1st Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR. Congress opening

3. The First Gorno-Altai Congress It was held, as planned, in Biysk from July 1 to July 6, 1917. Grigory Ivanovich Choros-Gurkin, who had now finally come forward as the leader of the national movement of the Altaians, became its main organizer. Special Commissioner from

Eliseeva Natalya Viktorovna,
Professor of the Russian State University, Head of the Educational and Scientific Center "New Russia. History of Post-Soviet Russia"

Aggravation of interethnic relations

At the beginning of his reign, M. S. Gorbachev did not understand the threat that interethnic tensions and conflicts posed to the USSR. He naively believed that the national question had been resolved in the USSR. Reality disproved his ideas.

The conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh led to massacres of Armenian families in Sumgayit, Azerbaijan, in March 1988. In turn, thousands of Azerbaijanis were forced to flee Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh. At the beginning of 1989, the union authorities introduced direct union rule in Karabakh, hoping to solve the problem in this way, but at the end of the year they returned Nagorno-Karabakh to the jurisdiction of Azerbaijan. The Supreme Council of Armenia, in response to this, adopted a resolution on the unification of Nagorno-Karabakh with Armenia. The conflict escalated into a full-scale war between the military formations of Azerbaijan and Karabakh with the active support of the latter by Armenia. On September 24, 1989, the Supreme Council of Azerbaijan adopted a law on the sovereignty of the republic. In January 1990, pogroms of Armenians began in Baku. The response was the introduction of troops, which caused casualties among the population.

In Georgia, they recalled the overthrow of the Menshevik Social Democratic government of independent Georgia by the Red Army in 1922. In May-June 1989, the houses of Meskhetian Turks, who had been evicted there back in 1944, were pogroms in Fergana. The army leadership did not want to take on the role of a whipping boy and did not intervene until they received direct instructions. As a result, thousands of citizens became victims of violence. These events gave rise to an increasingly critical attitude of the local population towards the Union authorities. By the autumn of 1989, there was a rise in the national movement in Ukraine. The first congress of the RUH movement, which advocated the independence of Ukraine, was held.

Under the influence of economic turmoil in the republics, social tension increased. Dissatisfaction with the policy of the union center turned many informal political associations from supporters into opponents of "perestroika", forcing them to take anti-union positions. The leaders of the national fronts clearly formulated the economic and national problems of their republics, won the sympathy of the population and quickly became influential political forces in the republics.

Demands to restore the state sovereignty of the national republics gained more and more popularity. In the Baltics, these demands were based on the non-recognition of the 1939 Treaty between the USSR and Nazi Germany, known as the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, which allowed the USSR to occupy the Baltic republics. In November 1988, the Estonian National Front came forward with demands for the recognition of sovereignty, political independence and a change in property relations in the republic. Similar processes of the growth of national consciousness, the search for national identity and the articulation of national interests took place in Lithuania, Latvia, Azerbaijan, Moldova and Ukraine. A wave of rallies swept through the capitals of the republics. A mass demonstration in Chisinau turned into riots.

The result of political shifts in the mood of the population of the republics was the toughening of the position of their leadership in relations with the union center. The top of the national nomenklatura hoped that these movements would clear the way for it to power in the already independent republics. History has confirmed such expectations. In Georgia, the group of President Z. Gamsarkhudia was soon replaced by the clan of E. Shevardnadze, in Azerbaijan, President A. Elchibey, the leader of the National Front, was replaced by the former member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU G. Aliyev. In all the republics of Central Asia, power remained in the hands of former party functionaries of the Communist Party. For most of the Russian party bureaucracy, the growth of national movements was unacceptable.

In response to interethnic conflicts and the strengthening of national movements, the allied leadership either did not react or used force. Troops of the Transcaucasian Military District dispersed a peaceful rally in Tbilisi using sapper shovels and tear gas. There were casualties. The order to use troops to disperse the demonstration was given by the local party authorities, but the anger of the population was directed against Moscow. MS Gorbachev understood that the use of force would not only undermine his popularity, but would also leave the USSR without Western credits. Massive repression would only hasten the bankruptcy of the country. But understanding this did not remove the question: how to save the USSR?

Growing opposition sentiment in Russia

In Russia, there was also a radicalization of the mood of the masses. In July 1989, the Leningrad People's Front was established in Leningrad. A little later, the Moscow Association of Voters was established in Moscow. The faction "Democratic platform in the CPSU" appeared in the Communist Party without prior notice. These informal associations published their own newspapers.

For the first time, signs of social unhappiness resulted in strikes. In March 1989, the Vorkuta miners went on strike. The miners of Kuzbass, Donbass, Vorkuta and Karaganda created strike committees, established the Union of Donbass Strike Committees and demanded that the authorities solve long-standing problems.

On the eve of the First Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR, large cities were engulfed in rallies. So, in Moscow on May 5, 1989, about 150 thousand people gathered for a rally of the democratic opposition at the Luzhniki stadium. During the work of the congress on May 27, a grand rally was held in Leningrad.

Social tension also increased in connection with the mass withdrawal of Soviet troops. On February 15, 1989, the withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan was completed; in the spring, the withdrawal of 50,000 Soviet soldiers from the GDR and Czechoslovakia began, and later from Mongolia. In June, the Central Asian Military District was abolished. Thousands of military personnel returned to the country, where there was no housing or jobs for them.

The defeat of the party nomenklatura in the elections

Elections to the First Congress of People's Deputies became a completely new phenomenon for the Soviet people. Gone are the non-alternative "elections without a choice", when the voters were offered one candidate approved by the CPSU. Alternativeism has activated various political forces - from democrats to chauvinists from the "Memory" society. A real political struggle began in the USSR. In the regions, the access of opposition candidates to the pages of newspapers and television was limited, but they actively used rallies and meetings with voters. The population showed great interest in their programs, people passed leaflets from hand to hand. This "samizdat" successfully competed with the official media.

The electoral law provided for a list of people's deputies from the CPSU according to a quota of 100 people. They were selected at the Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU in March 1989. Almost the entire composition of the top party leadership was included in the list. Although it was attended by representatives of the creative intelligentsia - writers D. A. Granin, V. I. Belov, Ch. Aitmatov, jurist D. Kudryavtsev, academician L. I. Abalkin, film director T. E. Abuladze, actor M. A. Ulyanov, as well as well-known workers, builders, agricultural workers, the people called the list "Red Hundred".

After the elections, it turned out that members of the CPSU made up 85% of the deputies. According to the quota from the CPSU, MS Gorbachev managed to carry out his own list, including both reformers and conservatives. And yet it was the defeat of the party-state, the loss of power by it. Many high-ranking party members, 32 first secretaries of regional party committees out of 160 did not pass the elections. Moreover, in Leningrad and the region not a single party and Soviet leader, not a single member of the bureau of the regional committee, and even the commander of the military district, was elected. In Moscow, party workers were also largely defeated, but about 90% of Muscovites voted for B. N. Yeltsin. Elections in many large industrial and scientific centers of the Volga region, the Urals, Siberia and the Far East, the south and east of Ukraine, as well as in the Baltic states, Armenia and Georgia, turned out to be a failure for the party apparatus. Relatively well for the party, the elections were held in the regions of the Central Black Earth and North Caucasus regions, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Central Asia.

Approximately a quarter of all deputies elected by district were critical of the CPSU. Many of these deputies came from public organizations. Famous scientists, writers, lawyers were elected to the I Congress of People's Deputies: A. D. Sakharov, R. Z. Sagdeev, N. P. Shmelev, S. S. Averintsev, P. G. Bunich, Yu. N. Afanasiev, Yu. F. Karyakin, V. L. Ginzburg, G. Kh. Popov, A. A. Sobchak, Yu. Yu. Boldyrev and others.

The paradox was that, although the elections were organized and controlled by the CPSU, many figures who were more radical than Gorbachev, his political competitors, won. Before the elections, they had access only to informal tools of political struggle. Having become deputies with rights secured by law, they acquired a high legal status and wide opportunities. The new political system made it possible to form a different political elite, which opposed itself to the party apparatus.

At the April Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU, the concern of the party leaders was fully expressed. All the bitterness of defeat in the elections, the desire to shift the blame for the economic crisis of the socialist system, onto the “corrupting” role of the mass media, splashed out on M. S. Gorbachev. This was essentially the first massive offensive by conservative forces in the party apparatus against Gorbachev, against "perestroika". Despite this, he managed to remove 74 members and 24 candidate members from the Central Committee of the CPSU.

I Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR

The congress lasted from May 25 to June 9, 1989. And all 16 days under the arches of the Kremlin Palace passions raged, hitherto unknown to Soviet citizens. The whole country, without looking up, followed the live (for the first time!) broadcast of the congress on television.

Already from the first minutes of the congress, the prepared scenario was violated. A deputy from Riga, VF Tolpezhnikov, unexpectedly rose to the podium and offered to honor the memory of those who died in Tbilisi. Hall stood up. A. D. Sakharov demanded that the agenda be changed, placing as its first issue the adoption of a decree on the exclusive right of the congress to appoint the highest officials of the USSR. It would seem that procedural issues were moving into a political plane. The question of the possibility of combining the posts of General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU and Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR came to the fore. It was decided in favor of Gorbachev: he remained General Secretary and was elected Chairman of the Supreme Council.

The deputies were divided into two camps. The majority, which consisted of the party nomenklatura, which Yu. N. Afanasiev aptly called the "aggressively obedient majority," supported Gorbachev, albeit with reservations. Democrats, on the other hand, noted the failure of economic reforms and pointed to the perniciousness of the administrative-command system of governance. They put forward the slogan of abolishing Article 6 of the USSR Constitution, which determined the leading role of the CPSU in the political system of the USSR. This was a matter of principle: if for Gorbachev and his supporters the reform of the political system seemed complete, then the opposition demanded the creation of conditions for a multi-party system.

The congress not only did not consolidate society around the "perestroika" leadership of the CPSU, but, on the contrary, divided it into supporters and opponents of the Communist Party. He publicly raised the question of the illegitimacy of her monopoly on the government of the country and questioned the reality of the federal structure of the country under such governance. Of great importance for the further development of events was the fact that the Russian democrats supported the deputies from the Baltic states on the issue of the economic independence of their republics.

In his report “On the Main Directions of the Domestic and Foreign Policy of the USSR,” M. S. Gorbachev, already as Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, emphasized that the time of party dictatorship had passed, and a new political regime was being established in the country. Gorbachev defined the program of further actions as follows: to promote a “full-blooded market” in the economy, to implement the slogan “Power to the Soviets!” in politics, to strive for the elimination of nuclear weapons in foreign policy and to negotiate in order to achieve a balance of interests in international affairs.

A long parting with Lenin for Gorbachev turned into a definition of his ideological position as a centrist. In ideological terms, this meant the rejection of the class perception of the world, from the command-administrative economy and the recognition of the rule of law, which was alien to the practice of the past 70 years. In political terms, this was expressed in maneuvering between extremes: half-hearted economic reforms, a “balanced” personnel policy, hopes for the reformability of the CPSU, reconciliation of right and left, etc.

The ideology of the democrats reflected a view of Soviet history as a history of continuous violence and irrational bigotry. Criticism of the policy of the past years raised the question of the power itself, which was raised at the congress in the draft Decree on Power, proposed by Academician AD Sakharov. It followed from the Decree that the CPSU needed to "resign." This idea, publicly voiced at a meeting of a legitimate representative body of power, united the democratic opposition, which formulated the economic perspective as "a society with an efficient economy in a market environment."

After the congress, the political process began to develop according to a confrontational scenario. Between the radical Democrats and Gorbachev's supporters, a struggle for support from the population unfolded. The Democrats formed the Interregional Deputy Group of People's Deputies of the USSR (IDG), which included about 300 people, and the Coordinating Council of more than 20 people, elected five of its co-chairs - B. N. Yeltsin, Yu. N. Afanasyev, G. Kh. Popov , A. D. Sakharova and V. A. Palma.

In September 1989, the MDG formulated its political program. The key was the demand for the abolition of the 6th article of the Constitution of the USSR. After the sudden death of A. D. Sakharov on December 14, 1989, B. N. Yeltsin became the leader of the MDG. The Democrats had a reputation for being opponents of the partocrats, to whom the Democrats themselves included not only party conservatives, but also party reformers headed by M. S. Gorbachev.

To the generally accepted rules of law

The US administration developed a new strategy for relations with the USSR - National Security Analysis-33 - which was presented to President George W. Bush in March 1989. The document stated that Gorbachev's reforms "lead to a change in the Soviet social order in the direction of Western liberal democracy." During 1989, US Secretary of State John Baker met several times with M. S. Gorbachev and Foreign Minister E. A. Shevardnadze. In June, George Bush visited Poland and Hungary. Meetings with their leaders and the opposition convinced him that in the countries of Eastern Europe, with the weakening of dependence on the USSR, "socialism was being curtailed."

The growing economic crisis in the USSR forced MS Gorbachev to speed up rapprochement with Western countries. Their governments put forward a condition: if you want to get loans, observe human rights, above all freedom of speech, assembly, and political associations. But for the CPSU (party-state), whose policy was to maintain a monopoly on power at any cost, including repression against dissidents, this meant a greater likelihood of leaving the political scene. Nevertheless, in January 1989, the Soviet Union signed the Vienna Declaration of the CSCE, according to which it was obliged to bring its legislation into line with the norms of law generally accepted in world practice. The USSR for the first time agreed with the priority of international law in relation to the legislation of the country.

In April 1989, article 70 of the Criminal Code of the RSFSR was repealed, which provided for punishment for the manifestation of political dissent. Humanitarian and human rights topics were discussed at the Paris (1989), Copenhagen (1990) and Moscow (1991) meetings of the CSCE. Soviet legislation was brought into line with international conventions and treaties.

The decision to translate the legislation of the USSR into international legal standards had far-reaching consequences for relations with the socialist countries and between the union republics. The activity of the nationalist forces until 1989 was restrained by the threat of applying the relevant articles of the Criminal Code. After the signing of the Vienna Declaration, the nationalist opposition received a legal basis for legalization. And centrifugal tendencies intensified in the USSR and Eastern Europe.

In March, the Soviet leadership announced a unilateral reduction in defense spending and a reduction in the armed forces. During 1989-1991, it was planned to reduce the size of the army by 500 thousand people, defense spending - by more than 14%. These actions in the West were perceived as forced, associated with a deep economic crisis, and only increased doubts about the solvency of the USSR. There were difficulties in obtaining commercial loans.

In June 1989, MS Gorbachev paid a visit to the FRG. In a joint statement signed at the end of the meeting, the role of both countries in building a new Europe was defined. Mutually beneficial and equal cooperation was envisaged. Such a turn in relations put on the agenda the extremely painful for the USSR question of the unification of Germany. The unification was not exclusively an intra-German problem; the countries that won the Second World War were also related to it: the USSR, the USA, England and France. The divided Germany ensured the balance of the two socio-political systems.

The GDR, like most socialist countries, experienced serious economic difficulties and needed reforms aimed at democratizing the economic and political system. But the leadership of the country, headed by E. Honecker, had a negative attitude towards the reforms carried out in the USSR. The opposition consolidated on the slogan of unification with the FRG, on the desire of the citizens of East Germany to achieve a high standard of living for the inhabitants of West Germany. The foreign policy of MS Gorbachev, oriented towards the democratization of international relations, objectively contributed to these aspirations. Negotiations for the unification of Germany were difficult. Having recognized the right of the German people to unite, Soviet diplomacy intended to drag out the process in time and, as one of the conditions, put forward the demand that a united Germany not join NATO. On November 9, 1989, a symbolic event took place - the Berlin Wall collapsed, although negotiations on the terms of unification continued until October 1990.

The federal states of Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia began to disintegrate. The communist leaders of Serbia, headed by S. Milosevic, decided to play the card of great Serbian chauvinism in order to retain power and unleashed a fratricidal war in Yugoslavia.

