "they wanted to calm down the offended feeling of the old nobility, who was being removed from the supreme control of unnatural upstarts." At the same time, not the form, but the essence of government, the nature of the supreme power changed: while retaining its titles, it turned from personal will into a state institution.

Filippov A.N. in the book "History of the Senate under the Board of the Supreme Privy Council and the Cabinet" he expressed the opinion that the main defect of the system of government bodies created by Peter was the impossibility of combining the collegial principle of their organization with the nature of the executive branch. As a body of executive power, "standing in direct relation to the supreme power," Filippov believed that the Supreme Privy Council was founded.

Thus, the emergence of the council is not so much the result of a struggle of political interests as a necessity associated with filling a significant gap in the Peter's system of top management bodies. The results of the council's activities were insignificant, for it “had to act immediately after that tense, active era when reform followed reform, when strong excitement prevailed in all spheres of national and state life. The Soviet had to be an institution of the epoch of reaction ... The Soviet had to sort out the complex tasks of the Peter's reform, which remained far from resolved for subsequent eras. Such activities ... showed clearly what in Peter's reform stood the test of time and what had to be set aside. Filippov believed that the council adhered most consistently to Peter's line in its policy towards industry, but on the whole, “the general tendency of the Council’s activity is to reconcile the interests of the people with the interests of the ... ". At the same time, just like Klyuchevsky, he believed that “the council responds in its activities mainly to the needs of the given moment, is engaged in those matters that require an immediate solution.

In 1909, a book by Vyazemsky B.L. "Supreme Privy Council". Like many of his predecessors, the author was interested not so much in the policy pursued by the council as in its history as a state institution. However, one cannot agree with the opinion of E.V. Anisimov. that the conclusions and observations of the author did not differ in originality and were a repetition of the ideas of Filippov and Milyukov. In fact, many of Vyazemsky's judgments were just original, if only because his assessment of the council's activities was almost unconditionally positive. Considering the reasons for the emergence of the Supreme Privy Council, Vyazemsky, as if synthesizing the ideas of Gradovsky and Filippov, came to the conclusion that the council played a kind of prosecutor general, adapting the system of Peter's institutions to autocracy.

Researcher Stroyev V.M. in the Supreme Privy Council he saw a kind of "coalition government", which "proved to be at the height of its calling."

In 1975 Anisimov E.V. defended his Ph.D. thesis on "Internal policy of the Supreme Privy Council (1726 - 1730)". The creation of the Supreme Privy Council is considered in the work as "the initial stage of restructuring the management system, which pursued the goal of adapting the state apparatus to the new tasks that the autocracy faced in the first post-Petrine years."

A group of historians led by Eroshkin believed that the assessment of the work of state institutions during the period of palace coups depends on the assessment of the personality of the monarch. Discussions about the "insignificance" of Peter's successors are very common, as opposed to the significance and scale of the political transformations of Peter himself.

Another group of researchers led by Golikova argue that the Supreme Privy Council is the direct heir of Peter's secret councils in the 20s of the 18th century, bodies with a more or less constant composition, information about which was clearly reflected in the diplomatic correspondence of that time.

The fall of the Supreme Privy Council in 1730 could be seen as proof that the appearance of organs like it is something like the ghost of Russian absolutism. This organ was perceived in this way by many historians of the 18th - 19th centuries, starting with V.N. Tatishchev. and ending with Pavlov - Silvansky N.P., and echoes of understanding appeared in Soviet historiography.

The stereotypical ideas about the post-Petrine era that have developed in the public mind are reflected in Karamzin's "note on ancient and new Russia", who condemned attempts to limit autocracy by members of the Supreme Privy Council and all the policies he pursued. Karamzin believed that Anna Ivanovna "wanted to govern in accordance with the thoughts of Peter the Great and was in a hurry to correct many of the omissions made since his time," but her "unhappy attachment" to Biron did not allow her to fulfill her task. In essence, the same point of view was reproduced in some of the works of legal historians that appeared in the second half of the 19th century, including A.D. Gradovsky.

The first who set himself the task of impartially illuminating the history of post-Petrine Russia was S.M. Soloviev, in 18 - 20 volumes of his History of Russia from Ancient Times, who gave a detailed sketch of the events of that time. Considering government policy during the reign of Catherine 1, Soloviev did not generally deny that the measures taken by the Supreme Privy Council were compelled, but his general conclusion was that “the reformer's program seemed too extensive, and“ the people left to Russia by Peter did not have his faith in the ability of the Russian people, in the opportunity for him to go through a difficult school; they got scared of this difficulty and stepped back. " The activities of the Supreme Council represent a reaction against both the financial administration and the tax system of Peter the Great.

The financial policy of the council, according to Vyazemsky, was dictated by concern about cutting government spending. The reorganization of local government carried out by the council, which was interpreted by all Vyazemsky's predecessors as a complete destruction of the Petrine system, was, as he believed, caused by the fact that Peter “did not dare to finally get rid of the pre-reform institutions, as a result of which the reorganization of local government turned out to be imperfect and the new order had to adapt to the old soil on which it was transferred ”Vyazemsky's desire to justify the actions of the council manifested itself in the interpretation of the judicial reform. He argued that in fact there was no real separation of powers under Peter, and the measures of the Supreme Privy Council were hardly more accessible and effective, since the voivode could immediately enforce his decisions.

Speaking about the historiography of the post-Petrine period, it is necessary to mention the article by N.A. Pavlova - Silvansky "Opinions of the leaders on the reforms of Peter the Great", published in 1910. He considered Menshikov to be the main opponents of Peter's reforms. The researcher categorically refuted Milyukov's judgment about the unity of the methods of Peter and the leaders, arguing that the questions remained, but the methods of their solution had changed, since, in contrast to Peter, the leaders always avoided the difficult and difficult; they often used in their events the method of accurate reproduction of pre-Petrine orders.

In 1949 E.S. Parhom defended his Ph.D. thesis on the commercial and industrial policy of the Supreme Privy Council, in which foreign influence on it was especially emphasized and, accordingly, many events were highly negatively assessed. The history of the development of the customs tariff in 1727 - 1731the study of F.I. Kozintseva, industrial policy was reflected in the monograph by N.I. Pavlenko on the history of metallurgy. Financial, including fiscal policy was analyzed in detail in the monograph by S.M. Troitsky.

According to Anisimov, under PeterIIThe council turned into a "collective regent," and Menshikov's resignation cleared "the way to power for the noble opposition," and in these conditions the council "became an instrument in its hands." The implemented administrative reform bore the features of centralization and concentration of management and pursued the goal of increasing the efficiency, mobility of management, adapting the activities of the state apparatus to the specifics of the internal situation and within the political problems of the post-Petrine period. He paid special attention to attempts to revise the tax reform. It was in her, in his opinion, that the leaders saw the causes of the deplorable financial condition of the country and the ruin of the peasantry.

In his work "Russia without Peter" the author also criticized the policy of the Supreme Privy Council.

Of the latest works on the problems of interest to us, I will mention Ya.A. Gordin "Between slavery and freedom." He believes that the Supreme Privy Council in the first year of its existence fulfilled the main tactical task - a frantic gallop, which was led by PeterI, was suspended, the position of the merchants and peasants was exposed. Reign of PeterIIproved the incapacity of the state system, half-built by PeterI... The defeat of the constitutional "trick" of the leaders led to the fact that from the very first months of the new reign began a backward movement towards the vulgarized Peter's attitudes.

A brief review of the historiography of post-Petrine Russia shows quite clearly that for a century and a half there was a constant struggle between two mutually exclusive tendencies. On the one hand, the desire to portray the entire post-Petrine era as "a dark page in Russian history, and, accordingly, to present domestic politics as an attempt at counter-reform." On the other hand, the desire to prove that the policy of the Supreme Privy Council was dictated by the specific conditions of the country ruined by the Peter the Great reform and therefore was quite reasonable and justified.

Source base: when performing the work, they relied on the study of various sources that allow to reveal various aspects of the emergence and functioning of the Supreme Privy Council. Sources on my topic can be divided into several groups.

Group 1 - legislative acts (February 8, 1726 - a decree establishing the Supreme Privy Council; "Opinion is not in a decree", February 25, 1730 - "Conditions", March 4, 1730 - a decree on the abolition of the Supreme Privy Council), allowing to consider the process the emergence of this higher body, to reveal the content of specific measures. They give an official fact of the need for certain events.

Group 2 - works of contemporaries. These include: "A Brief Story about the Death of Peter the Great" by F. Prokopovich "Manstein's Notes on Russia 1727 - 1744".

Group 3 - memoirs. Among them: Minich's notes.

Group 4 - diplomatic correspondence. Despatches from foreign ambassadors.

Structure. The work consists of an introduction, 2 chapters, a conclusion and a list of sources and literature.

Chapter 1 - Circumstances of the emergence of the Supreme Privy Council.

Chapter 2 - The Politics of the Supreme Privy Council.

Chapter I. The historical circumstances of the emergence of the Supreme Privy Council.

1.1. The struggle of court groups for power after the death of Peter I

On January 16, 1725, Peter lay down and never got up. The forces left the king. A few hours before his death, when he was already speechless, Peter's weakening hand atwithI sang to write only two words: "give everything." But to whom he bequeathed his business, to whom he transferred the Russian throne, remained unknown .

The affair of Tsarevich Alexei and the early death of Peter's sons by his second wife Catherine forced Peter to establish a new order of succession to the throne, according to which the sovereign could appoint a successor at his discretion. The new law ("Charter on the inheritance of the throne"), set forth and interpreted by Feofan Prokopovich in the "Truth of the will of the monarchs in determining the heirpower of his ”, was announced on February 5, 1722.

The law on succession to the throne presupposed the existence of a will and the transfer of the throne by the will of the monarch, but Peter did not have time to draw it up during his lifetime.

On January 28, 1725, Peter died. And from that moment on, the Russian throne becomes an object of struggle between different countries.atbanquets of the courtiers, in which the Russian guard plays a huge role. The time of palace coups begins.

What was that period of palace coups that marked the history of the Russian Empire from 1725 to 1762 and even later (the murder of Paul)?

In the works of V.I. Lenin, there are assessments of the evolution of autocracy in Russia. He emphasized that “the Russian autocracyXviicentury with the boyar duma and the boyar aristocracy does not look like autocracyXviiicenturies with its bureaucracy, service estates, with separate periods of "enlightened absolutism"Xviii century ". 1.

IN AND. Lenin defines Russian autocracyXviiicenturies as a bureaucratic-noble monarchy with bureaucracy and service estates. The creation of this monarchy, the formation of absolutism, the origins of which go back to the second halfXviiin., is a consequence of the transformations in the kingdom of PeterI... The period of "enlightened absolutism" in Russia falls at the time of CatherineII, although elements of "enlightened absolutism" are also characteristic of PeterI... Therefore, one cannot speak of the era of palace coups as something fundamentally different from the previous and subsequent stage in the history of the autocratic system in Russia. However, the new concepts and approaches gave rise to rethinking many assessments and conclusions that have already become postulates.

Of course, almost four decades separating Peter's deathIfrom the accession to the throne of "the successor of Peter". CatherineII, represent a special period in the history of the Russian Empire, a period filled with political events of great importance. DuringXviiiv. there was a further (in comparison with Peter's absolutism) evolution of autocracy: the times of the Supreme Privy Council are especially distinguished as an attempt to significantly belittle the autocracy in favor of the feudal oligarchy, the "trick of the supreme leaders" at the beginning of 1730, which pursued the goal of putting the feudal aristocracy in power and by means of "conditions" limit the monarch. .

Throughout this period, there was a struggle for power between individual groups of the "gentry", "supreme" and "gentry", nobles and ordinary nobility, between various groups of the court nobility. But since during the palace coups the noble nature of the autocracy did not change, "the coups were ridiculously easy, as long as it was a question of taking away power from one handful of nobles or feudal lords and giving it to another."

No sooner had the Russian emperor closed his eyelids than the question of who would inherit his throne became the subject of heated debate. For a long time already two groups of the ruling nobility were formed at the court. One consisted of nobles, although titled, but for the most part unborn, not of noble origin. They owe their titles and ranks, their wealth and influence, their place in society to Peter. Among these nobles (Alexander Danilovich Menshikov and Pyotr Andreyevich Tolstoy, Gavriil Ivanovich Golovkin and Fedor Matveyevich Apraksin, Pavel Ivanovich Yaguzhinsky and Ivan Ivanovich Buturlin.

The second group of nobility, represented by the Golitsyns, headed by Dmitry Mikhailovich, Dolgoruky, Nikita Ivanovich Repnin and others, consisted of nobles, whose fathers and grandfathers were the very boyar aristocracy that sat in the boyar duma during the reign of grandfather and father PeterI, Mikhail Fedorovich and "Quiet" Alexei Mikhailovich and ruled the Russian land according to the usual rule: "The Tsar indicated, and the boyars were sentenced," they were far from being like the Khovansky and Sokovnins, the same representatives of the boyar nobility of Moscow RussiaXviicenturies, like their fathers and grandfathers, cling to the Old Testament antiquity; they understood that it would not be possible to turn the wheel of history backwards, and there was no need to. Therefore, taught by Peter to live "with the style of the German", dressed in a new dress of European cut, with shaved beards and wigs, they not only were not alien to Peter's innovations, but they themselves carried them out .

If the nobles, who made up the first grouping of the court nobility, were clearly aware that they owe their titles of "Most Serene Prince" or "Count", "their immovable property", their careers to Peter, the Petrine order, which were based on the spirit of the "table of ranks", then the nobility, who was part of the second group, considered their right to rule Russia to be a hereditary right, bequeathed by the fathers along with the estates, based on the "breed" and the experience passed down from generation to generation "of the sovereign's service.

The first were a product of the reforms they were carrying out, the second (and without Peter's reforms, if everything remained in the same position as in the times of "Quiet", they would have ruled the Russian land. 1. If for the former the basis of their position in the ruling circles was the personality of the autocrat, the latter considered themselves entitled to occupy their posts and own their wealth by virtue of their origin alone. This feudal aristocracy looked with contempt at the likes of Menshikov, who made a career from the tsar's orderly to the Most Serene Prince, the St. Petersburg governor and the president of the military collegium.

The death of Peter caused a clash and struggle between these two groups of the ruling elite. A dispute erupted over the heir to Peter. In the chambers of the palace, where the creator of the law of succession to the throne was dying, an intense discussion of the spirit and letter of this law began. Comparing it with the decree on single inheritance, they talked about the possible inheritance of this throne by the daughters. In this case, Peter's eldest daughter Anna became the heir to the throne. But back in 1724, for herself, for her husband, and for her offspring, she renounced her claims to the Russian throne. Consequently, the throne was to pass to the second daughter of Peter Elizabeth. Peter's widow, Catherine, had the least rights to the throne, both according to old Russian customs and according to the decree on single succession, which could be considered an analogue of the decree on succession to the throne. But her candidacy was nominated and stubbornly defended by unborn nobles: Menshikov, Tolstoy, Apraksin, etc. their nobles.

