Questions of thinking in psychology were posed abstractly (the image of a theoretician). In life, practical thinking. Previously, the problem of practical intelligence was narrowed down to the question of visual-active or sensorimotor thinking (solving a problem by looking at things or operating with them). Visual-effective thinking is the first stage of thinking in phylo- and ontogenesis. But it is not directly related to the question of organizing practical thinking. Mental objects human activities engaged in mental work are hardly amenable to direct perception. Differences between theoretical and practical thinking cannot be sought in the differences in the mechanisms of thinking themselves, in "two different intelligences." Intelligence is one. Differences between theoretical and practical thinking are related to practice in different ways (not that one is connected, the other is not). Both are connected, but the connection is different (its nature). The work of practical thinking is aimed at solving particular, specific problems. Theoretical thinking - finding theoretical general patterns (tactics). The theoretical mind - from contemplation to abstraction, the practical mind - from abstraction to practice. In practical thinking, the connection with practice is more direct. Practical thinking has a kind of responsibility (theorists put forward hypotheses, practitioners are in a more rigid framework). Teplov questions the belief, prevailing from Hegel to Kant and psychology at the beginning of the 20th century, that the theoretical mind is the highest possible form of the manifestation of intelligence. All gradations are conditional, but it is important to realize the enormous complexity and importance of the problem of practical thinking. The problem posed by Aristotle in the doctrine of "the practical mind". The practical mind is directed to the particular, to the activity, therefore, it must have both types of knowledge, i.e. knowledge of the general and the particular (this is more difficult).
The question of the practical mind is resolved only through a detailed study of the characteristics of a person's mental work in various areas of practical activity. "The commander's mind" is one of the characteristic examples of the practical mind. In recent years, the problem of the practical mind has been touched upon only sporadically. This was the case until the 20s. 20th century, when the terms "practical thinking" and "practical intelligence" became common in the pages of psychological research. Under these terms, however, they did not understand at all the work of the mind in the conditions of practical activity, but only the question of the so-called visual-active or sensorimotor thinking. The confusion of the practical mind with visual-active thinking has greatly contributed to the strengthening of this view of the practical mind as a lower, elementary function of mental activity. A deeper formulation of the practical mind was outlined in Soviet psychology (Rubinstein "Fundamentals general psychology Cognitive operations, directly included in the course of practical effective solution of the problem, put forward specific requirements that are different from the requirements for generalized theoretical thinking.
These mental operations require:
- more sophisticated observation and attention to individual, private details
- imply the ability to use to solve a problem that special and singular in the organization of the process that is not included in the theoretical generalization
- require the ability to move from reflection to action and back.
These are only a number of features characteristic of the practical mind, but this list is not complete.
It is generally accepted that a commander must have intelligence and will as a complex set of properties - strength of character, courage, determination, energy, perseverance, etc. Napoleon clarified: there must be a correspondence between mind and will, they must be equal (the square formula). The gift of a commander is a square, where the basis is will, the height is the mind. The usual understanding of the problem "the mind and will of the commander" is based on extremely important mistake... Mind and will are seen as two different abilities, as two "parts of the soul" (among the Greeks).
The first to propose the division of all psychic abilities into two classes was Aristotle (cognitive abilities and the ability to feel, desire ...). He is the founder of the opposition between mustache and will. But psychology passed by one of the most important concepts of the Aristotelian doctrine of the soul, the concept in which the unity of will and mind is realized, this concept is the practical mind. Practical mind is the ability to act for the human benefit and carried out on the basis of reason. The mind of a commander is one of the specific forms of practical mind (the engine of volitional action is mind and striving). Both faculties - intelligence and aspiration - condition movement. The mind of a commander cannot be understood as intelligence, it is the unity of intellectual and volitional moments (the ability to understand a difficult situation and almost instantly find the right decision called intuition). The psychological nature of the commander's intuition is closely related to the high development of spatial concepts and spatial thinking. For this you need: accumulation a large number knowledge, a kind of readiness of this knowledge, the skill developed by exercise to solve new, unexpected problems.
MIND OF THE COMMANDER
B. TEPLOV
Square: balance of mind and will ...
It is customary to think that a commander is required to have two qualities - an outstanding mind and a strong will (moreover, the word "will" means a very complex set of properties: strength of character, courage, decisiveness, energy, perseverance, etc.). This idea is completely indisputable. Napoleon introduced a new important shade to it: the point is not only that the commander must have both intelligence and will, but also that there must be a balance between them, that they must be equal: "A military man must have the same character , how much and mind. " He compared the gifts of a real commander with a square, in which the basis is will, the height is the mind. A square will be a square only if the base is equal to the height; a great commander can only be a person whose will and mind are equal. If the will greatly exceeds the mind, the commander will act decisively and courageously, but little wisely; otherwise, he will have good ideas and plans, but he will not have the courage and determination to implement them. Napoleon's "square formula" was a great success: it is cited constantly. At the same time, they often go further and raise this kind of question. Since "balance in nature is rare", in most cases you will have to put up with the fact that the talent of the commander will turn out to be not a square, but a rectangle, you will have to put up with the fact that the balance, which is the ideal, will be violated. What should be recognized as more desirable: an imbalance in the direction of the will or in the direction of the mind? Which is better: a commander with a predominance of will or with a predominance of mind? I have not come across cases in the literature when this question would be decided in favor of the mind. Usually the question itself is posed in order to develop the doctrine of the primacy of the will in the activities of a commander. The point of view of M.I. Dragomirova. In his opinion, "of all human deeds, war is to a large extent more volitional than mental." “No matter how ingenious the plan may be, it can be completely spoiled by execution, and execution lies in the will, if not exclusively, then to an incomparably greater extent than in the mind. The most incredible feats were accomplished almost by will alone: an example is the transition of Suvorov across the Alps in 1799 ". Without giving yet overall assessment To this point of view, I will point out in passing that there is a very common misconception here. The function of the mind is to invent plans, the function of the will is to execute them. This is not true. On the one hand, the execution of a plan requires no less intelligence than will, and on the other hand, in the activities of a commander, conceiving a plan is usually inseparable from its execution. This is one of the most important features of the commander's intellectual work.<...>
Practical mind
Asking the question of what is the engine of volitional action, Aristotle comes to the conclusion that such cannot be a striving by itself ("after all, those who control themselves, although they may have a striving and desire for something, do not perform actions under the influence of striving, but follow the prescriptions of the mind "), nor the mind itself (" after all, the theoretical mind does not think anything related to action, and does not say what should be avoided and what should be coveted "). The real engine of volitional action is "mind and striving," or "intelligent striving." "The mind does not set in motion without striving," but "both faculties - mind and striving - condition the movement." It is this unity of mind and striving that Aristotle calls will, on the one hand, and practical mind, on the other.<...>The commander's mind is one of the concrete forms of the practical mind in the Aristotelian sense of the term; it cannot be understood as some pure intellect; he is the unity of intellectual and volitional moments. When they say that any military leader has an outstanding mind, but lacks such volitional qualities as determination or moral courage, this means that his mind is not the one that the general needs. The true mind of a commander cannot be in a weak-willed, timid and weak-willed person.
The rare greatness of the spirit
"The element in which military activity is taking place is a danger." "Combat gives rise to the element of danger, in which all types of military activity are and move like fish in water, like birds in the air." In the "element of danger" the commander's mind works, and psychological analysis cannot ignore this circumstance. It is generally accepted that in a state of serious danger, where there is a reason for the emergence of fear, the quality and productivity of mental work decreases. The same Clausewitz wrote: "It is in human nature that the immediate feeling of great danger for oneself and for others is a hindrance to pure reason." But Clausewitz understood the nature of war well enough not to know that this kind of mental decline in a dangerous situation is by no means inevitable. He knew that everyone good warrior, and even more so for any great commander, the situation is exactly the opposite: the danger not only does not reduce, but, on the contrary, sharpens the work of the mind. "Danger and responsibility do not increase in normal person freedom and activity of the spirit, but, on the contrary, affect it depressingly, and therefore if these experiences inspire and sharpen the ability to judge, then, undoubtedly, we are dealing with a rare greatness of the spirit. "Where Clausewitz is indisputably right, it is that such behavior testifies to the greatness of the spirit. Without such greatness of the spirit there can be no great commander. Clausewitz is also right when he directly connects that "state" which is "called military talent" with the ability to remain faithful to judgments in the most dangerous and difficult circumstances No military talent is unthinkable without this ability.<...>An increase in all mental powers and an exacerbation of mental activity in an atmosphere of danger is a feature that distinguishes everyone good generals... <...>To solve in the shortest possible time those extremely difficult tasks that appear before the commander in the decisive moments of the operation, it is not enough to preserve the normal powers of the mind. What is needed is that "inspiration and sharpening of the capacity for judgment," which Clausewitz marveled at as a manifestation of the "rare greatness of the spirit."
"Admiration is worthy of hitting the spot ..."
In science, sometimes it can have high value a solution that is incorrect as a whole, but gives a deep, original and correct coverage of certain aspects of the issue. This cannot be so in the work of the practical mind. There is no reason to call the commander's work of genius, incorrect in general, i.e. in their final results. A commander's decisions leading an army to defeat would be a bad decision, even if it contained deep, original and correct ideas and combinations. The military leader always faces the question as a whole, and it is not only about individual, albeit wonderful, ideas, but about the ability to cover the whole issue and find solutions that are the best in all respects. Clausewitz touched upon one of the most important features of the commander's mind when he wrote that in war "the influence of genius is reflected not so much in the newly found design of the action, which immediately catches the eye, as in the happy outcome of the whole enterprise. It is precisely the hitting the point of silently made assumptions that is worthy of admiration and silent harmony throughout the course of the case , revealing itself only in the ultimate general success. "<...>
The genius of the whole and the genius of the details
In military affairs, concreteness of thinking is a necessary condition for success. A true military genius is always the genius of the whole and the genius of details.<...>One of the distinctive abilities of Peter the Great was, according to the characteristics of M.M. Bogoslovsky, the ability "with an increased tension of attention to one main matter ... to remember with great accuracy and take care of various little things"Furious and passionate Suvorov was able to take care of the most prosaic" trifles "with no less care and painstaking care. 1793, the very syllable of which betrays its great author: "The treasure of observation of health in natural rules: 1) drinking, kvass; for him, double dishes, so that there is no young and acidic. If the water, then healthy and somewhat flavored; 2) food; matured boilers; healthy supplies, baked bread; cooked food, not overcooked, not defended, not warmed up, hot, and for those who are not ripe for porridge, they are deprived of it ... this time there is air! ".<...>
Turning the Complex Into Simple ...
