Due to the critical situation on the outskirts of the capital, on October 20, Moscow was declared under a state of siege. The defense of the lines in 100-120 kilometers was assigned to the commander of the Western Front, Georgy Konstantinovich Zhukov, and on its near approaches, to the head of the Moscow garrison, P.A. Artemyev.

Due to the critical situation on the outskirts of the capital, on October 20, Moscow was declared under a state of siege. The defense of the lines in 100-120 kilometers was assigned to the commander of the Western Front, Georgy Konstantinovich Zhukov, and on its near approaches, to the head of the Moscow garrison, P.A. Artemyev. It was pointed out that it was necessary to strengthen the rear and to intensify the fight against the subversive actions of enemy agents.

The population of Moscow was actively involved in the construction of defensive structures around the capital and inside the city. In the shortest possible time, the city was surrounded by anti-tank ditches, hedgehogs, and forest blockages. Anti-tank guns were installed on dangerous areas. Muscovites were formed into divisions of the people's militia, tank destroyer battalions, combat squads, which, together with units of the regular army, participated in battles and in maintaining order in the city.

Enemy air raids on Moscow were successfully repelled. By the beginning of the battle near Moscow, the air defense of the capital had a coherent system based on the principle of all-round defense, taking into account the most dangerous directions - western and southwestern, as well as on the maximum use of the combat capabilities of fighter aircraft and anti-aircraft weapons, which closely interacted with each other.

Fighter aircraft fought against the air enemy on the distant approaches. Its airfields were located within a radius of 150-200 kilometers from Moscow, but as the Germans approached the capital, they moved closer and closer. In the daytime, the fighters operated throughout the entire depth of the defense, and at night - within the light searchlight fields.

On the immediate approaches to Moscow, German aircraft were fired upon and destroyed by anti-aircraft artillery, mostly of medium caliber. Its fire was controlled by sectors, each of which had one anti-aircraft artillery regiment. The regiments built battle formations in three lines, which had considerable depth. Parts and subunits of small-caliber anti-aircraft artillery and anti-aircraft machine guns were used to cover important objects inside the city from the air (the Kremlin, railway stations, power plants).

Retreating, the German bombers threw off their deadly cargo anywhere.

In October, the enemy made 31 raids on Moscow, 2018 aircraft participated in them, of which 278 were shot down. The air defense forces of Moscow waged a tense struggle with the air enemy and defended the capital from destruction.

The control of the forces and means of the air defense of Moscow was carried out centrally from the command post of the 1st air defense corps. The commander of the Moscow air defense zone was General M. S. Gromadin.

In October, fascist aviation carried out 31 raids on Moscow. About 2 thousand aircraft took part in them, but only 72 1 were able to break through to the bombing targets. When repelling raids in air battles and anti-aircraft artillery fire, 278 German aircraft 2 were shot down.

In the second half of October, it was possible to delay the advance of the Nazi troops in the zone of the Bryansk Front. This allowed the 3rd and 13th armies, which had been fighting hard behind enemy lines for almost three weeks, to break out of the encirclement on October 23 and, on the orders of the Headquarters, withdraw to the line east of Dubna, Plavsk, Verkhovye, Livny.

The actions of the front troops pinned down the 2nd Panzer Army in the Tula direction. She was able to resume attacks only at the end of October, when the offensive of the 4th Army of Army Group Center had already bogged down. By October 29, the enemy tank divisions advanced from Mtsensk to Tula, but were stopped here. “An attempt to capture the city on the move,” Guderian wrote after the war, “came up against a strong anti-tank and air defense and ended in failure, and we suffered significant losses in tanks and officers.” For three days, the Nazis fiercely attacked Tula, but the troops of the 50th Army and the Tula combat area, together with the militias, selflessly defended. Communists and Komsomol members of the city and region joined the ranks of the defenders. Their courage was amazing. Tulyaks turned their city into an impregnable fortress and did not surrender it to the enemy. An important role in organizing the struggle for Tula was played by the city defense committee headed by the first secretary of the regional party committee V. G. Zhavoronkov, who in those days was a member of the Military Council of the 50th Army.

The defense of Tula ensured the stability of the left wing of the Western Front on the far southern approaches to the capital. It also contributed to the stabilization of the situation on the Bryansk front.

Thus, the October offensive of the Nazi troops on Moscow failed. The enemy was forced to go on the defensive on the lines of Selizharovo, Kalinin, Tula, Novosil.

The most important condition for disrupting the enemy's intentions was the creation of reserves in a short time, most of which were brought into battle in the Western Front at the turn of the Mozhaisk line of defense.

A huge role in repelling the fierce onslaught of the Nazis, along with the ground forces, was played by the Soviet Air Force. In the first nine days of the enemy offensive on Moscow alone, the aviation of the Western Front, the 6th Air Defense Aviation Corps and units of the Air Defense Forces carried out 3,500 sorties, destroying a significant number of enemy aircraft, tanks and manpower. In total, from September 30 to October 31, the Air Force made 26,000 sorties, of which up to 80 percent were to support and cover troops.

The enemy also experienced the force of powerful blows from Soviet tanks and artillery. Tank brigades blocked the path of the fascist troops in especially dangerous directions.

To disrupt the enemy offensive, anti-tank areas and strongholds, various engineering barriers were equipped.

