Questions of thinking in psychology were placed abstract (image of theorist). In life - practical thinking. Previously, the problem of practical intelligence was narrowed to the question of visual-effective or sensing thinking (the problem of the task is to look at things or operating them). Visibility-effective thinking is the first stage of thinking in philo and ontogenesis. But it is not directly related to the issue of organizing practical thinking. Mental objects human activity, occupied by mental work, is hardly amenable to direct perception. The differences between theoretical and practical thinking cannot be sought in the differences of the mechanisms of thinking, in the "two different intellects". Intellect is one. The differences in theoretical and practical thinking are differently related to practice (not that one is connected, the other is no). Both are connected, but the connection is different (its character). The work of practical thinking is aimed at resolving private, specific tasks. Theoretical thinking is the finding of theoretical general patterns (tactics). Theoretical mind - from contemplation to abstraction, practical mind - from abstraction to practice. In practical thinking, communication with practice is more direct. In practical thinking - peculiar responsibility (theorists - hypotheses, practice - are in a stringent framework). The heat is questioned by the conviction that is from Hegel to Cant and the psychology of the beginning of the 20th century - that the theoretical mind is the highest possible form of manifestation of intellect. All gradations are conditional, but it is important to realize the tremendous complexity and importance of the problem of practical thinking. The problem assigned by Aristotle in the teaching "about a practical mind". The practical mind is aimed at the private, on activity, therefore, there must be both kinds of knowledge, i.e. Knowledge of general and private (it is more complicated).
The question of the practical mind is allowed only through a detailed study of the characteristics of human mental work in various fields of practical activity. The "mind of the commander" is one of the characteristic examples of a practical mind. In recent years, the problem of practical mind has been touched on only episodically. So the situation was up to 20 years. The 20th century, when the terms "practical thinking" and "practical intelligence" became usual on pages of psychological research. Under these terms, however, they understood not the work of the mind in the context of practical activity, but only the question of the so-called clear-effective or sensorious thinking. Mixing the practical mind with visual-effective thinking strongly contributed to the strengthening of such a look at the practical mind, as a lower, elementary function of mental activity. A deeper practice of a practical mind has settled in Soviet psychology (Rubinstein "Basics general psychology"). Thinking operations directly included in the course of practical effective permission of the problem put forward specific requirements other than the requirements imposed in generalized theoretical thinking.
These mental operations require:
- more sophisticated observation and attention to individual, private details
- suggest the ability to use to solve the problem, the special and one in the organization of the process, which is not included in theoretical generalization
- require the ability to move from reflections to action and back.
This is just a number of features characteristic of a practical mind, but this list is not complete.
It is considered: the commander must have a mind and will and the will as complex complex properties - the strength of character, courage, determination, energy, perseverance, etc. Napoleon clarified: between the mind and the will there must be a correspondence, they should be equal (square formula). The talent of the commander - the square, where the base is will, the height is the mind. The quality understanding of the problem "Mind and the Will of the Communion" has an extremely an important mistake. The mind and will are considered as two different abilities, like two "part of the soul" (Greeks).
The first preparing the division of all mental abilities into two classes was Aristotle (cognitive abilities and abilities feel, wishing ...). He is the appearance of the opposition of Usa and Will. But psychology passed by one of the most important concepts of Aristotelian teaching about the soul, the concept in which the unity of will and mind is carried out, this concept is a practical mind. The practical mind is the ability to activities aimed at human benefit and is based on the mind. The mind of the commander - one of the specific forms of the practical mind (the engine of the volitional action is the mind and desire). Both abilities - the mind and desire - determine the movement. The mind of the commander cannot be understood as intelligence, it is the unity of intellectual and volitional moments (the ability to understand in a difficult situation and almost instantly find correct solution called - intuition). The psychological nature of the commander intuition is closely connected with the high development of spatial representations and spatial thinking. For this you need: accumulation large number Knowledge, peculiar readiness of these knowledge generated by the exercise of the ability to solve new, unexpected tasks.
The mind of the commander
B. Teplov
Square: Equilibrium Mind and Will ...
It is customary to think that from the commander requires the presence of two qualities - an outstanding mind and strong will (and under the word "will", of course, is a very complex complex of properties: the power of character, courage, determination, energy, perseverance, etc.). This thought is completely indisputable. Napoleon introduced a new important hue to it: it's not just that the commander must have the mind, and the will, but in the fact that there should be an equilibrium between them that they should be equal: "a military man must have as many characters how much is the mind. " He compared to the present commander to the present commander, in which the base is will, the height is the mind. The square will be a square only under the condition if the base is equal to height; A large commander can only be the person who has the will and mind equal. If the will significantly exceeds the mind, the commander will act strongly and courageously, but little reasonable; In the opposite case, he will have good ideas and plans, but not enough courage and decisive them to implement them. Napoleonic "Formula Square" had a great success: quoted her constantly. At the same time, they often go further and put this kind of question. Since "equilibrium in nature is rarely found," in most cases it will have to be put up with the fact that the dating of the commander will be not a square, but a rectangle, will have to put up with the fact that the equilibrium, which is ideal, will be broken. What should be recognized as more desirable: violation of equilibrium towards the will or towards the mind? What is better: the commander with the predominance of will or with the predominance of the mind? I did not have to meet in the literature cases when this issue would have decided in favor of the mind. Usually the question itself is set in order to deploy the doctrine of the primacy of the Will in the activities of the commander. Extremely typical is the point of view M.I. Dragomirova. In his opinion, "Of all the acts of human war, there is a matter of much more volitional than the mind." "As if the plan is neither ingenious, it can be completely spoiled by execution, and the execution lies in the will of the will, if not exclusively, then in incomparably more than in the field of mind. The most incredible feats are made by almost one will: an example - the transition of Suvorov. Through the Alps in 1799. " Not letting back general Evaluation This point of view, I will indicate that there is one very widespread misconception. The function of the mind is considered to be inventing plans, the Will function is the execution of them. This is not true. On the one hand, the execution of the plan requires the mind no less than the will, and on the other, in the activities of the Communication, the plan thinking is usually inseparable from its execution. This is one of the most important features of intellectual work of the commander.<...>
Practical mind
Asking the question that is an engine of a volitional action, Aristotle comes to the conclusion that there can be no striving in itself ("After all, those who own themselves, although they may have a desire and hunt for something, but they do actions not under the influence of the desire, but follow the instructions of the mind "), nor the mind itself (" After all, the theoretical mind does not think anything related to action, and does not mean that what should be avoided and what should be the way "). A genuine strong-acting engine is the "mind and desire", or "reasonable desire." "The mind does not lead to motion without aspiration", but "both abilities - the mind and desire - determine the movement." This is the unity of mind and the desire of Aristotle and calls Will, on the one hand, a practical mind - on the other.<...> The mind of the commander is one of the specific forms of the practical mind in the Aristotelian sense of this term; It can not be understood as some pure intelligence; It is the unity of intellectual and volitional moments. When they say that any commander has an outstanding mind, but deprived of such volitional qualities as determination or moral courage, it means that his mind is not the one that needs a commander. The authentic mind of the commander can not be in a man of restless, timid and weakly accuracy.
Rare greatness of spirit
"The element in which military activities take place is a danger." "The fight generates element of danger, in which all types of military activities are and moved like fish in water, like birds in the air." In the "Element of Danger", the mind of the commander is working, and psychological analysis cannot pass by this circumstance. It is customary to think that in a state of serious danger, where there is a reason for the occurrence of fear, the quality and productivity of mental work decreases. The same Clausevitz wrote: "Human nature is peculiar to the immediate feeling of great danger to himself and for others was an obstacle to the pure mind." But Clausevitz understood quite well the nature of war, so as not to know that this kind of a decline in mental capabilities in a dangerous situation is not at all inevitable. He knew that in any good warrior, Moreover, any large commander the case is just the opposite: the danger not only does not reduce, but, on the contrary, exacerbates the work of the mind. "Danger and responsibility do not increase in normal man The freedom and activity of the Spirit, but, on the contrary, they act with depressingly, and because these experiences are painted and exacerbate the ability of the judgment, then, undoubtedly, we are dealing with the rare greatness of the Spirit. "What is Clausevitz undoubtedly right, so this is that This behavior indicates the greatness of the spirit. Without such a greatness, there can be no large commander. The rights of Clausevitz and when he directly connects the "condition", which is called the military talent, "with the ability to maintain the loyalty of judgments in the most dangerous and difficult circumstances . Without such an ability, no military talent is unthinkable.<...> Increasing all mental strength and aggravation of mental activity in the atmosphere of danger - a trait that distinguishes all good commander... <...> To resolve as soon as possible, those exclusively complex tasks that protrude before the warlord into the decisive minutes of the operation, it is not enough to preserve the normal forces of the mind. It is necessary that "Wrongness and the exacerbation of the ability of judgment", which was amazed by Clausevitz as a manifestation of the "rare greatness of the spirit."
"Admirations are worthy exactly to the point ..."
In science can sometimes have high value The decision, incorrectly in general, but giving deep, original and correct coverage of individuals of the question. In the work of the practical mind, it cannot be so. There is no reason to call the brilliant activities of the commander, the wrong in general, i.e. In its end results. The solutions of the commander leading the army to the defeat will be a bad solution, at least it contained deep, original and faithful ideas and combinations. Before the warlord, the question always stands as a whole, and it is not only separate, at least wonderful, ideas, as if possible to cover the whole question and find such solutions that are best in all respects. Clausevitz concerned one of the most important features of the mind of the commander, when he wrote that in the war "the influence of genius affects not so much in the newly found decoration of action, immediately striking, as in the happy outcome of a whole enterprise. Admiration is worthy exactly to get to the point of silent assumptions and Silent harmony throughout the case , determined only in the final general success. "<...>
Genius of whole and genius details
In military business, the concreteness of thinking is a necessary condition for success. Genuine Military Genius is always a genius of a whole, and genius of details.<...> One of the distinctive abilities of Peter the First was, according to the characteristic of M.M. Theological, ability "with increased voltage of attention to one main thing ... remember with great accuracy and take care of different little things". A frantic and passionate Suvorov knew how to take care of the most prosaic" trifles. "Proof of this is the numerous orders, orders are not just who wearing his signature, but they themselves composed and written. Here is an excerpt of one of his orders. 1793, whose syllable issues his great author: "Health observation jewel in natural rules: 1) drink, kvass; For him, double dishes so that there is no young and reoxy. If the water, then healthy and somewhat seasoned; 2) food; Mail boilers; Supses Healthy, bread baked; Food is a dishworn, not digestible, not consistent, not adjusted, hot and for the one who did not sleep toward the caress, deprived of it ... that once the air! ".<...>
Turning complex in simple ...
