The corps, which included the SS Reich division, was eager for Moscow, but the position of the Germans was becoming critical: the resistance of the Red Army was constantly growing, and the Soviet command, regardless of losses, threw more and more fresh units into battle. On October 14, the SS division entered the legendary Borodino field and attacked the positions of the 32nd Infantry Division. In the course of the battle, Hausser's soldiers attacked positions on the Semenovskie flushes, took them and went to the Borodino-Mozhaisk road. The positions of the Siberian regiments were broken through, the 32nd division was almost completely destroyed. The new Battle of Borodino ended in the defeat of the Red Army. But in these battles, the division had to lose its creator and commander. On October 14, 1941, Paul Hausser was seriously wounded by shrapnel from a shell that exploded nearby: the right side of his face was severely damaged, his right eye and jaw were especially damaged. [SS Oberführer Wilhelm Bittrich took command of the division after Hausser was wounded.] In Germany, where Hausser was immediately evacuated, he underwent several operations, and then followed a fairly long course of rehabilitation. Health in general was restored, but the right eye stopped seeing forever. On May 9, 1942, Hausser was awarded the Silver Wound Badge. In general, the 1941 campaign in the East turned out to be extremely difficult for the German troops, and the SS Reich division was no exception - its losses amounted to 40% of the personnel.
SS Panzer Corps
Hausser had to recover from his injury for more than six months. He was no longer destined to return to his division. And not only because of the consequences of injury. At this time, Himmler managed to take the next step in the development of the SS troops: the indisputable advantages of the SS divisions on the Soviet-German front removed all the objections of the Reich leadership about the creation of the next level of SS military headquarters. If earlier Himmler's undoubted success was the formation of SS divisions, which was so opposed by the leadership of the Wehrmacht, now he received the go-ahead to create the headquarters of the SS corps. This corps was supposed to include the best and most efficient SS divisions - Leibstandarte, Reich and Death's Head. In principle, in fact, Himmler planned to create a powerful - perhaps the most powerful in the German army - shock formation, which would be able to solve the most important tasks, and its use in the direction of the main strike promised great benefits (and even greater fame). It was quite logical that Hausser was appointed to the post of commander of the new corps. Who else could be entrusted with the command besides the creator of the SS reinforcement units? Neither Eicke nor Dietrich were ready for such a high post - to be honest, Dietrich, although he later became the commander of the army, still did not rise above the level of the division (but rather his limit was the post of a regiment commander, and even then in the military time). Hausser was still a lieutenant general of the Reichswehr, that is, he had the necessary level of training for commanding a corps. So, in general, there was no one to choose from.
On May 13, 1942, an order was given to begin the formation of the SS-Panzerkorps, and on May 28, SS Obergruppenführer and SS General Paul Hausser officially took over the leadership. The formation of the headquarters and corps units was carried out in Bergen-Belsen. In general, the states were standard for tank corps; in the end, the following corps subordination units were formed (initially they did not have a number, but then - with the appearance of other SS corps - they received the number 102, and even later, with the next reorganization, a number of them - the number 502):
aviation squadron (Fliegerstaffel);
motorized corps cartographic service SS;
heavy tank battalion SS (Schwere SS-Panzer-Abteilung);
artillery command of the SS (SS-Artillerie Kom-mandeur);
SS artillery battalion (SS-Artillerie-Abteilung);
mortar company SS (SS-Granatwefer-Kompanie);
anti-aircraft company SS (SS-Flugabwehr-Kompanie 102);
SS rocket launcher division (SS-Werfer Abteilung);
SS corps communications battalion (SS-Korps-Nachrichten Abteilung);
SS scooter company (SS-Kraftfahrzeug-Kompanie);
military geographic company SS (SS-Wehrgeologen-Kompanie);
repair company SS (SS-Werkstatt-Kompanie);
corps sanitary company SS (SS-Korps-Sanitats-Kom-panie);
field postal office SS (SS-Feldpostamt);
a motorized company of SS war correspondents;
the motorized unit of the SS field gendarmerie;
corps security company SS (SS-Korps Sicherungs-Kompanie 102);
field reserve brigade SS (SS-Feldersatz-Brigade).
Note that, among other things, the aforementioned tank battalion and the company of the first "Tigers" - PzKw VI tanks were attached to the corps.
The three SS divisions mentioned above were subordinated to Hausser, and initially, at the stage of forming the corps, all of them were reorganized. In the camps in northern France, they were transferred to the states of motorized (panzergrenadier) divisions (they officially received such names in November 1942), and each received a tank battalion - all together they were quite an impressive force. Thus, initially, the Hausser corps included the motorized divisions "Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler" SS Obergruppenfuehrer and SS General Sepp Dietrich, "Das Reich" SS Gruppenfuehrer and Lieutenant General of the SS troops Georg Keppler and the "Death's Head" Obergruppenfuehrer SS Trooper and SS General Theodor ... As you can see, Hausser had a difficult time with such honored commanders, only Keppler was his "pupil", and the rest were independent personalities, in some cases having much stronger and broader ties in the party leadership and in the SS. As chief of staff, Hausser did not receive an SS man - this position was taken by the General Staff Officer, Colonel of the Wehrmacht Müller.
In August, the corps, still at the stage of reorganization, was included in the active army and subordinated to the 15th Army stationed in Northern France. In the fall of 1942, Hausser's SS men had a chance (along with other German troops in France) to take part in the occupation of southern France, which until that time was formally under the jurisdiction of the legitimate French government of Marshal Henri Petain. [After the German attack on France, Petain led a group calling for an early end to the war and the conclusion of an armistice with Germany. On June 16, 1940, he was quite legally appointed prime minister and soon concluded an armistice with Germany. Petain chose the resort town of Vichy in the south of France as the headquarters of his government. On July 10, 1940, the National Assembly (569 votes in favor, with 80 against and 17 abstained) handed over to Petain all power in the unoccupied territory of France. Thus, Petain (like Hitler in 1933) received a mandate to govern the state absolutely legally, from the hands of the country's highest legislative body. In fact, from that moment on, France, which severed diplomatic relations with Great Britain, was an ally of Germany.] The operation was carried out quite quickly, but the main task - to capture the French fleet based in Toulon - was not achieved by the Germans: in fact, this meant the failure of the operation and only expanded the territory controlled by the Germans, which required an even greater increase in the occupation forces. And this despite the fact that there was a significant shortage of forces on the Soviet-German front.
Despite the fact that, in general, Hausser needed some more time to bring his corps to full combat readiness, including the training of very significant reinforcements, - the divisions that arrived in France suffered heavy losses in Russia and, in addition, left almost all the equipment at the front, - he was soon ordered to leave for the East. The situation on the Soviet-German front was close to critical. The Soviet offensive in January 1943 led to the destruction of Paulus's Stalingrad group, and a powerful blow in the Ukraine brought the entire southern flank of German troops to the brink of disaster. In January 1943, the transfer of the SS Panzer Corps to Ukraine began, and initially only the Leibstandarte and the Reich arrived here, the Death's Head somewhat lagged behind - its losses were the most significant and Eicke took more time to train replenishments. Hausser himself received one of the highest party awards from Hitler on January 30, 1943 - the Golden Party Badge.According to the status, the badge was automatically given only to those whose NSDAP-№ was less than 100,000. In other cases, the badge was, as it were, Hitler's personal insignia. Hausser received it in advance - as the commander of the elite SS units. Note that the subordinates of Hausser, Dietrich and Eicke, by this time had been wearing Gold Party badges for quite some time.]
By the beginning of the Russian campaign, three volunteer regiments of foreign citizens had been created in the ranks of the SS, and with the outbreak of hostilities, the number of foreign units began to grow steadily. The participation of foreign legions in the war against the USSR was supposed to show, according to Himmler's plan, a common European desire to destroy communism. The participation of citizens of all European countries in the war against the Soviet Union gave rise to the post-war identification of the SS troops and the European Community.
In 1941, foreign volunteers were recruited into the national volunteer legions and corps, ranging in strength from one battalion to a regiment. Similar names were given to various anti-communist units created in 1917-1920 in Europe. In 1943, most of the legions were reformed into larger military units, the largest of which was the German SS Panzer Corps.
SS-Standarte "Nord West"
The formation of this German regiment began on April 3, 1941. The regiment was dominated by Dutch and Flemish volunteers, organized in companies along ethnic lines. Nordwest's training took place in Hamburg. After the outbreak of war with the Soviet Union, it was decided to use the regiment's frame for the early formation of independent national legions. By August 1, 1941, the regiment numbered 1,400 Dutch, 400 Flemings and 108 Danes. At the end of August, the regiment was transferred to the Arus-Nord training area in East Prussia. Here, on September 24, 1941, according to the order of the FHA SS, the regiment was disbanded, and the existing personnel was distributed between the national legions and parts of the V-SS.
From the moment of formation and until the last day, the SS-Standartenführer Otto Reich was the commander of the regiment.
Volunteer Legion "Netherlands"
The creation of the legion began on June 12, 1941 in the Krakow area, a little later the legion's frame was transferred to the Arus-Nord training ground. The basis of the legion was the Dutch battalion from the disbanded regiment "Nordwest". Another contingent that arrived at the formation was a battalion, created from the ranks of the assault troops of the Dutch National Socialist Movement. The battalion departed from Amsterdam on October 11, 1941 and joined up with volunteers already trained in Arus.
By Christmas 1941, the legion was a motorized regiment of three battalions and two companies (the 13th infantry gun company and the 14th anti-tank company). Before being sent to the front, the total strength of the legion exceeded 2,600 ranks. In mid-January 1942, the legion was transferred to Danzig, and from there by sea to Libau. From Libava, the Dutch were sent to the northern sector of the front in the area of Lake Ilmen. By the end of January, the legion arrived at the positions assigned to it in the area of the Novgorod-Tosna road. The legion received its baptism of fire in the battle at Goose Gora near Volkhov (north of Lake Ilmen). After that, the Dutch took part in long defensive and then offensive battles near Volkhov. Then the legion operated at Myasny Bor. In mid-March 1942, a reinforced field hospital with Dutch personnel, which was part of the legion, arrived at the Eastern Front. The hospital was located in the Oranienburg area.
During the fighting, the legion earned the gratitude of the OKW, but lost 20% of its strength and was withdrawn from the front line and reinforced by ethnic Germans from Northern Schleswig. After a short rest and resupply, in July 1942, the legion took part in the destruction of the remnants of the Soviet 2nd Shock Army and, according to some reports, took part in the capture of General Vlasov himself. The rest of the summer and autumn the legion spent in operations at Krasnoe Selo and later around Shlisselburg, slightly deviating from the Leningrad direction. At the end of 1942, the legion operated as part of the 2nd SS Infantry Brigade. Its number at this time decreased to 1,755 people. On February 5, 1943, the news came from Holland that the honorary chief of the legion, General Seiffardt, had been killed by the Resistance. After 4 days, the FHA SS issued an order assigning the name General Seiffardt to the first company of the legion.
In addition to the gratitude of the OKW, the legion had another difference, its rottenführer Gerardus Muyman from the 14th anti-tank company in one of the battles knocked out thirteen Soviet tanks and on February 20, 1943 was awarded the knight's cross, thus becoming the first of the German volunteers to be awarded this honor. On April 27, 1943, the legion was withdrawn from the front and sent to the Grafenwehr training ground.
On May 20, 1943, the Netherlands Volunteer Legion was officially disbanded, in order to be born again on October 22, 1943, but already as the 4th SS Nederland Volunteer Tank Grenadier Brigade.
Volunteer Corps "Denmark"
Eight days after the German attack on the USSR, the Germans announced the creation of the Danish Volunteer Corps, independent of the Nordland regiment. On July 3, 1941, the first Danish volunteers, having received the banner, left Denmark and headed for Hamburg. By order of the FHA SS of July 15, 1941, the unit was named the Volunteer Unit "Denmark", and then renamed the Volunteer Corps. By the end of July 1941, a headquarters and an infantry battalion of 480 people were organized. In August, one officer and 108 Danes from the disbanded Nordwest regiment were added to the battalion. At the end of August, a liaison office was created at the battalion headquarters. In September 1941, the corps was expanded to include a reinforced motorized battalion. On September 13, 1941, the unit was moved to Treskau to join the corps reserve company. By December 31, 1941, the number of the corps increased to 1164 ranks, and about a month later it increased by another hundred people. Until the spring of 1942, the corps personnel underwent training.
On May 8-9, the Danish battalion was transported by plane to the Heiligenbeil area (East Prussia), and then to Pskov, to Army Group North. Upon arrival, the corps was tactically subordinate to the SS Totenkopf Division. From May 20 to June 2, 1942, the corps participated in battles north and south of the Demyansk fortifications, where it distinguished itself by destroying the Soviet bridgehead. In early June, the Danes operated along the road to Byakovo. On the night of June 3–4, the battalion was transferred to the northern section of the Demyansk corridor, where it fought off strong enemy attacks for two days. The next day, June 6, the Danes were replaced and camped in the woods near Vasilivshino. On the morning of June 11, the Red Army launched a counterattack and returned Bolshiye Dubovichi, occupied by the Germans, by the middle of the day, the situation deteriorated even more and von Lettov-Vorbek ordered the corps to retreat. After this battle, the number of companies ranged from 40 to 70 people in each. Having taken up the defensive position in the Vasilivshino area, the corps was replenished with a reserve staff that arrived from Poznan. On July 16, the Red Army attacked and occupied Vasilivshino, and on the 17th attacked the Danish battalion with tanks supported by aviation. Vasilivshino was again occupied by the Germans on 23 July, the extreme left flank of this position was occupied by a corps. On the twenty-fifth of July, the Danes were withdrawn to the reserve. By August 1942, the battalion had lost 78% of its initial strength, which was the reason for its withdrawal from the Demyansk region and sent to Mitava. In September 1942, the Danes returned to their homeland and paraded through Copenhagen and were dismissed to their homes, but on October 12, all the ranks were again gathered in Copenhagen and returned to Mitava. On December 5, 1942, a reserve company was introduced into the battalion, and the corps itself became part of the 1st SS Infantry Brigade.
