Chapter 14 Table of contents

PART 1
(TANK, TANK PLUG, TANK MOUTH)

ORDER
PEOPLE'S DEFENSE COMMISSIONER

1. To approve and put into effect the present Combat Regulations of the Armored and Mechanized Forces of the Red Army in 1944, part 1 (tank, tank platoon, tank company).

2. This Combat Manual must be studied by the entire officer corps of the armored and mechanized forces of the Red Army. The officer corps of other branches of the armed forces must know the basic tactical and technical data of combat vehicles and the provisions of this Charter, ensuring the correct use of tanks and interaction with them of the corresponding type of troops. The sergeants and rank and file of the armored and mechanized troops of the Red Army must study those provisions of the Charter that relate to his duties.

3. In joint operations with armored and mechanized troops, the officers of all branches of the Red Army should be guided by this Charter.

4. The instructions of the Charter are to be applied in strict accordance with the situation. Each chief and rank-and-file soldier is given independence in carrying out the task assigned to him. He must show initiative, acting in accordance with the changed environment, without waiting for orders from a senior superior, in the spirit of the requirements of this Charter.

5. The Charter of the Armored Forces of the Red Army, part one (UTV-1-38), - to cancel.

People's Commissar of Defense
Marshal of the Soviet Union
I. STALIN

Chapter one

GENERAL PROVISIONS

1. PURPOSE AND COMBAT PROPERTIES OF ARMORED AND MECHANIZED FORCES

1. Armored and mechanized troops are one of the main types of troops. They have great striking power, since they combine powerful fire with speed of movement and armor protection. Tanks are the main striking force of armored and mechanized troops.

2. Armored and mechanized troops can be used in all types of combat. They are a decisive means of attack and a powerful means of counterattacking in defense.

Their tasks:

- in an offensive battle- to destroy the enemy with a swift and decisive attack, take possession of the objects of the attack and hold them until the approach of your infantry;

- in a defensive battle- Inflict heavy losses on enemy infantry and tanks with powerful and well-aimed fire from the spot and sudden counterattacks, repel enemy attacks and hold the defended area.

3. Armored and mechanized troops are intended for joint operations with infantry or cavalry and for independent missions.

4. Tanks, reinforcing the infantry (cavalry) in the main direction, act in close cooperation with it as tanks of close support of the infantry(cavalry) and have the main task of destroying enemy infantry and tanks and ensuring the advance of the battle formations of their advancing infantry (cavalry).

5. When performing independent missions, armored and mechanized troops are usually used to develop the success of an offensive.

6. Combat properties of armored and mechanized troops:

• high operational and tactical mobility, ensuring quick maneuver, swiftness and attack power, the ability to move off-road and overcome obstacles;
• the power of close artillery and machine-gun fire on the move, from stops and from a place because of shelters, which makes it possible to destroy manpower, firing points and enemy tanks located in open places or in light shelters;
• the ability to have a strong moral impact on the enemy;
• invulnerability from enemy rifle and machine-gun fire, from shell fragments, mines and aerial bombs, and from single hand grenades; relative invulnerability against fire from anti-tank guns and artillery batteries.

2. TYPES OF MACHINE

7. Machines, depending on their purpose, are divided into:

• combat;
• combatant;
• transport;
• special.

8. Combat are called vehicles intended for combat and carrying weapons.

9. Frontline are called standard vehicles designed to transport personnel and weapons of motorized troops.

10. Transport are called vehicles designed to transport non-motorized troops and military cargo.

11. Special machines that have a special purpose are called: gasoline tankers, water-oil tankers, marching workshops, etc.

12. Combat vehicles are serviced by crews, combat vehicles, transport and special vehicles - by drivers.

The combat vehicle is commanded by its commander. The commander of a unit of combat vehicles is also the commander of his combat vehicle. The commander of the combatant, transport and special vehicle is the senior in rank from the persons traveling in the vehicle. In the absence of officers and non-commissioned officers in the number of traveling persons, the duties of the vehicle commander are performed by the driver.

13. The commander of the car, along with its driver, is responsible for the exact observance of the rules for the operation of the car, as well as for the observance of the traffic rules.

14. Combat vehicles include:

• tanks - medium, heavy and special;
• armored vehicles - light and medium;
• self-propelled guns;
• armored personnel carriers;
• special combat vehicles:

15. Medium tanks. Weight up to 30 tons. Armament - one cannon, from two to four machine guns. Average speed - 15-20 km / h, cruising range - 200-300 km. Designed to destroy manpower and fire weapons of the enemy's infantry (cavalry), to fight against his tanks and to conduct combat and tactical reconnaissance.

16. Heavy tanks. Weight over 30 tons. Armament - one cannon and three or four machine guns. Average speed - 8-15 km / h, cruising range - 150-250 km. Used when attacking a heavily fortified enemy. Designed to destroy enemy manpower and fire weapons, as well as to fight against his tanks and artillery.

17. Flamethrower tanks. Armed, in addition to a cannon and a machine gun, a flamethrower. Designed to destroy enemy manpower and its firing points in shelters.

18. Light armored vehicles. Weight up to 4 tons. Armament - one or two machine guns. The average speed is 25-30 km / h. Cruising range - 450-600 km.

19. Medium armored vehicles. Weight up to 8 tons. Armament - one cannon, one or two machine guns. Average speed - 20-25 km / h, cruising range - 450-600 km.

20. Light and medium armored vehicles are intended to destroy manpower and fire weapons of enemy infantry and are used for reconnaissance, security and as a means of transportation for communications officers in battle.

21. Armored personnel carriers. Weight 3-5 tons. Armament - machine gun, heavy machine gun or anti-tank rifle. The average speed is 20-25 km / h. The power reserve is 120-180 km. Designed for transporting infantry on the battlefield, performing combat support tasks, conducting combat - supporting dismounted infantry with their fire.

3. TANK POSITIONS

22. In accordance with the plan of use and the combat mission, tank forces can be deployed:

• in the area (point) of concentration;
• in wait-and-see positions;
• at the starting positions;
• in the collection area (point).

23. In the area (point) of concentration, tanks are located before the start of the organization of the battle. The concentration area should be outside the influence of enemy artillery fire, have shelters from air and ground observation, as well as convenient transport routes and routes for movement towards the front.

24. The waiting position is occupied by tanks during the organization of the battle, before moving to the starting positions. It should be chosen in the area of ​​impending operations, in a place that provides a covert location of tanks and their preparation for battle and has hidden approaches to the front. The removal of the wait-and-see position should provide for a real enemy artillery fire (10-15 km).

25. The tanks take the starting position before the attack, being in full combat readiness. The starting position should allow tanks to be placed in battle formations. It should be in the direction of attack, have hidden approaches from the rear, convenient routes for attacking, and cover from air and ground surveillance. If there is time, tank trenches are opened at the starting positions even before the tanks are occupied. The removal of the starting position should be ensured from real machine-gun fire and from direct fire of enemy anti-tank guns (1-3 km). In some cases, deployment lines are assigned instead of starting positions. Moving from a wait-and-see position, the tanks on the deployment lines are rebuilt on the move into a battle formation for an attack.

26. To collect tanks in battle are assigned:

• collection area (point);
• intermediate collection area (point);
• reserve collection area (point).

27. A collection area (point) is designated for the collection of tanks upon their combat missions, for further missions, for putting in order the materiel and replenishment of ammunition and fuels and lubricants.

28. An intermediate gathering area (point) is assigned to assign additional missions to tanks on the battlefield, to restore communication with the infantry and supporting combat arms, to replenish ammunition and to evacuate the seriously wounded from tanks. Intermediate assembly areas (points) are designated in places sheltered from enemy fire.

29. A reserve area (point) of assembly is assigned after the location of its infantry, in case tanks cannot enter the intended area (point) of assembly.

30. The axis of communications, combat power and recovery is assigned in units and formations that have their own rear, and serves as a direction for the supply, evacuation of wounded and emergency tanks, as well as for the movement of mobile communications and movement of observation posts.

31. The platoon and company are assigned concentration and assembly points, the battalion, regiment and brigade are assigned areas.

4. COMBAT READINESS

32. Combat readiness is the readiness of a combat vehicle, subunit, or unit for combat operations.

33. Full combat readiness of a combat vehicle consists of:

• full crew availability;
• the presence and full serviceability of the material part of the machine, weapons, observation devices, communications and tools;
• complete supply of fuels and lubricants, ammunition, spare parts, chemical protection equipment, food and water;
• correct combat styling.

34. Depending on the situation, the crew of a combat vehicle may be in a state of combat readiness No. 1, 2, 3.

35. Combat readiness number 1. The entire crew is housed in the tank and is ready to open fire. All tank hatches are closed. The motor is ready to start immediately. Combat readiness number 1 is accepted:

• at the starting positions;
• on the signal of a combat alarm when positioned on the spot, in defense and on the march.

36. Combat readiness number 2. One person from the crew remains in the turret of the tank (as directed by the tank commander); he is observing and is ready to open fire. The rest of the crew is located near the tank. The tank hatches are open. Combat readiness number 2 is adopted:

• when positioned on the defensive (according to special instructions);
• in areas (points) of collection;
• on wait-and-see positions (according to special instructions).

37. Combat readiness number 3. The entire crew is located near the tank in cracks, in dugouts and in other shelters. The tank hatches are open. Combat readiness number 3 is adopted:

• when located on site as part of the duty unit;
• in wait-and-see positions;
• on halts when marching.

38. The degree of combat readiness of the crews is established by order or signal.

< Назад		Forward>

3. Features of the attack of a fortified area and a heavily fortified position

492. When attacking a fortified area and a heavily fortified position, a rifle company is given guns, heavy machine guns, mortars, anti-tank rifles and tanks.

Before the offensive, the company commander receives a diagram of the enemy's defense, in which firing points and engineering obstacles must be indicated.

In the task of the company, the battalion commander indicates where and how many passes through the obstacles for the company will be made and what it must do with its own means.

The commander of a rifle company must carefully study the directions of the passes made in obstacles, study the enemy's positions, the location of the bunker (bunker), trenches and the fire system.

493. The battle formation of a company consists of defensive groups, assault groups, a fire group (guns, mortars and heavy machine guns) and platoon rifle chains.

The preparation for the attack of assault groups, barrage groups, fire groups and platoons is carried out personally by the company commander at the direction of the regiment commander and under the direction of the battalion commander.

494. Barrage group organized by a sapper with wire cutters, mine detectors, electric suits and demolition material. Assistance to sappers is given before the division of the shooters.

495. Appointment assault group- attack of previously reconnoitered bunkers (bunkers).

The strength and composition of the assault groups is determined by the regiment commander.

The usual composition of the assault group: two rifle squads, one or two heavy machine guns, a squad of anti-tank rifles, a platoon of 50-mm mortars, one or two guns, a sapper squad with explosives, cans of gasoline and wire cutting equipment, two or three knapsacks flamethrower, one or two heavy tanks.

The commander of the rifle platoon is appointed as the commander of the assault group.

496. To attack the front edge, the company commander, organizing interaction, indicates the terrain:

Objectives of barrage groups and covering them with fire;
-tasks of assault groups and their support with fire;
-tasks of rifle platoons;
- the tasks of guns, mortars, machine guns and other fire weapons before the start of the attack, when the company overcomes obstacles in front of the forward edge, when attacking the forward edge and during the battle in depth;
-signals for communication and control.

497. Having given an order, the company commander checks the company's readiness for an attack.

498. The commander of the assault group receives from the company commander the task and instructions:
- about the initial position of the assault group and the time of its occupation;
- about the methods and time of the bunker (bunker) attack; what bunker (bunker) and trenches will be suppressed, destroyed and blinded and by what time;
-on the forces and means attached to the assault group for attacking and undermining the bunker (bunker);
- who, how and when will cover the assault group from counterattacks.

499. The commander of the assault group sets up simple signals for communication within the group and with means of amplification.