Warriors of all branches of the military in the battles on the outskirts of Moscow showed examples of the performance of military duty and the invincible strength of morale, showed mass heroism. In these battles, units of rifle divisions distinguished themselves: 316th General I.V. Panfilov, 78th Colonel A.P. Beloborodov, 32nd Colonel V.I. Polosukhin, 50th General N.F. Lebedenko, 53rd Colonel A.F. Naumov, 239th Colonel G.O. Martirosyan, as well as the 1st Guards Motorized Rifle Division Colonel A.I. Lizyukov, the cavalry group of General L.M. Dovator, tank brigades led by M.E. Katukov, P. A. Rotmistrov, I. F. Kirichenko, M. T. Sakhno, and many other compounds.

The results of the October offensive did not please the Nazis. The main goals of Operation Typhoon - the destruction of the Soviet Army and the capture of Moscow - were not achieved. The outcome of the bloody battles was unexpected not only for the soldiers, but also for the generals of the Wehrmacht.

The stubborn resistance of the Soviet troops was the main reason for the hesitation that appeared among the command of the Wehrmacht, the divergence of opinions in determining the ways of further waging war against the Soviet Union. In early November, Franz Halder, then Chief of the German General Staff, wrote in his diary: “We must, by analyzing the current situation, accurately determine our capabilities for conducting subsequent operations. There are two extreme points of view on this issue: some consider it necessary to gain a foothold on the achieved lines, others demand to actively continue the offensive.

But in fact, the Nazis had no choice. Winter was approaching, and the goals of the Barbarossa plan remained unfulfilled. The enemy was in a hurry, striving at all costs to capture the capital of the Soviet Union before the onset of winter.

The plan of the fascist German command to continue the offensive in November contained the same idea as in October: simultaneously inflict crushing blows on the flanks of the Western Front with two mobile groupings and, rapidly bypassing Moscow from the north and south, close the encirclement east of the capital.

In the first half of November, the fascist German command regrouped its troops: from near Kalinin to the Volokolamsko-Klinskoye direction, it transferred the 3rd tank group, and replenished the 2nd tank army with more than a hundred tanks, concentrating its main forces on the right flank to bypass Tula .

By November 15, 1941, Army Group Center included three field, one tank armies and two tank groups, numbering 73 divisions (47 infantry, 1 cavalry, 14 tank, 8 motorized, 3 security) and 4 brigades.

The task of covering Moscow from the north (Operation Volga Reservoir) was assigned to the 3rd and 4th German tank groups, consisting of seven tank, three motorized and four infantry divisions, and from the south - to the 2nd tank army, consisting of four tank, three motorized and five infantry divisions. The 4th Army was to conduct a frontal offensive, pin down the main forces of the Western Front, and then destroy them west of Moscow. The 9th and 2nd armies, pinned down by the troops of the Kalinin and Southwestern fronts, were actually deprived of the opportunity to take part in the November offensive. In total, the fascist German command allocated 51 divisions directly for the capture of Moscow, including 13 tank and 7 motorized.

Assessing the current situation, the Soviet command clearly understood that the relative relaxation of tension on the front near Moscow was temporary, that although the enemy had suffered serious losses, he had not yet lost his offensive capabilities, retained the initiative and superiority in forces and means, and would persistently strive to capture Moscow. Therefore, all measures were taken to repel the expected offensive. At the same time, new armies were formed and deployed at the line of Vytegra, Rybinsk, Gorky, Saratov, Stalingrad, Astrakhan as strategic reserves.

The rate, having determined the intentions and capabilities of the enemy, decided

First of all, strengthen the most dangerous areas. She demanded

from the Western Front, in cooperation with the troops of the Kalinin and the right wing of the Southwestern Fronts, to prevent bypassing Moscow from the north

west and south. His armies were reinforced by anti-tank artillery and

guards mortar units. On Volokolamsk and Serpukhov

in the directions the reserves of the Headquarters were concentrated; 16th Army were

given three cavalry divisions; the 2nd cavalry corps (two divisions) arrived in the Podolsk, Mikhnevo region from the Southwestern Front, part

which additionally included infantry and tank divisions. For the first

half of November, the Western Front received a total of 100 thousand soldiers.

Kalinin Front - 30th Army.

The shock German groups were opposed by the 30th, 16th and partially 5th armies on the right and the 50th and 49th armies on the left wing of the Western Front.

The command of the Western Front, reinforcing the troops operating northwest and southwest of Moscow, organized counterattacks in the 16th Army zone on Volokolamsk and in the Skirmanovo area, as well as in the 49th Army zone in the Serpukhov direction. According to the recognition of the fascist command, the counterattack in the zone of the 49th Army did not allow the 4th German Army to go on the offensive here in the second half of November.

In total, the troops of the Western Front (including the 30th Army) by mid-November had 35 rifle, 3 motorized rifle, 3 tank, 12 cavalry divisions, 14 tank brigades .. As before, in terms of numbers, Soviet divisions were significantly inferior to German ones. Despite the strengthening of the troops of the Western Front, the fascist German armies in November continued to maintain their overall numerical superiority in men and military equipment near Moscow, especially in the directions of the main attacks. So, in the Klin direction, against 56 tanks and 210 guns and mortars, which the 30th Army had, the enemy had up to 300 tanks and 910 guns and mortars.