The solution of all the task facing the commander is based on the setting analysis. Until the situation is found out, it is impossible to talk about the foresight or planning. Information about the situation is the data that proceeds to which any strategic, operational or tactical task should be solved. But is it possible to specify another industry human activityWhere data from which the planning and decision makes decishes the solution would be so complicated, diverse and difficult to foresee how data on the situation in the war?<...> Information about the enemy received from a wide variety of sources and relating to various sides of the state of his army, its actions and intentions, the Mall-forming data on their forces, the area of \u200b\u200blocality, in respect of which sometimes one low-challenging item may be crucial - in all this And in many other things, a commander analyzing the mind should understand before deciding. Thus, the first feature of the intellectual work of the commander - the colossal complexity of the material to be analyzed. The second, no less characteristic feature - simplicity, clarity, certainty of the products of this work, i.e. those plans, combinations, solutions to which commander comes. The easier and more than a certain plan of the operation or battle, it will be better for otherwise equal conditions. This thought has repeatedly expressed and argued Clausevitz: "Simplicity of ideas ... is a root of good warming."<...> The largest commander had this quality to the greatest extent. In the characteristics of the regimental art of Suvorov, this side is always noted as one of the most important: "The simplicity of Suvorov's considerations was wonderful, and she corresponded to the simplicity of execution."<...> So, for intellectual work, the commander is typical of the emergency complexity of the source material and a large simplicity and clarity of the final result. Initially, the analysis of complex material, as a result, a synthesis that gives simple and certain positions. The turning complex in a simple - this brief formula can be designated one of the most important parties in the work of the commander.<...> The ability to find and highlight a significant and constant systematization of the material is the most important conditions that ensure the unity of analysis and synthesis, the equilibrium between these sides of the mental activity that distinguishes the work of the mind of a good commander.<...>
The ability to decide
Without risk and daring, the activities of the commander is impossible. This leads us to one of the most important qualities of the mind of the commander, for the designation of which very different expressions are used: the ability to risk, the courage of thought, the courage of the mind ... Finally, determination ...<...> The psychological nature of the decisiveness of Clausevitz understood as follows. Decisitancy, on the one hand, is "the ability ... to eliminate the flour doubts and the danger of oscillations." It can only take place when it is necessary to act in the absence of sufficient data: "In cases where the person has sufficient data ... There is no reason to talk about decisiveness, because the determination implies doubts that are not here." On the other hand, decisive in the sense, which is meant, "there can be no people with a limited mind." Such people can act in difficult missions without hesitation, but not because they are able to overcome doubts, but because they have no doubt and does not arise, since they cannot assess the degree of reliability and completeness of the available data. About such people can not be said that they act resolutely; They can be said about them that they act thoughtlessly. A prerequisite condition is a great mind (insight) and courage. But it is impossible to reduce them. There are people who possess a very insightful mind and unconditional courage, but their "courage and insight are caught, without stretching each other's hands and therefore do not produce a third property - decisiveness." Then the courage, which underlies the determination, is excellent from courage against personal danger.<...> ... Suvorov was firmly convinced that the courage of the mind, which is required from the military man holder, is much more rare and the matter is much more difficult than downtime for personal courage.<...> ... Example - Leaving Kutuzov Moscow without a fight, contrary to the opinion of the enormous majority of Russian military leaders, contracted with the requirements of the king and all the ruling spheres of St. Petersburg, moreover, the contrary to the majority of the army and the people. Of course, Tolstoy Rights, when he writes: "... He was terribly thoughted about the order he had to give." He understood that he was falling "to the position of the thoroughly, in which Barclay was to Tsareva-Zancy." His authority in the army could not temporarily not shock after leaving Moscow. "On the way out of Moscow," writes one of the eyewitnesses, "the brown prince ordered his shod to the city and, the head to his hand ... I looked ... to the capital and on the troops, held by him with a disturbed eyes; they For the first time, seeing him, did not shout. The immortal greatness of Kutuzov is that he was not afraid of terrible gravity taken responsibility and did what the conscience was considered the only right.<...>
Ostive courage
There is such a warehouse of the mind, which combines the greatest caution and the criticalness of thought with its utmost courage. This is the ability to at risk, which is to express Dragomirov, the result of the "great understanding". Only those whose opposite properties can be large commander, creating new quality, which would most naturally be called a strangely sound expression: cautious courage. It is impossible to understand the matter so that there is a speech about some kind of golden middle, about some capacity, average between courage and caution. It would be wrong to think that in large commander the courage seems to be, weakened, constrained by caution. On the contrary: caution, high criticality of thought make it possible to go to such a courage of a solution that is inconceivable.<...> The example of Suvorov, which considered it possible to attack even five times large forces, but "with a mind, art and, in response," the rapid onset of the Turkish army defeated under the Rymnik, in numbers four times superior to the Russian-Austrian forces, and made it as a result of deeply thoughtful Calculation ("If the Turks do not occur yet, it means that they did not finish the concentration of the forces"), who committed the assault to the assault of Izmail, but presented to him the only one of his birth in carery and caution preparations (the construction of a copy of the Ishmaal shaft and systematic exercises on it reproducing All phases of the upcoming assault, the development of a detailed disposition, etc.).<...>
Maximum initiative and ability to subordinate to their will will be the will of the enemy ...
Undoubtedly, the first thing that is required from the military man holder is the maximum initiative and the ability to subordinate to their will will be the will of the enemy. But it is the whole difficulty of the task that the straightforward fulfillment of plans, "not considered with the intentions and desires of the enemy," there is only a very rude and imperfect method of "imposing their will". This method of action during superficial consideration may seem impressionable, it can give a short-term effect in a collision with heavily and little to resist the enemy, but in a serious struggle it cannot lead to long-term success. Big Master Military Affairs arrived differently. The first of its task they put penetration into the intention and intention of the enemy: firmly hold on the principle of "unobinding the will of the enemy", but it is for this to begin with the fact that subseid your mind information about the adversary, and only then make up your creative and the most initiative plan and, when drawing up His opponent's will to subjection. And the most difficult thing is that the whole cycle is constantly repeated with each new change in the situation, with each receipt of new information about the actions and intentions of the enemy. It is not surprising that therefore, that the ability to penetrate the environment of the enemy, to solve his intentions was always regarded as one of the most valuable qualities of the commander. "As they tell, the feminocles once noticed that he considers the highest virtue of the commander the ability to understand and predict the ideas of the enemy." "Does nothing makes the commander more great," writes N. Makiavelli, "as penetration into the opponent's plan." "The main property that distinguishes the talented commander is the ease of the impending character of his opponent" [M. Dragomirov].<...> Excellent expression "The principle of unsuitability of the will of the enemy!" But after all, to follow this advice, you must first know what the enemy wants, that he really wants, and not that he would have to, according to our assumptions, want.<...> Suvorov, sent before the assault I am emptying such a message to the Turks: "I arrived with the army here. Twenty-four hours on thinking - the will; my first shot - already bridle; assault - death. What I declare you for consideration," Suvorov, who began orders By the battle when wept in the words: "Bearing in full", the same Suvorov showed so great interest in the enemy that "the enemy position knew sometimes better than the enemy", preferring always fighting a smart opponent - a damn, impossible in a commander coarse and elementary active type ...<...>
Interaction opposed all plannedness?
Drawing up war plans in general, individual operations, each upcoming battle is the most important components in the work of the commander and their headquarters. But military planning is planning a special kind. Here with emergency brightness there are the exceptional difficulties with which the intellectual work of the military man holder is connected. "What is happening (in war) interaction on its very nature opposed all the plaguing," wrote Clausevitz.<...> But is it possible to introduce the war "Methodically", going around without plans? In fact, the work of the commander is constant and continuous planning, although the nature of the war is equally constantly and continuously opposed to this planning. Only a commander who in this struggle will be able to defeat the nature of war, can count on a victory over the enemy. First of all, military planning requires a large abstinence. He must refrain from planning too much, should refrain from planning too far ahead, should finally refrain from premature plans. One reason is based on these requirements: the situation in the war is continuously changing and no plan can not provide all changes.<...> In relation to its plans, the commander must show the greatest flexibility and freedom of mind, never allow his mind to be connected and shoves its own plans. the best commanderreally, always considered it. Suvorov, for example, "Better than any other understood that the perfectly compiled campaign plans could be executable only part, and sometimes they should completely change because they will counteract the enemy, which the strength and ways with loyalty cannot be determined and which has its own intentions and goals . Suvorov has always accepted a case in war. "<...>
Foresight
"Managing - it means to foresee," says the ancient saying. Anticipate - it means through the dusk of the unknown and fluidity of the situation to see the main meaning of the events committed, to catch their main trend and, based on this, to understand where they go. The foresight is the highest level of the turning complex in a simple, which ... already had to talk. Antimony - result deep penetration In the situation and comprehend the main thing in it, decisive, what determines the course of events. All large commander in one way or another possessed the ability to foresee ..<...> A rare ability to solve the intentions of the enemy and predict the course of the events of Kutuzov more than once showed before, but only in the Patriotic War of 1812. This side of his genius turned fully.<...>Already in the Tsarevo-Cheating, after the army, he talks about the Napoleonic army, at that time the victoriously coming: "and the French will also be. Believe to my word ... I will have horsepower meat." There is an opinion that Kutuzov gave the Borodino battle against the will, only obeying the desire of the army and the whole country.<...> ... The behavior of Kutuzov in front and during the battle says that he attached exceptional importance and did everything possible to concentrate to this point material and strain to the extreme stress of the army's moral forces. Kutuzov gave Borodino battle as a battle in his entire sense, decisive. So do not give battles for which they look like on unnecessary and useless. Great Power Kutuzov inspection affected here, firstly, in the fact that he saw the moment when it was possible to give a decisive battle with confidence in victory, and, secondly, in the fact that he understood the character of the Borodino battle, realized that it was Winning with a deferred result. Therefore, he was not embarrassed by the lack of formal signs of the victorious ending of the battle ... Through the external course of events that appear to be unfavorable, he saw their inner meaning, which was that under Borodin he won a complete and decisive victory over Napoleon.<...>
Speed \u200b\u200borientation