500. The commander of the assault group gives orders on the ground and indicates:
- what weapon or anti-tank rifle at which embrasure the bunker (bunker) will fire;
-In what order will the attack and detonation of the bunker (bunker) be carried out;
-tasks for guns, mortars, anti-tank rifles, tanks, sapper and flamethrowers;
-signals for control;
- the order of supply of ammunition and removal of the wounded.

501. The barrage group at night, under the cover of reconnaissance or security, makes passages and clears passages made by artillery. Passage making continues during artillery processing.

502. During the period of artillery treatment, the company commander:
- monitors the results of artillery and mortar fire in the direction of the forthcoming company offensive and on the flanks;
-Checks with combat reconnaissance the destruction of enemy firing points and making passages in obstacles;
- reports to the battalion commander about the readiness for the assault.

503. Having received the "Attack" signal, the company commander gives his signal to storm the leading edge.

Assault groups, by crawling and dashing, or on drags and armored trailers behind the tanks, move forward and, with the transfer of artillery fire into the depth of the defense, storm the bunker (bunker) and destroy the enemy in them. At the same time, the company attacks fire weapons and destroys the enemy in the trenches and communication passages between the bunker (bunker). Escort guns, anti-tank rifles and heavy machine guns follow in the gaps and on the flanks of the attacking infantry, and mortars follow the rifle lines. The rest of the firepower suppresses the targets from which the artillery transferred fire, primarily the flanking machine guns.

504. Attack of a bunker (bunker) is carried out after artillery processing and when the artillery fire of an assaulted bunker (bunker) is surrounded by artillery fire.
505. Under cover of fire, the barrier group makes passes through the obstacles; rifle squads with mortars and heavy machine guns bypass the bunker (bunker), watch the exits from it, clear the communication passages from the enemy and cover the sapper from possible enemy counterattacks.

Sappers, using dead spaces, get to the embrasures, close them and undermine the bunker (bunker).

Archers rush into the destroyed bunker (bunker) and capture or destroy the surviving enemy soldiers.

The commander of the assault group sends a signal to the company commander about the capture of the bunker (bunker).

506. The company commander, having captured the firing points, the bunker (bunker), gives the signal to the commanders of the reinforcement means to quickly move forward to new positions.

When fighting in the depths of the defense, the company commander concentrates the fire of guns, machine guns, mortars, flamethrower weapons and anti-tank rifles at the embrasures and periscopes of non-destroyed bunkers (bunkers), which with their fire impede the advance of the infantry, as well as against newly discovered fire weapons and causes fire for this purpose supporting artillery. To destroy the revived and surviving bunkers (bunkers), an assault group moves forward, which attacks the bunkers (bunkers). As soon as the bunker (bunker) ceases to fire, the rifle company immediately continues the attack, preparing and accompanying it with fire.

507. If the attack by the company of the bunker (bunker) and the firing points located in the depths of the defense has failed, then separate guns, anti-tank rifles and flamethrower means are put forward for firing at the embrasures and barriers of the bunker (bunker), and the assault groups resume the attack with the support of tanks.

508. If the bunker (bunker) can be bypassed, the company commander leaves the assault group and part of the fire weapons to block and destroy it from the rear and flanks, and boldly moves the company forward. The company commander immediately informs the battalion commander about the results of the reconnaissance and the decision taken.

509. To help tanks detained on obstacles, the company commander, without stopping the attack,
directs the barrier group, supporting it with fire.

a source

Military publishing house of the People's Commissariat of Defense,
Moscow, 1942
pp. 174-179

Any weapon gives an effect only with the appropriate use. Naturally, the anti-tank defense system developed during the Second World War not only in the technical, but also in the tactical plan. The infantry determined the specialty of tank destroyer. determined the order of their combat work within the subdivision and interaction with other subunits. The details of the tactics of "tank destroyers" and armor-piercers were already indicated above. Now let's consider some aspects of the general organization of the infantry anti-tank defense system. and the actions of its other elements, it will be necessary to touch upon the evolution of the anti-tank defense system and its organization in various types of combat.

In the USSR, by the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, PTO issues were not sufficiently developed. The Provisional Field Manual of the Red Army in 1936 and the draft Field Manual of 1940 rightly provided for artillery in combination with engineering barriers as the basis for the PTO. a platoon of anti-tank guns (45-mm guns) was added to the staff of rifle battalions. and in 19391 a battery of six 45 mm cannons was added to the staff of a rifle regiment. If there were means of reinforcement, a mobile PT artillery reserve was also assumed with the inclusion of groups of sappers. The infantry was supposed to fire from rifles and machine guns at the viewing slots of the tanks with armor-piercing bullets. The 1938 and 1940 infantry combat regulations proposed to create groups of tank destroyers with bundles of grenades and incendiary bottles to fight the tanks that had broken through. However, the importance of the infantry PTS on the eve of the war was clearly underestimated. AT fire was organized at the expense of 45-mm guns (we have already mentioned that before the war their production was stopped), combined with AT obstacles, divisional and partly regimental artillery fire.However, neither regimental nor divisional guns of special AT shells had the estimated the average density of AT artillery would be 4 guns per 1 km of the front - in no way is it enough to repel a massive tank attack. Artillery was asked to take positions behind natural anti-tank obstacles - but at the same time, tank-hazardous directions and roads were poorly covered, along which, in fact, enemy tanks preferred to move quickly. The PT areas were supposed to provide all-round defense, in some directions they were to be strengthened by PT obstacles. In the forest and in settlements, explosive barriers were to be supplemented by anti-tank debris. According to pre-war calculations, a rifle battalion on its own could arrange 1 km of a blockage in 1 hour. According to the same calculations, the battalion could prepare 1 km of AT ditch during the day (Ing. P-39). In reality, the rifle units did not have such terms and opportunities. Nevertheless, both blockages and PT ditches were created locally, including by strengthening the existing natural obstacles.

In general, the PTO, according to the pre-war regulations and instructions, was built linearly and shallowly, along the lines, with an even distribution of the PTS along the front and in depth, with a weak reserve and PT area in the rear (at the positions of the second echelons) on tank-inaccessible terrain. Strongholds and positions were not connected by trenches - it was believed that in a mobile war, fire communication was sufficient. Due to anti-tank ditches and escarpments, cut-off positions were created, but their preparation required a lot of time. The interaction between artillery, infantry and engineering troops and general management were not worked out. This clearly did not correspond to the conditions when the enemy resorted to quick deep breakthroughs, massing tanks in selected directions, bypassing and enveloping. All the more difficult and unequal was the combat with tanks for the infantry, which did not have sufficient anti-tank weapons. By the beginning of World War II, the Red Army had 14.5 thousand anti-tank guns at the planned 14.8 thousand, these guns then constituted, in fact, all military anti-tank artillery. But since before the war, these guns were taken out of production, their losses in the first weeks of the war had nowhere to replenish. Regimental and divisional guns were ineffective in the fight against mobile tanks and were rather an auxiliary tool. It is not surprising that in these conditions, anti-aircraft guns became one of the main anti-aircraft weapons of artillery (however, the 88-mm anti-aircraft gun was also recognized as the most effective PTS of the German Wehrmacht). And the Red Army infantry itself was poorly prepared to fight tanks.

Already on July 6, 1941. The order of the Headquarters of the Supreme Command to strengthen the fight against tanks demanded "to immediately create in regiments and battalions companies and teams to destroy tanks," added to the grenades and incendiary bottles "packages with explosives and ... flamethrowers of light tanks." In addition, a directive was issued on night operations against tanks, that is, attacks by specially selected groups of fighters on enemy tanks in parking lots in front of the front line. The most experienced "grenade launchers" were assigned to combat tanks in rifle subunits. They were supplied with anti-tank grenades and incendiary bottles and were located in single trenches and crevices in tank-hazardous directions. Interaction with anti-tank artillery, even where it was available, was still poorly organized - batteries of anti-tank guns rarely moved into tank-hazardous directions. In combination with the short - no more than 25 m - range of grenades and bottles, this reduced the effectiveness of the "command to destroy tanks" and led to large losses of personnel.

However, already in the initial period of the war, “anti-tank units” began to be practiced in defense, in which AT guns were located, covering them with rifle or machine-gun subunits. And in August 1941, the headquarters of the Supreme Command demanded that the troops create anti-tank strong points (PTOP) and areas on the most important tank-hazardous areas - they had to abandon the linear formation of anti-tank defense. PTOPs were supposed to dismember a massive attack of tanks and destroy them in parts. Artillery commanders were appointed heads of the PTOP - not least of all this was caused by the weak ability of the combined arms (infantry) commanders to organize a fire system. PTOPs included 2-4 guns and PTOPs of rifle units. In the defense near Moscow, in the areas of rifle regiments, from 1 to 3 PTOPs were created. and in the depths of the defense of the PT areas. Sometimes PTOPs were organized in settlements. On the approaches to PTOPs, posts of reconnaissance-observers and reconnaissance-illuminators were set up. posts warning about tank attacks In the defense zone of the famous 316th rifle division of General Panfilov, from October 12 to 21, 1941, PTOPs destroyed up to 80 tanks near Rostov in the Dyakovo area in the 136th rifle division, 11 PTOPs were created. united in a PT node up to 6 km deep - as a result, attacking Dyakovo, the enemy lost about 80 tanks.

In the fall of 1941. groups of tank destroyers began to be created in all rifle units of the Red Army. The group included 9-11 people and, in addition to small arms, was armed with 14-16 anti-tank grenades. 15-20 incendiary bottles ", in battle she acted in conjunction with armor-piercers - she was given 1-2 calculations of ATR. The ATR calculations themselves were an example of the use of a complex of melee weapons - at the position they also prepared AT grenades and incendiary bottles for battle, they strove for the second numbers of calculations equip with a submachine gun for shelling infantry accompanying tanks or evacuating crews of destroyed tanks. Such measures allowed rifle subunits “during a tank attack not only to cut off enemy infantry, but also to take an active part in the fight against the tanks themselves. The importance of tank destroyers in the battle of Moscow is evidenced by the documents of the Western Front. The directive of the Front Commander, General of the Army G.K. Zhukov, dated October 19, ordered anti-tank detachments consisting of 1-2 anti-tank guns, a platoon of fighters with grenades and KS bottles to be deployed on the rear lines and rear roads. a platoon of sappers with mines, a company of riflemen. So they tried to compensate for the weakness of the PTO of the leading edge with an extension and large intervals of the front. And two days later, the Front Military Council ordered the formation “in each rifle regiment - one anti-tank fighter squadron, consisting of one middle commander and 15 fighters, including a sapper squad ... 150 anti-tank grenades, 75 bottles of KS. PPSh - 3, anti-tank mines, semi-automatic rifles. All rifle cartridges are armor-piercing .. Each rifle division has two fighter detachments ... three army mobile detachments ... The detachments must be especially mobile, maneuverable to act suddenly, boldly, in short. " The detachments were supposed to be put on trucks, but then there was a great shortage of transport. PT areas were created in regiments. In the 316th SD, for example, regimental PT areas included from 4 to 20 guns of different calibers.

Schematic diagram of the organization of the PTO of a rifle division in defense near Moscow (December 1941)

In the order to all army commanders. The commanders of divisions and regiments of the Western Front were told “PTRs are also attached to strong points, and it should be borne in mind that the greatest effectiveness of their fire is obtained with group use (3-4 guns). Tank destroyers with anti-tank grenades, bundles of ordinary fans and bottles of flammable liquid are effective means of close combat against tanks. Groups of tank destroyers should be prepared at each strong point. "On November 1, the Front Military Council suggested encouraging fighters for destroying a tank with a grenade or a bottle of 1000 rubles, for three tanks to submit to the Order of the Red Star, five to the Red Banner, ten or more to the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. calculation of MTP for the destruction of three tanks - to the medal "For Courage" and a monetary reward.

The isolated location of the anti-tank guns still did not provide a proper coordination of the actions of tank destroyers and artillery. Meanwhile, the enemy changed the tactics of the offensive, used deeper battle formations, bypassed the anti-tank guns, blocked them with artillery and infantry. in cooperation with the infantry, massaging them within the battalion defense area in the most probable directions of enemy tanks movement.