At the heart of the solution of any task facing a commander is an analysis of the situation. Until the situation is clarified, one cannot speak of foresight or planning. Information about the situation is the data on the basis of which any strategic, operational or tactical task should be solved. But is it possible to specify another industry human activity where the data from which the planning and decision-making mind proceeds would be as complex, varied, and difficult to visualize as data on the situation in war?<...>Information about the enemy obtained from a wide variety of sources and concerning the most diverse aspects of the state of his army, his actions and intentions, the most imaginative data about his forces, data about the terrain, in relation to which sometimes one inconspicuous detail can be of decisive importance - in all this and in many other things, the analyzing mind of the commander must sort out before making a decision. Thus, the first feature of the commander's intellectual work is the colossal complexity of the material to be analyzed. The second, no less characteristic feature of it is simplicity, clarity, and certainty of the products of this work, i.e. those plans, combinations, decisions to which the commander comes. The simpler and more definite the plan of an operation or battle, the better it is, other things being equal. This idea was repeatedly expressed and argued by Clausewitz: "Simplicity of ideas ... is the root of good warfare."<...>The largest generals possessed this quality to the greatest extent. In the characteristics of Suvorov's military leadership, this side is always noted as one of the most important: "The simplicity of Suvorov's considerations was remarkable, and simplicity of execution corresponded to it."<...>So, for the intellectual work of a commander, the extreme complexity of the source material and the great simplicity and clarity of the final result are typical. In the beginning - the analysis of complex material, in the end - the synthesis, which gives simple and definite provisions. The transformation of the complex into the simple - this short formula can indicate one of the most important aspects in the work of the commander's mind.<...>The ability to find and highlight the essential and the constant systematization of material are the most important conditions that ensure that the unity of analysis and synthesis, then the balance between these aspects of mental activity, which distinguish the work of the mind of a good commander.<...>
The ability to dare
The activity of a commander is impossible without risk and daring. This leads us to one of the most important qualities of the commander's mind, for which very different expressions are used: the ability to take risks, the courage of thought, the courage of the mind ... finally, decisiveness ...<...>Clausewitz understood the psychological nature of decisiveness as follows. Decisiveness, on the one hand, is "the ability ... to remove the pangs of doubt and the danger of hesitation." It can take place only when it is necessary to act in the absence of sufficient data: "In those cases when a person has sufficient data ... there is no reason to speak of decisiveness, because decisiveness presupposes doubts that are not here." On the other hand, decisive in the sense that is meant, "cannot be people with a limited mind." Such people can act in difficult situations without hesitation, not because they are able to overcome doubts, but because they have no doubts and do not arise, since they cannot assess the degree of reliability and completeness of the available data. Such people cannot be said to act decisively; it can be said of them that they act thoughtlessly. A prerequisite for decisiveness is great intelligence (discernment) and courage. But decisiveness cannot be reduced to them. There are people who have a very perceptive mind and unconditional courage, but their "courage and discernment stand apart, not holding out their hands to each other, and therefore do not produce the third quality - decisiveness." The courage that underlies determination is distinct from courage in dealing with personal danger.<...>... Suvorov was firmly convinced that the courage of reason that is required of a military leader is a much rarer quality and a much more difficult matter than mere personal courage.<...>... An example is Kutuzov's abandonment of Moscow without a fight, contrary to the opinion of the vast majority of Russian military leaders, contrary to the requirements of the tsar and all ruling spheres of St. Petersburg, moreover, contrary to the voice of the majority of the army and the people. Of course, Tolstoy is right when he writes: "... He was horrified at the thought of the order he should have given." He understood that he was getting "into the position of the plague, in which Barclay was before Tsarev-Zaymishche." His authority in the army could not but shake temporarily after the abandonment of Moscow. “On the way out of Moscow,” writes one of the eyewitnesses, “the Highness Prince ordered his droshky to be turned towards the city and, leaning his head on his hand ... looked ... at the capital and at the troops passing by him with downcast eyes; they the first time they saw him, they did not shout hurray. " The immortal greatness of Kutuzov lies in the fact that he was not afraid of the terrible severity of the responsibility he had assumed and did what he considered the only right thing in his conscience.<...>
Sharp audacity
There is a mentality that combines the greatest caution and criticality of thought with its utmost courage. This is the ability to take great risks, which, in the words of Dragomirov, is the result of "great understanding." Great commanders can only be those who have these opposite properties - caution and courage of thought, create a new quality that would most naturally be called a strange-sounding expression: cautious courage. It is impossible to understand the matter so that here we are talking about some kind of golden mean, about a certain quality, an average between courage and caution. It would be wrong to think that among great generals, courage is moderated, weakened, and restrained by caution. On the contrary: caution, high criticality of thought make it possible to go for such a bold decision, which is unthinkable outside of this.<...>An example of Suvorov, who considered it possible to attack even five times larger forces, but "with intelligence, skill and response," who quickly defeated the Turkish army near Rymnik, four times larger than the Russian-Austrian forces, and did it as a result of a deeply thought-out calculation ("if the Turks are not yet advancing, it means they have not finished concentrating their forces"), who carried out an insanely bold assault on Ishmael, but preceded him with a preparation unique of its kind in terms of thoroughness and caution (the construction of a copy of the Izmalsky rampart and systematic exercises on it, which reproduced all phases of the upcoming assault, the development of a detailed disposition, etc.).<...>
Maximum initiative and ability to subjugate the will of the enemy ...
Undoubtedly, the first thing that is required of a military leader is maximum initiative and the ability to subordinate the will of the enemy to his will. But the whole difficulty of the task lies in the fact that the straightforward fulfillment of plans, "disregarding the intentions and desires of the enemy," is only a very crude and imperfect way of "imposing one's will." Such a method of action, on a superficial examination, can seem impressive, it can have a short-term effect when faced with a weak-willed and little able to resist enemy, but in a serious struggle it cannot lead to long-term success. Great masters of military affairs acted differently. Their first task was to penetrate the intentions and designs of the enemy: adhere firmly to the principle of "disobeying the will of the enemy," but for this, start with the fact that subject your mind to information about the enemy, and only then draw up your own creative and maximum initiative plan and, when drawing up it, subjugate the enemy's will to yours. And the most difficult thing is that this entire cycle is constantly repeated with each new change in the situation, with each receipt of new information about the actions and intentions of the enemy. It is not surprising, therefore, that the ability to penetrate the plans of the enemy, to unravel his intentions has always been regarded as one of the most valuable qualities of a commander. "As they say, Themistocles once remarked that he considers the highest virtue of a commander to be able to understand and predict the plans of the enemy." "Nothing makes a commander more great," writes N. Machiavelli, "like penetration into the enemy's plans." "The main property that distinguishes a talented commander is the ease of unraveling the character of his opponent" [M. Dragomirov].<...>An excellent expression of "the principle of disobeying the will of the enemy!" But in order to follow this advice, one must first of all know what the enemy wants, what he really wants, and not what he should, according to our assumptions, want.<...>Suvorov, who sent the following message to the Turks before the storming of Ishmael: "I arrived here with an army. Twenty-four hours to think - will; my first shot is already captivity; storm is death. What I announce to you for consideration," Suvorov, who began the order to the battle of Trebbia with the words: "Take the enemy army to the full," the same Suvorov showed such great interest in the enemy that "sometimes he knew the enemy position better than the enemy himself", always preferring to fight a clever enemy - a feature impossible for a commander rough and elementary active type ...<...>
Is interaction opposed to any planning?
Drawing up plans for the war as a whole, individual operations, each upcoming battle is the most important component in the work of commanders and their staffs. But military planning is a special kind of planning. Here the exceptional difficulties with which the intellectual work of a military leader is connected appear with extraordinary vividness. "The interaction taking place (in war) by its very nature opposes any planning," wrote Clausewitz.<...>But is it possible to introduce a war "methodically", dispensing with plans? In fact, the work of a general is constant and continuous planning, although the nature of war is just as constantly and continuously opposed to this planning. Only a commander who in this struggle will be able to defeat the nature of war can count on victory over the enemy. First of all, military planning requires great abstinence from the commander. He must refrain from planning too much, must refrain from planning too far ahead, must finally refrain from accepting plans prematurely. One reason lies at the heart of these demands: the situation in war is constantly changing and no plan can foresee all changes.<...>In relation to his plans, the commander must show the greatest flexibility and freedom of mind, never allow his mind to be bound and constrained by his own plans. the best generals, indeed, have always reckoned with this. Suvorov, for example, “understood better than anyone else that perfectly drawn up campaign plans could only be partly feasible, and sometimes they had to completely change because they would be opposed by an enemy whose forces and methods could not be determined with fidelity and which had its own intentions and goals. Suvorov always took into account the case in the war. "<...>
Foresight
"To manage is to foresee," says an old saying. To anticipate means to discern the main meaning of the events taking place through the gloom of uncertainty and fluidity of the situation, to grasp their main tendency and, proceeding from this, to understand where they are going. Foresight is the highest stage of that transformation of the complex into the simple, about which ... I already had to talk. Foresight is the result deep penetration into the situation and comprehension of the main thing in it, the decisive one, that determines the course of events. All the great generals, to one degree or another, had the ability to foresee ..<...>Kutuzov showed his rare ability to unravel the intentions of the enemy and predict the course of events more than once before, but only in the Patriotic War of 1812 did this side of his genius unfold in full.<...>Already in Tsarevo-Zaymishche, after the review of the army, he speaks of the Napoleonic army, which was victoriously advancing at that time: "And the French will also be there. Believe my word ... I will have horse meat." There is an opinion that Kutuzov gave the Battle of Borodino against his will, only obeying the wishes of the army and the whole country.<...>... The behavior of Kutuzov before and during the battle suggests that he attached exceptional importance and did everything possible to concentrate at this moment the material and strain the moral forces of the army to extreme tension. Kutuzov described the Battle of Borodino as a general, decisive battle in the full sense of the word. Thus, battles that are viewed as unnecessary and useless are not given. Great strength Kutuzov's insight was reflected here, firstly, in the fact that he saw the moment when it was possible to give a decisive battle with confidence in victory, and, secondly, in the fact that he understood the nature of the Battle of Borodino, he realized that it was - delayed victory. Therefore, he was not embarrassed by the lack of formal signs of the victorious end of the battle ... Through the external course of events, which seemed unfavorable, he saw their internal meaning, which was that at Borodino he won a complete and decisive victory over Napoleon.<...>
Quick orientation
