The goal of the GKCHP was. Over the years, the secrets of the State Emergency Committee have acquired a large number of versions

The August putsch, the creation and inglorious decline of the GKChP in August 1991, were overgrown with a huge number of versions of "what it was" and "why it happened." Can the actions of the State Emergency Committee be called a coup d'etat and what were the coup d'etat really trying to achieve?

Despite the many years of legal proceedings that followed, the numerous public speeches of the participants in the coup and its opponents are still not completely clear. And, probably, it will never appear.

In fact, the State Committee for the State of Emergency in the USSR was active from 10 to 21 August 1991. The main declared goal at first was to prevent the collapse of the USSR: the exit to the members of the State Emergency Committee was seen in the new Union Treaty, which Gorbachev planned to sign. The treaty provided for the transformation of the Union into a confederation, and not from 15, but from nine republics. In this the putschists saw, not without reason, the beginning of the end of the Soviet state.

And now, at this point, discrepancies begin. It would seem that the main supporter of the Union Treaty was Mikhail Sergeevich Gorbachev. The main opponents are members and supporters of the GKChP. But later, at the trial and further, one of the leaders of the coup, vice-president of the USSR Gennady Yanayev, claimed that "the documents of the State Emergency Committee were developed on behalf of Gorbachev," and other participants in that process generally noted that the prototype of the State Emergency Committee was created on March 28, 1991 on meeting with Gorbachev and with his "blessing".

The next moment is the behavior of the putschists in the course of the events themselves in relation to the then head of the USSR. It is worth recalling that in those days he went on vacation to the Foros dacha in Crimea. Knowing at the same time that everything in the country is completely unsettled, that the people and a huge part of the party and state nomenclature are dissatisfied with "Perestroika", and, moreover, knowing the attitude to the reformatting of the USSR, in which the citizens of the Union saw simply the dismantling of the country. A referendum on the preservation of the USSR took place on March 17, 1991, and most of the citizens spoke out for the territorial integrity of the state.

Incidentally, this is precisely why the terms "putsch", "revolution" and "coup" in the strict sense are in no way suitable for defining the activities of the State Committee. The GKChP participants just advocated the preservation of the country, its integrity, sovereignty and the preservation of the staus quo, with the curtailment of the most odious perestroika initiatives.

Moreover, when it finally became clear that the GKChP case was lost, the first thing the putschists sent a delegation to Gorbachev on Foros again, and some of them were arrested at the moment when they were leaving the plane in Moscow on which they flew with Gorbachev.

The events of the three August days themselves are also something devoid of logic at first glance. On the one hand, the members of the State Emergency Committee declare that Mikhail Gorbachev cannot yet rule the country for health reasons, and and. about. Yanaev becomes the president of the USSR, but at Gorbachev's dacha the telephone connection is cut off only in his office. Communication worked perfectly not only in the security house, but also in the cars of the presidential motorcade. And, moreover, later it turns out that at the dacha "Mikhail Sergeevich has been actively working all these days and signing decrees."

Another goal was to remove from power Boris Yeltsin, the then president of the RSFSR and, as it were, already at that time a political opponent of Gorbachev. But this elimination did not happen either by the method of detention or by the method of an ambush in the forest along the route of the presidential cortege from the dacha to Moscow.

It did not happen in Moscow either, although there were all the possibilities. Troops have already been brought into the capital, and the people have not yet begun to gather around the White House, where Yeltsin arrived. Moreover, according to some versions, Yeltsin's guards, consisting of KGB officers, were ready to "localize the object," but did not receive the appropriate order, although one of the putschists was the head of the USSR KGB, Vladimir Kryuchkov.

In general, the very composition of the participants in this State Committee leads to complete bewilderment as to why they did not succeed in their plans. Among the "putschists" were the head of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the minister of defense, and, as mentioned above, the head of the KGB, and the prime minister and vice president. But the coup failed and they all ended up in the dock.

There are, of course, a number of conspiracy theories. One of them was once voiced by Mikhail Poltoranin, the press minister and Yeltsin's supporter during the putsch. It boils down to the fact that the putsch was Gorbachev's greatest provocation.

According to this Soviet and Russian official, "Gorbachev used them (GKChP. - Ed.) in the dark. In his usual manner, he said or hinted: men, we are losing power, our country. I myself cannot return the USSR to the required mode of functioning, I have an image of a democrat in the world. I'm going on vacation, you tighten the screws here, close the newspapers. I'll come back, unscrew some nuts, the world will calm down. The people who got into the Emergency Committee sincerely wanted to save the country. When everything started spinning, they rushed to him: come back, Mikhail Sergeevich. And he washed his hands: I don't know anything. The Moors have done their job. "

This version finds indirect confirmation in Gorbachev's policy towards the CPSU. The fact is that Mikhail Sergeevich tried with all his might to reduce the influence of the party both on himself and on the state as a whole. And as a result of the suppression of the GKChP, the action of the CPSU was suspended, and then, just a few months later, the party was generally disbanded. But the problem is that the existence of the Communist Party did not suit not only Gorbachev, but also Yeltsin, who, in addition to the party, was not satisfied with Gorbachev himself.

And on this occasion, there is another version, in which it was Yeltsin who became the main beneficiary of the putsch and it was he who, at least, knew about the upcoming events, as he knew that nothing bad would happen to him. Mikhail Vasiliev writes about this in his investigation material.

According to him, "Gorbachev in 1991 suited only a small group of bureaucrats as a leader. Patriots, who could not forgive him for scandalous concessions to the West, and democrats who dream of overthrowing the central government, and a rapidly impoverished people dreamed of his departure. one powerful force without a clear leader, but with enormous potential.

Part of the party elite and secret services took a clear course towards capitalizing the USSR in order to privatize its vast resources. And they didn't need the chatterbox Gorby. But who instead of him? Where can one find such a leader of "the same blood" to speak the same language with them, but be popular among the people? After all, otherwise a change in the social order would have been impossible.

The answer lies on the surface - this is Boris Yeltsin. "

Further, the author leads to the conclusion that the head of the KGB and one of the putschists Kryuchkov was in collusion with Yeltsin and understood how everything would end in the end. However, this version has one very significant inconsistency, namely the hot, to the point of exceeding his own authority, Yeltsin's desire to condemn and imprison the putschists.

In general, it is worth starting with the fact that no one was eager to plant the putschists. And at the first opportunity the prisoners were released on recognizance not to leave. As a result, they, of course, spent from a year to a year and a half in Matrosskaya Tishina, but upon leaving they were able not only to take part in rallies and demonstrations, but also to run for office and be elected to the Russian parliament. And then to get under the amnesty, with which everything was also more than interesting. First and foremost, the amnesty was announced even before the end of the trial, in violation of both procedural norms and formal logic. How can you grant amnesty to people for whom a court verdict has not yet been announced? As a result, an additional meeting had to be held in order to settle all legal norms.

Secondly, according to the memoirs of the then Prosecutor General of the Russian Federation Kazannik, he called and warned Yeltsin that the State Duma would include in the lists of amnestied putschists. To which, according to Kazannik, Yeltsin replied sharply: "They will not dare!" Nevertheless, they dared, and Yeltsin imposed his resolution on this decision, which read "Kazannik, Golushko, Yerina. Not release anyone from those arrested, but investigate the criminal case in the same manner." But Kazannik refused to follow the resolution despite telephone conversations, in which Yeltsin reiterated: "You won't dare to do that." By the way, the 1993 White House defenders were also released under that amnesty.

And most importantly, one of the members of the Emergency Committee, Valentin Varennikov, refused the amnesty and eventually won the case in 1994. However, the rest of the putschists, even agreeing to the amnesty, ultimately did not plead guilty to "high treason," and it is generally clear why.

As for Yeltsin's desire for a final investigation and, most likely, a guilty verdict for members of the Emergency Committee, there was a certain political symbolism in this. It was necessary to show that the return to the USSR is so marginal that it is simply criminal, that there is simply no reverse move. Well, the demonstration that now he is the sovereign master in the country was also useful. However, it did not work out. And it did not work out so much that many high-ranking government officials even of that time called this trial a "farce."

By the way, later the fate of the majority of the putschists was favorable. For the most part, they occupied high positions in government, public and commercial structures. In general, they quickly turned from the Soviet into the new Russian elite. Some of them, even despite their more than solid age, continue to work actively to this day.