By concentrating about 1000 aircraft near Moscow (although there were many obsolete types among them), the Soviet command created a quantitative superiority in aviation over the enemy. In order to gain air supremacy, the Stavka ordered the commander of the Soviet Air Force to carry out an operation from November 5 to 8 to destroy German aircraft at airfields. The air forces of the Kalinin, Western, Bryansk fronts, the 81st division of the DBA and aviation of the Moscow defense zone were involved in it. 28 enemy airfields were hit, and on November 12 and 15 another 19, where 88 aircraft were destroyed.

Much attention was paid to the engineering equipment of the area. The troops improved their positions, created zones of operational barriers. The intensive construction of defensive lines continued. Only on the outer boundary of the Moscow zone, by November 25, 1428 bunkers, 165 km of anti-tank ditches, 110 km of wire fences in three rows and other obstacles were built.

The air defense of the capital continued to be strengthened and improved. By decision of the State Defense Committee of November 9, 1941, the air defense zones of the country were removed from the subordination of the military councils of the districts and fronts and subordinated to the deputy people's commissar of defense for air defense, who actually became the commander of the country's air defense forces as an independent branch of the Armed Forces of the USSR. At the same time, all air defense zones in the European part of the Soviet Union were transformed into divisional and corps air defense areas. The Moscow Air Defense Zone became the Moscow Air Defense Corps District.

In those difficult days, the Soviet people celebrated the 24th anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution. The ceremonial meeting of the Moscow Council of Working People's Deputies on November 6, the parade of troops on Red Square on November 7 and the speeches of the Chairman of the State Defense Committee I. V. Stalin played an important role in strengthening the confidence of the people and the army that the enemy near Moscow would be stopped, that here, at the walls of the capital, the defeat of the Nazi invaders will begin.

Addressing the soldiers who were leaving Red Square for the front, I. V. Stalin said on behalf of the party and the people: “The whole world is looking at you as a force capable of destroying the predatory hordes of German invaders. The enslaved peoples of Europe, who fell under the yoke of the German invaders, are looking at you as their liberators.”

After a two-week pause, Army Group Center resumed its offensive against the Soviet capital. On the morning of November 15, powerful artillery and air preparation began, and then the 3rd Panzer Group dealt a strong blow to the 30th Army of General D. D. Lelyushenko. Part of the troops of this army, located north of the Volga reservoir, by order of the command on November 16, retreated to the northeastern bank of the Volga.

Stubborn resistance to the enemy was provided by formations defending south of the reservoir. Only in the second half of November 16, the enemy was able to force the Lama River, while losing up to 60 tanks and armored vehicles. By the end of November 17, he managed to reach the Novozavidovsky area. The situation at the junction of the Kalinin and Western fronts became extremely complicated. To eliminate the threat of an enemy breakthrough to Klin, the front command reinforced the 30th Army with two divisions and organized several air strikes against the advancing enemy troops in its zone.

On November 16, in the Volokolamsk direction, the German 4th Panzer Group (at least 400 tanks) went on the offensive against the 16th Army with massive air support. Its main blow fell at the junction of the 316th Infantry Division of General I.V. Panfilov and the group of troops of General L.M. Dovator. In decisive battles with the Nazis, the Panfilov heroes immortalized their names. In the area of ​​​​the Dubosekovo junction, 28 Panfilov soldiers, having destroyed 18 tanks and dozens of fascists in four hours of an unequal battle, did not let the enemy through.

And on the same day, part of the forces of the 16th Army, with the support of aviation, launched a powerful counterattack on the enemy. The defenders of Moscow fought steadfastly in other sectors of the front as well. In the Istra direction, the 78th Rifle Division was especially stubbornly defending.

Events at the front from November 16 to 21 showed that the main forces of the 3rd and 4th Panzer Groups, which had the task of making quick operational breakthroughs and a swift bypass of Moscow, were drawn into protracted battles. The pace of the enemy offensive was continuously decreasing and did not exceed even for mobile troops 3-5 km per day. The Nazis had to overcome staunch defenses, while repelling counterattacks by infantry, tank and cavalry formations. Enemy attempts to encircle any division, as a rule, did not bring success. To master each subsequent line, he was forced to organize the offensive again.

Kalininsky actively helped the Western Front, whose troops firmly fettered the 9th German field army, preventing it from transferring a single division to the Moscow direction.

On November 19, the command of Army Group Center, having reinforced the 3rd Panzer Group with tank and motorized divisions, demanded that it capture Klin and Solnechnogorsk as soon as possible. To avoid encirclement, on November 23, Soviet troops left these cities after stubborn street fighting.

The onslaught of the enemy did not weaken in other sectors of the defense either. Particularly stubborn battles were waged by the troops of the 16th and partly of the 5th armies at the turn of the Istra River. The Soviet divisions held back the fierce attacks of the Nazis here for three days and inflicted heavy damage on them. However, on November 27, the 16th Army had to leave the city of Istra.

Despite significant losses, the enemy continued to rush towards Moscow, spending the last reserves. But he failed to cut the front of the defense of the Soviet troops.

The Soviet command assessed the resulting situation as very dangerous, but not in the least hopeless. It saw that the troops were determined to prevent the enemy from reaching Moscow and were fighting steadfastly and selflessly. Every day it became more obvious that the enemy's capabilities were not unlimited, and as his reserves were spent, his onslaught would inevitably weaken.