In case of unforeseen changes in the situation, another important property of the commander's mind comes into force - the speed of orientation, considerations and decisions. All great commanders, of course, use both means of combating the "darkness" of the military situation: they strive to foresee as much as possible, and are ready to respond to the unforeseen with the greatest quickness.<...>No wonder Caesar was Suvorov's favorite hero. In him, Suvorov was most impressed by the speed: "Julius Caesar won in haste."<...>Suvorov himself, in his quality, even surpassed the one whom he set for himself as a model. Speed, swiftness, agility (in all resolute manifestations) are an organic property of Suvorov.<...>Let's take the Rymnik case. Having received from the Austrian commander, Prince Coburg, the news of the approaching of a huge army of Turks to the Austrians, Suvorov wrote him in response on a piece of paper in pencil one word: "Coming!" - and immediately, in the middle of the night, set out on a campaign. Walking along a washed-out road, in the pouring rain, forced to build a bridge on the way, he traveled about 100 miles for two days. "There is a story: when the spy reported to the grand vizier about the appearance of Suvorov, the vizier ordered him to be hanged for spreading fables." Arriving at the place, Suvorov immediately, accompanied by several officers and a small party of Cossacks, goes on reconnaissance, climbs a tree, carefully examines the fortress and immediately draws up a battle plan, a plan of extraordinary courage, which included a change of front in the mind of the enemy. He drove back with ready plan in the head. "Victory at Focsani owes Suvorov's ability to instantly navigate and make decisions in an unforeseen turn of affairs. In the midst of the battle, he suddenly turns his column, with great difficulty leads it through the swamps and appears from the side from which the Turks did not expect the Russians at all. The peak of Suvorov's swiftness was the battle at Trebbia. First of all, the famous march to Trebbia (80 miles in 36 hours!) ... Some regiments did not go the last segment of the way, but fled and immediately entered the battle. Suvorov himself with four Cossack regiments rushed away ahead and arrived on the battlefield at the moment when the position of the Austrians M. Melas was becoming hopeless. "He arrived just in time," - a few days later Melas, with tears in his eyes, told Miloradovich that he owed his salvation to the quick arrival of the Russians. , and not Russians, but Suvorov; so few Russians arrived that there was still a great advantage on the French side, but this difference was replenished by the presence by Suvorov. The genius of war appeared in him, the spirit of victory flew in. Leaping onto the dais, he scanned the battlefield with a long, attentive gaze. It was in such moments, when it came to his inimitable eye, that he was truly great. Two Cossack regiments, not having time to catch their breath, flew to the right, into the flank of Dombrovsky with the Poles, and dragoons were sent against his front; the other two Cossack regiments rushed under the command of Suvorov's nephew, Gorchakov, to threaten the right flank of the French. The French advance was delayed, and the Poles were completely confused. The success, of course, was minute, but in such cases, every minute is precious. The head of the Russian avant-garde appeared on the road ... "<...>The ability we are interested in ... the ability to quickly understand a difficult situation and almost instantly find the right solution is called differently. It is sometimes called intuition.<...>This concept, often conveyed in Russian translations by the words “faithful military eye or faithful military gaze,” is often found in the characteristics that Napoleon gave to military leaders.<...>This expression was often used by Suvorov: "You don't need methodism, but a correct military view."<...>The psychological nature of the commander's intuition is closely related to the high development of spatial concepts and spatial thinking. Instant understanding and decision in the act of intuition presupposes visualization of thinking. In military affairs, this visibility means, first of all, the mental gaze of all spatial relationships, the ability to see on some imaginary map, scheme, plan, and the like, all possible combinations of actions in their relation to all essential features of the terrain. An equally important role is played in the commander's intuition and sense of time. "In practice, this time plays a huge role: a minute has been missed, and the best measure can lead to disaster. War is a matter of tact and minute; often the loss of a minute is tantamount to the loss of a party." The time factor is always of paramount importance in a war. But sometimes his role is especially vivid, so that the choice of the moment becomes central, in the full sense of the word, decisive.<...>... A striking example is the Battle of Kinburn, where Suvorov showed a wonderful sense of time, firstly, in determining the moment of the first counterattack, made just when the Turks went on the assault, and secondly, in choosing the moment in order to throw into battle all the reserves that he kept intact until evening: their introduction into the matter decided the fate of the battle and led to the complete extermination of the Turkish detachment.<...>
Outstanding military education
It is not enough to say that a general must be an intelligent person. To this must be added: a commander must be a highly educated person: he must have excellent military training and an outstanding general education.<...>Indeed, outstanding commanders, those who can not hesitate to be classified as great, were not just people who "knew a lot": they usually stood at the highest levels of education of their time. Striking examples already gives the ancient world. Greatest generals antiquity were among the most cultured and educated people of their era. Alexander was a student (and not only nominally) of Aristotle, Hannibal was a highly educated person for that time, Caesar, finally, in terms of the breadth of knowledge and a brilliant culture of mind, stood in the forefront of the great people of the ancient world. Can this be understood as mere coincidences? To approach this issue a little deeper, let's take a closer look at the two largest commanders of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries: Suvorov and Napoleon. Suvorov considered the pursuit of science and constant concern for self-education as the primary duty of a military leader.<...>Once he received from Catherine II George the 3rd degree for the imposition, at his discretion, on a more worthy one. He chose Lieutenant Colonel Curtis. The laying on was performed in a very solemn atmosphere, while pronouncing the instruction. "At the end of this instruction, the last condition necessary for the general was given: continuous self-education through reading." Suvorov himself performed this instruction with extraordinary zeal, and, moreover, throughout his life. Here are some relevant excerpts from his biography. The period of soldier's service (17 - 23 years). She persistently works on her education at home and in the classrooms of the cadet corps. "The time that his associates spent with cards and wine, he spent reading books." "All his time, without the slightest exception, was spent on service, on attending classes in the cadet corps and on home scientific studies; he decidedly never went anywhere else." All the money that he managed to save through austerity, he used to buy books. The period of service as a lieutenant (23 - 25 years). "I took advantage of every free minute to continue my self-education." Period of long-term stay in the village in the mid-80s. (about 55 years old). "I read a lot and at one time even had a reader on the payroll. But this reading did not at all have the value of military special knowledge; he was attracted by knowledge in general, in the sense of broadening his mental horizons." Service in Byrlad in 1790 (59 years). "Most of Suvorov's free time was spent reading. He had one German student or candidate with whom he met several years ago and took him as a reader." "Suvorov was insatiable, forcing Philip Ivanovich to read a lot and for a long time and almost did not give him rest, bickering over every stop." "Everything was read on different languages: newspapers, magazines, military memoirs, statistics; got to read not only books, but also manuscripts. "Service in Finland in 1791 - 1792 (60 - 61 years)." Taking advantage of his little leisure, Suvorov was engaged in reading in Finland; he could not live without reading. We do not know if he had scientific works in his hands at that time, but he read a lot of newspapers, as is evident from his subscription for 1792. " Polish war 1794 (age 63). The tireless activity "did not prevent him from finding time to read, mainly in the evenings, for which he had several books in his luggage, including a commentary by Julius Caesar, his favorite hero." Exile in Konchansky (66 - 67 years old). "Accustomed to mental pursuits from a young age, Suvorov all the more could not do without them in his solitude. He read a lot, but less than he would like, because his eyes hurt. There was a library in Konchanskoye; he refilled it from time to time." In this respect, there was no difference between Suvorov and Napoleon; the latter was just as much engaged in his education, was an equally passionate reader.<...>It is difficult to say which areas of knowledge Napoleon and Suvorov were not interested in. Their education was literally encyclopedic. One can especially note Napoleon's interest in mathematics (he showed outstanding mathematical abilities from childhood), geography, history, in his youth - also philosophy ... Suvorov knew mathematics, geography, philosophy, and most of all history. Especially it is necessary to highlight the Russian commander's inclination and undoubted ability to learn languages. He knew the languages German, French, Italian, Polish, Finnish, Turkish, Arabic, Persian.<...>It is impossible not to note the features common to both Napoleon and Suvorov. Both of them were distinguished by extreme independence of mind, high criticality of thought. The following words, referring to Suvorov, may well be transferred to Napoleon: "Everything obtained by means of science was processed in him into something completely new, his own, which almost reached the denial of samples ... He was not a borrower anywhere and not in the less the imitator. " But both of them had an extremely valuable ability: they knew how to separate doctrine from criticism. Before criticizing, processing, denying, they knew how to assimilate. Here is a remark about Suvorov at the age of 17 - 23 years old we find in Petrushevsky: "His mind is inherent in the spirit of criticism, but he gave him free rein only later; now he studied - and there was no place for criticism." And here is what he writes about Napoleon Tarl: "In any case, the 16-year-old second lieutenant did not criticize so much as he studied. This is also a fundamental feature of his mind: in every book, as well as to every person, he approached in these early years of his life with a greedy and impatient desire to extract as soon as possible and as fully as possible what he does not yet know and which can give food to his own thoughts. "<...>Equally important is their inherent ability to rigorously and immediately systematize knowledge. "I believe Locke," says Suvorov, "that memory is the storeroom of the mind; but there are many partitions in this storeroom, and therefore everything must be put as soon as it should be." Napoleon said that various affairs and various objects are stacked in his head the same way they could be stacked in a chest of drawers. "When I want to interrupt my occupation with some business, I close his drawer and open another drawer of business; they do not mix, and one thing never bothers or bothers me while doing another." IN last words Napoleon notes not only the complete orderliness of his mental baggage, but also the extreme ease of using it ... A trait that is very important for the commander's mind.<...> A.M. Marchenko Suvorov in his manuscripts. - SP b., 1900. - S. 38. Clausewitz K About the war. - vol. 2. - M., 1941 .-- p. 295. Petrushevsky A.F. Generalissimo Prince Suvorov, in 3 volumes. Vol. 1. - SP b., 1884. - S. 530. Clausewitz K About the war. - vol. 1. - M., 1941 .-- p. 67 - 68. Tarle E.V. Napoleon's invasion of Russia. 1812 - M., 1938 .-- S. 144. In the same place. - S. 147. Dragomirov M.I. Fourteen years old. 1881 - 1894: Sat. original and translated articles. - SP b., 1895. - S.316. Geisman P.A. The fall of Poland and Suvorov. - In the book: Suvorov in the reports of professors of the Academy of the General Staff. - SP b., 1900. - P.109. THEMISTOCLES (c. 525 - c. 460 BC), Athenian commander, leader of a democratic group, in the period Greco-Persian Wars from 493/492 archon and strategist (repeatedly). He played a decisive role in organizing the all-Greek resistance forces. Achieved the transformation of Athens into a maritime power and the creation of the Delian Union. (Approx. Author-comp.) Plutarch. Selected biographies. - M. - L., 1941 .-- p. 65. MACHIAVELLI (Machiavelli) Niccolo (1469-1527), Italian political thinker, historian, author of the work "Sovereign", 1513, ed. 1532, etc. (Approx.aut.-comp.) Dragomirov M.I. Eleven years. 1895 - 1905: Sat. original and translated articles. In 2 volumes - volume 2. - SP b., 1909. - S.534. Petrushevsky A.F. Generalissimo Prince Suvorov. - SP b., 1900. - P.237. In the same place. - S. 580. In the same place. - P.752. Typical for him are the words spoken at Novi: "Moro understands me, the old man, and I am glad that I am dealing with a clever military leader" - KN Osipov Suvorov. - M., 1958 .-- p. 296. Clausewitz K. About the war. - vol. 1. - SP b., 1941. - p.109. Petrushevsky A.F. Generalissimo Prince Suvorov. - SP b., 1900. - S. 520. CAESAR (Caesar) Guy Julius (102 or 100-44 BC), Roman dictator in 49, 48-46, 45, from 44 - for life. General. Began watered. activity as a supporter of the rep. group, occupying the posts of a military tribune in 73, aedil in 65, praetor in 62, seeking a consulate, in 60 entered into an alliance with G. Pompey and Crassus (1st triumvirate). Consul in 59, then governor of Gaul; in 58-51 subjugated to Rome the entire trans-Alpine Gaul. In 49, relying on the army, he began the struggle for autocracy. Having defeated Pompey and his supporters in 49-45. (Crassus died in 53), ended up at the head of state. Having concentrated in his hands a number of the most important republican posts (dictator, consul, etc.), he actually became a monarch. Killed by a Republican conspiracy. Author of "Notes on the Gallic War" and "Notes on Civil Wars"; carried out a reform of the calendar (Julian calendar). (Approx. Author-comp.) Mikhnevich N.P. Suvorov is a strategist. - In the book: Suvorov in the reports of professors of the Academy of the General Staff. - SP b., 1900. - P.7. RIMNIK (Rimnic), p. in Romania, a tributary of the river. Siret (Seret). During Russian-Turkish war 1787-1791 at Rymnik, Russian and Austrian troops under command. A.V. Suvorov 11.9.1789 defeated the Turkish army, for which Suvorov received the title of Count of Rymnik. (Approx. Author-comp.) Osipov K.N. Suvorov. - M., 138. - S. 144. Petrushevsky A.F. Generalissimo Prince Suvorov. In 3 volumes.Vol. 1. - SP b., 1884. - S. 213. FOKSHANI, a city in Romania, in the area of which 21.7 (1.8). 1789 Russian-Austrian troops (over 17 thousand people) during the Russian-Turkish war of 1787 - 1791. defeated the Turkish troops of Osman Pasha (30 thousand people). The victory was achieved thanks to the skillful and decisive actions of A.V. Suvorov, who actually led the allied forces in the battle.(Approx. Author-comp.) Osipov K.N. Suvorov. - M., 138. - S. 142. TREBBIA (Trebbia), p. in Northern Italy. right tributary of the river By. 17 - 19.6.1799 Russian-Austrian troops led by A.V. During the Italian campaign, Suvorov defeated the French troops of General J. MacDonald at Trebbia. (Approx. Author-comp.) Petrushevsky A.F. Generalissimo Prince Suvorov. In 3 volumes - Vol. 1. - SP b., 1884. - S. 581 - 582. Mikhnevich N.P. Suvorov is a strategist. - In the book: Suvorov in the reports of professors of the Academy of the General Staff. - SP b., 1900. - S. 5. Dragomirov M.I. Eleven years. 1895 - 1905: Sat. original and translated articles. In 2 volumes - volume 2. - SP b., 1909. - P.445 - 446. KINBURN, a fortress on the Kinburn Spit (between the Dnieper and Yagorlytsky estuaries of the Black Sea). During the Russian-Turkish war of 1787-1791. the Turkish fleet landed a landing (5 thousand people), which were defeated by the troops of A.V. Suvorov (about 4 thousand people). ALEXANDER OF MACEDONA (356-323 BC), king of Macedonia since 336 AD The son of King Philip II, was brought up by Aristotle. Having defeated the Persians at Granicus (334), Issus (333), Gavgamelah (331), he subdued the kingdom of the Achaemenids, invaded Cf. Asia (329), conquered lands up to the river. Indus, creating the world's largest monarchy of antiquity. (Approx. Author-comp.) HANNIBAL (247 or 246-183 BC), Carthaginian general. Son of Hamilcar Barka. During the 2nd Punich. war (218-201) crossed the Alps, won victories at the river. Titinus, Trebbia (218), at Lake Trasimene (217), at Cannes (216). In 202 under Zama (North Africa) Hannibal was defeated by the Romans. (Approx. Author-comp.) Petrushevsky A.F. Generalissimo Prince Suvorov. - SP b., 1900. - P.299. Osipov K.N. Suvorov. - M, 1938. - P.21. Petrushevsky A.F. Generalissimo Prince Suvorov. In 3 volumes - Vol. 1. - SP b., 1884. - S. 5. Osipov K.N. Suvorov. - M, 1938. - P.25. Petrushevsky A.F. Generalissimo Prince Suvorov. - SP b., 1900. - P.267. BYRLAD, a city in Eastern Romania. Petrushevsky A.F. Generalissimo Prince Suvorov. In 3 volumes.Vol. 1. - SP b., 1884. - P.372 - 373. Petrushevsky A.F. Generalissimo Prince Suvorov. - SP b., 1900. - P.278. In the same place. - P.318. In the same place. - S.501. In the same place. - P.748. In the same place. - P.6. TARLEE Evgeny Viktorovich (1874-1955), historian, author of works: "Napoleon", "Talleyrand", "Napoleon's invasion of Russia", " Crimean War"(v. 1-2), etc. (Approx. author-comp.) Tarle E.V. Napoleon. - M., 1941 .-- p. 11. Osipov K.N. Suvorov. - M., 1938 .-- p. 25.