Supporters of Catherine's accession to the throne, and first of all Peter Tolstoy, argued her rights, referring to the fact that by the coronation of Catherine in 1724, Peter, as it were, designated her as his successor ... But opponents of Catherine and her friends were no less active. Dmitry Mikhailovich Golitsyn and other noble nobles nominated the young son of Alexei Petrovich Peter to the throne. They hoped to turn the helpless boy into a puppet, to rule as they wanted, removing Menshikov, Tolstoy and other unborn nobles from control.

When the imminent death of Peter became apparentI, Catherine instructed Menshikov and Tolstoy to act in her, and, therefore, in their interests. For almost a year and a half, the St. Petersburg garrison, which had not received a salary, and other regiments finally received money, other monetary payments were promised, the troops returned from work to rest, etc.

In the hall of the palace, where the senators, generals and clergy from the synod have gathered, one by one the guards officers begin to penetrate. They listen attentively to Tolstoy, who proves Catherine's right to the throne, and when Pyotr Alekseevich's supporters speak, they hear threats against the "boyars" whom they threaten to "break their heads" if they even touch Catherine with a finger. After a while, the commander of the Semyonovsky regiment N.I. Buturlin led both guards regiments to the palace, lined up with a drumbeat under a gun. When Field Marshal N.I. Repin asked by whose order the regiments were brought, Buturin impressively replied that they came here by order of the Empress, to whom everyone must obey, "not excluding you." .

The demonstration of the guards did its job. At first, Repnin agreed to recognize Catherine as the legitimate ruler, after him, when they finally found out from the secretary of state, Makarov, that Peter did not leave any will, and other nobles.

1.2. Creation of the Supreme Privy Council.

Having ascended the throne, Catherine continued to shower the guards with "favors". Behind Catherine's back were the nobles, who at first actually ruled for her, and then legally consolidated power in the country.

There was no unity among the main nobles. Everyone wanted power, everyone strove for enrichment, glory, honor. Everyone was afraid of the "most luminous" ... They were afraid that this "omnipotent Goliath", as Menshikov was called, using his influence on the empress, would become the helm of the government, and other nobles, who were more knowledgeable and bred him, would be pushed into the background. Feared the "omnipotent Goliath" not only nobles, but also the nobility, gentry. The coffin of Peter was still standing in the Peter and Paul Cathedral, and already Yaguzhinsky turned to the ashes of the emperor, loudly so that they could hear, complaining about "insults" from Menshikov. The influential Golitsyns rallied, one of whom, Mikhail Mikhailovich, who commanded the troops stationed in Ukraine, seemed especially dangerous for Catherine and Menshikov. Menshikov openly criticized the Senate, and the senators refused to meet in response. In such an environment, the smart and energetic Pyotr Andreevich Tolstoy acted, having achieved the consent of Menshikov, Apraksin, Golovkin, Golitsyn and Catherine (whose role in this matter was practically reduced to zero) to establish the Supreme Privy Council. On February 8, 1726, Catherine signed a decree establishing it. The decree read that "for the good, we have judged and have commanded from now on at our court both for external and internal important state affairs to establish the Privy Council ...". Alexander Danilovich Menshikov, Fedor Matveyevich Apraksin, Gavrila Ivanovich Golovkin, Pyotr Andreyevich Tolstoy, Dmitry Mikhailovich Golitsyn and Andrey were introduced to the Supreme Privy Council by a decree of February 8

Ivanovich Osterman .

After some time, the members of the Supreme Privy Council submitted to Catherine "an opinion not in the decree on the newly established Privy Council," which established the rights and functions of this new supreme government body. "Opinion not in a decree" assumed that all the most important decisions are made only by the Supreme Privy Council, any imperial decree ends with an expressive phrase "given in the Privy Council", papers sent to the Empress's name are also supplied with an expressive inscription "for filing in the Privy Council", foreign policy, the army and navy are under the jurisdiction of the Supreme Privy Council, as are the collegia that lead them. The Senate, of course, is losing not only its former significance as the supreme body in the complex and cumbersome bureaucratic machine of the Russian Empire, but also the title of “governing”. "Opinion is not a decree" it became a decree for Catherine: she agreed with everything, only stipulating something. Created "at the side of the empress", the Supreme Privy Council only graciously reckoned with her. So, in fact, all power was concentrated in the hands of the "supreme leaders", and the ruling Senate, the stronghold of senatorial opposition to Menshikov and his entourage, having simply become "high," lost its significance for a long time, never ceasing to be the focus of opposition to the "supreme leaders" .

The composition of the Supreme Privy Council is noteworthy; it fully reflects the balance of power that has developed in government circles. Most of the members of the Supreme Privy Council, namely four out of six (Menshikov, Apraksin, Golovkin and Tolstoy, belonged to that unnatural nobility or adjoined it, like Golovkin, who came to the fore under Peter and thanks to him took leading positions in government , became rich, noble, influential. The aristocratic nobility was represented only by Dmitry Mikhailovich Golitsyn. And, finally, Henry Ioganovich Osterman, a German from Westphalia, who became Andrei Ivanovich in Russia, an intriguer, an unprincipled careerist, ready to serve anyone and in any way, stands alone, an energetic and active bureaucrat, an obedient executor of the tsar's orders under Peter and the ruler of the Russian Empire under Anna Ivanovna, a "crafty courtier" who successfully survived more than one palace coup. overseas "adventurers who looked at Russia as a feeding trough, although they were not invited to distant Muscovy by him, they were afraid and did not dare to act openly, his incompetent successors were on the Russian throne, and the "German attack" unfolded for the whole, penetrating all the pores of the Russian state. Thus, the composition of the Supreme Privy Council under CatherineIin February 1726 reflected the victory of Peter's pupils and their support in January 1725 (the guards. But they were not going to rule Russia at all like Peter. from who their fathers and grandfathers were in the Muscovite state), striving together, a small but powerful and influential group to rule the Russian Empire in their personal interests.

Of course, the inclusion of Dmitry Mikhailovich Golitsyn in the Supreme Privy Council did not at all mean his reconciliation with the idea that he, Gediminovich, has the same right and reason to rule the country as the tsar's orderly Menshikov, the "thin" Apraksin and others. The time will come, and the contradictions between the "leaders", i.e. the same contradictions between the noble and unborn nobility, which resulted in the events at the tomb of Peter, will be reflected in the activities of the Supreme Privy Council itself .

Even in a report dated October 30, 1725, the French envoy F. Campredon reported a "secret meeting with the queen", in connection with which he mentioned the names of A. D. Menshikov, P. I. Yaguzhinsky and Karl Friedrich. A week later, he reports on "two important meetings" held at Menshikov's. One of his reports also mentions the name of Count P.A.Tolstoy.

Practically at the same time, the Danish envoy G. Mardefeld reported in his reports about the persons who were members of the councils "gathered for internal and external affairs": these are A. D. Menshikov, G. I. Golovkin, P. A, Tolstoy and A. I. Osterman.

When analyzing this news, the following circumstances should be noted. First, we are talking about the most important and "secret" state affairs. Secondly, the circle of advisers is narrow, more or less constant and includes people holding key government posts and relatives of the tsar (Karl Friedrich is Anna Petrovna's husband). Next: meetings can take placeat EkaterinaIand with her participation. Nakonec, most of the persons named by Campridon and Mardefeld then became members of the Supreme Privy Council. Tolstoy had a plan to curb Menshikov's willfulness: he persuaded the empress to create a new institution - the Supreme Privy Council. The empress was to preside over its meetings, and its members were given equal votes. If not intellectually, then with a heightened sense of self-preservation, Catherine understood that the unbridled temper of the Most Serene Highness, his disdainful attitude towards other nobles sitting in the Senate, the desire to command everything and everyone, could cause strife and an explosion of discontent not only among the noble nobility, but also among those who elevated her to the throne. Intrigue and rivalry, of course, did not strengthen the empress's position. But on the other hand, Catherine's consent to the creation of the Supreme Privy Council was an indirect recognition of her inability to rule the country herself, like her husband.

Was the emergence of the Supreme Privy Council a break with Peter's principles of government? To resolve this issue, you need to turn to the last years of Peter and the practice of solving the most important issues by the Senate. The following is striking here. The Senate may not meet in full; the emperor himself is often present at meetings dealing with important issues. Particularly indicative is the meeting on August 12, 1724, which discussed the construction of the Ladoga Canal and the main items of state revenues. It was attended by: PeterI, Apraksin, Golovkin, Golitsyn. It is noteworthy that all of Peter's advisers are future members of the Supreme Privy Council. This suggests that PeterI, and then Catherine was inclined to think about reorganizing the top management by forming a body narrower than the Senate. Apparently, it is no coincidence that Lefort's report of May 1, 1725 reports on plans being developed at the Russian court “to establish a secret council,” including the Empress, Duke Karl Friedrich, Menshikov, Shafirov, Makarov.

On May 3, this message was repeated almost word for word in Campridon's report.

So, the origins of the emergence of the Supreme Privy Council should be sought not only in the "helplessness" of Ekatep ins I. The announcement of the meeting on August 12, 1724 casts doubt on the widespread thesis about the emergence of the Council as a kind of compromise with the "clan nobility" personified by Golitsyn.

The decree of February 8, 1726, which officially formalized the Supreme Privy Council under the Empress's person, is interesting precisely not for the traces of the struggle of individuals and groups (they can only be discerned there with very great difficulty): this state act is nothing more than a legislative establishment, in principle reduced to the legalization of the already existing advice.

Let us turn to the text of the decree: “We have seen before that secret real advisers, and in addition to the Senate government, have a lot of work in the following matters: 1) that they often have secret councils on political and other state affairs in their positions, like the first ministers, 2) some of them sit in the first collegiums, which is why in the first and very necessary business, in the secret council, and in the Senate in business they stop and continue from the fact that they, for a lot of work, can soon mend resolutions and named state affairs. We have judged that for the good and have commanded from now on at our court both for external and internal important state affairs to establish a Supreme Secret Council, in which we ourselves will be present ”.pSpbyu __________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

The decree of February 8, 1726 is difficult to suspect of some kind of "understatement" masking some kind of struggle between parties, groups, etc.: the fact is so clearly visible that the center of gravity of the legislative decree lies in a completely different plane, namely in the field of tasks of functioning the state machine.

Not so long ago, the opinion was clearly formulated that for a number of years, since the time of PeterI“The lack of responsiveness of the Senate began to be felt more strongly, and this could not but lead to the creation of a more flexible permanent body. It became the Supreme Privy Council, which arose on the basis of meetings of advisers, systematically gathered by CatherineI". The above thesis most adequately reflects the reasons for the changes in top management in 1726 and is confirmed in a specific material.

Already on March 16, 1726, the French envoy Campredon relied on estimates that came from the Council itself. In the so-called "Opinion is not a decree" we find, in particular, such a commentary on the decree of February 8, 1726: “but how is Her Imperial Majesty now ... there is, that with the help of God, it has become better than the previous one, unlike the example ... "I, Is a purely absolutist body. Indeed, there is no document regulating the activities of the Council. “Opinion is not a decree” rather formulates general principles of independence and absolute power, rather than somehow limits them. In charge of foreign and domestic policy, the Council is imperial, since the empress in it “rules the first presidency”, “this council is only the least for a special collegium or otherwise honored, it is only Her Majesty who serves to relieve Her burden in her heavy government”.

So, the first link: the Supreme Privy Council - the direct heir to the unspoken advice of PeterI in the 20s Xviiicentury, bodies with a more or less constant composition, information about which was clearly reflected in the diplomatic correspondence of that time.

The fall of the Supreme Privy Council in 1730 could be seen as proof that the emergence of organs like it is something like a ghost of the past that stood in the way of the newly born Russian absolutism. This is how many historians perceived this organ.Xviii – XIXcenturies, starting with V. N. Tatishchev and ending with N. P. Pavlov-Selvansky, and echoes of this understanding were manifested in Soviet historiography. Meanwhile, neither the events of 1730, nor their consequences for such a conclusion provide any grounds. It should be borne in mind that by the indicated time the Council had largely lost the quality of the tacit real government of the country: if in 1726 there were 125 meetings of the Council, and in 1727 - 165, then, for example, from October 1729 after the death of PeterIIin January 1730 the Council did not meet at all and business was largely neglected. In addition, the documents published in 1730, and the documents of the program, without exaggeration, value, cannot be reduced to the famous "Condition". The so-called "Oath Promise of the Members of the Supreme Privy Council" deserves no less attention. It is viewed as a document drawn up by members of the Council after familiarizing themselves with the position of the capital's nobility in relation to the supreme power. It says: "The integrity and well-being of every state consists of good advice ... The Supreme Privy Council is not for any of its own assembly of power, just for the best state crawl and government, to help their imperial majesties." Apparently, it is impossible to perceive this declaration, given the official nature of the document as a demegological device: its orientation is diametrically opposite to the provisions of "Konditsiy". Most likely this is evidence of a change in the initial position of the Supreme Privy Council, taking into account the wishes expressed in the noble projects, and the moods of the nobility itself. It is no coincidence that the programmatic requirement of the "Oath Promise": "To see that in such a first meeting of one surname more than two persons were not On the one hand, the traditions of "a monarchy with a boyar duma and a boyar aristocracy" were still in memory, and on the other, that the political thinking of the top of the ruling class in this period directly rejected them.

This adjustment of the position of the Supreme Privy Council was the reason that he did not experience any brutal repression in March 1730. The decree of March 4, 1730, which abolished the Council, was carried out in a very calm form. Moreover, a significant part of the members of the Council was introduced into the restored Senate and only then, under various pretexts, removed from public affairs. Members of the Supreme Secret Council A.I. Osterman and G.I. Golovkin on November 18, 1731 were introduced into the newly established Cabinet of Ministers. Such confidence on the part of the new empress in people who were, without a doubt, aware of the well-known "trick" with the limitation of the empress's powers, deserves to be noted. There is still a lot of unclear in the history of the events of 1730. Even A.D. Gradovsky drew attention to an interesting detail of the first steps of Anna Ioannovna's policy: while restoring the Senate, the Empress did not restore the post of Prosecutor General. As one of the options for explaining this phenomenon, the historian did not exclude the fact that "her advisers meant to place some new institution between the Senate and the supreme power ..."

Period 20-60s Xviiiv. - by no means a return or bythe torture of returning to the old days. This is the period of "young mansky maximalism ", which was experienced at that time by the strengthening Russian absolutism, interfering in everything and everyone and at the same time,apparently, having no real support in the Senate at this time in a central institutions that used to be a "harmonious system" are often only on paper.

In contrast to the entrenched among many bourgeoisopinion of researchers, which is not completely eliminated in the works of Soviet historians, namely the "supra-Senate" imperial owlsyou were the conductors of a new, absolutist line in management.

Let's turn to specific material. Here are just a few quite striking and typical examples. The emergence of the SupremePrivy Council elicited a rather characteristic reaction fromus of the Senate, which we can judge by personal order Catherine I: “Announce in the Senate. So that now, by decree, sentnym from the Supreme Privy Council was executed as definedbut, but about places do not shield. For they have not yet entered into business, but resignplaces are shielded " .