With unforeseen changes in the situation, another crucial property of the commander comes into force - the speed of orientation, considerations and decisions. All large commander are used, of course, by both means of combating the "darkness" of the military situation: they seek to foresee more, but for unexpectedly ready to answer with the greatest speed.<...> No wonder Caesar was the favorite hero of Suvorov. It was most implanted by Suvorov's speed: "Julius Caesar defeated hasty."<...> Suvorov himself even surpassed the one who put himself as a sample. The speed, swiftness, mobility (in all resolutely manifestations) is the organic property of Suvorov.<...> Take Ramnica. Having received from the Austrian Commander, Prince Coburg, news about the approach to the Austrians of the Huge Army of the Turk, Suvorov wrote him in response to a pencil church one word: "IT!" - And immediately, deep at night, campaign. Walking on a blurred road, under a torrential rain, forced to locate a bridge, he did about 100 miles for two days. "There is a story: when the spy reported to a great visiting about the appearance of Suvorov, Vizier ordered him to hang him for the spread of Nescious." Arriving in place, Suvorov immediately accompanied by several officers and a small batch of Cossacks goes to the reconnaissance, climbs on the tree, carefully examines the fortress and immediately constitutes a battle plan, a plan, extraordinary in courage, which included the change of the front in mind the enemy. He went back with ready plan In the head. "Victory at Fokshans is obliged to the Suvorov ability to instantly navigate and make a decision in unforeseen the turnover of the case. In the midst of the battle, he suddenly turns his column, with great difficulty he spends her through the swamps and appears on the side where the Turks did not expect Russian from that side. The vertex of Suvorov's rapidness - the battle at the demand. First of all, the famous march to the kittest (80 miles for 36 hours!) ... Some shelves did not go to the last segment, but they fled and immediately entered the battle. Suvorov himself with four Cossack shelves said Forward and arrived on the battlefield at the moment when the position of Austrians M. Melas became hopeless. "He arrived just in time," a few days later, Melas, with tears, spoke to Miloradovich that he was obliged to save his quick arrival of the Russians. Actually , and not Russians, and Suvorov; Russians arrived so little that on the side of the French still remained a big advantage, but this difference was replenished SUVOROVA. The genius of war appeared in him, flew the spirit of victory. Dropping on the exaltation, he won a long attentive view of the battlefield. It was at such moments when the case concerned his inimitable chamorar, he was truly great. Two Cossack regiment, not having time to translate the spirit, flew to the right, to the Flang Dombrovsky with the Poles, and against the front of him were sent dragoons; The other two Cossack shelves rushed under the boss of the Suvorov nephew, Gorchakov, threaten the right flank of the French. The onset of the French was delayed, and the Poles were given in perfect confusion. Success, of course, was a minute, but in such cases every minute and the road. It seemed on the road of the head of the Russian avant-garde ... "<...> Interesting us ... The ability to quickly understand in a difficult situation and almost instantly find the right decision is called differently. Sometimes it is called intuition.<...> This concept, often transferable in Russian translations, the faithful military eye or a faithful military view is often found in the characteristics that Napoleon Military leaders.<...> This expression often used Suvorov: "Do not need methodism, but a faithful view of the military."<...> The psychological nature of the commander intuition is closely connected with the high development of spatial representations and spatial thinking. Instant of understanding and solutions in the act of intuition involves the visibility of thinking. In a military case, this clarity denotes the first-mentioned view of all spatial relationships, the ability to see on some imaginary map, a scheme, plan, and the like all possible combinations of action in their attitude to all essential facilities. An equally important role is played in the intuition of the commander and a sense of time. "In practice, this time plays a huge role: they missed a minute, and the best measure can lead to a catastrophe. The war is the case of the clock and minutes; often the loss of minutes is equivalent to the loss of the party." Time factor always plays a paramount value. But sometimes his role is especially bright, so the choice of moment acquires the central, in the full sense of the word is crucial.<...> ... A bright example is the Kinburn battle, where Suvorov showed a wonderful sense of time, firstly, in determining the moment of the first counterattack, made just when the Turks went to the assault, and secondly, in the choice of moment To quit all the reserves, which he kept intact until the evening: the introduction of them in the case decided the fate of the battle and led to the complete extermination of the Turkish squad.<...>
Outstanding Military Education
It is not enough to say: the commander must be a smart person. To this should be added: the commander must be a highly educated person: it should have excellent military training and outstanding general education.<...> Indeed, outstanding commander, those that you can not hesitate to attribute to the category of the Great, were not just people of "knowledgeable": they were usually on the top steps of the formation of their time. Bright examples Gives an antique world. The greatest commander Antiquities belonged to the number of the most cultural and educated people of their era. Alexander was a student (and not only nominally) Aristotle, Hannibal was highly educated for that time by man, Caesar, finally, in the latitude of knowledge and the brilliant culture of the mind stood in the first rows of great people of the ancient world. Is it possible to understand how simple chance? To approach this issue somewhat deeper, we will take a look at the two largest collens of the XVIII - XIH century: Suvorov and Napoleon. An occupation of sciences, constant care for self-education Suvorov considered the greatest responsibility of the military man holder.<...> Once he received from Catherine II, George 3rd degree for laying, at its discretion, at a more worthy. He chose Lieutenant Colonel Kurtis. Laying produced in a very solemn atmosphere, uttered the instruction. "In the conclusion of this instruction, it was shown the last condition necessary to General: continuous self-education by reading." Suvorov himself performed this instruction with the zeal of extraordinary, and moreover throughout life. Here are some of the excerpts here from his biography. The period of the soldiers (17 - 23 years). It is persistently working on its formation at home and in the classes of the Cadet Corps. "The time that his companions was conducted for maps and wine, he spent behind the books." "All of his time, without the slightest exception, went to the service, to visit the classes of the Cadet Corps and at home scientific classes; he has not been more determined anywhere." All the money he managed by hard savings, he used to buy books. The period of service by the lieutenant (23-25 \u200b\u200byears). "Enjoyed every free minute to continue its self-education." The period of long-term stay in the village in the mid-80s. (about 55 years). "I read a lot and at one time I even had a reader on the salary. But this reading didn't have the meaning of military special knowledge; he attracted knowledge at all, in the sense of the expansion of the mental horizon." Service in Byrelad in 1790 (59 years). "Most of the free time went from Suvorov to reading. With it there was one German student or a candidate with whom he met a few years ago and took him to the readers." "Suvorov was not imatible, forcing Philip Ivanovich to read a lot and long and almost did not give him a rest, rebuilding for each stop." "Everything was read on different languages: newspapers, magazines, military memoirs, statistics; It was possible to read not only books, but also a manuscript. Service in Finland in 1791 - 1792 (60 - 61 years old). "Using its small leisure activities, Suvorov was engaged in Finland reading; Without reading, he could not live. We do not know whether scientific works were in his hands at that time, but he read a lot of newspapers, as it can be seen from his subscription for 1792. " Polish War 1794 (63 years). The tireless activity "did not prevent him from finding time for reading, mainly in the evenings, for which there were several books in his baggage, including the comment by Julia Caesar, his favorite hero." Link in Konchansky (66 - 67 years). "I get used to the young years to mental classes, Suvorov, especially since I could not do without them in my privacy. He read a lot, but less than I wanted, since the eyes were sick. In Konchansky there was a library; he replenished it at times." There was no difference between Suvorov and Napoleon; The latter was also engaged in his formation, was the same passionate reader.<...> It is difficult to say what areas of knowledge Napoleon and Suvorov were not interested. Their formation was literally the word encyclopedic. Napoleon can especially note the interest in mathematics (he since childhood showed outstanding mathematical abilities), geography, stories, in youth - also philosophy ... Suvorov knew math well, geography, philosophy, and the most important story. Especially it is necessary to allocate the tendency and undoubted abilities to study languages \u200b\u200bfrom the Russian commander. He knew the languages \u200b\u200bGerman, French, Italian, Polish, Finnish, Turkish, Arabic, Persian.<...> It is impossible not to mark the features, common and for Napoleon, and for Suvorov. Both of them were distinguished by the extreme independence of the mind, the high criticality of thought. The following words relating to Suvorov may well be transferred to Napoleon: "Everything, produced by science processed in it in something completely new, its own, who had fallen not about the denial of the samples ... He was not a borrower anywhere and than, but the less imitator. " But both of them had an extremely valuable ability: they knew how to separate the teachings from criticism. Earlier than criticizing, recycle, deny, they knew how to absorb. This is what remark about Suvorov at the age of 17 - 23 years old we find Petryshevsky: "His mind is inherent in the spirit of criticism, but he gave him the will only later; now he studied - and there was no place for criticism." But what he writes about Napoleon Tarla: "In any case, the 16-year-old Podororuk not so much criticized how much he studied. This is also a root line of his mind: in every book, as well as to any man, he approached these initial years of his Life with greedy and impatient desire as soon as possible to extract what he still does not know and what can give food his own thought. "<...> No less important is inherent in both the ability to rigorously and immediately systematize knowledge. "I believe Locke," says Suvorov, "that the memory is a pantry mind; but in this storeroom a lot of partitions, and therefore it is necessary to immediately lay everything, where follows." Napoleon said that various things and various objects were laid in his head just as they could be laid in the dresser. "When I want to interrupt the occupation in some business, I close his box and open another box of business; they do not mix, and never one thing is constraints and does not tire me during the lesson." IN recent words Napoleon notes not only the complete ordering of his mental luggage, but also the extreme ease of use ... The feature is very important for the mind of the commander.<...> Marchenko A.M. Suvorov in their manuscripts. - SP b., 1900. - p.38. Clausevitz to the war. - T.2. - M., 1941. - C.295. Petrushevsky A.F. Generalissimus Prince Suvorov, in 3 tons. T.1. - SP b., 1884. - p.530. Clausevitz to the war. - T.1. - M., 1941. - S.67 - 68. Tarla E.V. Napoleon's invasion to Russia. 1812 - M., 1938. - P.144. Ibid. - p.147. Dragomirov M.I. Fourteen years old. 1881 - 1894: Sat. Original and translation articles. - SP b., 1895. - p.316. Heisman P.A. Fall of Poland and Suvorov. - In the book: Suvorov in reports of professors of the Academy of General Staff. - SP b., 1900. - C.109. Feministocles (approx. 525 - approx. 460 BC), Athenian commander, leader of a democratic group, in the period greco-Persian Wars from 493/492 Archont and strategist (repeatedly). Played a decisive role in organizing the underestural forces of resistance. I achieved the transformation of Athens into the marine power and the creation of the Delos Union. (Approx. Avt.-Cost.) Plutarch. Selected biographies. - M. - L., 1941. - p.65. Machiavelli (Makywelli) (Machiavelli) Niccolo (1469-1527), Italian political thinker, historian, author of the "Sovereign", 1513, ed. 1532, etc. (approx. Avt.-Cost.) Dragomirov M.I. Eleven years. 1895 - 1905: Sat. Original and translation articles. In 2 tons - T.2. - JV B., 1909. - S.534. Petrushevsky A.F. Generalissimus Prince Suvorov. - SP b., 1900. - p.237. Ibid. - S.580. Ibid. - P.752. Specifications are characteristic of him, said at Novi: "Moro understands me, old man, and I am glad that I am dealing with the smart warlord" - Osipov K.N. Suvorov. - M., 1958. - C.296. Clausesvitz K. About the war. - T.1. - SP b., 1941. - C.109. Petrushevsky A.F. Generalissimus Prince Suvorov. - SP b., 1900. - S.520. Caesar (CAESAR) Guy Julius (102 or 100-44 BC), Roman dictator in 49, 48-46, 45, from 44 g. - For life. Commander. He began political. Activity as a supporter rep. Groupings, taking office of the Military Tribune in 73, Edil in 65, Pretor in 62 g. After seeking a consulate, in 60 G. entered into an alliance with the city of Pompey and the Crassus (1st triumvirate). Consul in 59, then governor of Gaul; In 58-51. Subduced Rome all Calpian Gallia. In 49, relying on the army, began the struggle for the uniformity. Defeating Pompey and his supporters in 49-45. (Crass died in 53), was at the head of state. Focusing in his hands a number of the most important republican posts, (dictator, consul, etc.), became actually a monarch. Killed as a result of civilian conspiracy. The author of "Notes about the Gallic War" and "Notes on Civil Wars"; He conducted a calendar reform (Julian calendar). (Approx. Avt.-Cost.) Mikhnevich N.P. Suvorov - strategist. - In the book: Suvorov in reports of professors of the Academy of General Staff. - SP b., 1900. - S.7. Rymnik (Rimnic), r. In Romania, the influx of p. Syret (gray). During russian-Turkish war 1787-1791 With Rymnik, Russian and Austrian troops under the commands. A.V. Suvorov 11.9.1789 defeated the Turkish army, for which Suvorov received the title of Graph Ramnica. (Approx. Avt.-Cost.) Osipov K.N. Suvorov. - M., 138. - C.144. Petrushevsky A.F. Generalissimus Prince Suvorov. In 3 tons. T.1. - SP b., 1884. - C.213. Fokshans, a city in Romania, in the area of \u200b\u200bwhich 21.7 (1.8) .1789. Russian-Austrian troops (over 17 thousand people) during the Russian-Turkish war 1787 - 1791. They defeated the Turkish troops of Ottoman Pasha (30 thousand people). The victory was achieved due to the skillful and decisive action A.V. Suvorov, who actually led the allied troops in the battle. (Approx. Avt.-Cost.) Osipov K.N. Suvorov. - M., 138. - p.142. Trebbia (Trebbia), p. In Northern Italy. right influx of p. By. 17 - 19.6.1799 Russian-Austrian troops led by A.V. Suvorov during the Italian campaign was broken by the French troops of General J. McDonald. (Approx. Avt.-Cost.) Petrushevsky A.F. Generalissimus Prince Suvorov. In 3 tons. - T.1. - SP b., 1884. - S.581 - 582. Mikhnevich N.P. Suvorov - strategist. - In the book: Suvorov in reports of professors of the Academy of General Staff. - SP b., 1900. - p.5. Dragomirov M.I. Eleven years. 1895 - 1905: Sat. Original and translation articles. In 2 - t. - T.2. - JV B., 1909. - p.445 - 446. Kinburn, fortress at the Kinburn Spit (between the Dnieper and the Yagalitsky Limans of the Black Sea). During the Russian-Turkish War 1787-1791. The Turkish fleet landed a landing (5 thousand people), which defeated the troops A.V. Suvorov (approx. 4 thousand people). Alexander Macedonsky (356-323 BC), King of Macedonia from 336. The son of King Philip II, brought up Aristotle. By defeating the Persians under the branger (334), Isse (333), Gavgamelakh (331), subjugated the kingdom of the achemenides, invaded Wed. Asia (329), won the land to r. Ind, creating the largest world monarchy of antiquity. (Approx. Avt.-Cost.) Hannibal (Hannibal) (247 or 246-183 BC), Carthaginsky commander. Son Hamilkar Barka. During the 2nd pin. Wars (218-201) made the transition through the Alps, won the victory at RR. Titin, Tsobby (218), in the Lake Traziment (217), under Cannes (216). In 202, at replacement (sowing. Africa), Hannibal was defeated by the Romans. (Approx. Avt.-Cost.) Petrushevsky A.F. Generalissimus Prince Suvorov. - SP b., 1900. - p.299. Osipov K.N. Suvorov. - M, 1938. - p.21. Petrushevsky A.F. Generalissimus Prince Suvorov. In 3 tons. - T.1. - SP b., 1884. - p.5. Osipov K.N. Suvorov. - M, 1938. - p.25. Petrushevsky A.F. Generalissimus Prince Suvorov. - JV b., 1900. - p.267. Grablad, city in East Romania. Petrushevsky A.F. Generalissimus Prince Suvorov. In 3 tons. T.1. - SP b., 1884. - p.372 - 373. Petrushevsky A.F. Generalissimus Prince Suvorov. - SP b., 1900. - C.278. Ibid. - p.318. Ibid. - S.501. Ibid. - P.748. Ibid. - p.6. Tarla Evgeny Viktorovich (1874-1955), historian, author of work: "Napoleon", "Talleyran", "Napoleon's invasion to Russia", " Crimean War"(t. 1-2), etc. (approx. Avt.-Cost.) Tarla E.V. Napoleon. - M., 1941. - C.11. Osipov K.N. Suvorov. - M., 1938. - p.25.