Warlord's mind
The features of the commander's mental work are such that he cannot plan in advance all his actions in detail. The commander is forced to quickly understand a difficult situation and instantly find the right solution. This decision is sometimes attributed to intuition or inspiration. For example, the German military theorist General Clausewitz bluntly stated that in war, thinking recedes into the background, and intuition prevails, which is nothing more than art.
But this is not entirely true, and Napoleon expressed the true state of affairs best of all when he said: “Inspiration? This is a quick calculation. " The entire military career of Napoleon confirms his words. He has a work "Remarks on the Military Operations of the Campaigns of 1796 and 1797 in Italy", which is very reminiscent of a collection of analyzes of chess games. The Soviet psychologist BM Teplov writes about her: “This work shows very consistently that the enemy's commanders allowed whole line major mistakes ... and that they were defeated precisely because of, and not because of some mysterious genius of Napoleon. Napoleon, on the other hand, won because he calculated better, thought better, and these calculations and considerations are very easy to explain to any sane person, which is what is done on the pages of the Notes. While objecting in some cases to attacks on the incorrectness of his own actions, Napoleon in other cases completely openly admits his mistakes and shows that it would be better to do otherwise. He does this, of course, not out of modesty, which is absolutely not characteristic of him, but because the correctness of a decision is for him a matter of rational calculation and knowledge, that is, an unconditionally provable thing. You can make a mistake in the haste of military action, but it is foolish to insist on a mistake later, when any reasonable person can check the calculations and prove the truth. "
Of course, Napoleon simplified the matter somewhat. He reduced to discursive reasoning what was not reasoning on the battlefield, but a kind of fusion of verbal and figurative thinking. But the very possibility of such information is very characteristic: it shows that the mind of a commander ultimately goes back to ordinary speech thinking and his actions can be quite accurately expressed with the help of language.
Intuition is not an unexpected "enlightenment": he sat down and suddenly decided: "In the morning I will move the army" there, not here. The same Napoleon said: “If it seems that I am always prepared for everything, then this is explained by the fact that before I did anything, I thought for a long time before ... I always work, I work during lunch, I work when I'm in the theater; I wake up at night to work. " And it is no coincidence that the great commanders were, as a rule, cultured and educated people. Alexander the Great is a student of the philosopher Aristotle, Julius Caesar is a prominent historian, writer, orator, even a linguist. From childhood, Napoleon showed outstanding abilities in mathematics, geography, history, philosophy. He “read avidly, with unheard-of greed, streaking his notebooks with notes and synopses,” writes the Soviet historian E. V. Tarle about him; being in Paris, Napoleon studied at every opportunity. Cornel, Racine, Moliere - his handbooks, he knew and loved poetry and literature in general. Suvorov perfectly knew mathematics, geography, philosophy, history, especially the latter. Most of his free time was spent reading. He knew many languages: German, French, Italian, Polish, Finnish, Turkish, Arabic, Persian, wrote poetry and even printed them.
So, the mind of a commander - although his thinking is mainly visual and effective - is formed primarily through the development of theoretical intelligence. The intuition of Suvorov or Napoleon is rooted deeply in linguistic, verbal thinking. This applies not only to the general, but also to any other intuition. We will return to this question later, but now we will mention only one component of intuition - practical experience.
B. M. Teplov MIND OF THE COMMANDER // Teplov. B.M. Problems of individual differences. M., 1965The activity of a commander makes extremely high demands on the mind. Clausewitz was absolutely right when he wrote: “At the highest post of commander-in-chief, mental activity is one of the most difficult that only falls to the lot of the human mind” (Clausewitz, 1941).
At the same time, the mind of a commander is one of the most characteristic examples of a practical mind, in which the peculiar features of the latter appear with extreme brightness. The study of the mental work of a commander is therefore not only of practical interest, but also of great importance from the point of view of constructing the psychology of thinking. In this work, an attempt is made to outline the first, tentative steps of this study.
It is customary to think that a commander is required to have two qualities - an outstanding mind and a strong will (moreover, the word "will" means a very complex set of properties: strength of character, courage, decisiveness, energy, perseverance, etc.). This idea is completely indisputable.
Napoleon at one time introduced a new important shade into it: it is not only that the commander must have both intelligence and will, but that there must be a balance between them, that they must be equal. "A military man should have as much character as he has intelligence." If the will greatly exceeds the mind, the commander will act decisively and courageously, but little wisely; otherwise, he will have good ideas and plans, but he will not have the courage and determination to implement them.
There is one very common misconception here. The function of the mind is to invent plans, the function of the will is to execute them. This is not true. The fulfillment of plans requires intelligence as much as will. On the other hand, in the activities of a commander, conceiving a plan is usually inseparable from its execution. This is one of the most important features of the commander's intellectual work.
The usual understanding of the problem of "the mind and will of the commander" is based on one extremely important mistake. Mind and will are seen as two different abilities, as two - to use the favorite expression of the ancient Greeks - "parts of the soul." It is assumed - and this is most important for the theme of my work - that one can have a good and even outstanding mind of a commander, without having, however, the corresponding volitional qualities: decisiveness, courage, firmness, etc.
Aristotle was the first to propose the division of all psychic abilities into two classes: cognitive abilities and driving abilities (abilities of feeling, desire and action). The opposition of mind and will originates from it. But having very firmly assimilated this Aristotelian division, psychology, as I said, passed by one of the most important concepts of the Aristotelian doctrine of the soul, the concept that destroys the possibility of a gap between mind and will, moreover, a concept in which the true unity of will and mind. I mean the already familiar concept of "practical mind".
Asking the question of what is the engine of volitional action, Aristotle comes to the conclusion that neither the desire in itself, nor the mind in itself, can be such. The real engine of volitional action is "mind and striving" or "intelligent striving." The practical mind is "the ability for activities aimed at the human good and carried out on the basis of reason" (Aristotle, 1884).
It is interesting to note that, continuing further the analysis of volitional action, Aristotle puts forward one more concept, higher, so to speak, than the concept of will. He designates it with a word that in Russian can be translated by the words "decision" or "intention".
Aristotle defines the decision as "a balanced (or deliberate) striving for what is in our power", or even shorter, as "Aspiring mind".
WITH point of view of the question of interest to us, we can say: for Aristotle practical reason is at the same time mind,and will; its originality lies precisely in the unity of mind and will.
The commander's mind is one of the specific forms of "practical mind" in the Aristotelian sense of the term; it cannot be understood as some kind of pure intellect, it is the unity of intellectual and volitional moments.
When they say that any military leader has an outstanding mind, but lacks such strong-willed qualities as determination or "moral courage", it means that his mind is not the one that the commander needs. The true "mind of a commander" cannot be in a weak-willed, timid and weak-willed person.
"The element in which military activity takes place is a danger" (Clausewitz). In this "element of danger" the commander's mind works, and psychological analysis cannot ignore this circumstance.
It is generally accepted that in a state of serious danger, where there is a reason for the emergence of fear, the quality and productivity of mental work decreases. But with any great commander, the situation is exactly the opposite: the danger not only does not reduce, but, on the contrary, sharpens the work of the mind.
Clausewitz wrote: "Danger and responsibility do not increase the freedom and activity of the spirit in a normal person, but, on the contrary, have a depressing effect on him, and therefore, if these experiences inspire and sharpen the ability to judge, then undoubtedly we are dealing with a rare greatness of the spirit."
An increase in all psychic powers and an exacerbation of mental activity in an atmosphere of danger is a feature that distinguishes all good generals, although it can manifest itself in very different ways.
There are generals with a relatively even and unchanging mental performance: their mind gives the impression of always working at full load. Such are, for example, Peter the Great or Napoleon, but this "evenness", of course, is only relative, and in them the aggravation of the danger causes an increase in mental activity. “Napoleon, as the dangers grew, became more energetic,” notes Tarle (1941).
Other generals are characterized by a feature that can be called a kind of "economy of psychic forces." They know how in acute moments to carry out the maximum mobilization of all their capabilities, but in normal times they seem indifferent, sluggish and inactive. True, at this time they can develop a large preparatory work, but it has a deeply hidden, subsoil character. Such was Kutuzov, who in quiet moments gave the impression of being lazy and carefree. But especially indicative for us in this regard are those military leaders who only in an atmosphere of danger, only in a battle situation could reveal their military talent and the strength of their military mind. Such, apparently, was Condé, who "liked to try to accomplish impossible undertakings," "but in the presence of an adversary he found such wonderful thoughts that in the end everything was inferior to him." Such was Marshal Ney, about whom Napoleon wrote: “Ney had mental enlightenments only among the nuclei, in the thunder of battle, there his eye, his composure and energy were incomparable, but he did not know how well to prepare his operations in the quiet of his office, studying the map ".
Such persons, of course, are not first-class generals; they are not suitable for independent decision large operational tasks, but it is hardly possible to see some innate property in their limitations. Apparently, here the matter is about the lack of sufficient knowledge and, most importantly, about the lack of the necessary culture of mind. There is no doubt, however, that these individuals are extremely clearly expressed one of the most important aspects of military talent - the ability to maximize the productivity of the mind in conditions of maximum danger.
In military affairs, the concreteness of thinking- a prerequisite for success. A true military genius is always the “genius of the whole” and the “genius of details”.
At the heart of the solution of any task facing a commander is an analysis of the situation. Until the situation is clarified, one cannot speak of foresight or planning. Information about the situation is the data on the basis of which any strategic, operational or tactical task should be solved.