There is another year in the history of the Russian state that can be called revolutionary. When the country was heated to the limit, and Mikhail Gorbachev could no longer influence even his inner circle, and they tried in every possible way to resolve the current situation in the state by forceful methods, and the people themselves chose whom to give their sympathies to, the coup of 1991 took place.

Old leaders of state

Many leaders of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, who remained adherents of conservative management methods, realized that the development of perestroika was gradually leading to the loss of their power, but they were still strong enough to prevent the market reform of the Russian economy. With this they tried to prevent the economic crisis.

And yet, these leaders were no longer so authoritative as to use persuasion to hinder the democratic movement. Therefore, the only way out of this situation, which seemed the most possible for them, was to declare a state of emergency. No one then expected that the 1991 putsch would begin in connection with these events.

The ambiguous position of Mikhail Sergeevich Gorbachev, or the removal of the leadership

Some conservative leaders even tried to put pressure on Mikhail Gorbachev, who had to maneuver between the old leadership and representatives of the democratic forces in his immediate circle. These are Yakovlev and Shevardnadze. This unstable position of Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev led to the fact that he began to gradually lose support from both sides. And soon the press began to get information about the upcoming coup.

From April to July, Mikhail Gorbachev prepared a treaty called "Novo-Ogarevsky", with the help of which he was going to prevent the collapse of the Soviet Union. He intended to transfer the bulk of his powers to the authorities of the union republics. On July 29, Mikhail Sergeevich met with Nursultan Nazarbayev and Boris Yeltsin. It discussed in detail the main parts of the agreement, as well as the forthcoming removal from their posts of many conservative leaders. And this became known to the KGB. Thus, the events were getting closer and closer to the period that in the history of the Russian state began to be called the "August 1991 putsch".

The conspirators and their demands

Naturally, the leadership of the CPSU was concerned about the decisions of Mikhail Sergeevich. And during his vacation, she decided to take advantage of the situation with the use of forceful methods. Many famous personalities took part in a kind of conspiracy. This is who at that time was the chairman of the KGB, Gennady Ivanovich Yanaev, Dmitry Timofeevich Yazov, Valentin Sergeevich Pavlov, Boris Karlovich Pugo and many others, who organized the 1991 putsch.

The State Emergency Committee on August 18 sent a group representing the interests of the conspirators to Mikhail Sergeevich, who was vacationing in Crimea. And they presented him with their demands: to declare a state of emergency in the state. And when Mikhail Gorbachev refused, they surrounded his residence and cut off all communications.

Provisional government, or expectations were not met

In the early morning of August 19, about 800 armored vehicles were brought into the Russian capital, accompanied by an army of 4 thousand people. All the media announced that the State Emergency Committee was created, and it was to him that all the powers to govern the country were transferred. On this day, people waking up, turning on their televisions, could only see the endless broadcast of the famous ballet called "Swan Lake". This was the morning when the August 1991 putsch began.

The people responsible for the conspiracy argued that Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev was seriously ill and temporarily unable to run the state, and therefore his powers were transferred to Yanaev, who was vice president. They hoped that the people, already tired of perestroika, would side with the new government, but the press conference they organized, where Gennady Yanayev spoke, did not make the desired impression.

Yeltsin and his supporters

A photograph of Boris Nikolaevich, taken at the time of his speech in front of people, was published in many newspapers, even in Western countries. Several officials agreed with Boris Yeltsin's opinion and fully supported his position.

Putsch 1991. Briefly about the events that took place on August 20 in Moscow

A huge number of Muscovites took to the streets on August 20. All of them demanded to dissolve the Emergency Committee. The White House, where Boris Nikolayevich and his supporters were, was surrounded by defenders (or, as they were called, resisting the putschists). They lined up barricades and surrounded the building, not wanting the old order to return.

Among them there were a lot of native Muscovites and almost all of the intelligentsia. Even the famous Mstislav Rostropovich specially flew from the United States to support his compatriots. The August 1991 putsch, the reasons for which are the reluctance of the conservative leadership to voluntarily give up their powers, rallied a huge number of people. Most countries supported those who defended the White House. All the leading TV companies broadcast the events that were taking place abroad.

The failure of the conspiracy and the return of the president

The demonstration of such massive disobedience prompted the putschists to decide to storm the White House building, which they had set for three in the morning. This terrible event resulted in more than one victim. But on the whole, the coup failed. Generals, soldiers and even most of the Alpha fighters refused to shoot ordinary citizens. The conspirators were arrested, and the President returned safely to the capital, canceling absolutely all the orders of the State Emergency Committee. Thus ended the August 1991 putsch.

But these few days have greatly changed not only the capital, but the whole country. Thanks to these events happened in the history of many states. ceased to exist, and the political forces of the state changed their alignment. As soon as the 1991 putsch ended, rallies representing the country's democratic movement were again held on August 22 in Moscow. People carried the panels of the new tricolor national flag on them. Boris Nikolaevich asked the relatives of all those killed during the siege of the White House for forgiveness, since he could not prevent these tragic events. But in general, the festive atmosphere remained.

Reasons for the failure of the coup, or the final collapse of the communist regime

The 1991 putsch ended. The reasons that led to its failure are fairly obvious. First of all, most of the people living in the Russian state no longer wanted to return to the times of stagnation. Mistrust in the CPSU began to be expressed very strongly. Other reasons are the indecisive actions of the conspirators themselves. And, on the contrary, they were quite aggressive on the part of the democratic forces, which were represented by Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin, who received support not only from numerous masses of the Russian people, but also from Western countries.

The coup of 1991 had not only tragic consequences, but also brought significant changes to the country. He made it impossible to preserve the Soviet Union, and also prevented the further spread of the power of the CPSU. Thanks to a decree signed by Boris Nikolaevich to suspend its activities, after a while all Komsomol and communist organizations throughout the state were disbanded. And on November 6, another decree finally banned the activities of the CPSU.

Consequences of the tragic August coup

The conspirators, or representatives of the State Emergency Committee, as well as those who actively supported their positions, were immediately arrested. Some of them committed suicide during the investigation. The 1991 coup claimed the lives of ordinary citizens who defended the White House building. These people were awarded titles, and their names forever entered the history of the Russian state. These are Dmitry Komar, Ilya Krichevsky and Vladimir Usov - representatives of Moscow youth who stood in the way of the moving armored vehicles.

The events of that period forever crossed out the era of communist rule in the country. The collapse of the Soviet Union became obvious, and the main public masses fully supported the positions of the democratic forces. Such an impact was exerted on the state by the recent putsch. August 1991 can be safely considered the moment that sharply turned the history of the Russian state in a completely different direction. It was during this period that the dictatorship was overthrown by the masses, and the choice of the majority was on the side of democracy and freedom. Russia has entered a new period of its development.

The events that took place from August to December 1991 in the USSR can be safely called the most important in the entire post-war world history. It was not for nothing that Russian President Vladimir Putin characterized the collapse of the Soviet Union as the largest geopolitical catastrophe of the century. And its course, to a certain extent, was determined by the coup attempt carried out by the State Committee for a State of Emergency (GKChP). 25 years have passed, new generations of Russian citizens have grown up, for whom these events are exclusively history, and those who lived in those years must have forgotten a lot. However, the very fact of the destruction of the USSR and the timid attempt to save it still cause lively controversy.

Weakening of the USSR: objective and artificial reasons

Centrifugal tendencies in the USSR began to be clearly seen already in the late 80s. Today we can confidently say that they were the consequences of not only internal crisis phenomena. The course of destroying the Soviet Union immediately after the end of World War II took the entire Western world and, first of all, the United States of America. This was fixed in a number of directives, circulars and doctrines. Every year, fabulous funds were allocated for these purposes. Since 1985 alone, about $ 90 billion has been spent on the collapse of the USSR.

In the 1980s, the US authorities and special services were able to form in the Soviet Union a rather powerful agent of influence, which, although it did not seem to occupy key posts in the country, was capable of having a serious impact on the course of events at the national level. According to numerous testimonies, the leadership of the KGB of the USSR has repeatedly reported what is happening to the General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev, as well as about the US plans to destroy the USSR, take control of its territory and reduce the population to 150-160 million people. However, Gorbachev did not take any action aimed at blocking the activities of Western supporters and actively opposing Washington.

The Soviet elites were divided into two camps: the conservatives, who proposed to return the country to the traditional tracks, and the reformers, whose informal leader was Boris Yeltsinwho demanded democratic reforms and greater freedom for the republics.