In December 1942, the corps served in the fortified area of Nevel, and later fought defensive battles south of Velikiye Luki. After that, the corps spent three weeks in reserve. On Christmas Eve, the Danes were attacked by a Soviet division and retreated from the Kondratovo they occupied, but on December 25, the corps recaptured Kondratovo. On January 16, 1943, the cauldron at Velikiye Luki was closed, and the Danes moved to a position north of Myshino - Kondratovo, where they remained until the end of February. On February 25, the corps attacked and captured the enemy stronghold on Tide - this was the last battle of the Danish volunteers.
At the end of April 1943, the remaining Danes were sent to the Grafenwehr training ground. On May 6, the corps was officially disbanded, but most of the Danes remained to continue serving in the newly formed Nordland division. In addition to the Danes, a large number of ethnic Germans from northern Schleswig served in this part. White emigres also preferred to serve in the Danish corps.
The volunteer corps was commanded by: Legions Obersturmbannführer Christian Peder Krussing July 19, 1941 - February 8-19, 1942, SS Sturmbannführer Christian Frederik von Schalburg March 1 - June 2, 1942, Legions Hauptsturmführer K.B. Martinsen June 2-10, 1942, SS-Sturmbannführer Hans Albrecht von Lettow-Vorbeck June 9-11, 1942, again K.B. Martinsen June 11, 1942 - May 6, 1943), Legions-Sturmbannführer Peder Nirgaard-Jacobsen May 2-6, 1943
In April 1943, after the disbandment of the volunteer corps from its veterans who had returned to Denmark, Martinsen created the Danish counterpart of the German SS. Officially, this unit was first named "Danish German Corps", and then the "Schalburg" corps in memory of the corps commander who died. This corps was not part of the W-SS and did not in any way belong to the SS organization. In the second half of 1944, under pressure from the Germans, the Schalburgcorpset was transferred to the V-SS and reorganized into the SS Schalburg training battalion, and then into the SS Seeland guard battalion.
Volunteer Legion "Norway"
With the beginning of the war of Germany against the USSR, the idea of the need for real participation of the Norwegians in hostilities on the side of Germany was widespread in Norway.
Recruitment points were opened in major Norwegian cities, and by the end of July 1941 the first three hundred Norwegian volunteers had left for Germany. After arriving in Kiel, they were sent to the Fallinbostel training area. Here on the first of August 1941 the volunteer legion "Norway" was officially created. In mid-August, another 700 volunteers from Norway arrived here, as well as 62 volunteers from the Norwegian community in Berlin. On October 3, 1941, in the presence of Vidkun Quisling, who arrived in Germany, the first battalion of the legion took the oath in Fallinbostel. As a sign of continuity, this battalion received the name "Viken" - the same as the 1st Hird regiment (paramilitary units of the Norwegian National Samling). The staff of the legion, according to the order of the FHA SS, was supposed to consist of 1218 ranks, but by October 20, 1941, the unit numbered more than 2000 people. The Norwegian Legion was organized according to the following principle: headquarters and headquarters company (anti-tank company), a platoon of war correspondents, an infantry battalion of three infantry companies and one machine-gun company. A spare battalion created in Halmestrand was also considered part of the legion.
On March 16, 1942, the legion arrived at the Leningrad sector of the front. A few kilometers from Leningrad, the Norwegians were included in the 2nd SS Infantry Brigade. After the arrival of the legion, they began to carry out patrol service, and then took part in the battles at the front until May 1942. In September 1942, the reserve battalion of the legion, which had already transferred the bulk of the ranks to the legion, was consolidated into a company, but, in addition to this company, a new one was created on the territory of Latvia in Jelgava (Mitava). At the same time, the first of the four arrived at the front, a police company of the Norwegian Legion, created in Norway from pro-German-minded police officers. Its commander was the SS-Sturmbannführer and the leader of the Norwegian SS, Janas Lee. The company operated as part of the legion, which at that time was on the northern sector of the front, where it suffered heavy losses in defensive battles near Krasnoe Selo, Konstantinovka, Uretsk and Krasny Bor. In February 1943, the 800 remaining legionnaires were joined with the reserve companies, and at the end of March the legion was withdrawn from the front and sent to Norway.
On April 6, 1943, a parade of the ranks of the legion took place in Oslo. After a short vacation, the legion returned to Germany in May of the same year, the Norwegians were gathered at the Grafenwehr training ground, where the legion was disbanded on May 20, 1943. However, most of the Norwegians responded to the call of V. Quisling and continued to serve in the ranks of the new "German" SS division.
After the creation of the 1st Police Company and its excellent service on the Eastern Front, the creation of other police companies began. The second company was created by Norwegian Police Major Egil Hoel in the fall of 1943, and included 160 officers of the Norwegian police. After completing the training, the company arrived at the front and was included in the 6th SS reconnaissance unit of the "Nord" division. Together with the specified unit, the company operated at the front for 6 months. The company commander was SS-Sturmbannführer Egil Hoel.
In the summer of 1944, the 3rd police company was created, in August 1944 it arrived at the front, but due to Finland's withdrawal from the war and the retreat of German troops from its territory, the company did not have time to take part in the battles. One hundred and fifty people of its composition were sent to Oslo, and in December 1944 the company was disbanded. At the time of formation, the company was commanded by SS-Hauptsturmführer Age Heinrich Berg, and then SS-Obersturmführer Oskar Olsen Rustand. The last of these officers tried to form the 4th police company at the end of the war, but nothing came of his idea.
The Legion was commanded by: Legions Sturmbannführer Jürgen Bakke from 1 August 1941, Legions Sturmbannführer Finn Hannibal Kjellstrup from 29 September 1941, Legions Sturmbannführer Arthur Kvist from autumn 1941.
Finnish Volunteer Battalion
Even before the start of the war with the Soviet Union, the Germans secretly recruited Finns into the V-SS. The recruitment campaign gave the Germans 1,200 volunteers. During May - June 1941, volunteers arrived in batches from Finland to Germany. Upon arrival, the volunteers were divided into two groups. Persons with military experience, that is, participants in the "winter war", were distributed among the units of the "Viking" division, and the rest of the volunteers were gathered in Vienna. From Vienna, they were transferred to the Gross Born training area, where they formed the Finnish SS volunteer battalion (previously referred to as the SS volunteer battalion "Nordost"). The battalion consisted of a headquarters, three rifle companies and a heavy company. Part of the battalion was a reserve company in Radom, which was part of the reserve battalion of the German legions. In January
In 1942 the Finnish battalion arrived at the front at the location of the "Viking" division on the line of the Mius River. According to the order, the arriving Finns became first the fourth and then the third battalion of the Nordland regiment, while the third battalion itself was used to replace the division's losses. Until April 26, 1942, the battalion fought on the Mius River against units of the 31st Infantry Division of the Red Army. Then the Finnish battalion was sent to Aleksandrovka. After heavy fighting for Demidovka, the Finns were withdrawn from the front sector to replenishment, which lasted until September 10, 1942. The change in the situation at the front required the participation of the battalion in the bloody battles for Maykop, in which the German command used the Finns in the most difficult sectors. At first
In 1943, the Finnish volunteer battalion, in the general stream of the German retreat, went all the way from Mal-gobek (through Mineralnye Vody, villages and Bataysk) to Rostov, participating in rearguard battles. Having reached Izium, the Finns, along with the remnants of the Nordland regiment, were withdrawn from the division and sent to the Grafenwehr training ground. From Grafenwehr, the Finnish battalion was transferred to Ruhpolding, where it was disbanded on July 11, 1943.
During the existence of the battalion, Finnish volunteers also served in the military correspondent unit and in the reserve infantry battalion "Totenkopf" No. 1. Attempts to create a completely new Finnish SS unit in 1943-1944 were unsuccessful, and the formation of the SS "Kalevala" unit was discontinued ... The most famous Finnish volunteer was Obersturmführer Ulf Ola Ollin from the 5th SS Panzer Regiment, he received the most awards of all the Finns, and his tank - "Panther" with the number 511 was known throughout the "Viking" division.
The battalion commander was SS-Hauptsturmführer Hans Kollani.
British Volunteer Corps
By the beginning of 1941, about 10 British served in the ranks of the B-SS, but until 1943 no attempts were made to form an English legion in the Waffen-SS. The initiator of the creation of the British division was John Amery, the son of the former British Minister for Indian Affairs. John Amery himself was a well-known anti-communist and even fought on the side of General Franco in the Spanish Civil War.
Originally from the British who lived on the continent, Amery created the British Anti-Bolshevik League, which was to create its own armed formations to be sent to the Eastern Front. After a long debate with the Germans, in April 1943 he was allowed to visit the English prisoner of war camps in France to recruit volunteers and propagate his ideas. This venture received the code designation "Special compound 999". It is interesting to note that this number was the telephone number of Scotland Yard before the war.
In the summer of 1943, a special unit was transferred under the control of the D-1 XA SS department, which dealt with the issues of European volunteers. In the fall of 1943, the volunteers changed their previous English uniform to the Waffen-SS uniform, while receiving SS soldiers' books. In January 1944, the former name "Legion of St. George" was changed to "British Volunteer Corps", more in line with the tradition of the B-SS. It was planned to increase the size of the corps to 500 people at the expense of prisoners of war, and put Brigadier General Parrington, captured in 1941 in Greece, at the head.
After some time, the composition of the British was divided into groups for use at the front. Volunteers were assigned to various parts of the Waffen-SS. The largest number of volunteers was taken to the regiment of military correspondents "Kurt Eggers", and the rest were distributed between the 1st, 3rd and 10th SS divisions. Another 27 British remained in the Dresden barracks to complete their training. In October 1944, it was decided to transfer the BFK to the III SS Panzer Corps. After the famous air raid of the Western Allies on Dresden, the BFK was transferred to the Lichterfelde barracks in Berlin, where those who had returned from the front also arrived. After completing their training in March 1945, the British were transferred partly to the headquarters of the German SS Panzer Corps, and partly to the 11th SS Panzer Reconnaissance Battalion. In the ranks of the specified battalion, the BFK took part in the defense of Schonberg on the western bank of the Oder on March 22.
With the beginning of the assault on Berlin, most of the British went to break through to the Western allies, to whom they surrendered in the Mecklenburg area. The remaining individual volunteers took part in street fighting along with the Nordland division.
In addition to the British, volunteers from the colonies, commonwealth countries and America were recruited into the BFK.
BFK commanders: SS-Hauptsturmführer Johannes Rogenfeld - Summer 1943, SS-Hauptsturmführer Hans Werner Ropke - Summer 1943 - May 9, 1944, SS-Obersturmführer Dr. Kühlich - May 9, 1944 - February 1945, SS-Hauptsturmführer Hans Werner Ropke Alexander Dolezalek - until the end of the war.
Indian Volunteer Legion
The Indian Legion was formed at the beginning of the war in the ranks of the German army as the 950th Indian Infantry Regiment. By the end of 1942, the regiment consisted of about 3,500 ranks. After training, the legion was sent to the security service, first to Holland, and then to France (guarding the Atlantic Wall). On August 8, 1944, the legion was transferred to the SS forces with the designation "Indian Legion of the Waffen-SS". Seven days later, the Indian volunteers were transported by train from Lokanau to Poyrz.
Upon arriving in the Poyyrz area, the Hindus were attacked by the Poppies, and in late August, the Legion fought the Resistance en route from Shatrow to Allier. In the first week of September, the legion reached the Berry Canal. Continuing on the move, the Indians fought street battles with the French regular troops in the city of Dong, and then retreated in the direction of Sancoin. In the area of Luzi, the Indians were ambushed at night, after which the legion marched in an accelerated march towards Dijon via Loir. In the battle with enemy tanks at Nuits - Site - Georges, the unit suffered heavy losses. After this battle, the Indians retreated by march through Relipemont in the direction of Colmar. And then they continued their retreat to German territory.
In November 1944, the unit was designated the Waffen-SS Indian Volunteer Legion. By the beginning of December of the same year, the legion arrived at the garrison of the city of Oberhoffen. After Christmas, the legion was transferred to the Hoiberg training camp, where it remained until the end of March 1945. In early April 1945, the legion was disarmed on Hitler's orders. In April 1945, the Indian Legion began moving towards the Swiss border in the hopes of obtaining asylum there and avoiding extradition to the Anglo-Americans. Breaking through the Alps to the Lake Constance region, the Indian volunteers were surrounded and captured by the French Poppies and the Americans. Since 1943, the so-called Guards Company, located in Berlin and created for ceremonial purposes, existed as part of the Indian regiment. During the war, the company apparently continued to remain in Berlin. During the storming of Berlin, Indians in SS uniform participated in its defense, one of them was even taken prisoner by the Red Army, all of them, probably, were the ranks of the aforementioned "Guards" company.
The commander of the legion was SS-Oberführer Heinz Bertling.