But is it possible to point to another branch of human activity, where the data from which the planning and decision-making mind proceeds would be as complex, diverse and difficult to see as data on the situation in war? I have not yet touched upon either the small reliability of these data, or their constant variability. I only mean great amount them, the complexity of their relationship, mutual contradiction and, finally, just the diversity of their content. Information about the enemy, obtained from various sources and concerning the most diverse aspects of the state of his army, his actions and intentions, the most diverse data about his forces, data about the terrain, in relation to which sometimes one inconspicuous detail can be of decisive importance - in all this and the analyzing mind of the commander still has to sort out a lot before making a decision.
Thus, the first feature of the commander's intellectual work is a colossal the complexity of the material to beanalysis.
The second, no less characteristic feature of it is simplicity, accuratespine, certainty products of this work, i.e. those plans, combinations, solutions, to which the commander comes. The simpler and more definite the plan of an operation or battle, the better, all other things being equal.
So, for the intellectual work of a commander, the following are typical: the extreme complexity of the source material and the great simplicity and clarity of the final result. First - the analysis of complex material, in the end - synthesis, giving simple and definite additions. Turning Complexity Into Simple- this short formula can indicate one of the most important aspects in the work of the commander's mind.
Successful resolution of that task in the most difficult conditions of war , which I conditionally called "the transformation of the complex into the simple", presupposes the high development of a number of mental qualities. It presupposes, first of all, a very strong ability to analiza, making it possible to understand the most confusing data, pay attention to smallest details, to single out from them those that remain unnoticed for a more superficial glance, but can, under the given conditions, be of decisive importance.
It further presupposes skill see at once the whole and alldetails. In other words, it presupposes a powerful synthetic power of the mind (to cover the whole with one glance), connected, however, with the concreteness of thinking. What is required here is a synthesis that is not carried out with the help of far-reaching abstraction - the synthesis that can be seen in many scientists, especially clearly in mathematicians and philosophers - but a concrete synthesis that sees the whole in the variety of details. In this respect, the mind of a commander has much in common with the mind of an artist. “My genius was, - wrote Napoleon without modesty unusual for him, - that at one quick glance I covered all the difficulties of the case, but at the same time all the resources to overcome these difficulties; it owes my superiority over others. "
In psychology, the classification of minds into analytical and synthetic is widely used.
Great generals are always characterized by a balance between analysis and synthesis.
What is the psychological nature of this "equilibrium"?
Synthesis not only follows analysis, but also precedes it. The analysis characteristic of great commanders is always an analysis from some point of view, an analysis in the light of some ideas and combinations. At the same time, however - here we touch on an extremely important point - the greatest flexibility and freedom of mind is required. The mind of a general should never be constrained in advance and bound by these preliminary points of view. The commander must have a sufficient supply of possible plans and combinations and be able to quickly change them or choose between them. A person who is inclined to turn the work of analysis into confirmation of an idea he has previously accepted, a person dominated by preconceived points of view, can never be a good leader.
Drawing up plans for the war as a whole, individual operations, each upcoming battle is the most important component in the work of commanders and their staffs. But military planning is a special kind of planning. Here the exceptional difficulties with which the intellectual work of a military leader is connected appear with extraordinary vividness.
"The interaction taking place (in war) by its very nature opposes all planning," wrote Clausewitz. And as if to confirm this idea, Napoleon says about himself that he "never had plans of operations." However, this is said by the same Napoleon who constantly emphasized that any war must be "methodical." But is it possible to wage a war "methodically" without plans?
In fact, the work of a general is constant and continuous planning, although the "nature of war" is just as constantly and continuously opposed to this planning.
First of all, military planning requires great abstinence from the commander. He must refrain from planning too much in detail.
But from this, of course, one cannot conclude that the less detailed the plan, the better it is. If this were the case, then the commander's task would be very simple. In fact, an ideal plan defines everything that can be defined, and the more it defines, the better it is, in principle. But if the plan determines what in the given conditions cannot be responsibly foreseen, then it may turn out to be not only bad, but even harmful.
A famous example of an overly detailed plan is Weyrother's plan for the battle of Austerlitz. "The disposition compiled by Weyrother in Battle of Austerlitz, - writes L.N. Tolstoy, - was a model of perfection in the works of this kind, but she was nevertheless condemned for her perfection, for too much detail. " But the trouble is not that people condemned her, but that life itself condemned her, that she could not stand the test of practice. And she was condemned not for the very fact of its details, but for the fact that the author made it in more detail than he had grounds for.
Suvorov's disposition for the assault on Izmail was even more detailed: it “indicated everything essential, from the composition of the columns to the number of cars and the length of the stairs; the number of shooters at the column, their place and purpose, as well as workers, were determined; assigned private and general reserves, their places and conditions of use; taught the rules of caution inside the fortress; the directions of the columns, the limit of their distribution along the fortress fence, etc. are indicated with accuracy. " (Petrushevsky, 1900). And this extremely detailed disposition has stood the test brilliantly. Weyrother's tragedy consisted, firstly, in the fact that he did not foresee well, and secondly, and this is perhaps especially important, in the fact that he did not correlate his planning with his powers of foresight.
The same objections that are made against plans that are too detailed are also made against plans that look too far ahead. This applies to both tactics and strategy.
“Only the beginning of the battle can be really fully established by the plan: its course requires new instructions and orders arising from the situation, ie. driving "(Clausewitz).
When Suvorov, while he was in Vienna, came four members of the Gofkrigsrat with a prepared campaign plan to the Adda River, asking Suvorov to correct or change the project in the name of the emperor in what he deems necessary. Suvorov crossed out the note with a cross and wrote at the bottom that he would start the campaign by crossing the Adda, but would end it “wherever God pleases” (Petrushevsky, 1900).
It is extremely instructive to get to know more closely the manner of planning of Napoleon, who more than anyone else demanded "methodical" in the work of a commander and himself belonged to the generals of a "rationalistic" warehouse.
Tarle describes the Napoleonic style of planning in the following way: “Napoleon usually did not work out detailed plans for the campaign in advance. He outlined only the main "objectives", the main specific goals, the chronological (approximate, of course) sequence, which must be followed in this case, the paths that will have to move. Military concern covered and absorbed him entirely only in the campaign itself, when daily, and sometimes hourly, he changed his dispositions, in accordance not only with his intended goals, but also with the situation, in particular with the continuously received news about the movements of the enemy "(Tarle, 1941).
What made it possible for Napoleon to do without preliminary elaboration of detailed plans?
First, it skill with phenomenal ease to compose plans. The power of imagination, combinatorial abilities, and finally, just creative energy were exceptionally great in him. And, besides, he developed these traits in himself by continuous exercise to the level of the greatest skill.
Secondly, it is not entirely accurate to say that Napoleon, undertaking an operation or even preparing for it, did not have any detailed plan at all. He did not have one plan, but he had several possible plans. And the moment of "creating a plan" was often, in essence, only the moment of choosing the best of the possible plans that he saw.
Thirdly, Napoleon spent a lot of energy and time on withselection of those specific data that should serve as a materialriyal when developing a plan. He strove to have an exhaustive knowledge of the enemy army and the country in which he was to wage a war, to give battle.
Thanks to all these qualities, Napoleon received very valuable advantages over most of his opponents, who in advance bound themselves with a certain plan of action.
From this point of view, perhaps the most instructive Regensburg operation of 1809 with its remarkable maneuvers at Abensberg and Eckmühl, which the commander himself considered "his best maneuver." “Napoleon's plan,” writes Levitsky, “outlined the concentration of the army on the Upper Danube up to the river. Lech. Further actions Napoleon put in dependence onsetting "(Levitsky, 1933).
It is very interesting to compare the behavior of Marshal Berthier, who was in charge of the main command until the arrival of Napoleon to the army, with the behavior of Napoleon after his arrival in Stuttgart. Berthier painfully tries to accept any plan of action, begins all sorts of movements and maneuvers. Napoleon immediately stops all this fuss and, like a predator before a jump, freezes in anticipation of the moment when he will receive sufficient data about the intentions and actions of the enemy; only then does he draw up a plan and immediately begin to carry it out.
We started with the statement: the activity of a commander makes very high demands on the mind. In the future, we made an attempt to prove, develop and concretize this position. Now, summing up, we must add some clarification to it: for a commander, it is not enough natural strength mind; he needs large stock knowledge, as well as a high versatile culture of thought.
The ability to cover all aspects of the issue at once, quickly analyze material of extreme complexity, systematize it, highlight the essential, outline an action plan and, if necessary, instantly change it - all this, even for the very talented person impossible without a very thorough intellectual preparation.
Napoleon was no less right when, of all the “gifts that nature endowed him with,” he especially emphasized his exceptional capacity for work. “Work is my element,” he said proudly, “I was born and made for work. I know the limits of my legs, I know the limits for my eyes; I have never been able to recognize such boundaries for my work. "
LITERATURE
Aristotle. Nicomachean ethics. Per. E. Radlov. SPb., 1884.
Clausewitz. On the war, vol. I. Ed. 5th. M., 1941; vol. II. Ed. 3rd. M., 1941.
Levitsky N.A. The military leadership of Napoleon. M., 1933.
Petrushevsky A. Generalissimo Prince Suvorov. Ed. 2nd, SPb., 1900.
It is not enough to say that a general must be an intelligent person. To this must be added: a commander must be a highly educated person: he must have excellent military training and an outstanding general education.
http://artofwar.ru/k/kamenew_anatolij_iwanowich/rawnowesieumaiwoli.shtml
Nejasno kak s bezgrammotnim Thengiz-Khanom ... On wiigral bolsche chem kto-libo iz ykazannix polkowzew w dannoj stat "e B.M. Teplova
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B.M. Teplov iskluchil iz swoego rassmotrenija Attilu, Timura, Thengiz-Khana i w swoix ocenkax baziruetsja na razionalizme Aristotelja (ychitel "Alexandra Makedonskogo)
Ychenie Aristotelja ispolzowal Foma Akwinskij -integrirowal 5 "dokazatelstw" suschestwowanija boga w bibliju .Pri pomoschi razionalnnogo
dat "dokazatelstwo suschestwowanija irrazionalnnogo ponjatija kak religija -nabor zabluzdenij
Aristotel "awtor postulata -" ... Rabi dolzni bit "". W razlichnix versijax ego ychenie zaimstwowanno Kantom, Lokkom, Montesk "e, Spinozoj
i drugimi
Sootwestwenno mozno predpolozit "zelanie Teplova w toj ili inoj forme implementirowat" rabskoe wospriajtie realnnosti swoim chitateljam
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I grubo tendecioznoe rassmotrenie welikix polkowdzew, iskljuchiw iz ix spiska polkowodzew Azii -Attilu, Thengiz-Khana, Timura
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"... Eti kompanii (asiatskix polkowodzew" welis "po wsem prawilam woennogo iskusstwa ..." -Napoleon
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Bezgrammotnij Thengiz-Khan pokazal wischij resultat iz 50-100 mlrd ljudej ziwschix za wsju istoriju chelowechestwa.
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Antichnaja filosofija eto ne tolko Aristotel ", i ne on bil perwij filosof no i ..
Thales, Sokrat, Platon, Zeno, Gorgias, Protagor, Critij, Diogen, Demokrit, Epicurus, Confuzij i drugie ...
Http://www.abcgallery.com/R/raphael/raphael30.html
Http://www.abcgallery.com/P/poussin/poussin65.html
Today I offer the reader extracts from the article "The Mind of a Commander" by Boris Mikhailovich Teplov (1896-1965), the largest researcher of individual differences in domestic and world science, a scientist who had enormous erudition in various fields: history and philosophy, art and literature, organ physiology feelings and higher nervous activity.
The Great Patriotic War forced us to study the phenomenon of a commander and try to answer the question of how a commander, in conditions of combat activity, makes decisions about what qualities a war requires of him.