March 17, 1991 an all-Union referendum on the fate of the Soviet Union was held, in which 79.5% of the citizens who had the right to vote took part. Nearly 76.5% of them were in favor of preserving the USSR , but with a tricky wording - like "A renewed federation of equal sovereign republics."

On August 20, 1991, the old Union Treaty was to be canceled and a new one was signed, giving a start to a de facto renewed state - the Union of Soviet Sovereign Republics (or the Union of Sovereign States), whose Prime Minister was planning to become Nursultan Nazarbaev.

In fact, the members of the State Committee for the State of Emergency came out against these reforms and for the preservation of the USSR in its traditional form.

According to information actively disseminated by the Western and Russian liberal media, the KGB officers allegedly overheard a confidential conversation about the creation of the JIT between Gorbachev, Yeltsin and Nazarbayev and decided to act. According to the Western version, they blocked Gorbachev, who did not want to impose a state of emergency in Foros (and even planned to physically liquidate him), introduced an emergency situation, brought army and KGB forces onto the streets of Moscow, wanted to storm the White House, seize or kill Yeltsin and destroy democracy. Arrest warrants were massively printed in printing houses, and handcuffs were made in huge quantities in factories.

But this theory is objectively not confirmed by anything. What actually happened?

GKChP. Chronology of major events

17 August some of the heads of security and executive bodies held a meeting at one of the secret facilities of the USSR KGB in Moscow, during which they discussed the situation in the country.

August 18 some of the future members and sympathizers of the Emergency Committee flew to the Crimea to see Gorbachev, who was ill there, in order to convince him to declare a state of emergency. According to the version popular in Western and liberal media, Gorbachev refused. However, the testimonies of the participants in the events clearly indicate that, although Gorbachev did not want to take responsibility for making a difficult decision, he gave the go-ahead to the people who came to him to act at their own discretion, and then shook their hands.

In the second half of the day, according to the well-known version, the connection was cut off at the presidential dacha. However, there is information that the journalists managed to dial there by a regular phone. There is also evidence that government special communications have been working at the dacha all the time.

In the evening of August 18, documents on the creation of the State Emergency Committee are being prepared. And at 01:00 on August 19, Vice-President of the USSR Yanaev signs them, including himself, Pavlov, Kryuchkov, Yazov, Pugo, Baklanov, Tizyakov and Starodubtsev in the committee, after which the State Emergency Committee decided to impose a state of emergency in certain areas of the Union.

On the morning of August 19th The media announced the inability of Gorbachev to fulfill his duties for health reasons, the transfer of power to Gennady Yanaev and the creation of a State Emergency Committee for the whole country. In turn, the head of the RSFSR Yeltsin signed a decree "On the illegality of the actions of the State Emergency Committee" and began to mobilize his supporters, including through the radio station "Echo of Moscow".

In the morning, units of the army, the KGB and the Ministry of Internal Affairs move to Moscow, which take under protection a number of important objects. And at lunchtime, crowds of Yeltsin's supporters begin to gather in the center of the capital. The head of the RSFSR publicly demands "to rebuff the putschists." Opponents of the Emergency Committee began to build barricades, and a state of emergency was declared in Moscow.

20 August a large-scale rally is taking place near the White House. Yeltsin speaks to its participants personally. Participants of mass actions are beginning to frighten with rumors about the impending assault.

Later, the Western media will tell heart-warming stories about how the putschists were going to throw tanks and special forces at the "defenders of democracy", and the commanders of the special forces refused to carry out such orders.

Objectively, there is no data on the preparation of the assault. Special forces officers would later refute both the existence of orders to attack the White House and their refusal to comply with them.

In the evening, Yeltsin appoints himself and. about. Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces on the territory of the RSFSR, and Konstanina Kobets- Minister of Defense. Kobets orders the troops to return to their places of permanent deployment.

In the evening and at night from 20 to 21 August the movement of troops is observed in the capital, local clashes occur between protesters and the military, three participants in mass actions are killed.

The command of the internal troops refuses to move units to the center of Moscow. Armed cadets of educational institutions of the Ministry of Internal Affairs arrive to defend the White House.

Towards morning the troops begin to leave the city. In the evening, Gorbachev already refuses to receive the GKChP delegation, and Yanaev officially dismisses it. Attorney General Stepankovsigns a decree on the arrest of committee members.

August 22 Gorbachev returned to Moscow, interrogations of members of the State Emergency Committee began, they were dismissed from their posts.

August 23 "Defenders of democracy" demolish the monument Dzerzhinsky (reminds nothing?), the activity of the Communist Party is prohibited in Russia.

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On August 24, Gorbachev resigned as General Secretary of the CPSU and offered the Central Committee to dissolve. The collapse of the USSR became irreversible, culminating in the well-known events of December 1991.

Life after the USSR. Assessment of the events of 1991

Judging by the results of referenda and elections that took place at the end of 1991 in various parts of the USSR, most of the population of the Union then actually supported its collapse.

Once on the territory a single state, wars and ethnic cleansing broke out one by one, the economies of most republics collapsed, crime rose catastrophically, and the population began to decline rapidly. The "dashing 90s" burst into people's lives like a whirlwind.

The fate of the republics has developed in different ways. In Russia, the era of the aforementioned "dashing 90s" ended with the coming to power Vladimir Putin, and in Belarus - Alexander Lukashenko. In Ukraine, the drift towards traditional ties began at the start of the 2000s, but it was interrupted by the Orange Revolution. Georgia moved away from the general Soviet history in jerks. Kazakhstan came out of the crisis relatively smoothly and rushed towards Eurasian integration.

Objectively, nowhere in the post-Soviet territory does the population have social guarantees of the level of the USSR. In most of the former Soviet republics, the standard of living has not even approached the Soviet one.

Even in Russia, where incomes of the population have grown significantly, problems of social security call into question the thesis of an increase in the standard of living compared to what it was before 1991.

Not to mention the fact that a huge superpower ceased to exist on the world map, which shared the first place in the world in terms of military, political and economic power only with the United States, which the Russian people were proud of for many years.

It is significant how Russians assess the events of 1991 today, 25 years later. The data of the research conducted by the Levada Center, to some extent, summarize the numerous disputes about the State Emergency Committee and the actions of Yeltsin's team.

Thus, only 16% of Russia's residents said that they would come out “to defend democracy” - that is, they would support Yeltsin and defend the White House - in place of the participants in the events of 1991! 44% answered categorically that they would not defend the new government. 41% of respondents are not ready to answer this question.

Today, only 8% of Russia's residents call the events of August 1991 the victory of the democratic revolution. 30% describe what happened as a tragic event that had disastrous consequences for the country and the people, 35% - just as an episode in the struggle for power, 27% found it difficult to answer.

Speaking about the possible consequences after the victory of the State Emergency Committee, 16% of the respondents said that with this development of events Russia would live better today, 19% - that it would live worse, 23% - that it would live the same way it lives today. 43% could not decide on the answer.

15% of Russians believe that in August 1991 the representatives of the State Emergency Committee were right, 13% - that Yeltsin's supporters. 39% say that they did not have time to understand the situation, and 33% do not know what to answer.

40% of the respondents said that after the events of August 1991 the country went in the wrong direction, 33% - that in the right direction. 28% - found it difficult to answer.

It turns out that about a third to half of Russians are not sufficiently informed about the events of August 1991 and cannot unequivocally assess them. Among the rest of the population, those who assess the "August revolution" and the activities of "defenders of democracy" are moderately predominant. The overwhelming majority of the inhabitants of Russia would not take any action to counteract the Emergency Committee. In general, few people are happy about the defeat of the committee today.

So what really happened in those days and how are these events to be judged?

GKChP - an attempt to save the country, an anti-democratic putsch or a provocation?

On the eve it became known that the CIA predicted the emergence of the Emergency Committee back in April 1991! An unknown speaker from Moscow informed the leadership of the special services that the "supporters of tough measures," the traditionalists, are ready to remove Gorbachev from power and reverse the situation. At the same time, Langley believed that it would be difficult for the Soviet conservatives to retain power. A Moscow source listed all the leaders of the future GKChP and predicted that Gorbachev, in the event of a potential riot, would try to maintain control of the country.

It is clear that there is not a word about the US response in the information document. But they naturally had to be. When the Emergency Committee emerged, the US leadership harshly condemned it and did everything to achieve similar actions from other Western countries. The position of the heads of the USA, Great Britain and other Western states was announced by journalists directly in the Vesti program, which, in turn, could not but affect the consciousness of doubting Soviet citizens.