The mind of the commander
The features of the mental work of the commander is such that he cannot plan all his actions in advance in the details. The commander is forced to quickly understand in a difficult situation and instantly find the right decision. This solution is sometimes referred to by intuition or inspiration. For example, the German Military Theorist General Clausevitz directly stated that in war thinking retreats to the background, and intuition prevails, which is nothing more than art.
But this is not quite the case, and best expressed the true situation of things Napoleon when he said: "Inspiration? This is a quick calculation. " All Napoleon's head career confirms his words. He has the work of "comments on the hostilities of the campaigns of 1796 and 1797 in Italy," a very reminisant collection of chess parties analyzes. Soviet psychologist B. M. Teplov writes about it: "In this work, it is very consistently shown that the enemy commander allowed whole line The biggest mistakes ... and that they were broken, that is why, and not due to some kind of mysterious genius of Napoleon. Napoleon won because it was better to calculate, it was better, and these calculations and considerations are very easy to explain to any sensible person, which is done on the "comments" pages. Objectives in some cases against the attacks on the misuse of his own actions, Napoleon in other cases is completely openly recognized by his mistakes and shows that it would be better to do otherwise. He does it, of course, not from modesty, absolutely not peculiar to him, but because the correctness of the solution is the case of rational calculation and knowledge for him, that is, the thing is unconditionally provable. You can make a mistake in the hurry of hostilities, but stupid to insist on an error later, when every reasonable person can check the calculations and prove the truth. "
Of course, Napoleon somewhat simplified the case. He brought to the discursive reasoning that the battlefield was not reasoned, but a kind of alloy of speech and figurative thinking. But the very possibility of such information is very characteristic: it shows that the mind of the commander ultimately dates back to ordinary speech thinking and its actions can be perfectly pronounced by language.
Intuition is not an unexpected "enlightenment": I sat down and suddenly decided: "Sorrow Dvina Raint" there, not here. The same Napoleon said: "If it seems that I always have been prepared for everything, then this is explained by the fact that earlier than anything to do, I thought for a long time before ... I always work, I work during lunch, I work when I am in the theater; I wake up at night to work. " And absolutely not by chance the great commander were, as a rule, cultural and educated people. Alexander Macedonsky - student of the philosopher Aristotle, Julius Caesar - the largest historian, writer, speaker, even linguist. Napoleon since childhood showed outstanding abilities for mathematics, geography, history, philosophy. He "readpieces, with unheard of greed, creating his notebooks with notes and abstracts," the Soviet historian E. Tarla writes about him; Being in Paris, Napoleon has studied with any opportunity. Cornel, Rasin, Moliere - his desk books, he knew and loved poetry and generally literature. Suvorov knew Mathematics, geography, philosophy, history, especially the last. Most of his free time went to read. He knew many languages: German, French, Italian, Polish, Finnish, Turkish, Arabic, Persian, wrote poems and even printed them.
So, the mind of the commander - although his thinking is mostly clearly effective - formed primarily due to the development of theoretical intelligence. The intuition of Suvorov or Napoleon is rooted deep into linguistic, speech thinking. This applies not only to the regimental, but also to any other intuition. We will return to this issue, and now we will mention only one component of intuition - about practical experience.
B. M. TeplovThe mind of the commander // Heat. B.M. Problems of individual differences. M., 1965.The activities of the commander presents exceptionally high demands on the mind. Clausevitz was completely right when he wrote: "At the highest post of commander-in-chief mental activity belongs to the number of the most difficult, which only falls out to the share of the human mind" (Clausevitz, 1941).
At the same time, the mind of the commander is one of the most characteristic examples of the practical mind, in which the emergency brightness acts peculiar features of the latter. The study of mental work of the commander is therefore not only practical interest, but also of great importance from the point of view of building psychology of thinking. In this paper, an attempt is made to schedule the first, the estimated steps of this study.
It is customary to think that from the commander requires the presence of two qualities - an outstanding mind and severe will (and under the word "will", of course, a very complex complex of properties: the strength of character, courage, determination, energy, perseverance, etc.). This thought is completely indisputable.
Napoleon at one time introduced a new important hue to it: not in the only case that the commander must have the mind, and the will, but in the fact that between them should be the equilibrium that they should be equal. "A military man must have as many characters as the mind." If the will significantly exceeds the mind, the commander will act strongly and courageously, but little reasonable; In the opposite case, he will have good ideas and plans, but not enough courage and decisiveness to implement them.
Here is one very common misconception. The function of the mind is considered to be inventing plans, the Will function is the execution of them. This is not true. The execution of plans requires a mind no less than will. On the other hand, in the activities of the commander, the plan thinking is usually inseparable from its execution. This is one of the most important features of intellectual work of the commander.
The usual understanding of the problem "Mind and Will in the Communist Party" has a basis for its one extremely important mistake. The mind and will are considered as two different abilities, as two - using the favorite expression of the ancient Greeks - "Parts of the Soul". It is assumed - and this is most important for the topic of my work - that you can have a good and even outstanding mind of the commander, without having, however, the corresponding volitional qualities: decisiveness, courage, hardness, etc.
The first to propose division of all mental abilities into two classes: cognitive abilities and driving abilities (the ability of feeling, desire and operations) was Aristotle. The opposition of mind and will leads its own ongoing. But very firmly learning this Aristotelian division, psychology, as I said, passed by one of the most important concepts of Aristotelian teachings about the soul, of the concept that destroys the possibility of gap between the mind and will, moreover, the concept in which the true unity of will and Mind. I mean already familiar to us the concept of "practical mind."
Written by the question that is an engine of a volitional action, Aristotle comes to the conclusion that there can be no striving in itself, nor the mind in itself. A genuine volitional action engine is the "mind and desire" or "reasonable desire." The practical mind is "the ability to activities aimed at human benefit and is based on the mind" (Aristotle, 1884).
It is interesting to note that by continuing further analysis of the volitional action, Aristotle pushes another concept, higher, if so can be expressed than the concept of will. He denotes his word, which in Russian can be translated by the words "solution" or "intention".
The decision of Aristotle defines as "weighted (or deliberate) desire for the fact that in our power", or even shorter, as "Strong mind."
FROM the point of view of the question of interest to us can be said: for Aristotle the practical mind is at the same time the mindand will;his originality is just the unity of mind and will.
The mind of the commander is one of the specific forms of the "practical mind" in the Aristotelian sense of this term; It can not be understood as a certain pure intelligence, it is the unity of intellectual and volitional moments.
When they say that any warlord has an outstanding mind, but deprived of such volitional qualities as determination or "moral courage", it means that he is not the one that needs a commander. The authentic "mind of the commander" can not be in a man of restless, timid and weakly accuracy.
"The element in which military activities take place is the danger" (Clausevitz). In this "element of danger", the mind of the commander is working, and psychological analysis cannot pass by this circumstance.
It is customary to think that in a state of serious danger, where there is a reason for the occurrence of fear, the quality and productivity of mental work is reduced. But all of the large commander the case is just the opposite: the danger not only does not reduce, but, on the contrary, exacerbates the work of the mind.
Clausevitz wrote: "Danger and responsibility do not increase freedom in a normal person and the activity of the Spirit, but, on the contrary, there are depressingly, and therefore these experiences are painted and exacerbate the ability of judgment, then undoubtedly we are dealing with the rare greatness of the Spirit."
Increasing all mental strength and aggravation of mental activity in the atmosphere of danger - a trait that distinguishes all good commander, although it can be very different.
There are commander with a relatively flat and unchanged mental performance: their mind makes an impression of working always on full load. Such, for example, Peter first or Napoleon, but this "evenness", of course, is only relative, and they have an increase in danger causes an increase in mental activity. "Napoleon, as the hazards increase, it became energetic," notes Tarla (1941).
Other commander is characterized by a feature that can be called a kind of "economy of mental forces". They know how to the sharp moments to make the maximum mobilization of all their capabilities, at the usual time seem indifferent, lethargic and low-active. True, at this time they can deploy a large preparatory workBut it has a deeply hidden, subsided. Such was Kutuzov, in calm minutes, who gave the impression of a lazy and carefree. But those warlords, who only in the atmosphere of danger, could only find their military talent and the power of their military mind in the situation of the battle only in this connection. Such, apparently, was Konde, who "loved to try to commit impossible enterprises", "But in the presence of the enemy, there were such wonderful thoughts that in the end he was inferior." That was the Marshal of her, about which Napoleon wrote: "It had mental insights only among the cores, in the thunder of battle, there his eye meer, his cold-blooded and energy were incomparable, but he did not know how to prepare his operations in silence, studying the card "
Such persons, of course, are not first-class commander; They are unsuitable for self-decide Large operational tasks, but a certain inborn property can be seen in their limitations. Apparently, it is about the lack of sufficient knowledge and, most importantly, the absence of the necessary culture of the mind. Undoubtedly, however, that these persons are extremely pronounced one of the most important sides of the military talent - the ability to maximize the productivity of the mind in the conditions of maximum danger.