Conclusions and assessments of B.M. Teplova are of great theoretical and practical importance. On their basis, we can understand what should be paid attention to when training officers, as well as what should be taken into account when deciding personnel issues.
B. TEPLOV
Warlord's mind
It is customary to think that a commander is required to have two qualities - an outstanding mind and a strong will (moreover, the word "will" means a very complex set of properties: strength of character, courage, decisiveness, energy, perseverance, etc.). This idea is completely indisputable. Napoleon introduced a new important shade to it: the point is not only that the commander must have both intelligence and will, but also that there must be a balance between them, that they must be equal: "A military man must have the same character , how much and mind. " He compared the gifts of a real commander with a square, in which the basis is will, the height is the mind. A square will be a square only if the base is equal to the height; a great commander can only be a person whose will and mind are equal. If the will greatly exceeds the mind, the commander will act decisively and courageously, but little wisely; otherwise, he will have good ideas and plans, but he will not have the courage and determination to implement them.
Napoleon's "square formula" was a great success: it is cited constantly. At the same time, they often go further and raise this kind of question. Since "balance in nature is rare", in most cases you will have to put up with the fact that the talent of the commander will turn out to be not a square, but a rectangle, you will have to put up with the fact that the balance, which is the ideal, will be violated. What should be recognized as more desirable: an imbalance in the direction of the will or in the direction of the mind? Which is better: a commander with a predominance of will or with a predominance of mind?
I have not come across cases in the literature when this question would be decided in favor of the mind. Usually the question itself is posed in order to develop the doctrine of the primacy of the will in the activities of a commander. The point of view of M.I. Dragomirova. In his opinion, "of all human deeds, war is to a large extent more volitional than mental." “No matter how ingenious the plan may be, it can be completely spoiled by execution, and execution lies in the will, if not exclusively, then to an incomparably greater extent than in the mind. The most incredible feats were accomplished almost by will alone: an example is the transition of Suvorov across the Alps in 1799 " ...
Without giving a general assessment of this point of view, I will point out in passing that there is a very widespread misconception here. The function of the mind is to invent plans, the function of the will is to execute them. This is not true. On the one hand, the execution of a plan requires no less intelligence than will, and on the other hand, in the activities of a commander, conceiving a plan is usually inseparable from its execution. This is one of the most important features of the commander's intellectual work.
Practical mind
Asking the question of what is the engine of volitional action, Aristotle comes to the conclusion that such cannot be a striving by itself ("after all, those who control themselves, although they may have a striving and desire for something, do not perform actions under the influence of striving, but follow the prescriptions of the mind "), nor the mind itself (" after all, the theoretical mind does not think anything related to action, and does not say what should be avoided and what should be coveted "). The real engine of volitional action is "mind and striving," or "intelligent striving." "The mind does not set in motion without striving," but "both faculties - mind and striving - condition the movement." It is this unity of mind and striving that Aristotle calls will, on the one hand, and practical mind, on the other.
The commander's mind is one of the concrete forms of the practical mind in the Aristotelian sense of the term; it cannot be understood as some pure intellect; he is the unity of intellectual and volitional moments.
When they say that any military leader has an outstanding mind, but lacks such volitional qualities as determination or moral courage, this means that his mind is not the one that the general needs. The true mind of a commander cannot be in a weak-willed, timid and weak-willed person.
The rare greatness of the spirit
"The element in which military activity is taking place is a danger." "Combat gives rise to the element of danger, in which all types of military activity are and move like fish in water, like birds in the air." In the "element of danger" the commander's mind works, and psychological analysis cannot ignore this circumstance.
It is generally accepted that in a state of serious danger, where there is a reason for the emergence of fear, the quality and productivity of mental work decreases. The same Clausewitz wrote: "It is in human nature that the immediate feeling of great danger to oneself and to others is a hindrance to pure reason." But Clausewitz understood the nature of war well enough not to know that this kind of mental decline in a dangerous situation is by no means inevitable. He knew that with every good warrior, and even more so with every great commander, the situation is exactly the opposite: the danger not only does not reduce, but, on the contrary, sharpens the work of the mind. "Danger and responsibility do not increase the freedom and activity of the spirit in a normal person, but, on the contrary, have a depressing effect on him, and therefore if these experiences inspire and sharpen the ability to judge, then, undoubtedly, we are dealing with a rare greatness of the spirit."
Where Clausewitz is indisputably right, it is that such behavior testifies to the greatness of the spirit. Without such greatness of spirit, there can be no great commander. Clausewitz is also right when he directly connects that "state" which is "called military talent" with the ability to remain faithful to judgments in the most dangerous and difficult circumstances. Without this ability, no military talent is conceivable.
An increase in all psychic powers and an exacerbation of mental activity in an atmosphere of danger is a feature that distinguishes all good generals ...
To solve in the shortest possible time those extremely difficult tasks that appear before the commander in the decisive moments of the operation, it is not enough to preserve the normal powers of the mind. What is needed is that "inspiration and sharpening of the capacity for judgment," which Clausewitz marveled at as a manifestation of the "rare greatness of the spirit."
"Admiration is worthy of hitting the spot ..."
In science, sometimes a solution can be of high value, which is incorrect as a whole, but which gives a deep, original and correct coverage of certain aspects of the issue. This cannot be so in the work of the practical mind. There is no reason to call the commander's work of genius, incorrect in general, i.e. in their final results. A commander's decisions leading an army to defeat would be a bad decision, even if it contained deep, original and correct ideas and combinations. The military leader always faces the question as a whole, and it is not only about individual, albeit wonderful, ideas, but about the ability to cover the whole issue and find solutions that are the best in all respects.
Clausewitz touched upon one of the most important features of the commander's mind when he wrote that in war "the influence of genius is reflected not so much in the newly found design of the action, which immediately catches the eye, as in the happy outcome of the whole enterprise. It is precisely getting to the point of silently made assumptions that is worthy of admiration and silent harmony in the entire course of the business, which is revealed only in the ultimate overall success. "
The genius of the whole and the genius of the details
In military affairs, concreteness of thinking is a necessary condition for success. A true military genius is always the genius of the whole and the genius of details.
One of the distinctive abilities of Peter the Great was, according to the characteristics of M.M. Bogoslovsky, the ability "with increased attention to one major matter ... remember with great accuracy and take care of various trifles."
Furious and passionate Suvorov knew how to take care of the most prosaic "trifles" with no less thoroughness and painstaking care. Proof of this is his numerous orders, orders not only bearing his signature, but also those composed and written by him. Here is an excerpt from one of his orders from 1793, the very syllable of which betrays its great author: “The preciousness of observing health in natural rules: 1) drink, kvass; for him there are double dishes so that there is no young and acidic. If water, then healthy and somewhat seasoned; 2) food; well-worn cauldrons; healthy supplies, baked bread; cooked food, not overcooked, not standing, not warmed up, hot and for those who are not ripe for porridge, it is deprived of it ... this time there is air! " ...
Turning the Complex Into Simple ...
At the heart of the solution of any task facing a commander is an analysis of the situation. Until the situation is clarified, one cannot speak of foresight or planning. Information about the situation is the data on the basis of which any strategic, operational or tactical task should be solved.
But is it possible to point to another branch of human activity, where the data from which the planning and decision-making mind proceeds would be as complex, diverse and difficult to visualize as data on the situation in war?
Information about the enemy obtained from a wide variety of sources and concerning the most diverse aspects of the state of his army, his actions and intentions, the most imaginative data about his forces, data about the terrain, in relation to which sometimes one inconspicuous detail can be of decisive importance - in all this and in many other things, the analyzing mind of the commander must sort out before making a decision.
Thus, the first feature of the commander's intellectual work is the colossal complexity of the material to be analyzed.
The second, no less characteristic feature of it is simplicity, clarity, and certainty of the products of this work, i.e. those plans, combinations, decisions to which the commander comes. The simpler and more definite the plan of an operation or battle, the better it is, other things being equal. This idea was repeatedly expressed and argued by Clausewitz: "Simplicity of ideas ... is the root of good warfare."
The largest generals possessed this quality to the greatest extent. In the characteristics of Suvorov's military leadership, this side is always noted as one of the most important: "The simplicity of Suvorov's considerations was remarkable, and simplicity of execution corresponded to it."
So, for the intellectual work of a commander, the extreme complexity of the source material and the great simplicity and clarity of the final result are typical. In the beginning - the analysis of complex material, in the end - the synthesis, which gives simple and definite provisions. The transformation of the complex into the simple - this short formula can indicate one of the most important aspects in the work of the commander's mind.
The ability to find and highlight the essential and the constant systematization of material are the most important conditions that ensure that the unity of analysis and synthesis, then the balance between these aspects of mental activity, which distinguish the work of the mind of a good commander.
The ability to dare
The activity of a commander is impossible without risk and daring. This leads us to one of the most important qualities of the commander's mind, for which very different expressions are used: the ability to take risks, the courage of thought, the courage of the mind ... finally, decisiveness ...
Clausewitz understood the psychological nature of decisiveness as follows. Decisiveness, on the one hand, is "the ability ... to remove the pangs of doubt and the danger of hesitation." It can take place only when it is necessary to act in the absence of sufficient data: "In those cases when a person has sufficient data ... there is no reason to speak of decisiveness, because decisiveness presupposes doubts that are not here." On the other hand, decisive in the sense that is meant, "cannot be people with a limited mind." Such people can act in difficult situations without hesitation, not because they are able to overcome doubts, but because they have no doubts and do not arise, since they cannot assess the degree of reliability and completeness of the available data. Such people cannot be said to act decisively; it can be said of them that they act thoughtlessly. A prerequisite for decisiveness is great intelligence (discernment) and courage. But decisiveness cannot be reduced to them. There are people who have a very perceptive mind and unconditional courage, but their "courage and discernment stand apart, not holding out their hands to each other, and therefore do not produce the third quality - decisiveness."
The courage that underlies determination is distinct from courage in dealing with personal danger.
Suvorov was firmly convinced that the courage of reason that is required of a military leader is a much rarer quality and a much more difficult matter than mere personal courage.
An example is Kutuzov's leaving Moscow without a fight, contrary to the opinion of the vast majority of Russian military leaders, contrary to the requirements of the tsar and all ruling spheres of St. Petersburg, moreover, contrary to the voice of the majority of the army and the people.
Of course, Tolstoy is right when he writes: "... He was horrified at the thought of the order he should have given." He understood that he was getting "into the position of the plague, in which Barclay was before Tsarev-Zaymishche." His authority in the army could not but shake temporarily after the abandonment of Moscow. “On the way out of Moscow,” writes one of the eyewitnesses, “the Highness Prince ordered his droshky to be turned towards the city and, leaning his head on his hand ... looked ... at the capital and at the troops passing by him with downcast eyes; they the first time they saw him, they did not shout hurray. " The immortal greatness of Kutuzov lies in the fact that he was not afraid of the terrible severity of the responsibility he had assumed and did what he considered the only right thing in his conscience.
Sharp audacity
There is a mentality that combines the greatest caution and criticality of thought with its utmost courage. This is the ability to take great risks, which, in the words of Dragomirov, is the result of "great understanding." Great commanders can only be those who have these opposite properties - caution and courage of thought, create a new quality that would most naturally be called a strange-sounding expression: cautious courage. It is impossible to understand the matter so that here we are talking about some kind of golden mean, about a certain quality, an average between courage and caution.
It would be wrong to think that among great generals, courage is moderated, weakened, and restrained by caution. On the contrary: caution, high criticality of thought make it possible to go for such a bold decision, which is unthinkable outside of this.