Serbian Volunteer Corps
Until the establishment of the Serbian government of General Milan Nedić in August 1941, no attempts were made to organize Serbian armed units. General Nedić announced the creation of various state police forces. Their combat effectiveness left much to be desired, so they were mainly used for local security tasks. In addition to these formations, the so-called Serbian Volunteer Team was created on September 15, 1941. This unit was created from the activists of the ZBOR organization and the radical military. The unit commander was appointed Colonel Konstantin Mushitsky, who was the adjutant of the Yugoslav Queen Maria before the war. The team soon turned into an excellent anti-partisan unit, which was recognized even by the Germans. Like the rest of the Serbian and Russian units, the team "made" peace with the Chetniks and fought only against Tito's troops and the Ustash arbitrariness. Soon, KFOR divisions began to emerge throughout Serbia, these divisions were known as "detachments", during 1942 their number increased to 12, as a rule, the detachment consisted of 120-150 soldiers and several officers. KFOR units were widely recruited by the Germans for anti-partisan actions and, in fact, were the only Serbian formation that received weapons from the Germans. In January 1943, the SDKKomand was reorganized into the SDKorpus, which consisted of five battalions of 500 people each. The corps did not hide its monarchical orientation and even went to parades in Belgrade under the banner with monarchist slogans. At the beginning of 1944, the KFOR and the new volunteers were reorganized into 5 infantry regiments (Roman numbers I through V) of 1,200 fighters each and an artillery battalion of 500 people. In addition, a school for recruits and a hospital in Logatec were later established as part of KFOR. On October 8, 1944, corps units began their retreat from Belgrade. The next day, the SDKorpus was transferred to the Waffen-SS with the designation "Serbian SS Volunteer Corps". The structure of the hull was left unchanged. The ranks of the Serbian corps did not become the ranks of the Waffen-SS and continued to wear their previous ranks and obey the Serbian command. After the retreat from Belgrade, the KFOR units, together with the Chetniks and the Germans, fled to Slovenia. In April 1945, by agreement with the Germans, KFOR became part of one of the Chetnik divisions in Slovenia. At the end of April, two regiments of the SDK (I and V regiments), by order of the commander of the Chetniks in Slovenia, General Damjanovic, left in the direction of the Italian border, crossing which they surrendered on May 1. The remaining three regiments II, III and IV, under the command of the chief of staff of the KFOR, Lieutenant Colonel Radoslav Tatalovich, participated in the battles with the NOAJ near Ljubljana, after which they retreated to Austrian territory and surrendered to the British.
The commander of the Serbian corps was Colonel (at the end of the war, General) Konstantin Mushitsky.
Estonian Volunteer Legion
The legion was formed according to the states of the usual three-battalion regiment at the SS Heidelager training camp (near Debitz, on the territory of the General Government). Soon after the full complement of the legion was designated as the "1st Estonian SS Volunteer Grenadier Regiment." Until the spring of next year, the regiment was trained in the above camp. In March 1943, the regiment received an order to send the first battalion to the front as part of the SS Viking tank-grenadier division, which was operating at that time in the Izyum area. The German SS-Hauptsturmführer Georg Eberhardt was appointed commander of the battalion, and the battalion itself became the Estonian SS Volunteer Grenadier Battalion "Narva". From March 1944 it operated as the 111 / 10th SS Westland Regiment. Without engaging in major battles, the battalion, together with the division, operated as part of the 1st Tank Army in the Izyum-Kharkov region. The baptism of fire of the Estonians took place on July 19, 1943 in the battle for Hill 186.9. Supported by the fire of the Viking division's artillery regiment, the battalion destroyed about 100 Soviet tanks, but lost its commander, who was replaced by SS-Obersturmführer Koop. The next time, the Estonian volunteers distinguished themselves on 18 August of the same year in the battle for heights 228 and 209 near Klenovaya, where, interacting with a company of "tigers" from the SS Totenkopf tank regiment, they destroyed 84 Soviet tanks. Apparently, these two cases gave the spacecraft analysts the right to indicate in their intelligence reports that the Narva battalion has extensive experience in fighting with machine tools. Continuing the hostilities in the ranks of the Viking division, the Estonians along with it ended up in the Korsun-Shevchenkovsky cauldron in the winter of 1944, after leaving which they suffered huge losses. In April, the division received an order to withdraw the Estonian battalion from its composition, the Estonians were given a touching farewell, after which they departed for the place of the new formation.
Caucasian SS military unit
In the early years of the war, a large number of units from the natives of the Caucasus were created as part of the German army. Their formation took place mainly on the territory of occupied Poland. In addition to the front-line army units, various police and punitive units were formed from the Caucasians. In 1943, in Belarus, in the Slonim district, two Caucasian police battalions of the Schutzmannschaft were created - the 70th and 71st. Both battalions took part in anti-partisan operations in Belarus, being subordinate to the chief of anti-bandit formations. Later, these battalions became the basis for the North Caucasus security brigade being formed in Poland. By order of Himmler on July 28, 1944, about 4,000 ranks of the brigade, along with their families, were transferred to the region of upper Italy. Here, together with the Cossack camp, the Caucasians formed the backbone of the anti-partisan forces subordinate to the HSSPF "Adriatic Coast" of SS-Obergruppenführer Globochnik. On August 11, the brigade was reorganized into the Caucasian corps by order of Berger, and in less than a month it was renamed the Caucasian formation. The recruitment of the unit was accelerated by the transfer of 5,000 employees from the 800, 801, 802, 803, 835, 836, 837, 842 and 843 army field battalions. The unit consisted of three national military groups - Armenian, Georgian and North Caucasian. It was planned to deploy each group into a full-fledged regiment.
At the end of 1944, the Georgian and North Caucasian groups were located in the Italian city of Paluzza, and the Armenian group in Klagenfurt. In December 1944, the Azerbaijani group, which was previously part of the East Turkic SS formation, was transferred to the compound. Azerbaijani participants in the events after the war claimed that their group managed to arrive in Verona before the end of the war.
Groups located in Italy were constantly involved in anti-partisan operations. At the end of April, the North Caucasian group began to retreat to Austrian territory, and the small Georgian group was disbanded by its commander. In May 1945, the ranks of the compound were issued by the British to the Soviet side.
In contrast to the next unit, Caucasian émigré officers were in all command positions, and the commander of the unit itself was SS-Standartenführer Arvid Toyerman, a former officer of the Russian Imperial Army.
East Turkic military unit of the SS
The German army created a large number of volunteer units from the inhabitants of Soviet Central Asia. The commander of one of the first Turkestan battalions was Major Mayer-Mader, who in the pre-war years was a military adviser to Chiang Kai-shek. Mayer-Mader, seeing the limited and unpromising use of Asians by the Wehrmacht, dreamed of the sole leadership of all Turkic units. To this end, he went first to Berger, and then to the head of the VI directorate of the RSHA SS-brigadeführer and Major General of the V-SS Walter Schellenberg. To the first, he proposed an increase in the number of the V-SS by 30,000 Turkestanis, and to the second, the implementation of sabotage in Soviet Central Asia and the organization of anti-Soviet demonstrations. The major's proposals were accepted and, in November 1943, on the basis of the 450th and 480th battalions, the 1st East Muslim SS Regiment was created.
The formation of the regiment took place not far from Lublin, in the town of Ponyatovo. In January 1944, it was decided to deploy the regiment into the SS Noye Turkestan division. For this purpose, the following battalions were taken from the active army: 782, 786, 790, 791st Turkestan, 818th Azerbaijani and 831st Volga-Tatar. At this time, the regiment itself was sent to Belarus to participate in anti-partisan operations. Upon arrival, the headquarters of the regiment was located in the town of Yuratishki, not far from Minsk. On March 28, 1944, during one of these operations, the commander of the Mayr-Ma-der regiment was killed, and SS-Hauptsturmführer Billig took his place. Compared to the previous commander, he was not popular with his people, and a number of excesses took place in the regiment, as a result of which Billig was displaced, and the regiment was transferred to the von Gottberg battle group. In May, the regiment took part in a major anti-partisan operation near Grodno, after which, together with other national units, at the end of May - beginning of June, it was withdrawn to the territory of Poland. In July 1944, the regiment was sent to the Neuhammer training ground for replenishment and rest, but soon it was sent to Lutsk and subordinated to a special SS regiment Dirlewanger. With the outbreak of the Warsaw Uprising in August 1944, the Muslim regiment and the Dirlewanger regiment were sent to suppress it. Upon arrival, on 4 August, both regiments became subordinate to Battle Group Reinefarth. In Warsaw, Turkestanis operated in the Wola city district. In early October, the Warsaw Uprising was over. When the uprising was suppressed, the Turkestanis received recognition from the German command. On October 1, it was announced that the regiment would be deployed to the East Turkic SS unit. The Muslim regiment was renamed into the "Turkestan" military group with a force of one battalion, the rest of the regiment, together with replenishment from the Volga-Tatar army units, made up the "Idel - Ural" military group. In addition, an SS assembly camp for Turkic volunteers was set up in the vicinity of Vienna. On October 15th, the formation, together with the Dirlewanger regiment, was sent to suppress the new, now Slovak uprising.
By the beginning of November 1944, the formation consisted of 37 officers, 308 non-commissioned officers and 2317 soldiers. In December, the "Azerbaijan" military group was taken from the compound. This group was transferred to the Caucasian formation. In December, the compound presented an unpleasant surprise to the Germans. On December 25, 1944, the commander of the Turkestan group Waffen-Obersturmführer Gulyam Alimov and 458 of his subordinates went over to the Slovak rebels near Miyava. At the request of the Soviet representatives, the rebels shot Alimov. For this reason, about 300 Turkestanis again deserted to the Germans. Despite this sad experience, two days later the Germans organized officer courses to train native officers of the formation in the town of Poradi.
On January 1, 1945, the military group "Crimea", created from the disbanded Tatar brigade, became part of the formation. At the same time, 2227 Turkestanis, 1622 Azerbaijanis, 1427 Tatars and 169 Bashkirs were gathered in the Vienna SS-Obersturmbannführer camp by Anton Ziegler. All of them were preparing to join the ranks of the Turkic SS unit. In March 1945, the compound was transferred to the 48th Infantry Division (2nd Formation). In April 1945, the 48th division and the Turkic unit were at the Dollersheim training camp. The National Committees planned to transfer the unit to Northern Italy, but nothing is known about the implementation of this plan.
The East Muslim SS Regiment and the East Turkic SS Formation were commanded by: SS-Obersturmbannführer Andreas Mayer-Mader - November
1943-28 March 1944, SS-Hauptsturmführer Biel-lig - 28 March - 6 April 1944, SS-Hauptsturmführer Hermann - 6 April - May 1944, SS-Sturmbannführer Reserve Franz Liebermann - June - August
1944, SS-Hauptsturmführer Rainer Olzscha - September - October 1944, SS-Hauptsturmführer Wilhelm Hintersatz (under the pseudonym Harun al Rashid) - October - December 1944, SS-Hauptsturmführer Furst - January - May 1945. Mullahs were in all parts of the compound, and Nagib Khodiya was the supreme imam of the entire compound.
Losses of SS troops
During the Polish campaign, the losses of the V-SS were estimated at several dozen people. The superiority of the German army in armament and the lightning-fast course of the campaign reduced the losses of the Waffen-SS to almost a minimum. In 1940, in the West, the SS men faced a completely different enemy. The high level of training of the British army, prepared positions in advance and the availability of modern artillery from the allies became an obstacle on the way of the SS to victory. During the western campaign, the Waffen-SS lost about 5,000 people. During the fighting, officers and non-commissioned officers led the soldiers into the attack by personal example, which, according to the generals of the Wehrmacht, led to unreasonably large losses among the officers of the Waffen-SS. Undoubtedly, the percentage of losses among the officers of the Waffen-SS was higher than in the units of the Wehrmacht, but the reasons for this should not be sought in poor training or in the method of fighting. In parts of the Waffen-SS, a corporate spirit prevailed and there was no such clear line between officer and soldier as in the Wehrmacht. In addition, the structure of the Waffen-SS was built on the basis of the "Fuehrer principle" and that is why, in attacks, SS officers were ahead of their soldiers and died with them.
On the Eastern Front, the SS men faced fierce resistance from the Soviet army, and as a result, in the first 5 months of the war, Waffen-SS units lost more than 36,500 people killed, wounded and missing. With the opening of the second front, the losses of the SS increased even more. According to the most conservative estimates, in the period from September 1, 1939 to May 13, 1945, the SS troops lost more than 253,000 soldiers and officers killed. During the same time, 24 Waffen-SS generals were killed (not counting those who committed suicide and police generals), and two SS generals were shot by court order. The number of wounded in the SS by May 1945 was about 400,000, and some SS men were wounded more than two times, but after recuperation they still returned to duty. According to Leon Degrel, of the entire Waffen-SS Walloon unit, 83% of the soldiers and officers were injured one or more times. Perhaps, in a number of divisions, the percentage of those who were injured was less, but I think it did not fall below 50%. The SS troops had to operate mainly in the occupied territories, and by the end of the war they had lost more than 70,000 people missing.
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6th SS Panzer Army
The formation of the headquarters began on 6 September 1944 by the command of the Waffen-SS "Dislots". On Sept. 1944 the army was transferred to the command of Army Group B in the West. In Feb. 1945 the army was transferred to Army Group South in Hungary. In May 1945, the army headquarters surrendered in Krems (Austria) to the American troops of General. D. Patton.
The army consisted of the I and II SS Panzer Corps and the LXVII Army Corps.
