Battle of Kursk- fighting during the Great Patriotic War in the area of ​​the Kursk ledge in the summer of 1943. It was a key element of the summer 1943 campaign of the Red Army, during which a radical turning point in the Great Patriotic War, which began with the victory at Stalingrad, ended.

Chronological framework

In Russian historiography, the point of view was established that the Battle of Kursk took place from July 5 to August 23, 1943. Two periods are distinguished in it: the defensive stage and the counteroffensive of the Red Army.

At the first stage, the Kursk strategic defensive operation was carried out by the forces of two fronts of the Central (July 5-12, 1943) and Voronezh (July 5-23, 1943) with the involvement of strategic reserves VGK rates(Steppe Front), the purpose of which was to disrupt the Citadel plan.

Background and plans of the parties

After the defeat at Stalingrad, the leadership of Germany faced two key problems: how to hold the eastern front under the increasing blows of the growing power of the Red Army, and how to keep the allies in their orbit, who had already begun to look for ways out of the war. Hitler believed that an offensive without such a deep breakthrough, as it was in 1942, should not only help solve these problems, but also raise the morale of the troops.

In April, a plan for Operation Citadel was developed, according to which two groups would strike in converging directions and encircle the Central and Voronezh fronts in the Kursk salient. According to Berlin's calculations, their defeat made it possible to inflict huge losses on the Soviet side, and to reduce the front line to 245 km, and to form reserves from the released forces. Two armies and one army group were allocated for the operation. South of Orel, Army Group (GA) "Center" deployed the 9th Army (A) of Colonel General V. Model. After several revisions of the plan, she received the task of breaking through the defenses of the Central Front and, having traveled about 75 km, to unite in the Kursk region with the troops of the GA "Yu" - the 4th Panzer Army (TA) Colonel General G. Goth. The latter was concentrated north of Belgorod and was considered the main force of the offensive. After breaking through the line of the Voronezh Front, she had to go to the meeting point for more than 140 km. The outer front of the encirclement was to be created by 23 ak 9A and the army group (AG) "Kempf" from the GA "South". It was planned to deploy active hostilities in a section of about 150 km.

For the "Citadel" GA "Center" allocated V. Model, whom Berlin appointed in charge of the operation, 3 tank (41.46 and 47) and one army (23) corps, a total of 14 divisions, of which 6 tank, and GA "South" - 4 TA and AG "Kempf" 5 corps - three tank (3, 48 and 2 shopping malls SS) and two army (52 ak and ak "Raus"), consisting of 17 divisions, including 9 tank and motorized.

The headquarters of the Supreme High Command (VGK) received the first information about Berlin's planning for a major offensive operation near Kursk in mid-March 1943. And on April 12, 1943, at a meeting with I.V. Stalin, a preliminary decision was already made on the transition to strategic defense. The Central Front of Army General K.K. Rokossovsky received the task of defending the northern part of the Kursk salient, repelling a possible strike, and then, together with the Western and Bryansk fronts, going on the counteroffensive and defeating German group in the Eagle area.

The Voronezh Front of Army General N.F. Vatutin was supposed to defend the southern part of the Kursk salient, bleed the enemy in the upcoming defensive battles, then go on the counteroffensive and, in cooperation with the Southwestern Front and the Steppe Fronts, complete his defeat in the Bel -city and Kharkov.

Kursk defensive operation viewed as essential element throughout the summer campaign of 1943. It was planned that after the expected enemy offensive in the zone of the Central and Voronezh fronts was stopped, conditions would arise for completing its defeat and moving on to a general offensive from Smolensk to Taganrog. The Bryansk and Western fronts will immediately begin the Oryol offensive operation, which will help the Central Front finally thwart the plans of the enemy. In parallel with it, the Steppe Front should approach the south of the Kursk salient, and after its concentration it was planned to launch the Belgorod-Kharkov offensive operation, which was to be carried out in parallel with the Donbass offensive operation of the Southern Fronts and Southwestern Front.

On July 1, 1943, the Central Front had 711,575 people, including 467,179 combat personnel, 10,725 guns and mortars, 1,607 tanks and self-propelled guns, and the Voronezh Front had 625,590 military personnel, of which 417,451 combat personnel, 8,583 guns and mortars, 1,700 units armored vehicles.

Kursk defensive operation. Combat operations in the north of the Kursk Bulge, July 5-12, 1943

During April - June, the start of the "Citadel" was postponed several times. The last date was the dawn of July 5, 1943. On the Central Front, fierce battles unfolded over a 40 km section. 9 And with a small interval attacked in three directions. The main blow was inflicted on 13A by Lieutenant General N.P. Pukhov with the forces of 47 TC - on Olkhovatka, the second, auxiliary, 41 TC and 23 AK - on Malo-Arkhangelsk, on the right wing of 13 A and the left 48A of Lieutenant General P.L .Romanenko and the third - 46 shopping mall - to Gnilets on the right flank 70A of Lieutenant General I.V. Galanin. Heavy and bloody battles ensued.

On the Olkhovatsko-Ponyrovka direction, Model threw more than 500 armored units into the attack at once, and groups of bombers went in waves in the air, but a powerful defense system did not allow the enemy to break the lines on the move Soviet troops.

In the second half of July 5, N.P. Pukhov put forward main strip part of the mobile reserves, and K.K. Rokossovsky sent howitzer and mortar brigades to the Olkhovatka area. Counterattacks by tanks and infantry, supported by artillery, halted the enemy advance. By the end of the day, a small “dent” had formed in the center of 13A, but the defense had not been broken through anywhere. The troops of 48A and the left flank of 13A completely held their positions. At the cost of heavy losses, 47th and 46th TCs managed to advance 6-8 km in the Olkhovat direction, while 70A troops retreated only 5 km.