In military business concreteness- prerequisite condition for success.Genuine military genius is always the "genius of the whole", and the "genius of details."
The solution of all the task facing the commander is based on the setting analysis. Until the situation is found out, it is impossible to talk about the foresight or planning. The setting information is the data on the basis of which any strategic, operational or tactical task should be solved.
But is it possible to specify another branch of human activity, where the data from which the planning and decision makes the decision comes, would be so complex, diverse and difficult to see how the situation on the situation in the war? I do not touch yet the low reliability of these data, nor their constant variability. I mean only great amount Their complexity of their relationship, mutual inconsistency and, finally, simply a variety of their content. Information about the opponent received from a variety of sources and relating to various sides of the state of his army, its actions and intentions, the diverse data on their forces, data on the locality, in respect of which sometimes one low-cost detail may be crucial - in all this and Still in many respects should understand the analyzing mind of the commander, before making a decision.
Thus, the first feature of the intellectual work of the commander - colossal the complexity of the material to beth analysis.
The second, no less characteristic feature - simplicity, accurateastrastnessproducts of this work, i.e. those plans, combinations, solutions,to which the commander comes. The simpler and definitely the plan of the operation or battle, the one, with other things being equal, is better.
So, for intellectual work, the commander is typical: the extraordinary complexity of the source material and a large simplicity and clarity of the final result. Initially - analysis of complex material, as a result - synthesis that gives simple and certain additions. Turning complex in simple- This brief formula can be designated one of the most important parties in the work of the commander.
Successful permission in the most difficult conditions of war of that task , which I specifically called "the turning complex in simple," suggests the high development of a number of qualities of the mind. It assumes first of all very strong ability to An.alizagiving the ability to understand the most confusing data, pay attention to the smallest details, allocate those that remain unnoticed for a more superficial look, but may be crucial.
It suggests the ability see immediately and the whole, and alletali.In other words, it implies a powerful synthetic force of the mind (in one glance to cover the whole), which is connected, however, with concreteness of thinking.It requires a synthesis, which is not carried out with the help of far-reaching abstraction, is the synthesis that can be seen from many scientists, especially vividly in mathematicians and philosophers, and a particular synthesis, seeing integer in the variety of details. In this regard, the mind of the commander has a lot in common with the mind of the artist. "My genius was, - wrote Napoleon without unusual modesty, - what one rapid looki covered all the difficulties of the case, but at the same time all the resources to overcome these difficulties; This is obliged to my superiority over others. "
In psychology, the classification of the minds for analytical and synthetic is used to be widely distributed.
Large commander is always characterized by equilibrium between analysis and synthesis.
What is the psychological nature of this "equilibrium"?
Synthesis not only follows the analysis, but also precedes him. Analysis, characteristic of large commander, is always an analysis from some point of view, the analysis in the light of some ideas and combinations. At the same time, however, - here we concern the item is extremely important - the greatest flexibility and freedom of mind are required. The mind of the commander should never be in advance and is associated with these preliminary points of view. The commander must have a sufficient stock of possible plans and combinations and have the ability to quickly change them or choose them between them. The person, inclined to turn the work of the analysis in confirmation of the idea adopted by him, a person who is in the mercy of biased points of view, can never be a good commander.
Drawing up war plans in general, individual operations, each upcoming battle is the most important component in the work of the commander and their headquarters. But military planning is planning a special kind. Here with emergency brightness there are the exceptional difficulties with which the intellectual work of the military man holder is connected.
"What is happening (in war) interaction on its very nature opposed every plan," wrote Clausevitz. And as if in confirmation of this thought, Napoleon talks about himself that he "never had plans for operations." However, this says that the most Napoleon, who constantly emphasized that any war should be "methodical". But is it possible to wage war "Methodically", going around without plans?
In fact, the work of the commander is constant and continuous planning, although the "nature of war" is as constantly and continuously opposed to this planning.
First of all, military planning requires a large abstinence. He must refrain from planning toodetailed.
But from here, of course, it is impossible to conclude that the less detailed plan, the better. If it were so, the task of the commander would be very simple. In fact, the perfect plan defines everything that can be determined, and the more it determines, the more, in principle, better. But if the plan defines the fact that in these conditions it is impossible to imagine, it may not be only bad, but even a bad plan.
The famous example of too detailed plan is the Weotherly Plan of the battle with Austerlice. "Disposion compiled by Weiver in Austerlitsky Battle, - writes L.N. Tolstoy, "was a model of perfection in the writings of this kind, but it was still condemned for its perfection, for too much detail." But the trouble is not that it was condemned by people, but in the fact that her life was condemned that she could not withstand testing practice. And she was convicted, it was not the fact of her details, but for the fact that the author did it more than had to be founded.
Suvorov's disposition to the sturm of Izmail was still more: in it, "it was indicated that everything was essential, ranging from the composition of the columns and ending the number of machines and the length of the stairs; The number of arrows at a column, their place and purpose, as well as workers; Private and general reserves, their places and conditions of use are appointed; Caution rules are taught inside the fortress; The directions of the columns are accurate, the limit of their propagation along the serf fence and so on. " (Petrushevsky, 1900). And this extremely detailed disposition brilliantly sustained the test. The tragedy of the Weerter was, firstly, in the fact that he had badly foresaw, secondly, - and this is perhaps it is especially important - that its planning has not correlated with its possibilities of foresight.
The same objections that are made against too detailed plans are made against plans that look too far ahead. This also applies to tactics and strategy.
"Only the beginning of the battle can be really fully established by the plan: the current requires new, arising from the situation of instructions and orders, i.e. driving "(Clausevitz).
When four members of the Gofcrigsrat with the Campaign River to the Adda River, asking Suvorov, came to Suvorov, asking him in Vienna, to the Suvorov, asking Suvorov, the name of the emperor correct or change the project in what he recognizes fit. Suvorov twisted the cross with a note and wrote from the bottom that it would start the campaign with the transition through hisDDU, and he would make it, "where God will be" (Petrushevsky, 1900).
It is extremely instructive to get acquainted with the manner of Napoleon's planning, which more than anyone demanded "methodicity" in the work of the commander and himself belonged to the commander of the "rationalistic" warehouse.
Tarla characterizes the Napoleonic planning manner: "Napoleon usually did not produce in advance detailed campaign plans. It marked only the main "lenses", the main specific goals, chronological (approximate, of course) the sequence that should be followed by the paths that will have to move. Military care covered and absorbed him entirely in the campaign itself, when daily, and sometimes he also changed his dispositions, confirming not only with his intended goals, but also with the situation, in particular with the continuously received news of the enemy movement. "(Tarla, 1941).
What gave Napoleon the opportunity to do without prior development of detailed plans?
First, his skillwith phenomenal ease to compose plans.The power of imagination, combinatorial abilities, finally, simply creative energy were extremely large in it. And, moreover, he continuously developed these features to the level of greatest skill.
Secondly, it will not exactly would definitely say that Napoleon, making an operation or even preparing for her, did not have any detailed plan at all. He did not have one plan, but he had several possible plans.And the moment of "creating a plan" was often essentially only the moment of choosing the best of the possible plans to him.
Third, Napoleon spent energy and time on sOthe birand of those specific data that must serve Material when developing a plan.He sought to have an exhaustive knowledge of the enemy army and the country in which he had to lead war, giving a battle.
Thanks to all the listed qualities, Napoleon received very valuable advantages over most of his opponents, which pre-associated themselves with a certain action plan.
From this point of view, the most, perhaps, the instructive regensburg operation of 1809 with its wonderful maneuvers in Abensburg and Ekmeil, which the commander himself considered "his best maneuver". "Napoleon's plan," writes Levitsky, - outlined the concentration of the army in the Upper Danube to p. Lech. Further actions Napoleon put dependent onoutstairs "(Levitsky, 1933).
It is very interesting to compare the behavior of Marshal Beatier, at which the main command was to continue before the arrival of Napoleon to the army, with the behavior of Napoleon after arriving in Stuttgart. Beatier is painfully trying to accept any plan of action, begins various types of movement and maneuver. Napoleon immediately stops all this bustle and, as a predator before the jump, freezes, waiting for the moment when he receives sufficient data on the intentions and actions of the enemy; Only then is the plan and immediately proceeds to its implementation.
We started from approval: the activities of the Communist Party makes very high demands on the mind. In the future, we made an attempt to prove, develop and specify this position. Now, summing up, we must make some refinement in it: not enough for the commander natural power mind; He is needed big reserve Knowledge, as well as high versatile culture of thought.
The ability to cover immediately all sides of the question, quickly analyze the material of emergency complexity, systematize it, to allocate a significant, schedule an action plan and, if necessary, instantly change it - all this even for talented man It is impossible without very solid intellectual training.
No less rights was Napoleon, when from all the "gifts, which had its own nature," especially allocated its exceptional performance. "Work is my element," he said proudly, "I'm born and arranged for work." I know the boundaries of my legs, I know the borders for my eyes; I could never learn such borders for my work. "
LITERATURE
Aristotle. Nikomakhova Ethics. Per. E. Radlova. St. Petersburg., 1884.
Clausevitz. About War, t. I. Ed. 5th. M., 1941; t. II. Ed. 3rd M., 1941.
Levitsky N. A. The commander of Napoleon. M., 1933.
Petrushevsky A. Generalissimus Prince Suvorov. Ed. 2nd, spb., 1900.
It is not enough to say: the commander must be a smart person. To this should be added: the commander must be a highly educated person: it should have excellent military training and outstanding general education.
http://artofwar.ru/k/kamenew_anatolij_iwanowich/rawnowesieumaiwoli.shtml.
Nejasno Kak s Bezgrammotnim Thengiz-Khanom ... on Wiigral Bolsche Chem Kto-Libo Iz Ykazannix Polkowzew W Dannoj Stat "E B.M. TEPLOVA
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Sootwestwenno Mozno Predpolozit "Zelanie Teplova W TJ ILI INOJ FORME IMPLEMENTIROWAT" Rabskoe Wospriajtie Realnnosti Swoim Chitateljam
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I Grubo Tendecioznoe Rassmotrenie Welikix Polkowdzew, ISKLJUCHIW IZ IX Spiska Polkowodzew Azii -attilu, Thengiz-Khana, Timura
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"... ETI KOMPANII (Asiatskix Polkowodzew" Welis "Po Wsem Prawilam Woennogo Iskusstwa ..." -Napoleon
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Bezgrammotnij Thengiz-Khan Pokazal Wischij Resultat Iz 50-100 Mlrd Ljudej Ziwschix Za Wsju Istoriju Cheloosechstwa.
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Antichnaja Filosofija Eto Ne Tolko Aristotel ", I Ne ON BIL PERWIJ FILOSOF NO I ..
Thales, Sokrat, Platon, Zeno, Gorgias, Protagor, Critij, Diogen, Demokrit, Epicurus, Confuzij I Drugie ...
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Today I offer the reader of extracting from the article "The Communist Party" Boris Mikhailovich Teplova (1896-1965), the largest investigator of individual differences in domestic and world science, a scientist who has enormous erudition in a wide variety of areas: history and philosophy, art and literature, organ physiology feelings and higher nervous activity.
The Great Patriotic War forced to explore the phenomenon of the commander and try to answer the question of how the warlord in combat activities makes decisions, which qualities require war from him.