In July 1942, the General Staff developed an instruction for the ATO of troops. According to it. the organization of anti-tank battalion was assigned to the combined-arms commanders (since then, the organization of anti-tank defense became their primary responsibility), and its basis in the regiments was the anti-tank battalion in rifle companies, united in battalion anti-tank units, and in divisions and higher - anti-tank lines. the requirement - it had to be, first of all, "anti-tank". Therefore, the PTOP had to now coincide with the company strongpoints, and the anti-tank units - with the battalion defense areas. This simplified the management of the VET. increased its stability, improved the interaction of artillery and sappers with the infantry PTS, which solved the main tasks in battle. -42. Part 2) and into the draft of the Field Manual of 1943. One of the company defense areas or a battalion unit could turn into a PT unit or area if they were in the forward position and on tank-accessible terrain.

By definition BUP-42. anti-tank defense consisted in a combination of artillery fire and anti-tank infantry weapons with the widespread use of natural and artificial obstacles "- The infantry destroys enemy tanks with anti-tank guns with grenades and incendiary mines." The recognition of the role of the infantry PT fire was a very important step compared to pre-war views. It should be noted that BUP-42 introduced anti-tank land mines and mines into the number of infantry fighting means.

The depth of the anti-tank defense system was growing, it had to be organized throughout the entire depth of the area or the defense sector with the concentration of the bulk of the regular and attached vehicles in the main directions. ambushes of anti-tank guns and anti-tank guns were organized, reinforced by anti-tank mines, the anti-tank regimental reserve was reinforced.

In 1942. the magazine "Military Thought" wrote: "Anti-tank artillery ... it is better to have groups of 2-6 guns in the so-called. anti-tank strongholds, reliably covered with anti-tank obstacles ... provided with armor-piercing and tank destroyers. " Positions for anti-tank weapons and anti-tank guns had to be selected so that they, “without changing their place, could fire at the entire area assigned to them and tank-accessible directions mainly with flank fire,” reinforced with artificial obstacles and anti-tank mines. The most advantageous was the location of the PTS (anti-tank guns, anti-tank weapons, flamethrowers), which made it possible to take enemy tanks into "fire bags", which allowed the sudden opening of fire from ambushes when enemy tanks approached obstacles in front of the front edge of the defense.

PTS fired independently in designated areas (sectors). After repelling the attack of the PTR and AT tanks, the guns, which showed themselves to be firing, had to change their position. Both in the offensive and in defense, part of the anti-tank missile system and 45-mm anti-tank guns could be allocated to the reserve of the regiment commander, during battles in a village or forest, the allocation of a reserve was considered mandatory.

PT areas from rifle and artillery units were created outside the infantry battle formations to cover tank-hazardous areas and roads. AT artillery and ATM were also allocated to the AT reserve, which was to be used together with a mobile engineering reserve of minefields. Note the strengthening of the PT reserves, which contributed to the activity of the PTO.

These principles were tested during the Battle of Stalingrad. Company PTOs here already included 4-6 guns and an anti-tank rifle platoon - this met the BUP-42 standards (a rifle company, 35 guns, 1-2 anti-tank rifle platoons, mortars and machine guns). More attention had to be paid to AT issues in the offensive, since the enemy often resorted to counterattacks with tanks and assault guns - especially in the battle for the second position.

Schematic diagram of the organization of a PTO of a rifle division in defense at Stalingrad in the summer of 1942.

Schematic diagram of the organization of the PTO of a rifle division in the battle of Kursk

Armor-piercers in the counterattack. Southwestern Front. Summer 1942. Let's pay attention to the 12.7-mm single-shot PTR on the left.

In each company, 2-3 groups of tank destroyers were created, usually consisting of 3-6 fighters under the command of a sergeant, sometimes with 1-2 PTR crews. Each soldier had a rifle or carbine (later they tried to supply them with submachine guns), two hand-held anti-tank grenades, 2-3 incendiary bottles. Fighters - and even more armor-piercing - operated under the cover of fire from machine gunners or light machine guns, snipers. Groups of fighters were trained at special gatherings in the army's rear, during which they selected the most decisive, dexterous and quick-witted fighters.

By the end of the first period of the war, the main PTS in the company defense areas were PTR, in the battalion - PTR and artillery pieces. On a wide front, the defense was made up of separate company areas, on which the entire weight of the anti-tank defense system fell. When tanks appeared, the head was first hit, then the fire was transferred to the next one (with the exception of ambushes against tank columns, when the first and last were hit first). Tanks that broke through into platoon and company strongpoints were ordered to “destroy with all anti-tank weapons” (BUP-42). In winter, the PTO was additionally reinforced by obstacles in the form of icy slopes, rises and embankments, reinforced with mines and land mines hastily installed in the snow, and the infantry vehicles were placed on skis, drags, sledges.

The expansion of military production and the increase in the production of PTS created the basis for saturating the troops with them. Together with the experience of the first period of the war (from June 22, 1941 to November 18, 1942, i.e., the end of the Stalingrad defensive operation), this created the basis for improving the anti-tank defense system in the second period, calculated from the start of the offensive near Stalingrad to December 31, 1943 until December 31, 1943. the end of the Kiev offensive operation Since during this period the enemy was increasing the massing of tanks and self-propelled guns in the direction of the main attack (30-50 or more units per 1 km of the front), the Soviet troops had to increase the depth of the tactical defense zone and improve its battle order Changes were also taking place in the states rifle units At the headquarters of the 1942t rifle division was supposed to have 30 anti-tank guns and 117 anti-tank guns.

In the defensive battle near Kursk in the summer of 1943, rifle formations created a deeply echeloned anti-tank defense system. the density of the PTS has increased In the practice of the troops, the organization of the PTS, based on a kind of "network" - the PTS system of strong points, nodes and districts, is increasingly being established. The battle order of a rifle division in defense included from 4 to 8-13 PTOPs, which had fire communication among themselves.In the 15th rifle corps, for example, 24 PTOPs were created (15 in the main defense zone and 9 in the second), united in 9 PT areas ... However, experience has shown that it is more correct to transfer the PTO center of gravity to battalions, combining 2-3 company PTOs into battalion PT nodes (4-6 in the division's zone), covering them with obstacles and obstacles. PT units interacted with PTOPs and PT areas in the depth of the defense. PTOP usually included 4-6 guns (up to 12 on the main axes), 6-9 or 9-12 ATRs. 2-4 mortars, 2-3 easel and 3-4 light machine guns, a platoon of machine gunners and a squad (sometimes a platoon) of sappers with AT mines, sometimes tanks and self-propelled guns. Commanders of companies and battalions were appointed chiefs (commandants) of the PTOP. The saturation of the active army with PT artillery increased - if in November 1942 there were 1.7 PT guns per 1000 soldiers. then in July 1943 - 2.4 In addition to anti-tank guns, the PTOP artillery could include 85-mm anti-aircraft guns and even 152-mm howitzers and howitzers-cannons to combat new heavy German tanks.

Note that the high density of artillery and infantry PTS near Kursk was explained not only by the rather long time of organizing the defense, but also by the fact that the defense was actually occupied by offensive groupings. orders in the direction of the main attack included heavy tanks in the first echelon and on the flanks, and medium tanks, assault guns, and armored personnel carrier infantry in the middle. the fight against heavy tanks and well-armored assault guns was taken over by guns with a caliber of over 76 mm. and the anti-tank missile systems and 45-mm cannons located in the infantry positions are medium tanks, passing heavy through themselves to anti-tank areas.

So, in the battle for the village of Cherkasskoye on July 5, the armor-piercers of the 196th Infantry Regiment knocked out 5 enemy tanks. An anti-tank rifle crew consisting of Sergeant PI Bannov and Junior Sergeant I Khamzaev destroyed 14 tanks during July 7, 8 and 10. The commander of the German 19th Panzer Division recorded the battle on July 8 with units of the 81st Infantry Division in the Melekhovo area: "North of the collective farm" Harvest day "the Russians settled in the system of trenches, knocking out our flamethrower tanks with anti-tank guns and putting up fanatical resistance to our motorized infantrymen. On the night of July 9, this group managed to retreat." The most effective anti-tank missiles on the Kursk Bulge and were later against armored personnel carriers, light reconnaissance and command armored vehicles Without the support of artillery and anti-tank reserves, armor-piercing and tank destroyers still suffered heavy losses. , with grenades and incendiary bottles, 11 tanks were almost completely killed in position.

The enemy began to practice night tank attacks more widely, and this only increased the importance of close combat and AT minefields. Groups of sappers-tank destroyers in all types of combat tried to set up explosive barriers directly in front of advancing enemy tanks, using standard TM-41 mines, "mine belts "and other means In defense, sappers-fighters often occupied positions near rifle units, installed AT mines on sleds or boards pulled up by ropes. Although AT mines were an engineering tool. It was no accident that BUP-42 mentioned landmines and mines among the "means of fighting infantry." and hand grenades). This practice paid off and survived after the war.

BUP-42 demanded that each soldier be able to hit tanks. If tanks attack without infantry, it is necessary to hit them with anti-tank grenades, bottles with a combustible mixture, and fire at the viewing slots. toss bunches of grenades and anti-tank mines under the tracks. destroy tankmen with fire ... If tanks attack with infantry, only specially designated fighters should fight tanks, and everyone else is obliged to hit the infantry with fire and grenades.

In BUP-42, the actions of the armor-piercers were analyzed in detail. At night, firing at tanks was allowed only when they were clearly visible. The return in defense to a developed system of trenches and communication trenches increased the survivability of the infantry transport vehicles and the effectiveness of tank destroyers.They were able to quickly and covertly maneuver within the defense area of ​​the subunit and unit, without crossing under enemy fire, almost any section of the trenches could become a firing position. PTR in the trenches were hampered by the size of the PTR Positions of the PTR often became the basis of the platoon strongpoint Calculations of the PTR interacted in battle not only with infantrymen - tank destroyers and AT artillery crews but also with sappers and units of tank destroyer dogs The effectiveness of the actions of tank destroyers and armor piercers was largely determined camouflage their positions and the endurance of the fighters For rapprochement with the tanks, fighters sometimes set up smoke screens using RDG hand smoke grenades or small smoke bombs DM-11 When tank destroyers were included in assault groups to attack enemy firing points, The installation of smoke screens was almost obligatory. Even more often smoke screens were used by flamethrowers - the chemical troops were also in charge of smoke.

Within the regimental sections, anti-tank districts were created.The mobile regimental anti-tank reserve included 2-3 anti-tank guns, before an anti-tank rifle platoon and before a platoon of submachine gunners Platoons of tank destroyer dogs were also included in the reserve of units - they were located in tank-hazardous areas near the positions of anti-tank artillery. such platoons also included the calculations of the PTR and light machine guns.

When reinforcing PTOPs and AT areas, much attention was paid to AT obstacles, the arrangement of sheltered firing positions of AT guns and rifles, positions for tank destroyers with AT grenades and incendiary bottles. observers and machine gunners who covered the approaches to the positions of the PTS and interfered with the enemy in clearing obstacles The main part of the firing PTS was tried to be located on the reverse slopes of the heights BUP-42 determined the order of organizing anti-tank defense and in the offensive of anti-tank missiles and anti-tank vehicles, the guns had to move on the offensive in the combat formations of subunits. the infantry regiment was allocated a reserve PTS. which kept in a tank-hazardous direction. especially to cover the flanks and joints. When their tanks or self-propelled guns fell behind or failed, the PTS infantry support switched to its support, destroying the firing points. PTS of the enemy, but remaining ready to repel a tank counterattack Armor-piercers and tank destroyers operated in the first echelon of the landing when crossing and securing a bridgehead - they took on the main role in repelling enemy counterattacks in the most dangerous initial period of the struggle for a bridgehead. flamethrowers with knapsack flamethrowers. shooters abundantly supplied with anti-tank grenades, bundles of grenades and incendiary bottles, were also brought together as part of assault groups when attacking bunkers (bunkers) or fortified buildings. Groups of submachine gunners with anti-tank grenades and incendiary bottles were also used to identify and destroy enemy tanks in ambush, calculations of anti-tank guns and "faustics", facilitating the advancement of their tanks.