On the initiative of George W. Bush, on December 2-3, 1989, he met with MS Gorbachev on the island of Malta aboard the Soviet ship "Maxim Gorky". Both leaders issued statements declaring the end of the Cold War. This meeting is usually regarded as the victory of the "new political thinking" over the thinking in the spirit of the "cold war" that dominated the world in the second half of the twentieth century. Over time, in the Western world, changes in relations with the USSR began to be interpreted as their victory in the Cold War.

The Soviet government, forced to ask the West for economic assistance, for politically motivated loans, could not use force to keep vassal regimes in power in Eastern Europe. During the negotiations in Malta, Gorbachev informally assured Bush that the USSR would not use military force in Eastern Europe. By 1989, when the political elites of these countries realized the reality, the collapse of the Warsaw Pact was only a matter of time. In Poland, negotiations began with the Solidarity trade union on holding free elections. In these elections, the ruling party suffered a crushing defeat. In Romania, even the use of weapons by security forces did not save the regime; President N. Ceausescu was executed.

The prospects for revising the foreign policy in relations with the countries of the Asia-Pacific region have also opened up. In particular, the leadership of Vietnam was asked to withdraw its troops from Cambodia, which helped to improve relations between the USSR and China and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). The withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan was nearing completion, and the situation in the Indochina region improved. This created the prerequisites for a Soviet-Chinese summit meeting. The official visit of the Soviet delegation headed by M. S. Gorbachev on May 15-18, 1989 was the first visit of the head of the USSR to the PRC in the previous 30 years. This visit marked the beginning of the normalization of relations between the states. As a result of the second visit of the Soviet leadership to China in May 1991, a Soviet-Chinese border treaty was signed.

However, not everyone then and later considered the foreign policy of the USSR in 1990-1991 successful. Some viewed it as a national catastrophe. The “concessions” made by M. S. Gorbachev to the West, in accordance with his ideal of “new political thinking”, but rather under the pressure of the economic crisis in the USSR, increasingly frightened the supporters of the “socialist choice”. Accustomed to militant anti-imperialist rhetoric, the party nomenklatura, part of the generals, officers, and intelligentsia considered such a desire to establish cooperation with developed countries as a “surrender of positions”, as a betrayal of national interests, or, more mildly, as unjustified concessions.

Gradual reforms on the road to collapse

By March 1989, the price of oil fell to $40-50 per 1 ton from $125 in 1985 and largely determined the economic situation in the USSR, its inability to maintain food imports in the same volumes. The unforeseen expenses connected with natural and social cataclysms have affected also. So, in the summer of 1988, the largest earthquake occurred in Armenia. The cities of Spitak, Leninakan and Kirovakan were completely destroyed. More than 24 thousand people died, direct material damage was estimated at 10 billion rubles (at 1988 prices), and taking into account the costs of restoring the destroyed, this amount should be at least doubled.

In 1989, official statistics recognized a decline in industrial production. The ongoing economic policy could not provide stabilization. The economic reform program of 1987 was buried, control over the money supply and money incomes of the population was lost. Despite the crisis and the decline in production, the growth rate of the population's money income in 1989 was 1.4 times higher than the growth rate of the population's expenditures on the purchase of goods and services.

The “money overhang” of unsecured money grew rapidly. In 1989, additional money was released into circulation twice as much as in the previous year - 18.3 billion rubles. A huge additional money supply in the context of a general shortage could not be spent on the purchase of food and goods and took the form of forced savings. Although productivity did not increase at all with such a rapid increase in income, wage increases were perceived by people as honestly earned money.

In 1989, the deficit was 92 billion rubles, or 10% of the gross national product. To cover it, the government used loans from the State Bank of the USSR, "printing press" and loans abroad. Recognizing the country's financial situation as critical, the leadership of the USSR announced plans to cut military spending. In March 1989, a resolution was adopted to cut Union budget expenditures in 1990 by 29.3 billion rubles and increase revenues by 33.7 billion. This meant that, under the pressure of the crisis, MS Gorbachev nevertheless decided to go into conflict with the party and economic elite. But, as the further development of events showed, the measures taken were not enough to stop the impending catastrophe.

It was obvious that in order to reduce the budget deficit and reduce the growth rate of the money supply, at least it was necessary to sharply increase retail prices. But in the face of social tension and political destabilization, the country's top leadership considered this too dangerous and unacceptable and gave priority to political rather than economic reforms. This reorientation took place when it had already become clear to the majority of the population that it was precisely the economic achievements of "perestroika" that turned out to be minimal. The people lived even worse than in previous years.

Nomenklatura privatization and primary accumulation of capital gained momentum. On the basis of the Law "On Cooperation", over a short period of time, more than 1,000 commercial banks were established, for which banking legislation was not even developed. State specialized banks (Promstroybank, Agroprombank, etc.) were transformed into commercial ones.

The legalization of cooperative and then small-scale private production took place in conditions of disordered relations between the state and non-state sectors of the economy. The founders of many commercial banks were large state-owned enterprises. These banks, as well as cooperatives at state-owned enterprises, were often used for the semi-legal transfer of state funds to private business. In the course of nomenklatura privatization, the property of state enterprises was simply recorded as a contribution to certain joint-stock companies controlled by private individuals - yesterday's party officials. Introduced in accordance with the Law "On State Enterprise (Association)", the state order, according to Prime Minister N. I. Ryzhkov, "turned out to be at the mercy of ministries and departments and was turned by them into a new package of traditional methods of targeted directive planning."

Despite the rapid deterioration of the economic situation, the authorities delayed the transition to a market economy. The approach of gradual, evolutionary reform of the economic system prevailed in the government. In the summer of 1989, Academician L. I. Abalkin, a supporter of this approach, was appointed Deputy Prime Minister. He formed the State Commission on Economic Reform, which included Academicians A. G. Aganbegyan and S. S. Shatalin, Corresponding Member of the USSR Academy of Sciences V. A. Martynov, specialists in management problems, professors R. N. Evstigneev, G. A. Yeghiazaryan, B. Z. Milner.

The commission declared its striving for a variety of forms of ownership, their equality, and the transformation of the market into an instrument for coordinating commodity producers. But at the same time, she tried to preserve the bureaucratic state regulation of the economy. There were disputes, laws written in the Soviet tradition were developed and adopted, that is, laws of indirect action, with many references to yet-to-be-planned by-laws. The effect of such "reformatory" activity without price liberalization and financial stabilization was zero.

The budget deficit made it necessary to reduce budget financing. The lack of currency led to a sharp decline in food imports - the cities were threatened with starvation. Money turned into cut paper. Barter prevailed in relations between enterprises, which objectively led to a reduction in production. The issue of money to cover the budget deficit spurred the shortage of goods in stores and the rise in prices in collective farm markets. Their prices were already 3-4 times higher than state retail prices. But the State Commission still leaned towards a smooth, "evolutionary" version of economic reforms.

Split in the party

In the autumn of 1989, political destabilization entered a new phase. The Communist Party actually split not only along ideological currents - into Stalinists, Leninists, Marxists and reformists, but also along national-republican lines. It was no longer the party-state that was in power in 1985. After the XXVII Congress of the CPSU, the composition of the district committees and city committees changed three times, the Soviet bodies were almost completely updated, and after the January 1987 Plenum of the Central Committee, the composition of the first secretaries of the republics and regional committees also changed. A rapid advance to the top of the second and third echelons of the nomenclature began. The displacement of the older generation of party officials was accompanied by a general weakening of the role of the party in society.

In September 1989, the Russian Bureau of the Central Committee of the CPSU was formed, chaired by M. S. Gorbachev. At the September 1989 Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU, the leader of the Communist Party of Lithuania, A. Brazauskas, publicly announced that the Lithuanian communists supported the demand for Lithuania's secession from the USSR. In early December, the Supreme Soviets of the Baltic republics abolished Article 6 of the USSR Constitution on their territory and recognized the illegality of the forcible annexation of these republics to the USSR in 1940. A mass withdrawal of republican communists from the CPSU began, the republican party organizations were divided into two: the CPSU and the Communist Party of a particular republic.

II Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR

The congress was held from 12 to 24 December 1989. Deputies from the Baltic States, with the support of Russian democrats, initiated discussion and evaluation of the previously secret Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact (the 1939 Treaty between the USSR and Germany). The congress not only condemned this pact, but also recognized its legal inconsistency, thereby providing a legal justification for the withdrawal of the Baltic republics from the Union. In fact, the problem of separatism was legalized as a natural component of the general democratic process of "perestroika".

In terms of the intensity of passions, the rally activity of the deputies, this congress was similar to the First. In connection with the upcoming elections of people's deputies in the republics and regions, the deputies adopted the Law "On Amendments and Additions to the Constitution (Basic Law) of the USSR on Electoral System Issues" dated December 20, 1989 No. 963-I. Barriers for candidates in the form of “meetings of public representatives” organized by the district committees of the party were removed from the electoral legislation.

The congress heatedly discussed the report of the parliamentary commission to study the causes of the tragedy in Tbilisi, when the troops of the Transcaucasian Military District dispersed a peaceful rally in Tbilisi. 19 people were killed, more than 250 were injured of varying severity. The commission was headed by A. A. Sobchak. The tension in the hall reached a climax during the speech of the military prosecutor A.F. Katusev, who completely removed the blame from the army for its actions. Georgian deputies with exclamations of "shame!" left the hall, followed by deputies from the Baltic States and the MDG. Gorbachev called on the deputies to return to the hall, promising to speak immediately after the break in a spirit of reconciliation and respect for the feelings of the Georgian people. During the break, additions were made to the draft resolution, which explicitly condemned the use of violence against the demonstrators.

Democrats set the tone at the convention. Ideas were voiced about abandoning the leading role of the CPSU, dismantling the unitary state of the USSR. And in this context - about the transition to a competitive market and private ownership of the means of production. But these proposals did not find a place in the report of the Prime Minister N. I. Ryzhkov. Nevertheless, the majority of deputies voted for confidence in the government.

Following the results of the congress, on December 25-26, 1989, an extraordinary Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU was held, at which M. S. Gorbachev called Lithuania an integral part of the USSR and promised that there would be no second Tbilisi. He said that he did not intend to ban the Lithuanian People's Front "Sąjūdis" and expel the first secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Lithuania, A. Brazauskas, from the party. But the real situation at the Plenum testified that the Secretary General was losing power. Top party functionaries shouted rude remarks from their seats, "slammed" the speeches of his supporters. A conservative wave was growing in the Central Committee of the CPSU.

Foreign policy

A symbolic event took place on November 9, 1989 - the Berlin Wall collapsed, although negotiations on the terms of unification continued until October 1990.

In February 1990, at a meeting in Moscow with FRG Chancellor G. Kohl, MS Gorbachev proposed to "take the unification of Germany into your own hands." Discussions about the right of a united Germany to join military alliances are a thing of the past. The Soviet leadership recognized such a right for her, with all the ensuing other rights and obligations. This concession was made in connection with the rapid deterioration of the socio-economic and political situation in the USSR, the most severe need for loans for the purchase of food. Germany fulfilled its obligations and provided the USSR and then Russia with loans for a total of almost 100 billion marks, or more than half of the total amount of foreign aid. Among the German population, a movement began to provide humanitarian and food assistance to the Soviet people. A group of presidents of the largest German banks came to Moscow with specific proposals and projects.

During Mikhail Gorbachev's visit to the United States in late May - early June 1990, the issue of reducing offensive weapons was discussed. As a result of the visit, a protocol was signed to the Treaty between the USSR and the USA on underground explosions for peaceful purposes, the Agreement on the destruction and cessation of the production of chemical weapons, as well as a trade agreement that abolished discriminatory measures against the USSR. But restrictions on the supply of high-tech goods and computers remained.

In the fall of 1990, a meeting was held in Paris between representatives of 22 NATO countries and the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO), which signed the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE), in particular, on equalizing the total number of weapons from NATO and the Warsaw Pact. The treaty entered into force on July 17, 1992. The vast superiority in conventional weapons that the Soviet Union had in Europe was eliminated.

In 1990, on the initiative of MS Gorbachev, the Charter of Paris for a New Europe was signed, proclaiming an era of democracy, peace and unity on the continent. This document declared the end of the Cold War. At the same time, the "Declaration of the 22" was approved - a joint statement by the NATO countries and the Warsaw Pact, which stated that the states of both military blocs do not consider each other as hypothetical opponents.

The crisis of the CMEA and the Warsaw Pact

By 1990, the CMEA countries accounted for 80% of Soviet imports. In the GDR, the Soviet Union bought wagons, in Hungary - Ikarus buses, in Czechoslovakia - Skoda cars, in Bulgaria - wines and cigarettes. Clothing and footwear were purchased in huge volumes. And the USSR exported oil to the fraternal countries, and at very preferential prices, despite the multiple rise in prices on the world market, other raw materials and some types of equipment.

By 1989-1990, political elites had established themselves in the countries of Eastern Europe, considering dependence on the USSR as the reason for the degradation of the political and economic institutions of their countries. They defiantly severed cultural ties, and progress began in economic relations within the CMEA. Ministers and politicians attributed the difficulties experienced by their countries to the low quality of imported products or to the fact that it was impossible to use the CMEA currency (transferable ruble) outside this union. Soon dull discontent gave way to an open clash of interests. The rejection of subjectivity in setting prices for export-import deliveries required settlements between the CMEA countries in convertible currency. This order, at the suggestion of the USSR, was introduced on January 1, 1991. None of the countries had a convertible currency, which led to the rupture of economic ties between them. The CMEA collapsed, joint projects were abandoned.

The Warsaw Treaty Organization also lost its meaning. In June 1990, Hungary announced its withdrawal from it, followed by the rest of the countries of the military alliance. A year later, in Budapest, an official statement was published on the termination of the activities of all political, and then military structures of the Department of Internal Affairs and on the abolition of the CMEA. This is how the military and economic organizations of the former socialist countries ceased to exist. Reduced not only economic, but also cultural cooperation.

It is unfair to reproach MS Gorbachev for inaction at a time when ties with Eastern European countries were being severed. The revision of the results of the historical path of the USSR in the twentieth century, the rejection of communist mythology and the need for Western loans did not allow the leader of the Soviet reformers to resort to political or military pressure on the former allies. He tried to build new, equal relations with his neighbors. In an effort to prevent alienation in Soviet-Polish relations, in the spring of 1990 Moscow officially recognized the responsibility of the Stalinist leadership for the execution of captured Polish officers in Katyn in 1940. Poland was given documents relating to the events of those years. However, this recognition was not enough for reconciliation, the attitude of many Poles towards the USSR remained negative.

On the way to Russian sovereignty

By 1990, the demand for Russian sovereignty was becoming increasingly popular in Russian political currents of various orientations. Society has consolidated around this slogan for several reasons. Firstly, because of mass dissatisfaction with the drop in living standards in the context of a permanent socio-economic crisis. People saw that the union authorities were not solving the economic problems of the country, and hoped that the Russian authorities, having rejected the conservative majority of the Union Congress of People's Deputies, would be able to carry out urgent market reforms. Secondly, the Russian party nomenklatura sought to gain power no less than the nomenclature of other union republics received. Thirdly, the claims of Russians to the policy of the center in connection with the growth of anti-Russian sentiments in the union republics also had an effect.

In order to "knock the ground" out from under the feet of the Russian democrats, the question of Russia's economic sovereignty was raised at the very first meeting of the newly created Bureau of the Central Committee of the CPSU for the RSFSR, chaired by M. S. Gorbachev on January 15, 1990. It is important that the leaders of the CPSU themselves raised the question of Russia's sovereignty. Later, he was called "heretical" and the blame for "sovereignization" was laid on political opponents of the Central Committee of the CPSU.