There are a number of oddities in the entire history of the GKChP.

First of all, For some reason, the leaders of the powerful security structures of the USSR, indisputable intellectuals and excellent organizers of the old school acted spontaneously, uncertainly and even somehow confused. They could not decide on the tactics of action. Yanaev's shaking hands went down in history during a speech on camera.

From which it is logical to assume that the creation of the State Emergency Committee was a completely unprepared step.

Secondly, Yeltsin's team, which was by no means as experienced and powerful as their opponents, worked like clockwork. Notification schemes, transport, communications were effective; the defenders of the barricades were well fed and watered; leaflets were printed and sold in huge editions; their own media worked.

Everything indicates that Yeltsin was well prepared for such a development of events.

Thirdly, Mikhail Gorbachev, who continued to be the official head of the USSR, fell ill just in time and left Moscow. Thus, the country was deprived of the supreme power, and he himself remained as if it had nothing to do with it.

Fourth, the USSR president did not take any measures to try to stop the leaders of the Emergency Committee. On the contrary, in his own words, he gave them complete freedom of action.

Fifth, today it is known that back in June 1991, the US authorities discussed the prospect of a putsch in the USSR with Gorbachev and the leadership of the USSR Foreign Ministry. Wouldn't the president of the Union, if he wanted to, have prevented it in two months?

All these strange facts raise questions and doubts in the official interpretation of the winning side, according to which the GKChP was an illegal military junta, without the knowledge of Gorbachev trying to stifle the seeds of democracy. Moreover, all of the above suggests a version that Gorbachev and Yeltsin could deliberately provoke their political opponents to take action at an inconvenient time for them.

On the one hand, the signing of the new Union Treaty was a victory for the reformers. But the victory is, to put it mildly, half-hearted. The traditionalists, who held almost all the key posts in the state, if they were well prepared, had all the necessary tools to disrupt the signing of the treaty during the event itself by political means and for a political counterattack during the crisis that would inevitably follow the signing itself. In fact, the traditionalists were forced to act without preparation, at an inconvenient time for themselves against opponents, who, on the contrary, were well prepared for the fight.

Everything indicates that Gorbachev and Yeltsin simply could have lured the organizers of the Emergency Committee into a trap, after falling into which they were forced to act according to someone else's scenario. Everyone who could stop the death of the USSR in 1991 was thrown out of the game overnight.

Some of the GKChP participants and those sympathizing with the committee died shortly after the coup under mysterious circumstances, committing strange suicides, and the other part was quietly amnestied in 1994, when it no longer posed any threat. The Gakachepists were set up, but when it became clear it was too late to do anything.

The events of August 1991 ideally fit into the scheme of color revolutions with the only difference that the head of state actually played on the side of the "revolutionaries - defenders of democracy." Mikhail Sergeevich Gorbachev could probably tell a lot of interesting things, but he is unlikely to do it. The man, whom fate has lifted to the very heights of world politics, the head of a superpower, exchanged all this for advertising pizza and bags. And the citizens of Russia, even after 25 years, are well aware of this and assess accordingly.

Those who suggest forgetting the history of August 1991 as a bad dream are categorically wrong. Then we went through one of the most tragic events in our history, and it is vitally important to work on the mistakes in this regard. The bloody consequences of the collapse of the USSR still have to be sorted out - including in Ukraine: in the Donbass they are now being killed, largely due to the fact that the State Emergency Committee was unable to stop the local princelings who wanted to break the state for the sake of personal power.

At the same time, the supporters of the other extreme are also wrong, denying the right to exist of the Russian Federation because of the August 1991 tragedy. Yes, the USSR collapsed against the will of the people, expressed in the referendum on March 17, but this is not a reason to refuse Russia to have the current statehood - a guarantee of the sovereign existence of the Russian people. On the contrary, everything must be done for the development of the Russian Federation as an internationally recognized legal successor of the USSR. And the most important task is to restore the former greatness of our Fatherland on its basis.

Source - Wikipedia

The State Committee for a State of Emergency is a self-proclaimed authority in the USSR that existed from August 18 to 21, 1991. It was formed from the first state and officials of the Soviet government who opposed the reforms carried out by the President of the USSR M.S.Gorbachev. Perestroika and the transformation of the Soviet Union into a new "Union of Sovereign States", which became a confederation consisting of part of the already sovereign republics.
The forces under the leadership of the President of Russia (RSFSR) BN Yeltsin refused to obey the State Emergency Committee, calling their actions unconstitutional, there was an attempt to declare a strike. The actions of the GKChP led to what became known as the "August putsch".
From 22 to 29 August 1991, former members of the dissolved GKChP and persons who actively assisted them were arrested, but from June 1992 to January 1993 they were all released on recognizance not to leave. In April 1993, the trial began. On February 23, 1994, the defendants in the GKChP case were amnestied by the State Duma of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation, despite Yeltsin's objection. One of the defendants, Valentin Varennikov, refused to accept the amnesty and the trial continued over him. On August 11, 1994, the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of Russia acquitted Varennikov.

By the beginning of 1991, the situation in the USSR became critical. The country has entered a phase of disintegration. The leadership began to study the issue of declaring a state of emergency.
From the "Conclusion on the materials of the investigation of the role and participation of officials of the KGB of the USSR in the events of August 19-21, 1991":

Marat Nikolaevich asked my advice on which type of helicopter to choose - the Mi-8 or Mi-24. Naturally, I advised the Mi-24, since it was armored against 12.7 mm bullets, and all the tanks in the White House area had machine guns of this caliber. But in case of failure of one of the engines, the Mi-24 helicopter could not continue its flight. The Mi-8 could fly on one engine. Tishchenko agreed with me. However, less than an hour later, he called back and happily said that according to the information he received from the same KGB department, all the tanks and infantry fighting vehicles brought into Moscow did not have ammunition, so he was preparing the Mi-8. And some time later, a message came that the commander of the Airborne Forces, General Grachev, stopped the division in Kubinka. By the evening it became clear that the State Emergency Committee had shamefully failed, and by lunchtime on August 21, all the media loudly announced this. The orgy of victory began.

Unfortunately, it was overshadowed by the death of three people under the wheels of an infantry fighting vehicle in the tunnel between Vosstaniya Square and Smolenskaya Square. It all seemed strange to me. Why send troops and armored vehicles to Moscow without ammunition? Why is the Moscow department of the KGB striving to save Yeltsin while the chairman of the KGB Kryuchkov is a member of the Emergency Committee? All this looked like some kind of farce. Subsequently, in 1993, Yeltsin really stormed the White House, and the tanks were firing direct fire and by no means blank charges. And in August 1991 it all looked like a grandiose performance or monstrous stupidity on the part of the leadership of the State Emergency Committee. However, what happened happened. I express only my opinion. Then events developed with lightning speed: the return of Gorbachev from Foros, the ban and dissolution of the CPSU, the Belovezhsky agreement on the liquidation of the USSR, the creation of the Union of Independent States on the basis of the former republics of the USSR.

The most absurd thing was, of course, the disintegration of a single Slavic core: Russia, Ukraine and Belarus. It seemed that there was some kind of insanity among the leaders of these republics, who demonstrated complete ignorance of the history of the creation of Russian statehood. But the most striking thing was that all this was supported by the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, which hastened to dissolve itself, and the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation ratified the Belovezhsky agreement.

I remembered the words of Denikin and Wrangel, who, after the defeat of the White movement in the Civil War of 1918, referring to their descendants in their memoirs, noted the historical merit of the Bolsheviks in that they basically preserved Great Russia. Modern Bolsheviks, dressed in national clothes, completely destroyed the great power, completely disregarding the opinion of its peoples.

After some time, it became clear that the head of all these processes was the apparatus of the CPSU Central Committee, headed by a member of the Politburo A. N. Yakovlev and with a very dubious and incomprehensible role of Gorbachev. Most of the rulers in the new states belonged to the cohort of workers in the party apparatus of the CPSU, and most of the oligarchs and "new" Russians in the past belonged to the party or Komsomol elite. In front of the eyes of all the people, active supporters of the CPSU policy were turning into its fierce enemies. Calls for a "witch hunt" began, however, they were soon suspended, as this could clearly affect them themselves.

The people were deceived.

Links:
1. Ogarkov and Operation Herat
2. Akhromeev Sergey Fedorovich
3. Gorbacheva Raisa Maksimovna (ur. Titarenko)
17.