When making a march, subunits of anti-tank weapons and anti-tank guns were usually distributed along the length of the column. At the command “Tanks,” battalion columns were dismembered by company, guns and anti-tank missile systems took up firing positions in front of the infantry, sappers planted mines in front and on the flanks of these positions, and rifle subunits, using the existing obstacles and shelters, were made to repel tanks with their own means. Anti-aircraft weapons, depending on the situation, were made for firing at aircraft or firing at tanks. Anti-tank missiles and anti-tank guns were assigned to cover groups when rifle units left the battle and broke through the encirclement.

Infantry and artillery anti-tank weapons were brought together organizationally. In the spring of 1E42, the anti-tank battalion was returned to the staff of the Red Army rifle division, but already in the composition of twelve 45-mm anti-tank guns and an anti-tank rifle company (36 guns). For comparison, the US Army infantry regiment already at the end of the war had a regular anti-tank battery (company) armed with nine 57-mm anti-tank guns and nine RPGs "Bazooka" anti-tank strongholds.

The third period of the Great Patriotic War (January 1944 - May 1945) was characterized mainly by offensive actions of the Red Army. However, the enemy constantly conducted counterattacks with tank units, repeatedly tried to launch a counteroffensive in certain sectors (East Prussia in August-September 1944, the Balaton region in January-March 1945). During the Berlin operation, Soviet rifle units had to repulse an average of 4-5 enemy counterattacks with tanks and self-propelled guns. This required the Soviet troops to quickly create an echeloned highly stable circular anti-tank defense system. It still relied on the VET system and PT nodes and PT districts.

The company PTOP in the Red Army in the last period of the war included 3-5 guns (both 57-mm and 100-152-mm caliber), an ATR platoon, 1-2 tanks, a rifle unit, and a mortar platoon. The battalion PT, in addition to the means of PTOPs, had up to 12 guns of different calibers and an anti-tank rifle unit. Moreover, the PTR played an auxiliary role in the fight against light armored vehicles, fired at the viewing slots - like ordinary rifles at the beginning of the war.

A hasty transition to the defense often did not allow the organization of anti-tank guns, and the main load fell on the anti-tank areas, which were created throughout the depth of defense in the most tank-hazardous areas at the expense of anti-tank fighter units. In the PT area there could be up to 14 guns and self-propelled guns and up to 18 anti-tank guns.

PTS during this period became common in assault operations - the assault group was assigned an anti-tank rifle squad, 1-2 anti-tank guns, and the assault squads were reinforced by a platoon of sappers with anti-tank mines, a battery of 45-mm guns, and backpack flamethrowers.

The average density of vehicles in the tactical defense zone (including guns, tanks and self-propelled guns) by the end of the war increased to 20-25 units per 1 km of the front, i.e. 5-6 times compared to the initial period. The main part of them was still artillery means. Moreover, the density of guns not only increased during the war, but also differentiated depending on the importance or danger of the site. The average density of AT guns in the first period of the war was 2-5, in the second - 6, in the third - 8 per 1 km of the front. The depth of the fire system of anti-tank weapons in defense increased from 2-3 to 6-8 km, and taking into account the second line of defense - up to 15-20 km. The AT fire system of company PTOPs, battalion AT units and regimental districts was joined by fire from various reserves at the lines of their deployment. At the lake. Balaton, for example, AT areas included 8-14 guns and self-propelled guns, 6-18 ATGMs, and the ATM was reinforced by maneuvering artillery from the depths and from non-attacked areas. This in itself showed that artillery turned out to be the only real basis for anti-tank defense in conditions of weakness of infantry PTSs. At Lake Balaton, as in the initial period of the war, soldiers again threw themselves under tanks with grenades. The popularity of captured Panzerfaust "" among the Soviet infantry is not accidental. So, in the same Hungary on December 3, 1944. two companies of the 1st battalion of captain I.A. Rapoport of the 29th Guards. airborne regiment, repelling the counterattack of German tanks and infantry near the town of Meze-Komar, in addition to two 45- and two 76-mm cannons, the Panzerfaust captured the day before were used, knocking out 6 tanks, 2 assault guns and 2 enemy armored personnel carriers during the battle.

Schematic diagram of the organization of the PTO of a rifle division in the third period of the Great Patriotic War (Balaton operation, March 1945)

It should be noted that the PTO principles developed during the war years remained fundamental in the Soviet Army until the mid-1950s, when, in connection with the development of nuclear and high-precision weapons, a fundamental revision of the methods of waging battle and the combat formations of offensive and defense began.

Anti-tank missiles, anti-tank grenades and mines were successfully used by partisans. From June 20, 1942. to February 1, 1944 The Soviet Central Headquarters of the partisan movement handed over 2,556 anti-tank guns, 75,000 anti-tank guns and 464,570 fragmentation hand grenades to the partisan detachments. Partisans made extensive use of incendiary bottles and homemade "mobile" mines. The PTR was used by Soviet partisans to fire at enemy echelons - at steam locomotives or fuel tanks.

As for the German army, here the PTO issues were sufficiently worked out by the beginning of the Second World War - especially since it was the Germans who had the opportunity to become the pioneers of the PTO. A characteristic feature of the German anti-tank defense system was the close interaction of infantry and anti-tank artillery - the advance of the infantry anti-tank guns was always accompanied by wheels. However, clashes with Soviet troops in 1941, sensitive, albeit scattered counterattacks by Soviet tankers in the initial period of the war forced the German command to clarify the statutory provisions on the anti-tank defense of troops. So, already in the fall of 1941. Instruction was sent to the troops "On methods of dealing with heavy Soviet tanks." The main measures of struggle were recognized as: suppression of tanks by artillery at their initial positions, direct fire at attacking tanks with separate extended guns, as well as the defeat of tanks by "shock detachments" of infantry, ie. tank destroyers. PTO of German troops in the winter of 1941/42. was organized inside strong points ("hedgehogs"), created in important directions and adapted for a circular defense. Already in the spring of 1942. The headquarters of the Main Command of the Ground Forces sent out "Instructions on the combat training of the infantry." They paid special attention to firing - including anti-tank - at short ranges.

In the second half of 1942. the Wehrmacht moved from focal defense to positional defense, respectively, returning to the system of continuous trenches and increasing the depth of defense. Most of the firepower was located in the first position. Special soldiers with tracer bullets in ammunition and lighting pistols were allocated as observers to signal the appearance of tanks, illuminate the terrain and target AT equipment. In the counteroffensive at Stalingrad, Soviet troops had to face a densely occupied defense, consisting of strongholds connected by trenches. The basis of the anti-tank defense system was artillery fire and engineering barriers, the advanced infantry units were abundantly supplied with PTS. The settlements adapted to the all-round defense - again, first of all, in the PT relation.

Near Kursk in the summer of 1943, the German defense was even deeper (the first position, for example, included not two, but three trenches), and the PT fire weapons were located inside strong points in open positions and in permanent structures, including transportable shelters, etc. n. “Crabs” are domed metal structures with embrasures along the perimeter. Specially appointed officers were responsible for organizing anti-tank defense within the units - as a rule, they were artillerymen, commanders of anti-tank battalions.

In 1944-1945. German units created fairly high PTS densities in defense. The main line of defense, as a rule, consisted of three positions, with 2-3 trenches each. Strongpoints and nodes of resistance were created at the positions, and in some directions - with a system of "crabs". PTS were echeloned throughout the depth of the defense, but most of them were located in the main strip (depth 6-8 km), and up to 80% - in the first two positions. Given the massive use of tanks by Soviet troops, the Wehrmacht command attached great importance to the infantry PTS. In the German defense, opposing the 2nd Ukrainian Front during the Uman-Botoshan operation, the density of close combat vehicles was 6.4 per 1 km of the front, against the 1st Ukrainian and 1st Belorussian fronts during the Vistula-Oder operation - 10, Berlin - 20 per 1 km of the front.

At the last stage of the war, the Germans practiced "mobile tank-destroyer groups" of infantrymen with "panzerfaust", designed to compensate for the lack of anti-tank weapons on an extended front. "Faustniki" became the main element of the near VET.

Strong points of defense in terms of anti-tank forces created German units in the cities. In Berlin, for example, they included tanks or assault guns dug in near houses, anti-tank guns on the first and second floors and numerous positions of machine gunners and "Faustists" on all tiers, mortar batteries in the courtyards. Colonel General B.C. Arkhipov wrote later: "The paratroopers, who are stationed on tank armor, find themselves in a particularly difficult situation, but the tanker cannot do without them, because they protect him from grenade launchers, fausters and other tank hunters."

Units were also created, combining almost all AT assets of the ground forces. So, in April 1942. the formation of anti-tank fighter brigades began in the Red Army. The brigade consisted of an anti-tank artillery regiment (76-, 45-mm anti-aircraft guns and 37-mm anti-aircraft guns), 2 anti-tank rifle battalions of 3 companies in each, a mortar battalion, an engineering and mine battalion and a tank battalion, a company of machine gunners. Such brigades of three were brought together in anti-tank divisions, which served as a mobile PT reserve of the fronts. In the course of the war, the ideas of "enlarging" both purely infantry units and units of tank destroyers, modeled on anti-tank artillery units, were repeatedly expressed. So, according to the memoirs of N.D. Yakovlev, in March 1943. commander of the Volkhov front K.A. Meretskov suggested introducing special “grenadier” units armed with anti-tank missiles and anti-tank grenades in the rifle troops. On the other hand, tank destroyer brigades armed with close combat PTSs were formed in the German army. G. Guderian recalled that on January 26, 1945. Hitler gave the order to form a "tank destroyer division". With a formidable name, it should have consisted of the mouths of scooters (cyclists) with "panzerfaust", i.e. become another improvisation of the end of the war.

Japanese troops on the islands of the Pacific Ocean (for example, on Guadalcanal) and in Manchuria made extensive use of suicide fighters who threw themselves under a tank with grenades or a powerful explosive charge. Although there were cases of throwing under a tank in especially tense moments of battle in all armies, perhaps only the Japanese made "teishintai" ("special shock troops" of suicide bombers) a permanent element. In the Kwantung Army, the 1st separate suicide brigade was formed. During the Japanese counterattacks in the Madayashi region on August 13-14, 200 such suicide bombers were thrown against Soviet tanks, but the results of their actions were small. Groups of "ordinary" fighters with grenades, mines and smoke weapons were more dangerous.

"Panzerfaust" became a massive infantry PTS. The picture shows a sniper and a submachine gunner of the SS troops in a trench, between them the "Panzerfaust" pipe is visible, March 1945)

American calculation RPGM1 "Bazooka" in defense. Normandy, July 1944

RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS

Some conclusions can be drawn regarding the development and combat use of anti-tank infantry weapons during the Second World War:

1. The experience of hostilities has shown the urgent need to saturate infantry units (squad-platoon-company) with weapons capable of effectively hitting all types of tanks and armored vehicles at ranges of up to 400-500 m. The development of the PTS, of course, proceeded in parallel with the development of armored vehicles. During the war, the tactical maneuverability of tanks (speed on the battlefield, throttle response, agility, maneuverability) changed insignificantly, but the quality of firepower and protection increased - the tanks became more powerful, "long-armed" and "thick-skinned." The scale of the use of tanks and their massing in the directions of the main attacks increased. at the same time, the nomenclature of BTTs was growing on the battlefield, self-propelled guns entered the battlefield. transport and combat armored vehicles. Accordingly, the requirements for PTS changed - at the same ranges they had to reliably hit much better protected targets, while having the flexibility and stealth of infantry weapons. With the growing maneuverability and dynamics of hostilities, the PTS required high combat readiness, a higher probability of hitting a target from the first shot, and maneuverability in all conditions. The weapon, which required more than two (with ammunition - three) people to maintain and carry in battle, was too bulky for the infantry. At the same time, the requirements for ease of use and handling, speed and low cost of production have become more stringent.