The legal basis for Russia's sovereignty was made up of changes to the Constitution of the RSFSR introduced in the course of the reform of the political system. According to the decisions of the XIX All-Union Party Conference, held on October 27, 1989, the Supreme Council introduced 25 amendments to the Constitution of the RSFSR. The congress of people's deputies of the RSFSR became the highest body of state power in the RSFSR, which was given the right to change the Constitution, determine the domestic and foreign policy of the RSFSR in accordance with the policy of the USSR. The congress elected by secret ballot from among its members the Supreme Soviet - a permanent legislative, administrative and control body of state power of the RSFSR. The latter consisted of two chambers: the Council of the Republic and the Council of Nationalities. The Chairman of the Supreme Soviet was the highest official of the RSFSR, elected by the congress by secret ballot from among its members for a term of 5 years. The amendments did not stipulate the division of powers between the RSFSR and the USSR. This situation laid a time bomb under the relationship between the union center and the RSFSR.

The election campaign for the election of people's deputies of the RSFSR began. In the context of the growing financial crisis and increased social tension, the main topic and subject of political confrontation between the Union and Russian authorities was the question of the depth and direction of economic reforms. The allied leadership strove for an evolutionary transformation of the administrative-command system into a market one. This policy led to the destruction and plunder of state assets that had become "no man's", essentially covered up nomenklatura privatization, did not give hope for a quick transformation of the economic system, and doomed the population to years of hardship.

However, by that time it had already become clear that it was impossible to combine directive planning and the market. If in directive planning it is important for directors of enterprises to carry out a plan lowered down from above, no matter how absurd it may be, then in market conditions their goal is to make a profit and win a place in the market. These goals of business entities were incompatible.

Gorbachev and his entourage continued to talk about market socialism and looked for ways to build it, although the experience of other countries spoke of the unrealizability of this idea. Neither Yugoslavia nor Hungary, who tried to build market socialism, succeeded in eliminating the main reason for the inefficiency of the socialist economy - the inefficiency of public investment. If in the USSR the official did not care where and with what return "no one's" state investments were invested, then another obstacle to the growth of labor efficiency arose at the "self-governing" Yugoslav state enterprises. Through the organs of workers' self-government, it was difficult to carry out decisions on investing profits in production. Workers needed money for a better life today, they did not want to wait for new equipment to pay off, they demanded higher wages, bringing the cost of production almost to the selling price. Under such conditions, investments were reduced to a minimum.

In Western countries, similar problems caused by the unwillingness of workers - co-owners of enterprises - to invest income in the development of enterprises, were observed in production cooperatives and in enterprises bought out from owners by their employees.

A logical conclusion suggested itself: state property, even in market conditions, turns out to be a brake on the country's economic development, and hence on raising the living standards of the population. Without the legitimization of large-scale private ownership of the means of production, effective investment cannot be expected. Realizing this, the Russian democrats set as their goal the return of Russia to a competitive market, to the division of power and property. This involved the rejection of socialism in any form: from the Stalinist Gulag, from the Brezhnev stagnant, from the Yugoslav market.

During the election campaign, a negative public opinion was formed in society about the results of “perestroika” in general and about MS Gorbachev personally. On the contrary, the speeches of B. N. Yeltsin and other democratic leaders contributed to the growth of public support for the demands of radical reforms and the rejection of socialist myths. Populist slogans also played their role: abolish privileges, transfer state dachas and mansions to children, etc.

According to the electoral law then in force, the elections were held according to the majoritarian system. Each candidate fought for votes independently, the support of public organizations was minimal. However, the orientation of the candidate's speeches allowed voters to understand which camp he belongs to. However, there were also attempts to consolidate the political forces participating in the elections. In January 1990, the pre-election bloc of informal organizations "Democratic Russia" was established.

B. N. Yeltsin conducted his election campaign in Sverdlovsk, where before the "perestroika" he worked as the first secretary of the regional committee. He criticized the CPSU and specifically Gorbachev, supported the slogan on the abolition of the 6th article of the Constitution, insisted on the adoption of laws on property and land, said that Russia should become a presidential republic, suggested that the communists, within the framework of a multi-party system, form an independent party focused on democratic socialism.

On February 4, 1990, a grand rally took place in Moscow. Its organizers urged Muscovites to support supporters of the democratic path of development in the elections. There was a demand to give the opposition the opportunity to influence politics, there was criticism of Gorbachev. On February 25, new rallies were held demanding the removal of the CPSU from power.

Elections of people's deputies of the RSFSR took place on March 4. Among those elected, 86% were members of the CPSU, of which 20-25% supported the "Democratic Platform of the CPSU"; 12.6% - scientists, 5% - workers. There were many military and journalists. Only the weekly "Arguments and Facts" received 10 seats. And party and Soviet workers - 110 mandates. The democratic opposition did not win, but received at least a third of the votes. In the constituency where B. N. Yeltsin ran, 11 more candidates were registered. But he won by a huge margin and received over 85% of the vote.

The opposition is organizing

By the summer of 1989, the conservative opposition announced the creation of the United Front of Workers (UFT), and in the summer of 1990 it established the Russian Communist Party (RKP). The slogan of the Russian communists is "to stop the degeneration of perestroika in an anti-socialist and anti-people direction." They declared the main enemy to be the Democrats, who "occupied a dominant position in the media" and "led part of the active citizens with false guidelines." Russian orthodox communists rejected the concept of "universal values" proposed by Gorbachev, arguing that proletarian values ​​are just universal human values. The leading ideologists of the Russian communists were the professor of political economy of the Higher Trade Union School A. A. Sergeev, G. I. Zyuganov and. K. Polozkov, elected First Secretary of the RCP.

At the February 1990 Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU, party conservatives accused M. S. Gorbachev of "creating a regime of unlimited freedom for the activities of anti-socialist and nationalist groups", and together with him A. N. Yakovlev and E. A. Shevardnadze - of the failure of all economic reforms, the collapse of the Warsaw Pact, the departure from communist ideology. At the March 1990 Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU, E. K. Ligachev accused Gorbachev of weakening the party and that, by refusing to support the communist parties in the socialist countries, he contributed to the fall of the socialist regimes. Ligachev categorically stated that "it is impossible to modernize socialism, to treat the pain points of our economy with the methods of capitalist economy."

On the same flank, the national patriots, or sovereigns, also acted. This opposition took shape in the association "Soyuz" within the framework of the Supreme Soviet and the Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR. Its leaders were V. I. Alksnis, E. V. Kogan, Yu. I. Blokhin. The "Union" took an uncompromising, aggressive position in relation to M. S. Gorbachev, demanded that he be removed from power.

In addition to the RCP and the Union, smaller conservative groups emerged in 1990: "Unity - for Leninism and communist ideals", "Marxist Labor Party - the party of the dictatorship of the proletariat" and others.

Noticeable activity on the conservative flank was shown by some representatives of the intelligentsia and the Union of Writers of the RSFSR, headed by Yu. V. Bondarev and A. A. Prokhanov. In their ideology, monarchical sentiments, interest and idealization of pre-revolutionary Russia were intricately intertwined with sympathy for the Stalinist regime.

On the reformist political flank, the pre-election bloc "Democratic Russia" took shape in the All-Russian Movement with branches in all regions of Russia, with representative bodies and apparatus. This movement aimed to achieve the sovereignty of Russia and finally move to the market and legal private property. Many of the program goals of "Democratic Russia" repeated the demands put forward by the MDG.

The "Democratic Platform in the CPSU" formed its own elected bodies and began to publish a newspaper. The leadership of the CPSU did not consider the Democratic Platform as an ally, although its slogans of transforming the CPSU into a social democratic party resonated with many ordinary communists. M. S. Gorbachev banned the membership of the Democratic Platform activists in the CPSU.

Extraordinary III Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR

MS Gorbachev understood that under the new conditions the post of General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU and Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR no longer guaranteed the preservation of his status. The idea arose to introduce the post of president, who could be elected at the Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR. To introduce amendments to the Constitution, it was necessary to enlist the support of the Politburo and the Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU. The promotion of the plan took place under the guise of correcting the political reform, the purpose of which from now on was to be not the strengthening of democracy, but the construction of a rule of law state.

Among Gorbachev's entourage, the opinion prevailed that the Union leadership "lacked power." In many respects, this was true, because under the conditions of the policy of separating the functions of the CPSU and the state, the influence of the party apparatus on what was happening in the country decreased. It seemed that the introduction of the presidency of the USSR would help curb the spread of social and ethnic conflicts. It is no coincidence that the establishment of this institution was accompanied by a discussion of the need to introduce a state of emergency or direct presidential rule in areas of instability.

On March 12, 1990, the Extraordinary III Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR began its work. AI Lukyanov, First Deputy Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, made a report on the introduction of amendments and additions to the Constitution of the USSR and the establishment of the post of President of the USSR. He presented the presidency as a new frontier of "perestroika", a continuation of the redistribution of state and party power.

The political intrigue of the congress was that the election of MS Gorbachev to this post was held with the support of the Interregional Deputy Group - Gorbachev's political opponent. Such a temporary alliance was needed both by Gorbachev, who was opposed by the conservatives, and by the democrats, who were counting on his support for the demand for the abolition of Article 6 of the Constitution. As a result, after manipulating the regulations, the Secretary General won a sufficient number of votes and was elected President of the USSR. At the same time, changes were made to Article 6 of the Constitution, which meant that the CPSU was losing its monopoly on power. From now on, other political parties could participate in the government of the country.

Gorbachev believed that he had strengthened his position, but subsequent events showed that this was not the case. The republics also began to introduce the posts of president, which nullified the idea of ​​strengthening the central government. On March 30, 1990, two weeks after Gorbachev's election, at a meeting of the Federation Council, it became known that the post of president had been introduced in Uzbekistan. To Gorbachev's bewildered question: “How did this happen? Without advice, consultations, the president is elected in Uzbekistan without any advice," - followed the calm answer of the Uzbek leader I. Karimov: "The people wanted it that way." Karimov was supported by N. Nazarbayev: “Yes, and here in Kazakhstan people also ask, why don’t we have a president?” . As a result, the regional elites received an additional powerful tool in the struggle for the sovereignty of the republics.

In order to still maintain the influence of the center, the allied leaders tried to strengthen the vertical of presidential power and change the nature of the federal structure of the Union. Many decisions of the President of the USSR also concerned further liberalization. So, in August 1990, by a special decree, the victims of political repressions of the 1920-1930s were rehabilitated, Soviet citizenship was returned to persons deprived of it in 1966-1968, including the writer A. I. Solzhenitsyn.

I Congress of People's Deputies of the RSFSR

On May 16, 1990, the First Congress of People's Deputies of the RSFSR began its work. The division of deputies took place along the line "reformers - conservatives". The core of the reformers were "Democratic Russia" and its allies. The reformers were represented by a wide range of political forces - from radical democrats to high-ranking representatives of the nomenklatura, who saw Boris Yeltsin as an authoritarian leader capable of bringing order to the country.

The congress culminated in the election of the Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR. BN Yeltsin had the greatest chance of being elected. M. S. Gorbachev openly opposed his candidacy, proposing an alternative - party orthodox I. K. Polozkov. On May 30, the third round of voting ended with Yeltsin's victory. In many ways, this predetermined the path of Russia.

The republic was declared a federation: it included autonomous republics - national-state formations, autonomous regions and districts. The congress formed the bicameral Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR and the Constitutional Commission.

At the congress, the "Declaration on the Sovereignty of Russia" of June 12, 1990 was adopted. It proclaimed the supremacy of the Constitution and laws of the RSFSR throughout the republic and provided for the suspension of normative acts of the USSR that conflicted with the laws of the RSFSR. By adopting this norm, the congress began a "war of laws".

Both democrats and members of communist factions advocated for Russian sovereignty. The democrats were driven to this by the consciousness that under the federal government it would not be possible to carry out consistent economic and political reforms. And this happened not only because Gorbachev relied on the “aggressively obedient majority” from the Central Asian republics at the congresses, but also because it was objectively beneficial for Central Asia to keep Russia as its donor.

Under the slogan of sovereignty, the Russian party nomenklatura fought with the allied for property. It was this that prompted her to vote for the sovereignty of the RSFSR, and then for laws that removed Russia from the jurisdiction of the USSR and allowed it to establish control over union property. For Russian politicians of any orientation, the task of transformation has turned from a purely economic into a political one, and the demand for sovereignty has turned into the right to independently carry out radical market reforms.

In general, the congress reflected the increased radicalism in the mood of Russians. He instructed the Supreme Council to develop and submit to the next congress a draft concept of economic reforms. During the work of the congress, the deputies elected to the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR gathered for the first session, the agenda of which was opened by the question of the formation of the Russian government. It was clear to the new Russian elite that it was about creating a team capable of implementing Russia's transition to market relations. As a result of long negotiations and voting, I. S. Silaev was appointed Prime Minister, G. A. Yavlinsky was appointed First Deputy Prime Minister, and B. G. Fedorov was appointed Minister of Finance.

For the success of the reforms, the most important condition was the removal of the Russian executive power from direct subordination to the federal authorities. On June 22, 1990, the congress adopted a resolution "On the delimitation of the functions of managing organizations on the territory of the RSFSR." According to this decree, the Council of Ministers of the RSFSR was removed from the subordination of the government of the USSR. Direct control over organizations, enterprises and institutions on the territory of the RSFSR was retained by eight allied ministries, including the Ministry of Defense and the KGB. But at the same time, it was stipulated that the republican Ministry of Internal Affairs interacts with the Union Ministry of Internal Affairs, and in the future it was supposed to create the KGB of the RSFSR. Autonomy was acquired by the State Bank of the RSFSR and Vnesheconombank, subordinate to the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR.

The confrontation between the union government and the party apparatus of the CPSU, on the one hand, and the new government of Russia, on the other, was felt throughout the congress. Gorbachev attended the sessions of the congress and spoke out against any sovereignty, realizing that this meant the beginning of the end of the USSR. The "Declaration of Russian Sovereignty" has become a political and legal instrument for distancing Russia from both the union center and party dictates. With this document, the decommunization of the Russian government began.

The last congress of the CPSU

A week after the adoption of the "Declaration on the Sovereignty of Russia", on June 19, 1990, the Conference of Russian Communists opened. Gorbachev was not opposed to the creation of the Communist Party of Russia, but suggested that the problems of the republic should not be confused with the problems of the party as a whole. At the conference, the Russian Communists demanded the resignation of the entire Politburo and the dissolution of the Central Committee of the CPSU.

Two weeks later, the last, XXVIII Congress of the CPSU was held. It became the scene of a clash between reformist and orthodox trends in the party. The orthodox denounced MS Gorbachev and his supporters that the CPSU had lost its power monopoly. This explained the economic problems and interethnic conflicts. B. N. Yeltsin proposed to rename the CPSU into the Party of Democratic Socialism and allow freedom of factions in it. After his proposal was rejected, Yeltsin announced his withdrawal from the CPSU and left the meeting room. It was an open challenge to the allied authorities and MS Gorbachev. The vote showed that a quarter of the congress delegates were against Gorbachev.

At this congress, for the last time, politicians came together who, by a whim of fate, first together, and then in different political columns - B. N. Yeltsin, M. S. Gorbachev and E. K. Ligachev. For Yeltsin, the tribune of the congress became a springboard for the beginning of a new stage in his political biography. Ligachev suffered a humiliating defeat in this auditorium. Having put forward his candidacy for the post of Deputy Secretary General, he did not receive support even from that part of the hall that was opposed to Gorbachev. And Gorbachev himself lost his right and left wings and remained the General Secretary of the CPSU, which had not changed in essence.

The resolution "Toward Humane Democratic Socialism" adopted by the congress recognized ideological pluralism, private property and the principle of separation of powers. But it was no longer a program of the communist party-state, but a declaration that was worth little. The CPSU was disintegrating, a mass exit from its ranks of those party members who were in it for career reasons began.