The assessment of the current situation given in those days by the leadership of the Wehrmacht can be judged by Halder's entry in his official diary: “Field Marshal von Bock personally directs the course of the battle near Moscow from his advanced command post. His ... energy drives the troops forward ... The troops are completely exhausted and incapable of an offensive ... Von Bock compares the current situation with the situation in the battle of the Marne, indicating that a situation has arisen when the last battalion thrown into battle can decide the outcome battles." However, the calculations of the Nazis for each "last" battalion were not justified. The enemy suffered heavy losses, but could not break through to Moscow.

After the capture of Klin and Solnechnogorsk, the enemy made an attempt to develop his strike northwest of Moscow. On the night of November 28, he managed to cross with small forces to the eastern bank of the Moscow-Volga Canal in the Yakhroma area north of Iksha.

The Headquarters of the Supreme High Command and the command of the Western Front took urgent measures to eliminate the danger that had arisen. Reserve formations and troops from neighboring sectors were transferred to the Kryukovo, Khlebnikovo, and Yakhroma regions. An important role in changing the situation north of Moscow was played by the timely advance from the reserve to the line of the Moscow-Volga Canal between Dmitrov and Iksha of the 1st Shock Army under the command of General V. I. Kuznetsov. Its advanced units pushed the enemy back to the western bank of the canal.

In late November and early December, the 1st shock and the newly formed 20th armies, with the active support of the aviation group of General I.F. Petrov, launched a series of counterattacks on the Nazi troops and, together with the 30th and 16th armies, finally stopped them further promotion. The enemy was forced to go on the defensive. The threat of a breakthrough to Moscow from the northwest and north was eliminated.

Events on the left wing of the Western Front unfolded exceptionally sharply and tensely. Here the 2nd German Panzer Army was able to resume the offensive only on November 18th. After unsuccessful attempts to capture Tula from the south and northwest, the command of Army Group Center decided to launch an offensive in a northerly direction, bypassing the city from the east.

The strike force - the 2nd Tank Army, consisting of four tank, three motorized, five infantry divisions, supported by aviation, broke through the defenses of the 50th Army and, developing the offensive, captured Stalinogorsk (Novomoskovsk) on November 22. Her units rushed to Venev, Kashira. Fierce fighting broke out.

The front commander demanded that the 50th Army "under no circumstances allow the enemy to penetrate into the Venev area." This city and the approaches to it were defended by a combat group consisting of a regiment of the 173rd rifle division, the 11th and 32nd tank brigades (30 light tanks), a tank destroyer battalion formed from the local population. Without breaking the resistance of the group with frontal attacks, the 17th German Panzer Division bypassed the city from the east. On November 25, its advanced units were 10-15 km from Kashira.

Two other divisions of the 2nd Panzer Army were advancing on Mikhailov and Serebryanye Prudy. The Nazis sought to take Kashira as soon as possible and capture the crossings on the Oka.

In order to stop the advance of the enemy's southern strike force, the command of the Western Front on November 27 conducted a counterattack in the Kashira area with formations reinforced with tanks and rocket artillery of the 1st Guards Cavalry Corps. As a result of the counterattack, the corps, with the support of the aviation of the front and parts of the Moscow air defense, inflicted a heavy defeat on the 17th tank division of the enemy and by November 30 threw it back to the Mordves region.

Thus, the stubborn defense of Tula, the staunch resistance of the Soviet troops in the areas of Stalinogorsk and Venev thwarted the plans of the enemy. The 2nd Panzer Army was unable to capture the crossings across the Oka.

After this failure, the Nazis made desperate attempts to take control of Tula with a blow from the east and northeast. They believed that in the current situation it was impossible "to carry out further operations to the north or east ... without first mastering this important communications junction and the airfield."

On December 3, the enemy managed to cut the railway and highway north of Tula. At the same time, he increased pressure on the city from the west at the junction of the 49th and 50th armies. The fight has reached its peak. To eliminate the breakthrough north of Tula, the 50th Army of General I.V. Boldin launched a counterattack on the enemy in the area of ​​​​Kostrovo, Revyakino, where it surrounded part of the forces of the 4th German Panzer Division.

The active operations of the troops of the left wing of the Western Front in early December forced the 2nd German Panzer Army to begin a retreat. At the critical moment of the battle in the areas of Kashira and Tula, she could not get help from her neighbor on the right - the 2nd field army, whose main forces were involved in protracted battles with the troops of the 3rd and 13th armies of the Southwestern Front in the Yelets direction.

The enemy, having failed north and south of Moscow. December 1 tried to break through to the city in the center of the Western Front. He delivered strong blows in the Naro-Fominsk region and pushed the defending divisions back. The front command immediately responded to this with a counterattack, using the reserve of the 33rd and neighboring armies. The enemy was driven back across the Nara River with heavy losses. Thus, his last attempt to save Operation Typhoon failed. The Nazis also failed to carry out the plan for the destruction of Moscow by air strikes. Strengthening air defense has yielded results. In November, only a few planes broke through to the city. In total, during the period July - December 1941, the Moscow Air Defense Forces repelled 122 air raids, in which 7146 aircraft participated. Only 229 aircraft, or a little over 3 percent, were able to break through to the city.