2. In the course of the war, the nomenclature of PTS increased significantly - both due to special models of anti-tank weapons (PTR, RPG), and due to adaptation to the needs of anti-tank equipment "multipurpose" weapons (signal pistol, rifle grenade launchers, flamethrowers). At the same time, anti-tank weapons differed: by the principle of destructive action (kinetic energy of a bullet, cumulative effect, high-explosive or incendiary action), by the principle of "propelling" action (small arms and rocket weapons, hand grenades), range (MTR - up to 500. RPG - up to 200, hand grenades - up to 20 m). Some means were in service at the beginning of the war, others appeared during it and developed rapidly afterwards, while others (incendiary bottles, "sticky bombs", ampulomet) were just an improvisation of wartime. On the other hand, they also tried to use special PTS to solve other problems - this is clearly seen on the example of PTR and RPG (which were also used to combat fortified firing points and fortifications) and indicates the need for a certain "universalization" of even "special" military weapons ... You can see an analogy with the last two decades of the 20th century, when multipurpose warheads (cumulative fragmentation, penetrating, thermobaric) are being created for RPGs and ATGMs. allowing them to be used as light means of fire support for small units.

In the second half of the war, the German specialists most fully developed a new system of anti-tank weapons for infantry (they were motivated primarily by the quantitative and qualitative growth of the armored and mechanized troops of the Red Army), but the rapidly depleting resources of industry and the swift actions of the Red Army did not give the German army the opportunity to fully use this advantage. Regarding the anti-tank weapons system of the Red Army, it is worth noting that by the end of the war, as at the beginning, rifle subunits had hand grenades used at ranges of up to 20-25 m as their main means. firing range. The fight against enemy tanks was again completely assigned to the artillery. This was facilitated by the adoption in 1942-1943. new anti-tank guns (45-mm cannon arr. 1942, 57-mm arr. 1943, 76-mm arr. 1943), as well as changes in ammunition. In 1943. adopted 45-, 57- and 76-mm sub-caliber ("special armor-piercing") shells, and in the ammunition of regimental 76-mm guns mod. 1927 and 1943 and divisional 122-mm howitzer mod. 1938 introduced cumulative ("armor-burning") shells. The sub-caliber projectile allowed the forty-fives to fight the new medium and heavy German tanks, the regimental cannon could fire with a cumulative projectile at a distance of up to 600 m, although its accuracy was low. However, neither the quantitative increase in the anti-tank artillery, nor its closer interaction with the infantry (in 1943, for example, a platoon of anti-tank guns was returned to the staff of the rifle battalion), nor the inclusion of light self-propelled guns and anti-tank guns in the staff of rifle units and formations of light self-propelled guns and anti-tank batteries, nor an increase in anti-tank capabilities regimental and divisional artillery did not solve the problem of close anti-tank defense at the subunit level and did not relieve the infantry of the need to fight enemy tanks with their own means. This led to large losses in conditions when the enemy often resorted to counterattacks with the participation of tanks, armored vehicles and self-propelled guns, and the time for organizing the defense and pulling up artillery was extremely limited. An example of this is the heavy fighting in the area of ​​the lake. Balaton in February-March 1945. While concentrating artillery in battalion defense areas or regimental AT areas, the forward subunits were left without PTS.

3. The infantry armament complex began to change dramatically from the middle of 1943. - the main role has passed to samples with a cumulative warhead, first of all - to RPGs. The reason for this was a change in the armored armament system of armies - the removal of light tanks from combat units, an increase in the thickness of the armor of medium tanks and self-propelled guns up to 50-100 m, heavy - up to 80-200 mm. The cumulative warhead not only made it possible to significantly increase the armor penetration without increasing the mass and speed of the projectile, but also created high overpressure and high temperature behind the armor more often than kinetic armor-piercing projectiles, causing the ammunition load to detonate. The new infantry vehicle complex, which developed in the post-war decades, was basically formed almost by the spring of 1945: hand and rifle cumulative grenades, disposable and reusable RPGs with cumulative shots, heavy-duty anti-tank grenade launchers and light recoilless guns, hand incendiary means, still experimental experienced ATGM. Melee infantry PTSs filled niches at all levels - short-range as individual weapons and means of separation and with an effective firing range of up to 200 or up to 500 m in companies, battalions and special anti-tank units.

4. The increase in the saturation of troops with light melee PTSs operating in infantry battle formations increased the survivability, independence and maneuverability of subunits and units, and strengthened the general anti-tank defense system.

Table 5 CHANGE IN THE AMOUNT OF ANTI-TANK MEANS IN THE STATES OF THE INFANTRY (SMALL) DIVISIONS IN 1941 -1945.

Year	1941		1943		1944		1945
Compound	rifle division	infantry division	rifle division	infantry division	rifle division	infantry division	infantry division	rifle division	infantry division	infantry division
Country	the USSR	Germany	the USSR	Germany	the USSR	Germany	USA	the USSR	Germany	USA
Personnel, people	11 626	16 859	9 435	13 155	11 706	12 801	14 253	11 780	11 910	14 248
Anti-tank rifles	89	96	212		107**			111
Grenade launchers *	-	-	-	98	-	108	510	-	222	557
Total guns	66	148	92	124	118	101	128 ***	112 ***	103	123
of which VET	18	75	48	50	54	24	63	66	31	57

* Rifle (rifle) grenade launchers are not counted

** The decrease in the number of anti-tank missiles in the Soviet rifle division after 1943 is associated with a decrease in their role in the anti-tank defense system

*** Including self-propelled guns

The importance of the infantry PTS can be judged at least by the fact that throughout the war tanks kept course machine guns, and the tankers developed a whole range of techniques for fighting tank "destroyers" and tried not to go into battle without infantry. The norms of saturation of the PTS of the infantry combat formations turned out to be significantly higher than it was envisaged before the war, which was determined by the scale and methods of using BTT. The role of PTS infantry increased in all types of combat. These changes in the system and nomenclature of weapons and military equipment determined the beginning of the transition from "anti-tank defense as an important type of combat support" to "fighting tanks and armored vehicles" as one of the main components of combat operations, and for the infantry this task has become the most urgent.

5. The effectiveness of the PTS in battle was determined not only by their performance characteristics, but also by the complex use of these means, the organization of close interaction of infantry, anti-tank, regimental and divisional artillery, own tank units, sappers and "chemists" (flamethrowers) both in defensive and offensive combat. , the degree of preparedness of the personnel of the subunits. The special training of tank destroyers and "armor-piercing" was justified not only when fighting tanks, but also, say, when storming fortified firing points. At the same time, the presence of trained "fighters" did not remove the tasks of fighting tanks (at least with the help of grenades) from the rest of the infantrymen. The need to complicate the training of the infantry, in particular, training in the handling of anti-tank mines and incendiary weapons, was revealed. The complex use of various PTSs, combined with the dynamism of combat, also required better training of combined-arms commanders at all levels.

On the example of the domestic armed forces.

The charter of the combatant infantry service. Project (1897).

Wartime company front - 200 steps (item 181).

Wartime battalion front - approx. 400 steps with two companies in the warhead (there can be one, two or three companies in the warhead) (p. 228, 230).

Instructions for action in battle of detachments from all types of weapons. Project (1901).

The length of the front of the battle formation can be (item 20):

For a shelf - up to 1,000 steps;
For a brigade - up to 1 verst;
For a division - up to 2 versts;
For the case - up to 3 versts.

Instruction for action in battle of detachments from all types of weapons (1904).

The length of the front of the battle formation can be (p. 23):

For a battalion - approx. 400 steps
For a shelf - up to 1,000 steps;
For a brigade - up to 1 verst;
For a division - up to 2 versts;
For the case - up to 3 versts.

Each artillery division of a three-battery composition in the warhead increases the length of the battle formation by approximately 600 steps.

Combat Infantry Regulations (1908).

The average length of the wartime chain is 250-300 steps (p. 199).

The battle formation of a battalion is made up of companies assigned to company combat areas and companies left in the battalion reserve. All battalion companies may be in combat areas (p. 258).

For the regiment, the order is similar to the battalion (p. 284)

Combat cavalry charter (1912).

The interval between people is on average 3 steps;
Platoon - 40-80 steps (p. 376).

Field Service Charter (1912).

The length of the battle formation along the front (p. 452):

Battalion - approx. ½ versts;
Regiment - approx. 1 versts;
Brigade - approx. 2 versts;
Division - approx. 3 versts;
Hull - 5-6 versts.

General instructions for fighting for fortified zones. Part I: actions of all combat arms (1916).

The front of the offensive for a division is 1–2 versts (p. 99b).
The division's sector in defense is 5-10 versts (p. 268).

Field Charter of the Red Army. Part I. Maneuver warfare (1918).

The length of the combat area (p. 477) on the offensive:

Battalion - up to ½ verst;
Regiment - up to 1-2 versts;
Brigade - 2-4 versts;
Division - 3-6 versts;
Hull - 5-10 versts.

When attacking heavily fortified positions on a division of 1-2 versts.

When defending (passive):

Battalion - up to 1 verst;
Regiment - up to 3 versts;
Brigade - up to 6 versts;
Division - up to 10 versts;
Hull - up to 20 versts.

For active defense, the norms are the same as in the offensive.

Combat infantry regulations. Part I (1919).

The average length of the battle formation of a company is 200-250 steps (p. 216).

Combat infantry regulations. Part II (1919).

Front of the offensive (p. 19):

Battalion - up to ½ verst;
The regiment is 1-2 versts.

Front Defense:

Battalion - up to 1 verst;
Regiment - up to 3 versts.

Field Charter of the Red Army. Part II (division and corps) (1925).

A sector along the front (p. 822) when attacking:

For the regiment - from 750 m to 2 km;
For a division - from 1 to 4 km.

When defending:

For the regiment - from 2 to 4 km;
For a division - from 4 to 10 km.

Combat regulations of the Red Army infantry. Part II (1927).

Width of the offensive front:

Battalion - if less than 500 m, then the formation is three-echelon (one company per echelon) (p. 347).
Rota - 300-400 m (p. 511).
Platoon - approx. 150 m (p. 611).

District defense area (p. 106):

Battalion - from 1x1 to 2x2 km;
Rota - from 500x500 m to 1x1 km;
Platoon - up to 500x500 m.

The defense of the battalion on a wide front - from 2 to 5 km (item 118).

Field Charter of the Red Army (1929).

The width of the line of action (p. 139) in the offensive:

Regiment in the strike group - 1-2 km;
Division strike group without reinforcement means - 2 km;
The strike group of the corps is 4-6 km.

On the defensive:

Regiment - 3-4 km;
Division - 8-12 km;
Building - 24-30 km.

Cavalry battle regulations. Part II. Sec. I (1929).

Front on the offensive:

Platoon - up to 100 m (p. 244);
Squadron - up to 400 m (p. 398);
Regiment - up to 2 km (p. 550).

Defense area:

Platoon - up to 150x200 m (p. 244);
Squadron - up to 500x500 m; on a wide front up to 1x1 km (p. 413);
Regiment - up to 2-3 km; on a wide front - up to 4 km; dismounted entirely - up to 1-1.5 km (p. 552).

Instructions on the tactics of units and subunits of the cavalry of the Red Army. Interim Leadership (1935).

Offensive strip:

Regiment - up to 2 km (item 232);
Squadron - 300-500 m (p. 637);
Platoon - 100-150 m (p. 745).

Defense area (sector):

Regiment - up to 3 x 2.5-3 km; on a wide front up to 5 km; dismounted entirely - up to 1-1.5 km (p. 445);
Squadron - 0.5-1 x 0.5-1 km (p. 637);
Platoon - up to 300x300 m (p. 745).