August putsch
Mass demonstrations in Moscow against the August 1991 putsch
	The planned transformation of the USSR into a Union of Sovereign States with the initial participation of only the RSFSR and the Kazakh SSR. / P\u003e
Primary goal:	Stop the collapse of the USSR and prevent its transformation into a confederation.
	Failure of the putsch. The political victory of Boris Yeltsin, the disruption of the signing of a new Union Treaty between the republics of the USSR, a significant weakening of the positions of the CPSU, the formation of the State Council, consisting of the President of the USSR and the heads of the Union republics.
Organizers:	GKChP USSR
Driving forces:	GKChP Political support in the RSFSR: Liberal Democratic Party of the Soviet Union Russia Communist Party of the RSFSR Union republics that supported the GKChP: Azerbaijan Azerbaijan SSR Belarusian Soviet Socialist Republic Byelorussian SSR International support for the GKChP: Iraq Iraq Libya Libya Serbia Serbia Sudan Sudan Flag of Palestine PLO
Opponents:	RSFSR: Russia Defenders of the White House Russia Supreme Council of the RSFSR Russia Council of Ministers of the RSFSR Russia Administration of the President of the RSFSR Russia Lensovet, and its defenders Republics that rejected the acts of the State Emergency Committee: Latvia Latvian SSR Lithuania Lithuanian SSR Moldova Moldavian SSR Estonia Estonian SSR United States United States United States International condemnation States of America USA
Fatalities:
Injured:	Unknown
Those arrested:

August putsch - an attempt to remove M.S.Gorbachev from the post of President of the USSR and change his course, undertaken by the self-proclaimed State Committee on a State of Emergency (GKChP) - a group of conservative conspirators from the leadership of the Central Committee of the CPSU, the government of the USSR, the army and the KGB on August 19, 1991, which led to radical changes in the political situation in the country.

The actions of the State Emergency Committee were accompanied by the declaration of a state of emergency for 6 months, the deployment of troops to Moscow, the re-subordination of local authorities to the military commandants appointed by the State Emergency Committee, the introduction of strict censorship in the media and the prohibition of a number of them, the abolition of a number of constitutional rights and freedoms of citizens. The leadership of the RSFSR (President B.N.Yeltsin and the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR) and some other republics, and later also the legitimate leadership of the USSR: President M.S.Gorbachev and the Supreme Soviet of the USSR qualified the actions of the State Emergency Committee as a coup d'etat.

The goal of the putschists

The main goal of the putschists was to prevent the liquidation of the USSR, which, in their opinion, was supposed to begin on August 20 during the first stage of signing a new union treaty, turning the USSR into a confederation - the Union of Sovereign States. On August 20, the agreement was to be signed by representatives of the RSFSR and the Kazakh SSR, the rest of the future components of the commonwealth within five meetings, until October 22.

In one of the first statements of the State Emergency Committee, distributed by Soviet radio stations and central television, the following goals were indicated, for the implementation of which a state of emergency was introduced in the country:

It should be noted that if a new agreement was signed and the existing management structure of the USSR was abolished, the members of the State Emergency Committee could lose their top government posts.
According to sociological research by the Public Opinion Foundation, conducted in 1993, the majority (29% of respondents) stated that the purpose of the State Emergency Committee was to seize power, and for this they wanted to "overthrow Gorbachev" and "prevent Yeltsin from coming to power" (29%) ... 18% express the idea that the GKChP members wanted to change the political structure of society: “to preserve the Soviet Union”, “to return back the old socialist system”, and for this “to establish a military dictatorship”.
In 2006, the former chairman of the KGB of the USSR, Vladimir Kryuchkov, stated that the State Emergency Committee did not aim to seize power:

Timing

The GKChP members chose the moment when the President was away - on vacation at the Foros state residence in Crimea, and announced his temporary removal from power for health reasons.

Forces of the Emergency Committee

Active members and supporters of the Emergency Committee

• Achalov Vladislav Alekseevich (1945-2011) - Deputy Minister of Defense of the USSR
• Baklanov Oleg Dmitrievich (b. 1932) - First Deputy Chairman of the USSR Defense Council
• Boldin Valery Ivanovich (1935-2006) - Chief of Staff of the President of the USSR
• Varennikov Valentin Ivanovich (1923-2009) - Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces - Deputy Minister of Defense of the USSR
• Generalov Vyacheslav Vladimirovich (b. 1946) - head of security at the residence of the President of the USSR in Foros
• Kryuchkov Vladimir Alexandrovich (1924-2007) - Chairman of the KGB of the USSR
• Lukyanov Anatoly Ivanovich (b. 1932) - Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR
• Pavlov Valentin Sergeevich (1937-2003) - Prime Minister of the USSR
• Plekhanov Yuri Sergeevich (1930-2002) - Head of the Security Service of the KGB of the USSR
• Pugo Boris Karlovich (1937-1991) - Minister of Internal Affairs of the USSR
• Starodubtsev Vasily Alexandrovich (b. 1931) - Chairman of the Peasant Union of the USSR
• Tizyakov Alexander Ivanovich (b. 1926) - President of the Association of State Enterprises and Industrial Facilities, Construction, Transport and Communications of the USSR
• Shenin Oleg Semenovich (1937-2009) - member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU
• Yazov Dmitry Timofeevich (b. 1923) - Minister of Defense of the USSR
• Yanaev Gennady Ivanovich (1937-2010) - vice president of the USSR

Power and information support of the Emergency Committee

• The Emergency Committee relied on the forces of the KGB (Alpha), the Ministry of Internal Affairs (Division named after Dzerzhinsky) and the Ministry of Defense (Tula Airborne Division, Taman Motorized Rifle Division, Kantemirovskaya Division). In total, about 4 thousand servicemen, 362 tanks, 427 armored personnel carriers and infantry fighting vehicles were brought into Moscow. Additional parts of the Airborne Forces were deployed in the vicinity of Leningrad, Tallinn, Tbilisi, Riga.

Generals P.S.Grachev and his deputy A.I. Lebed were in command of the Airborne Forces. At the same time, Grachev maintained a telephone connection with both Yazov and Yeltsin. However, the GKChP did not have full control over its own forces; so, on the very first day, units of the Taman division went over to the side of the defenders of the White House. From the tank of this division he delivered his famous message to the assembled supporters of Yeltsin.

• Informational support to the State Emergency Committee was provided by the State Television and Radio of the USSR (for three days, news broadcasts certainly included the exposure of various acts of corruption and violations of the law committed within the framework of the "reformist course"), the State Emergency Committee also enlisted the support of the Central Committee of the CPSU, but these institutions could not have a noticeable impact on the situation in capital, and the committee could not mobilize that part of society that shared the views of the members of the State Emergency Committee.

Head of the Emergency Committee

Despite the fact that G.I. Yanaev was the nominal head of the State Emergency Committee, according to a number of experts (for example, the former deputy of the Leningrad City Council, political scientist and polytechnologist Alexei Musakov), the real soul of the conspiracy was V.A.Kryuchkov The leading role of Kryuchkov is repeatedly mentioned in the materials official investigation carried out by the KGB of the USSR in September 1991

Despite this, in the opinion of Russian President Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin:

Opponents of the Emergency Committee

Resistance to the GKChP was led by the political leadership of the Russian Federation (President B. N. Yeltsin, Vice-President A. V. Rutskoy, Prime Minister I. S. Silaev, acting Chairman of the Supreme Soviet R. I. Khasbulatov).
In an address to the citizens of Russia, Boris Yeltsin on August 19, describing the actions of the State Emergency Committee as a coup d'etat, said:

Khasbulatov was on the side of Yeltsin, although 10 years later in an interview with Radio Liberty he said that, like the State Emergency Committee, he was dissatisfied with the draft of a new Union Treaty:

As for the content of the new Union Treaty, apart from Afanasyev and someone else, I myself was terribly dissatisfied with this content. Yeltsin and I argued a lot - should we go to the meeting on August 20? And finally, I convinced Yeltsin by saying that if we don't even go there, we don't form a delegation, it will be perceived as our desire to destroy the Union. There was, after all, a referendum in March on the unity of the Union. Sixty-three percent or 61 percent of the population seems to be in favor of keeping the Union. I say: "You and I have no right ...". Therefore, I say: "Let us go, make up a delegation, and there we will state our comments on the future Union Treaty in a motivated manner."