The attempts of the Nazis to carry out extensive reconnaissance and sabotage, terrorist and other subversive activities were also unsuccessful. The state security organs neutralized about 200 fascist agents in the capital and its suburbs. In addition, over 75 spies and saboteurs were detained by the border units for the protection of the rear in the combat area of ​​the Western Front, and several enemy sabotage and reconnaissance groups were liquidated. In the Moscow direction, the enemy failed to commit a single sabotage in the rear of the Soviet troops, disrupt the work of industrial enterprises, transport, disrupt the supply of the army in the field. Using captured enemy agents who turned themselves in, the Soviet counterintelligence officers, together with the military command, misinformed the enemy intelligence about the location and redeployment of formations and associations of troops, their command posts, and about the work of the Moscow road junction. As a result, the Nazi command did not have reliable data on the advancement of reserves to the Moscow region.

The end of November - the beginning of December was a period of crisis of the Nazi offensive against Moscow. The plan to encircle and capture the Soviet capital was a complete failure. “The attack on Moscow failed. All the sacrifices and efforts of our valiant troops were in vain. We suffered a serious defeat,” Guderian wrote after the war. The enemy was finally exhausted, his reserves were exhausted. “The information that we had said that all the reserves that von Bock had were used and drawn into the battle,” said Marshal of the Soviet Union K.K. Rokossovsky. The failure of Operation Typhoon was a fait accompli.

In those difficult, decisive days of the battle for the capital, Pravda wrote: “We must by all means frustrate Hitler’s predatory plan ... This is what our whole country is waiting for ... The rout of the enemy must begin near Moscow!”.

Echelons with weapons and ammunition were going to the front in a continuous stream. Fresh reserves of the Headquarters were concentrated in the areas northeast and southeast of the capital. Moscow and Tula became the front-line arsenals of the fighting troops.

An important measure in disrupting the new onslaught of the enemy near Moscow was the counteroffensive organized by the Headquarters in mid-November near Tikhvin and Rostov-on-Don. The fascist German army groups "North" and "South", repelling the offensive of the Soviet troops, were deprived of the opportunity to provide assistance to the Army Group "Center" on decisive days. These were the first serious harbingers of great changes on the entire Soviet-German front.

So, the offensive of the Nazi troops on Moscow in November also ended in complete failure.

Army Group Center failed to achieve the goals of Operation Typhoon. Her troops were drained of blood and lost their offensive capabilities. During the fighting from November 16 to December 5, the Wehrmacht lost 155 thousand soldiers and officers, 777 tanks, hundreds of guns and mortars near Moscow. By means of aviation of the fronts and Moscow air defense, many aircraft were shot down in air battles and destroyed at airfields. During two months of defensive battles, the Soviet Air Force made more than 51,000 sorties, of which 14 percent were for the air cover of the capital. Here, in the Moscow direction, by December 1941, for the first time, they won operational air supremacy. The aviation guard was born in the sky near Moscow. The rank of guards received the 29th, 129th, 155th, 526th fighter, 215th assault and 31st bomber aviation regiments.

On December 4-5, 1941, the defensive period of the battle near Moscow ended. The Soviet Armed Forces defended the capital, stopping the advance of the fascist hordes.

Battle for Moscow. Moscow operation of the Western Front November 16, 1941 - January 31, 1942 Shaposhnikov Boris Mikhailovich

Chapter One Initial position and plans of the parties. The plan of the German attack on Moscow

Chapter one

Starting position and plans of the parties. The plan of the German attack on Moscow

In the first half of November, all types of reconnaissance began to note the pulling up and accumulation of enemy forces in front of the Western Front, the preparation of shock groups and the desire of the Nazi troops to take an advantageous starting position for resuming the offensive on a large scale. In the period from 1 to 11 November, according to our intelligence, the enemy forces in front of the Western Front increased by nine divisions. It became clear that in the near future we should expect a second attempt by the Germans to capture Moscow.

The headquarters of the Western Front and the General Staff of the Red Army by the beginning of the second offensive of the Nazi troops on Moscow had, on the whole, correct information about the grouping of forces and about the possible intentions of the enemy.

As early as November 5, the head of the Operations Department of the headquarters of the Western Front, in a document drawn up by him (a diagram with a legend), defined the probable plan of action for the Germans as follows: the enemy, apparently, is preparing a strike on both flanks of the Western Front: 1) in the north - in the directions to Klin and Istra ; 2) in the south - in the direction of Podolsk and Lopasnya. But he will need a certain amount of time to bring up his reserves, put his troops and rear in order, rest and organize logistics. Enemy forces are currently located in several groups: a) the Volokolamsk grouping (five to six divisions, of which two are armored and one motorized), intended for probable actions from Volokolamsk to Klin, Dmitrov, bypassing Moscow from the north; part of the forces can be sent through Istra directly to Moscow; b) Dorokhovskaya (Mozhaisk) grouping (four to five divisions), located on the shortest routes to Moscow, with an axis of action along the Mozhaisk-Moscow highway; c) the Maloyaroslavets grouping (four to five divisions, one of them tank divisions), apparently aimed at Podolsk and further on Moscow from the south. To the west of Serpukhov, the concentration of forces (the Tarusa-Serpukhov group) was also determined, consisting of four to five divisions (one of them was tank) for possible actions in the direction of Serpukhov.

In the center, in the Naro-Fominsk region, the presence of weaker forces (about three infantry and one tank divisions) was assumed, intended for communication between the two active wings. The operational reserves were numbered in three or four divisions, with their location near Mozhaisk, Maloyaroslavets, east of Gzhatsk, near Kaluga. In total, according to available data, about 25–30 divisions and up to 350–400 aircraft were concentrated, based on forward airfields.