It was the Supreme Secret Council that formed a specialaal Commission on Tax, headed by D.M. Golitsyn, which had to solve one of the most painful issues - the state ofstate finance and. " at the same time - a disastrous statetaxable population of Russia ... But the Commission did not even succeed inbeat the "information barrier" - because of the negative attitude of the lower authorities. In its report to the Council on September 17October 1727 D.M. Golitsyn reported that the commission was the ambassadorus to the Senate and the Military Collegium a decree "and, moreover, the clauses according to which it is required to send the appropriatestey, and ony from the High Senate sent a statement about oneKiev province, and that is not at all points. And about the Smolensk Governoratenii announced that the statements were submitted to the Senate, and about other governorsnot sent in the statements. A yaz of the Military Collegium Bulletinsent, not to all the same points ... "and so on. The council was forced den by his protocol of September 20, 1727, to threaten thegiyam and clerks with a fine if the statements continuewill be delayed, but as far as can be expected, this had no effect. The council was able to return to workmission only on January 22, 1730, when her dono was again obeyedbut it was not possible to complete the work of the Commission.

Many similar incidents, apparently, and brought membersThe Supreme Council to the conclusions on the need to reducestaff of various instances. So, G.I. Golovkin categoricallystated: “The state will look seriously at it, since the netokmo people are superfluous, the devil of which you can’ stay, but the whole officenewly made, in which the need is not seen. "

Senate position on a number of Supreme Council inquirieswas more than evasive. So, on the corresponding request aboutthe fiscal officials received the following report: “And the number ofand where and whether all against the specified number have fiscal, orwhere they do not have, and for what, there is no news in the Senate "... Inog Yes, the Senate proposed too slow and archaicsolutions to pressing issues. These include the proposalSenate in the midst of peasant uprisings of the 20s. “Restore special orders for the investigation of robbers and murdererscases ". In contrast to this, the Soviet took up the peasant uprisingsniyami himself. When in 1728 in the Penza province up toa free large movement, the Council by special decree orderedmilitary units "ravage to the ground" "thieves and robberyno one's camps ", and about the course of the punitive expedition, the commanders appointed by MM Golitsyn had to report directly according to the Council.

Summing up, we note that the analysis of the activities of the highest state institutions of Russia in the 20-60s.Xviiiv. vividly illustrates their one-sidedness as necessary elements of the political system of absolute monarchy. They can be clearly tracedcontinuity not only in the general direction of policy, but alsotheir very competence, positions, principles of formation,For current work and other moments up to registration todocumentation, etc.

In my opinion, all this makes it possible to supplement to some extentgeneral idea that exists in Soviet historiographyregarding the political system of RussiaXviii v. Apparently, after blowing more clearly to understand all the depth and versatility, fromLenin's well-known characteristics of “the old serfsociety ", in which the coups were" ridiculously easy "while it was about how to transfer power from one group of feodalov or two. Sometimes this characteristic gets simplified.interpretation, and the emphasis continues to be placed only on the fact that all successiveXviiiv. governments carried outfasting politics.

The history of higher institutions of the 20-60s.Xviii v. visible by also shows that absolutism as a system in these years steadilystrengthened and acquired greater maturity in comparison with the previousmarching period. Meanwhile still very commonare arguments about the "insignificance" of Peter's successorsI v counterbalance to the significance and scale of political transformationsthe names of Peter himself. It seems that such a shift in the center of gravitywith a really important factor - the functioning of thekhooshki absolutist governments - on the personal qualities of that- or another monarch at this stage in the development of historiographyis simply archaism. It is especially important to be aware of this whenwriting textbooks and teaching aids, as well as publications, racesread to the wide readership.

Obviously, a certain adjustment of the establishedterms to better define key issues Russian history Xviiiin., as well as the most promising putay their solutions. The more facts about higher society accumulatestate bodies, the functioning of which really reflected the state of absolutism - a political superstructure at the stage of late feudalism , the clearer it becomes: invariably useThe term “the era of palace coups”, which has been used since the time of Klyuchevsky, does not at all reflect the main essence of the period of the 1920s-1960s.Xviiicenturies. Given the controversial nature of thein this article of provisions, it is hardly worth proposing a specificthe exact wording for the definition of this period: it waswould be premature in the current state of sample developmentlemes. However, even now we can say unequivocally: such a formulation and a specific term should reflect the main tendencies.socio-economic and political development of the countryus, and therefore, include the definition of what was giventime for the evolution of absolutism and the degree of its maturity.

Turning to the issue of further ways of developing the problem, we emphasize: until now, it remains relevant for a long timethe thesis of S.M. Troitsky on the need for a "monographto develop the history of the ruling class of feudal lords.At the same time, the well-known Soviet researcher believed that “the nextshould pay special attention to the study of specific contradictionschi within the ruling class of feudal lords and those forms thatrye took the struggle between separate strata of feudal lordsat one time or another " ... An appeal to the history of the supreme sovereignsRussian business institutionsXviiiv. allows to supplement and conto crete the general thesis of S.M.Troitsky. Apparently not lessthe problems of "social stratification" in the environment are also importantstate class, factors that influenced the formation of hellministerial elite with real influence on the domesticthe country's foreign and foreign policy. A special issue is undoubtedlynoteworthy is the issue of politicalthinking of this period, the study of socio-politicalviews of statesmen of the 20-60s, finding out thathow did the "programmatic" political attitudes of this time.

Chapter 2. Politics of the Supreme Privy Council.

2.1. Correction of Peter's reforms.

The Supreme Privy Council was created by a personal decree dated February 8, 1726, consisting of A.D. Menshikov, F.M. Apraksin, G.I. Golovkina, A.I. Osterman, P.A. Tolstoy and D.M. Golitsyn '. The fact that it included the presidents of the Military, Admiralty and Foreign Collegiums meant that they were removed from the subordination of the Senate and their leadership was directly accountable to the Empress. Thus, the top leadership of the country made it clear exactly which policy directions they understood as priorities, and ensured the adoption of

operational decisions, destroying the very possibility of paralysis of the executive power due to collisions, such as that which took place at the end of 1725. The minutes of the council meetings indicate that initially it discussed the issue of division into departments, i.e., the distribution of spheres competence between its members, however, this idea was not implemented. Meanwhile, in fact, such a division by virtue of the official duties of the supreme leaders, as presidents of the collegiums, took place. But the decision-making in the council was carried out collegially, and therefore the responsibility for them was also collective.

The very first decisions of the council indicate that their members were clearly aware that its creation meant a radical restructuring of the entire system of central government bodies, and sought to make its existence as legitimate as possible. It is no coincidence that their first meeting was devoted to the solution of questions about the functions, competence and powers of the council, about its relationship with other institutions. As a result, a well-known "opinion not in a decree" appeared, in which the position of the Senate subordinate to the council was determined, and the three most important collegia were actually equalized with it. since they were instructed to communicate with each other by promemoria ... Throughout February and the first half of March 1726, the supreme leaders (soon in this work they were joined by Duke Karl Friedrich, who was included in the council at the insistence of the empressHolstein) again and again returned to the regulation of the activities of the new body. The fruit of their efforts was the personal decree of March 7 "on the position of the Senate," March, another decree on the form of relations with the Senate).

Historical literature has actively discussed the question of whether the leaders initially had intentions of an oligarchic nature and whether the establishment of the Supreme Privy Council actually meant a limitation of the autocracy. In this case, Anisimov's point of view seems to me the most convincing. “According to its place in the system of power and competence,” he writes, “the Supreme Privy Council has become the highest government authority in the form of a narrow,controlled by the autocrat a body consisting of proxies. The circle of his affairs was not limited - he was the supreme legislative authority, the supreme judicial, and the supreme administrative authority. " But the council "did not replace the Senate," it "was primarily responsible for matters that did not fall under the existing legislative norms." “It was extremely important,” Anisimov notes, “that the Council discussed the most acute state problems in a narrow circle, without becoming the subject of the attention of the general public and thus not damaging the prestige of the autocratic power.” 1 .

As for the empress, later, in a decree of January 1, 1727, she quite clearly explained: with their advice and impartial announcements of the opinions of their We help and reliefperpetrated " . Anisimov quite convincingly shows that with a number of orders, which outlined a range of issues that were to be reported to her personally, bypassing the council, Catherine ensured her independence from him. This is also indicated by many other examples, such as, for example, the history of the inclusion of the Duke of Holstein in the council, the empress editing some of the council's decisions, etc. But how should the establishment of the Supreme Privy Council be interpreted (and its appearance was undoubtedly an important transformation in the field of government ) from the point of view of the history of reforms in RussiaXviii centuries?

As will be seen from the following review of the council's activities, its creation really contributed to an increase in the level of management efficiency and, in essence, meant the improvement of the system of government bodies created by PeterI... The close attention of the leaders from the first days of the council's existence to the regulation of its activities indicates that they acted strictly within the bureaucratic rules set by Peter and, albeit unconsciously, sought not to destroy, but to supplement its system. It is worth noting that the council was created as a collegial body, acting in accordance with the General Regulations. In other words, the very creation of the council, in my opinion, meant the continuation of Peter's reform. Let us now consider the specific activities of the Supreme Privy Council in the most important issues of domestic policy.

Already by the decree of February 17, the first measure was carried out aimed at streamlining the collection of provisions for the army: the general-food master was subordinate to the Military Collegium with the right to report to the Supreme Privy Council about the wrong actions of the collegium. On February 28, the Senate ordered the purchase of fodder and provisions from the population at the seller's price, without inflicting any harassment on him.

A month later, on March 18, on behalf of the Military Collegium, instructions were issued to officers and soldiers sent to collect the poll tax, which, apparently, according to the legislators, should have helped to reduce abuses in this most painful issue for the state. In May, the Senate implemented last year's proposal from its attorney general and sent Senator A.A. Matveev with an audit to the Moscow province. Meanwhile, the Supreme Privy Council was primarily concerned with financial issues. The leaders tried to solve it in two directions: on the one hand, by streamlining the system of accounting and control over the collection and spending of monetary sums, and on the other, by saving funds.

The first result of the work of the supreme leaders to streamline the financial sphere was the subordination of the State Office of the Chamber Collegium and the simultaneous abolition of the position of county rent masters, announced by the decree of July 15. The decree noted that with the introduction of the poll tax, the functions of rentmasters and chamberlains at the local level began to be duplicated, and ordered to leave only chamberlains. It was also considered expedient to concentrate the accounting of the income and expenditure of all financial resources in one place. On the same day, by another decree, the State Office was prohibited from independently issuing funds for any emergency expenses without the permission of the Empress or the Supreme Privy Council.

July 15 was a turning point in the fate of not only the State Office. On the same day, on the grounds that Moscow has its own magistrate, the office of the Chief Magistrate was abolished there, which was the first step in transforming the city administration, and this measure itself was one of, as the rulers believed, ways to save money 1 ... The first step was also taken on the road to judicial reform: a personal decree was issued on the appointment of a city governor to correct court and search cases. Moreover, the reasoning was that the district residents suffer great inconvenience from the need to travel to provincial cities on difficult matters. At the same time, court courts turn out to be overloaded with cases, which entails increased judicial red tape. However, it was allowed to complain about the governor to the same court courts.

It is clear, however, that the restoration of the post of district governors was related not only to legal proceedings, but in general to the local administration system. “And before,” the leaders believed, “before that, there were only governors in all cities and all sorts of things, both sovereigns and petitioners, they also sent one by decree sent from all orders and were without salary, and then the best from one rule happened, and people were happy " ... This was a principled position, a very definite attitude to the system of local government created by Peter. However, it is hardly fair to see her as nostalgic for the old. Neither Menshikov, nor Osterman, nor even more so the Duke of Holstein could experience such nostalgia simply because of their origin and life experience. Rather, behind this reasoning was a sober calculation, a real assessment of the current situation.

As further developments showed, the decrees of July 15 were just a prelude to making decisions that were much more drastic. The supreme leaders understood perfectly well that the liquidation of the Moscow office of the Chief Magistrate alone would not solve the problem of finances. They saw the main evil in an excessively large number of institutions of different levels and an overly bloated state. At the same time, as is clear from the above statement, they recalled that in pre-Petrine times a significant part of the administrative apparatus did not receive a salary at all, but was fed "from deeds." Back in April, Duke Karl Frederick submitted an "opinion" in which he argued that "the civilian state is not so burdened by anything as from a multitude of ministers, of whom, according to reasoning, a great part can be set aside." And further the Duke of Holstein remarked that “there are many ministers who, as before, here, in the empire, according to the former custom, from clerical incomes, without burdening the state, could live quite well”. The Duke was supported by Menshikov, who proposed to refuse to pay salaries to minor employees of the patrimony and the Justitz Collegium, as well as local institutions. His Serene Highness believed that such a measure would not only save state funds, but also "things can be done more justly and without continuing to be resolved; ... By the end of May, it was decided not to give salaries to the clerks, but they were satisfied with their business as usual with the petitioners, who will give what of their own free will. ... It should be borne in mind that under the order were meant small employees who did not have class ranks.

However, it is significant that in the issue of staff reductions, the leaders first of all paid attention to the collegia, i.e.

central rather than local institutions. Already in June 1726, they noted that from their bloated staff "there is a needless loss in salary, but there is no success in business." ... On July 13, the members of the council submitted a report to the empress, in which, in particular, they wrote: “In such a plural, there can be no better success in government, for they are all revered in hearing cases for one ear, and not only that there was a better way, but from a lot of disagreements in business, stopping and continuing, and in the salary, a vain loss occurs " .

Apparently, the ground for the report had been prepared in advance, for on July 16, on its basis, a personal decree appeared, almost literally repeating the arguments of the leaders: insanity is happening. " The decree ordered to leave in each collegium only one president, a vice-president, two advisers and two assessors, and even those were ordered to be present in the collegium not all at the same time, but only half of them, changing annually. Accordingly, the salary was supposed to be paid only to those who are currently in the service. Thus, in relation to officials, the measure previously proposed for the army was implemented.

In connection with this reform, A.N. Filippov wrote that "the Council was very close to the conditions of the then reality and was keenly interested in all aspects of management ... in this case, he noted ... what he had to constantly encounter in the activities of the collegiums." However, the historian considered the decision taken as a half measure, which "could not have a future." The supreme leaders, he believed, did not bother to study the causes of the vice they observed, and reduced the number of collegiate members, "not daring either to abandon collegiality directly or to defend the Petrine reform as a whole." Filippov is undoubtedly right that the excessive number of collegiate members was not an invention of the leaders and that it really had a negative effect on the efficiency of decision-making, but his assessment of the reform seems to be too harsh. Firstly, the fact that the leaders did not encroach on the principle of collegiality indicates, on the one hand, that they did not aim at the Peter's reform of central administration as such, and on the other hand, it is quite understandable that the rejection of this principle meant would be a much more radical change, which in the specific historical conditions of that time could have had unpredictable consequences. Secondly, I would like to note that the actual argumentation related to the ineffectiveness of the work of the collegiums both in the council's report and then in the decree was essentially just a cover, while the goal was purely financial in nature. And finally, we must not forget that, at the very least, the collegiums existed in Russia for more than a dozen years after that, on the whole, coping with their functions.