For Gorbachev himself, the results of the last party congress were not relevant. As president of the USSR, he was no longer under the control of the party, the Politburo and the Central Committee. These structures turned out to be practically excluded from participation in decision-making. And the abolition of the order of nomenklatura appointment, coupled with the deprivation of the CPSU of legal grounds for influencing personnel policy, freed the republican and local elites from the control of the party. The state apparatus of the Soviet Union turned into a complex conglomerate of cooperating and opposing groups and clans.

missed chance

By the middle of 1990, two centers of power had taken shape in the country: the Union, headed by the President of the USSR M. S. Gorbachev, and the Russian, headed by the Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR, B. N. Yeltsin. In the foreground were the problems of the economy. The federal government adopted the document "Basic Directions for the Stabilization of the National Economy and the Transition to Market Relations", known as the plan of L. I. Abalkin. The leadership of the RSFSR chose the program "500 days" by G. A. Yavlinsky.

Supporters of the union plan accused opponents of adventurism: they say that you cannot reform a gigantic country in 500 days. Supporters of Yavlinsky reproached the federal government for its primitivism and unwillingness to carry out reforms in general. In fact, in essence, the programs were similar and differed sharply from what had been done before. They were aimed at creating a market, and not at "restructuring" the planned economy. In 1990-1991, both the Union and Russian authorities recognized the need for private property, price liberalization, and did not rule out unemployment. The pace laid down in them was different. Abalkin's plan was based on a phased transition to the market and was designed for 5 years. And in the program "500 days" such a period was only a populist slogan. Yavlinsky had an intention to achieve financial stability with a breakthrough, "shock therapy" - price liberalization, the abolition of subsidies to enterprises and the reduction of military spending. Simultaneously with the transition to free prices, it was supposed to carry out a phased privatization.

MS Gorbachev understood that there was no alternative to the reforms declared by the 500 Days program. But, having estimated what hardships the radical reform brings, he was afraid of a social explosion. It should be noted that his rating by that time had fallen to an extremely low one. He decided to make one on the basis of two programs. But compromise proved impossible because they presented alternative methods of financial stabilization. The text of the "synthesized" program rather resembled a political economy textbook. Gorbachev's decision turned out to be wrong - he missed his chance.

The Russian leadership announced its intention to implement the 500 Days program on a national scale. But he did not succeed, since it was simply impossible to achieve financial stabilization without control over the "printing press", that is, the State Bank of the USSR. And he was still under the jurisdiction of the union center.

Allied leadership - loss of leverage

In the second half of 1990, the union leadership continued to lose the levers of state administration, and since January 1991, when the Russian Law “On Property in the RSFSR” dated December 24, 1990 No. 443-I, came into force, management in the sphere of production. Enterprises that came under Russian jurisdiction received tax benefits. There was an absurd situation when the neighboring factories worked according to different laws - the union and the Russian.

The allied authorities did not want to lose the agricultural sector as well. In response to the proposal of the democratic opposition to give the land to the peasants, at the October 1990 Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU, a decision was made stating that the Plenum was against the "transfer or sale of land to private ownership", and the Central Committee of the CPSU, "supporting various forms of denationalization of enterprises", acted "for the priority of collective forms of ownership." M. S. Gorbachev did not accept this idea either: “I have always advocated and continue to advocate for the market. But, being for the market, however, I, for example, do not accept private ownership of land - whatever you do with me. I won't accept. Lease - at least for 100 years, even with the right to sell lease rights, with inheritance. Yes! And I will not accept private property with the right to sell land. By the way, this is a tradition of the rural community.

union treaty

The question of federative relations in the USSR also caused sharp controversy. He became a key figure in late Soviet history. Even at the First Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR, the new Union Treaty was discussed as the crowning achievement of the reform of the political system. At the same time, work began on his projects. More than 200 experts of various specialties and representatives of over 40 political parties and movements were involved in it. The work was supervised by the Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR AI Lukyanov.

In August-October 1990, meetings of expert groups of the Union and Autonomous Republics were held. By November, the first version of the draft was prepared and published in the media. But he did not satisfy the leadership of the republics. Russian politicians focused not on the Union of Sovereign Republics, but on the Union of Sovereign States, that is, on the transformation of the republics of the USSR into independent states.

In December 1990, B. N. Yeltsin tried to conclude a quadripartite agreement within the Union - with Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine. Subsequently, Russia began to conclude bilateral agreements with the republics, which, in turn, entered into agreements with each other. Taken together, these treaties amounted to a kind of “anti-union treaty”.

The political process of strengthening the republics led to a crisis of Soviet statehood. The federal government was unable to get out of this crisis on its own, it appealed to public opinion. The question of the fate of the Soviet Union was made dependent on the results of the referendum, which was scheduled by the IV Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR for March 17, 1991. The majority of Soviet citizens, not accustomed to objecting to their superiors, spoke in favor of preserving the USSR. But it was not possible to save the Union. The interests of the national republican elites got in the way.

On the eve of bankruptcy

In late 1989 - early 1990, Soviet foreign trade organizations increasingly failed to meet the deadlines for payments under contracts. Without paying off their debts, counterparties refused to supply food, medicines, equipment, demanded prepayment for new deliveries, which further exacerbated the currency crisis. By the fall of 1989, Western banks began to doubt the advisability of providing new loans to the USSR. They were worried not only by the rapid growth of debt, but also by political instability in the country. A landslide decline in oil production was added to low oil prices - from 500 to 300 million tons.

The Soviet government, faced with the reluctance of commercial banks to provide loans, was forced to turn directly to the governments of Western countries for the provision of politically motivated loans.

Store shelves were completely empty, food shortages became total. The province has long been accustomed to cards. In December 1990, the rationed distribution of certain products was also introduced in Moscow, which until then had been supplied according to different standards.

In December 1990, MS Gorbachev was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize. That provoked a surge of criticism of his policies in the general population. The gap between the president's triumph abroad and the results of his reforms at home became apparent. The USSR entered 1991 without a plan or budget. All 15 republics consistently moved towards their sovereignty. There was a demarcation of political forces, the forks "market or plan", "democracy or authoritarianism", "one party-state or multi-party system", "pluralism or a single ideology" were realized. MS Gorbachev, speaking from the positions of centrism, sought to stand above the political battle. It was a dangerous choice. But the president of the USSR still headed the party and state apparatus and remained Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the USSR.

13 DAYS THAT SHAKED THE EMPIRE

May 1989 Moscow, Kremlin, First Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR. TVs on all day. Live Stream. Almost the entire two hundred and fifty millionth country from the Baltic States to Sakhalin clung to the screens, catching incredible words, empathizing, rejoicing and indignant. In the pauses between broadcasts, people called each other: “Did you hear? No, did you hear?!" Then they snapped up newspapers, argued furiously in families, in transport, at work, at rallies. Society woke up, tried the voice, tried to realize itself, to find a way forward. Almost all eyewitnesses of this epochal event, which took place 20 years ago, designate their impressions of that time with the word “shock”.

Now it is clear that it was these 13 days of the very first Congress of People's Deputies that abruptly turned the history of the last great empire called the USSR, changed the fate of millions of Soviet citizens. We've been arguing for 20 years how could this happen.

What was it

By that time, “perestroika” had been going on in the USSR for 4 years, begun in April 1985 by the new, reformist leadership of the CPSU, headed by M.S. Gorbachev. Successes were mainly foreign policy. Inside the country, things were getting worse for the communist reformers: stagnation in the economy, a hole in the budget, empty store shelves, queues and coupons. The fall in world oil prices to 10-12 dollars per barrel has put the people on the brink of starvation. Remember those supermarkets where the clerk tosses packets of faded sausages onto an empty counter, and the tired and angry crowd snatches them up, pushing and cursing? Remember looking for laundry detergent and toilet paper? Against such a background, calling for a "renewal of socialism" was already unthinkable.

Contrary to their old "principles", the "perestroika" communists had to decide on deep and risky transformations in the economy, introduce private property and the market, and give scope to entrepreneurship. And at the same time maintain control over state power and over the monopoly ruling party. The task is almost unsolvable. It was then that the Congress was invented. However, it did not have to be completely re-invented. Apparently, some intelligent head suggested reviving the practice ... Zemsky Sobors. Yes, yes, our Congress of People's Deputies was nothing more than a "class-representative" institution known from history, tailored in a new way. Zemsky Sobors, which operated in Russia in the 16th and 17th centuries, included delegates from all lands and estates - the tribal aristocracy, boyars, service nobility, church hierarchs, peasants and townspeople. Our Congress was formed according to the same principle of the political ark. Among the 2,250 deputies were the highest party and government officials, the military, priests, scientists, writers, actors and directors, workers and collective farmers. 750 people were elected from the territorial and national-territorial districts, another 750 from public organizations, to which the only Communist Party at that time was assigned. Of course, the Congress could not be any kind of parliament. But the Zemsky Sobor turned out quite well from it.

Who were they

The composition of the people's deputies of the first draft approximately, although complimentary, reflected the appearance of the then Soviet society. A quarter - from industry, 20% from agriculture, quite a lot (up to 28%) of the scientific and creative intelligentsia (140 members of various academies alone). High school workers, doctors and teachers, journalists and seven priests (including the future Patriarch Alexy) had to balance the presence of 237 party workers and 80 soldiers who remained in the service.

With all the costs of the then elections, there was a real elite Soviet society. Academician D. Likhachev convincingly stood up for the preservation of spirituality and culture, the writers-“soil” V. Belov and V. Rasputin continued the Slavophile tradition in a century-old dispute with Westerners E. Yevtushenko and Y. Karyakin. The third dimension in this dialogue was represented by the Kazakh O. Suleimenov and the Kyrgyz Ch. Aitmatov. Leningrad delegated to the Kremlin a whole creative constellation represented by D. Granin, K. Lavrov, O. Basilashvili. For the first time, two future governors of the northern capital, A. Sobchak and V Matvienko, showed themselves to the country. Projects for the restructuring of the socialist economy were put forward and discussed by leading scientists - academicians L. Abalkin, O. Bogomolov, G. Arbatov, V. Tikhonov, A. Emelyanov, Yu. Ryzhov, A. Yablokov. The most popular economists-publicists P. Bunich, N. Shmelev and G. Popov (later - the first mayor of Moscow) spoke about ways to combat the most acute economic crisis.

The great humanist Academician A. Sakharov, who selflessly and passionately stood up for human rights and dignity, became a kind of symbol of the First Congress. Next to the rebellious B. Yeltsin, who left the Communist Party and headed the opposition, subsequently well-known politicians appeared - G. Starovoitova, G. Burbulis and dozens of other democrats, and the frantic "hawk" V. Alksnis appeared in the fight against them.

Among the deputies in uniforms, Marshal S. Akhromeev and General B. Gromov (now the governor of the Moscow region) enjoyed the greatest authority. Brilliant lawyers S. Alekseev, A. M. Yakovlev, V. Yakovlev (the first head of the Supreme Arbitration Court), Yu. Kalmykov played a huge role in lawmaking. Irreconcilable opponents - "liberal" A.N. Yakovlev and "conservative" E. Ligachev, future leaders of neighboring states E. Shevardnadze, N. Nazarbaev, A. Akaev, I. Karimov - entered the deputy corps from the top party apparatus.

All speakers of subsequent "councils", "dooms" and meetings should consider A. Lukyanov, who gave unforgettable and virtuoso examples of speaker's art, their teacher in the difficult task of managing the parliamentary element.

Never again in the history of Soviet and Russian parliamentarism in the composition of the deputy corps was there such a concentration of minds, talents, professional competence, temperaments and bright personalities as at that first congress-cathedral. That is why it is a pity that such a brilliant potential was used for such a short time.

What could they

Formally, Gorbachev and his entourage took a huge personal risk by creating a constitutional center of power that they could not control administratively. According to the constitution, the Congress was the highest body of state power, competent to consider any a question assigned to the jurisdiction of the USSR, including making immediate changes to the constitution itself. This was already a "bomb", a controlled political coup. But at first, control remained reliable. The party apparatus, which wielded decisive influence in the outlying and rural areas, as well as in many public organizations, could rely entirely or mainly on the loyalty of approximately two thirds Congress. Only about a third of the deputies, mostly from Moscow and Leningrad, were independent and critical.

The congress allowed the “perestroika” communists to solve several problems: to show the country and the world a new attractive political regime, while de facto remaining at the helm; to share "with all the earth" responsibility for the ongoing reforms; create a channel to release steam of public discontent; get for themselves a new non-partisan source of legitimacy - from people's representatives; at the same time restrain the conservatives in the Communist Party itself by the threat of their "separation from the state" and failure in the elections.

Looking back, we should recognize the plan with the Congress as quite correct and at first successful.

What did they achieve

No one expected an immediate explosion of lawmaking from the First Congress. His main achievement is elsewhere. congress woke up country. By that time, the majority of Soviet people lived, as it were, with a divided consciousness: in reality, they saw their own poverty, wretchedness of life, limited life prospects, bureaucratic omnipotence, and completely different pictures were drawn in the media and public life. Official glorifications to the only and wisest party, arguments about the advantages of socialism and dull propaganda clichés reigned.

Forced participation in the ritual "approval" with a general feeling of a dead end gave rise to latent mass discontent among the people, which was prevented from manifesting only by the absence of an organizing center and bright leadership. The First Congress showed the leaders and gave the decisive signal "It's time!". The accumulated public discontent broke out and immediately became a political force. Under the direct influence of the First and subsequent Congresses, discontent turned into a revolution.

As early as April 1989, the newly elected Muscovite people's deputies formed the "Moscow group" and prepared for a fight at the Congress. The task was to get the head of state out of the control of the party (M. Gorbachev was seen in this capacity), to consolidate the principles of democracy and the course towards a market economy.

It is curious that the first meeting of future oppositionists took place ... at the Center for Eye Microsurgery, chaired by its leader Svyatoslav Fedorov. It was there that the tactic was chosen: to propose concise fundamental acts to the Congress, after their rejection - to appeal to the people for direct support and seek the withdrawal of opponents of change from the deputy corps. Academician Sakharov suggested a simpler tactic: “It is not known how long this entire thaw will last. It is necessary, under any pretext, to go to the microphone and speak the truth. If we can do this for at least a few days, we will have another country…” I must say that this approach turned out to be the most effective.

Political struggle

The congress became the arena of a real and dramatic political struggle, which took place in front of the whole people and with the direct participation of the people. Thousands of calls and telegrams were daily sent to the Congress and individual deputies, which were regularly read from the rostrum, and rallies were in full swing on the streets of the evening and night. In Moscow, Pushkin Square, Cinema House and Luzhniki became the centers of the rally controversy. Among the street tribunes, future well-known politicians stood out - V. Novodvorskaya, V. Zhirinovsky, V. Igrunov, A. Isaev.

The Democrats, who numbered about 300 during the voting, failed to approve their agenda and pass through the Congress the political decisions they had outlined. After almost all of them were "rolled" during the elections of the Supreme Council, the famous historian Yu. became known as the Interregional Deputy Group).

Nevertheless, A. Sakharov managed, to the screams and clapping of the hall, to read out the draft “Decree on Power”, which proposed to cancel the 6th article of the Constitution (it declared the Communist Party “the leading and guiding force”), officially transfer power in the country to the Soviets, do everything elections are competitive, all key officials are elected at the Congress and accountable to him. The goal was the transition to a professional army and a new federation while maintaining the old borders. Sakharov made a direct appeal to the citizens to support the "decree".

At the Congress, parliamentary commissions were created, thanks to which a fair assessment was later given to the fact that the army was used to disperse a rally in Tbilisi on April 9, 1989 (A. Baltic republics to the USSR (A. Yakovlev commission).

Fatal contradictions

At the Congress, for the first time, the main contradictions that were inexorably splitting the country were openly revealed.