Defenders of the White House

At the call of the Russian authorities, masses of Muscovites gathered near the House of Soviets of the Russian Federation (“White House”), among whom were representatives of various social groups - from the democratic-minded public, student youth, intellectuals to veterans of the Afghan war.

According to the leader of the Democratic Union party Valeria Novodvorskaya, despite the fact that she was held in a pre-trial detention center during the days of the coup, her party members took an active part in street actions against the State Emergency Committee in Moscow.

Some of the participants in the defense of the House of Soviets who were part of the Zhivoye Koltso detachment on August 20, 1991, formed a social and political organization of the same name, the Zhivoye Koltso Union (leader K. Truevtsev).

Another social and political association that formed near the House of the Council during the days of the putsch is the "Social and patriotic association of volunteers - defenders of the White House in support of democratic reforms - the Russia squad."

Among the defenders of the White House were Mstislav Rostropovich, Andrei Makarevich, Konstantin Kinchev, Margarita Terekhova, the future terrorist Basayev and the head of the Yukos company Mikhail Khodorkovsky

Background

• On June 17, Gorbachev and the leaders of the nine republics agreed on a draft Union Treaty. The project itself caused a sharply negative reaction from the security officials from the USSR Cabinet of Ministers: Yazov (Army), Pugo (Ministry of Internal Affairs) and Kryuchkov (KGB).
• July 20 - Russian President Yeltsin issued a decree on departisation, that is, banning the activities of party committees at enterprises and institutions.
• On July 29, Gorbachev, Yeltsin and the President of Kazakhstan N.A. Nazarbayev met privately in Novo-Ogaryov. They have scheduled the signing of a new Union Treaty on August 20.
• On August 2, Gorbachev announced in a televised address that the signing of the Union Treaty was scheduled for August 20. On August 3, this appeal was published in the Pravda newspaper.
• On August 4, Gorbachev went to rest at his residence near the village of Foros in the Crimea.
• August 17 - Kryuchkov, Pavlov, Yazov, Baklanov, Shenin and Gorbachev's assistant Boldin meet at the ABTs facility - a closed guest residence of the KGB at the address: Akademika Vargi Street, possession 1. Decisions are made to introduce a state of emergency from August 19, to form a State Emergency Committee, to demand Gorbachev to sign the relevant decrees or resign and transfer powers to Vice-President Gennady Yanayev, Yeltsin to detain at the Chkalovsky airfield upon arrival from Kazakhstan to talk with Yazov, then to act depending on the results of the negotiations.

The beginning of the putsch

• On August 18, at 8 a.m., Yazov informs his deputies Grachev and Kalinin about the imminent introduction of a state of emergency.
• 13:02. Baklanov, Shenin, Boldin, General V. I. Varennikov and the head of the USSR President's security Yuri Plekhanov take off from the Chkalovsky airfield on a TU-154 military aircraft (tail number 85605) assigned to Defense Minister Yazov to Crimea for negotiations with Gorbachev, in order to get his consent to declare a state of emergency. At about 5 pm they meet with Gorbachev. Gorbachev refuses to give them his consent.

• At the same time (at 16:32), all types of communications were turned off at the presidential dacha, including the channel that provided control of the strategic nuclear forces of the USSR.
• On August 19, at 4 a.m., the Sevastopol regiment of the KGB troops of the USSR blocks the presidential dacha in Foros. By order of the Chief of Staff of the USSR Air Defense Forces, Colonel-General Maltsev, two tractors blocked the runway on which the President's flight facilities are located - the Tu-134 aircraft and the Mi-8 helicopter.

G. Yanaev's version

• According to GKChP member Gennady Yanayev, on August 16, at one of the special facilities of the USSR KGB in Moscow, a meeting of the USSR Minister of Defense Yazov and KGB Chairman Kryuchkov took place, at which the situation in the country was discussed. On August 17, at the same facility, a meeting was held in the same composition, to which the Chairman of the USSR Government Valentin Pavlov was also invited. It was decided to send a group of members of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee to Foros in order to demand that Mikhail Gorbachev immediately declare a state of emergency and not sign a new Union Treaty without holding an additional referendum. On August 18, at about 20:00, Yanaev arrived at the Kremlin at the invitation of Kryuchkov, where he met with a group of Politburo members who had returned from Foros from Gorbachev. Yanaev was offered to head the Emergency Committee. After a long discussion, he agreed only at about 1:00 on August 19.

Defenders of the White House

August 19

• At 6 o'clock in the morning, the USSR mass media announced the introduction of a state of emergency in the country and the inability of the President of the USSR M. S. Gorbachev to perform his functions "for health reasons" and the transfer of all power to the State Emergency Committee. At the same time, troops were brought into Moscow.
• At night, Alfa moved to Yeltsin's dacha in Arkhangelskoye, but did not block the president and did not receive instructions to take any action against him. Meanwhile, Yeltsin urgently mobilized all his supporters in the upper echelon of power, the most prominent of whom were R.I. Khasbulatov, A.A. Sobchak, G.E.Burbulis, M.N. Poltoranin, S.M. Shakhrai, V.N. Yaroshenko. The coalition drafted and faxed an appeal “To the citizens of Russia”. Boris N. Yeltsin signed a decree "On the illegality of the actions of the Emergency Committee." Echo of Moscow became the mouthpiece of the opponents of the putsch.
• BN Yeltsin's condemnation of the State Emergency Committee during a speech from a tank of the Taman division at the White House. Russian President Boris N. Yeltsin arrives at the "White House" (Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR) at 9 o'clock and organizes a center of resistance to the actions of the State Emergency Committee. Resistance takes the form of rallies that gather in Moscow at the White House on Krasnopresnenskaya embankment and in Leningrad on St. Isaac's Square near the Mariinsky Palace. Barricades are being erected in Moscow, leaflets are being distributed. Directly at the White House is the armored vehicles of the Ryazan Regiment of the Tula Airborne Division under the command of Major General AI Lebed] and the Taman Division. At 12 o'clock from the tank, Boris N. Yeltsin addresses those gathered at the rally, where he calls the incident a coup d'etat. From among the protesters, unarmed militias are being created under the command of Deputy K.I.Kobets. Afghan veterans and employees of the private security company Alex take an active part in the militia. Yeltsin is preparing the space for retreat by sending his emissaries to Paris and Sverdlovsk with the right to organize a government in exile.
• GKChP evening press conference. V.S.Pavlov, who developed a hypertensive crisis, was absent. The GKChP participants were noticeably nervous; the whole world was covered by shots of G. Yanaev's shaking hands. The journalist T. A. Malkina openly called what was happening "a coup", the words of the members of the State Emergency Committee were more like excuses (G. Yanaev: "Gorbachev deserves all respect").

At 23:00 a company of paratroopers of the Tula Airborne Division on 10 BRDM arrived in the vicinity of the House of Soviets. Along with the soldiers arrived the deputy commander of the Airborne Forces, Major General A.I. Lebed.

The plot in the program "Time"

• In the evening broadcast of the Vremya program, the USSR Central Television unexpectedly broadcasts a plot prepared by its correspondent Sergei Medvedev about the situation at the White House, in which Yeltsin falls, reading the Decree “On the illegality of the GKChP actions” signed the day before. In conclusion, there is a commentary by S. Medvedev, which directly expresses doubts about the possibility of this item being broadcast. Nevertheless, the story was seen by a huge audience of TV viewers throughout the country, it contrasted sharply with the rest of the program (with stories in support of the actions of the Emergency Committee) and allowed doubting the actions of the Emergency Committee.
• The author of the plot, Sergei Medvedev, explains its release as follows:

It is worth noting that in 1995 Sergei Medvedev became the press secretary of President Boris Yeltsin and held this post until 1996.