At the end of 1726, the rulers got rid of another superfluous, in their opinion, structure: by a decree of December 30, Waldmeister offices and the positions of Waldmeisters themselves were destroyed, and the supervision of the forests was entrusted to the governor. The decree noted that “among the people it is a great burden from waldmeisters and forest overseers,” and explained that waldmeisters live off fines levied from the population, which naturally entails significant abuses. It is clear that the decision was supposed to help ease social tension and, apparently, as the leaders believed, to increase the population's ability to pay. Meanwhile, it was a question of softening Peter's legislation on protected forests, in turn related to the maintenance and construction of the fleet.This was another acute problem, where the Peter's legacy directly collided with real life. The construction of the fleet required large financial investments and the involvement of significant human resources. Both that, and another in the conditions of post-Petrine Russia was extremely difficult. It has already been said above that in the first year after Peter's death, the construction of the fleet, in spite of everything, continued. In February 1726, a personal decree was issued on the continuation of the construction of ships in Bryansk ... However, later, already in 1728, the council, after long disputes, was forced to come to a decision not to build new ships, but only to keep the existing ones in good working order. This happened already under PeterII, which is often associated with the young emperor's lack of interest in maritime affairs. Accordingly, the leaders are accused of neglecting the beloved brainchild of Peter the Great. However, the documents indicate that this measure, like other similar ones, was forced and was dictated by the real economic conditions of the time, when, by the way, Russia was not waging any wars.

However, in 1726, as in the previous year, a number of legalizations were adopted aimed at maintaining Peter's

heritage. Of great importance, in particular, was the act of April 21, which confirmed the Peter's decree of 1722 on the order of succession to the throne and gave force to the law "Truth of the will of the monarchs." On May 31, a personal decree confirmed the obligatory wearing of German dress and shaving beards by retired people, and on August 4 - by “philistines” of St. Petersburg.

Meanwhile, the discussion in the Supreme Privy Council on how to reconcile the interests of the army and the people continued. The search for palliative solutions for a year and a half did not lead to any serious results: the treasury was practically not replenished, arrears grew, social tension, expressed primarily in peasant escapes, which threatened not only the welfare of the state, but also the welfare of the nobility, did not subside. It became clear to the supreme leaders that it was necessary to take more radical comprehensive measures. A reflection of these sentiments was a note by Menshikov, Makarov and Osterman, filed in November 1726. It was on its basis that a draft decree was prepared and submitted to the Supreme Privy Council on January 9, 1727, which, after discussion in the council, was implemented in February by several issued decrees ...

The decree of January 9 openly stated the critical state of state affairs. “According to the discussion about the current state of our empire,” it said, “it is shown that almost all those matters, both spiritual and secular, are in poor order and require immediate correction ... not only the peasantry, on which the upkeep of the army is supposed,” in great poverty it is acquired from great taxes and incessant executions and other disorder into extreme and all-end ruin, but other matters, such as: commerce, justice and mints, are found in a very ruined state. " Meanwhile, "the army is so necessary that the state cannot stand without it ... for that sake, the peasants should be cared for, because the soldier is tied to the peasant like a soul is to a body, and when the peasant is not there, then there will be no soldier either." The decree ordered the leaders "to have diligent reasoning about both the land army and the navy, so that they would be supported without the great burden of the people," for which it was proposed to create special commissions on taxes and the army. It was also proposed to postpone its payment for 1727 until September, before the final decision on the size of the podina was made, to pay part of the tax in kind, to transfer the collection of taxes and recruits to the civil authorities, to transfer the regiments

from the countryside to the cities, part of the officers and soldiers from the nobility should be released on long-term vacations in order to save money, to reduce the number of institutions, to streamline the conduct of business in the Patrimony Collegium, to establish the Household Chancellery and the Revision Collegium, to consider the issue of correcting the monetary affairs, to increase the amount of fees for sale of villages, liquidate the Manufacturing Collegium, and the manufacturers gather once a year in Moscow to discuss minor issues, while the more important ones are to be decided in the Kommerz Collegium .

As you can see, the leaders (on the basis of their own opinion) were offered a whole program of anti-crisis actions, which soon began to be implemented. Already on February 9, a decree was issued on the postponement of payment for the May third of 1727 and the return of the officers sent to collect the poll tax to the regiments. At the same time, it was reported about the establishment of a commission on the army and navy, "so that these were kept without the great burden of the people."... On February 24, Yaguzhinsky's long-standing proposal was implemented, repeated in a note by Menshikov, Makarov and Osterman, “two units of officers, and non-commissioned officers, and privates, who are from the gentry, to their homes, so that they can inspect their villages and bring them in proper order.” At the same time, it was stipulated that this rule does not apply to officers from the homeless nobility.

On the same day, February 24, a comprehensive decree appeared, containing a number of important measures and almost literally repeating the decree of January 9: worked in establishing good order in all matters, both spiritual and secular, and in composing decent regulations in the hope that already a very proper order with the benefit of the people will follow in all that; but from a discussion of the current state of Our Empire, it is shown that not exactly the peasants on whom the upkeep of the army is supposed to be found in great scarcity and from great taxes and incessant executions and other disturbances they come to extreme ruin, but other matters, such as commerce, justice and the mints are in a very weak state and all that needs to be corrected as soon as possible. " The decree ordered that the poll tax be collected not directly from the peasants, but from the landlords, elders and stewards, thus establishing the same procedure for the serf village, which was previously

installed for palace villages. Responsibility for the collection of the poll tax and its implementation was to be assigned to the voivode, who were given one headquarters officer to help. And so that disagreements did not arise between them due to seniority in ranks, it was decided to give the governors the rank of colonel during the execution of their office.

The decree of February 24 again repeated the norm on sending part of the military on leave, and also ordered the transfer of regiments to cities. Moreover, the arguments that were heard even during the discussion of this issue in 1725 were repeated almost word for word: in urban conditions, it is easier for officers to observe their subordinates, keep them from escaping and other crimes, and can be collected much faster if necessary; when the regiment sets out on a campaign, it will be possible to concentrate the remaining patients and property in one place, which will not require unnecessary costs for numerous guards; the deployment of regiments in cities will lead to a revival of trade, and the state will be able to receive a duty on goods brought here, but “most of all, it will be a great relief for the peasantry, and there will be no burdens for citizenship .

By the same decree, a number of measures were taken to reorganize the bodies of both central and local government. “The multiplication of rulers and offices throughout the state,” the leaders noted, “not only serves to a great burden of the state, but also to a great burden of the people, now instead of the fact that before this one ruler had an addressee in all matters, now by ten and, maybe more. And all those different rulers have their own special offices and clerical servants and their own special court, and each of them drags the poor people on their own business. And all those stewards and clerical clerks want their food, keeping silent about other disturbances that occur every day from shameless people to the increasing burden of the people. " The decree of February 24 subordinated the city magistrates to the governors and destroyed the offices and offices of the zemstvo commissars, which had become unnecessary when imposing duties on collecting taxes on the governor. At the same time, a judicial reform was carried out: the court courts, whose functions were transferred to the governors, were liquidated. The leaders realized that the reform entailed strengthening the role of the Justic Collegium, and took measures to strengthen it. Under the Supreme Privy Council itself, the Household Chancellery was established, which structurally and organizationally had a collegiate structure. By the same decree, the Revision Board was created, and the Votchina Board was also transferred to Moscow, which was supposed to make it more accessible to the landowners. About the Manufactory Collegium, the decree said that “it cannot make any important resolution without the Senate and our Cabinet, for that, and for the sake of it, it is in vain to receive a salary”. The collegium was liquidated, and its affairs were transferred to the Commerce Collegium. However, a month later, on March 28, it was recognized that it was "indecent" for the affairs of the Collegium to be in the Commerce Collegium, and therefore the Manufactory Office was established under the Senate. The decree of February 24 also contained measures to streamline the collection of fees for issuing documents from various institutions.

The reorganization of the management was continued in the next month: on March 7, the Reketmeister's office was liquidated, and its functions were entrusted to the Chief Prosecutor of the Senate, "so that there would be no needless salary." The March 20 personal decree again criticized the "multiplication of states" and the associated increase in salary costs. The decree commanded to restore the pre-Petrine salary system - "as it was before 1700": pay only to those who were paid then, and "where they were content with work", also be satisfied with this. Where before in the cities the governor did not have clerks, there and now no secretaries can be appointed. It was this decree (then repeated on July 22 of the same year) that was a kind of apotheosis of criticism by the leaders of Peter's reforms. It is significant that he differed from others in the sharpness of tone and the absence of the usual detailed argumentation. The decree, as it were, betrayed the tiredness and irritation that had accumulated among the leaders, a feeling of their powerlessness to change anything in a cardinal way.

In parallel with the work on reorganizing management and taxation, the leaders paid a lot of attention to the issues of trade, rightly believing that its activation could quickly bring income to the state. Back in the fall of 1726, the Russian ambassador to Holland B.I. Kurakin proposed to open the Arkhangelsk port for trade and the empress ordered the Supreme Privy Council to inquire about this and report on her opinion. In December, the council heard a Senate report on free trade and decided to create a Commission on Commerce, led by Osterman, which began by calling on merchants to submit proposals to "fix commerce." The issue of Arkhangelsk was resolved early next year, when the port was opened by a decree of January 9 and ordered to "let everyone trade unsecured." Later, the Commerce Commission transferred to free trade a number of goods that had previously been farmed out, abolished a number of restrictive duties and helped create favorable conditions for foreign merchants. But its most important business was the revision of the Peter's protectionist tariff of 1724, which, as Anisimov put it, was speculative, divorced from Russian reality and did more harm than good.

In accordance with the February decree and the opinion of the leaders, expressed by them in numerous notes, the government decided to take urgent measures in the sphere of monetary circulation. The nature of the measures outlined was similar to those taken under Peter: minting a lightweight copper coin for 2 million rubles. As noted by AI Yukht, the government "was aware that this measure would adversely affect the overall economic situation in the country," but "it saw no other way out of the financial crisis." Sent to Moscow to organize what A.Ya. Volkov discovered that the mints looked "like after an enemy or firefighting devastation"3 million rubles of lightweight five-kopecks.

The Council's consideration of the poll tax and the upkeep of the army did not proceed smoothly. So, back in November 1726 P.A. Tolstoy proposed, instead of revising the arrears, on which Menshikov, true to the interests of his department, insisted, to revise the funds in the Military, Admiralty and Kamercollegiums. Tolstoy was surprised that in peacetime, when many officers are on leave, the army lacks men, horses and funds, and, apparently, rightly suspected possible abuse. Back in June of the same year, a decree was issued, according to which the army regiments were ordered to submit to the Revision Collegium receipt and expense books and account statements in good condition, which was again strictly confirmed at the end of December. The military board proposed to collect taxes in kind from the population, but on the initiative of Tolstoy, it was decided to give the payers the opportunity to choose the form of payment themselves.

It is significant that for all the difficulties and insoluble problems that the Supreme Privy Council faced, its activities were highly appreciated by foreign observers. Now the finances of this state are no longer undermined by unnecessary construction of harbors and houses, poorly mastered manufactories and factories, too extensive and inconvenient undertakings or feasts and pomp, and now they, Russians, are not forced by force to such luxury and festivities, to the construction of houses and resettlement. here their serfs, - wrote the Prussian envoy A. Mardefeld. - In the Supreme Privy Council, deeds are carried out and dispatched quickly and according to mature discussion, instead of, as before, while the late sovereign was busy building his ships and pursuing his other inclinations, they lay dormant for a whole six months, not to mention countless other commendable changes " .

In May 1727, the active work of the Supreme Privy Council was interrupted by the death of CatherineIand accession to the throne of PeterII... The disgrace of Menshikov that followed in September, according to many researchers, changed her character and led to the triumph of the counter-reform spirit, a symbol of which was, first of all, the move of the court, the Senate and the colleges to Moscow. To verify these claims, let us again turn to legislation.

Already on June 19, 1727, the order to transfer the patrimonial college to Moscow was confirmed, and in August the Chief Magistrate was liquidated, which became unnecessary after the liquidation of the city magistrates. At the same time, a burgomaster and two burgomasters were appointed to the St. Petersburg City Hall for the court of the merchants. A year later, instead of city magistrates, town halls were ordered to be in the cities. At the beginning of autumn, the council considered the issue of the advisability of retaining trade consulates in foreign countries, in particular, in France and Spain. The Senate, in turn, relying on the opinion of the Commerce Collegium, believed that "there is no benefit to the state in this, and it is hopeless to keep them for profit in the future, because many of the government and merchant goods sent there have been sold with overhead." As a result, it was decided to liquidate the consulates. It is unlikely that Anisimov was right, who saw here another evidence of rejection by the leaders of the policy of Peter, who cared about the penetration of Russian goods into remote corners of the planet, including America, even if it was unprofitable. About three years have passed since the death of the great reformer - a period long enough to be convinced of the hopelessness of this venture. The measure adopted by the rulers was of a purely pragmatic nature. They looked at things soberly and considered it necessary to encourage Russian trade where there were opportunities and prospects for development, for which they took quite serious measures. So, in May 1728, a decree was issued on the establishment of special capital in Holland for external expenditures, in order to thus support the exchange rate and increase the volume of Russian exports abroad).

By the fall of 1727, it became clear that the removal of the army from collecting the poll tax jeopardized the receipt of any money by the treasury at all, and in September 1727 the military were again sent to the counties, although they were now subordinate to governors and governors; in January 1728 this measure was confirmed by a new decree. In the same January, a stone building was allowed in Moscow, and in April it was clarified that it requires obtaining some kind of special police permission. On February 3 the next, 1729, stone building was allowed in other cities. On February 24, on the occasion of the coronation celebrations, the emperor announced a petition for fines and lightening of punishments, as well as forgiveness of the poll tax for the May third of this year. As before, close attention was paid to the control of income and expenditures: the decree of April 11, 1728 required the immediate submission of invoices to the Revision Board by the collegiums, and on December 9, it was announced that the salaries of the officials guilty of such delays were withheld. On May 1, the Senate recalled the need to regularly send statements to the Academy of Sciences from central government institutions for their publication. In July, the Household Office was removed from the jurisdiction of the Supreme Privy Council and reassigned to the Senate with the proviso that it is still obliged to submit monthly information about its activities to the Council. However, relinquishing some responsibilities, the council accepted others: ‘In April 1729, the Preobrazhenskaya chancellery was abolished and cases“ on the first two points ”were ordered to be considered in the Supreme Privy Council.

The Order to governors and voivods, issued on September 12, 1728, was of great importance for streamlining management, which regulated their activities in some detail. Some researchers drew attention to the fact that the Order reproduced certain procedures of pre-Petrine time, in particular, the surrender of the

kind "on the list". However, the document itself was written in the tradition of Peter's regulations and contained a direct reference to the General Regulations of 1720. There were many such references to the authority of the grandfather in other legislative acts of Peter's time.II.