An example of Suvorov, who considered it possible to attack even five times larger forces, but "with intelligence, skill and response," who quickly defeated the Turkish army near Rymnik, four times larger than the Russian-Austrian forces, and did it as a result of a deeply thought-out calculation ("if the Turks are not yet advancing, it means that they have not finished the concentration of forces"), who carried out an insanely bold assault on Ishmael, but preceded him with a preparation unique of its kind in terms of thoroughness and caution (the construction of a copy of the Izmail rampart and systematic exercises on it, which reproduced all phases of the upcoming assault, the development of a detailed disposition, etc.).
Maximum initiative and ability to subjugate the will of the enemy ...
Undoubtedly, the first thing that is required of a military leader is maximum initiative and the ability to subordinate the will of the enemy to his will. But the whole difficulty of the task lies in the fact that the straightforward fulfillment of plans, "disregarding the intentions and desires of the enemy," is only a very crude and imperfect way of "imposing one's will." Such a method of action, on a superficial examination, can seem impressive, it can have a short-term effect when faced with a weak-willed and little able to resist enemy, but in a serious struggle it cannot lead to long-term success.
Great masters of military affairs acted differently. Their first task was to penetrate the intentions and plans of the enemy: firmly adhere to the principle of "disobeying the will of the enemy", but precisely for this, start by subordinating your mind to information about the enemy, and only then make up your own creative and maximally proactive plan when drawing up subjugate his opponent's will. And the most difficult thing is that this entire cycle is constantly repeated with each new change in the situation, with each receipt of new information about the actions and intentions of the enemy.
It is not surprising, therefore, that the ability to penetrate the plans of the enemy, to unravel his intentions has always been regarded as one of the most valuable qualities of a commander. "As they say, Themistocles once remarked that he considers the highest virtue of a commander to be able to understand and predict the plans of the enemy." "Nothing makes a commander more great," writes N. Machiavelli, "like penetration into the enemy's plans." "The main property that distinguishes a talented commander is the ease of unraveling the character of his opponent" [M. Dragomirov].
An excellent expression of "the principle of disobeying the will of the enemy!" But in order to follow this advice, you must first of all know what the enemy wants, what he really wants, and not what he should, according to our assumptions, want.
Suvorov, who sent the following message to the Turks before the storming of Ishmael: "I arrived here with an army. Twenty-four hours to think - will; my first shot is already captivity; storm is death. What I announce to you for consideration," Suvorov, who began the order to the battle of Trebbia with the words: "Take the enemy army to the full," the same Suvorov showed such great interest in the enemy that "sometimes he knew the enemy position better than the enemy himself", always preferring to fight with an intelligent enemy - a feature impossible for a commander rough and elementary active type ...
Is interaction opposed to any planning?
Drawing up plans for the war as a whole, individual operations, each upcoming battle is the most important component in the work of commanders and their staffs. But military planning is a special kind of planning. Here the exceptional difficulties with which the intellectual work of a military leader is connected appear with extraordinary vividness.
"The interaction taking place (in war) by its very nature opposes any planning," wrote Clausewitz.
But is it possible to introduce a war "methodically", dispensing with plans?
In fact, the work of a general is constant and continuous planning, although the nature of war is just as constantly and continuously opposed to this planning. Only a commander who in this struggle will be able to defeat the nature of war can count on victory over the enemy.
First of all, military planning requires a great abstinence from the commander. He must refrain from planning too much, must refrain from planning too far ahead, must finally refrain from accepting plans prematurely. One reason lies at the heart of these demands: the situation in war is constantly changing and no plan can foresee all changes.
In relation to his plans, the commander must show the greatest flexibility and freedom of mind, never allow his mind to be bound and constrained by his own plans. And the best commanders, indeed, have always reckoned with this. Suvorov, for example, “understood better than anyone else that perfectly drawn up campaign plans could only be partly feasible, and sometimes they had to completely change because they would be opposed by an enemy whose forces and methods cannot be determined with certainty and which has its own intentions and goals. Suvorov always took into account the case in the war. "
Foresight
"To manage is to foresee," says an old saying. To anticipate means to discern the main meaning of the events taking place through the gloom of uncertainty and fluidity of the situation, to grasp their main tendency and, proceeding from this, to understand where they are going. Foresight is the highest stage of that transformation of the complex into the simple, about which ... I already had to talk. Foresight is the result of deep penetration into the situation and comprehension of the main thing in it, the decisive one, that determines the course of events.
All great generals, to one degree or another, had the ability to foresee ...
Kutuzov showed his rare ability to unravel the intentions of the enemy and predict the course of events more than once before, but only in the Patriotic War of 1812 did this side of his genius unfold in full.
Already in Tsarevo-Zaymishche, after the review of the army, he speaks of the Napoleonic army, which was victoriously advancing at that time: "And the French will also be there. Believe my word ... I will have horse meat."
There is an opinion that Kutuzov gave the Battle of Borodino against his will, only obeying the wishes of the army and the whole country.
The behavior of Kutuzov before and during the battle suggests that he attached exceptional importance and did everything possible to concentrate at this moment the material and strain the moral forces of the army to the extreme. Kutuzov described the Battle of Borodino as a general, decisive battle in the full sense of the word. Thus, battles that are viewed as unnecessary and useless are not given.
The great power of Kutuzov's insight was reflected here, firstly, in the fact that he saw the moment when it was possible to give a decisive battle with confidence in victory, and, secondly, in the fact that he understood the nature of the Battle of Borodino, he realized that it was - victory with a delayed result. Therefore, he was not embarrassed by the lack of formal signs of the victorious end of the battle ... Through the external course of events, which seemed unfavorable, he saw their internal meaning, which was that at Borodino he won a complete and decisive victory over Napoleon.
Quick orientation
In case of unforeseen changes in the situation, another important property of the commander's mind comes into force - the speed of orientation, considerations and decisions. All great commanders, of course, use both means of fighting the "gloom" of the military situation: they strive to foresee as much as possible, and are ready to respond to the unexpected as quickly as possible.
No wonder Caesar was Suvorov's favorite hero. In him, Suvorov was impressed by the speed: "Julius Caesar won in haste."
Suvorov himself, in his quality, even surpassed the one whom he set for himself as a model. Speed, swiftness, agility (in all resolute manifestations) are an organic property of Suvorov.
Let's take the Rymnik case. Having received from the Austrian commander, Prince Coburg, the news of the approaching of a huge army of Turks to the Austrians, Suvorov wrote him in response on a piece of paper in pencil one word: "Coming!" - and immediately, in the middle of the night, set out on a campaign. Walking along a washed-out road, in the pouring rain, forced to build a bridge on the way, he traveled about 100 miles for two days. "There is a story: when the spy reported to the grand vizier about the appearance of Suvorov, the vizier ordered him to be hanged for spreading fables." Arriving at the place, Suvorov immediately, accompanied by several officers and a small party of Cossacks, goes on reconnaissance, climbs a tree, carefully examines the fortress and immediately draws up a battle plan, a plan of extraordinary courage, which included a change of front in the mind of the enemy. He drove back with a plan in mind. "
The victory at Fokshany is due to Suvorov's ability to instantly navigate and make decisions in an unforeseen turn of affairs. In the midst of the battle, he suddenly turns his column, with great difficulty leads it through the swamps and appears from the side from which the Turks did not expect the Russians at all.
The pinnacle of Suvorov's swiftness is the battle of Trebbia. First of all, the famous march to Trebbia (80 miles in 36 hours!) ... Some regiments did not go the last segment of the way, but fled and immediately entered the battle. Suvorov himself with four Cossack regiments rushed ahead and arrived on the battlefield at a time when the position of the Austrians M. Melas was becoming hopeless. “He arrived just in time,” - a few days later Melas, with tears in his eyes, told Miloradovich that he owed his salvation to the quick arrival of the Russians. Actually, not Russians, but Suvorov; so few Russians arrived that there was still a great advantage on the French side, but this difference was supplemented by the presence of Suvorov. The genius of war appeared in him, the spirit of victory flew in. Leaping onto the dais, he scanned the battlefield with a long, attentive gaze. It was in such moments, when it came to his inimitable eye, that he was truly great. Two Cossack regiments, not having time to catch their breath, flew to the right, into the flank of Dombrovsky with the Poles, and dragoons were sent against his front; the other two Cossack regiments rushed under the command of Suvorov's nephew, Gorchakov, to threaten the right flank of the French. The French advance was delayed, and the Poles were completely confused. The success, of course, was minute, but in such cases, every minute is precious. The head of the Russian avant-garde appeared on the road ... "
The ability we are interested in ... the ability to quickly understand a difficult situation and almost instantly find the right solution is called differently. It is sometimes called intuition.
This concept, often conveyed in Russian translations by the words “faithful military eye or faithful military gaze,” is often found in the characteristics that Napoleon gave to military leaders.
This expression was often used by Suvorov: "You don't need methodism, but a correct military view."
The psychological nature of the commander's intuition is closely related to the high development of spatial concepts and spatial thinking. Instant understanding and decision in the act of intuition presupposes visualization of thinking. In military affairs, this visibility means, first of all, the mental gaze of all spatial relationships, the ability to see on some imaginary map, scheme, plan, and the like, all possible combinations of actions in their relation to all essential features of the terrain.
An equally important role is played in the commander's intuition and sense of time. "In practice, this time plays a huge role: a minute has been missed, and the best measure can lead to disaster. War is a matter of tact and minute; often the loss of a minute is tantamount to the loss of a party."
The time factor is always of paramount importance in a war. But sometimes his role is especially vivid, so that the choice of the moment becomes central, in the full sense of the word, decisive.
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.. A striking example is the Battle of Kinburn, where Suvorov showed a remarkable sense of time, firstly, in determining the moment of the first counterattack, made just when the Turks went to storm, and secondly, in choosing the moment to throw into battle all the reserves, which he kept intact until evening: their introduction into the matter decided the fate of the battle and led to the complete extermination of the Turkish detachment.
Outstanding military education
It is not enough to say that a general must be an intelligent person. To this must be added: a commander must be a highly educated person: he must have excellent military training and an outstanding general education.
Indeed, outstanding commanders, those who can not hesitate to be classified as great, were not just people who "knew a lot": they usually stood at the highest levels of education of their time. The ancient world already provides vivid examples. The greatest military leaders of antiquity were among the most cultured and educated people of their era. Alexander was a student (and not only nominally) of Aristotle, Hannibal was a highly educated person for that time, Caesar, finally, in terms of the breadth of knowledge and a brilliant culture of mind, stood in the forefront of the great people of the ancient world. Can this be understood as mere coincidences?
To approach this issue a little deeper, let's take a closer look at the two largest commanders of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries: Suvorov and Napoleon.
Suvorov considered the pursuit of science and constant concern for self-education as the primary duty of a military leader.
Once he received from Catherine II George the 3rd degree for the imposition, at his discretion, on a more worthy one. He chose Lieutenant Colonel Curtis. The laying on was performed in a very solemn atmosphere, while pronouncing the instruction. "At the end of this instruction, the last condition necessary for the general was given: continuous self-education through reading."
Suvorov himself performed this instruction with extraordinary zeal, and, moreover, throughout his life. Here are some relevant excerpts from his biography.
The period of soldier's service (17 - 23 years). She persistently works on her education at home and in the classrooms of the cadet corps. "The time that his associates spent with cards and wine, he spent reading books." "All his time, without the slightest exception, was spent on service, on attending classes in the cadet corps and on home scientific studies; he decidedly never went anywhere else." All the money that he managed to save through austerity, he used to buy books.
The period of service as a lieutenant (23 - 25 years). "I took advantage of every free minute to continue my self-education."
Period of long-term stay in the village in the mid-80s. (about 55 years old). "I read a lot and at one time even had a reader on the payroll. But this reading by no means mattered military special knowledge; he was attracted by knowledge in general, in the sense of broadening his mental horizons."