Subsequent data clarified and supplemented previously available information. The prisoner, captured on November 12 in front of the 33rd Army, showed that the preparations for the offensive were completed and the offensive could begin at night or in the morning of November 13; according to him, the regiment in which he was located would pin down, and other troops would bypass the defending units of the Red Army.

On November 14, the Military Council of the Western Front reported to Comrade Stalin about the situation on its left flank:

“Parts of the right flank of the 3rd Army of the Southwestern Front continue a non-stop retreat in a southeasterly direction towards Efremov. Every day the gap between the right flank of the 3rd Army of the Southwestern Front and the left flank of the 50th Army of the Western Front increases and by the end of November 13 it reached 60 km.

The enemy, having failed to capture the city of Tula from the south, having failed to break through to Tula from the north. - Western, while suffering heavy losses, taking advantage of the withdrawal of parts of the 3rd Army of the Southwestern Front, during 12 and 13.11 began to pull tank and infantry formations to the left flank of the 50th Army. The enemy continues with impunity to create a large grouping south of Dedilovo, Uzlovaya for a strike in the north. and sowing - east. direction around Tula from the east to the flank and rear of the 50th Army.

In mid-November, our intelligence agencies in the center came to the conclusion that the strongest groupings of Germans were in the following areas: a) in the area of ​​Volokolamsk, Dorohovo; b) at the junction of the Western and Southwestern fronts - in the Tula region (two tank corps - the 24th and 47th). The actions of the German command should be regarded as preparations for an offensive against the wings of the Western Front, bypassing Moscow (on the right wing in the direction of Klin, Dmitrov, on the left - in the direction of Tula, Kolomna) in combination with a frontal attack from the Naro-Fominsk region.

The number of concentrated infantry divisions in total approached the number of divisions with which the Germans went on the offensive on October 2, 1941 against the Western Front (twenty-six infantry divisions in the first line, two infantry divisions of the army reserve, about seven infantry divisions of the front reserve; about thirty in total five divisions). The number of tank formations (up to ten tank divisions, 800-900 tanks in total) allowed the enemy to start the operation with strikes from large mobile groups in the most important directions. The following spoke about the likelihood of such an attack by the enemy:

a) the desire of the German command (turning into a template) to use its usual, favorite technique in operations: acting in two flank strike groups (“wedges”), surround the intended object (on a scale from the vast “Cannes”, with the aim of encircling the entire enemy’s main forces, to "pincers" that broke off, surrounded and destroyed one of the private groupings or one of the parts of the enemy's operational formation). At the same time, the initial encirclement was usually carried out by motorized troops (the so-called "tank encirclement"), and then the enemy sought to secure it with infantry divisions following him ("infantry encirclement"). In this case, such a course of action would allow the enemy to reach the flanks of our Moscow grouping, and subsequently encircle the capital and the main forces of the Western Front;

b) the difficulty of a frontal offensive for the Germans in this situation and their attempts to capture Moscow in the forehead;

c) local conditions; in particular, the ability to cover the left flank of the northern German strike group and the flanks of the southern group with water barriers (the Moscow Sea and the Volga reservoir in the north and the Oka River in the south);

d) the transfer of enemy troops noted by us in late October - early November: from Kalinin to the Volokolamsk region from October 30 to November 2 and in the direction of Orel, Mtsensk, Tula from October 25 to November 8.

During the first half of November, the armies of the Western Front continued to conduct battles, mainly of local importance, in order to improve their position, repelling enemy attempts to penetrate our location. More significant hostilities unfolded on both flanks of the Western Front: in the Volokolamsk direction, as well as in the area southeast of Aleksin, from where the enemy tried to reach the rear of Tula from the north.

Our troops strengthened defensive lines, carried out private regroupings, and were also understaffed with personnel and materiel. New military formations also arrived - rifle, tank, cavalry, as a result of which our forces increased. So, on November 12, five cavalry divisions were included in the 16th Army, which covered a very responsible direction to Moscow.

On November 10, the 2nd cavalry corps of General Belov arrived at the Serpukhov direction, which, after unloading, concentrated in the area northeast of Lopasnya. The next day, the 112th Panzer Division arrived in the Lopasni area.

The concentration of cavalry and tanks in the Klinsko-Volokolamsk and Serpukhov directions was carried out with the aim of breaking through on both wings to the rear of the enemy in order to disrupt his preparations for the offensive. A similar measure of the Headquarters is already planning an active defense on the Western Front, the results of which were reflected in the subsequent period.

On November 15, the front line of our troops passed in a general direction from the western coast of the Moscow Sea to the south, east of Volokolamsk, east of Dorokhov (in the Mozhaisk direction), then to Naro-Fominsk, west of Serpukhov, further along the Oka River to Aleksin, west of Tula and west of the station Nodal. The troops of the Western Front (consisting of the 16th, 5th, 33rd, 43rd, 49th and 50th armies) repelled enemy infantry and tank attacks in the center of the 16th army and continued fighting on the front of the 49th army and the right flank of the 50th army, eliminating German attempts to surround Tula with actions from the northwest.

On the right flank of the Western Front, at the junction with the Kalinin Front south of the Moscow Sea, was the 16th Army, which grouped its main forces in the Volokolamsk direction. The 5th Army operated in the Mozhaisk direction; the Naro-Fominsk direction was covered by the 33rd Army. Further south was the front of the 43rd and 49th armies. The 50th Army, recently included in the Western Front, defended the Tula region.