Commander: SS Oberstgruppenführer, SS Colonel General Joseph Dietrich (6.9.1944 - 8.5.1945)
I SS-Pz.Korps "Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler"
The headquarters of the corps was formed on 08/14/1943 (the formation of the corps was completed in December 1943) in Berlin-Lichterfeld; initially the headquarters of the corps was located in Brussels. As part of the ground forces, it was used from August. 1943. In December. 1943 subordinated to the command of the 14th Army in Italy, and in January. 1944 transferred to the reserve of Army Group D in France. In June 1944 he joined the 7th Army in Normandy. The next month it became part of the West Panzer Group, which in August. 1944 was deployed to the 5th Panzer Army.
On Sept. - Oct. 1944 fought with the 7th Army in the Eiffel region of France. In nov. 1944 set aside for rest in Westphalia, and the next month transferred to the reserve of the main command in the West. In Jan. 1945 as part of the 5th Panzer Army participated in the offensive in the Ardennes. After a vacation in Germany (in February - March 1945) in April. 1945 transferred to the 6th SS Panzer Army in Hungary.
The corps fought the 1st SS Panzer Division "Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler", the 12th SS Panzer Division "Hitler Youth", the Training Panzer Division (in Normandy), and the 101st (501st) SS heavy tank battalion. Units of the corps subordination were numbered 101 (501). In May 1945, together with the army, he retreated to Lower Austria and surrendered to the Anglo-American troops in the Vienna area.
Commanders: SS Oberstgruppenfuehrer, SS Colonel General Joseph Dietrich (4.7.1943 - 09.8.1944); SS Brigadeführer, Major General of the SS Forces Fritz Kraemer (08/09/1944 - 08/16/1944); SS Obergruppenfuehrer, General of the SS troops Georg Keppler (08.16.1944-30.10.1944); SS Gruppenfuehrer, Lieutenant General of the SS troops Hermann Priss (10/30/1944 - 8.5.1945).
II SS Panzer Corps (II SS-Pz.Korps)
Formed in June 1942 in Bergen-Belsen under the name of the SS Panzer Corps, on 1.6.1943 received the number "2". In aug. 1942 - Feb. 1943 was in France as part of Army Group "D", and then transferred to the southern sector of the Eastern Front near Kharkov and in March 1943 was included in the 4th Panzer Army. As part of the ground forces, it was used from March 1943; at this time it included the 1st SS Panzer Division "Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler", the 2nd SS Panzer Division "Das Reich", the 3rd SS Panzer Division "Death's Head".
He fought at Kharkov and Belgorod (summer offensive in 1943). In July 1943, together with the army, he was transferred to Kursk. After the fall of the fascist regime in Italy in August. 1943 transferred to the Apennines (only the SS division "Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler" remained on the Eastern Front) and in December. became part of the 14th Army. In Jan. 1944 transferred to France in the Alençon region. In March 1944, the 9th SS Panzer Division "Hohenstaufen", the 10th SS Panzer Division "Frundsberg", a training tank division and the 349th Infantry Division were operating in the corps.
From Apr. 1944 fought in the Lvov region in northern Ukraine as part of the 1st Panzer Army, but in July 1944 he returned to France and, as part of the West Panzer Group, took part in the battle in Normandy. Since Aug. 1944 - in the 5th Panzer Army. In oct. - nov. 1944 fought as part of the 1st Parachute Army, and in January. 1945 in the ranks of the 6th SS Panzer Army participated in the offensive in the Ardennes. After resting in Germany (Feb. - March 1945), as part of the same army, he took part in the offensive near Budapest. Suffering heavy losses, he retreated to Lower Austria and surrendered to the Anglo-American forces in May 1945.
Commanders: SS Obergruppenfuehrer, General of the SS troops Paul Hausser (1.6.1942-28.6.1944); SS Obergruppenführer, General of the SS troops Wilhelm Bittrich (10.7.1944-8.5.1945).
Volunteer Legion "Norway", 1942 As an interesting fact, it should be noted that there are no buttonholes. There were several examples of Norwegian volunteers' sleeve patches. Pictured in this photograph is in the shape of the Norwegian flag with a blue and white cross on a red background. Another type of this patch was a red shield with a black outline and a cross in the center.
III (German) SS Panzer Corps (HI germanisches SS-Pz.Korp)
Formed on 03/30/1943, and it consisted mainly of parts of the SS, formed from the "Germanic" peoples and Volksdeutsche. These were the new SS formations, primarily the 11th SS Motorized Division "Nordland" and the 4th SS Volunteer Motorized Brigade "Netherlands". As part of the ground forces, it was used from September. 1943, when he was included in the 2nd Panzer Army in the Balkans. Here he fought against the partisans of Marshal I. Broz-Tito, and after Italy's withdrawal from the war he participated in the disarmament of Italian units and the occupation of Northern Italy. On Sept. - nov. 1943 was again thrown against the partisans. Only during one operation at the end of Nov.
1943 500 people The 1st battalion of the 24th SS tank regiment was destroyed in the Glina area approx. 5 thousand partisans (but then the partisans defeated the 23rd and 24th regiments at Glina). At the end of Nov. 1943 began its transfer to the front of the 18th Army, which occupied positions in the Oranienbaum area near Leningrad. March - Sept. 1944 fought in the army group "Narva", and in November. 1944 returned to the 18th Army, which was defending in Courland. In Feb. 1945 transferred to Arnswald, where he was included in the 11th Army of Army Group Vistula. From March 1945 he entered the 3rd Panzer Army, which fought in the Stettin area. In the last days of the war, he occupied positions near Mecklenburg.
Commanders: SS Obergruppenfuehrer, General of the SS troops Felix Steiner (05/10/1943 - 11/9/1944); SS Obergruppenfuehrer, General of the SS Troops Georg Kepler (9/11/1944 - 4/2/1945); SS Obergruppenfuehrer, General of the SS troops Matthias Kleinheisterkamp (4.2.1945-11.2.1945); Lieutenant General Martin Unrein (11.2.1945-5.3.1945); SS Brigadeführer, Major General of the SS Troops Joachim Ziegler (5.3.1945-1.5.1945).
IV SS Panzer Corps (IV SS-Pz.Korp)
Formed on 08/14/1943 in Poitiers (France). 6/30/1944 it included parts of the disbanded VII SS Panzer Corps. As part of the ground forces, it was used from August. 1944, when he was included in the 9th Army operating in the Warsaw region on the Soviet-German front. In oct. - Dec.
1944 the corps consisted of the 3rd SS Panzer Division "Dead Head", the 5th SS Panzer Division "Viking", the 104th (504th) heavy artillery division, as well as at different times the 711th, 96th -I Infantry, 118th Jaeger and 211st People's Grenadier Divisions. Dec. 1944 transferred to the reserve of Army Group Center (in Warsaw), and in January.
1945 - Army Group South in Hungary. From Feb 1945 fought in Hungary as part of the 6th SS Panzer Army. After the defeat near Budapest, he withdrew to Enns (Austria), where in May 1945 he was disbanded.
Commanders: SS Obergruppenfuehrer, General of the SS troops and police Alfred Wünneberg (8.6.1943 - 23.10.1943); SS Gruppenfuehrer, Lieutenant General of the SS troops Walter Kruger (23.10.1943-14.3.1944); SS Obergruppenfuehrer, General of the SS troops Matthias Kleinheisterkamp (1.7-20.7.1944); Brigadeführer SS, Major General of the SS forces Nikolaus Heilmann (07.20.1944-6.8.1944); SS Obergruppenführer, General of the SS troops Herbert Otto Hille (6.8.1944-8.5.1945).
V SS Mountain Rifle Corps (V SS-Freiwilligen-Gebirgskorps; V SS-Frw. Geb. Korp)
Formed on 8/14/1943 in Prague, used in the Balkans for anti-partisan operations. In oct. 1943 the corps consisted of the 7th SS Volunteer Mountain Rifle Division "Prince Eugene", the 13th SS Mountain Rifle Division "Khanjar", the 369th (Croatian) and 181st Reserve Infantry Divisions; in addition, the 21st SS Mountain Rifle Division "Skanderbeg" and the 23rd SS Mountain Rifle Division "Kama" were under the operational control of the corps headquarters. Then he was transferred to Germany. As part of the ground forces, it has been used since November. 1943, when he was included in the 2nd Panzer Army operating in Bosnia. In Feb. 1945 transferred to the 9th Army of the Vistula Army Group, which occupied positions on the Oder. In March 1945, the 32nd SS Volunteer Grenadier Division "January 30", the 286th and 391st Infantry Divisions, the garrison of the fortress of Frankfurt an der Oder and the 5th SS Assault Battalion operated in the corps. Capitulated in May 1945 near Berlin.
Commanders: SS Obergruppenfuehrer, General of the SS troops Arthur Fleps (4.7.1943-21.9.1944); Brigadeführer SS, Major General of the SS forces Karl Ritter von Oberkamp (21.9-1.10.1944); SS Obergruppenführer, General of the SS troops and police Friedrich Eckeln (01.10.1944-8.5.1945).
VI Army Corps of the Waffen SS (Latvian) (VI Waffen - A.K. der SS)
Formed on October 8, 1943, and it included the Latvian SS formations: the 15th and 19th grenadier divisions of the SS troops, as well as the grenadier (Latvian No. 7) regiment of the SS troops, etc. As part of the ground forces, it was used from January. 1944, when he was included in the 16th Army operating in the North of Russia in the Pleskau region. Until the end of the war, he fought in the ranks of this, as well as the 18th army, retreating with battles to Courland, where in May 1945 he surrendered to Soviet troops.
Commanders: SS Obergruppenfuehrer, General of the SS troops and police Karl von Pfeffer-Wildenbruch (8.10.1943-11.6.1944); SS Obergruppenfuehrer, General of the SS troops and police Friedrich Eckeln (11.6.1944-21.7.1944); SS Gruppenfuehrer, Lieutenant General of the SS forces Karl Fischer von Troienfeld (21-25.7.1944); SS Obergruppenfuehrer, General of the SS troops Walter Krueger (25.7.1944-8.5.1945).
VII SS Panzer Corps (VII SS-Panzerkorp)
It may have been formed in Oct. 1943. Composition not known; On 20/07/1944 it was disbanded and its units were merged into the IV SS Panzer Corps.
Commander: SS Obergruppenfuehrer, General of the SS troops Matthias Kleinheisterkamp (10.1943 - 20.7.1944).
IX SS Mountain Rifle Corps (Croatian) (IX Waffen Gebirgskorps (Kroatisches)
It began to form in June 1944 in Baksalmas (Hungary), where it included the 22nd SS Mountain Rifle Division "Kama" and the 509th SS Heavy Artillery Division. In oct. 1944 transferred to Croatia. It was used for anti-partisan operations until the end of 1944, when it was transferred to Hungary. Dec. 1944 The 8th SS Cavalry Division Florian Geyer, the 22nd SS Volunteer Cavalry Division Maria Theresia, the Felchernhalle Panzer Division and the 13th Panzer Division operated in the corps near Budapest. In addition, several unreliable Hungarian divisions were subordinated to the corps command. 12/2/1945 destroyed near Budapest by Soviet troops. Only 170 servicemen managed to escape from the encirclement.
Commanders: Gruppenführer, Lieutenant General of the SS forces Karl Gustav Sauberzweig (21.6-12.1944); SS Obergruppenführer, General of the SS troops and police Karl von Pfeffer-Wildenbruch (12.1944 - 12.2.1945).
X SS Army Corps (X SS-A.)
Formed in Jan. 1945 (possibly from the headquarters of anti-bandit units). Destroyed in Pomerania in March 1945.
Commanders: SS Obergruppenfuehrer, General of the SS and Police, Erich von dem Bach-Zelewski (26.1-10.2.1945); Lieutenant General Gunther Krappe (10.2-7.3.1945); SS Standartenfuehrer Herbert Goltz (7.3.1945-3.1945).
XI SS Panzer Corps (XI SS-Pz.Korp)
As part of the ground forces, it was used from August. 1944 (possibly formed at the same time).
Commander: SS Obergruppenfuehrer, General of the SS troops Matthias Kleinheisterkamp (6.8.1944 - 8.5.1945).
Officers of the "Khanjar" division. They were probably photographed at an early stage in the history of this formation. Their buttonholes are not yet decorated with the symbols of the division - they are either clean or carry SS runes. One of the officers (left) can hardly be seen on the left sleeve of an army eagle. Wearing this type of emblem in this way was common, although it had to be worn on the chest. Judging by the shade of the image, in this case, the headdresses are red fez. Of note is the use of two different types of Styrian mountain gaiters and mountain boots. All officers have standard buckles on their belts.
XII SS Army Corps (XII SS-A.K.)
Formed in Aug. 1944. As part of the ground forces was used from Sept. 1944. In December. 1944, the corps consisted of the 176th Infantry and 1.83th People's Grenadier Divisions, as well as corps-subordinated SS units. 04/16/1945 destroyed in the Ruhr Cauldron.
Commanders: SS Obergruppenfuehrer, General of the SS troops Matthias Kleinheisterkamp (1.8-6.8.1944); SS Obergruppenführer, General of the SS troops and police Kurt von Gottberg (6.8-18.10.1944); SS Obergruppenfuehrer, General of the SS troops Karl Maria Demelhuber (10/18/20/1944); General of the infantry Ponter Blumentritt (10/20/1944 - 1/20/1945); Lieutenant General Fritz Beierlein (20.1-29.1.1945), General of Artillery Eduard Grasemann (29.1.1945-16.4.1945).
XIII SS Army Corps (XIII SS-A.K.)