20 August

• By order of the State Emergency Committee, officers of the Ministry of Defense, KGB and the Ministry of Internal Affairs V.A.Achalov, V.F. Grushko, G.E. Ageev, B.V. Gromov, A.I. Lebed, V.F. Karpukhin, V.I. Varennikov and BP Beskov carried out preparations for the previously unplanned seizure of the building of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR by units of power structures. According to experts, the capture plan they developed was flawless from a military point of view. For the operation, units with a total number of about 15 thousand people were allocated. However, the generals responsible for preparing the assault began to doubt the expediency. Alexander Lebed goes over to the side of the White House defenders. The commanders of "Alpha" and "Vympel" Karpukhin and Beskov ask the Deputy Chairman of the KGB Ageev to cancel the operation. The assault was canceled.
• In connection with the hospitalization of V. Pavlov, the provisional leadership of the Council of Ministers of the USSR was entrusted to V. Kh.Doguzhiev, who did not make any public statements during the putsch.
• Russia is creating an interim republican ministry of defense. Konstantin Kobets is appointed Minister of Defense.
• At 12:00, a rally, sanctioned by the Moscow city authorities, starts near the House of Soviets. Several tens of thousands of people gathered at it. The rally was organized by the Democratic Russia movement and the Councils of Labor Collectives in Moscow and the Moscow Region. The officially declared slogan of the rally is "For legality and order"
• At 15:00 on the first channel of the Central Television of the USSR in the program "Vremya", under conditions of strict censorship on other channels, an unexpected story appeared, later described as follows by the famous journalist E. A. Kiselyov:

I then worked at Vesti. Vesti were disconnected from the air. We sit, watch the first channel (...) And an announcer appears in the frame, and suddenly begins to read the messages of news agencies: President Bush condemns the putschists, British Prime Minister John Major condemns, the world community is outraged - and at the end: Yeltsin outlawed the State Emergency Committee, the prosecutor Russia, then there was Stepankov, initiates a criminal case. We're shocked. And I can imagine how many people, including participants in the events, who at that moment caught the slightest hint of the direction in which the situation was swinging, ran to the White House to Yeltsin to sign their loyalty and loyalty. On the third day, in the evening, I meet Tanechka Sopova, who then worked in the Main Information Office of Central Television, well, hugs, kisses. I say: "Tatyan, what happened with you?" - “And this is me Bad boy, says Tanya. I was a responsible release. " That is, she collected the folder, picked up the news. And there was an order: go to agree on everything. “I go in,” he says, “once, and there is the whole synclite and some people who are completely unfamiliar. They are discussing what to broadcast at 21 o'clock in the program "Time". And here I, little one, poke around with my papers. " She really is such a tiny woman. “They tell me in plain text where I should go with my three-hour news: 'Make it yourself!' - well, I went and did the layout.”

According to Kiselev, Tatyana Sopova is "a little woman, because of whom, perhaps, the coup in August 1991 failed."

August 21

• On the night of August 21, tank units controlled by the State Emergency Committee carry out maneuvers in the area of \u200b\u200bthe White House (the building of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR). Supporters of Boris Yeltsin clash with a military column in a tunnel under Novy Arbat. (see the incident in the tunnel on the Garden Ring)
• Group Alpha is not ordered to storm the White House.
• At 3 o'clock in the morning, Air Force Commander-in-Chief Yevgeny Shaposhnikov suggests that Yazov withdraw the troops from Moscow, and that the State Emergency Committee "declare illegal and disperse." At 5 o'clock in the morning, a meeting of the collegium of the USSR Ministry of Defense was held, at which the commander-in-chief of the Navy and the Strategic Missile Forces support Shaposhnikov's proposal. Yazov gives the order to withdraw troops from Moscow.
• In the afternoon of August 21, the session of the Supreme Council of the RSFSR begins, chaired by Khasbulatov, which almost immediately accepts statements condemning the State Emergency Committee. Vice-President of the RSFSR Alexander Rutskoy and Prime Minister Ivan Silaev fly to Foros to see Gorbachev. On another plane, some members of the State Emergency Committee fly to the Crimea for negotiations with Gorbachev, but he refuses to accept them.
• A delegation from the State Emergency Committee arrived at the presidential dacha in Crimea. MS Gorbachev refused to accept it and demanded to restore communication with the outside world. In the evening, M.S.Gorbachev contacted Moscow, canceled all orders of the State Emergency Committee, removed its members from government posts and appointed new leaders of the power departments of the USSR.

August 22

• Mikhail Gorbachev returns from Foros to Moscow with Rutskoi and Silaev on a Tu-134. GKChP members were arrested.
• Mourning for the dead has been declared in Moscow. On the Krasnopresnenskaya embankment in Moscow, a mass rally was held, during which the protesters carried out a huge banner of the Russian tricolor; at the rally, the President of the RSFSR announced that a decision had been made to make the white-azure-red banner the new state flag of Russia. (In honor of this event in 1994, the date of August 22 was chosen to celebrate the Day of the State Flag of Russia.)
• The new state flag of Russia (tricolor) was first installed at the top of the building of the Council House.
• The defenders of the White House are supported by rock groups (Time Machine, Cruise, Shah, Metal Corrosion, Mongol Shuudan), which will organize a Rock on the Barricades concert on August 22.

August 23

At night, by order of the Moscow City Council, with a mass gathering of protesters, the monument to Felix Dzerzhinsky on Lubyanskaya Square was dismantled.

On the air, Yeltsin in the presence of Gorbachev signs a decree on the suspension of the Communist Party of the RSFSR

Further developments

On the night of August 23, by order of the Moscow City Council, with a mass gathering of protesters, the monument to Felix Dzerzhinsky on Lubyanka Square was dismantled.

On the air, Yeltsin, in the presence of Gorbachev, signs a decree on the suspension of the Communist Party of the RSFSR. The next day, Gorbachev announces his resignation as General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee. A statement on the matter said:

The Secretariat, the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee did not oppose the coup. The Central Committee failed to take a decisive position of condemnation and opposition, did not rouse the communists to fight against the violation of constitutional legality. Among the conspirators were members of the party leadership, a number of party committees and the media supported the actions of state criminals. This put the communists in a false position. Many party members refused to cooperate with the conspirators, condemned the coup and joined the fight against it. No one has the moral right to indiscriminately accuse all communists, and I, as President, consider myself obligated to protect them as citizens from unfounded accusations. In this situation, the CPSU Central Committee must make a difficult but honest decision to dissolve itself. They themselves will determine the fate of the republican communist parties and local party organizations. I do not consider it possible for myself to continue performing the functions of the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and resign the corresponding powers. I believe that democratically-minded communists, who have remained faithful to constitutional legality and the course of renewing society, will come out in favor of creating a party on a new basis that, together with all progressive forces, can actively participate in the continuation of fundamental democratic reforms in the interests of working people.

Confronting the putschists in Leningrad

Despite the fact that the main events took place in Moscow, the confrontation between the State Emergency Committee and the democratic forces in the regions, especially in Leningrad, also played an important role.

On the morning of August 19, the city radio and television broadcasted: The GKChP's appeal to the Soviet people, Anatoly Lukyanov's statement in his support, followed by an appeal by Colonel-General V.N. Samsonov, the commander of the Leningrad Military District, whom the GKChP had appointed as the military commandant of Leningrad. In it, Samsonov announced the introduction of a state of emergency and special measures in the city and adjacent territories, which included:

• a ban on holding meetings, street processions, strikes, as well as any public events (including sports and entertainment);
• prohibition of dismissal of workers and employees of their own free will;
• a ban on the use of duplicating equipment, as well as radio and television transmission equipment, the seizure of sound recording, amplifying technical means;
• establishing control over the media;
• introduction of special rules for using communications;
• restricting the movement of vehicles and conducting their inspection;

And other measures.

General Samsonov also announced the creation of an emergency committee in the city, which, in particular, includes the first secretary of the regional committee of the CPSU Gidaspov.

The Lensovet building (Mariinsky Palace), in which the democratic faction was the strongest, on August 19 turned into a headquarters to counter the putsch, and St. Isaac's Square in front of it - into a constant spontaneous meeting. Megaphones were installed on the square, broadcasting the latest reports on events and speeches from the meeting of the Leningrad City Council presidium, which opened at 10 o'clock. The square and the streets adjacent to the palace, as well as the streets near the TV center, were covered with barricades.

The mayor of the city, A. A. Sobchak, arrived in Moscow the day before to participate as a member of the Russian delegation in the planned signing of a new Union Treaty. Having compiled, together with Boris N. Yeltsin and other leaders of democratic resistance, the text of the Appeal to the citizens of Russia, he flew to Leningrad at about 2 pm. Immediately upon arrival, he went not to the Mariinsky Palace, as expected, but to General Samsonov's headquarters, where he persuaded the latter to refrain from sending troops into the city. Then he spoke at an emergency session of the Leningrad City Council, which opened at 16:30, and later addressed the townspeople on television (on August 19, 1991, Leningrad television was the only one in the USSR that managed to broadcast a program directed against the putschists). Together with Sobchak in the studio were the chairman of the Leningrad City Council Alexander Belyaev, the chairman of the Regional Council Yuri Yarov and the vice-mayor Vyacheslav Shcherbakov. They ended their speech with an appeal to the townspeople: to go to the Palace Square on the morning of August 20 for a protest rally.