Dividing line in the north, with the Kalinin Front: Verbilki, Reshetnikovo station, Knyazhi Gory, Sychevka (all inclusive for the Western Front); in the south, with the Southwestern Front: Spassk-Ryazansky, Mikhailov, Uzlovaya station, Krapivna, Belev, Dyatkovo (all inclusive for the Western Front). The total length of the front line (excluding small bends) on November 15 is about 330 km.

In total, there were on the Western Front (including the troops of the 30th Army): thirty-one rifle divisions, three motorized rifle divisions, nine cavalry divisions, fourteen tank brigades, two tank divisions, six aviation divisions. The combat and numerical composition of some formations was very small. In total, as of November 15, the troops of the Western Front had (see the table of the balance of forces) about 240,000 fighters, 1,200 field guns, 500 tanks, 180-200 combat aircraft (80 fighters, 80 bombers, 20 attack aircraft).

Note The figures for the combat composition and balance of forces of the parties are derived by comparing and studying data from several sources.

The opposing enemy forces included about twenty-four to twenty-six infantry divisions, four motorized divisions, eleven to thirteen tank divisions; only about forty divisions deployed in front of the Western Front (see table of the balance of power).

The combat composition of these troops was expressed in approximately 230,000 soldiers, about 1800 field guns, 1300 tanks, 600-800 aircraft. When comparing the balance of forces within the entire front, we get almost equality in infantry, superiority of the Germans in artillery, mortars, partly in aviation, and more than double superiority in tanks. Thus, the quantitative superiority in technology by the beginning of the second offensive was on the side of the Germans.

Along with the general correlation of forces along the entire front, the correlation of forces along the axes where decisive events are played out is of great importance. As will be seen below, the Germans were able to concentrate their main mobile forces on both wings in accordance with the plan of the operation - since the initiative for action in the first half of November was on their side - and in the first period they achieved even more significant superiority in forces and in technology in the shock sectors . This question will be covered in detail in the description of the course of the operation.

The operational and strategic position of the enemy in the theater of operations and the quantitative superiority in tanks gave the Germans the opportunity to strike at Moscow in large mobile groups in the following directions:

a) Turginovo, Klin, Dmitrov (distance about 100 km) and further bypassing Moscow from the northeast;

b) Teryaeva Sloboda, then to Klin (or directly to Solnechnogorsk) and further to Moscow, directing the main blow along the Leningrad highway (distance about 120 km);

c) Volokolamsk, Novo-Petrovskoe, Istra and further to Moscow (distance about 110 km);

e) the Naro-Fominsk direction, using the Naro-Fominsk-Moscow highway as an axis (distance 70 km);

f) the Maloyaroslavets direction, with branchings to Podolsk or Krasnaya Pakhra and further to Moscow;

g) Serpukhov - for actions to Moscow from the south (distance 90 km) or bypassing Moscow from the southeast;

h) the Tula direction, with partial ramifications to Mikhailov, Zaraisk, Venev, Kashira, Serpukhov, and the enemy’s desire to bypass Tula from the southeast and surround it was already indicated.

All these directions were responsible, each of them had its own significance in the defense system of the Western Front, as a result of which it was necessary to reliably cover them in the situation of the enemy's impending offensive. The shortest routes to the capital passed through our center, but the mobile groupings of the Germans, according to available information, were concentrated against our wings.

The Supreme High Command of the Red Army took measures to repulse the enemy's impending offensive.

The plan of the Supreme High Command of the Red Army provided for:

1) the creation of powerful strategic reserves in the depths of the country (a large number of reserve formations, the formation of reserve armies, etc.);

2) the construction of a number of fortified lines and areas on the far and near approaches to Moscow, which were supposed to form a multi-lane defense system for the capital;

3) conducting a stubborn and active defense on the outskirts of Moscow from the west, the allocation of the forces necessary for this, based on fortified positions;

4) the concentration of operational-strategic reserves near Moscow and their location behind the flanks, outside the ring of a possible enemy tank encirclement;

5) exhausting the enemy with inflicting counterattacks and partial defeats on the outskirts of Moscow in order to exhaust and stop him;

6) the transition to a decisive counteroffensive at a convenient moment in order to defeat the enemy.

The main task of the troops of the Western Front in this situation was to reliably provide approaches to the capital, exhaust, wear down the enemy with active defense in the most important directions, inflict partial defeats on him, stop his advance, delay him until favorable conditions are created. to launch a decisive counteroffensive.

In this position, the Western Front under the command of General of the Army Comrade. Zhukov took upon himself the blow of a huge mass of people and military equipment thrown by the Nazi command on November 15-16 in the second general offensive against Moscow.

As it became known later (already after the start of the second German offensive), by the beginning of December, the German command had concentrated and introduced 30–33 infantry, 13 tank and 4–5 motorized infantry divisions during the offensive against the Western Front, in total 47–51 divisions. These forces were deployed as follows:

a) against our right flank in the Klinsko-Solnechnogorsk direction - the 3rd and 4th tank groups of Generals Goth and Gepner, consisting of the 1st, 2nd, 5th, 6th, 7th, 10th and 11th tank divisions, the 36th and 14th -th motorized infantry divisions, 23rd, 106th and 35th infantry divisions;

b) against the left flank, in the Tula-Kashirsko-Ryazan direction - the 2nd armored army of General Guderian, consisting of the 3rd, 4th, 17th and 18th tank divisions, the 10th and 29th motorized infantry divisions, the 167th infantry division ;

c) against our center - the 9th, 7th, 20th, 12th, 13th and 43rd army corps, the 19th and 20th tank divisions of the enemy.