Conclusions and estimates B.M. Teplov have an important theoretical and practical significance. On their basis, we can understand what to pay attention to the preparation of the officer, as well as, that should be taken into account when solving personnel issues.
B. Teplov
The mind of the commander
It is customary to think that from the commander requires the presence of two qualities - an outstanding mind and strong will (and under the word "will", of course, is a very complex complex of properties: the power of character, courage, determination, energy, perseverance, etc.). This thought is completely indisputable. Napoleon introduced a new important hue to it: it's not just that the commander must have the mind, and the will, but in the fact that there should be an equilibrium between them that they should be equal: "a military man must have as many characters how much is the mind. " He compared to the present commander to the present commander, in which the base is will, the height is the mind. The square will be a square only under the condition if the base is equal to height; A large commander can only be the person who has the will and mind equal. If the will significantly exceeds the mind, the commander will act strongly and courageously, but little reasonable; In the opposite case, he will have good ideas and plans, but not enough courage and decisive them to implement them.
Napoleonic "Formula Square" had a great success: quoted her constantly. At the same time, they often go further and put this kind of question. Since "equilibrium in nature is rarely found," in most cases it will have to be put up with the fact that the dating of the commander will be not a square, but a rectangle, will have to put up with the fact that the equilibrium, which is ideal, will be broken. What should be recognized as more desirable: violation of equilibrium towards the will or towards the mind? What is better: the commander with the predominance of will or with the predominance of the mind?
I did not have to meet in the literature cases when this issue would have decided in favor of the mind. Usually the question itself is set in order to deploy the doctrine of the primacy of the Will in the activities of the commander. Extremely typical is the point of view M.I. Dragomirova. In his opinion, "Of all the acts of human war, there is a matter of much more volitional than the mind." "As if the plan is neither ingenious, it can be completely spoiled by execution, and the execution lies in the will of the will, if not exclusively, then in incomparably more than in the field of mind. The most incredible feats are made by almost one will: an example - the transition of Suvorov. through the Alps in 1799 " .
Without giving another overall assessment of this point of view, I will simply indicate that one very widespread misconception takes place. The function of the mind is considered to be inventing plans, the Will function is the execution of them. This is not true. On the one hand, the execution of the plan requires the mind no less than the will, and on the other, in the activities of the Communication, the plan thinking is usually inseparable from its execution. This is one of the most important features of intellectual work of the commander.
Practical mind
Asking the question that is an engine of a volitional action, Aristotle comes to the conclusion that there can be no striving in itself ("After all, those who own themselves, although they may have a desire and hunt for something, but they do actions not under the influence of the desire, but follow the instructions of the mind "), nor the mind itself (" After all, the theoretical mind does not think anything related to action, and does not mean that what should be avoided and what should be the way "). A genuine strong-acting engine is the "mind and desire", or "reasonable desire." "The mind does not lead to motion without aspiration", but "both abilities - the mind and desire - determine the movement." This is the unity of mind and the desire of Aristotle and calls Will, on the one hand, a practical mind - on the other.
The mind of the commander is one of the specific forms of the practical mind in the Aristotelian sense of this term; It can not be understood as some pure intelligence; It is the unity of intellectual and volitional moments.
When they say that any commander has an outstanding mind, but deprived of such volitional qualities as determination or moral courage, it means that his mind is not the one that needs a commander. The authentic mind of the commander can not be in a man of restless, timid and weakly accuracy.
Rare greatness of spirit
"The element in which military activities take place is a danger." "The fight generates element of danger, in which all types of military activities are and moved like fish in water, like birds in the air." In the "Element of Danger", the mind of the commander is working, and psychological analysis cannot pass by this circumstance.
It is customary to think that in a state of serious danger, where there is a reason for the occurrence of fear, the quality and productivity of mental work decreases. The same Clausevitz wrote: "Human nature is peculiar to the immediate feeling of great danger to himself and for others it was a hindrance for pure mind." But Clausevitz understood quite well the nature of war, so as not to know that this kind of a decline in mental capabilities in a dangerous situation is not at all inevitable. He knew that in any good warrior, and even more so in any large commander the case is just the opposite: the danger not only does not reduce, but, on the contrary, exacerbates the work of the mind. "Danger and responsibility do not increase the freedom and activity of the Spirit in a normal person, but, on the contrary, there are depressingly expaning on it, and because if these experiences are painted and exacerbated by the ability of judgment, then, undoubtedly, we are dealing with the rare spirit of the Spirit."
What Clausevitz is undoubtedly right, so this is what behavior indicates the greatness of the Spirit. Without such greatness, there can be a large commander. The rights of Clausevitz and when he directly connects that the "condition", which is called by the Military Talent, "with the ability to maintain the loyalty of judgments in the most dangerous and difficult circumstances. Without such an ability, no military talent is unthinkable.
Increasing all mental strength and aggravation of mental activity in the atmosphere of danger - a feature that distinguishes all good commander ...
To resolve as soon as possible, those exclusively complex tasks that protrude before the warlord into the decisive minutes of the operation, it is not enough to preserve the normal forces of the mind. It is necessary that "Wrongness and the exacerbation of the ability of judgment", which was amazed by Clausevitz as a manifestation of the "rare greatness of the spirit."
"Admirations are worthy exactly to the point ..."
In science, it can sometimes have a high value solution, incorrectly in general, but giving deep, original and correct coverage of individual sides of the question. In the work of the practical mind, it cannot be so. There is no reason to call the brilliant activities of the commander, the wrong in general, i.e. In its end results. The solutions of the commander leading the army to the defeat will be a bad solution, at least it contained deep, original and faithful ideas and combinations. Before the warlord, the question always stands as a whole, and it is not only separate, at least wonderful, ideas, as if possible to cover the whole question and find such solutions that are best in all respects.
Clausevitz concerned one of the most important features of the mind of the commander, when he wrote that in the war "the influence of genius affects not so much in the newly found decoration of action, immediately striking, as in the happy outcome of a whole enterprise. Admiration is worthy exactly to get to the point of silent assumptions and Silent harmony throughout the case, found only in the final general success. "
Genius of whole and genius details
In military business, the concreteness of thinking is a necessary condition for success. Genuine Military Genius is always a genius of a whole, and genius of details.
One of the distinctive abilities of Peter the First was, according to the characteristic of M.M. Theological, ability "with enhanced stress attention to one main thing ... remember with great accuracy and take care of different trifles."
Furious and passionate Suvorov knew how to take care of the most prosaic "trifles" with no less carefulness and painstaking. Proof of this is the numerous orders, orders are not just wearing his signature, but also them themselves and written. Here is an excerpt of one of his orders of 1793, whose most syllable issues his great author: "Health observation jewel in natural rules: 1) drink, kvass; for him, double dishes so that there is no young and rebalance. If water, then healthy And somewhat flavored; 2) food; the boilers are mute; the supplies are healthy, bread baked; the food is dismissed, not digestible, not spaced, not adjusted, hot and for the one who did not sleep to the caress, deprived of it ... for the air! " .
Turning complex in simple ...
The solution of all the task facing the commander is based on the setting analysis. Until the situation is found out, it is impossible to talk about the foresight or planning. Enforcement information is those data based on which any strategic, operational or tactical task should be solved.
But is it possible to specify another branch of human activity, where the data from which the planning and decision makes the solution comes, would be so complicated, diverse and difficult to foresee how the situation on the situation in the war?
Information about the enemy received from a wide variety of sources and relating to various sides of the state of his army, its actions and intentions, the Mall-forming data on their forces, the area of \u200b\u200blocality, in respect of which sometimes one low-challenging item may be crucial - in all this And in many other things, a commander analyzing the mind should understand before deciding.
Thus, the first feature of the intellectual work of the commander - the colossal complexity of the material to be analyzed.
The second, no less characteristic feature - simplicity, clarity, certainty of the products of this work, i.e. those plans, combinations, solutions to which commander comes. The easier and more than a certain plan of the operation or battle, it will be better for otherwise equal conditions. This thought has repeatedly expressed and argued Clausevitz: "Simplicity of ideas ... is a root of good warming."
The largest commander had this quality to the greatest extent. In the characteristics of the regimental art of Suvorov, this side is always noted as one of the most important: "The simplicity of Suvorov's considerations was wonderful, and she corresponded to the simplicity of execution."
So, for intellectual work, the commander is typical of the emergency complexity of the source material and a large simplicity and clarity of the final result. Initially, the analysis of complex material, as a result, a synthesis that gives simple and certain positions. The turning complex in a simple - this brief formula can be designated one of the most important parties in the work of the commander.
The ability to find and highlight a significant and constant systematization of the material is the most important conditions that ensure the unity of analysis and synthesis, the equilibrium between these sides of the mental activity that distinguishes the work of the mind of a good commander.
The ability to decide
Without risk and daring, the activities of the commander is impossible. This leads us to one of the most important qualities of the mind of the commander, for the designation of which very different expressions are used: the ability to risk, the courage of thought, the courage of the mind ... Finally, determination ...
The psychological nature of the decisiveness of Clausevitz understood as follows. Decisitancy, on the one hand, is "the ability ... to eliminate the flour doubts and the danger of oscillations." It can only take place when it is necessary to act in the absence of sufficient data: "In cases where the person has sufficient data ... There is no reason to talk about decisiveness, because the determination implies doubts that are not here." On the other hand, decisive in the sense, which is meant, "there can be no people with a limited mind." Such people can act in difficult missions without hesitation, but not because they are able to overcome doubts, but because they have no doubt and does not arise, since they cannot assess the degree of reliability and completeness of the available data. About such people can not be said that they act resolutely; They can be said about them that they act thoughtlessly. A prerequisite condition is a great mind (insight) and courage. But it is impossible to reduce them. There are people who possess a very insightful mind and unconditional courage, but their "courage and insight are caught, without stretching each other's hands and therefore do not produce a third property - decisiveness."
Then the courage, which underlies the determination, is excellent from courage against personal danger.
Suvorov was firmly convinced that the courage of the mind, which is required from the military man holder, is a much more rare quality and the matter is much more difficult than downtime for personal courage.
An example is to leaving Kutuzov Moscow without a fight, contrary to the opinion of the huge majority of Russian warlords, contracted with the requirements of the king and all the ruling spheres of St. Petersburg, moreover, the rotation with the voice of most army and the people.
Of course, Tolstoy Rights, when he writes: "... He was terribly thoughted about the order he had to give." He understood that he was falling "to the position of the thoroughly, in which Barclay was to Tsareva-Zancy." His authority in the army could not temporarily not shock after leaving Moscow. "On the way out of Moscow," writes one of the eyewitnesses, "the brown prince ordered his shod to the city and, the head to his hand ... I looked ... to the capital and on the troops, held by him with a disturbed eyes; they For the first time, seeing him, did not shout. The immortal greatness of Kutuzov is that he was not afraid of terrible gravity taken responsibility and did what the conscience was considered the only right.
Ostive courage
There is such a warehouse of the mind, which combines the greatest caution and the criticalness of thought with its utmost courage. This is the ability to at risk, which is to express Dragomirov, the result of the "great understanding". Only those whose opposite properties can be large commander, creating new quality, which would most naturally be called a strangely sound expression: cautious courage. It is impossible to understand the matter so that there is a speech about some kind of golden middle, about some capacity, average between courage and caution.
It would be wrong to think that in large commander the courage seems to be, weakened, constrained by caution. On the contrary: caution, high criticality of thought make it possible to go to such a courage of a solution that is inconceivable.