Literally fatal was the inevitable theme sovereignties of republics and territories. The tone was set by deputies from the Baltics, who had already included articles on sovereignty in their constitutions and now wanted to remake the Union into a treaty federation: “We proceed from the fact that the union republics are primary, and the federation is derivative. Only the republics can transfer to the Union or regain certain powers, and not vice versa. For the republics created the Union.” This was followed by a demand that all property on their territories, including mineral resources, be secured in the ownership of the republics, and that the laws of the Union be put into effect only through their ratification in the parliaments of the republics.

It was clear to everyone that the crafty "sovereignty" was only a stepping stone to complete independence. And then there were demands for the sovereignty of the autonomies and for the redistribution of borders, beyond which conflicts broke out in Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhazia, the Ferghana Valley ... The great empire was cracking at the seams.

No less acute was the contradiction between state and market economy. The latter was only born in genuine torment and entangled in ideological swaddling clothes. N. Ryzhkov, elected head of government, for the first time revealed to the Congress and the country the amazing facts of the economic collapse: more than a 100-billion-dollar budget deficit, exorbitant foreign debt, lack of commodity stocks and money for imports. According to Ryzhkov, "negative trends" in the economy have been growing for three five-year periods, while official statistics and propaganda deliberately lied, hiding the terrible truth. Recognizing the need to develop "cooperation and rent", the Soviet prime minister immediately created an ideological dead end, arguing that cooperation "does not accept such elements as grabbing, profit, personal enrichment, self-interest." Well, what kind of business could there be after that?

As an alternative, G. Popov suggested leaving no more than 50% of the economy in the public sector, transferring the rest to cooperative and private ownership. In turn, it was proposed to “decentralize” state property, creating corporations and concerns instead of bureaucratic departments. N. Shmelev warned: "If we do not stop inflation, growing like a snowball, the collapse of the consumer market, the monstrous, record-breaking budget deficit in the world (in relation to GNP), we may face an economic collapse within two to three years." Alas, the Communist Party did not heed the calls, and the gloomy forecast came true.

Historical meaning

Thanks to the First Congress, the political struggle in the USSR became massive, legal and public, accelerating the processes of change and incurring inevitable costs. Problems were sharply raised, heatedly discussed, but in reality most often they were not solved, because the system of power and control changed too slowly, and society too quickly. The most important laws on the press, on rallies, on freedom of conscience, on leaving the country, on rent, adopted by subsequent Congresses and the Supreme Soviet, lagged behind the requirements of the time in many respects.

The most important achievement of the Congress can be called an honest dialogue between the authorities and society, thanks to which for the first time in our country a real and active civil society. On May 25, 1989, the USSR was one country, and two weeks later it was a completely different one, and this change was irreversible.

The initiator of perestroika, the first and last president of the USSR M. Gorbachev turned out to be a tragic figure. For too long he tried to combine the two roles of leader of change and leader of the communist party. The roles were in conflict, and the choice was late. As a result, both positions were lost. As a leader of change, the moderate M. Gorbachev was supplanted by the radical B. Yeltsin. And a group of conservatives from among the closest associates in the Communist Party removed Gorbachev, staged a helpless putsch and brought down the tottering empire. Could it be otherwise - a separate issue for lovers of historical alternatives.

One thing is clear: the era of great changes - necessary and unnecessary, overdue and excessive, breakthrough, painful, tragic and fateful began 20 years ago precisely with the First Congress, which woke up the country, but failed to determine its path to a better future. The right road seemed to be visible, but we again went the other way ...

Sergei Stankevich

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Chairman of the Central Election Commission for the Election of People's Deputies of the USSR VP Orlov.

presiding.

Dear Comrades People's Deputies of the USSR! It has been a great honor for me. In accordance with the Constitution of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, I, as Chairman of the Central Electoral Commission, will have to open the Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR.

Allow me, first of all, on behalf of the Central Electoral Commission for the Election of People's Deputies of the USSR, to cordially congratulate you on your election to the highest body of state power in our country, on the great confidence that the Soviet people have placed in you, on that honorable and extremely responsible mission that is now entrusted to you.

The elections and the preparations for them were held in conditions of wide openness and openness that had never been seen before, and a rapid growth in the political activity of the working people. This was especially convincingly confirmed on March 26, Sunday, when more than 172 million Soviet people - almost 90 percent of all voters included in the lists - came to the polls to express all shades of public opinion and support perestroika.

The elections showed that perestroika had become a nationwide affair. The Soviet people spoke in favor of its further deepening, for the most rapid changes for the better in all

areas of life. By their novelty and the high interest of the masses, the elections supplemented and enriched the image of perestroika and became a step of fundamental importance in the development of democracy. They moved our society forward along the path outlined by the 27th Party Congress and the 19th All-Union Conference of the CPSU.

The elections confirmed that the people see in Lenin's party a force capable of uniting Soviet society, ensuring its consolidation, and finding effective ways to solve pressing problems and overcome difficulties. We have not yet had a more powerful, nationwide referendum in favor of the Communist Party, its course of renewal.

Today we can say that the elections were a major contribution to the practical implementation of the reform of the political system, the establishment of democracy. They brought Soviet democracy to a qualitatively new level and will go down in the history of our socialist state as one of the most important milestones in the development of all social life. During the election campaign, the Soviet people acquired a unique political experience. At a new, extremely responsible and difficult stage in the democratic development of our country, candidates for deputies were nominated from below. Thousands of contenders participated in the pre-election campaign, the elections were carried out on an alternative basis. Millions of voters have just now truly felt that their voice means a lot in solving major state issues, in the socio-political development of the country.

The current election campaign has presented a far from unambiguous picture. It reflected all the diversity of positions, points of view, opinions that exist in our society. It became a kind of testing ground, where new provisions of the USSR Constitution were put into effect for the first time, and a fundamentally new Law on Elections was tested. In general, it made it possible to hold elections on a truly democratic basis, to get a new electoral practice. At the same time, at pre-election meetings, in labor collectives, in the mass media, wishes were expressed about the need to correct certain norms and procedures established by the Law.

All of them deserve attention and require analysis. It is important, taking into account the experience gained, to make the necessary changes to the electoral legislation so that it would better meet the interests of developing socialist democracy and strengthening our statehood. All proposals on these questions received by the Central Election Commission will be submitted to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR.

Today, 2,155 People's Deputies of the USSR out of 2,249 elected are present at the Congress. Detailed data on the results of the elections, on the composition of the deputies will be reported by the Credentials Commission, which will be elected by the Congress and to which the Central Election Commission will transfer all the documentation necessary to verify the powers of the deputies.

It should be said that in this hall today there are workers, collective farmers, production commanders, scientists, cultural figures, military personnel - people of different professions, different generations, representatives of the people with great political and intellectual potential.

The composition of the deputies reflects the multinational nature of our country. Among them are representatives of 65 nations and nationalities.

The current deputy corps will have to solve problems of national importance. These tasks are entrusted by our Constitution primarily to the Congress of People's Deputies, which, being the highest body of state power, is authorized to consider any issue that falls within the jurisdiction of the USSR, determines the main line of activity of the Supreme Soviet and all other state bodies.

Today, the attention and thoughts of all working people are turned to the Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR, much is expected of it. And first of all - the answer to the questions that concern people related to the further course of perestroika. Together with the deputy mandate, the voters gave you, comrade deputies, their faith in a better life, in a prosperous and powerful Soviet socialist state.

Allow me to express confidence that the Congress of People's Deputies will justify the aspirations of the people, that each deputy will contribute his share of experience, intelligence and labor to joint efforts aimed at achieving new levels of socio-economic and spiritual progress by our society.

Comrades! In accordance with Article 110 of the Constitution of the USSR, I declare the first meeting of the Congress of People's Deputies of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics open.

(Applause.)

On the podium is People's Deputy of the USSR VF Tolpezhnikov, head of the office of the 1st Riga City Clinical Emergency Hospital named after N. Burdenko (Proletarian national-territorial constituency, Latvian SSR).

Comrades! Before we begin our meeting, I ask you to honor the memory of those who died in Tbilisi. (Everyone gets up. A moment of silence). Thank you.

I am submitting a deputy's request: on behalf of my voters, I demand to announce publicly even now, at the Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR, who ordered the beating of peaceful demonstrators in the city of Tbilisi on April 9, 1989 and the use of poisonous substances against them, as well as the name of these poisonous substances. (Applause).

presiding. Comrades! Many deputies made proposals for the election of the Presidium of our Congress. These proposals were supported by a meeting of representatives of groups of people's deputies of the USSR.

The floor for a proposal on behalf of the meeting of representatives on the composition of the Presidium of the Congress is given to Deputy Lukin.

V. P. Lukin, gas cutter at the Kolomna Diesel Locomotive Plant named after V. V. Kuibyshev (Moscow rural national-territorial constituency, RSFSR).

Dear comrades! As is known, the organization of preparations for the Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR and the session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR is entrusted to the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. Such work has been done.

The meeting of representatives of groups of deputies submits a proposal to elect to the Presidium of the Congress of People's Deputies Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU Comrade Gorbachev Mikhail Sergeevich. (Applause). And the First Deputy Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR Comrade Anatoly Ivanovich Lukyanov. (Applause).

A proposal is also made to elect Comrade Vladimir Pavlovich Orlov, Chairman of the Central Election Commission, to the Presidium of the Congress. (Applause). In accordance with the Constitution of the USSR, he opened the first meeting of the Congress.

At a meeting of groups of deputies, it was decided to delegate to the Presidium of the Congress one representative from each union republic. The meetings of deputies of the republics proposed the following comrades to the Presidium of the Congress: Azizbekova Pyusta Azizaga kyzy - director of the Museum of the History of Azerbaijan; Aitmatov Chingiz - Chairman of the Board of the Union of Writers of the Kirghiz SSR, editor-in-chief of the journal "Foreign Literature"; Ambartsumyan Viktor Amazaspovich - President of the Academy of Sciences of the Armenian SSR; Brazauskas Algrdas-Mikolas Kazyo - First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Lithuania; Vorotnikov Vitaly Ivanovich - member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU, Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR; Gorbunov Anatoly Valeryanovich - Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Latvian SSR; Ishanov Hekim - chief engineer of the production association "Turkmenneft", Turkmen SSR; Kozhakhmetov Ibraimzhan - chairman of the collective farm named after Kirov, Panfilov district, Taldy-Kurgan region, Kazakh SSR; Kiseleva Valentina Adamovna - apparatchik of the Grodno production association "Khimvolokno" named after the 60th anniversary of the USSR, Byelorussian SSR; Kurashvili Zeynab Givievna - seamstress-minder of the Tbilisi knitwear production association "Gldani", Georgian SSR; Lippmaa Endel Teodorovich - Director of the Institute of Chemical and Biological Physics of the Academy of Sciences of the Estonian SSR; Mukhabatova Sonyabibi Khushvakhtovna - foreman of the farm of the state farm "Khaeti-Nav" in the Garm region, Tajik SSR; Nishanov Rafik Nishanovich - First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Uzbekistan; Paton Boris Evgenievich - President of the Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian SSR; Rotar Svetlana Anatolyevna - foreman of machine milking of the collective farm "Moldova" of the Dondyushansky district, Moldavian SSR.

Thus, in total, eighteen comrades are proposed to be elected to the Presidium of the Congress.

presiding. Allow me to put the proposed proposals to the vote.

Whoever is in favor of electing the proposed composition of the Presidium, I ask you to raise your certificates. Please drop it. Against? Abstained? The Presidium of the Congress has been elected. Almost unanimous.

Request to the elected deputies to take seats in the Presidium of the Congress. (Applause).

M. S. Gorbachev presides.

presiding. On behalf of the Presidium of the Congress, let me thank you for your trust. (applause). We will try to work in full contact - I am sure that all members of the Presidium will support me in this - with the Congress in order to successfully lead this ship to the intended goals.

We need to approve the agenda and procedure for the work of the Congress. I would like to inform the people's deputies of the USSR, the Congress, that yesterday, under your authority, representatives of groups of people's deputies of the USSR, 446 people, met. We sat for nine hours and discussed these issues in the most thorough manner in order to prepare proposals on them for you.

The floor on behalf of the meeting of representatives on the agenda and the procedure for the work of the Congress is given to Deputy Nazarbayev.

Nazarbaev N.A., Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Kazakh SSR (Alma-Ata - Ili territorial constituency, Alma-Ata region).

Dear Comrade People's Deputies! Yesterday, at a meeting of representatives of groups of people's deputies, the question of the agenda of the Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR was comprehensively discussed.

Various points of view on this issue were expressed at the meeting. As a result of a thorough discussion, proposals were developed to include the following issues on the agenda of the Congress:

1. Election of the Credentials Commission of the Congress.

2. Election of the Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR.

3. Election of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR.

4. Election of the First Deputy Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR.

5. On the main directions of the domestic and foreign policy of the USSR. Speaker - Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR.

6. Program for the forthcoming activities of the Government of the USSR. Speaker - Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR.

7. Approval of the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR.

8. Election of the USSR Constitutional Supervision Committee.

9. Approval of the Chairman of the People's Control Committee of the USSR, Chairman of the Supreme Court of the USSR, Prosecutor General of the USSR, Chief State Arbitrator of the USSR.

10. Miscellaneous.

On behalf of the meeting of representatives of groups of people's deputies, I am submitting a proposal to approve this agenda of the Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR. As regards the procedure for the work of the Congress, it is proposed to consider issues in the order in which they are included in the agenda.

presiding. So, there is a proposal from a meeting of representatives of groups of people's deputies of the USSR.

Please - Andrey Dmitrievich Sakharov. (Applause.)

Sakharov A. D., Academician, Chief Researcher of the P. N. Lebedev Physical Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences, Moscow. (From the Academy of Sciences of the USSR).

Dear deputies, I would like to speak in defense of two fundamental provisions that became the basis of the draft agenda drawn up by a group of Moscow deputies as a result of long work. This project was also supported by a number of deputies from other regions of the country.

We proceed from the fact that this Congress is a historic event in the biography of our country. The voters, the people elected us and sent us to this Congress so that we take responsibility for the fate of the country, for the problems that it faces now, for the prospects for its development. Therefore, our Congress cannot begin with elections. This will turn it into an electoral convention. Our Congress cannot give up legislative power to one-fifth of its members. The fact that rotation is envisaged does not change anything, especially since in a hurry, obviously, the rotation is designed in such a way that only 36 percent - I am based on the Constitution - only 36 percent of deputies have a chance to be part of the Supreme Council.

This is the basis for the first principled thesis of the position contained in the draft presented by the Moscow group.

I propose to adopt as one of the first items on the agenda of the Congress the decree of the Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR. We are experiencing a revolution, perestroika is a revolution, and the word "decree" is the most appropriate in this case. The exclusive right of the Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR is the adoption of laws of the USSR, the appointment of the highest officials of the USSR, including the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, the Chairman of the USSR People's Control Committee, the Chairman of the Supreme Court of the USSR, the Prosecutor General of the USSR, the Chief State Arbiter of the USSR. In accordance with this, changes must be made to those articles of the Constitution of the USSR that relate to the rights of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. These are, in particular, articles 108 and 111.

The second fundamental question that confronts us is the question of whether we can, whether we have the right to elect the head of state - the Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR before discussion, before discussion on the entire range of political issues that determine the fate of our country, which we are required to consider. There is always an order: first the discussion, the presentation by the candidates of their platforms, and then the elections. We will disgrace ourselves in front of all our people - this is my deep conviction if we do otherwise. We cannot do this. (Applause).