Formed in Aug. 1944 in Breslau. As part of the ground forces, it was used from September. 1944. Soon he was transferred to France. If in November. 1944 the corps included the 17th SS Motorized Division "Götz von Berlichingen", but since December. 1944, only parts of the Wehrmacht remained subordinate to the headquarters of the corps: the 19th People's Grenadier and 347th Infantry Divisions, the 566th Anti-Tank Division, the 9th Anti-Aircraft Division, etc. Fought on the Western Front and ended the war in the Alps.
Commanders: SS Gruppenfuehrer, Lieutenant General of the SS troops Hermann Priss (7.8-20.10.1944); SS Gruppenfuehrer, Lieutenant General of the SS troops Max Simon (20.10.1944-8.5.1945).
XIV SS Army Corps (XIV SS-A.K.)
Formed in November. 1944. 01/25/1945 disbanded, and the remaining units were included in the X Army Corps of the SS. Use in the ground forces has not been confirmed.
Commanders: SS Gruppenführer, Lieutenant General of the SS and Police, Heinrich Friedrich Reine-Fart (11.1944-12.1944); Obergruppenführer SS, General of the SS troops and police Erich von dem Bach-Zelewski (12.1944-25.1.1945).
XV Cossack Cavalry Corps (XV Kosaken Kav. Korps)
Created by order of G. Himmler 25.2.1945 on the basis of the command of the 1st Cossack Division of the SS troops. It included the Cossack formations, which were transferred on 11/04/1944 during the war to the jurisdiction of the Reichsfuehrer SS. The corps included the 1st and 2nd Cossack divisions, as well as the Plastun brigade.
Commander: SS Gruppenfuehrer, SS Lieutenant General Helmut von Panwitz.
XVI SS Army Corps
Formed in Jan. 1945. Use in the ground forces not confirmed.
Commander: SS Obergruppenfuehrer, General of the SS troops Karl Maria Demelhuber (1.1945-8.5.1945).
XVII SS Army Corps (Hungarian) (XVII Waffen-Armee Korps der SS (Ungarisches)
Formed in March 1945. 4.5.1945 surrendered to American troops.
Commanders: SS Obergruppenfuehrer, General of the SS troops Ferenc Feketehalmi-Cheidner (3.1945- 4.1945); SS Obergruppenfuehrer, General of the SS troops Eno Ruskai (4.1945-5.1945).
XVIII SS Army Corps (XVIII SS-A.K.)
Formed in Dec. 1944. As part of the ground forces was used from Feb. 1945.
Paul Hausser, commander of the 2nd SS Panzer Corps
The corps and division commanders, however, faced very different problems. Although both SS divisions underwent more than a year of training, their combat readiness was still incomplete. We already wrote about the situation with tanks, so the 1st tank battalions of the 9th and 10th SS divisions remained in France, since they never received the Panthers they were supposed to. Moreover, the lack of equipment and equipment did not allow sending anti-tank divisions of both divisions to the East. Thus, both SS divisions were tank divisions only on paper.
SS soldiers in the USSR, spring 1944
For the speedy transfer of divisions to the front, 72 train echelons were allocated for each. The dispatch of units was accompanied by significant difficulties, the main of which were air raids by allied aviation. One of the strongest occurred on March 28, when a train with headquarters units of the 3rd battalion of the 22nd SS regiment was twice raided at the station while waiting for dispatch. As a result, even before arriving at the front, the battalion suffered the first losses, and 5 officers were killed, including the battalion adjutant of the SS Obersturmführer Werner Maksimov and the quartermaster of the SS Untersturmführer Walter Volkmann. It is interesting to note that during the raid, the personnel of the battalion became subordinate to the local anti-aircraft units, thereby providing all possible assistance in repelling it. It is worth adding that the servicemen who survived the raid received a special 10-day leave, as a result of which they had the opportunity to celebrate Easter at home, with their families.
However, neither the air raids of the Anglo-Americans, nor the sabotage of the European Resistance could disrupt the transfer of the division to the front. The Frundsberg route to the front ran along the route: Nantes - Paris - Metz - Trier - Koblenz - Kassel - Halle - Cottbus - Breslau - Krakow - Lvov. So already at the beginning of April, cold and snow, in complete contrast to warm France, where spring had already begun, "welcomed" the soldiers of the 10th SS Division in Western Ukraine.
On April 1, 1944, the corps headquarters arrived in Lviv, led by Hausser. As already indicated, the II SS Panzer Corps was included in the 4th Panzer Army of General of the Panzer Forces Erhard Raus. On April 2, Hausser received a special order from Routh, according to which the divisions of the corps were ordered to prepare for battle as soon as possible. Considering that most of the corps had just arrived or was even on the way, it was not possible to quickly execute this order. In addition to parts of "his" corps, Hausser was also subordinated to the 100th Jaeger and 367th Infantry Divisions, who arrived from Hungary, and the 506th Heavy Tank Battalion.
Probably the first to disembark in Lvov were divisional supply units. Wasting no time, the commander of the 10th SS economic battalion, SS Sturmbannführer, Gerhard Schill, launched a vigorous activity and quickly organized a supply point. The bakers from the 1st company of the battalion were ordered to bake 12,000 loaves of bread on the very first day - after all, the arriving soldiers had to be quickly fed. Making this amount of bread required 20,000 liters of water and 10 tons of flour. Meanwhile, SS Obersturmführer Richard Bohler, an officer from the economic battalion, arrived at a German army supply depot in Vinniki, 6 kilometers southeast of Lvov, with orders to get fresh meat. By the most conservative estimate, the division needed 147 head of cattle, 120 pigs and 240 sheep per day.
Equipment of the SS division "Frundsberg" in Ukraine
The bulk of the division began arriving on April 3, 1944. Since the Lvov railway station could not receive all the units of the arriving tank divisions, many of them had to disembark at the "neighboring" stations. The 6th company of Leo Franke from the 10th SS Panzer Regiment arrived in the Zolochev area (a city east of Lvov) by noon on April 2. Since there was no equipment for unloading wagons with equipment at this station, bales of hay were used to unload the tanks, prudently taken by the SS from France. The commander of the 3rd platoon, Edmund Erhard, recalled: “At the station, the company commander called the platoon commanders for a briefing. The enemy was advancing on Lvov, and we were sure that we would be in battle before the end of the day. We checked the schedule of the march to the collection point on the maps. " The 1st platoon was moved forward under the command of Hans Kwandel, followed by the 3rd platoon, parts of the company headquarters and the 2nd platoon of SS Untersturmführer Rudolf Schwemmlein. The company commander, Leo Franke, in a brisk Volkswagen, moved along the moving convoy, accompanied by two connected motorcyclists. The company’s route ran through several surrounding villages; soon SS tankers went to the Slovita area. During the march, the main enemy for the SS Frundsberg Division was the cold, piercing wind and slush of early spring on impassable terrain, with completely muddy roads. The movement was slow. The column of the 6th tank company moved along a narrow road, and as soon as the tank or truck got stuck, the whole column stopped. Therefore, the 6th company of the 10th tank regiment reached the assembly point in Berezhany only at 5 a.m. on 4 April. Tanks from the 2nd platoon, many of them bogged down in the mud or off the road, joined the company during the day.
On April 2-3, units of the 10th SS reconnaissance battalion of Heinrich Brinkmann disembarked from the echelons at the station near Zolochev. The battalion had time to reorganize after a 1,600-kilometer road. After everything was ready for the march, Brinkmann moved towards the Berezhany, in the assembly area. Like other mobile SS units, the battalion's movement was hampered by muddy roads. All the paths were filled with columns of troops, which were moving almost at a pace. Once in a traffic jam, the armored vehicles practically stopped. Almost 15 hours (!) Were spent on the 35-kilometer route. Therefore, only on April 4, Brinkmann arrived at the indicated sector.
While the division was just getting ready, the German headquarters had already begun urgent preparations for a powerful deblocking strike. On April 3, Routh ordered the two army divisions subordinate to Hausser to secure a place for the deployment of mobile units of the II SS Panzer Corps in the Rogatin-Berezhany area. According to Routh's plan, as soon as the main units of II Panzer Corps arrive, all 4 divisions will have to strike to the southeast, in the general direction of Buchach, and break through the encirclement around 1 Panzer Army. Here we note that since the units of the 1st Panzer Army had been fighting in encirclement for more than a week, an important task for the units of the II SS Panzer Corps was the task of quickly organizing supplies for Hube's units after their release. Therefore, trucks with supplies for the encircled units had to move behind the attacking wedge, mainly fuel and ammunition (a total of about 600 tons of various cargoes).
Officers of the 10th SS Reconnaissance Battalion in Zolochev
The Germans were concentrated opposite the right flank of the 18th Guards Rifle Corps of the Red Army, General I.M. Afonin. This corps held from the west a section of the outer front of the encirclement of the 1st Panzer Army and was exhausted by previous battles, experienced a shortage of personnel and weapons. With two battered rifle divisions, the corps occupied a 35-kilometer defense line from Pidhaitsy to Mariampol on the Dniester. It is clear that the Soviet troops did not create a solid defense in this sector, and in addition, reconnaissance on the external front was conducted unsatisfactorily. The corps' successful actions were also not facilitated by the fact that organizationally it was subordinate to the 1st Guards Army, the main forces of which fought with the 1st Panzer Army in the Proskurov (now Khmelnitsky) area, 100 kilometers to the south.
On April 4, the German rangers and infantrymen began to move to their original positions. The conditions in which the march took place were more than difficult - ice, slush, bad roads. Subsequently, the thaw, which began on April 5, further exacerbated the problem. Soon the whole space turned into a sea of mud, making movement almost impossible. The technique is bogged down. All available sappers and special snow blowers were sent to clean the roads. By such measures, it was possible to achieve some results, the movement was partially normalized. But now the enemy's opposition was added to the difficulties with the weather: Soviet aircraft, as soon as the weather permitted, immediately attacked the Germans.
Commander of the 21st SS Regiment Eduard Deisenhofer
Nevertheless, both army divisions launched an attack on April 4, as planned, despite all the difficulties. Major General Georg Zwade's 367th division successfully captured a bridgehead across the Naraevka River, southeast of Rohatyn, and Lieutenant General Willibald Utz's 100th Jaeger Division set up bridgeheads near the Zlota Lipa River near Litvinovo, 10 kilometers northwest of Podgaytse and in the area southeast of Berezhany. Interestingly, according to Soviet reports, only reconnaissance in force (!) Was recorded in the Podgaytsev area that day: the Germans allegedly unsuccessfully attacked with the forces of an infantry regiment supported by 30 tanks. Further more. The commander of the 18th corps I.M. Afonin reported that 11 tanks and 2 armored personnel carriers were burned and destroyed that day, up to 300 enemy soldiers were destroyed. However, these data are not confirmed by German sources: the 100th Jaeger Division just achieved some success, and, according to all sources, it operated without tank support. Pidhaitsy were taken by Utz's units by the morning of April 5th.
By the evening of April 4, 57 trains with units of the SS Frundsberg division (and only 35 echelons with units of Hohenstaufen) had already arrived in Lvov and its environs. There was no time to wait for all the components of both divisions to arrive, and Hausser decided to bring Frundsberg into battle. Some units (mainly those that disembarked in the vicinity of Lvov) set out immediately upon arrival, such as the already mentioned 6th Tank Company or the 10th SS Reconnaissance Battalion. After 24 hours, the division was already more or less deployed, but its real strength was still small: Troenfeld reported to Hausser that there were only 32 Pz-IV tanks and 38 Stug-III self-propelled guns in combat readiness.
But, not paying attention to all the problems, it was necessary to act urgently. Hausser placed his tank divisions (or rather, a division) in the center, while the 100th Jaeger Division covered the left flank, and the 367th Infantry Division - the right.
The goal set by Routh in front of the II SS Panzer Corps was simple: to attack southeast along the Rohatyn-Berezhany line, and then strike south of Pidhaitsy and move through Monastyrisk to Buchach.
The 10th SS Reconnaissance Battalion was the first unit of the SS Frundsberg Division to receive the baptism of fire. On the morning of April 5, Brinkmann's battalion reached Pidhaitsy, which had just been taken by units of the 100th Jaeger Division. According to the memoirs of SS Unterscharfuehrer Franz Widmann, a liaison from the battalion headquarters, the huntsmen made a good impression on the SS with their equipment and equipment. Something irritated the SS men: “They (the huntsmen. - R.P.) had white camouflage gowns that we didn't have, ”Widmann recalled. The battalion's command post was set up in a typical Ukrainian hut, with a thatched roof. Soon Troienfeld arrived in Pidhaitsy. At 11:00 a meeting was held, in which Troienfeld, Brinkmann, Willibald Utz and the staff officers of both divisions took part. As a result of this "advice" Brinkmann received an order to reconnoiter the approaches to Buchach and to ensure the protection of the sector north of Buchach, creating a bridgehead on the eastern bank of the Strypa River.
Commander of the 10th SS Panzer Regiment Franz Kleffner
The weather forecast for this day was disappointing - snow and rain. The disgusting state of the roads did not allow the use of wheeled armored vehicles, so the 1st company of the battalion (equipped with just these vehicles) remained in reserve, southeast of Pidhaitsy. For the prompt execution of the order received, three reconnaissance patrols were created from the units of the 2nd and 3rd companies - two patrols had to go different ways to Buchach, and one to Osovitsa (10 kilometers east of Buchach).