The example of Suvorov, which considered it possible to attack even five times large forces, but "with a mind, art and, in response," the rapid onset of the Turkish army defeated under the Rymnik, in numbers four times superior to the Russian-Austrian forces, and made it as a result of deeply thoughtful Calculation ("If the Turks still do not occur yet, it means that they did not finish the concentration of the forces") who committed the assault to the assault, but presented to him the only one of its kind and caution preparations (built copy of the Izmail shaft and systematic exercises on it, reproducing All phases of the upcoming assault, the development of a detailed disposition, etc.).
Maximum initiative and ability to subordinate to their will will be the will of the enemy ...
Undoubtedly, the first thing that is required from the military man holder is the maximum initiative and the ability to subordinate to their will will be the will of the enemy. But it is the whole difficulty of the task that the straightforward fulfillment of plans, "not considered with the intentions and desires of the enemy," there is only a very rude and imperfect method of "imposing their will". This method of action during superficial consideration may seem impressionable, it can give a short-term effect in a collision with heavily and little to resist the enemy, but in a serious struggle it cannot lead to long-term success.
Big Master Military Affairs arrived differently. The first of its task they put penetration into the intention and intention plan: firmly hold the principle of "unobinding the will of the enemy", but it was for this to begin with the fact that subjugate their mind information about the enemy, and only then make up their creative and maximally initiative plan and in drawing up His will of the enemy subjugate his own. And the most difficult thing is that the whole cycle is constantly repeated with each new change in the situation, with each receipt of new information about the actions and intentions of the enemy.
It is not surprising that therefore, that the ability to penetrate the environment of the enemy, to solve his intentions was always regarded as one of the most valuable qualities of the commander. "As they tell, the feminocles once noticed that he considers the highest virtue of the commander the ability to understand and predict the ideas of the enemy." "Does nothing makes the commander more great," writes N. Makiavelli, "as penetration into the opponent's plan." "The main property that distinguishes the talented commander is the ease of the impending character of his opponent" [M. Dragomirov].
Excellent expression "The principle of unsuitability of the will of the enemy!" But after all, to follow this advice, it is necessary, first of all, to know what the enemy wants, that he really wants, and not that he would have to, according to our assumptions, want.
Suvorov, sent before the assault I am emptying such a message to the Turks: "I arrived with the army here. Twenty-four hours on thinking - the will; my first shot - already bridle; assault - death. What I declare you for consideration," Suvorov, who began orders By the battle when wept in the words: "Bearing in full", the same Suvorov showed so great interest in the enemy that "the enemy position knew sometimes better than the enemy", preferring always fighting a smart opponent - a damn, impossible in a commander coarse and elementary active type ...
Interaction opposed all plannedness?
Drawing up war plans in general, individual operations, each upcoming battle is the most important components in the work of the commander and their headquarters. But military planning is planning a special kind. Here with emergency brightness there are the exceptional difficulties with which the intellectual work of the military man holder is connected.
"What is happening (in war) interaction on its very nature opposed all the plaguing," wrote Clausevitz.
But is it possible to introduce the war "Methodically", going around without plans?
In fact, the work of the commander is constant and continuous planning, although the nature of the war is equally constantly and continuously opposed to this planning. Only a commander who in this struggle will be able to defeat the nature of war, can count on a victory over the enemy.
First of all, military planning requires a large abstinence. He must refrain from planning too much, should refrain from planning too far ahead, should finally refrain from premature plans. One reason is based on these requirements: the situation in the war is continuously changing and no plan can not provide all changes.
In relation to its plans, the commander must show the greatest flexibility and freedom of mind, never allow his mind to be connected and shoves its own plans. And the best commander, indeed, always considered it. Suvorov, for example, "Better than any other understood that the perfectly compiled campaign plans could be executable only part, and sometimes they should completely change because they will counteract the enemy, which the strength and ways with loyalty cannot be determined and which has its own intentions and goals . Suvorov has always accepted a case in war. "
Foresight
"Managing - it means to foresee," says the ancient saying. Anticipate - it means through the dusk of the unknown and fluidity of the situation to see the main meaning of the events committed, to catch their main trend and, based on this, to understand where they go. The foresight is the highest level of the turning complex in a simple, which ... already had to talk. The foresight is the result of deep penetration into the situation and comprehending the main thing in it decisive, which determines the course of events.
All the large commander in one way or another possessed the ability of foresight ...
A rare ability to solve the intentions of the enemy and predict the course of the events of Kutuzov more than once showed before, but only in the Patriotic War of 1812. This side of his genius turned fully.
Already in the Tsarevo-Cheating, after the army, he talks about the Napoleonic army, at that time the victoriously coming: "and the French will also be. Believe to my word ... I will have horsepower meat."
There is an opinion that Kutuzov gave the Borodino battle against the will, only obeying the desire of the army and the whole country.
The behavior of Kutuzov before and during the battle says that he attached exceptional importance and did everything possible to concentrate to this point material and strain to the extreme stress of the army's moral forces. Kutuzov gave Borodino battle as a battle in his entire sense, decisive. So do not give battles for which they look like on unnecessary and useless.
The great strength of Kutuzov inspection affected here, firstly, in the fact that he saw the moment when it was possible to give a decisive battle with confidence in victory, and, secondly, that he understood the character of the Borodino battle, realized that - Winning with a deferred result. Therefore, he was not embarrassed by the lack of formal signs of the victorious ending of the battle ... Through the external course of events that appear to be unfavorable, he saw their inner meaning, which was that under Borodin he won a complete and decisive victory over Napoleon.
Speed \u200b\u200borientation
With unforeseen changes in the situation, another crucial property of the commander comes into force - the speed of orientation, considerations and solutions. All large commander use, of course, by both means of fighting the "darkness" of the military situation: they strive to foresee more, and on unexpectedly ready to answer with the greatest speed.
No wonder Caesar was the favorite hero of Suvorov. It was most implanted by Suvorov's speed: "Julius Caesar defeated hasty."
Suvorov himself even surpassed the one who put himself as a sample. The speed, swiftness, mobility (in all resolutely manifestations) is the organic property of Suvorov.
Take Ramnica. Having received from the Austrian Commander, Prince Coburg, news about the approach to the Austrians of the Huge Army of the Turk, Suvorov wrote him in response to a pencil church one word: "IT!" - And immediately, deep at night, campaign. Walking on a blurred road, under a torrential rain, forced to locate a bridge, he did about 100 miles for two days. "There is a story: when the spy reported to a great visiting about the appearance of Suvorov, Vizier ordered him to hang him for the spread of Nescious." Arriving in place, Suvorov immediately accompanied by several officers and a small batch of Cossacks goes to the reconnaissance, climbs on the tree, carefully examines the fortress and immediately constitutes a battle plan, a plan, extraordinary in courage, which included the change of the front in mind the enemy. He drove back with the finished plan in the head. "
Victory at Fokshans is obliged to the Suvorov ability to instantly navigate and make a decision in unforeseen the turnover of the case. In the midst of battle, he suddenly turns his column, with great difficulty he spends her through the swamps and appears on the other side, from where the Turks did not expect Russian at all.
The top of Suvorov's rapidness - battle at the demand. First of all, the famous march to the taste (80 versts for 36 hours!) ... Some shelves have not segged the last segment, but they fled and immediately entered the battle. Suvorov himself with four Cossack shelves would be twisted forward and arrived at the battlefield at the moment when the position of Austrians M. Melas became hopeless. "He arrived just in time," a few days later, Melas with tears in his eyes spoke Miloradovich that he was obliged to save his quick arrival of Russians. Actually, not Russians, and Suvorov; The Russians arrived so little that there was still a big advantage on the french side, but this difference was replenished with the presence of Suvorov. The genius of war appeared in him, flew the spirit of victory. Dropping on the exaltation, he won a long attentive view of the battlefield. It was at such moments when the case concerned his inimitable chamorar, he was truly great. Two Cossack regiment, not having time to translate the spirit, flew to the right, to the Flang Dombrovsky with the Poles, and against the front of him were sent dragoons; The other two Cossack shelves rushed under the boss of the Suvorov nephew, Gorchakov, threaten the right flank of the French. The onset of the French was delayed, and the Poles were given in perfect confusion. Success, of course, was a minute, but in such cases every minute and the road. It seemed on the road of the head of the Russian avant-garde ... "
Interesting us ... The ability to quickly understand in a difficult situation and almost instantly find the right decision is called differently. Sometimes it is called intuition.
This concept, often transferable in Russian translations, the faithful military eye or a faithful military view is often found in the characteristics that Napoleon Military leaders.
This expression often used Suvorov: "Do not need methodism, but a faithful view of the military."
The psychological nature of the commander intuition is closely connected with the high development of spatial representations and spatial thinking. Instant of understanding and solutions in the act of intuition involves the visibility of thinking. In a military case, this clarity denotes the first-mentioned view of all spatial relationships, the ability to see on some imaginary map, a scheme, plan, and the like all possible combinations of action in their attitude to all essential facilities.
An equally important role is played in the intuition of the commander and a sense of time. "In practice, this time plays a huge role: they missed a minute, and the best measure can lead to a catastrophe. The war is the case of the clock and minutes; often the loss of minutes is equivalent to the loss of the party."
Time factor always plays a paramount value. But sometimes his role is especially bright, so the choice of moment acquires the central, in the full sense of the word is crucial.
.
... Kinburnsky battle can serve, where Suvorov showed a wonderful sense of time, first, in determining the moment of the first counterattack, made just when the Turks went to the assault, and secondly, in the choice of the moment to quit On all the reserves that he kept intact until the evening: the introduction of them in the case decided the fate of the battle and led to the complete extermination of the Turkish squad.
Outstanding Military Education
It is not enough to say: the commander must be a smart person. To this should be added: the commander must be a highly educated person: it should have excellent military training and outstanding general education.
Indeed, outstanding commander, those that you can not hesitate to attribute to the category of the Great, were not just people of "knowledgeable": they were usually on the top steps of the formation of their time. Bright examples gives an antique world. The greatest commander of antiquity belonged to the number of the most cultural and educated people of their era. Alexander was a student (and not only nominally) Aristotle, Hannibal was highly educated for that time by man, Caesar, finally, in the latitude of knowledge and the brilliant culture of the mind stood in the first rows of great people of the ancient world. Is it possible to understand how simple chance?
To approach this issue somewhat deeper, we will take a look at the two largest collens of the XVIII - XIH century: Suvorov and Napoleon.
An occupation of sciences, constant care for self-education Suvorov considered the greatest responsibility of the military man holder.
Once he received from Catherine II, George 3rd degree for laying, at its discretion, at a more worthy. He chose Lieutenant Colonel Kurtis. Laying produced in a very solemn atmosphere, uttered the instruction. "In the conclusion of this instruction, it was shown the last condition necessary to General: continuous self-education by reading."
Suvorov himself performed this instruction with the zeal of extraordinary, and moreover throughout life. Here are some of the excerpts here from his biography.
The period of the soldiers (17 - 23 years). It is persistently working on its formation at home and in the classes of the Cadet Corps. "The time that his companions was conducted for maps and wine, he spent behind the books." "All of his time, without the slightest exception, went to the service, to visit the classes of the Cadet Corps and at home scientific classes; he has not been more determined anywhere." All the money he managed by hard savings, he used to buy books.
The period of service by the lieutenant (23-25 \u200b\u200byears). "Enjoyed every free minute to continue its self-education."
The period of long-term stay in the village in the mid-80s. (about 55 years). "I read a lot and at one time I even had a reader on the salary. But this reading didn't have the meaning of military special knowledge; he attracted knowledge at all, in the sense of the expansion of the mental horizon."