Service in Byrlad in 1790 (59 years). "Most of Suvorov's free time was spent reading. He had one German student or candidate with whom he met several years ago and took him as a reader." "Suvorov was insatiable, forcing Philip Ivanovich to read a lot and for a long time and almost did not give him rest, bickering over every stop." "Everything was read in different languages: newspapers, magazines, military memoirs, statistics; not only books, but also manuscripts were obtained for reading."
Service in Finland in 1791 - 1792 (60 - 61 years old). "Taking advantage of his little leisure time, Suvorov was engaged in reading in Finland; he could not live without reading. We do not know if he had scientific works in his hands at that time, but he read a lot of newspapers, as can be seen from his subscription for 1792."
Polish War of 1794 (63 years). The tireless activity "did not prevent him from finding time to read, mainly in the evenings, for which he had several books in his luggage, including a commentary by Julius Caesar, his favorite hero."
Exile in Konchansky (66 - 67 years old). "Accustomed to mental pursuits from a young age, Suvorov all the more could not do without them in his solitude. He read a lot, but less than he would like, because his eyes hurt. There was a library in Konchanskoye; he refilled it from time to time."
In this respect, there was no difference between Suvorov and Napoleon; the latter was just as much engaged in his education, was an equally passionate reader.
It is difficult to say which areas of knowledge Napoleon and Suvorov were not interested in. Their education was literally encyclopedic. One can especially note Napoleon's interest in mathematics (he showed outstanding mathematical abilities from childhood), geography, history, in his youth - also philosophy ... Suvorov knew mathematics, geography, philosophy, and most of all history. Especially it is necessary to highlight the Russian commander's inclination and undoubted ability to learn languages. He knew the languages German, French, Italian, Polish, Finnish, Turkish, Arabic, Persian.
It is impossible not to note the features common to both Napoleon and Suvorov. Both of them were distinguished by extreme independence of mind, high criticality of thought. The following words, referring to Suvorov, may well be transferred to Napoleon: "Everything obtained by means of science was processed in him into something completely new, his own, which almost reached the denial of samples ... He was not a borrower anywhere and not in the less the imitator. "
But both of them had an extremely valuable ability: they knew how to separate doctrine from criticism. Before criticizing, processing, denying, they knew how to assimilate. Here is a remark about Suvorov at the age of 17 - 23 we find in Petrushevsky: "His mind is inherent in the spirit of criticism, but he gave him free rein only later; now he studied - and there was no place for criticism." And here is what he writes about Napoleon Tarl: "In any case, the 16-year-old second lieutenant did not criticize so much as he studied. This is also a fundamental feature of his mind: in every book, as well as to every person, he approached in these early years of his life with a greedy and impatient desire to extract as quickly as possible and as fully as possible what he does not yet know and which can give food to his own thoughts. "
Equally important is their inherent ability to rigorously and immediately systematize knowledge. "I believe Locke," says Suvorov, "that memory is the storeroom of the mind; but there are many partitions in this storeroom, and therefore everything must be put as soon as it should be." Napoleon said that various affairs and various objects are stacked in his head the same way they could be stacked in a chest of drawers. "When I want to interrupt my occupation with some business, I close his drawer and open another drawer of business; they do not mix, and one thing never bothers or bothers me while doing another." In the last words of Napoleon, not only the complete orderliness of his mental baggage is noted, but also the extreme ease of using it ... This is a very important trait for the commander's mind.
Notes (edit)
1.Teplov B.M. Warlord's Mind (Experience psychological research thinking of the commander on military-historical materials).
In the book: Teplov B.M. Fav. works. In 2 volumes - Vol. 1. - M., 1985 .-- p. 223 - 305.
2.Napoleon. Fav. manuf. Vol. 1. - M., 1941 .-- p. 320.
3. Dragomirov M.I. Eleven years. 1895 - 1905: Sat. original and translated articles. In 2 volumes.Vol.2. - SP b., 1909. - S.394.
4.Ibid. - p. 170 - 171.
5. Aristotle. About the soul. - M., 1937 .-- P.9 - 10.
6.Klausewitz K About the war. - vol. 1. - M., 1941 .-- p. 40.
7.Ibid. - P.108.
8.Ibid. - P.454.
9.Ibid. - vol. 2. - M., 1941 .-- p. 305.
10.Ibid. - P.305.
11.Ibid. - vol. 1. - M., 1941 .-- S. 159.
12. Bogoslovsky M.M. Peter the First: Materials for a biography. - M., 1941 .-- p. 324.
13.Marchenko A.M. Suvorov in his manuscripts. - SP b., 1900. - S. 38.
14.Klausewitz K About the war. - vol. 2. - M., 1941 .-- p. 295.
15. Petrushevsky A.F. Generalissimo Prince Suvorov, in 3 volumes. Vol. 1. - SP b., 1884. - S. 530.
16.Klausewitz K About the war. - vol. 1. - M., 1941 .-- p. 67 - 68.
17. Tarle E.V. Napoleon's invasion of Russia. 1812 - M., 1938 .-- S. 144.
18.Ibid. - S. 147.
19. Dragomirov M.I. Fourteen years old. 1881 - 1894: Sat. original and translated articles. - SP b., 1895. - S.316.
20. Geisman P.A. The fall of Poland and Suvorov. - In the book: Suvorov in the reports of professors of the Academy of the General Staff. - SP b., 1900. - P.109.
21 THEMISTOCLES (c. 525 - c. 460 BC), Athenian commander, leader of a democratic group, during the Greco-Persian wars from 493/492. archon and strategist (repeatedly). He played a decisive role in organizing the all-Greek resistance forces. Achieved the transformation of Athens into a maritime power and the creation of the Delian Union. (Approx. Author-comp.)
22. Plutarch. Selected biographies. - M. - L., 1941 .-- p. 65.
23. MACHIAVELLI (Machiavelli) Niccolo (1469-1527), Italian political thinker, historian, author of the work "Sovereign", 1513, ed. 1532, etc. (Approx.aut.-comp.)
24 Dragomirov M.I. Eleven years. 1895 - 1905: Sat. original and translated articles. In 2 volumes - volume 2. - SP b., 1909. - S.534.
25. Petrushevsky A.F. Generalissimo Prince Suvorov. - SP b., 1900. - P.237.
26. Ibid. - S. 580.
27 Ibid. - P.752.
28. Characteristic for him are the words spoken at Novi: "Moro understands me, the old man, and I am glad that I am dealing with a clever military leader" - Osipov K.N. Suvorov. - M., 1958 .-- p. 296.
29. Clausewitz K. About the war. - vol. 1. - SP b., 1941. - p.109.
30. Petrushevsky A.F. Generalissimo Prince Suvorov. - SP b., 1900. - S. 520.
31. CAESAR (Caesar) Gaius Julius (102 or 100-44 BC), Roman dictator in 49, 48-46, 45, from 44 - for life. General. Began watered. activity as a supporter of the rep. group, occupying the posts of a military tribune in 73, aedil in 65, praetor in 62, seeking a consulate, in 60 entered into an alliance with G. Pompey and Crassus (1st triumvirate). Consul in 59, then governor of Gaul; in 58-51 subjugated to Rome the entire trans-Alpine Gaul. In 49, relying on the army, he began the struggle for autocracy. Having defeated Pompey and his supporters in 49-45. (Crassus died in 53), ended up at the head of state. Having concentrated in his hands a number of the most important republican posts (dictator, consul, etc.), he actually became a monarch. Killed by a Republican conspiracy. Author of "Notes on the Gallic War" and "Notes on Civil Wars"; carried out a reform of the calendar (Julian calendar). (Approx. Author-comp.)
32. Mikhnevich N.P. Suvorov is a strategist. - In the book: Suvorov in the reports of professors of the Academy of the General Staff. - SP b., 1900. - P.7.
33 Rimnic, p. in Romania, a tributary of the river. Siret (Seret). During the Russian-Turkish war of 1787-1791. at Rymnik, Russian and Austrian troops under command. A.V. Suvorov 11.9.1789 defeated the Turkish army, for which Suvorov received the title of Count of Rymnik. (Approx. Author-comp.)
34. Osipov K.N. Suvorov. - M., 138. - S. 144.
35. Petrushevsky A.F. Generalissimo Prince Suvorov. In 3 volumes.Vol. 1. - SP b., 1884. - S. 213.
36. FOCHANI, a city in Romania, in the area of which 21.7 (1.8). 1789 Russian-Austrian troops (over 17 thousand people) during the Russian-Turkish war of 1787 - 1791. defeated the Turkish troops of Osman Pasha (30 thousand people). The victory was achieved thanks to the skillful and decisive actions of A.V. Suvorov, who actually led the allied forces in the battle. (Approx. Author-comp.)
37. Osipov K.N. Suvorov. - M., 138. - S. 142.
38. Trebbia, p. in Northern Italy. right tributary of the river By. 17 - 19.6.1799 Russian-Austrian troops led by A.V. During the Italian campaign, Suvorov defeated the French troops of General J. MacDonald at Trebbia. (Approx. Author-comp.)
39. Petrushevsky A.F. Generalissimo Prince Suvorov. In 3 volumes - Vol. 1. - SP b., 1884. - S. 581 - 582.
40. Mikhnevich N.P. Suvorov is a strategist. - In the book: Suvorov in the reports of professors of the Academy of the General Staff. - SP b., 1900. - S. 5.
41 Dragomirov M.I. Eleven years. 1895 - 1905: Sat. original and translated articles. In 2 volumes - volume 2. - SP b., 1909. - P.445 - 446.
42. KINBURN, a fortress on the Kinburn spit (between the Dnieper and Yagorlytsky estuaries of the Black Sea). During the Russian-Turkish war of 1787-1791. the Turkish fleet landed a landing (5 thousand people), which were defeated by the troops of A.V. Suvorov (about 4 thousand people).
43. ALEXANDER OF MACEDONA (356-323 BC), king of Macedonia from 336 AD The son of King Philip II, was brought up by Aristotle. Having defeated the Persians at Granicus (334), Issus (333), Gavgamelah (331), he subdued the kingdom of the Achaemenids, invaded Cf. Asia (329), conquered lands up to the river. Indus, creating the world's largest monarchy of antiquity. (Approx. Author-comp.)
44. Hannibal (247 or 246-183 BC), Carthaginian commander. Son of Hamilcar Barka. During the 2nd Punich. war (218-201) crossed the Alps, won victories at the river. Titinus, Trebbia (218), at Lake Trasimene (217), at Cannes (216). In 202 under Zama (North Africa) Hannibal was defeated by the Romans. (Approx. Author-comp.)
45. Petrushevsky A.F. Generalissimo Prince Suvorov. - SP b., 1900. - P.299.
46. Osipov K.N. Suvorov. - M, 1938. - P.21.
47. Petrushevsky A.F. Generalissimo Prince Suvorov. In 3 volumes - Vol. 1. - SP b., 1884. - S. 5.
48. Osipov K.N. Suvorov. - M, 1938. - P.25.
49. Petrushevsky A.F. Generalissimo Prince Suvorov. - SP b., 1900. - P.267.
50.BIRLAD, a city in Eastern Romania.
51. Petrushevsky A.F. Generalissimo Prince Suvorov. In 3 volumes.Vol. 1. - SP b., 1884. - P.372 - 373.
52. Petrushevsky A.F. Generalissimo Prince Suvorov. - SP b., 1900. - P.278.
53 Ibid. - P.318.
54 Ibid. - S.501.
55 Ibid. - P.748.
56 Ibid. - P.6.
57. TARLEE Evgeny Viktorovich (1874-1955), historian, author of works: "Napoleon", "Talleyrand", "Napoleon's invasion of Russia", "Crimean war" (v. 1-2), etc. (Approx. Ed. -const.)
58. Tarle E.V. Napoleon. - M., 1941 .-- p. 11.
59. Osipov K.N. Suvorov. - M., 1938 .-- p. 25.