At about 14:00 on April 5, the armored personnel carriers began to move forward. On a small 12-ton bridge, built by sappers of the 100th Jaeger Division with the active involvement of the residents of Pidhaitsy, they crossed the Koropets River and continued to move towards the enemy. Soon, units of the 1st and 2nd patrols went to a fork in the road to Pidhaitsy, 6 kilometers south of the city. Here, the forward reconnaissance squads of the 1st SS Untersturmführer Kurt Scholler patrol stumbled upon a Soviet anti-tank position, probably from the 563rd Anti-Tank Fighter Regiment. Scholler decided not to get involved in the battle, but preferred to bypass the Soviet defense center, making a detour to the side, 1 kilometer to the north. However, he did not take into account the state of the earth's surface, and his maneuver failed: two armored personnel carriers were hopelessly bogged down in the mud, and the rest could hardly move. As a result, the movement of the 1st patrol stopped about four kilometers southeast of Pidhaitsy.
Meanwhile, the 2nd patrol of SS Untersturmführer Rudolf Hoffmann scouted the approaches to the village of Madzelovka. Taking advantage of the moment, the battalion headquarters company, led by Brinkmann himself, and parts of the 3rd company of SS Obersturmführer Gerhard Hinze, reinforced by two artillery and one anti-tank platoons taken from the 2nd company, approached him. At about 17:00, Khintse's group, together with the headquarters company, attacked the southeast and took Madzelovka almost without a fight - the Soviet troops simply fled. However, the advance was slowed down, both by rain and mud, and by mines, with which the Soviet troops abundantly "littered" all the surrounding roads.
Commander of the 10th SS Reconnaissance Battalion Heinrich Brinkmann
The reinforced 3rd company of Khintse developed an attack and captured the village of Kurdvanovka. True, the enemy did not manage to inflict large losses: the bulk of the Soviet troops managed to retreat across the Strypa River near the village of Osovitsy. On the shoulders of the retreating enemy by 21.00 Khintse took Osovitsy and established control over the undamaged bridge across the Strypa. SS outposts were deployed on the heights east of Osovitsa. Thus, Hinze managed to create a small foothold. However, the poor condition of the roads and the lack of fuel did not allow the main parts of the reconnaissance battalion to reinforce the Khintse detachment that had rushed forward. As a reinforcement, only the 3rd patrol of SS Haupscharführer Gottfried Kuffner (the commander of the 3rd platoon of the 2nd company, on the basis of which this patrol was created) arrived, and the main part of the reconnaissance battalion, led by the headquarters company, was concentrated near Kurdvanovka, where gathered up to 50 different armored vehicles. On the first day at the front, battalion losses were 2 killed and 4 wounded. Going back a bit, we note that Kuffner's 3rd Patrol was the most successful of all three. Moving north of the other two patrols, Kuffner managed to capture the village of Kotuzov, 12 kilometers southeast of Pidhaitsy, where 7 trucks and 1 motorcycle with a sidecar were taken as trophies. Building on the success, the patrol captured the village of Vishnevoe on Strypa, however, its advance stopped there, since Soviet troops blew up the bridge over the Strypa while retreating. Realizing that nothing else could be achieved in this area, Brinkmann reoriented Kuffner, giving him the order to reinforce the German units in Osovitz.
As the facts testify, on April 5 the Germans did not waste time in vain. The 100th Jaeger Division attacked the northeast and achieved partial successes. After that, in full accordance with the preliminary plans, it was time to bring into action the main forces of the 10th SS Panzer Division.
While Brinkmann's scouts were fighting at Osovitsa, the Frundsberg tank companies reached Pidhaitsy. In an attempt to stop the German offensive, Soviet aviation subjected Pidhaitsy to heavy bombing. Although this raid could not greatly influence the course of events, it nevertheless delayed the deployment for the attack of the division's tank companies. The town was literally packed with troops and equipment: in addition to various Frundsberg units, there were units of the 100th Jaeger Division and forward detachments of the 653rd Heavy Anti-Tank Division (equipped with Ferdinand self-propelled guns). There were congestions in the narrow streets of the provincial town, and the personal intervention of the division commander Karl von Troienfeld, who was among the soldiers and regulated the flow of traffic, was required to restore order.
In the end, tanks and self-propelled guns of the 2nd Battalion Leo-Hermann Reinhold from the 10th SS Panzer Regiment attacked the enemy south of the positions of the 10th SS Reconnaissance Battalion, between 5-6 pm. Without further ado, Troienfeld decided to strike at Buchach along the shortest path. It so happened that the tanks followed in the footsteps of the 1st Reconnaissance Patrol of Scholler.
The leading detachment was the 6th tank company of Leo Franke. At first, everything developed in the spirit of a rapid march, typical for the SS troops, but then the tanks got bogged down in the mud and the pace of the offensive slowed down noticeably. In addition, Franke took into account Scholler's warning about the enemy's anti-tank nest on his way and, most importantly, drew the appropriate conclusions. Slowly, the 6th tank company approached the Soviet anti-tank position, which, as we recall, did not dare to contact the 1st reconnaissance patrol. Events developed very quickly - at first the Red Army men opened fire on the leading tank, but did not manage to hit it. The Germans responded with accurate fire from their tank guns. In a fleeting battle, 10 Soviet anti-tank guns, standing along the road, were destroyed. Divisional veteran Bernhard Westerhoff described the action as "a real night battle." The Germans suffered no losses and continued their offensive, but the Soviet infantry, taking advantage of the darkness, took cover on both sides of the road and now constantly tried to attack the tanks separately. Nevertheless, the offensive continued, and in order to strengthen the blow, Troienfeld threw forward the 8th tank company of SS Obersturmführer Wilhelm Stock, armed with self-propelled guns.
SS Untersturmfuehrer Georg Siebenhuner
Soon, in this direction, the SS men took the villages of Marinopol and Delievo. According to Soviet data, the Soviet 563rd Fighter-Anti-Tank Regiment, which was defending in this area, reported on the destruction of 15 enemy tanks and two armored personnel carriers per day, but at the same time it itself suffered significant losses. German data do not confirm their high losses, no tanks were lost that day.
By the end of the day on April 5, despite the terrifying state of the soil and strong enemy resistance, German tanks nevertheless reached Kovalevka (a village 15 kilometers from Buchach), while Franke was wounded during the battle. At nightfall, the vanguard units of the 1st Battalion of SS Sturmbannführer Heinz Laubsheer from the 21st SS Regiment joined the tankers. As noted by most researchers, the results of the first day of fighting for the SS Frundsberg division were very successful. In just 5 April, according to Soviet data, the Germans pushed parts of the 18th Rifle Corps up to 10 kilometers in depth.
During the night from 5 to 6 April, the rest of the 21st SS regiment reached the positions of the advanced tank detachments near Kovalevka, and by the middle of the day on April 6, the division's shock group was ready to continue the offensive on Buchach. The attack was personally led by SS Gruppenfuehrer Troienfeld. However, already in the course of the attack, the plans changed, and the infantrymen were reoriented to Monastyriska, as expected according to Routh's plan, and the tanks, without infantry support, continued their attack on Buchach alone. Nevertheless, by 17:00 on April 6, the 6th tank company, at the cost of losing two tanks, broke the strong resistance of the 8th rifle division of the Red Army, reinforced by the 520th anti-tank fighter regiment, and broke into Buchach. Soviet troops withdrew to the northeast. 15 minutes later, 8 Pz-IV tanks (according to other sources, 5) collided with the advanced units of the German 6th Panzer Division - this was Major Stal's 114th Panzer-Grenadier Regiment, which stormed Buchach from the east. As P. Karel pathetically said: “Five minutes later, the soldiers of Frundsberg and the 6th Panzer Division slapped each other on the back:“ We could! ”. Thus, the communication between the 1st and 4th Panzer Armies, which had been broken for two weeks, was restored. However, the formation in Buchach was only the beginning of the final breakthrough of the 1st Panzer Army. The strike groups of both the SS Frundsberg Division and the 6th Panzer Division were in a very vulnerable position in Buchach. This was especially true of the Frundsberg tanks, which did not have infantry support and were therefore very vulnerable. The tankmen had to "dismount" and take up a perimeter defense, especially since the Soviet command, realizing the full significance of Buchach, threw parts of the front reserve into battle - the 52nd and 74th rifle corps, which decisively attacked. As a result, the forward detachments of both German armies were cut off from the main forces and now fought in encirclement, and the narrow corridor connecting the 1st and 4th tank armies was again blocked by the enemy.
A group of soldiers of a division in Ukraine
The quick arrival at Buchach of reinforcements - a grenadier from the 21st SS regiment - was a big question. They, led by other tank units of the 2nd Battalion of the 10th SS Panzer Regiment, advanced on the right flank. Their target, according to the order of Rous, was the village of Monastyriska, which was controlled by the southern flank of the division. The ground on which the attack was going turned into a swamp, the armored personnel carriers of the 1st "armored" battalion of Laubsheyer got stuck in the mud and practically stopped. In addition, at Monastyriska, the SS men encountered units of the 280th Infantry Division, which were not going to retreat. The Red Army put up decisive resistance, and the pace of the German attack slowed down sharply, and after the commander of the 3rd battalion of the 21st SS regiment, SS Sturmbannführer Karl-Gunther Molt, was wounded, the division's offensive stopped altogether. In this difficult situation, the regiment commander, SS Obersturmbannfuehrer Deisenhofer, asked for air and artillery support. For this, the 1st division of SS Sturmbannfuehrer Harry Jobst was involved. The adjutant of the 1st Division of the 10th SS Artillery Regiment and the temporary commander of the Hummele battery, SS Untersturmführer Hans-Dietrich Sauter, brought his battery to a position near Pidhaitsy to support the attack on Monastyriska with fire. Although the soldiers equipped their firing positions in accordance with the regulations, Sauter was faced with the fact that his young artillerymen stubbornly did not want to dig deep trenches, in contrast to the same Red Army men, whose trenches (captured and carefully examined by the Germans) met all the requirements. Soon the Hummels opened fire.
As a result, at about 16.00, after an air strike by dive bombers from the 77th assault squadron, the 2nd battalion of SS Sturmbannführer Fritz Mauer from the 21st SS regiment took Monastyriska by storm. After that, progress in the offensive for "Frundsberg" ended, and only the next day, April 7, units of the 21st SS regiment reached Buchach, together with the 1st company of the 10th SS sapper battalion.
Meanwhile, the main part of the 10th SS reconnaissance battalion was unable to strengthen the bridgehead of the 3rd company in Osovitsa. The units assembled near Kurdvanovka (headquarters company, units of the 2nd and 4th companies) were practically immobilized due to lack of fuel and mud spread everywhere. The requested fuel was almost never received. In addition, the 1st company, armed with wheeled armored vehicles, still remained in Pidhaitsy, since it could not move along the muddy roads. The situation in this area was unstable: for example, the anti-tank platoon of SS Untersturmführer Theo Henke from the 5th company was involved in battles with the retreating units of the Red Army west of Kurdvanovka. Among other things, Troienfeld ordered Brinkmann to secure the northern flank of the division, for which the latter needed to collect all available forces. The regrouping of the battalion began.
Hans Lingner, Georg Martin and Rudolf Reinecke in Ukraine
During April 6, the soldiers of the reconnaissance battalion shot down 3 Soviet aircraft with rifle fire, the pilots were taken prisoner. Judging by the German description ("we have never seen such primitive aircraft"), these were Po-2 aircraft. It is curious that on August 1, 1944, the battalion was awarded a special award - a special certificate from Adolf Hitler, in which the Fuhrer personally thanked the soldiers of the 10th SS reconnaissance battalion for the destruction of three enemy aircraft near Kurdvanovka.
Meanwhile, the Soviet command did not sit idly by either. Realizing the importance of such a key point as Pidhaitsy, which was supposed to become the basis for the further development of the Soviet offensive, on April 6, the headquarters of the 1st Ukrainian Front issued the following order: move out by car to the western bank of the river. Strypa, strike at Pidhaitsy and push the enemy back. Koropets ". However, the terrible condition of the roads did not allow the execution of this order: the Soviet troops, like the Germans, got stuck in the mud and lost precious time, and when the situation with the weather and roads improved, it was too late.
Nevertheless, this and other orders intensified the actions of the Red Army. In the afternoon of April 6, Soviet troops, with the forces of 2-3 infantry companies supported by 4 tanks, broke through to the north of Osovitsa, at Vishnevchik (displacing the 100th Jaeger Division), and then at Bobulintsy (displacing parts of the Khintse group) and created dangerous insertion. After that, the threat of encirclement hung over the Germans in Osovice. Since the attempt to reinforce the bridgehead failed due to lack of fuel, Brinkmann ordered Hinze to leave his positions and retreat to Kurdvanovka. During the night, the SS men evacuated their small bridgehead on Stryp and by 3 a.m. reached Kurdvanovka. Realizing what was happening, the Soviet troops wasted no time: they crossed the Strypa and entrenched themselves on both banks of the river. Thus, from Vishnevchik to Osovitsa, a dangerous Soviet bridgehead was created with a key point in Bobulintsy. Note that, despite a fairly active day, the losses of the reconnaissance battalion amounted to only one person wounded.
On April 7, the 367th Infantry Division, operating on the right flank of the II SS Panzer Corps, struck in the direction of the confluence of the Strypa and Dniester. The attack was successful, and on the left flank, the army infantrymen established contact with the 21st SS regiment, thereby creating a continuous front. On the same day, the 100th Jaeger Division, reinforced by the 506th heavy tank battalion of Major Eberhard Lange, repulsed all Soviet attacks and established itself on the eastern bank of the Strypa near Zolotniki, in the north of the corps defense sector. The next day, heavy self-propelled guns "Ferdinad" from the 653rd anti-tank division approached the division.