These troops were part of the 9th and 4th armies, the 2nd tank army, the 3rd and 4th tank groups and were united by the Central Army Group (commander - General Bock; army group headquarters - Vyazma), operating on the Moscow strategic direction.

Hitler gave the order to capture Moscow at any cost in the near future. The aim of the German fascist leadership was to penetrate our Western Front's flanks by breaking through and making a deep detour, to break through the opposing Red Army troops, to surround and occupy Moscow. To do this, the enemy sought to: a) capture Klin, Solnechnogorsk, Rogachevo, Dmitrov, Yakhroma in the north; b) to occupy Tula, Kashira, Ryazan and Kolomna in the south; c) then strike at Moscow from three sides - from the north, west and south - and take it.

The German Information Bureau reported in early December:

"The German command will consider Moscow as its main goal even if Stalin tries to shift the center of gravity of military operations elsewhere."

Thus, the operational plan of the German command was reduced to a concentric offensive against Moscow with its mobile forces delivering the main blows on the setting wings (“wedges”); infantry formations in the center were to conduct an auxiliary offensive.

The northern German wing, having captured the Klin, Solnechnogorsk, Dmitrov region and advancing part of its forces on Moscow, developed a strike around the capital from the northeast and entered into communication with the troops of the southern wing east of Moscow. The main task of the southern German wing (the main core of which was the 2nd Panzer Army) was to carry out a quick breakthrough through our front in the direction of Tula and further across the line of the Oka River between Ryazan and Serpukhov, to capture important industrial regions with the cities of Tula, Stalinogorsk, Kashira, and then surround the capital from the southeast, closing the ring east of Moscow together with the northern group. The 24th Panzer Corps, according to the original plan, was to break through the Tula, to the crossings on the Oka River near Kashira and Serpukhov. The 47th Panzer Corps, building up the strike of the 24th Panzer Corps, was supposed to capture the Kolomna area and create bridgehead positions to ensure the crossing of troops across the Moscow River. Two army corps (43rd and 53rd) were attached to the 2nd Panzer Army for this operation.

The German center was to first pin down the troops of the Red Army on the shortest approaches to Moscow from the west with the help of its army corps, and then, with the development of the operation on the wings, striking through Zvenigorod and Naro-Fominsk, break through to the capital in order to split our front into isolated pieces and make it impossible for the further organized resistance of the Red Army near Moscow.

This operational plan was no worse and no better than other similar plans of the German command, the implementation of which in other cases gave success. In its conception and construction, this plan, at first glance, seemed to correspond to the level of development of military art and modern technology. Large forces were assembled for the offensive, they occupied an advantageous starting position, were concentrically aimed at the capital of the Soviet country. With a direct movement in front of them, they were supposed to go to the flank and rear of the troops of the Western Front and surround Moscow. It seemed to the fascist German leadership that there were all the prerequisites for delivering the last blow of tremendous force, which, even before the onset of winter, was to decide the fate of Moscow, the entire campaign and even the war. It was the plan of an experienced and skillful predator, seeking quick captures.

However, the conditions under which the great battle of Moscow proceeded were already different, more favorable for the Red Army than at the beginning of the war. The results of the previous five-month struggle of the Red Army and the entire Soviet people under the wise leadership of Comrade Stalin against the fascist invaders began to show. In the new conditions of the struggle that developed on the Western Front in November - December 1941, with a favorable political and strategic situation for the Red Army, this operational plan of the German command no longer corresponded to the situation. It turned out to be lifeless, adventurous and led the Nazi troops to defeat near Moscow.

The start of the German offensive.

The procedure for describing the Moscow operation

On November 16, the second general offensive of the Nazi forces against Moscow began on the Western Front. The actions of the troops, which unfolded from the second half of November in a vast strip from the Moscow Sea to Tula, were united by a single operational plan and a common front command and represented one large and complex operation. At the same time, combat operations on the northern wing, in the center and on the southern wing, in the presence of unity and mutual connection of operational events within the framework of a front-line operation, also had their own regularity and a certain independence of development. They are rich in instructive factual material and are valuable in those operational-tactical conclusions that can be drawn within the framework of an army or several armies solving a common task (an army operation, an operation of an army group).

In order to correctly understand the characteristic features and specifics of actions in various operational areas in various periods of struggle (while not losing sight of the connection and interdependence of events), it is advisable to consider this grandiose epic in terms of major successive stages of the operation (the defensive battle near Moscow; the counteroffensive of the Red Army in the Western front; further development of the offensive from the line of the rivers Lama, Ruza, Nara, Oka). Within each stage, first analyze the actions of the wings and the center separately, and then link them accordingly to each stage of the front operation and draw the necessary general conclusions and conclusions. In this order, further description of events will be conducted.

A number of major issues and measures of the Supreme High Command that cannot be placed within this framework (for example, the concentration of reserve armies, the role of the Moscow defense zone, the participation of the High Command aviation, etc.) will be singled out and considered separately. The defensive battle near Moscow covers the period from November 15–16 to December 5, 1941.