I have repeatedly expressed support for the candidacy of Mikhail Sergeevich Gorbachev in my speeches. (Applause). I adhere to this position even now, because I do not see another person who could lead our country. But I don't see it at the moment. My support is conditional. I believe that a discussion is necessary, a report by the candidates is necessary, because we must keep in mind the alternative principle of all elections at this Congress, including the election of the Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. I say the word "candidates", although I think it is quite possible that there will be no other candidates. And if they are, then we will speak in the plural. Candidates must present their political platform. Mikhail Sergeevich Gorbachev, who was the founder of perestroika, whose name is associated with the beginning of the process of perestroika and leadership of the country for four years, should tell about what happened in our country during these four years. He must speak about both achievements and mistakes, speak about it self-critically. And our position will also depend on this. The most important thing he should say is what he and other candidates are going to do in the near future in order to overcome the extremely difficult situation that has developed in our country, what they will do in the future ... (Noise in the hall).

presiding. Let's agree that if someone wants to speak in the order of discussion, then up to 5 minutes maximum. Finish it, Andrey Dmitrievich.

Sakharov A. D. Now I will finish. I will not list all the issues that I consider necessary to discuss. They are included in our project. With this project, I hope, the deputies are familiarized. But, in conclusion, I hope that the Congress will turn out to be worthy of the great mission that lies before it, that it will democratically approach the tasks before it.

presiding. One minute, comrades! I think we are already at the final stage. We discussed the issues on the agenda with rather great desire and indifference. And these questions are basically formed. But, I think, we will not deprive the comrades who spoke at the previous stages of the opportunity to bring their point of view to the Congress. And it is up to the Congress to make a decision. Our main proposal has been submitted on behalf of all the delegations, so I ask you, comrades, to speak briefly.

Please, Comrade Popov.

Popov G. Kh., editor-in-chief of the journal "Economic Issues", Moscow. (From the Union of Scientific and Engineering Societies of the USSR).

Comrades! Yesterday, in a fully democratic atmosphere, at a meeting of representatives of groups of deputies, an agenda was adopted, which was reported here today. We participated in the discussion, we were all given the opportunity to speak. There was a vote, for the proposal that we made, 15 percent of the participants in the meeting of representatives spoke. But, as Mikhail Sergeevich rightly said, democracy is democracy - we have the opportunity to address the Congress as well.

The crux of the problem lies essentially in one agenda item. To be precise, it is whether to hold debates, debates and reports before the elections of the Supreme Soviet or after the elections of the Supreme Soviet. There was a proposal that Andrey Dmitrievich spoke about. There was also a second proposal, which was voted on yesterday: that Mikhail Sergeyevich's report be heard as the third item on the agenda, after he was elected.

What is the origin of the current idea that elections by the Congress of the Supreme Soviet should take place immediately? It comes from two assumptions. Both of these assumptions are not someone's invention, ill will, desire to start the voting machine, etc. They are dictated by the logic of our Constitution, and it is quite clear that the comrades made these proposals. According to the Constitution of the USSR, we really must wait until the Supreme Soviet appoints the Chairman of the Council of Ministers, the Prosecutor General, elects the Chairman of the People's Control Committee, then these candidates must come to us and we must vote. In this case, the logic proposed by the agenda is natural. But we believe that an amendment to the Constitution, which Andrei Dmitrievich spoke about, is necessary here, to the effect that the Chairman of the Council of Ministers, the Chairman of the People's Control Committee, the Prosecutor General, the Chairman of the Supreme Court and the Chief State Arbitrator should be elected or appointed here, at the Congress, in order to enhance the role of the Congress as the highest body of state power in the country. If this amendment is passed, there will be no need to pre-select the Supreme Council in order to enable it to work and put forward candidates.

The second assumption, which is the basis of the agenda. The point is that the election of deputies to the Supreme Council essentially does not require debates about their points of view, positions, etc. In essence, we are offered to move away from such principles of democracy as real secret ballot, choice among alternative candidates. We are invited to vote for a list of candidates in which the number of applicants corresponds to the number of allocated seats. Why did such an idea come about? Again, not because someone wants to violate democracy. There is logic here, and again this is the logic of our Constitution. It says that the Council of the Union should be formed taking into account the regional principle. .And from here all the consequences arose: if it is a regional principle, then, therefore, quotas. The quotas that are natural for the Council of Nationalities were extended to the Council of the Union, and as a result, quite naturally, each region strives to realize its quota. There is a situation that requires attention. Indeed, today in each region there are different deputies. I do not know the situation in many places, but, for example, the Moscow region is quite familiar to me.

In the Moscow region, such a well-known figure in our perestroika as Nikolai Travkin won the election. In the list of representatives from the Moscow region, I do not see him as a candidate for the Supreme Soviet. I, for one, think that his participation in the Supreme Soviet is necessary for our perestroika.

Therefore, we are offered to simply take as a basis what each region offers. It seems to me that we all ended up in this hall only because there were new elections, elections with alternative candidates, elections with programs, and so on. The principle of alternativeness should be extended to the elections of the Supreme Soviet. If this principle is accepted, the principle of alternativeness, then everything falls into place, then there is an opportunity to really hear the report and arrange a debate as the third item on the agenda.

Our delegation yesterday sat for a very long time, until late, and by a majority of votes, with three abstentions and two against, it decided to address the Congress with a proposal. We are submitting a full list of candidates, significantly exceeding the number of seats allocated to us. We ask all of you to follow our example and defend the new democracy. (Applause).

presiding. The floor is given to People's Deputy Meshalkin.

Meshalkin E.N., Director of the Research Institute of Pathology and Circulation of the Ministry of Health of the RSFSR, Novosibirsk. (From the Movement for Peace, united by the Soviet Peace Committee, together with the United Nations Association in the USSR).

Dear Comrade Deputies! This is the first time I have had to address such a responsible and huge forum. Forgive me if I'm a little worried, but it seems to me that if we are going to approve the agenda today, of course, there must be its motivation. But there must also be a completely responsible formulation of the question. The agenda proposed here was approved by the majority of delegations yesterday. The key item on this agenda is the question of whether to elect the Chairman of the Supreme Council immediately or listen to him first. It seems to me that in order to listen to the future Chairman of the Supreme Council, it is necessary first of all to empower him. Because we need not only a statement of today's affairs, but also an analysis of what can be done, backed up by the supreme authority, that is, the Supreme Council, with which, of course, the Chairman will discuss his report. This is absolutely necessary, because we cannot simply listen to empty promises, we need to know what will be backed up by deeds. (Applause).

Representatives of a group of deputies from Moscow, in particular Academician Sakharov, confirmed that they see no alternative to the figure of Mikhail Sergeevich Gorbachev. When talking about a candidate for the post of Chairman or President, it is not what he says now that determines his figure, but his deeds preceding these elections. Don't we know of previous cases that the candidate for the presidency has described himself at least for the period of four years of activity? After all, no one forces the President of the United States of America immediately before the election to speak before a microphone or before the Senate with promises. There is a lengthy four-to-six-month election campaign in which the deeds of the future president and his promises are outlined. And therefore, I believe that from the position, so to speak, in order for us to receive a really practical report, a real analysis of what needs to be done in order to carry out and complete perestroika in our country, we must first vest the Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Council with the powers of the Chairman of the Supreme Council, and then listen to this report. This is my point of view. This is the first. (Applause).

I also believe that it is necessary to listen to this report even after the elections to the Supreme Soviet have been held. No one bothers to introduce alternative candidates to the discussion of candidates for the Supreme Council - this is the second issue on the agenda, but not the first, and it is not necessary to bring it up now. I believe that our first meeting of the Congress should now confine itself to approving the agenda. And for each item on the agenda, when the turn comes to consider it, the debates that I just talked about should be organized. I call for voting for the agenda, which was approved yesterday by the Bolynists - not 85 percent, as Comrade Popov says, but more than 85 percent. In essence, the vote was unanimous. The representatives of the delegations approved the agenda. Thank you. (Applause).

presiding. Comrades, shall we continue the debate? Or have two points of view formed, and we can discuss them and decide which one we will adhere to?

Who is in favor of ending the exchange of opinions on this? One minute. I will read out a note: “In pursuance of the orders of my voters to hold any elections at the Congress, without fail on a competitive basis and on the basis of Articles 48 and 120 of the Constitution of the USSR, I put forward my candidacy for elections to the post of Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. I am ready to present my program. Obolensky Alexander Mitrofanovich, people's deputy from the Leningrad rural national-territorial district of the RSFSR.

Deputy (did not introduce himself).

There is an alternative proposal. I agree that we should elect Mikhail Sergeyevich as the first Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, because we know him. We know him by his deeds, by his daily laborious activity. I deeply agree with this. But I do not agree to immediately elect the Supreme Soviet, because many people whom we do not know will enter it. We are returning now in our lives to common sense. It is impossible to elect strangers, mostly people who are changing before our eyes.

I want to see how they show themselves here, what is their position, their citizenship, their courage, and only after that, after listening to them, looking at them, I will vote for them.

I am making an alternative proposal. The first to elect the Chairman of the Supreme Council. I agree with the arguments that have been made here. But I propose that the election of the Supreme Soviet itself be held after the discussion.

presiding. So, who is in favor of stopping the exchange of views on this issue? Please vote. Please drop it. Who is against? So. For now, those who are against it, please lower your IDs. It is necessary to develop a mechanism for counting. A proposal is made: to entrust the counting of votes in open voting to a group of people's deputies in the following composition: the head of the group is deputy Kostenko, chairman of the Orenburg regional executive committee. His assistants: Academician Platonov - President of the Academy of Sciences of Belarus, Sokolov - Senior Researcher at the Voronezh Research and Production Association "Electronics". It is assumed that the group will also include the following deputies: Amangeldinova - teacher of a secondary school, Pavlodar; Vidiker - director of the state farm "Suvorovsky", Kazakhstan; Akhunov - Deputy Director of School No. 4, Uzbek SSR; Baranov - Chairman of the Trade Union Committee of the Leningrad Production Association "Izhora Plant"; Andreev - chief engineer of the Moscow State Design and Survey Institute "Mosgiprotrans"; Yaroshenko - Deputy General Director of the Research and Production Association for Tractor Engineering, Moscow; Babich - chairman of the Kiev city committee of the trade union of workers of the agro-industrial complex; Bichkauskas - investigator for particularly important cases of the Prosecutor's Office of the Lithuanian SSR; Giro - commander of the Tu-154 ship, Tajikistan; Ibragimov - driller of the Marine Department of Drilling Operations "Oil Rocks", Azerbaijan SSR; Margvelashvili - Senior Lecturer, Tbilisi State University; Bursky - Chairman of the Brest Regional Executive Committee; Reshetnikov - Deputy Head of the Kaluga Motor-Building Production Association; Nazarov - the first secretary of the Russian-Polyansky district party committee of the Omsk region; Erokhin - deputy commander of a military unit, Kyiv military district; Shlyakota - director of the state farm "Vetsumi", Latvian SSR; Aasmäe - Head of the Design Bureau Sector, Estonian SSR; Belyaev - Dean of the Moscow Engineering Physics Institute.

Here are the comrades proposed by the representatives of the delegations. Are there any withdrawals for these comrades? No.

Who are you suggesting? Come out here and speak.

Belyaev V. N. (Kantemirovsky territorial constituency, Moscow). Two comrades fell ill, we have two sectors not covered. At that meeting, two comrades were included in the reserve. I would ask the chairman of the counting group to report these names so that they can be approved by the Congress.

presiding. Good. So, name these two names. Who can report? Comrade Kosteniuk. Please report two comrades.

Kosteniuk A. G. Mikhail Sergeevich, Comrade Deputies! We have a reserve, this is Comrade Karasev...

presiding. Where?

Kosteniuk A. G. Head of the Department of the Kramatorsk Industrial Institute of the Ukrainian SSR. And Comrade Yury Nikitich Belenkov, Director of the All-Union Cardiological Research Center of the USSR Academy of Medical Sciences.

presiding. Comrades, is a replacement acceptable?

It's clear. Decided.

Boldyrev Yu. Yu., Senior Engineer of the Central Research Institute of Marine Electrical Engineering and Technology, Leningrad (Moscow Territorial Electoral District, Leningrad).

I have a proposal for a voting mechanism. The fact is that not all deputies will be able to speak during the Congress. The voters should have the right to evaluate how their representatives worked at this Congress. Voters should have the right to know how their deputies voted on certain issues, except for personal ones. Therefore, I am making a proposal: to organize a fixed vote on all issues, except for personal ones. I think all technical issues can be resolved. (Applause).

presiding. I think that this proposal is one of the attempts to draw us into something that the Congress should not be drawn into. (Applause).

But since such a proposal has been received, I must somehow decide on this. So, the first proposal that was submitted to the Presidium. Whoever is for this voting mechanism, please raise your certificates. Please drop it. Against? Thirty-one deputies against. Abstentions? Twenty people abstained. Issue resolved.

So, there is a counting commission, I ask the comrades to start working now, and I will probably start again with who is in favor of approving the agenda that Comrade Nazarbayev introduced on behalf of the meeting of representatives of groups of people's deputies of the USSR in the form in which it is , and at the same time the order of discussion of the issues outlined by him (in the order in which they go), I ask the deputies to raise their certificates. Please drop it. Who is against? Consider, comrades. Who, comrades, abstained on this question?

presiding. Issue resolved. (Applause).

Thus, the fate of other proposals is determined. The Congress cannot work on two agendas at once.

Don't worry, I know what to do. Who is in favor of limiting this? Consider the issue of the agenda resolved and thus do not start consideration of other alternative proposals. I ask the deputies to vote. Please drop it. Are there any against? Clear minority. In this case, no calculation is required. This is in the course of the question and has no such significance. Absolute majority.

Decided. The agenda of the Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR was approved.

Now about the order of our work. Deputy Nazarbayev, on behalf of the meeting of representatives of groups of people's deputies, made a proposal to consider issues in the order in which they are included in the agenda. I included this in the first voting point, we voted.

But here we are talking about the Rules. As you know, the Constitution provides for the adoption of the Regulations of the Congress of People's Deputies and the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, which should define in detail the entire procedure for the activities of the highest authorities. Naturally, we don't have such Regulations now. We have to adopt it, and, apparently, the Congress should make a decision at the appropriate moment and instruct the Supreme Council to develop a draft of these Regulations and submit it for approval by the next Congress, that is, the autumn Congress.

Apparently, this is how we do it. Before the adoption of the permanent Regulations, it would be advisable to adopt a temporary document defining the procedure for the work of the Congress. This task is being solved by the Provisional Rules of the Sessions of the Congress, the draft of which you have. It includes all the norms of the Constitution of the USSR on the work of the Congress, as well as the rules arising from them. The temporary regulations were considered by the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, and yesterday at a meeting of group representatives we discussed it quite intensively, by the way, and many interesting additions were made. In my opinion, there were no objections, everyone unanimously approved it. Therefore, here is our project, you have it. I can put it to a vote if the deputies agree with the proposals made by the meeting of group representatives on this score.

Take the floor, introduce yourself right away, please.

Antanavichyus KA, Head of a Department, Institute of Economics, Academy of Sciences of the Lithuanian SSR, Vilnius (Vilnius - Oktyabrsky National-Territorial Electoral District, Lithuanian SSR).

Nothing has been introduced into the Regulations that we received today from what was proposed yesterday - amendments. For example, an amendment was adopted under Article 19 to the effect that a statement, declaration, appeal submitted to the Congress by at least twenty deputies are distributed by the Congress as official documents of the Congress.

Further, Article 15 was amended to the effect that, when deciding on the closure of debates, deputies elected from a union republic have the right to insist on the continuation of debates on issues relating to the republics, if such a proposal is supported by at least two-thirds of the deputies elected from this republic.

And there were other proposals, but we did not make them. So, I think that their authors will also speak out.

presiding. Firstly, I see that Article 15 says: “The termination of the debate is carried out by a decision of the Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR, adopted by a majority of at least two-thirds of the total number of people's deputies. When deciding whether to close a debate, deputies elected from a union republic have the right to insist on giving the floor to one of the deputies from that republic, if such a proposal is supported by at least two-thirds of the deputies elected from that republic.