Heinz Harmel
Heinz Harmel on exercise (coincide in time)
At that moment, the main units of the 1st Panzer Army were stuck on muddy roads in the area of the Seret River, 25 kilometers east of Strypa. In front of Hube's army was an open, treeless area that stretched westward as far as the Dniester. The chances that the army would quickly receive reinforcements or supplies were very slim, given that Frundsberg could not in any way expand the bridgehead at Buchach, and the main part of the SS Hohenstaufen division was still in the Berezhany area and had not yet entered to battle. Although small infantry reinforcements from the 21st SS Regiment had reached the 6th Company position in Buchach by 7 April, the bulk of Frundsberg's forces were still in the area northwest of Monastyriska.
The situation was aggravated by the fact that the Germans did not manage to create a continuous front along the Strypa. The 15-kilometer gap between the right flank of the 100th Jaeger Division at Zolotniki and the weak Frundsberg forces in Buchach was covered only by the 10th SS Reconnaissance Battalion. And then he covered it purely formally, since by that moment, on April 7, the reconnaissance battalion was in Kurdvanovka almost completely isolated, communication with the neighbors (the 100th Jaeger Division to the north and the 22nd SS regiment in the south) was not established. Because of the mud, only half-tracked vehicles could more or less successfully move, therefore the 1st company of SS Obersturmfuehrer Karl Zibrecht on wheeled armored vehicles, which did not manage to overcome the mud, still remained in Pidhaitsy as a reserve.
Under these conditions, Heinrich Brinkmann and his people did everything in their power to maintain control of the area. Since one of the most important tasks of the battalion was to cover the front near Buchach from the north, mobile patrols were sent to the area of the gap between Buchach and Zlotniki. The patrol consisted of two armored personnel carriers with a 20-mm gun and one radio armored personnel carrier. In addition, a reinforced prefabricated patrol was formed under the command of SS Untersturmführer Rudolf Harmstorf, commander of the 2nd company. Their task was simple - without getting involved in battles, to imitate the German presence along the entire front at Strypa. It is clear that patrols of such strength could not seriously affect the situation, but nevertheless it was better than nothing, especially since the enemy did not show much activity at first.
Since the threat of a Soviet strike was brewing from the northeast, Brinkmann sent a reinforced Harmstorf patrol to the area north of the village of Kuydanovo to cover this dangerous area. The rest of the patrols were patrolling at Strypa, periodically entering into fire contact with small groups of Soviet troops. We add that on April 7, a patrol by Gottfried Kuffner destroyed a Soviet reconnaissance aircraft that had landed on an emergency landing.
In the meantime, preparing for a potential Soviet attack, the battalion was actively gaining a foothold in Kurdvanovka. The defensive work was carried out under the leadership of the veteran of the Demyansk boiler, SS Untersturmführer Helmut Temanns, an officer-at-large of the battalion headquarters. Some of the armored personnel carriers were dug into the ground and turned into firing points. The soldiers dug up rifle cells, and some houses were turned into strong points. The Khintse company, advanced closer to the front, dug in on the right flank, but suffered losses from sniper fire and was forced to retreat, gaining a foothold in front of Kurdvanovka itself.
On the night of April 8, Rudolf Harmstorf attacked the area of the Soviet bridgehead in Bobulintsy and Vishnevchik, despite the significant superiority of the enemy. The losses amounted to two killed and six wounded, plus one cannon armored personnel carrier, but on the whole the raid was successful: prisoners were taken and testified. It was established that the enemy had concentrated large forces here, including units of the 10th Guards Tank Corps. Given that this site had not received much attention in the past, this valuable information was of particular importance. The 2nd company of Harmstorf fought almost all day at the front near this bridgehead, “putting pressure on the enemy by fire,” as the Germans noted in the documents.
Now the German command immediately realized that if the Soviet troops successfully crossed the Strypa in this sector and turned south, they could again encircle the 1st Panzer Army, and even the SS Frundsberg Division to boot. After analyzing the situation, Routh at 20:35 ordered the SS Division "Hohenstaufen" to attack through Kosovo and force the Strypa north of Zolotniki. In turn, "Frundsberg" was supposed to strike northeast of the bridgehead in Buchach and, acting on the eastern bank of the Strypa, unite with them, creating a more or less continuous front.
During the night of April 7-8, the 1st Battalion of SS Sturmbannfuehrer Alois Wild from the 22nd SS Regiment reached Buchach and in the morning joined units of the 2nd Tank Battalion in their attack to the northeast, to join the Hohenstaufen. The 1st division of the 10th SS artillery regiment also arrived in Buchach, supporting the attack. During the battle, tanks and artillery destroyed 40 Soviet anti-tank guns and several self-propelled guns, as a result the SS men somewhat expanded the bridgehead northeast of Buchach. True, the threat on the flank was not completely eliminated, and the SS men were entrenched in new positions. Meanwhile, the 2nd Battalion of the 22nd SS Regiment also crossed the Stripa and established contact with Wild's units, which further strengthened the bridgehead. On the same day, the 367th Infantry Division took control of a line from Buchach to the southwest to the Dniester with a length of 30 kilometers.
While the Frundsberg was desperately expanding its foothold, the 1st Panzer Army also did not sit idle: the opposing Soviet troops at the front near Buchach were thrown back, and communication between the German armies was restored again. At noon on April 8, Model, Hube and Hausser met in Buchach, formally demonstrating to the world the stability of the German position in this sector of the front and the success achieved in saving the 1st Panzer Army. Now a new phase of the operation began. The Germans had two main tasks: first, to keep and expand the corridor in Buchach, through which units of the 1st Panzer Army would be withdrawn as soon as possible, and secondly, to unblock the garrison of encircled Ternopil, which was unambiguously declared a "fortress".
Heinz Harmel on the exercise
Meanwhile, the enemy was not going to give up. At 21.45 on April 8, Soviet troops struck a strong blow in the Terebovlya region, 35 kilometers south of Ternopil, in order to close the corridor near Buchach. Routh immediately ordered the 9th and 10th SS Panzer Divisions and the 100th Jaeger Division to strike and destroy the advancing Soviet forces. Serious difficulties arose with the implementation of this order. The next day, "Hohenstaufen" and the 100th Jaeger Division began to reach their starting positions for a decisive attack, but got bogged down in battles with fiercely attacking Soviet units, while "Frundsberg" spent the whole day in local battles in the Buchach area, mainly against parts of the 18th Guards Rifle Corps. The success of these defensive battles showed that although the planned attack of Routh was thwarted, the enemy was also stopped and the situation for the Germans stabilized.
SS tank in Ukraine in the spring of 1944
The new commander of Army Group South, Field Marshal Walter Model, personally planned the operation to unblock Ternopil. To this end, the 9th SS Division "Hohenstaufen" was temporarily withdrawn from the II SS Panzer Corps and reassigned to the IIL Panzer Corps of General of the Panzer Forces Hermann Balck. "Hohenstaufen" reinforced the "Fribe" battle group, created on the basis of the 8th Panzer Division. This group was to deliver the main blow. The attack began on 11 April in a pouring rain. Despite heavy losses, two panzer divisions managed to cover only half the distance separating them from Ternopil, and the operation ended in failure.
Meanwhile, units of the 1st Panzer Army continued to break out of the encirclement through the Buchach corridor, but all this was done extremely slowly. On April 10, the 21st and 22nd SS Regiments, with the support of the 2nd Battalion of the 10th SS Panzer Regiment, engaged in a heavy battle with the 18th Guards Rifle Corps for the expansion of the German bridgehead northeast of Buchach. This was necessary to widen the corridor so that most of the 1st Panzer Army could finally emerge from the cauldron. The situation was not in favor of the Soviet troops, exhausted by previous battles: in the corps divisions (141, 226, 280th rifle divisions) there were only 300-350 active bayonets, there was almost no artillery. Therefore, despite the arrival of some parts of the 67th Rifle Corps to Afonin, the operation for the Germans was successful, and by dawn on April 11, the German bridgehead was expanded by 10 kilometers, and the 18th Guards Rifle Corps was pushed back to the northeast and south of Buchach. ... The expansion of the bridgehead made it possible to somewhat speed up the withdrawal of units of the 1st Panzer Army from the encirclement.
In the period 11-15 April, the 21st and 22nd SS regiments, plus the 2nd battalion of the 10th SS Panzer Regiment, with the support of the 1st Division of the 10th SS Artillery Regiment, continued to defend the bridgehead northeast of Buchach against the furious attacks by Soviet troops trying to prevent the breakthrough of the 1st Panzer Army. The intensity of the fighting was reflected in the combat report of the headquarters of the 1st Ukrainian Front to the Supreme Commander on April 14, 1944: “The 4th Panzer Army resumed the offensive from 11.30 part of its forces and, overcoming the stubborn resistance of the 10th SS Panzer Division of the enemy, advanced two kilometers west of Kaitanovka, captured Bobulintsy, Kurdybanovka (southern) and went to an unnamed stream four kilometers southwest of Osovtsy. During the day of the battle, 5 tanks and self-propelled guns and up to 150 enemy soldiers and officers were destroyed. "
The most difficult tests fell on the 21st SS regiment, in which on April 10-15, only 7 company commanders were lost in killed. On April 14, Heinz Laubscheer, commander of the 1st Battalion, 21st SS Regiment, was wounded; right on the battlefield, the battalion took command of Leo-Hermann Reinhold. It was no easier for the 22nd SS Regiment: in these battles, the commander of the 22nd SS Regiment SS Obersturmbannfuehrer Ernst Schutzeck (April 11) and the commander of the 1st battalion of this regiment, SS Sturmbannfuehrer Wild were seriously wounded (on April 19, Wild died in the field hospital) ... In support of the 22nd regiment, the only tank battalion of the 10th SS Panzer Regiment, the 2nd, was sent.
At the same time, the 10th SS Reconnaissance Battalion was conducting heavy battles in the sector opposite the Soviet bridgehead at Osovitsa, 12 kilometers north of Buchach. As we remember, the Soviet bridgehead on Stryp posed a serious threat, it was obvious to everyone that if this bridgehead was not quickly eliminated, then the Soviet troops would be able to use it for another attempt to encircle the 1st Tank Army. This was not easy, given that Brinkmann's battalion was the only German unit between the positions of the SS Frundsberg Division at Buchach and the 100th Jaeger Division at Zolotniki in the north. On April 10, Soviet troops attacked the 10th SS reconnaissance battalion from the bridgehead in Bobulintsy. Although the attack was repulsed, the situation remained serious. Losses per day amounted to 7 killed and 16 wounded, 2 armored personnel carriers. On April 11, Brinkmann launched a counterattack with the forces of the reinforced 3rd company Hintse, which in the afternoon captured the heights on the outskirts of Bobulintsy. On the same day, the 4th company of SS Obschurmfuehrer Pauli, which had established a defense line on Stryp, and not having any heavy weapons, was counterattacked by Soviet troops with the support of tanks. The Red Army managed to break into the German line, but after one KV-1 type tank was hit by a PAK-40, Pauli corrected the situation with a counterattack. Despite the "active day", the battalion's losses amounted to only 4 wounded soldiers. Then parts of the battalion were drawn into stubborn defensive battles. There was no continuous line of defense, in places Soviet troops infiltrated into the German rear, to eliminate these breakthroughs, Brinkmann threw in patrols in a hurry. SS Unterscharfuehrer Franz Novak of the 4th company recalled: “Russian infantrymen will bleed to death on our lines. We shoot to the last bullet, the Russians are driven back. I touched a Russian soldier who was dying of a wound in the stomach with my submachine gun. I light a cigarette and give it to the dying man ... After a few puffs, he closes his eyes.
The battalion also suffered heavy losses in heavy fighting that lasted for several days. The 3rd company of Khintse was surrounded by Bobulintsy, but on April 14 managed to break out of the ring and retreat to Kurdvanovka. At dawn on April 15, the enemy penetrated the positions of the 2nd platoon of the 3rd company near Kurdvanovka with infantry supported by two tanks. The Soviet troops did not show great decisiveness, limiting themselves only to the occupation of several houses on the outskirts. At about 14.00 SS Unterscharfuehrer Gstottner from 30 meters destroyed one tank from the Panzerfaust, after which SS Untersturmfuehrer Rudolf Hoffmann, commander of the 2nd platoon, counterattacked with the support of a sapper platoon of SS Hartmann. During this bold attack, Hoffmann, who was in the forefront, was killed, but the Red Army men were driven out of Kurdvanovka.
Brinkmann then dispatched several patrols ahead to clarify the situation. A patrol by SS Untersturmführer Georg Siebenhuner of the 3rd Company was sent north to pinpoint the enemy's position. During reconnaissance, Siebenhuner ran into a Soviet position at the edge of the forest. Two camouflaged tanks opened fire on the leading armored personnel carrier. Seconds later, several German cars were on fire. Siebenhuner himself was killed. The rather shabby patrol returned to Kurdvanovka. It was also hot in Kurdvanovka itself: in the afternoon, Soviet artillery opened harassing fire on the village, and the battalion suffered casualties in killed and wounded. On April 15, 9 people were lost killed (of which 1 officer) and 44 wounded (one of them, SS Untersturmfuehrer Hans Oetiens from the 4th company, was slightly wounded and remained in the ranks).