Interim Field Manual of the Red Army (1936).

The width of the offensive front, depending on the reinforcement (p. 175):

Battalion - 600 - 1,000 m;
Division strike group without reinforcement - 2-2.5 km;
The strike group of the division with reinforcement - 3-3.5 km.

The total width of a division's offensive zone may be twice as large as that of a strike group.

Normal Defense Front (p. 229):

Battalion - 1.5-2.5 x 1.5-2 km;
Regiment - 3-5 x 2.5-3 km;
Division - 8-12 x 4-6 km.

Combat regulations of the Red Army infantry. Part I (1938).

The front of the platoon's offensive - up to 150 m (p. 252).

The platoon's defense area - up to 300x250 m, with reinforcement - up to 500x250 m (p. 297).

The combat charter of the cavalry of the Red Army. Part I (1938).

The platoon strip in the offensive is 100-150 m (p. 351).

The platoon's defense area is 200-300 x 200-300 m (p. 387).

The combat charter of the cavalry of the Red Army. Part II (1940).

Offensive strip:

Regiment - 1.5 km on the main line; in the secondary direction up to 3 km (p. 236);
Squadron - up to 300 m (p. 320).

Defensive site:

Regiment - up to 2x3 km; on a wide front 2-4 km; in mobile defense up to 4 km (p. 356);
Squadron - up to 600x600 m (p. 446).

Combat regulations of the Red Army infantry. Part II. Project (1940).

Front of the offensive:

Rota - 200-500 m (p. 42);
Battalion - 400-1000 m (p. 207);
Regiment in the strike group - 1-1.5 km; in the binding group - 2-3 km (p. 482); When advancing on the front no more than 600 m - formation in three echelons (p. 483).

Defense area:

Rota - up to 1x1 km (p. 98);
Battalion - up to 2x2 km (p. 306);
A battalion on a wide front - up to 5 km (item 351);
Regiment - 3-5 x 2.5-3 km (p. 542);
Regiment on a wide front - up to 8 km (item 566).

Combat regulations of the Red Army infantry. Part I (1942).

Front of the offensive:

Platoon - up to 100 m (p. 253);
Rota - up to 350 m (p. 466).

Defense area:

Platoon - up to 300x250 m (p. 291);
Company - up to 700x700 m (p. 542).

Combat regulations of the Red Army infantry. Part II (1942).

Front of the offensive:

Battalion - up to 700 m (item 19);
Regiment - up to 1,500 m (item 429).

Defense area:

Battalion - up to 2 x 1.5-2 km (item 132);
In the conditions of positional defense, the regiment receives a section of the main defense zone, the size of which depends on the tasks and on the nature of the terrain (p. 625).

Field manual of the Red Army. Project (1943).

Division on the offensive - approx. 4 km, but not less than 3 (p. 161).

The division is on the defensive - up to 10 km along the front and 5–6 km in depth (p. 483).

The brigade on the defensive - 5-6 km along the front (p. 483).

Combat regulations of BT and MV of the Red Army. Part II (1944).

Front width in the offensive (items 38, 40):

Tank brigade - 1-1.5 km;
Mechanized brigade - 1.5-2 km;
Motorized rifle brigade - 1-1.5 km;
Tank regiment - 600 - 1200 m;
Motorized rifle battalion - 500-700 m.

Front width in defense (p. 38):

Tank brigade - up to 3 km;
Mechanized brigade - 4-6 km;
Motorized rifle brigade - 3-5 km;
Tank regiment - up to 1.5 km;
Motorized rifle battalion - 1-1.5 km.

Field manual of the Soviet Army (regiment - battalion) (1953).

When attacking a prepared defense (p. 129, 200):

A rifle regiment - up to 2 km;
Mechanized regiment - up to 2 km;
Tank regiment - up to 1.5 km;
Rifle battalion - up to 1 km;
Motorized rifle battalion - up to 1 km;
Tank battalion - up to 750 m.

A cavalry regiment when attacking a hastily organized defense - up to 1.5 km (p. 219).

Sector (area) of defense (p. 379, 455, 464):

Rifle, motorized rifle, mechanized regiment - 4-6 x 4-5 km;
Tank regiment - up to 4x4 km;
Cavalry regiment - up to 3x3 km;
Battalion - up to 2 x 1.5-2 km;
Rota - 800-1000 x 400-600 m.

Defense on a wide front (p. 438, 464):

A rifle regiment - 8-10 km;
Cavalry regiment - 4-5 km;
Tank regiment - 6-8 km;
Rifle battalion - up to 5 km;
Tank battalion - 3-4 km.

Field manual of the Soviet Army (regiment - battalion) (1959).

The offensive zone when breaking through the prepared defense (p. 96):

Regiment - up to 4 km;
Battalion - up to 1.5 km.

Defense sector (area) (p. 283):

Regiment - up to 6-10 x 6-8 km;
Battalion - up to 2-3 x 2 km.
Rota - up to 1 km.

When defending on a wide front, etc .:

Regiment - up to 15 km;
Battalion - up to 5 km.
Rota - up to 1.5 km.

Combat regulations of the Ground Forces (battalion - company) (1964).

Front of the offensive (p. 89):

Battalion - up to 2 km; without the use of nuclear weapons up to 1,000 m;
Rota - up to 800 m; without the use of nuclear weapons up to 500 m.

Defense area (p. 173, 175):

Battalion - up to 5x2 km;
Rota - up to 1000x500 m.

Combat regulations of the Ground Forces. Part II: battalion - company (1982).

Front of the offensive (p. 61):

Battalion - up to 2 km; without the use of nuclear weapons up to 1 km;
Rota - up to 1 km; without the use of nuclear weapons up to 500 m;
Platoon - up to 300 m.

Defense area (p. 173, 175):

Battalion - up to 5x3 km;
Rota - up to 1500x1000 m;
Platoon - up to 400x300 m.

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The strategic plans of the command are clothed in orders of the headquarters and the general staff, for clarity, illustrated by large-scale maps with beautiful arrows and lines. The same maps with the real position of the troops after the operation are already the result. Between these extreme points in the lives of soldiers and officers and the mechanism that forced them to make certain decisions in pursuance of the Plan. A unified algorithm that drives regiments, divisions and corps - Field Manual. It is they who are obliged to be guided by the military leaders of this level. Leaders of lower levels are guided by the Combat Manual.

Field Charter of the Red Army (PU-39) - State Military Publishing House of the USSR People's Commissariat of Defense, Moscow, 1939 - is the fundamental document of the Red Army. It was developed to replace the outdated Field Manual of 1936 (PU-36).

With him, the Red Army took the first blow on the border on June 22, 1941. With him she retreated to Moscow and the Volga. I won with him.

It is this document that shows how the military leadership of the USSR represented the modern war directly on the battlefield and what it was preparing for.

1939

Field regulations of the Workers 'and Peasants' Red Army (PU-39, 1939)

Ship charter of the Workers 'and Peasants' Navy of the USSR (1939)

1940

Combat charter of bomber aviation of the Workers 'and Peasants' Red Army, (BUBA-40, 1940, entered into force by order of the People's Commissar of Defense No. 24 of 1938)

Combat Regulations of Fighter Aviation of the Workers 'and Peasants' Red Army, (BUIA-40, put into effect by order of the People's Commissar of Defense of 1938 No. 25)

Combat regulations of the tank forces of the Workers 'and Peasants' Red Army, part II (1940)

Disciplinary Regulations of the Workers 'and Peasants' Red Army (enacted by order of the People's Commissar of Defense of October 12, 1940, No. 356)

1942

Combat regulations of the infantry of the Workers 'and Peasants' Red Army (part 1). Soldier, squad, platoon, company) (1942, approved and put into effect by Order of the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR No. 347 of 11/9/42)

Combat regulations of the infantry of the Workers 'and Peasants' Red Army (part 2). Battalion, regiment) (1942, approved and put into effect by Order of the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR No. 347 of 11/9/42)

1944

The combat regulations of armored and mechanized troops of the Workers 'and Peasants' Red Army (part 1). Tank, tank platoon, tank company (1944) (introduced by Order of the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR of 13.02.1944, No. 10)

The combat regulations of armored and mechanized troops of the Workers 'and Peasants' Red Army (part 2) (1944) (introduced by Order of the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR No. 11 dated 13.02.1944)

Combat regulations of anti-aircraft artillery of the Workers 'and Peasants' Red Army (part 1, book 1) (1944) (introduced by Order of the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR of 05/29/1944, No. 76)

Combat regulations of anti-aircraft artillery of the Workers 'and Peasants' Red Army (part 1, book 2) (1944) (introduced by Order of the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR of 05/29/1944, No. 77)

The combat regulations of the artillery of the Workers 'and Peasants' Red Army (part 1, book 1) (1944) (introduced by the Order of the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR No. 209 of 18.10.1944)

The combat charter of the cavalry of the Workers 'and Peasants' Red Army (part 1) (1944).

Field Charter of the Red Army (PU-39).

Chapter one. General basics

Chapter two. Organization of the Red Army troops

The type of troops and their combat use

Troops formations

Governing bodies

Chapter three. Political work in a combat situation

Chapter four. Command and control of troops

Management Basics

Organization of management

Issuance of the order and operational documents

Chapter five. The basics of battle formations

Chapter six. Combat support of troop actions

Reconnaissance

Safeguarding

Air defense of troops (air defense)

Chemical defense of troops (PHO)

Anti-tank defense of troops (PTO)

Chapter seven. Material support for the combat activities of troops

Rear organization

Supply Service

Sanitary service

Manning

Evacuation of prisoners of war

Veterinary service

Work of the rear on the march and in the oncoming battle

Home front work in the offensive

Home front work in defense

Chapter Eight. Offensive battle

Offensive Combat Basics

Approach to the enemy defensive zone and reconnaissance

Organization of the offensive

Interaction of combat arms in the offensive

Leading the offensive

Offensive against heavily fortified positions

Offensive at night

Offensive with overcoming the water line

The pursuit

Chapter nine. Meeting engagement

Counter Combat Basics

Features of the march in anticipation of the oncoming battle

Engagement of the oncoming battle with columns

Actions of the main forces

Meeting engagement management

Chapter ten. Defense

Defense basics

Defense on a normal front

Defensive Combat

Features of conducting a defensive battle at night

Defense of fortified areas

River defense

Defense on a broad front

Mobile defense

Exit and retreat

Chapter eleven. Winter activities

Chapter twelve. Actions in special conditions

Activities in the mountains

Activities in the forests

Actions in the desert steppes

Battles for settlements

Chapter thirteen. Joint actions of troops with river flotillas

Chapter fourteen. Joint actions of troops with the navy

Chapter fifteen. Troop movements

Travel movement (march)

Camping security

Trucking

Chapter sixteen. Rest and its protection

Leisure location

Security guard.

CHAPTER ONE

GENERAL BASIS

1. The Workers 'and Peasants' Red Army is the armed force of the workers and peasants of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. It is called upon to protect and defend our Motherland, the world's first socialist state of working people.

The Red Army is the bulwark of the world. She is brought up in the spirit of love and devotion to her Motherland, the party of Lenin-Stalin and the Soviet government, in the spirit of international solidarity with the working people of the whole world. Due to the historically formed conditions, the Red Army exists as an invincible, all-crushing force. This is how she is, this is how she will always be.

2. The defense of our Motherland is an active defense.

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics will respond to any attack by the enemy with a crushing blow with all the might of its armed forces.

Our war against an attacking enemy will be the fairest of all wars in human history.

If the enemy imposes a war on us, the Workers 'and Peasants' Red Army will be the most attacking army ever attacked.

We will wage the war offensively, with the most decisive goal of completely routing the enemy on his own territory.

The fighting of the Red Army will be aimed at destruction. The main goal of the Red Army will be to achieve a decisive victory and completely crush the enemy.