Antanavichyus K. A. Then the question arises: why did the representatives of the groups gather yesterday? Yesterday we agreed that the floor was not given to one deputy, but that the debate would continue at the request of at least two-thirds of the republic's deputies. This is the essence of the change: not just one deputy, but the debate continues and continues, as you said yesterday, until the second vote.

presiding. Okay, this is a clarification. Vote? I think, comrades, this is all acceptable. The mechanism is thought out: the Congress can always intervene in this process; if a delay begins, speculation begins on this legal norm, he can stop the debate by a second vote.

Now for your second suggestion. I believe that we all agreed then, I remember that, just like you. We voted that all these documents are distributed not by the delegations themselves, but through the Presidium of the Supreme Council. I think we need to include this, confirm what we agreed on at the meeting.

Probably, at night, you know, they worked until dawn, and something slipped through. Please, comrade Landsbergis.

Landsbergis VV, Professor of the State Conservatory of the Lithuanian SSR, Vilnius (Panevėžys city national-territorial constituency, Lithuanian SSR).

I asked for the floor a little earlier, but even now I want to draw your attention, dear deputies, to the fact that the method of voting that is accepted in our country and was already in effect yesterday may be considered incorrect. In cases where there are alternative proposals, it would be more correct to vote like this: first - who is for the first proposal, and then - who is for the second proposal. Not the way we do it. I suggest you think about it. And besides, I draw your attention to the fact that Academician Sakharov made two proposals on the agenda. And his first proposal - on the decree of the Congress - is still being hushed up.

presiding. Let's consider! As for the issue of the agenda, it has been settled. We have already decided. Collectively, the Congress decided. I don't think we will go back to it. Let's move on.

As regards the question submitted by Academician Sakharov regarding the decree, let us instruct the Presidium to consider this proposal. This is not against the agenda. This already applies to the hierarchy of the highest organs of power, and the Congress disposes of it more than the Supreme Soviet. And can be more precise. This topic was the most important yesterday, and by the way, we came up with a very interesting proposal. I mean that we will apparently propose (but this will be later) to hold two congresses a year after all. And not in the way it was planned - for the Supreme Soviet to basically become a working body, although a solid, high body, with great rights, but still basically working for the Congress. And so that the basic laws, except for those that do not require the decision of the Congress (we will outline this), should, after all, be adopted by the Congress. (Applause).

We agreed that the deputies who do not get into the Supreme Council should not have the feeling that they were invited once a year, well, even two, and then cook there, on the spot, in their own juice. No. We thought about it. It should be all in the complex. So far, it was considered as an idea, only preliminary. I felt from a conversation with many deputies that many, if not all, are worried about the fate of the people's deputy. And we agreed that, firstly, the commissions will include, say, 50 percent of the members of the Supreme Soviet and 50 percent of other people's deputies. Thus, this will immediately expand the possibilities for deputies to participate in the work of commissions.

We also agreed that the Supreme Soviet, carrying out its current work in the chambers and in the commissions, will send the people's deputies both the schedule of work and the schedule of the meetings of the commissions. Therefore, all deputies will know the issues that are being discussed, and each deputy, when he needs and considers it possible to participate in the discussion and express his point of view on a particular issue, will come and participate in the work of a particular commission or in a meeting of the chamber . Moreover, we agreed that this should be decided already at this Congress. In addition, there will be a new status of people's deputy of the USSR, which should raise the authority of the deputy corps in comparison with the position in which it is placed by the current status. We will work on this and decide at the autumn Congress.

Thus, comrades, through the implementation of these ideas, and when they are worked out, I think others will appear, we will come to the conclusion that the people's deputy will effectively participate in all work within the framework of his term of office. And we will give you all the necessary instructions on these issues.

Therefore, let's instruct the Presidium to decide on Academician Sakharov's proposal and to submit its views on this matter. Good? I don't think it requires a vote - just consent. Good.

One of the deputies approached me and said: “Mikhail Sergeevich, it is wrong that you are leading the Congress. Because it should be led by the Chairman of the Central Election Commission.” Someone is not satisfied with my, perhaps, undemocratic nature? I don't know. We discussed this question, comrades, and it was recognized that the working Presidium of the Congress should include representatives both from the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet and the Chairman of the Central Electoral Commission, who was instructed to open the Congress, and from the republics, so that there should be representatives, so that it would be a worker, a full-blooded, representative democratic body that could meet, discuss how the Congress is going, develop some considerations, and if something arises, report to you, etc. All deputies, when discussing in deputy groups and at a meeting of representatives, with this agreed, and the proposal was made. Perhaps they want to “overthrow” the chairman, or something, but don’t worry: we agreed that all members of the Presidium would take turns chairing the meetings of the Congress.

Levashev A.V., Assistant of the Department of Political Economy of the Leningrad Technological Institute named after the Lensoviet (Kolpinsk Territorial Electoral District, Leningrad).

Comrade deputies! The fact is that, under Article 110 of the Constitution, the first meeting of the Congress of People's Deputies after the elections is presided over by the Chairman of the Central Election Commission. If this is not so, then it turns out that all decisions, voting and acts adopted now have no legal force. We need to reopen the Congress. This is a very serious matter. Thank you for your attention.

presiding. I think the Congress worked out proposals at the preparatory stage and democratically resolved the issue of the Presidium. And thus today the Congress has constituted everything as it is. Will we start from this? Does anyone have doubts about this? No. Good.

We started discussing the Rules. You are welcome. Introduce yourself.

Plotnieks A. A., Professor, P. Stučka State University of Latvia, Riga (Jelgava national-territorial constituency, Latvian SSR).

Dear Comrade People's Deputies! The question of the Rules, temporary or permanent, may seem at first sight purely technical. But I rushed to this podium because I consider it a matter of paramount importance. By developing or refining this or that version of the Regulations, we are laying the foundations for the more or less successful activities of our Congress.

In this regard, I begin with a final conclusion. I would propose to form a commission from the People's Deputies of the USSR, who now, within a couple of days, would finalize this Provisional Regulation, and the Congress would approve it, since our legal status, the forms of our activity should be in force immediately after the Congress closes . Whether they can be used will depend on the nature of the document. In this regard, the following.

Today we are at the second stage of the reform of the political system. This stage assumes that we will rebuild the federation taking into account the real sovereignty of the union republics. This, in turn, means that very intensive legislative activity will be needed. The Provisional Rules say so. It is said about who enjoys the right of legislative initiative, how to pass laws, and so on. But a number of questions remain open. In particular, the question of which laws the Congress will adopt and which ones the Supreme Council will adopt remains open. The Constitution does not give us an answer to this question. If you compare the powers of the Congress and the Supreme Council, they partially overlap. This means that we must, in one way or another, stipulate in the Regulations which laws we will consider. And, perhaps, provide for some possibility of convening not an extraordinary, but the next Congress, which would be engaged in legislative activities.

Further, in this connection, I would suggest that we think about the following: maybe it makes sense for the laws adopted by the Supreme Soviet to be approved at the next Congress. It would be democratic and would not require much time, but at least the people, in the person of people's deputies, would give the go-ahead to the work that the Supreme Soviet has done over a certain period.

The question of regulating the legislative activities of the Congress. Also a very interesting question. For example, we do not get answers from the Rules of Procedure to questions about what are the terms for working out projects in permanent commissions and committees, what is the procedure for introducing amendments to them, what is the participation of deputies - both elected to the Supreme Council and unelected - in the activities of these permanent commissions. This is extremely important, this is a legislative technique. And it depends on how precisely we are able to develop these rules, whether we will be able to give technically more or less perfect laws. Mikhail Sergeevich has already said that it is still desirable to involve people's deputies who have not been elected to the Supreme Soviet in the work of standing committees. This is not in the regulation. It seems to me that it would be necessary to add this without fail, so that in those cases when special knowledge is needed, we can come and speak, because it will not be possible to speak at the Congress. And everyone wants to make their own contribution to the rule-making activity.

And, finally, it seems to me that today's experience already shows that organizational forms are needed. They are also included in the document, but there are still few of them. Imagine a huge group of people, how can they organize themselves? Apparently, it is necessary to organize according to the Union republics. And, apparently, the deputies of the union republic should already appear in the Regulations in some kind of association: let it be a group, let it be a delegation, as we want - it is necessary to clearly fix how their work is organized.

Then there will be no inconsistency, there will be more organization, there will be more efficiency. Thank you for your attention. (Applause).

presiding. Can I express my opinion about this, I think, very informative speech? We - this, apparently, is the fate of the first Congress - are faced with the fact that we need Regulations, we must develop them. But until we have worked out and approved the Regulations, we must live and work. For this, there is a stage, as it were, a transitional one - the Temporary Regulations. Here it is proposed so that we can work, move, and resolve issues. But, as I have already said, we must work out the Regulations; they will become the subject of deep discussion at the Congress. This is first.

Secondly. Many of the questions which Comrade Deputy correctly posed deserve general attention. I think that the Regulations will change especially seriously, given that the delegates support the idea of ​​the need to return again and more clearly define the hierarchy of relations between the Congress and the Supreme Council. Hence the participation of deputies in various forms of work, including in commissions and committees. All this should be implemented in the Regulations. If we stand on the basis of reality, the actual state is as follows: in order for the Congress to be able to work and resolve issues, we must now support and agree with the Provisional Regulations. All other issues mentioned in the speech should be permanently connected with the Regulations. True, some of them, for example, on the participation of deputies in the work of standing committees, regardless of whether they are members of the Supreme Soviet or not, are reflected in the document, but that is not the point. We will resolve all other issues within the framework of discussing the issue of two congresses (we have one scheduled so far), within the framework of clarifying the mutual competence of the Congress and the Supreme Council. Moreover, it will probably come to light that not every law requires, for example, ratification. There are laws that simply require the Supreme Council to meet and decide the issue. There are laws affecting the fate of the state, they will require ratification by the Congress. We need to work on this. All this will then be reflected in the permanent Rules of Procedure, which we will submit for approval by the next Congress. I think we need to move in that direction.

How, comrades? Correctly?

You are welcome. Comrade Stankevich.

Stankevich S. B., Senior Researcher, Institute of World History, USSR Academy of Sciences, Moscow (Cheremushkinsky territorial constituency, Moscow).

I would like to propose an amendment to Article 18 of the Provisional Regulations. I agree that a more serious revision of the Regulations can wait. It is necessary to create a special commission that will seriously deal with this. But the proposal that I am submitting for your consideration, it seems to me, makes sense to include already in the Provisional Rules of the Congress.

We are talking about article 18, which determines the voting procedure. The fact is that there is no provision for a roll-call vote. During the election campaign, from communication with voters in Moscow and other cities, it became quite clear to me that the vast majority of voters want to know how their representatives at the Congress vote. In addition, thanks to anonymous voting, deputies now have a fairly convenient opportunity to reject serious proposals, serious bills that the voters are waiting for, and then not bear any responsibility to them. We would like to avoid this convenient possibility of anonymous voting. I understand very well that since we have technical difficulties and we cannot currently afford such a luxury as an electronic voting system, in this situation we are forced to look for other solutions.

Let's say that the majority of voting will be carried out simply by a show of hands. Let's go to this archaic. But on the most fundamental proposals and bills, on demand, let's say, at least 100 deputies, we can go for such a luxury as a roll-call vote. Therefore, the essence of the proposal is as follows: to supplement Article 18 of the Provisional Regulations with a provision that, at the request of at least 100 deputies of the Congress, voting can be carried out by name. (Applause).

presiding. Allow me to express my attitude and consult on this. It seems that Stankevich's proposal generally deserves attention. Let's remember: according to the Brest peace, for example, there was a roll-call vote. This means that such questions may continue to arise when there is a need for a roll-call vote. But, in my opinion, one cannot agree that a roll call vote can be held at the request of 100 deputies. This must be the decision of the Congress. The congress should determine the form of voting, not 100 deputies. I propose to formulate the proposal as follows: by decision of the Congress, a roll-call vote may be held. In my opinion, this is a very important and serious addition.

Kosteniuk A. G. I report: for - 431.

Whoever is in favor of the second proposal: "The Congress may hold a roll-call vote on its own decision," please raise your hands. Please drop it. Is it necessary to count in this case?

presiding. But only if everyone agrees, then we won't. Overwhelming majority. Nobody insists on counting? None.

Then the issue is resolved. Your proposal, Comrade Stankevich, is accepted with an amendment.

Now, comrades, I would like to announce the request of Gorinov and Karpochev, deputies from the Mari ASSR. They write: “The attempts of some deputies to take the Congress away to discuss procedural questions is a very harmful thing. This does not create credibility for our Congress before the voters, even those voters who elected Comrades Sakharov, Boldyrev and others. The people are waiting for how the Congress will decide the fundamental issues of life, so we need to turn to the Congress, whether to give the floor three or four times to those who actively bring disorganization into the work of the Congress. (Applause).

For my part, I would comment on this as follows: many essential questions were raised here. Therefore, everything that has been done so far in this hour and a half, I consider significant. We have approved the agenda. We approved the Regulations, and all our activities should be based on this. Finally, we exchanged views on issues that are already emerging. I have in mind the considerations of Academician Sakharov. We need to think about how the Presidium, relying on the participation of deputies, prepares proposals that fall within the competence of the Congress and the competence of the Supreme Soviet on the functioning of our entire complex representative mechanism. Therefore, everything discussed here can hardly be attributed only to negative work. Basically, it is still positive, but the deputies' warnings, their wishes, I think, are appropriate and democratic. They exercised their right to make such remarks.

You are welcome. Introduce yourself.

Boyare Yu.R., Associate Professor, P. Stučka State University of Latvia, Riga (Dobele national-territorial constituency and constituency, Latvian SSR).

I have no doubt that the Regulations presented by the Presidium can be taken as a basis, and I would vote for it with pleasure. But, apparently, in addition, we still need to accept some small amendments so that we can move forward with a clear conscience. For some republics and delegations, they seem to be of considerable importance. Moreover, about what I will talk about now, we basically (Mikhail Sergeevich, I believe you will not let me lie) talked about it yesterday and somehow agreed. I have a proposal. Relatively small delegations, in particular the Baltic republics, are concerned that in the main political debate they, in our very large mass of generally constructive-minded comrades who all want to talk, may not get the floor at all. That is why we had a proposal yesterday... No, comrades, this is serious. I have no criticism, there is a small request. Still, we need to vote for each delegation, each republic to receive at least a guaranteed minimum of speeches - three speeches at the main political debate.

presiding. Correctly.

Boyars Yu. R. It is very important.

presiding. This issue - I confirm that the deputy is right - was discussed at the meeting of representatives, we agreed, and let's write it down - to instruct the Presidium of the Congress to collectively determine the list of speakers so that the interests of all republics, territories and regions are taken into account. In the first place I put the republics, we are the Union. And, probably, to some extent they should take into account that there are various representatives. Therefore, if you don't mind, we can propose the following wording: instruct the Presidium to monitor the performances so that at least a minimum of participants is provided - representatives of all republics, territories, regions and relevant groups.

Boyar Yu. R. My next suggestion, comrades. Yesterday we more or less agreed - this proposal was made by a number of comrades from the Russian Federation, from the city of Moscow - that after all, we, that is, the delegations themselves, should nominate their representatives to the Supreme Soviet. This should be written in the Regulations. Because we think, and we have been discussing for a very long time, the whole day in our group (back in Riga), who and how to nominate, taking into account the business, personal qualities and even the capabilities of each. Professor Plotnieks, who spoke before me, you will excuse me, he also has a significant moment. He has a small child at home and a mother who needs to be looked after. This is what we consider in our group. But other comrades cannot know this, so we have a very clear proposal. We put forward our list and we will stand for it. Then we will change. Why should I interfere in the affairs of the Russian Federation, determine who will represent the Russian Federation? I would consider it even immodest. This is our second proposal, on which we somehow agreed yesterday.

presiding. Yes, it has nothing to do with the Regulations, but it does have to do with the voting procedure.