While Brinmann's scouts held the front along the Strypa, the headquarters of the II SS Panzer Corps prepared their operation to eliminate the enemy bridgehead. On April 14-15, units of the 7th Panzer Division replaced the 21st SS Regiment in positions near Buchach. The released units were concentrated on the east bank of the Strypa, together with the 22nd SS Regiment, to participate in the planned attack against the Soviet bridgehead. A little further north, on the western side of the river, the 3rd Battalion of the 21st SS Regiment, parts of the 73rd Panzer-Grenadier Regiment of the 19th Panzer Division and 20 Tigers of the 506th Heavy Tank Battalion were concentrated. Parts of the 100th Jaeger Division, in particular the 54th Jaeger Regiment, prepared for an attack from the north, and the 10th SS Reconnaissance Battalion from the west. At 1600 hours on 15 April, 3rd Battalion, 21st SS Regiment conducted a limited attack northward to improve their positions before the offensive.
The concentrated German attack began on the morning of 16 April. Note that in the last two days the weather has improved, and the roads have dried up a bit, which facilitated the action of the mobile forces of the Germans. The 1st Battalion of the 21st SS Regiment attacked from the east of Strypa, and the 3rd Battalion of the 21st SS Regiment attacked from the west bank. Then the 22nd SS regiment entered into action, by noon the 1st battalion of the regiment knocked out Soviet troops from the forest near the village of Starye Petlikovtsi. On the right flank, the 9th company of the 22nd SS regiment crossed the Stripa and captured the height of 392; here, to the right, the 1st company of the 21st SS regiment reached an altitude of 380 - two kilometers northeast of Osovitsa. To the south of Kurdvanovka, units of the 73rd Panzer-Grenadier Regiment and Tigers of the 506th Tank Battalion began to concentrate. Seeing that the situation was not changing for the better, Soviet troops unexpectedly withdrew from their positions in the southeast of Kurdvanovka. Upon learning of this, Brinkmann decided to immediately attack Bobulintsy in order to block the enemy's escape routes.
On the eve of the reconnaissance, it was established that the Soviet troops had seriously fortified themselves in Bobulintsy and on the heights next to them, having dug tanks into the ground. Here the pretty battered 137th Infantry Division of the Red Army defended itself (according to the testimony of the prisoners, there were about 600 people in it). The attack was carried out by the forces of the 4th company of SS Hauptsturmführer Kurt Pauli, reinforced with two cannon armored personnel carriers. Before the attack, a single Stug-III self-propelled gun from the SS Das Reich division left for Kurdvanovka and fought back from its division. Brinkmann gave the self-propelled gun to the 4th company.
Pauli went 1 kilometer deep into enemy territory, where his company came under fire from Soviet anti-tank artillery and tanks. The SS men were supported by the army "Tigers", which knocked out two Soviet tanks, another tank was destroyed by the soldiers of the 4th company from a 75-mm anti-tank gun on an armored personnel carrier. After that, the enemy fled. Pursuing him, Pauli went out to the Bobulins. At the same time, the 54th Jaeger Regiment of the 100th Jaeger Division broke into the northern outskirts of Bobulintsy, and the 73rd Panzer-Grenadier Regiment attacked from the south. At this moment, units of the 2nd company of the 10th SS reconnaissance battalion under the command of SS Untersturmführer Harmstorf approached the company of Kurt Pauli. The sapper platoon of the SS Haupscharführer Hartmann, without special equipment, manually cleared the aisles for vehicles and the grenadier. Despite this, two armored personnel carriers were lost on the mines. However, this did not stop the attack of the 10th SS reconnaissance battalion. Two positions of Soviet anti-tank artillery were destroyed. At 17.00, an altitude of 1 kilometer to the west of Bobulintsy was captured. By 19.00, the Bobulins were finally surrounded by the Germans, and the SS men were drawn into fierce street fighting in the village. The Red Army soldiers fought to the last, but by 20.00 the Bobulins were taken, about which Pauli immediately informed the command. Brinkmann immediately transferred two platoons of the 3rd Company here. The SS men dug in the village, and a Harmstorf patrol was sent to scout further east. In the north, contact was established with the 100th Jaeger Division, and units of the 21st SS Regiment approached from the south. This success was paid for at a high price: three armored personnel carriers were lost, one cannon armored personnel carrier, in addition, the self-propelled gun from "Das Reich" given to Pauli was blown up by a mine. 10 people were killed, 7 were wounded, two were missing. Among the wounded was the commander of the 3rd platoon of the 4th company, SS Haupscharführer Karl Keller.
After the capture of Bobulintsy, the Soviet bridgehead was eliminated, and now the Germans firmly controlled the front along the Strypa River and the bridgehead at Buchach. Now some parts of the SS division "Frundsberg" were withdrawn to the reserve, in particular the 10th SS reconnaissance battalion.
On April 20, the last units of the 1st Panzer Army safely crossed the Strypa, and, thus, the army successfully completed the evacuation and finally escaped the encirclement. As Paul Hausser wrote after the war: “To see the remnants of the army leaving the encirclement after the battles during the Russian winter is a hard sight for any soldier. To provide care for the wounded and sick, it took a lot of preparatory work from the corps doctor and quartermaster. " It is unnecessary to note that the medical staff and supply personnel of the SS Frundsberg division fell to a significant part of the work in assisting units of the 1st Panzer Army.
On April 21, the 3rd battalion of the 21st SS regiment, the 10th SS reconnaissance battalion and the divisional escort company took up positions in the Bobulintsy area, where they stayed until the division was changed. On this day, a reconnaissance battalion at the front near Strypa destroyed one Soviet 150-mm self-propelled gun.
The withdrawal of the 1st Panzer Army from the encirclement was a major success for the German command. After the war G.K. Zhukov bleakly noted in his memoirs: “How many people broke out of the encirclement, neither I nor the front headquarters could accurately establish. Different numbers were named. Apparently, it was not dozens of tanks with a landing force that emerged from the encirclement, as the troops reported back then, but much more. " It is noteworthy that it was the SS Frundsberg division that played one of the main roles in this operation.
On April 25, two army divisions replaced Frundsberg at positions near Buchach, and General Friedrich Schulz's 59th Army Corps replaced the II SS Panzer Corps in this sector. Thus, the first military campaign for the 10th SS Panzer Division "Frundsberg" ended. One of the young soldiers of the reconnaissance battalion summed it up in a peculiar way: “The call of 1925 born in 1925 went through its baptism with fire! Now we were real front-line soldiers! "
The division's losses in its "first test" amounted to 2,076 people, of which 577 were killed and died of wounds, of which 18 were officers (of which SS Untersturmführer Werner Gutgessel died on May 10 in the infirmary from his wounds; the aforementioned SS Sturmbannfuehrer Wild ), 1432 wounded and 67 missing.
On April 27, the division commander was replaced. Von Troienfeld was recalled to carry out a "special assignment", and his position was taken by SS Standartenführer Heinz Harmel, Knight's Cross with Oak Leaves. He gained fame as the commander of the SS Deutschland Regiment of the SS Das Reich Division. In March-April 1944, Harmel graduated from the courses for division commanders, after which he was appointed commander of Frundsberg. On May 18, he was promoted to SS Oberführer.
Harmel noted his appointment with an order for the division:
“Officers and soldiers of the 10th SS Panzer Division Frundsberg!
The Reichsfuehrer SS appointed me commander of the 10th SS Panzer Division "Frundsberg". I took command today. I am happy to be in command of a division whose name reflects the glorious traditions of Frundsberg reviving in the army. Discipline and an inexhaustible aggressive spirit are crucial in the transition to these traditions. I am proud that the young division showed itself with dignity in the first battle and received full recognition. I believe in my officers and soldiers and expect the division to take its place alongside the old SS divisions. And this place won't be the last! For the Fuhrer, the people and the Reich! "
Another shift in the command staff was the change of the commander in the 10th SS Panzer Regiment. In April, SS Obersturmbannfuehrer Franz Kleffner was appointed commander of the 6th SS Panzer-Grenadier Regiment "Theodor Eicke", as a result of which the 10th SS Panzer Regiment was left without a commander at all. True, this did not cause any particular difficulties or inconveniences, since the division did not conduct hostilities, and the regiment itself consisted of only one battalion (2nd). Looking ahead, we note that only on June 22, a new regiment commander was appointed - SS Obersturmbannführer Otto Petsch became him.
The remainder of April and May II SS Panzer Corps spent in the reserve of Army Group Northern Ukraine in the Lvov region. Here, the main task of "Frundsberg" was to prepare for repelling the expected Soviet offensive in the sector at the junction between Army Groups "Center" and "Northern Ukraine". Everyday life was spent in constant drills and work on equipping stationary defensive positions on Buta. Part of the division's personnel was involved in anti-partisan actions. In particular, in the combat report of the II SS Panzer Corps, it was noted that yagdkommands from the 9th and 10th SS divisions took part in the liquidation of the Soviet "gang" of almost 300 people, among whom there were 20 "Soviet paratroopers" (that is, dropped on parachutes of military specialists from the Red Army) in the area of Bobrka. The nationalist forces also got it: in addition, in the Berezhany area, the SS men defeated a detachment of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (and Bandera's), numbering about 200 people.
It is characteristic that, despite the operations against the Ukrainian nationalist forces, during their stay near Lviv, the Ukrainians were enlisted in the division, mainly as translators and volunteers (Khivi - Hilfswillige - voluntary assistant), there were about 200 of them in total.
On June 1, 1944, the II SS Panzer Corps became subordinate to the 1st Panzer Army, but in the light of subsequent events, it did not stay long in its composition.
On June 1, in the ranks of the SS division "Frundsberg", there were 426 officers, 2,432 non-commissioned officers and 14,165 soldiers - a total of 17,023 people. However, on June 30, the number of personnel of the division was reduced to 13,552 people, so, probably, part of the personnel of the division was transferred to replenishment of other units.
The actions of the division were highly appreciated and recognized by the German command. The true expression of this was a special order from Field Marshal Model (issued on the day the II SS Panzer Corps departed for France), in which he emphasized the merits of the Hohenstaufen and Frundsberg divisions. In this document, we are primarily interested in the part devoted to the SS Frundsberg division: “The corps played a major role in strengthening the front in a very difficult time and in creating a shield for the defense of the Motherland. With the restoration of contact with the 1st Panzer Army in Buchach, you ... the soldiers of the 10th SS Panzer Division helped to save the situation in a critical situation ... I acknowledge your services and thank you. The Fuehrer is now calling you on a new mission. I am sure that you will follow his order in accordance with our motto: "There is no better soldier in the world than the soldiers of Adolf Hitler!"
An objective analysis shows that the first baptism of fire of the SS Frundsberg division ended in complete success. Still the "green" division, which had no combat experience, and in addition, the division, which was not yet fully staffed, turned out to be at its best, fully confirming its high rank as "SS Panzer Division". Although it should be noted that since there was only one tank battalion in the division, the Frundsberg actually acted as a panzer-grenadier division, not a tank one.
The division successfully fought both offensive and defensive battles. In the "best traditions" of the SS troops, it was thrown into battle practically from the march, not yet completing its full deployment. Mud and impassability were serious obstacles, but they were successfully overcome. During the battle, the vanguard in Buchach was temporarily cut off, but successfully held out in the encirclement. True, it should be said that the opposing "Frundsberg" Soviet troops, mainly the 18th Guards Rifle Corps, were exhausted by previous battles, experienced a significant shortage of personnel and weapons. Nevertheless, "Frundsberg" was also far from the "best form" of the SS Panzer Division.
Sons of the Reich. P. 4.
List of officers killed in the division. Personal archive of R. Ponomarenko. L. 1. We add that the next day, March 29, the list of division losses was replenished by the doctor of the 3rd battalion of the 22nd SS regiment, SS Hauptsturmführer, Doctor Ingo Riedl, and the commander of the 3rd battalion of the 21st SS regiment, SS Hauptsturmführer Werner Schmid.
Interestingly, the radio intelligence of the 1st Ukrainian Front, on March 26, detected the operation of the radio network of a tank division, of unspecified numbering, in the Zolochev area, on March 27 they detected the concentration of two tank divisions in this area, and on March 28 - infantry and tanks on the approaches to Pidhaitsy. This gave rise to some domestic historians, for example B. Sokolov, to conclude that the divisions of the 2nd SS Panzer Corps were already near Lvov at that time, which, as we saw, does not correspond to reality. (Cm. Sokolov B. Red Army against the Waffen SS. P. 283). So it is unclear what exactly Soviet radio intelligence detected and whether it was German disinformation.
Chronique de la SS-Pz-AA 10 S. 151. Needless to say, this statement contrasts sharply with the generally accepted myths about the superiority of SS units over the Wehrmacht in terms of equipment and equipment.
Tributary of the Dniester.
Due to the state of the supply routes, supply at that moment could only be carried out by dropping containers from the air.
Afonin I.M. The path was difficult, but glorious. P. 139.
Cm., Reynolds M. Sons of the Reich. P. 5.
Moskalenko K.S. On Pivdeno-Zadny straight p. 342. Note that, having absolutely no knowledge of the material, the Russian historian B. Sokolov, apparently relying on Soviet memoirists, asserts that on the morning of April 5, both SS tank divisions and the two above-mentioned army divisions (Red Army against the Waffen SS. p. 292). This statement is unfounded, given the above material we have given about the SS division "Frundsberg". As for the "Hohenstaufen", on April 5, only one battalion from this division was able to enter the battle - the 1st battalion of Ernst Hagenlocher from the 19th SS regiment. The rest of the 9th SS Division by this time were still arriving at the front.
From the Dnieper to the Vistula. P. 187.