In the legislation of this period, one can also find regulations that directly continue the policy of Peter the Great. So, on January 8, 1728, a decree was issued confirming that the main trade port of the country is still St. Petersburg, and on February 7, a decree appeared on the completion of the construction of the Peter and Paul Fortress there. In June, the petty bourgeois Protopopov was sent to the Kursk province "to find ores", and in August the Senate distributed geodesists to the provinces, entrusting them with drawing up land maps. On June 14, it was ordered from each province to send five officers and nobles to participate in the work of the Legislative Commission, but since the prospect of legislative activity apparently did not arouse enthusiasm, in November this order had to be repeated under the threat of confiscation of estates. However, six months later, in June 1729, the assembled nobles were dismissed to their homes and instead they were ordered to recruit new ones. In January 1729, a decree was issued prescribing the continuation of the construction of the Ladoga Canal to Shlisselburg, and a year later they remembered the penalty canceled by Catherine for failure to attend confession and communion and decided to replenish the state treasury in this way.

The statement about complete oblivion during the reign of Peter, which is often encountered in literature, is not entirely true.IIarmy and navy. So, on June 3, 1728, on the recommendation of the Military Collegium, the Corps of Engineers and the mine company were established, their staffs were approved. In December 1729, the Chancellery of the Life Guards of the Semyonovsky and Preobrazhensky regiments was created, and the decree on the annual dismissal of one third of the officers and privates from the nobility was confirmed. Measures were taken to strengthen the cities and forts of the Ufa and Solikamsk provinces for "a precaution against the Bashkirs."

changes in the system of management and legal proceedings, financial and tax spheres, trade. It is equally obvious that the council did not have any definite political program, a plan of transformations, and even more so one that would have any ideological basis. All the activities of the leaders were a reaction to specific social, political and economic circumstances in the country as a result of the radical reforms of Peter the Great. But this does not mean that the decisions of the new rulers of the country were made in the heat of the moment and were haphazard. Even though the situation was really critical, all the measures implemented by the supreme rulers went through a long stage of comprehensive discussion and the first serious steps were taken almost a year and a half after the death of Peter and six months after the establishment of the Supreme Privy Council. Moreover, in accordance with the bureaucratic procedure already established at the previous stage, almost every decision made by the council passed the stage of expert evaluation in the relevant department. It should also be taken into account that the people who came to power were not random people. They were experienced, well-informed administrators who had gone through Peter's school. But unlike their teacher, who for all his rigid rationalism was still partly a romantic, who had certain ideals and dreamed of achieving them at least in the distant future, the leaders showed themselves to be outspoken pragmatists. However, as the events of 1730 showed, at least some of them were not devoid of the ability to think big and look far ahead.

Several questions arise, however. Firstly, what was the real situation in the country and did not the leaders, as Anisimov thinks, try to exaggerate? Second, were the transformations carried out by the leaders really counter-reformatory and, thus, aimed at destroying what Peter had created? And if so, does this mean a reversal of the modernization process?

As for the situation in the country, for its characteristics it is worth referring to the monograph by P.N. Milyukov "State economy of Russia in the first quarterXviiicenturies and the reform of Peter the Great ”. Even though many of his data were subsequently challenged by later researchers, on the whole, the picture of the economic crisis he painted, I think, is correct. Meanwhile, as detailed and numerical as

in Milyukov's book, the picture was not known to the leaders, who based their judgments mainly on reports from the localities and information about the number of arrears. Therefore, for example, it is advisable to refer to such a document as the reports of A.A. Matveev on his revision of the Moscow province, where, as one might assume, the situation was not the worst. “In Aleksandrova Sloboda,” wrote Matveyev, “all the villages and villages the peasants are taxed by the palace through their measure, much imprudently from the main rulers of the settlement of that settlement; already a multitude of fugitives and emptiness have appeared; and in the suburb not only in the villages and villages not peasant, but beggarly straight have their own yards; besides, and not without attacking burdens to their own, and not to the palace profit. " From Pereslavl-Zalessky, the senator reported: “Incomprehensible thefts and abductions of not only state, but also capitation fees from the chamberlain, the commissars and from the local clerks, under which, according to the decrees of decent receipts and expenditures, they did not have here at all, except for those lying about their rotten and dishonorable scraps of notes; on their search for more than 4,000, the stolen money has already been found from me ”. In Suzdal, Matveyev executed a copyist of the chamberlain's office for stealing more than 1,000 rubles and, having punished many other officials, reported to St. Petersburg: the lower towns are escaping numerous from their endless poverty, there is nothing to pay for the capitation. The peasants of the synodal team file petitions for offenses and excessive fees in excess of the per capita rate set for them. salary ". “Facilitation in the payment of capitation money, the withdrawal of military commands, - wrote, commenting on these documents, S.M. Soloviev - that is all that the government could do for the peasants at the time described. But it could not eradicate the main evil - the desire of every higher one to feed at the expense of the lower and at the expense of the treasury; for this it was necessary to improve the society, and it was necessary to wait for that " 1 ^.

In the activities of the governments of CatherineI and Petra II, the main goal of which, as already mentioned, was the search for funds to maintain the viability of the state, the following interrelated areas can be distinguished: 1) improving taxation, 2) transforming the administrative system,3) measures in the field of trade and industry. Let's consider each of them separately.

As is clear from the materials of the discussion of issues related to the poll tax in the Senate and the Supreme Privy Council, the members of the first post-Petrine governments saw the main flaw in Peter's tax reform not in the principle of the poll taxation itself, but in the imperfect mechanism of tax collection, first of all, not giving the ability to quickly take into account changes in the composition of payers, which led to the impoverishment of the population and an increase in arrears, and secondly, in the use of military commands, which provoked a protest from the population and lowered the combat capability of the army. Criticism was also caused by the deployment of regiments in the countryside, with the imposition of the obligation on local residents to build regimental courtyards, which also made their duties unbearable. The constant growth of arrears raised serious doubts about the ability of the population to pay taxes in the amount established by Peter in principle, although this point of view was not shared by all the leaders. So, Menshikov, as N.I. Pavlenko, believed that the size of the tax was not burdensome and “this idea was firmly entrenched in the prince’s head six years ago, when the government of PeterIdiscussed the amount of the tax. " Menshikov "remained faithful to the conviction that it is enough to reduce the number of clerks and messengers of all kinds,., To liquidate the regimental courts in the districts that collected the poll tax, and to place soldiers in the barracks of the cities, as prosperity will come among the villagers." Since it was Menshikov who was the most authoritative of the council members, his opinion ultimately prevailed.

At the same time, it is worth noting that since the first experience of collecting the poll tax was carried out only in 1724 and its results could not be known to the main inspirer of the tax reform, the leaders had every reason to judge it by the first results. And as people who took responsibility for governing the country, they, moreover, were obliged to take decisive measures to remedy the situation. Anisimov believes that in reality the ruin of the country was not caused by the excessive size of the per capita tax, but was a consequence of the overextension of economic forces during the many years of the Northern War, an increase in the number and size of indirect taxes and duties. In this he is undoubtedly right. However, the introduction of a poll tax, at first glance, of a very moderate size, in such conditions could turn out to be that drop, after which the development of the situation crossed a critical line, and the measures that the rulers began to take were really the only ones.

but possible to save the day. Moreover, I will note that they did not go to a radical reduction in the size of the poll tax, rightly believing that it would endanger the existence of the army. In general, the measures of the supreme leaders should be recognized as quite reasonable: the withdrawal of military units from the countryside, the release of residents from the obligation to build regimental courtyards, a decrease in the size of the capitation tax, forgiveness of arrears, variation in the collection of taxes in money and food with the introduction of virtually free prices on them, shifting the collection of taxes from peasants to landlords and stewards, the concentration of the collection in the same hands - all this was supposed to help reduce social tension and gave hope for replenishing the treasury. And the Commission on Taxes, which, by the way, was headed by D.M. Golitsyn, that is, a representative of the old aristocracy, which, according to some authors, was in opposition to Peter's reforms, having worked for several years, was unable to offer anything to replace the poll tax. Thus, no matter how one evaluates the criticism by the leaders of the tax reform, their real actions were aimed only at its improvement, adjustment, adaptation to real living conditions.

The transformations were much more radical in nature.

carried out by the supreme leaders in the country's governing system, and some of them can really be considered as counter-reformist in relation to Peter's institutions. First of all, this refers to the liquidation of court courts, the creation of which was, as it were, the first step towards the implementation of the principle of separation of powers. However, this kind of theoretical reasoning was certainly alien and unfamiliar to the rulers. For them, the court court was just one of the many institutions that appeared on the ground in the course of Peter's reforms. In addition, in the absence of a professional legal education in the country, and, consequently, of professional lawyers, despite the fact that the law itself has not yet emerged as a sphere of independent social activity, the existence of court courts could in no way ensure a real separation of powers. Looking ahead, I will note that later, when the judicial institutions were made independent in the course of the provincial reform of 1775, a true separation of powers still did not work, because the country and society were simply not ready for it.

As for the organization of local government, when assessing the activities of the leaders, one must remember that the system of institutions that existed at the local level was created by Peter for a long time, and if its core was created in parallel with the collegiate reform, then at the same time many different institutions remained. arising earlier, often spontaneously and haphazardly! The completion of the tax reform and the beginning of the functioning of the new taxation system is inevitable, even if the economic situation in the country were more favorable, it should have led to changes in the structure of local authorities, and these changes, of course, should have been aimed at simplifying the system as a whole and increasing its efficiency. This is exactly what was done in 1726-1729. Moreover, it is noteworthy that the meaning of the measures taken was reduced to further centralization of management, to the creation of a clear vertical of executive power and, therefore, did not in any way contradict the spirit of Peter's reform.

One cannot fail to recognize as reasonable the desire of the leaders to reduce the cost of the apparatus by reducing it. It is another matter that the provincial administration created or, rather, recreated locally, was more archaic in form compared to the Petrine institutions, but it functioned differently now than in pre-Petrine Russia, if only because the governor obeyed not the order in Moscow, but the governor , which, in turn, was accountable to the central authorities, the organization of which was fundamentally different. One should not neglect the arguments of the leaders that it was easier for the population to deal with one boss than with many. Of course, new governors, like their predecessorsXviiV., did not disdain to fill their pockets, but to correct this evil, indeed, as Soloviev wrote, it was necessary first of all to correct morals, which was beyond the power of the rulers.

As for the central institutions, as we have seen, all the efforts of the leaders were aimed at making them cheaper, on the one hand, and increasing their efficiency by eliminating duplication of functions, on the other. And even if we agree with those historians who see their rejection of the very principle of collegiality in the arguments of the leaders, they did not take any real action to destroy it. Supreme leaders

destroyed a number of previously existing institutions and created others, moreover, new institutions were created on the same principles of collegiality, and their functioning was based on Peter's General Regulations and the Table of Ranks. The collegial body, as already mentioned, was the Supreme Privy Council itself. The reduction in the number of collegiate members does not contradict everything that has been said, which has not fundamentally changed the procedure for making decisions in institutions. The decision of the leaders to refuse to pay part of the officials' salaries and to transfer them to feeding "from business" looks somewhat different. Here one can indeed see a significant departure from the Peter's principles of organizing the administrative apparatus, which laid the foundations of the Russian bureaucracy. Of course, those who accuse the leaders of not understanding the essence of Peter's reform are right, but they acted not from any ideological guidelines, but obeying the circumstances. In order to justify them, however, it must be said that in reality officials both at that time and later received their salaries extremely irregularly, with great delays and not always in full; the distribution of salaries in food was practiced. So to a certain extent, the rulers gave the force of law to what existeddefacto... The vast state needed a ramified and well-functioning administrative apparatus, but did not have the resources to maintain it.

The very fact that the leaders not only liquidated some of Peter's institutions, but also created new ones by them, testifies, in my opinion, to the fact that these actions of theirs were quite meaningful. Moreover, their reaction to the changing situation was quite fast. So, according to the decree of February 24, 1727, all duties related to the collection of taxes in cities were assigned to city magistrates with the personal responsibility of their members for arrears. As a result, there were new abuses and a stream of complaints from the townspeople. , which became one of the factors that predetermined their elimination. In essence, this was a resolution of the contradiction between the form of Peter's city institutions, which goes back to foreign models, and the de facto enslavement state of the population of Russian cities,

in which even insignificant elements of self-government were incapacitated.

In my opinion, the commercial and industrial policy of the Supreme Privy Council can be characterized as quite reasonable and justified. Vrekhovniki proceeded on the whole from the economically correct idea that it is trade, most likely, that can bring the funds that the state needs so much. The protectionist tariff of 1724 caused significant damage to trade and caused many protests from both Russian and foreign merchants. The consequences of the closure of the Arkhangelsk port even earlier were also negative, which led to the destruction of the trade infrastructure that had developed over the centuries and the ruin of many merchants. Therefore, the measures taken by the rulers were reasonable and timely. It is significant that in these matters they were in no hurry, and the Commission on Commerce created by them completed work on the new tariff only by 1731. It was based, on the one hand, on the Dutch tariff (which once again proves that the churchmen were true "Chicks of Petrov's nest"), and on the other - the opinions of merchants and trade authorities. A positive role was played by the new bill of exchange charter, the abolition of a number of trade monopolies, permission to export goods from Narva and Revel ports, the elimination of restrictions associated with the construction of merchant ships, the introduction of deferrals for arrears in customs duties. Experiencing an acute shortage of funds, the leaders, however, considered it possible to provide targeted support to individual industrial enterprises by providing tax incentives and government subsidies. In general, their commercial and industrial policies were relatively more liberal and in line with modernization processes.

So, in the first five years after the death of Peter the Great, the process of transformations in the country did not stop and was not reversed, although its pace, of course, slowed down sharply. The content of the new transformations was associated primarily with the adjustment of those Peter's reforms that could not withstand the collision with real life. However, in general, the policy of the new rulers of the country was distinguished by continuity. Everything that is fundamental in Peter's reforms - the social structure of society, the principles of organizing public service and power, regular army and navy, the tax system, the administrative-territorial division of the country, the established property relations, the secular nature of power and society, the country's focus on an active foreign policy - remained unchanged ... Apparently, it is legitimate to draw one more conclusion: the first years of the history of post-Petrine Russia proved that Peter's reforms were fundamentally irreversible, and irreversible precisely because they generally corresponded to the natural direction of the country's development.

2.3. An attempt to limit the autocracy

The idea of ​​creating a council was first formulated in an approximate form during Peter's lifetime by Heinrich Fick. He was a like-minded person of Prince D.M. Golitsyn. There is evidence that the formal project for the establishment of the Supreme Privy Council was drawn up by two major diplomats: the former Petrine vice-chancellor Shafirov and the Holsteiner Bassevich. Each of them pursued his own interest - Shafirov hoped to become a member of the council as the chancellor - foreign minister - and regain the lost influence, and Bassevich hoped that his sovereign - as a member of the Russian august family - would head the Council.

They both miscalculated. The idea was intercepted by Menshikov, against whom it was originally directed.

Catherine was satisfied with the emergence of this strong and competent body, since it had to coordinate the interests of the majority of people and groups and stabilize the situation at the top.

The powers that the Council received amazed both Russian and foreign diplomats. They saw in what was happening a decisive step towards changing the form of government - towards limiting the autocracy. For the third clause of the decree - after two formal ones - read: "No decrees should be issued before, until they have completely taken place in the Privy Council, the protocols are not fixed and Her Majesty will not be read for the most merciful approbation."