On August 20, at 5 am, the Vitebsk division of the Airborne Forces of the KGB of the USSR and the Pskov division of the USSR Ministry of Defense marched towards Leningrad, but did not enter the city, but were stopped near Siverskaya (70 km from the city). The movement of military units in the vicinity and their pulling up to the city continued on the night of August 21 (they were regularly reported by Radio Baltika), but in the end V.N.Samsonov kept his word to A.A. Sobchak, and to bring them into the city did not.

At the rally on August 20 on Palace Square, which was attended by about 400 thousand people, along with the leaders of the city A. Belyaev, V. Shcherbakov and A. Sobchak, many prominent figures of politics and culture (People's Deputies M.E.Salye and Yu. Yu. Boldyrev, poet and composer A. A. Dolsky, academician D. S. Likhachev and others).

Free radio stations “Baltika” and “Open City” continued to broadcast in the city.

Victims

• Ilya Krichevsky, architect of the Kommunar design and construction cooperative
• Participant in the war in Afghanistan, forklift driver Dmitry Komar
• Economist of the joint venture "Ikom", son of Rear Admiral Vladimir Usov

All three died on the night of August 21 during an incident in a tunnel on the Garden Ring. On August 24, 1991, by decrees of the President of the USSR M. S. Gorbachev, all three were posthumously awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union "for courage and civic valor displayed in the defense of democracy and the constitutional order of the USSR."

Suicides of the leaders of the USSR

Minister of Internal Affairs of the USSR (1990-1991), member of the State Emergency Committee BK Pugo committed suicide by shooting himself with a pistol when he learned that a group had left for him to arrest him.
According to the founder of the Yabloko party, Grigory Yavlinsky, on August 22, 1991, he personally participated in the operation to arrest Pugo together with Viktor Ivanenko, Director General of the Federal Security Agency of the RSFSR:

At the site of the death of Pugo, three cartridges were found. Grigory Yavlinsky, referring to the data from the investigation, says that the last shot was fired by Pugo's wife Valentina Ivanovna, who also shot herself and died three days later without regaining consciousness.
August 24, 1991 at 21 hours 50 minutes. In office # 19 "a" in building 1 of the Moscow Kremlin, the guard on duty Koroteev discovered the corpse of Marshal of the Soviet Union Sergei Fyodorovich Akhromeev, who worked as an adviser to the President of the USSR. According to the version of the investigation, the marshal committed suicide, leaving a suicide note, in which he explained his act as follows:

At about five in the morning on August 26, 1991, the manager of the CPSU Central Committee N. Ye. Kruchina, under unclear circumstances, fell from the balcony of the fifth floor of his apartment in Pletnevy Lane and crashed to death. According to the data cited by the journalists of the Moscow News newspaper, Kruchina left a suicide note on the table, in which he wrote the following:

According to Moskovskiye Novosti journalists, Kruchina left a thick folder with documents containing detailed information about the illegal commercial activities of the CPSU and the KGB, including the creation of offshore enterprises with party money outside the USSR in recent years, on the armchair at his desk. An interesting fact: on October 6 of the same year, Kruchina's predecessor, 81-year-old Georgy Pavlov, falls from the window of his apartment as head of the Department of the Central Committee of the CPSU.

Symbolism

The symbol of victory over the putschists was the Russian tricolor, which was widely used by the forces opposing the State Emergency Committee. After the defeat of the State Emergency Committee, by the resolution of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR of August 22, 1991, the white-blue-red historical flag of Russia was recognized as the official national flag of the RSFSR.

Another symbol of the coup was the ballet Swan Lake, which was shown on television between the newscasts. In the mass consciousness, the putsch was associated with the Chilean putsch of Pinochet. So Anatoly Sobchak called the GKChP a junta, and Yazov tried to distance himself from this image, saying: "I will not be Pinochet."

The August putsch in culture

• In 1991 the short animated film The Putsch was shot at the Pilot studio.
• Alexander Prokhanov's novel "The Last Soldier of the Empire" was completely devoted to the August events of 1991.
• 2011 - On the 20th anniversary of the putsch, the documentary "Tomorrow everything will be different" was released on Channel One.
• 2011 - on the 20th anniversary of the putsch on the channel "Russia" a documentary film "August 91st. Versions ".

Theory about Gorbachev's participation in the GKChP activities

It was suggested that Mikhail Gorbachev himself, who knew about the conservative lobby in the Kremlin leadership, was in collusion with the State Emergency Committee. So, A. Ye. Khinshtein in the book “Yeltsin. Kremlin. Case history "writes:

However, Khinshtein does not indicate the source of this information. On February 1, 2006, in an interview with the Rossiya TV channel, Boris Yeltsin stated that Gorbachev's participation in the Emergency Committee had been documented.

Alpha's role

Alpha did not trust the Emergency Committee because of the "betrayal" of the KGB leadership after the events in the Baltic States, when one of its soldiers died. Therefore, "Alpha" hesitated, virtually maintaining neutrality. In an interview, the then Alpha commander stated that they could easily have taken over the White House. But, according to him, there was no command from above. Otherwise, the White House building would have been captured.

Former head of the presidential security service, Alexander Korzhakov, in his book of memoirs "Boris Yeltsin: From Dawn to Dusk", claims that in the early morning of August 19, 1991, special forces of the USSR KGB Alpha group, numbering about 50 people, arrived at Yeltsin's dacha in Arkhangelskoye and were guarding near the highway however, no action was taken when Yeltsin's cortege drove out of the dacha towards Moscow. Already after the president's departure, at about 11 o'clock, armed people approached the gates of the dacha, according to Korzhakov, led by a man who introduced himself as a lieutenant colonel of the Airborne Forces, who said that they allegedly arrived on behalf of the Minister of Defense to strengthen the security of the village. However, one of Yeltsin's security guards recognized him as an Alpha officer who had taught at the KGB courses. Yeltsin's guards invited the Alpha fighters to dine in the dining room. After lunch, the commandos sat in their bus for several hours and then left.

According to the BBC radio company, in three days of the coup, "Alpha" carried out only one order: on August 21 at 08.30, Karpukhin summoned the commander of the Alpha branch, Anatoly Savelyev, ordering him to go with people to Demyan Bednoy Street, where the radio transmission center is located and “To close down the radio station“ Echo of Moscow ”” because it “transmits disinformation”. At 10.40 the station was silent for several hours.

Participants' opinions

In 2008, Mikhail Gorbachev commented on the August 1991 situation as follows:

A member of the State Emergency Committee, Marshal Dmitry Yazov, in 2001, spoke about the impossibility of managing public opinion in 1991:

Alexander Rutskoy:

Value

The August putsch was one of those events that marked the end of the power of the CPSU and the collapse of the USSR and, according to popular belief, gave impetus to democratic change in Russia. In Russia itself, changes took place that contributed to the expansion of its sovereignty.

On the other hand, supporters of the preservation of the Soviet Union argue that disorder began in the country associated with the inconsistent policy of the then government.

Curious facts

• On the seventh anniversary of the events, in 1998, none of the representatives of the Russian authorities took part in the mourning events dedicated to the memory of the victims. By that time, in seven years, the number of GKChP supporters in Russia, according to the Institute of Sociology of Parliamentarism, increased from 17% to 25%

• According to polls conducted by the Sociological Opinion Foundation in 2001, 61 percent of the respondents could not name any of the members of the Emergency Committee. Only 16 percent were able to name at least one surname correctly. 4 percent remembered the head of the Emergency Committee Gennady Yanayev.

• In 2005, only about 60 people attended a meeting of former participants in the events on Gorbaty Bridge and an event at the Vagankovskoye cemetery in memory of those killed in the incident in the tunnel on the Garden Ring. The then SPS leader Nikita Belykh said at the mourning event:

• In 2006, according to a sociological survey by the Public Opinion Foundation, 67 percent of Russian residents (including 58 percent of young people) found it difficult to give any assessment - about the benefits or harms of the Emergency Committee.

• In 2009, the Moscow mayor's office and the government of St. Petersburg completely banned the procession and rally dedicated to the anniversary of August 1991, motivating this in Moscow by the fact that for the sake of him it would be necessary to block the streets and thus create inconvenience to Muscovites, and in St. Petersburg - by the fact that these measures will interfere with the work on the pipeline.