Service in Byrelad in 1790 (59 years). "Most of the free time went from Suvorov to reading. With it there was one German student or a candidate with whom he met a few years ago and took him to the readers." "Suvorov was not imatible, forcing Philip Ivanovich to read a lot and long and almost did not give him a rest, rebuilding for each stop." "Everything was read in different languages: newspapers, magazines, military memoirs, statistics; they got to read not only books, but also manuscripts."
Service in Finland in 1791 - 1792. (60 - 61 years). "Taking advantage of my small leisure activities, Suvorov worked in Finland reading; without reading he could not live. We do not know whether scientific works were in his hands at that time, but he read a lot of newspapers, as it can be seen from his subscription for 1792."
Polish War of 1794 (63 years). The tireless activity "did not prevent him from finding time for reading, mainly in the evenings, for which there were several books in his baggage, including the comment by Julia Caesar, his favorite hero."
Link in Konchansky (66 - 67 years). "I get used to the young years to mental classes, Suvorov, especially since I could not do without them in my privacy. He read a lot, but less than I wanted, since the eyes were sick. In Konchansky there was a library; he replenished it at times."
There was no difference between Suvorov and Napoleon; The latter was also engaged in his formation, was the same passionate reader.
It is difficult to say what areas of knowledge Napoleon and Suvorov were not interested. Their formation was literally the word encyclopedic. Napoleon can especially note the interest in mathematics (he since childhood showed outstanding mathematical abilities), geography, stories, in youth - also philosophy ... Suvorov knew math well, geography, philosophy, and the most important story. Especially it is necessary to allocate the tendency and undoubted abilities to study languages \u200b\u200bfrom the Russian commander. He knew the languages \u200b\u200bGerman, French, Italian, Polish, Finnish, Turkish, Arabic, Persian.
It is impossible not to mark the features, common and for Napoleon, and for Suvorov. Both of them were distinguished by the extreme independence of the mind, the high criticality of thought. The following words relating to Suvorov may well be transferred to Napoleon: "Everything, produced by science processed in it in something completely new, its own, who had fallen not about the denial of the samples ... He was not a borrower anywhere and than, but the less imitator. "
But both of them had an extremely valuable ability: they knew how to separate the teachings from criticism. Earlier than criticizing, recycle, deny, they knew how to absorb. This is what remark about Suvorov at the age of 17 - 23 years old we find Petryshevsky: "His mind is inherent in the spirit of criticism, but he gave him the will only later; now he studied - and there was no place for criticism." But what he writes about Napoleon Tarla: "In any case, the 16-year-old Podororuk not so much criticized how much he studied. This is also a root line of his mind: in every book, as well as to any man, he approached these initial years of his Life with greedy and impatient desire as soon as possible to extract what he still does not know and what can give food his own thought. "
No less important is inherent in both the ability to rigorously and immediately systematize knowledge. "I believe Locke," says Suvorov, "that the memory is a pantry mind; but in this storeroom a lot of partitions, and therefore it is necessary to immediately lay everything, where follows." Napoleon said that various things and various objects were laid in his head just as they could be laid in the dresser. "When I want to interrupt the occupation in some business, I close his box and open another box of business; they do not mix, and never one thing is constraints and does not tire me during the lesson." In the last words of Napoleon, not only the complete orderliness of his mental luggage is noted, but also the extreme ease of use ... The feature is very important for the mind of the commander.
Notes
1.teplov B.M. The mind of the commander (experience psychological research Thinking the commander in military historical materials).
In the book: Teplov B.M. Election Works. In 2 tons. - T.1. - M., 1985. - p.223 - 305.
2.Anapolation. Election . T.1. - M., 1941. - p.320.
3.Dagomirov M.I. Eleven years. 1895 - 1905: Sat. Original and translation articles. In 2 tons. - SP b., 1909. - p.394.
4. The same. - C.170 - 171.
5. Alistal. About the soul. - M., 1937. - P.9 - 10.
6.Klausevitz to about war. - T.1. - M., 1941. - P.40.
7.There. - C.108.
8.s. - p.454.
9.s. - T.2. - M., 1941. - P.305.
10.Same. - P.305.
11.There. - T.1. - M., 1941. - p.159.
12. Bogoslovsky M.M. Peter The first: materials for biography. - M., 1941. - p.324.
13. Markchenko A.M. Suvorov in their manuscripts. - SP b., 1900. - p.38.
14. Calausevitz to the war. - T.2. - M., 1941. - C.295.
15.Petrushevsky A.F. Generalissimus Prince Suvorov, in 3 tons. T.1. - SP b., 1884. - p.530.
16. Calausevitz to the war. - T.1. - M., 1941. - S.67 - 68.
17.Tarch E.V. Napoleon's invasion to Russia. 1812 - M., 1938. - P.144.
18.There. - p.147.
19.Dagomirov M.I. Fourteen years old. 1881 - 1894: Sat. Original and translation articles. - SP b., 1895. - p.316.
20.geysman P.A. Fall of Poland and Suvorov. - In the book: Suvorov in reports of professors of the Academy of General Staff. - SP b., 1900. - C.109.
21.Femistocle (approx. 525 - approx. 460 BC), Athenian commander, leader of a democratic group, during the Greco-Persian wars from 493/492. Archont and strategist (repeatedly). Played a decisive role in organizing the underestural forces of resistance. I achieved the transformation of Athens into the marine power and the creation of the Delos Union. (Approx. Avt.-Cost.)
22. Power. Selected biographies. - M. - L., 1941. - p.65.
23. Makiavelli (Makyavelli) (Machiavelli) Niccolo (1469-1527), Italian political thinker, historian, author of the "Sovereign", 1513, ed. 1532, etc. (approx. Avt.-Cost.)
24.Tramirov M.I. Eleven years. 1895 - 1905: Sat. Original and translation articles. In 2 tons - T.2. - JV B., 1909. - S.534.
25.Petrushevsky A.F. Generalissimus Prince Suvorov. - SP b., 1900. - p.237.
26.There. - S.580.
27.s. - P.752.
28.Characterna for him Words, said at Novi: "Moro understands me, old man, and I am glad that I am dealing with a smart warlord" - Osipov K.N. Suvorov. - M., 1958. - C.296.
29. Clausevitz K. About the War. - T.1. - SP b., 1941. - C.109.
30.Petrushevsky A.F. Generalissimus Prince Suvorov. - SP b., 1900. - S.520.
31.Sesar (Caesar) Guy Julius (102 or 100-44 BC), Roman dictator in 49, 48-46, 45, from 44 g. - For life. Commander. He began political. Activity as a supporter rep. Groupings, taking office of the Military Tribune in 73, Edil in 65, Pretor in 62 g. After seeking a consulate, in 60 G. entered into an alliance with the city of Pompey and the Crassus (1st triumvirate). Consul in 59, then governor of Gaul; In 58-51. Subduced Rome all Calpian Gallia. In 49, relying on the army, began the struggle for the uniformity. Defeating Pompey and his supporters in 49-45. (Crass died in 53), was at the head of state. Focusing in his hands a number of the most important republican posts, (dictator, consul, etc.), became actually a monarch. Killed as a result of civilian conspiracy. The author of "Notes about the Gallic War" and "Notes on Civil Wars"; He conducted a calendar reform (Julian calendar). (Approx. Avt.-Cost.)
32.Miknevich N.P. Suvorov - strategist. - In the book: Suvorov in reports of professors of the Academy of General Staff. - SP b., 1900. - S.7.
33.Nechn (Rimnic), r. In Romania, the influx of p. Syret (gray). During the Russian-Turkish War 1787-1791. With Rymnik, Russian and Austrian troops under the commands. A.V. Suvorov 11.9.1789 defeated the Turkish army, for which Suvorov received the title of Graph Ramnica. (Approx. Avt.-Cost.)
34. Osipov K.N. Suvorov. - M., 138. - C.144.
35.Petrushevsky A.F. Generalissimus Prince Suvorov. In 3 tons. T.1. - SP b., 1884. - C.213.
36. Phokshans, a city in Romania, in the area of \u200b\u200bwhich 21.7 (1.8) .1789. Russian-Austrian troops (over 17 thousand people) during the Russian-Turkish war 1787 - 1791. They defeated the Turkish troops of Ottoman Pasha (30 thousand people). The victory was achieved due to the skillful and decisive action A.V. Suvorov, who actually led the allied troops in the battle. (Approx. Avt.-Cost.)
37. Osipov K.N. Suvorov. - M., 138. - p.142.
38.Trebbia (Trebbia), r. In Northern Italy. right influx of p. By. 17 - 19.6.1799 Russian-Austrian troops led by A.V. Suvorov during the Italian campaign was broken by the French troops of General J. McDonald. (Approx. Avt.-Cost.)
39.Petrushevsky A.F. Generalissimus Prince Suvorov. In 3 tons. - T.1. - SP b., 1884. - S.581 - 582.
40.Miknevich N.P. Suvorov - strategist. - In the book: Suvorov in reports of professors of the Academy of General Staff. - SP b., 1900. - p.5.
41.Dramirov M.I. Eleven years. 1895 - 1905: Sat. Original and translation articles. In 2 - t. - T.2. - JV B., 1909. - p.445 - 446.
42.kinburn, fortress at the Kinburn Spit (between the Dnipro and the Yagalitsky Limans of the Black Sea). During the Russian-Turkish War 1787-1791. The Turkish fleet landed a landing (5 thousand people), which defeated the troops A.V. Suvorov (approx. 4 thousand people).
43.Alexander Macedonian (356-323 BC), King of Macedonia from 336. The son of King Philip II, brought up Aristotle. By defeating the Persians under the branger (334), Isse (333), Gavgamelakh (331), subjugated the kingdom of the achemenides, invaded Wed. Asia (329), won the land to r. Ind, creating the largest world monarchy of antiquity. (Approx. Avt.-Cost.)
44.hangnibal (Hannibal) (247 or 246-183 BC), Carthaginsky commander. Son Hamilkar Barka. During the 2nd pin. Wars (218-201) made the transition through the Alps, won the victory at RR. Titin, Tsobby (218), in the Lake Traziment (217), under Cannes (216). In 202, at replacement (sowing. Africa), Hannibal was defeated by the Romans. (Approx. Avt.-Cost.)
45.Petrushevsky A.F. Generalissimus Prince Suvorov. - SP b., 1900. - p.299.
46. \u200b\u200bOsipov K.N. Suvorov. - M, 1938. - p.21.
47.Petrushevsky A.F. Generalissimus Prince Suvorov. In 3 tons. - T.1. - SP b., 1884. - p.5.
48. Osipov K.N. Suvorov. - M, 1938. - p.25.
49.Petrushevsky A.F. Generalissimus Prince Suvorov. - JV b., 1900. - p.267.
50. Forest, city in East Romania.
51.Petrushevsky A.F. Generalissimus Prince Suvorov. In 3 tons. T.1. - SP b., 1884. - p.372 - 373.
52.Petrushevsky A.F. Generalissimus Prince Suvorov. - SP b., 1900. - C.278.
53.tes. - p.318.
54.s. - S.501.
55.s. - P.748.
56.There. - p.6.
57.Thever Evgeny Viktorovich (1874-1955), historian, author of work: "Napoleon", "Talleyran", "Napoleon's invasion to Russia", "Crimean War" (vol. 1-2) and others (approx. Auth. -Sost.)
58.Tarch E.V. Napoleon. - M., 1941. - C.11.
59. Osipov K.N. Suvorov. - M., 1938. - p.25.