One cannot agree with this characteristic only on one thing: by opposition Miliukov understands an aristocratic grouping, without differentiating it in any way. Meanwhile, the creation of the Supreme Privy Council was not just an objective victory of the forces opposing Menshikov and Tolstoy at that moment (although it was they who most of all sought the creation of the Council), but forces of a quite definite kind. The impetus for the emergence of the Council, for the activation of all groups and persons was the rumor about the possible campaign of Prince M.M. Golitsyn against St. Petersburg at the head of the army stationed in Ukraine. The rumor was false, but very symptomatic. Everyone knew that the famous general, alien to political intrigues, could take such a step only at the request of his older brother, Prince Dmitry Mikhailovich. Prince Dmitry Mikhailovich was already at this time discussing with the aforementioned Heinrich Fick the projects of the constitutional structure of Russia. And an important part of the rumors about the conspiracy was the intention of the hypothetical conspirators, having elevated the young Peter II to the throne, to limit the autocratic power.

As Klyuchevsky wrote about Golitsyn with absolute accuracy, “proceeding from the idea, subjectively or genealogically, that only a noble nobility is able to maintain lawful order in the country, he settled on the Swedish aristocracy and the Supreme Privy Council decided to make the main point of his plan.” But for all the undoubted orientation of Prince Dmitry Mikhailovich towards the noble nobility as a guarantor and executor of constitutional reform, the goal of this reform was by no means class-based - selfish for him. Many opponents of just such a development of state structure were not yet able to understand what Prince Dmitry Mikhailovich understood and what they themselves vaguely felt in the last decade of Peter's reign.

It is quite possible that the rumor that horrified Catherine's entourage was launched with a clear purpose - to move the situation, to force Catherine and the all-powerful Menshikov at that moment to make a fundamental compromise that would open up the possibility of reorganizing the system.

The fact that Prince Dmitry Mikhailovich became one of the six highest dignitaries in the empire was a huge victory for precisely that part of the opposition, which was guided by a fundamental reform of the system. The reform is European, but not anti-Petrine.

Historians who believe that the creation of the Supreme Privy Council predetermined the possibility of the constitutional impulse of 1730, in my opinion, are absolutely right.

But at the time of its emergence, the Supreme Privy Council was faced, first of all, with an extremely specific task - to prevent the final ruin of the country. And all the signs of imminent collapse were evident.

Conclusion

As a result of the study, I came to the following conclusions:

- analysis of sources and literature allows us to consider the emergence of the Supreme Privy Council as an urgent need to create a supreme body of power to resolve the most "important affairs" of the state. In this capacity, the Supreme Privy Council became the heir to the "Secret Councils" of Peter I;

- the composition of the Supreme Privy Council in the officially established alignment of political forces in society, during the struggle for power, was of a compromise nature, uniting representatives of two warring court groups: supporters of Catherine - the new nobility and supporters of Peter II - the court aristocracy;

- the compromise nature of the Supreme Privy Council predetermined the presence of constant confrontation between various groups of the nobility in its composition, complicated by Menshikov's attempts to concentrate power in the Supreme Privy Council in his own hands;

- we can agree with the opinion of Anisimov that the policy of the Supreme Privy Council bore the features of centralization and concentration of management and pursued the goal of increasing the efficiency, mobility of management, adapting the activities of the state apparatus to the specifics of the internal situation, internal political problems of the post-Petrine period;

- An attempt by the leaders to limit the autocracy by drawing up "Conditions" for the monarch may indicate the presence in the "trick of the leaders" of plans to change the political structure in society, elements of constitutionalism.

List of used sources and literature.

Sources.

Legislative acts:

1. "Opinion is not in the decree on the newly established Supreme Privy Council"

2. Decree establishing the Supreme Privy Council

3. Decree of the Supreme Privy Council granting the newly established Academy of Sciences monopoly rights in the field of civil printing in the country

4. Decree on the form of relations between the Supreme Privy Council and the Senate and Collegia

5. "The oath of the members of the Supreme Privy Council"

6. "Condition"

Works of contemporaries:

1. "A Brief Story about the Death of Peter the Great" by F. Prokopovich

2. "Notes of Manstein about Russia 1727 - 1744".

Diplomatic correspondence:

1. Dispatch from the British Ambassador Rondo.

Memoirs:

1. Notes of Minich.

Literature.

Andreev E.V. Representatives of the authorities after Peter I. Minsk, 1990.

Anisimov E.V. Materials of the commission D.M. Golitsin about taxes. T. 91.M., 1973.

Anisimov E.V. Time of Peter's reforms. M., 1991.

Anisimov E.V. Travelers who passed before us // Timelessness and temporary workers. L., 1991.

Anisimov E.V. Death in the office // Homeland. 1993. No. 1.

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Supreme Privy Council- the highest advisory state institution of Russia in 1726-1730 (7-8 people). Created by Catherine I as an advisory body, in fact, it solved the most important state issues.

The accession to the throne of Catherine I after the death of Peter I caused the need for such an institution that could explain the state of affairs to the empress and guide the direction of the government, for which Catherine did not feel capable. The Supreme Privy Council became such an institution.

The decree on the establishment of the Council was issued in February 1726. Field Marshal, His Serene Highness Prince Menshikov, General-Admiral Count Apraksin, State Chancellor Count Golovkin, Count Tolstoy, Prince Dimitri Golitsyn and Baron Osterman were appointed as its members. A month later, the empress's son-in-law, the Duke of Holstein, was included in the number of members of the Supreme Privy Council, on whose delight, as the empress officially announced, “we can fully rely.” Thus, the Supreme Privy Council was originally composed almost exclusively of the chicks of Petrov's nest; but already under Catherine I one of them, Count Tolstoy, was ousted by Menshikov; under Peter II, Menshikov himself found himself in exile; Count Apraksin died; the Duke of Holstein has long ceased to attend the council; of the original members of the Council, three remained - Golitsyn, Golovkin and Osterman.

Under the influence of the Dolgoruks, the composition of the Council changed: the predominance in it passed into the hands of the princely families Dolgoruky and Golitsyn.

The Senate and the Collegiums were subordinated to the Council. The Senate, which began to be called "High" (and not "Ruling"), was first humiliated to such an extent that it was decided to send him decrees not only from the Council, but even from the previously equal Holy Synod. The Senate was deprived of the ruling title, and then they thought to take this title from the Synod as well. First, the Senate was titled "highly trusted", and then simply "high".

Under Menshikov, the Soviet tried to consolidate government power; ministers, as the members of the Council were called, and senators swore allegiance to the Empress or the regulations of the Supreme Privy Council. It was forbidden to execute decrees not signed by the Empress and the Council.

According to the bequest of Catherine I, the Council was given power equal to the power of the sovereign during the childhood of Peter II; only on the question of the order of succession to the throne, the Council could not make changes. But the last point of the will of Catherine I was ignored by the leaders when Anna Ioannovna was elected to the throne.

In 1730, after the death of Peter II, half of the 8 members of the Council were Dolgoruky (princes Vasily Lukich, Ivan Alekseevich, Vasily Vladimirovich and Alexei Grigorievich), who were supported by the Golitsyn brothers (Dmitry and Mikhail Mikhailovich). Dmitry Golitsyn drew up a draft constitution.

However, most of the Russian nobility, as well as members of the Supreme Privy Council, Osterman and Golovkin, opposed the Dolgoruky's plans. Upon arrival in Moscow on February 15 (26), 1730, Anna Ioannovna received from the nobility, headed by Prince Cherkassky, in which they asked her to "accept autocracy as your praiseworthy ancestors had." Relying on the support of the guards, as well as of the middle and small nobility, Anna publicly tore up the text of the conditions and refused to comply with them; The Manifesto of March 4 (15), 1730, abolished the Supreme Privy Council.

The fates of its members developed in different ways: Mikhail Golitsyn was dismissed and died almost immediately, his brother and three of the four Dolgoruks were executed during the reign of Anna Ioannovna. Only Vasily Vladimirovich Dolgoruky, who was returned from exile under Elizaveta Petrovna and was appointed head of the military collegium, survived the repressions. Golovkin and Osterman held the most important government posts during the reign of Anna Ioannovna. Osterman briefly became the de facto ruler of the country in 1740-1741, but after another palace coup he was exiled to Berezov, where he died.

Arose the need for such an institution that could explain the state of affairs to the empress and guide the direction of the government, for which Catherine did not feel capable. Such an institution was the V. t. Council, which shook the very foundations of the government system of Peter the Great. The decree on the establishment of V. of the Privy Council was issued in February, its members were appointed General Feldm. His Serene Highness Prince Menshikov, General-Admiral Count Apraksin, State Chancellor Count Golovkin, Count Tolstoy, Prince Dimitri Golitsyn and Baron Osterman. A month later, the empress's son-in-law, the Duke of Holstein, was also included in the number of members of the Privy Council. whose joy as officially announced by the empress, we can fully rely... Thus, V. privy council at the beginning was composed almost exclusively of nestlings of Petrov's nest; but already under Catherine I one of them, Count Tolstoy, was ousted by Menshikov; under Peter II, Menshikov himself found himself in exile; Count Apraksin died; the Duke of Holstein has long ceased to attend the council; of the original members of the V. t. council, three remained — Golitsyn, Golovkin, and Osterman. Under the influence of the Dolgoruks, the composition of the military trade council changed: the predominance in the military trade council passed into the hands of the princely families Dolgoruky and Golitsyn.

Supreme Privy Council, an organ of unlimited supreme power, arose in the reign of Catherine I. It included: Prince. Menshikov, Counts Golovkin, Apraksin and Tolstoy, Prince. Golitsyn, bar. Osterman and the son-in-law of Catherine I, the Duke of Holstein. V. t. C. fulfilled the demands of the big commercial and industrial bourgeoisie; another class force, the nobility, took up arms against this activity. The Supreme Privy Council, in particular, abolished the restrictive regulation of trade, allowed trade with abroad through Arkhangelsk (under Peter I, foreign trade was allowed only through St. Petersburg), abolished a number of government monopolies. V.'s neglect of t. Page the interests of the nobility caused an acute discontent of the nobles, which flared up after the death of Peter II.

The Supreme Privy Council appears after the death of Peter the Great. The entry into the legal power of Catherine the First caused the need for its actual organization to clarify a certain area of ​​affairs, since the new empress did not have a clear idea of ​​how to continue the policy of the Russian government.

At first, it consisted of only six people, but just a month later, a replenishment arrived in the person of Catherine's son-in-law, the Duke of Holstein. It should be noted that all the people who were members of the council were confidants of the previous ruler, who proved themselves from the best side during his reign. However, later the composition of the organ began to change: Menshikov ousted Count Tolstoy, but he himself was exiled under Peter II, Holshtinsky stopped attending meetings, and Count Apraksin also died earlier. As a result, only three of the first advisers remained. At the same time, later the composition has changed even more radically and more and more often the princely families of Dolgoruky and Golitsyn prevail in the decision of state affairs.

The Russian government was in fact subordinate to the Senate, whose name had changed from "Ruling" to "High". However, soon the power of the Senate was so reduced that it took orders not only from the Council, but also from the Synod. And its members swore allegiance not only to the Empress, but also to the members of the Supreme Council. At the same time, any decision without the signature of the Council and the Empress was considered illegal, and the execution of such orders was prosecuted by law. According to her last will, Catherine equated the Council with the power of the sovereign, but this order could only exist until Peter II.

By the time of Anna Ioannovna's accession to the Russian throne, half of the members of the Council were Dolgoruky, and the two Golitsyn brothers were their adherents, while forming a strong coalition.

Earlier, Dmitry Golitsyn drew up the so-called "Conditions" actually limiting the power of the new empress. But the plans of the Council were opposed by Osterman and Golovkin, as well as the nobility led by Prince Cherkassky. As a result, Anna Ioannovna publicly destroyed (tore apart) "Konditsiya", after which she issued her official decree abolishing the Supreme Privy Council, thus returning absolute exclusive power to the hands of the Russian monarchs.

The idea of ​​creating an institution that stood above the Senate was in the air even under Peter the Great. However, it was not implemented by him, but by his wife Catherine I. At the same time, the idea itself changed dramatically. Peter, as you know, ruled the country himself, delving into all the details of the government mechanism, both in domestic and foreign policy. Catherine, on the other hand, was deprived of the virtues with which nature generously rewarded her husband.

Contemporaries and historians had different assessments of the empress's modest abilities. Field Marshal of the Russian army Burkhard Christopher Minich did not spare words of praise addressed to Catherine: “This empress was loved and adored by the whole nation, thanks to her innate kindness, which manifested itself every time she could take part in persons who fell into disgrace and deserved the emperor's disfavor. .. She was truly a mediator between the sovereign and his subjects. "

The enthusiastic review of Minich was not shared by the historian of the second half of the 18th century, Prince M. M. Shcherbatov: “She was weak, luxurious in the entire space of this name, the nobles were ambitious and greedy, and from this it happened: exercising in everyday feasts and luxuries, she left all power government to the nobles, of which Prince Menshikov soon took over. "

The famous historian of the XIX century S. M. Soloviev, who studied the time of Catherine I according to unpublished sources, gave Catherine a slightly different assessment: affairs, especially internal, and their details, no ability of initiative and direction. "

Three dissimilar opinions indicate that their authors were guided by different criteria in assessing the Empress: Minich - the presence of personal virtues; Shcherbatov - such moral properties that should be inherent in the first place a statesman, a monarch; Soloviev - the ability to run the state, business qualities. But the merits listed by Minich are clearly not enough to rule a vast empire, and the craving for luxury and feasting, as well as the lack of proper attention to business and the inability to assess the situation and determine ways to overcome the difficulties that have arisen, generally deprive Catherine of her reputation as a statesman.

Having neither knowledge nor experience, Catherine, of course, was interested in creating an institution capable of helping her, especially since she was oppressed by her dependence on Menshikov. The nobles were also interested in the existence of an institution capable of withstanding the onslaught of Menshikov and his boundless influence on the empress, among whom the most active and influential was Count P.A.Tolstoy, who competed with the prince in the struggle for power.

Menshikov's arrogance and disdainful attitude to other nobles who sat in the Senate crossed all boundaries. An illustrative episode occurred in the Senate at the end of 1725, when Minich, who was in charge of the construction of the Ladoga Canal, asked the Senate to allocate 15 thousand soldiers to complete the work. Minich's request was supported by P. A. Tolstoy and F. M. Apraksin. Their arguments about the expediency of completing the undertaking begun by Peter the Great did not in the least convince the prince, who declared that it was not the business of the soldiers to dig the earth. Menshikov defiantly left the Senate, thereby insulting the senators. However, Menshikov himself did not object to the establishment of the Privy Council, believing that he would easily tame his rivals and, under the guise of the Privy Council, would continue to dominate the government.

The idea of ​​creating a new institution was proposed by Tolstoy. The Empress was supposed to chair the meetings of the Supreme Privy Council, and the members of the Council were given equal votes. Catherine immediately jumped at the idea. If not with intelligence, then with a heightened sense of self-preservation, she understood that Menshikov's unbridled disposition, his desire to command everything and everyone could cause strife and an explosion of discontent not only among the clan nobility, but also among those who elevated her to the throne.