3. The great might and indestructible strength of the Workers 'and Peasants' Red Army lies in its selfless devotion to the great cause of Lenin - Stalin, the Motherland and the Bolshevik Party; in moral and political unity with the people and close ties with them; in high revolutionary military discipline; in the courage, determination, courage and heroism of all its personnel; in constant combat readiness; in excellent combat training and rich equipment with the most modern and most advanced weapons; in the sympathy and support that she will meet among the working masses of the attacked countries and the whole world.

4. The tasks of the Workers 'and Peasants' Red Army are international; they are of international, world-historical significance.

The Red Army will enter the territory of the attacked enemy as the liberator of the oppressed and enslaved.

It is an important task for the Red Army to attract to the side of the proletarian revolution the broad masses of the enemy army and the population of the theater of military operations. This is achieved by the political work carried out in the army and outside it by all commanders, military commissars and political workers of the Red Army.

5. The entire personnel of the Workers 'and Peasants' Red Army must be educated in the spirit of irreconcilable hatred for the enemy and an uncompromising will to destroy him. Until the enemy laid down his arms and surrendered, he will be mercilessly destroyed. However, the personnel of the Red Army are generous to the captured enemy and provide him with all kinds of assistance, saving his life. Formidable in battle, our army is a friend and protector of the working masses of the attacked country, protecting their lives, homes and property.

Being the most cultured army in the world, the Red Army spares and protects all cultural values ​​and avoids unnecessary destruction, where it is not caused by the conditions of the battle.

6. The most valuable person in the Red Army is the new man of the Stalin era. He has a decisive role in battle. Without him, all technical means of struggle are dead, in his hands they become a formidable weapon.

The entire personnel of the Red Army is brought up in the Bolshevik spirit of activity, bold initiative, unshakable impulse, indestructible perseverance and constant striving to defeat the enemy.

The entire composition of the Red Army must stubbornly cultivate an iron will and a steel character. He must be ready for selfless dedication and exceptional exertion of all his physical and moral strength in the 6th.

A fighter must be a conscientious performer of his combat mission and must understand it. Familiarization of fighters with the task and analysis of their actions at the end of the battle are therefore the most important duties of all commanders and military commissars.

7. Caring for the human soldier and all his subordinates is the primary duty and direct duty of commanders, military commissars and political workers.

The chief - the leader, senior comrade and friend - is going through all the hardships and difficulties of combat life with the troops. Maintaining the strictest discipline, he must know perfectly his subordinates, have constant personal communication with them, show special attention to their needs and be an example in everything.

He should especially highlight and encourage the exploits of his subordinates, instilling in them a readiness for heroic actions.

In battle, all chiefs must be guided by one goal - to destroy the enemy; in order to achieve this goal, they are obliged to demand the full exertion of forces from their subordinates. But the more care they have to show about them. Uninterrupted food, provision of rest according to the situation, constant care for the wounded so that none of them remains on the battlefield - all this is the most important condition for maintaining the combat effectiveness of troops.

Only this will ensure the commander and the commissioner the political stability and combat cohesion of the unit, and, consequently, its success in battle.

8. High revolutionary vigilance, strict preservation of military secrets and uncompromising struggle against spies and saboteurs must be the constant concern of the personnel of the Red Army.

On vacation, on a campaign, in battle, in any position and in any situation - to keep military secrets everywhere and always and watch everything vigilantly - such is the duty of a revolutionary soldier of the Red Army, sold and loyal to his homeland. Neither danger nor the threat of death can stop him in front of the obligation to fulfill his oath and stop the criminal deed of the enemy.

9. The Red Army is armed with numerous and sophisticated equipment. Its weapons of war are constantly multiplying and developing.

The more complex and numerous the technique, the more difficult it is to use and the more the personnel must be trained.

Only in experienced hands do the means of struggle become a formidable weapon. Therefore, their constant study, the ability to perfectly own them and their careful preservation as in peacetime. so in battle they are the main duty of soldiers, commanders and commissars.

The more skillful the use of weapons, the more they can give in battle.

The use of new weapons should be studied in battle as well, looking for the most effective ways of using them to achieve victory.

10. Constant readiness to engage in battle with the enemy should underlie the preparation of the Red Army. Fight is the only means to victory.

The battle is achieved:

Destruction of enemy manpower and materiel;

Suppression of his moral strength and ability to resist.

Every battle - offensive and defensive - has the goal of defeating the enemy. But only a decisive offensive in the main direction, completed by encirclement and relentless pursuit, leads to the complete destruction of the forces and means of the enemy.

Offensive combat is the main type of action of the Red Army. The enemy must be boldly and swiftly attacked wherever he is found.

11. It is impossible to be equally strong everywhere. Victory is achieved by decisive superiority over the enemy in the main direction. Therefore, the overwhelming majority of forces and assets should be used in an offensive battle in the direction of the main attack.

The constant striving to achieve superiority over the enemy at a decisive point through covert regrouping, speed and surprise of actions, as well as the use of night and terrain is the most important condition for success.

In secondary directions, forces are needed only to pin down the enemy.

12. Concentration of superior forces and means alone is not enough to reach the quinoa.

Modern combat is waged by combat arms of different properties and requires careful organization of their joint actions.

It is necessary to achieve interaction between the combat arms fighting in one direction, and coordination of actions of units in different directions, in order to achieve the defeat of the enemy with a united strike.

13. The interaction of the combat arms is the main condition for success in battle and must ensure the complete defeat of the enemy's battle formation to the full depth. Modern technical means of struggle provide this opportunity.

The range and destructive force of fire from the ground and air have increased; conditions have been created for a deep invasion of the enemy's battle formation; increased the possibility of quickly exposing the enemy's flanks and their sudden bypass with the aim of attacking in the rear.

In the interaction of all types of troops, an offensive battle must lead to the encirclement and complete destruction of the enemy.

The interaction of all types of troops is organized in the interests of the infantry, which plays the main role in battle.

14. Defense will be needed whenever defeating the enemy by an offensive in a given situation is impossible or inexpedient.

The defense must be indestructible and insurmountable for the enemy, no matter how strong he may be in a given direction. It must consist in stubborn resistance, depleting the physical and moral strength of the enemy, and in a decisive counterattack, inflicting complete defeat on him. Thus, the defense must achieve victory with small forces over a numerically superior enemy.

15. The display of initiative is one of the most important conditions for successful actions in battle.

The willingness to take responsibility for a bold decision and persistently pursue it to the end is the basis for all bosses in battle.

The initiative of subordinates should be encouraged in every possible way and used to achieve common success. The manifestation of initiative should not run counter to the general intention of the superior manager and should contribute to the better performance of the task.

A reasonable initiative based on an understanding of the task and position of its unit (unit) as a whole and its neighbors. It consists in: striving to find the best ways to accomplish the assigned task in the current situation; in taking advantage of all the sudden opportunities and in taking immediate action against the threat that has arisen.

Bold and reasonable daring must in all cases guide the superior and subordinates when entering the battle and during its conduct.

The reproach deserves not the one who, in an effort to destroy the enemy, did not achieve his goal, but the one who, fearing responsibility, remained inactive and did not use at the right time all forces and means to achieve victory.

16. All actions of the troops must be carried out with the greatest secrecy and speed.

The suddenness is overwhelming. It is achieved by speed and secrecy of action, swift maneuver, skillful use of the terrain, and reliable air cover.

Troops that are able to quickly execute orders, quickly regroup in a changed situation, quickly get up from rest, quickly make marching movements, quickly deploy in battle formation and open fire, quickly advance and pursue the enemy - can always count on success.

Surprise is also achieved by the use of new forms and methods of combat and new technical means of combat, unexpected for the enemy.

The enemy will also use surprise. Units of the Red Army must never be caught unawares and must respond with a decisive blow to any surprise on the part of the enemy.

Therefore, high vigilance and constant combat readiness are imperative.

17. The variety of modern technical means of combat and the complexity of their interaction make extremely high demands on combat control.

The clarity and precision of the assigned task most of all ensure the coordination of actions of subordinate units and the interaction of the combat arms. The decision made must be firmly and with the greatest energy, carried out. In the course of a battle, unforeseen circumstances and unexpected difficulties usually arise. The commander must quickly perceive all new data of the situation and immediately take appropriate measures. Management must be continuous. The commander is obliged to keep control of the battle firmly in his own hands. He must take measures to ensure that all his subordinates understand their maneuver and know what the superior boss demands of them and where the enemy is.

18. Successful control of a battle requires constant combat support of the troops. Vigilant security and continuous reconnaissance protect troops from surprise attacks by ground and air enemies and provide them with constant awareness of the location, grouping and intentions of the enemy.

The increased speed of movement, the range of modern means of warfare and the possibility of their sudden impact make the combat support service especially important and require its unconditional continuity in all cases of combat activity and the life of troops.

19. Fight is, to a large extent, a firing match between the opposing sides.

Modern fire has reached enormous power and long range. The approach to the battlefield, deployment and all actions in battle must always be covered with powerful fire.

The actions of the Red Army should be based on an understanding of the power of modern fire, on its skillful use and on the ability to overcome enemy fire.

Underestimating the destructive properties of fire and the inability to fight it will lead to unnecessary losses.

Therefore, suppressing enemy fire is one of the most important tasks in battle.

However, the solution to this problem is only a means to defeat the enemy.

20. The saturation of the troops with artillery and automatic weapons causes a large consumption of ammunition. A careful attitude to each shell and each cartridge and their skillful use in battle should be an immutable rule for all commanders and soldiers of the Red Army.

It is necessary to educate every commander and soldier in the firm consciousness that only well-aimed, organized, disciplined fire will defeat the enemy. Indiscriminate fire, causing a waste of ammunition, is only an indicator of inept combat and lack of confidence in their strength.

A high level of firepower training of all branches and troops is therefore the main guarantee of the rapid destruction of the enemy in battle.

21. Every battle must be supplied with the necessary material resources. The best military solution may turn out to be unsuccessful if the material conditions for its implementation are not prepared. The organization of the material support of a battle is therefore the most important duty of commanders, military commissars and staffs in battle.

Modern means of combat put the rear and material bases of the combat supply of troops under the constant threat of influence from the enemy. Continuous concern for the organization of the rear, its self-defense and defense is an indispensable condition for achieving victory over the enemy.

The rear and supply lines must fully ensure the combat food of the troops in any conditions of the situation.

22. The variety of combat conditions has no limit.

In war, no two cases are alike. Each case is special in war and requires a special solution. Therefore, in battle, you must always act in strict accordance with the situation.

The Red Army can face different opponents, with their different tactics and with different features of the theaters of operations. All these conditions will require special methods of combat. The Red Army must be equally prepared for swift action in maneuver clashes and for breaking through a fortified front when the enemy goes over to positional combat.

23. At different stages of the development of a war, the methods of warfare will not remain the same. In the course of the war, the conditions of the struggle will change. New means of struggle will appear. Therefore, the methods of fighting will also change.

The tactics of actions must be changed and new methods of fighting must be found, if the changed situation calls for it.

In any conditions and in all cases, the powerful blows of the Red Army must lead to the complete destruction of the enemy and the rapid achievement of a decisive victory with little blood.

CHAPTER TWO

ORGANIZATION OF THE RKKA FORCES

1. The type of troops and their combat use

24. The Red Army consists of various types of troops. No one branch of the military replaces another. All branches of the armed forces ensure victory is achieved only in joint application and joint effort.

In a joint battle, all branches of the armed forces must act in close connection. Some of them can perform independent tasks. However, in all cases, their efforts must, together with other branches of the military, lead to the achievement of a common goal.

The use of each type of troops should be based on the use of all its capabilities, taking into account its strengths and special properties.

It is necessary to strictly take into account the possibilities and the limit of the technical stress of each type of weapon.

25. The infantry is the main branch of the army. With its decisive advance in the offensive and stubborn resistance in defense, the infantry, in close cooperation with artillery, tanks and aviation, decides the outcome of the battle. The infantry bears the brunt of the battle.

Therefore, the purpose of the remaining combat arms participating in a joint battle with the infantry is to act in its interests, ensuring its advancement in the offensive and steadfastness in defense.