Boyars Yu. R. The following, at the suggestion of Professor Plotnieks. First of all, we are legislators and determine the policy of our state. Therefore, one of the most important tasks of our Congress is to draw up a basic list of priority laws. For this, apparently, it is necessary to vote. During the Congress, this work must be done, an appropriate commission should be created to deal with these laws and proposals for bills. This work, as they say at international meetings, is essential and important.

presiding. So, on the first part, there is a proposal to instruct the Presidium to monitor and regulate speeches so that the representation of the republics, at least regions, relevant groups, and public organizations is ensured in the debate.

As for the second group of questions. Let us instruct the Presidium to organize the elaboration of these issues and to submit considerations on this matter for their subsequent consideration - they are of a very important nature.

Boyar Yu. R. Yes, and by law. Comrades! Mikhail Sergeevich made a very important remark that law is different from law. But according to the so-called “functional” laws, I still have a proposal: to vote according to all laws, that is, all laws are adopted by the Congress or approved by the Congress, and in the intervals between the next Congresses and sessions, which, as we decide, will be once or two per year, the law adopted by the Supreme Council is in force. But if the Congress does not approve the law, then it does not work. This is the next suggestion.

presiding. I think it resonates with what I said. All these issues must be resolved in the main Regulations, where we will separate hierarchies, rights, correlations, and there we will determine to what extent and which laws will be finally decided in the Supreme Council, which ones - at the Congress or require information or approval of the Congress. That is, there we will put all the dots over the "i". Because these are big legal issues of fundamental importance.

Boyar Yu. R. A small amendment that we agreed on yesterday. I think we have definitely decided this. I mean amendments to the Rules. Look at item 19, the very last paragraph, at the very bottom of the page. We agreed that people's deputies will have the right to take part not only in the work of the chambers, but also in commissions and committees with an advisory vote. I propose to write this down, it is essential and important for the status of a people's deputy.

presiding. Okay, let's write it down. Moreover, during the preliminary study, we proceeded from the fact that we are talking about commissions.

presiding. We are talking about the fact that the commissions will include approximately 50 percent of the members of the Supreme Council, 50 percent of people's deputies - non-members. In commissions - with a decisive vote, and in the bodies of the Supreme Council - with an advisory vote.

Boyars Yu. R. The latest, comrades. Apparently, we are all very concerned about somehow moving forward all the time and not getting stuck in very complex issues and discussions that we will not solve in such a large mass. Therefore, I have extremely serious doubts about the question of whether we should vote by name. If we had electronics, as happens at some international meetings, then it would go quickly. And if now this mass votes by name, one question will take us all day. I doubt very much: should we do this?

presiding. For the information of the deputies, I want to say that such instructions have been given and a project is being drawn up so that each workplace of a deputy is properly prepared. The project is being worked on. And the matter will be decided.

Comrades, shall we finish the discussion?

The question is big. Yesterday we discussed it carefully at a meeting of representatives, very carefully. 446 people sitting here can confirm. And today's discussion confirms that this is a really big question. And I think we must act on the basis of the Constitution, according to which the Congress elects the Supreme Soviet. The Supreme Soviet is elected and not formed the way it was formed in practice when there were congresses of Soviets. Then the lower level of the Soviets delegated its deputy to the higher one, and thus the process of forming the congresses of Soviets proceeded. In this case, the proposals come from the seats from the delegations, but the decision is made - by voting - by the Congress itself.

There are questions here to think about. The issue of combining the right of the Congress to determine and make a final decision on the composition of the Supreme Soviet, taking into account the opinion of the republics, still needs to be clarified at subsequent stages. We, in my opinion, exchanged views, all these nuances will be taken into account.

Sebentsov A.E., Head of the Department of the Moscow Searchlight Plant (Perovsky Territorial Electoral District, Moscow).

Comrades! I have a proposal on Article 20 of the Provisional Regulations, which also applies to the conduct of our Congress. Article 20 provides that the meetings of the Congress are held openly and representatives of state and other organizations, as well as other persons, are invited to them. I would like to propose the following addition to this article: invited persons do not have the right to interfere in the work of the Congress, showing their opinion by shouting, applause, and in other ways.

presiding. I think that such a wish from the Congress to all those invited for today and for the future must be expressed. We have all the deputies sitting in the stalls, and apart from them there is no one here.

Sebentsov A. E. Yes, but we already heard screams from the balcony. And one more question. I would like to exercise my right of legislative initiative and propose a draft law on the status of a people's deputy of the USSR, so that this draft be duplicated and distributed to all deputies present at the Congress.

presiding. Comrades! Now we give half a minute for the performance.

Kurochka GM, Chairman of the Permanent Session of the Supreme Court of the Komi ASSR, Vorkuta (Vorkuta national-territorial constituency, Komi ASSR).

I propose to put the microphones between the rows, otherwise it is inconvenient to work, this is one; and the second sentence: at the very beginning I submitted a note to the Chairman of the Central Electoral Commission, for some reason there was no answer, although there are questions that concern many deputies. All.

presiding. Good. Please, Comrade Adamovich. Now, all of you, comrades.

Adamovich A. M., Director of the All-Union Research Institute of Cinematography, Moscow. (From the Union of Cinematographers of the USSR).

We sit for two hours, for two hours millions of people are watching us. And so our people think: “Well, what if we want to support the Congress, to express our opinion on the issues that are raised at it?” And let's imagine - people will come out now to somehow express their opinions. What will meet them? Will they really be met by the Decree on demonstrations and rallies that has been adopted. Shouldn't we, both at the time of the Congress and at the time of the elections, cancel the operation of this Decree so that the people can actively participate in our work? (Applause).

Deputy (did not introduce himself).

Amendment on Article 20. Here we have already spoken on this article, but noted a part that is not very significant, the last one. At the beginning of the wording of this paragraph it says: "Representatives of state organizations, etc. are invited to the meeting." Why "invited"? We are building a state of law, the term "invited" is not a legal formulation at all and essentially legalizes the discretion of the organizers of this or that congress. It is necessary to provide for the wording: "representatives of state organizations, labor collectives, press, television, mass media have the right to be present." Otherwise, we will not fulfill the directive of the 19th Party Conference on the Development of Glasnost and the Resolution on Glasnost.

presiding. First. Let's decide. I think that we will return to the topic that Comrade Adamovich raised. It is certain. As for the proposal to make a decision right now, to suspend the Decree on demonstrations and rallies, I think we cannot go down this path at all. The next step is to pause something else. Then we will say: let's suspend the operation of the Constitution, and in this way passions will flare up.

I think that the order that exists today - even with all the shortcomings that the deputies will probably talk about - allows holding rallies in favor and not in favor, but in connection with the Congress. And so to raise the question now that everything needs to be canceled, stopped, is unnecessary. I wouldn't address this issue in such dramatic tones.

And when we come to these issues, I think we will discuss them. Do you insist that this issue be voted on?

In my opinion, what we have makes it possible to discuss it. “By the way, on the eve of the Congress you were at a rally in two or three places, and everything is fine. So I don’t know what you are talking about.

There is a note here: “Is the meeting currently being broadcast live?” Goes. Everyone sees. The whole country sees, and the whole world sees.

Is the continuity of the TV broadcast of the Congress guaranteed? Guaranteed.

Saunin A.N., Associate Professor of the Department of Makeevka Civil Engineering Institute, Donetsk (Makeevka Territorial Constituency, Donetsk Region).

The first thing I would like to say is that I have the feeling that some of our deputies are rushing to the train that is about to leave, their proposals are diverting from the agenda, from the problems that we are discussing.

Second. About the regulation. We want to create a state of law, which means we want to live according to laws and regulations, and the haste of adopting the Regulations and other documents adopted here can lead us to return to them again - to their imperfection, to shortcomings - what we had and earlier. I believe that the democratic process is difficult. We need to be patient, listen carefully to all the pros and cons and make a decision.

According to the Regulations. The first article of the Provisional Regulations says that the Congress is held once a year. It seems that Mikhail Sergeevich said that we should hold congresses twice a year. Means, it is necessary to write down in the Regulations - two times a year.

Further. I don't like Article 19 - its last lines, where we, people's deputies, authorized equal representatives of the people, are divided into deputies with a decisive vote and an advisory vote. And I think that this is connected with what Mikhail Sergeevich spoke about - this is a change in the status of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, its transformation from a state authority into an organ of the Congress of People's Deputies. I suggest that this paragraph be removed.

presiding. Good. But I'm back to what we were talking about. So far, we have not amended the Constitution, and it says: once a year. We cannot adopt Regulations that would be contrary to the Constitution. Yesterday, at a meeting of representatives, everyone agreed that this topic - the topic of the Congress and the Supreme Council: the timing, frequency, regularity of the congresses - we all need to work out and make appropriate changes to the Constitution and lay it in the new Regulations. So let's do it, comrades. In the meantime, we will resolve the issue of the Temporary Regulations. To be able to act.

Lubenchenko KD, Associate Professor, Faculty of Law, Lomonosov Moscow State University (Ramensky Territorial Electoral District, Moscow Region).

Comrades, we all call for political culture. Unfortunately, we are not demonstrating it very much now, but there is a live broadcast. It seems to me that if we are talking about the Regulations, then this is such an extremely complex document that we must develop very carefully and over many months. Now we will not accept it.

But we also want to include in the Regulations a number of substantive issues, specific norms, and each of us wants to express a sea of ​​all sorts of thoughts in general. And this sea will simply overwhelm us. Now we are considering one issue: the issue of the Provisional Regulations. But the Congress has such a high legal force that, in general, the Provisional Regulations are not a hindrance for it. And in the course of considering certain issues, we can immediately make changes to it if something interferes with us. If we now devote time to including all these issues in the Rules, nothing will come of it. Therefore, it seems to me that it is necessary now to raise the question of a drafting commission that would immediately deal with these problems, summing up all the comments that are coming, so that we each do not go to the rostrum and not speak.

And the last. We were remarked here that the first meeting of the Congress after the elections is presided over by the Chairman of the Central Electoral Commission, and then by the Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. But in order not to violate the Constitution, it seems to me that we must confirm by a vote of the Congress the right to conduct it, which was entrusted to Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev by the Presidium. Thus, the issue of violating the Constitution will be procedurally removed.

presiding. But it seems that this issue has been resolved and legalized. What do you want to vote? Let's then fix everything by voting so that I am not a usurper. You are welcome. Against? No. Did you reach unanimity, comrades? Abstentions? Five abstentions. Decided.

Allow me to complete this discussion on the Rules of Procedure, relying on the proposal of the last deputy. Raise the question in such a way as to approve the Provisional Regulations with the additions that we have already decided here in each particular case. And, of course, to instruct the Presidium to submit a proposal on the commission so that it can already begin work on summarizing all the proposals on the Regulations and so that this work is already moving forward. And edit this Regulation taking into account the comments.

Who is for the adoption of the Provisional Regulations with the additions that we have adopted, please raise your certificates. Please drop it.

Who is against, comrades? I don't see, but do counters see? No. Who is abstaining? There are those who abstain. Do the math. Comrades calculated who abstained?

Kosteniuk A. G. 17 people abstained.

presiding. We adopted the regulation with 17 abstentions.

Now, comrades, in accordance with the Constitution, it is necessary to form a Credentials Commission of the Congress to check the credentials of the elected deputies. You have in your hands proposals for its composition. They are introduced both by groups of people's deputies and by the assembly of their representatives. They have been agreed upon, but nevertheless the Congress may have some questions or other proposals. What are your comments on staffing? Please... Andrey Dmitrievich Sakharov has the floor.

Sakharov A.D. I think that the position of Chairman of the Credentials Commission is an extremely important position. It should be discussed individually, not as a general list. My suggestion is that this position should be a professional lawyer due to the nature of this job.

presiding. So, a question about the chairman. Proposed Deputy Gidaspov Boris Veniaminovich - Director General of the Scientific and Production Association "GIPH", Chairman of the Board of the Intersectoral State Association "Tekhnokhim", Leningrad. I want to say that this candidacy was put forward directly at the meeting of representatives. It was a unanimous opinion, including, in my opinion, Andrey Dmitrievich Sakharov spoke out for it. Maybe it makes sense to discuss his proposal, since we are talking about the figure of the chairman. By the way, there are lawyers on the commission's list. I think this is not the case when a lawyer must necessarily be the chairman. The floor is given to Deputy Stankevich.

Stankevich S. B. I submit the following proposal: to give the commission itself the opportunity to elect a chairman, and to vote only for its composition. Let her decide for herself who will be the chairman, who will be his deputies, who will be the secretary. Thank you.

presiding. This topic was discussed at the meeting of representatives, and such a proposal was put forward. But everyone considered that this was the prerogative of the Congress, and not the commission itself.

Comrades from Leningrad, what can you say about Comrade Gidaspov?

Revnivtsev V. I., General Director of the intersectoral scientific and technical complex "Mekhanobr", Leningrad. (From the All-Union Society of Inventors and Innovators). It seems to me that decency and honesty should be the main qualities for the chairman of the Credentials Commission. On behalf of the Leningrad delegation, since we discussed this issue, I will say that Comrade Gidaspov has these properties. But there is a lawyer there, and I think the commission will ensure compliance with the legal form. (Applause).

presiding. Good. Does anyone question what they said?

presiding. Comrade Gidaspov, please come up to the podium and tell us a little about yourself.

Gidaspov B. V. (Petrograd territorial constituency, Leningrad).

Comrades! I'm not really a lawyer, I have a technical education. True, I attended two or three meetings and realized that now such education is almost going into the red. I graduated from the Polytechnic Institute, I taught at universities for a long time, worked my way up to the head of the department. Now he is a corresponding member of the Academy of Sciences, director of a large institute and chairman of an intersectoral association, a concern, created in Leningrad for the first time.

Gidaspov B.V. My attitude to the elections is correct, normal. We believe that as we held the elections, we got such results. (Applause).

presiding. Good. Any more questions? Comrade Aidak, please.

Aidak A.P., chairman of the collective farm "Leninskaya Iskra" of the Yadrinsky district of the Chuvash ASSR (Yadrinsky national-territorial electoral district, Chuvash ASSR).

Of course, I'm not speaking at the right time, but what can you do. The day before yesterday, on the initiative of the peasant commission, the Volga Rescue Committee and a group of collective farm chairmen, a meeting of collective farm chairmen and state farm directors was held. We are very grateful to Mikhail Sergeevich Gorbachev, Nikolai Ivanovich Ryzhkov, Yegor Kuzmich Ligachev for finding more than two hours to meet and discuss with us all the burning problems of the village.

Yesterday the chairmen of the collective farms and the directors of the state farms met again. The leadership of the country gave us the go-ahead to address this Congress with our pains. A group of collective farm chairmen (70 people) decided that this appeal should be discussed not only with collective farm chairmen and state farm directors, but with all agrarian deputies...

presiding. Comrade Aydak, are you on the composition of the Credentials Commission?

Aidak A.P. No. I ask everyone involved in agricultural production to stay in the hall during the break to discuss this appeal. Thank you.

presiding. Comrades, if there are no other comments or considerations on the Credentials Commission, then I could put its composition to a vote.

Who is in favor of the proposed composition of the Credentials Commission, I ask you to raise your certificates. Please drop it. Who is against? Two. Who abstained? Three abstentions.

The Credentials Commission was elected with two against and three abstentions. Now we must give the floor to report to the Chairman of the Credentials Commission.

Gidaspov B.V. I ask the members of the Credentials Commission to go after the adjournment to the Faceted Chamber, where the meeting will be held.