Campredon quotes the empress's statement from the time of the formation of the Supreme Privy Council. She stated that "she will show the whole world that she knows how to make them obey and maintain the glory of their reign." The establishment of the Supreme Privy Council really allowed Catherine to strengthen her power, to force everyone to "obey her", but under certain conditions: if she knew how to deftly weave intrigues, if she knew how to push the opposing forces with her foreheads and mediate between them, if she had a clear idea of ​​where and by what means the country should be led by the highest government institution, if it finally knew how to create coalitions useful to it at the right time, temporarily uniting rivals. Catherine did not possess any of the above qualities, so her statement, if accurately reproduced by Campredon, hung in the air, turned out to be sheer bravado. On the other hand, Catherine's consent to the creation of the Supreme Council indirectly testified to her recognition of her inability to rule the country herself, like her husband. The paradox of the establishment of the Supreme Privy Council was that it combined the conflicting aspirations of those involved in its creation. Tolstoy, as mentioned above, saw in the Supreme Privy Council a means of taming Menshikov. Apraksin and Golovkin shared these expectations. Menshikov, while supporting the idea of ​​creating a Supreme Privy Council, was apparently guided by three considerations. Firstly, he simply missed the steps taken by Tolstoy, and when he found them, he considered that it was useless to oppose them. Secondly, he also intended to benefit from the new institution - to crush the five members of the Supreme Privy Council, he believed, easier than the large composition in the Senate. And, finally, thirdly, Alexander Danilovich connected with the Supreme Council the realization of his old dream - to deprive the former influence of his worst enemy, the Prosecutor General of the Senate PI Yaguzhinsky.

The Supreme Privy Council was established on February 8, 1726 by a personal decree of the Empress. However, rumors about the possibility of the emergence of a new institution penetrated the diplomatic environment as early as May 1725, when the Saxon envoy Lefort reported that they were talking about the establishment of the "Privy Council". Similar information was sent by the French envoy Campredon, who even named the names of the members of the future institution.

Although the legislator had sufficient time to draw up a fundamental normative act, the decree read out by G.I. The creation of the new institution was justified by the fact that it was necessary to provide an opportunity for the members of the Supreme Privy Council to focus their efforts on solving the most important matters, freeing them from the petty worries that burdened them as senators. However, the decree does not define the place of the new institution in the current government mechanism, and does not clearly define the rights and obligations of the new institution. The decree named the names of persons obliged to be present in it: Field Marshal General Prince A.D. Menshikov, General-Admiral Count F.M. Apraksin, Chancellor Count G.I. Golovkin, Count P.A.Tolstoy, Prince D.M. Golitsyn and Baron A.I. Osterman.

The composition of the Supreme Privy Council reflected the balance of power among the “parties” that had competed in Catherine's enthronement: five of the six members of the Supreme Council belonged to the new nobility, and the tribal aristocracy was represented by Golitsyn alone. It is noteworthy, however, that it did not contain the favorite of Peter the Great, the person who was listed as number one in the bureaucratic world - the Prosecutor General of the Senate PI Yaguzhinsky. Pavel Ivanovich was, as noted above, Menshikov's worst enemy, and the latter did not object to the creation of the Supreme Privy Council, in particular, in the expectation that the position of the Prosecutor General of the Senate would be eliminated and the Supreme Privy Council would perform the intermediary role between the Empress and the Senate.

Another ally of Peter, also an enemy of Menshikov, - cabinet secretary A.V. Makarov, turned out to be outside the Supreme Privy Council. There was no place in it for such experienced businessmen as P. P. Shafirov, I. A. Musin-Pushkin, and others. All this gives reason to believe that during the recruitment of the Supreme Privy Council there was bargaining between Catherine, Menshikov and Tolstoy.

On February 17, cabinet secretary Makarov announced in the Supreme Privy Council a decree of the empress, which extremely puzzled and alarmed Menshikov - another person was appointed to the institution - Catherine's son-in-law, Duke Karl Friedrich Holstein. It did not take much for the prince to figure out the purpose of the appointment - he assessed it as a desire to weaken his influence, create a counterbalance to him and more reliable than he, Menshikov, support to the throne. Menshikov did not believe that Catherine could dare to do such a thing without his knowledge, and asked Makarov: did he correctly convey the empress's command? Having received an affirmative answer, His Serene Highness immediately went to Catherine for an explanation. The content of the conversation and its tone remained unknown, but the result is known - Catherine insisted on her own. The Duke, at a regular meeting of the Supreme Privy Council, assured the audience that he "will not be like a member and other ministers present for a colleague and comrade." In other words, the husband of the daughter of the Empress Anna Petrovna did not claim a leading role in the Supreme Privy Council, which somewhat reassured Menshikov. As for the other members of the Privy Council, they were quite satisfied with the appearance of such an influential figure who, relying on kinship with the empress, could withstand the dominance of Alexander Danilovich.

So, the composition of the new institution was approved. As for its competence, it was defined by a vague phrase: "We have judged and ordered from now on at our court both for external and internal important state affairs to establish a Supreme Privy Council, at which we ourselves will be present."

Subsequent decrees, issued both on behalf of the Supreme Privy Council and on behalf of the Empress, clarified the range of issues subject to his decision and his relationship to the Senate, Synod, colleges and the supreme power.

Already on February 10, the Supreme Privy Council ordered all central institutions to contact him with reports. However, one exception was made: the three "first", in the terminology of Peter's time, collegia (Military, Admiralty and Foreign Affairs) were withdrawn from the Senate, dealt with it as equals by promemoria and became subject only to the Supreme Privy Council.

There was a reason for the appearance of this decree: Menshikov, Apraksin and Golovkin were the presidents of the three collegia mentioned above; they also sat in the Supreme Privy Council, so it was not prestigious to subordinate these collegiums to the Senate, which itself was dependent on the Privy Council.

An important milestone in the history of the Supreme Privy Council is the so-called "Opinion not in the decree on the newly established Privy Council" submitted to the Empress by her members. There is no need to set out the content of all thirteen points of the Opinion. Let us dwell on the most important of them, which are of fundamental importance, since in them the purpose of creating a new institution and its main task were determined more clearly than in the founding decree. The Supreme Privy Council, the Opinion read, "serves only to relieve Her Majesty in the heavy burden of government." Thus, formally, the Supreme Privy Council was an advisory body, consisting of several persons, which made it possible to avoid hasty and erroneous decisions. However, the paragraph that followed this expanded the powers of the Supreme Privy Council by giving it legislative functions: “No decrees should be issued before in the Privy Council, the protocols are not fixed and Her Majesty will not be read for the most merciful approbation, and then they can be fixed and sent by the actual state councilor Stepanov (secretary of the council. - N. P.) ".

"Opinion" established the schedule of work of the Supreme Privy Council: on Wednesdays it should consider internal affairs, on Fridays - foreign; if the need arose, extraordinary meetings were called. "Opinion not in decree" expressed hope for active participation in the meetings of the Empress's Council: "Since Her Majesty herself has the presidency in the Privy Council, and there is reason to hope that she will often be personally present."

Another milestone in the history of the Supreme Privy Council is associated with the decree of January 1, 1727. He, like the decree of February 17, 1726 on the inclusion of the Duke of Holstein in the Privy Council, dealt another blow to Menshikov's omnipotence. In his statement to the members of the Council on February 23, 1726, the Duke, as we remember, promised to be an ordinary member of the new institution, like everyone else present, and called on everyone to "freely and frankly announce every opinion." Indeed, Menshikov retained the role of the leading member and continued to impose his will on the others. By a decree of January 1, 1727, Catherine I decided to officially assign this role to the duke. “We,” the decree said, “we can completely rely on his faithful zeal for us and for our interests, for the sake of his royal highness, like our dearest son-in-law and in his own dignity, not only over other members of the primacy and in all things that happen first voice, but we also allow His Royal Highness to demand from all institutions the statements he needs ”.

Fortunately for Menshikov, the duke as a person was not able to resist him. Weak in spirit and body, drunk even from a small amount of strong drinks, to which he had tender love, the duke could not compete with the prince also because he did not know the Russian language, was not aware of the state of affairs in Russia and did not have sufficient administrative experience ... The Saxon ambassador Lefort gave him a derogatory characterization: "The duke's way of life deprived him of his good name"; according to the ambassador, the prince found "the only pleasure in a glass", and he immediately fell asleep "under the influence of wine vapors, since Bassevich convinced him that only this could make himself fall in love in Russia." Bassevich, the first minister of the duke, an experienced schemer and braggart, who believed that Russia owed him everything that happened in it, easily ruled the duke like a puppet and represented the main danger for Menshikov.

We find a similar opinion about the duke in the Danish ambassador of Westphalen. True, Westphalen spoke of the empress's son-in-law less severely, finding in him some positive qualities: “The Duke does not speak Russian. But he speaks Swedish, German, French and Latin. He is well-read, especially in the field of history, likes to study, writes a lot, is inclined to luxury, stubborn and proud. His marriage to Anna Petrovna is unhappy. The duke is not attached to his wife and is prone to debauchery and drinking. He wants to be like Charles XII, between whom there is no resemblance to the duke. He loves to talk, and he discovers hypocrisy. "

Nevertheless, this generally insignificant person exerted a significant influence on the empress. In turn, in addition to Bassevich's advice, the duke, presumably, used the advice of his balanced and judicious wife.

A description of Anna Petrovna's appearance and her spiritual qualities was given by Count Bassevich. As already mentioned, Bassevich spared no pains to depict her in the most attractive form: “Anna Petrovna resembled her august parent in face and character, but nature and upbringing softened everything in her. Her height of more than five feet was not too tall with unusually developed forms and with proportionality in all parts of her body, reaching perfection.

Nothing could be more majestic than her posture and physiognomy; nothing is more correct than a description of her face, and at the same time her gaze and smile were graceful and gentle. She had black hair and eyebrows, a complexion of dazzling whiteness and a blush fresh and delicate such as no artificiality can ever achieve; her eyes were of an indeterminate color and were distinguished by an extraordinary brilliance. In a word, the strictest exactingness in anything could not reveal any flaw in it.

All this was joined by an astute mind, genuine simplicity and good nature, generosity, indulgence, excellent education and excellent knowledge of the languages ​​of Russian, French, German, Italian and Swedish. "

Campredon, who closely followed the alignment of forces at court, noted in his dispatches the growing influence of the Duke of Holstein on the empress already in the first half of 1725.

On March 3, he reported: "The queen, seeing in the duke the best support for herself, will warmly take his interests to heart and will largely be guided by his advice." March 10: "The Duke's influence is growing." April 7: "The Duke of Holstein is the Queen's closest attorney." April 14: “People here look with envy and without fear at the growing confidence in the Duke of Holstein, especially those who scornfully and even contemptuously treated him during the life of the tsar. Only their intrigues are useless. The queen, who wishes to elevate him to the throne of Sweden and hopes for him to receive military assistance from this power, sees in the duke her most faithful support. She is convinced that from now on he cannot have interests separate from her and her family, and that therefore she can only desire what is beneficial or honorable for her, as a result of which she, for her part, can fully rely on the conscientiousness of his advice and on the honesty of his relationship to her. " April 24: "The Duke of Holstein, who did not have a voice at the time of the late Tsar, now turns over to everyone, since the Tsarina is guided only by the advice of him and Prince Menshikov, our inveterate enemy."

The duke counted on receiving from Peter as a dowry for the daughter of Livonia and Estonia, but did not receive either one or the other. But on May 6, 1725, Catherine gave Ezel and Dago to the Duke of the island, which aroused the hatred of the Russian nobles.

The reader probably drew attention to the fact that the book deals with the influence on the empress alternately of the Duke of Holstein, then Menshikov, then Tolstoy. At first glance, these judgments contradict one another. But, looking closely at the personality of the empress, a weak-willed woman who sought to avoid conflicts with the nobles and at the same time easily succumbed to the suggestions of one or the other, one should recognize these contradictions as apparent. Catherine was in the habit of agreeing with everyone, and this created the impression of the growing influence on her of the Duke and the spouses and minister standing behind him, then Menshikov, then Tolstoy. The sources are silent about the influence of Makarov, but not because this influence was not, but because this influence was shadow. In fact, Menshikov should be given the palm in influencing the empress, not only because he played a decisive role in her enthronement, but also because he had the power that, having easily given Catherine a crown, could just as easily have this crown take away from her. The Empress was afraid of Menshikov and even in a critical situation for the prince, when he tried to take possession of the Duchy of Courland, she did not dare to remove him from power.

The expansion of the son-in-law's powers did not justify Catherine's hopes - with this maneuver, she ultimately failed to create a counterbalance to Menshikov in the Supreme Privy Council. The failure was explained primarily by the fact that the weak-willed, close-minded, lacking the ability to make independent decisions, the duke was opposed by the energetic, assertive, experienced not only in intrigue, but also in knowledge of the situation in the country of Menshikov.

The duke's natural shortcomings were aggravated by the fact that he easily succumbed to outside influence. The man, without whose knowledge the duke did not dare to take a step, was his minister, Count Bassevich - an adventurous personality, an intriguer by nature, who more than once put his master in an awkward position.

The goal towards which Catherine was striving was simple - not only to keep the crown on her head until the end of her days, but also to put it on the head of one of her daughters. Acting in the interests of the duke, the empress relied on family ties and rejected the services and zeal of Menshikov, to whom she owed the throne. However, the duke was so weak that he could not cope with putting things in order not only in the country, but also in his own family. Here is the testimony of the French diplomat Magnan, who noted, "by the way, the coldness and disagreement that reigned between him and the duchess, his wife, and reaching the point that he has not been allowed into her bedroom for more than three months."

As we remember, Catherine promised to chair the meetings of the Supreme Privy Council. However, she did not fulfill her promise: in the fifteen months that have elapsed since the establishment of the Supreme Privy Council until her death, she attended the meetings fifteen times. It is not uncommon for her to express a desire to be present on the eve of a meeting of the Council, but on the day when it was supposed to take place, she instructed to announce that she was postponing her presence until the next day, in the afternoon.

The sources do not name the reasons why this happened. But, knowing the empress's daily routine, one can safely express the opinion that she was unwell due to the fact that she went to bed after seven in the morning and spent the night hours at a plentiful feast.

As already mentioned, under Catherine I the Supreme Privy Council was ruled by Menshikov - a man, albeit of an impeccable reputation, but with a fairly wide range of talents: he was a talented commander and a good administrator and, being the first governor of St. Petersburg, successfully supervised the construction of the new capital.

The second person who influenced both the empress and the Supreme Privy Council was the secret cabinet secretary Alexei Vasilyevich Makarov. There is a reason to get to know this person better.