The actions of the infantry must be supported by the full power of firepower, their own and other types of troops, and must be reliably covered from the air.

The combination of movement and strike of manpower with powerful fire from all fire weapons is the basis for the actions of the infantry in battle.

26. Artillery has the greatest power and range of fire of all ground combat arms.

By raining down on the entire depth of the battle formation with its destructive fire, artillery suppresses and destroys the enemy's manpower, artillery and fire weapons, his reserves, command and control bodies and combat rear. It destroys aircraft and, together with tanks, is the main means of destroying enemy tanks.

Artillery is the only reliable and powerful means of destroying permanent fortifications and defensive positions.

No action by troops on the battlefield is possible without the support of artillery and is unacceptable without it. Artillery, suppressing and destroying the enemy, clears the way for all ground combat arms - in the offensive and blocks the path of the enemy - in defense. The most decisive and quick results in battle are ensured by massed, sudden and flexible artillery fire.

According to its purpose, caliber, range and fire power, artillery is divided into: infantry, light, heavy, high power and special - anti-aircraft and coastal.

27. Tanks have high mobility, powerful fire and great impact force. They are protected from enemy infantry fire.

The use of tanks should be massive.

The main task of the tanks is to directly support the infantry and to pave its way during the offensive. With the successful development of the offensive and in mobile combat, tanks can be used for a deeper attack on the enemy's battle formation in order to destroy his artillery, reserves and headquarters. In this case, they can play a decisive role in encircling and destroying the enemy. Tanks are a real means of fighting against enemy tanks. On the defensive, tanks are a powerful counter-attack.

The main type of tank action is a tank attack. Tank attacks must in all cases be supported by organized artillery fire.

Tanks can be used not only in joint actions with infantry, but also for solving independent tasks in large masses together with motorized artillery, motorized infantry and aviation.

The types of tanks are different depending on their weight, armor, weapons, cross-country ability, speed and range.

The Red Army is armed with tanks: small, light, medium and heavy.

Using all the capabilities of tanks, it is necessary to take into account their properties, the limits of the technical stress of the material part, the physical condition of the crews and the conditions for feeding and restoring the vehicles.

28. The cavalry possesses high mobility, powerful fire and great striking power. She is capable of independently conducting all types of combat. It should not, however, be used against fortified enemy positions.

The cavalry, together with tanks and aircraft, is used in cooperation with other branches of the armed forces and for solving independent tasks in operational communication with them.

Quick maneuver, powerful fire, and swift attack are the basis of the cavalry's actions in battle. An attack in horse formation must be undertaken every time the enemy is not ready for organized fire resistance and when his fire system is upset. The attacks of the cavalry units in all cases must be supported by powerful artillery and machine gun fire, as well as by the actions of tanks and aircraft. However, the power of modern fire will often require cavalry to fight on foot. The cavalry must therefore be ready for infantry combat.

Enemy aircraft are a big threat to the cavalry.

29. Aviation possesses powerful weapons, high flight speed and long range. It is a powerful means of engaging enemy manpower and equipment, destroying enemy aircraft and destroying important targets.

Aviation operates in close operational-tactical communication with ground forces, carries out independent air operations against deep targets in the enemy country and fights against its aviation, ensuring air supremacy.

The main task of aviation is to contribute to the success of ground forces in combat and operations.

Aiding the troops and securing them from attacks of an air enemy, aviation strikes and destroys: enemy battle formations and fire weapons - on the battlefield; reserves, headquarters, transport and warehouses - in the rear; enemy aviation - in air combat and at airfields.

Aviation is the primary means of operational and tactical reconnaissance. She also monitors the battlefield and serves as a means of communication.

In addition, aviation can be used to transport troops and weapons over long distances.

30. Aviation is divided into various types according to its purpose, armament and flight technical data.

Fighter aviation has the main purpose of: destroying all types of enemy aircraft by combat in the air and at its airfields; air defense of their “troops and important objects in the rear; support of combat operations of its aviation and its airfields and, in special cases, defeat of enemy manpower on the battlefield and in its rear, as well as the implementation of reconnaissance in the interests of the combined arms and aviation command.

Long-range bomber aviation has the main purpose of: destroying enemy aircraft at its airfields, destroying large targets of military-industrial importance, naval and air bases and other important objects deep behind enemy lines; the destruction of the linear forces of the fleet on the high seas and at bases; termination and disruption of rail, sea and road transport.

In special cases, long-range bomber aircraft can be used to defeat enemy troops in the area of ​​the battlefield and on the battlefield.

Short-range bomber aviation has its main purpose: direct tactical and operational interaction with ground forces on the battlefield and in the operational rear of the enemy.

Its objectives are: enemy battle formations on the battlefield; troops on the march, during transportation and in areas of concentration; headquarters and command facilities; enemy sea and river forces; enemy aviation at airfields and bases; enemy rear, supply stations and bases; railway junctions, stations and technical structures.

In some cases, short-range bomber aviation can be involved in independent actions to destroy important enemy targets in its deep rear.

Assault aviation has the main purpose of destroying enemy manpower, aviation and materiel on the battlefield and in its rear.

Acting depending on the situation from low, medium and high altitudes, ground attack aircraft strikes: enemy troops on the battlefield, in concentration areas, on a campaign, during transportation by rail and by road; aviation at its airfields; headquarters and command and control facilities, transport and military depots; railways and bridges.

Reconnaissance aviation has its mission to conduct aerial reconnaissance in the operational depth and deep behind enemy lines.

Military aviation performs reconnaissance, observation, artillery fire correction and communications missions and is used in special cases to perform combat missions in the interests of its military unit.

Each type of aviation must be used in accordance with its purpose.

However, during the decisive periods of the struggle, all types of aviation must concentrate their efforts on the battlefield to defeat the enemy's manpower and combat assets in the main direction.

Ground forces must be ready to carry out combat missions and without the direct assistance of aviation, if its concentration in other sectors or poor weather conditions will not allow the use of aviation in this direction.

31. Airborne units, as a new type of air infantry, are a means of disorganizing enemy command and control. They are used by the high command.

In cooperation with troops advancing from the front, the air infantry helps to encircle and defeat the enemy in a given direction.

The use of airborne infantry must be strictly tailored to the conditions of the situation and requires reliable provision and compliance with measures of secrecy and surprise.

32. Special troops: anti-aircraft, engineering, chemical, communications, automobile, transport, railroad and others, - are intended to ensure the combat activity and life of troops in their specialty.

The variety and complexity of the means of combat make the conduct of modern combat impossible without the constant active assistance of special forces.

The use of all the maneuverability of troops is possible only with the clear and proactive work of special troops, and first of all, engineering, communications and transport (road and rail).

Therefore, special forces in the army perform an extremely important and responsible task.

33. Fortified areas, being a system of long-term fortifications, provide long-term resistance in them by special garrisons and combined-arms formations.

By pinning down the enemy along their entire front, they create the possibility of concentrating large forces and means for inflicting crushing blows on the enemy in other directions.

Troops fighting in fortified areas require special perseverance, endurance and endurance.

34. On the sea coast and along major river lines, the navy and military river flotillas may operate in conjunction with ground forces.

The navy consists of: ships of various classes operating as part of maneuverable formations; naval aviation; coastal defense systems. Along with independent operations, the fleet assists the ground forces fighting on the sea coast by engaging the enemy with artillery fire, landing amphibious assault forces in its rear, and securing the flank of its forces that rests on the sea.

Ground forces interacting with the navy must be prepared for amphibious and anti-amphibious operations.

Military river flotillas, consisting of various classes of ships and aircraft, are used, in addition to performing independent tasks, in close connection with the ground forces.

With their maneuver and fire, they support the troops on the rivers flowing in the direction of their actions, and participate in their struggle for river borders, water barriers and crossings.

2. Troops formations

35. Troops of the Red Army form formations and units that differ in their composition, armament, tactical use and operational purpose. The troops are:

a) formations - rifle, cavalry, tank and aviation;

b) separate units - the Reserve of the High Command (RGK) and special combat arms.

36. Rifle formations are rifle divisions and rifle corps.

The rifle division is the main combined-arms tactical formation.

It consists of units of different types of troops, has a permanent composition and is capable of independently conducting all types of combat.

The main component of the rifle division is the infantry.

As a rule, an infantry division is indivisible. However, to carry out individual tactical tasks, temporary detachments may be allocated from a rifle division, consisting of units and subunits of different types of troops (forward detachments, vanguards, rear guards, etc.).

Several rifle divisions (2 to 4) make up a rifle corps.

The rifle corps has its own standard means of reinforcement and is the highest tactical formation capable of operating independently for a long time.

Rifle formations, depending on the mission being performed, are supported by aviation and reinforced by units of the High Command Reserve - artillery, tank, chemical, engineering and others.

37. Cavalry formations consist of cavalry divisions and cavalry corps.

The cavalry division is the main tactical unit of the cavalry.

It consists of units of cavalry and other types of troops and has a permanent composition. Several cavalry divisions (2 to 4) make up the cavalry corps.

The cavalry corps is the highest unit of cavalry and can carry out independent operational tasks in cooperation with other branches of the armed forces and in isolation from them.

Depending on the mission being performed, the cavalry corps can be reinforced by other types of troops, in particular by tank formations and aviation.

Cavalry formations capable of carrying out a quick maneuver and a decisive strike should be used to carry out active missions to defeat the enemy.

It is most expedient to use cavalry formations in conjunction with tank formations, motorized infantry and aviation - in front of the front (in the absence of contact with the enemy), on the approaching flank, in the development of a breakthrough, behind enemy lines, in raids and pursuit.

Cavalry units are able to consolidate their success and hold the terrain. However, at the first opportunity, they must be freed from this task in order to keep them for maneuver.

The actions of the cavalry unit must in all cases be reliably covered from the air.

38. Tank formations consist of tank units, motorized artillery, motorized infantry and other special combat arms.

The main tactical tank formation is a tank brigade.

Several tank brigades can form a tank group, which is the highest tank formation.

Tank formations are a powerful maneuverable means of striking. They should be used to decisively defeat the enemy in the main direction and can perform tactical tasks in direct interaction with other branches of the armed forces and independent operational tasks in isolation from them. Tank formations are not adapted to independently holding the conquered terrain, and therefore, when operating in isolation from other types of troops, they must be supported by motorized infantry or cavalry. The most expedient use of tank formations in conjunction with cavalry, motorized infantry and aviation is in front of the front (in the absence of contact with the enemy), on the approaching flank, in the development of a breakthrough and in pursuit.

39. The Red Army Air Force consists of aviation formations and units of fighter, long-range bomber, short-range bomber and assault aviation and separate units of reconnaissance and military aviation.

Air formations are the highest tactical unit capable of solving individual tasks in operational-tactical interaction with ground forces and in independent air operations.

Aviation formations consist of several aviation units (from 2 to 4).

An aviation unit of combat aviation, which is part of an aviation formation or operates independently, is the main tactical unit.

Several aviation formations can form an aviation group, which is the highest aviation formation. Aviation formations can be mixed - from parts of different types of aviation, and homogeneous - from parts of one type of aviation.

Air formations are used, as a rule, centrally in the hands of the high command. In special cases, air formations may be temporarily transferred to the subordination of rifle and cavalry corps and teak groups.

Military aviation remains in all cases as part of its military formations.

40. Separate units of the High Command Reserve consist of powerful and special means of struggle (artillery, tank and others). They are intended for the quantitative and qualitative strengthening of troops operating in the main directions, and are assigned to them depending on the importance of the tasks being performed.

Special troops consist of separate parts - engineering, chemical, communications, anti-aircraft, automobile, transport, railway, sanitary and others. They are attached to military formations as needed to ensure the performance of combat missions or are used independently.

41. For the conduct of joint combat operations, military formations of various types and the units of the RGK and special units attached to them form armies conducting operations in separate operational areas.

Several armies and large air formations can be combined in the theater of operations under the control of the front command to carry out a common strategic mission.