Like Menshikov, Devier, Kurbatov and other lesser-known associates of Peter the Great, Makarov could not boast of his ancestry - he was the son of a clerk of the Vologda provincial office. The amateur historian of the second half of the 18th century, I. I. Golikov, portrayed the first meeting of Peter with Makarov as follows: “When he was in Vologda in 1693, the Great Sovereign saw in the Vologda chancellery between the clerks of a young scribe, it was this very Mr. Makarov, and he looked at him, penetrating into his abilities, took him to himself, appointed him as a scribe to his Cabinet and, gradually raising him, made him a remembered dignity (secret cabinet-secretary. - N. P.), and since that time he has been inseparable from the monarch. "

There are at least three inaccuracies in Golikov's message: there was no Cabinet at Peter the Great in 1693; Makarov served not in the Vologda, but in the Izhora office of Menshikov; finally, 1704 should be considered the initial date of his service in the Cabinet, which is confirmed by the patent for the title of secret cabinet secretary.

Equally fantastic, but diametrically opposite information about Makarov's abilities was expressed by the German Gelbig, the author of the famous essay "Accidental People in Russia." About Makarov Gelbig wrote that he was “the son of a commoner, an intelligent fellow, but so ignorant that he could not even read and write. It seems that this ignorance was his happiness. Peter took him to his secretaries and entrusted him with copying secret papers, the work for Makarov is tedious, because he copied mechanically. "

Even a superficial acquaintance with the documents of that time, in the compilation of which Makarov was involved, is enough to be convinced of the absurdity of Gelbig's testimony: Makarov not only knew how to read and write, but also had an excellent command of the clerical language. It would be an exaggeration to consider Makarov's pen as brilliant, similar to the one owned by I.T. Pososhkov, P.P.Shafirov, F. Saltykov, but he knew how to compose letters, decrees, extracts and other business papers, he understood Peter's thoughts perfectly and gave to them a form acceptable for that time.

A huge mass of materials of national importance flocked to the Cabinet. All of them, before getting to the king, passed through the hands of the cabinet secretary.

Among the government elite, Makarov enjoyed great prestige. Menshikov and Apraksin, Golovkin and Shafirov and other dignitaries solicited his goodwill. The archival fund of the Cabinet of Peter the Great contains thousands of letters addressed to Makarov. Taken together, they represent an abundant material for the study of the characters, morals and human destinies of that time. Some turned to the tsar for mercy, others begged him from Makarov. Note that petitioners bothered the tsar on rare occasions: their hand was held by several decrees of Peter, strictly punishing for filing petitions personally to him. The petitioners, however, learned to bypass the decrees: they made requests not to the tsar, but to Makarov, so that he would seek satisfaction of the request from the monarch. The letters ended with a request to "intercede" before the king and to report to him the essence of the request "in a good time" or "in time." Prince Matvey Gagarin invented a slightly different formula: "Perhaps, my dear sir, seeing an opportunity to inform his imperial majesty." "In a good time" or "with time" in translation into modern language meant that the petitioner asked Makarov to report the request to the tsar at a time when he was in a good, complacent mood, that is, Makarov had to catch the moment when the request could not cause outbursts of anger in the irritable king.

With whatever requests they besieged Makarov! Marya Stroganova asked him to petition the tsar for the release of her nephew Afanasy Tatishchev from the service, since there is a need for him in the house. Princess Arina Trubetskaya married off her daughter and, in this regard, solicited that Makarov solicit Catherine's permission to borrow 5-6 thousand rubles from the treasury, “to send us this wedding”. Anna Sheremeteva, the widow of Field Marshal Boris Petrovich, asked to be protected "from petitioners among fugitive peasants, who are looking for great claims over the years." The countess asked the cabinet secretary "in good time" to report to the tsar and tsarina so that they would "defend" her from the plaintiffs.

Many requests to Makarov came from the nobles. The President of the Admiralty Collegium and Senator Fyodor Matveyevich Apraksin ended his message to the cabinet secretary with the words: "If you please hand over the letter to His Imperial Majesty and how it will be accepted, perhaps you should not leave it unannounced." The son of the prince-pope of the most drunken cathedral Konon Zotov, who volunteered to go abroad to study, complained to Makarov from Paris: “... N. P.) no praise, no anger. "

Even the almighty Menshikov resorted to Makarov's mediation. Not wanting to bother the tsar with insignificant matters, he wrote: "Oh, what, I didn't want to bother your Majesty, I wrote at length to the secretary Makarov." In a letter to Makarov, Alexander Danilovich, having outlined the essence of small matters, informed him: "And I did not want to bother His Majesty with these small matters, what I would expect." Menshikov, like other correspondents who were in confidential relations with Makarov, often informed the cabinet secretary about facts and events that he considered necessary to hide from the tsar, because he knew that they would cause his anger. So, for example, in July 1716 Menshikov wrote to Makarov, who was with the tsar abroad: “So in Peterhof and in Strelina there are a lot of sick workers and die incessantly, from which more than a thousand people died this summer. However, I am writing about this poor working condition to you in your special knowledge, about which, unless an occasion calls, then you can convey, beforehand, to tea, that many of his royal majesty's failures here do not bother him little by little. " In the report to the king, sent on the same day, about the mass death of the builders - not a single word. True, the prince said that he found work on the island of Kotlin "in a weak state", but the reason for this was the continuous rains.

Makarov dared to provide assistance even to those who were in tsarist disgrace. Among the nobles, who were favored by him, we meet the first "profit-maker" Alexei Kurbatov, who later became the vice-governor of the Arkhangelsk city, the Moscow vice-governor Vasily Ershov, the favorite orderly of the tsar, and then the admiralty Alexander Kikin. The latter was accused in 1713 of criminal fraud with contracts for the supply of bread to St. Petersburg. The threat to end his life on the gallows seemed quite real, but the former favorite of the tsar was then rescued from trouble by Ekaterina Alekseevna and Makarov.

Makarov's activities as a cabinet secretary deserve such detailed coverage, primarily because he fulfilled this position under Catherine I. Moreover, the cabinet secretary during her reign acquired immeasurably greater influence than in the previous one. Under the tsar-reformer, who held in his hands all the threads of governing the country, Alexei Vasilievich acted as a speaker; under Catherine, who did not possess management skills, he acted as an adviser to the empress and an intermediary between her and the Supreme Privy Council. Makarov was prepared for this task, having under his shoulders more than twenty years of school of training in the craft of the administrator, passed under the leadership of Peter. Knowing all the intricacies of the work of the government mechanism and being able to prompt the Empress in time to promulgate the necessary decree, Makarov, along with Menshikov, became Catherine's main assistant.

Several facts testify to the high prestige that Makarov managed to impart to the institution he led and to his own person. So, by decree of September 7, 1726, it was ordered to report important matters first to the Cabinet of Her Imperial Majesty, and then to the Supreme Privy Council. On December 9, 1726, Catherine, who highly appreciated Makarov's services, granted him the rank of privy councilor.

Another evidence of Makarov's high authority was the formula for registering his presence at meetings of the Supreme Privy Council. Even about senators, not to mention nobles of a lower rank, in journal entries we read: "admitted", "admitted" or "summoned" into the presence of the Supreme Privy Council, while the appearance of Makarov was recorded with a more respectful formula: "Then came the secret cabinet secretary Makarov "," Then there was a secret cabinet secretary Makarov "," Then the Cabinet secretary Makarov announced. "

The importance of the Senate and senators during the reign of Catherine weakened significantly. This is evidenced, for example, by the journal entry of the Supreme Privy Council dated March 28, 1726, when senators Dewier and Saltykov arrived at its meeting with a report: “Before the admission of those senators, His Royal Highness (Duke of Holstein - N. P.) deigned to announce his opinion: that when senators come to the Supreme Privy Council with deeds, then they should not read those deeds and not discuss them, so that they would not know what the Supreme Privy Council will discuss before their time. ”

The foreign minister in the then bureaucratic pyramid also stood below Makarov: "At that meeting, his Royal Highness, the Duke of Holstein, Privy Councilor von Bassevich was admitted." Recall that the Duke of Holstein was the son-in-law of the Empress.

Communication between the Empress and the Supreme Privy Council took place in various ways. The simplest one was that Makarov informed the council members about the cancellation of the empress's intention to attend a meeting of the Supreme Privy Council.

Most often, Makarov played an intermediary role between the empress and the Supreme Privy Council, conveyed Catherine's oral orders to him, or carried out instructions from the Supreme Privy Council to transfer prepared decrees to the Empress for approval. However, it would be a mistake to believe that Alexei Vasilyevich performed purely mechanical functions at the same time - in fact, during his reports, he gave the Empress advice, who was ignorant of management matters and did not want to delve into the essence of the issue, with which she easily agreed. As a result, the empress's orders actually belonged not to her, but to the cabinet secretary, who knew how to tactfully impose his will on her. Let us give a few examples, making a reservation that the sources did not keep direct evidence that the empress was a puppet in the hands of Menshikov and Makarov; this is where logical considerations come into play.

On March 13, 1726, it became known to the Supreme Privy Council that the Senate would not accept pro-memorials from the first three colleges. This was reported to the Empress by Makarov. Returning, he announced that the Senate henceforth "should be written by the High Senate, and not the Governing one, so that the word" Governmental "is obscene." It is unlikely that such an action, which required appropriate legal preparation, could have been carried out by Catherine on her own, without outside influence.

On August 8, 1726, Catherine, attending a meeting of the Supreme Privy Council, made a judgment that required her to know diplomatic etiquette and be aware of precedents. She "deigned to have some judgment" to send the ambassador to Poland instead of Count Bassevich, Prince Vasily Dolgoruky, "arguing that it is possible for him to manage the embassy business there without a public audience and other ceremonies, following the example of how the Swedish ambassador Zedergelm repaired here as well."

Makarov played a special role in appointments. This is not surprising - after the death of Peter I, no one in the country could compete with Alexei Vasilyevich in knowing the shortcomings and merits of various nobles. Personal acquaintance with each of them allowed him to know their zeal for service, and the degree of selflessness, and such properties of nature as a tendency to cruelty or mercy. Makarov's recommendations were of decisive importance for the empress.

So, on February 23, 1727, the Supreme Privy Council presented a list of candidates for governor of princes Yuri Trubetskoy, Alexei Cherkassky, Alexei Dolgoruky, President of the Household Office Alexei Pleshcheev. Catherine agreed to appoint only Major General Yu. Trubetskoy as governor; “About the others,” Makarov informed the Supreme Privy Council, “she was pleased to say that they are needed here, and for this she would“ choose others and introduce them. ” To "deign to say" something like that, one had to have detailed information about each of the candidates and be sure "that they are needed here" - and this was hardly within the power of the empress.

Makarov stood behind Catherine's back when Major General Vasily Zotov was appointed governor of Kazan. The Supreme Privy Council considered it more appropriate to appoint him president of the Justitz Collegium, but the Empress. of course, at the suggestion of Makarov, she insisted on her own.

It is known that Alexei Bibikov, who had a brigadier rank, was protected by Menshikov. It was him that Aleksandr Danilovich read into the Novgorod vice-governors, believing that the Kholopov recommended by the empress "due to old age and decrepitude, is not capable of any service." Ekaterina (read, Makarov) rejected Bibikov's candidacy, ordering "to elect another, older, Bibikov as vice-governor."

Feedback of the Supreme Privy Council with the Empress was also carried out through Makarov. In the papers, you can find different versions of the wording, the meaning of which was that the Supreme Privy Council instructed Makarov to transfer the decrees he had adopted to the empress for their approval or for signing.

Sometimes - though not often - the name of Makarov was mentioned along with the members of the Supreme Privy Council present at its meetings. So, on May 16, 1726 “in the presence of four persons (Apraksin, Golovkin, Tolstoy and Golitsyn. - N. P.) ... and the secret cabinet secretary of Alexei Makarov read the secret report of Alexei Bestuzhev, No. 17, from Copenhagen. " On March 20, 1727, Aleksey Vasilyevich even came up with an initiative to transfer the money left in the Rostov diocese after these expenses to the treasury. The Supreme Privy Council agreed: "Perpetrate on that proposal."

Of course, the ruling elite knew about Makarov's influence on the empress. Makarov also made mortal enemies, among whom the most sworn ones were A.I. Osterman and the vice-president of the Synod, Feofan Prokopovich. They caused him a lot of trouble during the reign of Anna Ioannovna, when Makarov was under investigation for many years and was kept under house arrest until his death.

However, the Empress did not need hints in all cases. At the level of everyday issues, she made independent decisions, as happened, for example, with the decree on July 21, 1726 on the procedure for conducting fistfights in the capital. The Chief of Police of St. Petersburg Devier reported that on the Aptekarsky Island there are crowded fistfights, during which “many, taking out knives, chase other fighters, while others, putting cannonballs, stones, and flails in their mittens, beat them without mercy with death blows, from which there are battles and not without mortal killings, which do not impute murder as a sin, they also throw sand in the eyes ”. The Empress did not prohibit fist fights, but demanded honest observance of their rules: “Who ... henceforth, in such fist fights for amusement, will have the desire, and they choose sotskikh, fifty and ten, register with the police office, and then observe the observance of the rules of the fist battle ".

Another person whose influence on state affairs was undoubted, although not too noticeable, was A.I. Osterman. For the time being, he was behind the scenes, and came to the fore later, after the fall of Menshikov. The Spanish ambassador de Liria reported on January 10, 1728: “... after the fall of Menshikov, all the affairs of this monarchy passed into his (Osterman. - N. P.) hands ... of a person known for his qualities and abilities. " According to him, Osterman was "a businessman behind whom everything is intriguing and intriguing."

Most foreign observers are unanimous in their high assessment of Andrei Ivanovich's abilities. Here is how the Prussian ambassador Mardefeld spoke about him on July 6, 1727, when Osterman was still under Menshikov's patronage: “Osterman's credit stems not only from the might of the prince (Menshikov. - N. P.), but it is based on the great abilities of the baron, his honesty, his disinterestedness and is supported by the boundless love of the young emperor for him (Peter II. - N. P.), who has enough foresight to recognize the mentioned qualities in him and to understand that the baron is quite necessary for this state for its relations with foreign powers ”.

Not all of the above estimates can be agreed. Mardefeld rightly noted the rare quality of a nobleman of that time - Osterman was not convicted of bribery or embezzlement. The statement about his intelligence, efficiency and role in government is also true. Indeed, Osterman had enough physical strength and talents to not only familiarize himself with the content of the numerous reports received by the Supreme Privy Council from the collegia, governors, officials who carried out his special assignments, but also to single out the most important ones in order to form the agenda of the next meeting, to prepare the corresponding decree, for which, on his instructions, assistants were looking for previous decrees on a similar case. Domestic nobles of that time were not accustomed to such systematic work, and the hardworking Osterman was really irreplaceable. According to Mardefeld, Osterman “bears the burden that they (Russian nobles. - N. P.), because of their natural laziness, they do not want to wear it. "

The observational French diplomat Magnan, who informed the Versailles court in June 1728, also noted Osterman's indispensability in resolving issues of the everyday, routine life of the state: none of the Russians feel hardworking enough to take on this burden. " Magnan is wrong in extending the lack of industriousness to all "Russians." Suffice it to refer to the cabinet secretary of Makarov, who was in no way inferior in hard work to Osterman. However, Aleksey Vasilievich lacked knowledge of foreign languages ​​and awareness in foreign policy.

These were the people in whose hands real power was and who had to look for ways to overcome the crisis that hit Russia at the beginning of the second quarter of the 18th century.