To restore the lost position at the junction of 13 and 70A, K.K. Rokossovsky in the second half of July 5 decided to conduct a counterattack on the morning of July 6 by 2 TA Lieutenant General A.G. Rodin and 19 TC in cooperation with the second echelon 13 A - 17 Guards . rifle corps (sk). He was unable to complete the task. After two days of fruitless attempts to implement the Citadel plan, 9A got bogged down in the defense of the Central Front. From July 7 to 11, the Ponyri station and the area of ​​​​the villages of Olkhovatka - Samodurovka - Gnilets, where two powerful centers of resistance were created, blocked the path to Kursk, became the epicenter of the battles in the strip 13 and 70A. By the end of July 9, the offensive of the main forces of 9A was stopped, and on July 11, she made the last unsuccessful attempt to break through the defenses of the Central Front.

On July 12, 1943, a turning point occurred in the fighting in this area. The Western and Bryansk fronts went on the offensive in the Oryol direction. V. Model, who was appointed responsible for the defense of the entire Oryol arc, began hastily transferring troops to Kursk near Orel. And on July 13, Hitler officially ended the Citadel. The depth of advance of 9A was 12-15 km at the front up to 40 km. No operational, let alone strategic, results have been achieved. Moreover, she did not hold on to the already occupied positions. On July 15, the Central Front went over to the counteroffensive and two days later basically restored its position until July 5, 1943.

At dawn on July 5, 1943, the troops of the GA "South" went on the offensive. The main blow was inflicted in the zone of the 6th Guards. And Lieutenant General I.M. Chistyakov in the direction of Oboyan by forces of 4TA. More than 1168 armored units were involved here by the German side. In the auxiliary, Korochansky direction (east and northeast of Belgorod), the positions of the 7th Guards. And Lieutenant General M.S. Shumilov was attacked by 3 TK and "Raus" AG "Kempf", which had 419 tanks and assault guns. However, thanks to the resilience of the fighters and commanders of the 6th Guards. And, already in the first two days, the offensive schedule of the GA "South" was disrupted, and its divisions suffered great damage. And most importantly, the shock group GA "South" was split. 4TA and AG "Kempf" failed to create a continuous breakthrough front, because. AG "Kempf" was unable to cover the right wing of the 4TA and their troops began to move in divergent directions. Therefore, 4TA was forced to weaken the shock wedge and direct large forces to strengthen the right wing. However, a wider offensive front (up to 130 km) than in the north of the Kursk Bulge and more significant forces allowed the enemy to break through the line of the Voronezh Front in a zone up to 100 km by the end of the fifth day and enter the defense in the main direction up to 28 km, while in its hulls, 66% of armored vehicles failed.

On July 10, the second stage of the Kursk defensive operation of the Voronezh Front began, the epicenter of the fighting shifted to Prokhorovka station. The battle for this center of resistance lasted from July 10 to July 16, 1943. On July 12, a frontal counterattack was carried out. For 10-12 hours, about 1,100 armored units of the opposing sides acted at different times in the station area on a 40 km section. However, it did not bring the expected results. Although the troops of the GA "South" managed to be kept in the army defense system, all formations of the 4th TA and AG "Kempf" retain their combat capability. In the next four days, the most intense fighting took place south of the station in the interfluve of the Seversky and Lipovoy Donets, which was convenient for striking both the deep right flank of the 4TA and the left wing of the Kempf AG. However, the area was not protected. On the night of July 15, 1943, 2nd SS TC and 3rd TC surrounded four 69A divisions south of the station, but they managed to break out of the "ring", albeit with heavy losses

On the night of July 16-17, the troops of the GA "South" began to retreat in the direction of Belgorod, and by the end of July 23, 1943, the Voronezh Front pushed the GA "South" back approximately to the positions from which it launched the offensive. The goal set for the Soviet troops during the Kursk defensive operation was fully achieved.

Oryol offensive operation

After two weeks of bloody battles, the last strategic offensive of the Wehrmacht was stopped, but this was only part of the plan of the Soviet command for the summer campaign of 1943. Now, it was important to finally take the initiative into our own hands and turn the tide of the war.

The plan for the destruction of German troops in the Orel region, which received the code name Operation Kutuzov, was developed even before the Battle of Kursk. The troops of the Western, Bryansk and Central fronts, bordering the Oryol arc, were to strike in the general direction of Orel, cut 2 TA and 9A GA "Center" into three separate groups, surround them in the areas of Bolkhov, Mtsensk, Orel and destroy.

Part of the forces of the Western (commanded by Colonel General V.D. Sokolovsky), the entire Bryansk (Colonel General M.M. Popov) and the Central Fronts were involved in the operation. A breakthrough of the enemy defense was envisaged in five sectors. The Western Front was to strike the main blow with the troops of the left wing - 11 Guards A, Lieutenant General I.Kh. Bagramyan - on Khotynets and auxiliary - on Zhizdra, and the Bryansk Front - on Oryol (main attack) and Bolkhov (auxiliary). The Central Front, after completely stopping the 9A offensive, was to concentrate the main efforts of 70,13, 48A and 2 TA on the Kromsky direction. The start of the offensive was tightly linked to the moment when it became clear that the 9A strike force was exhausted and tied up in battles on the lines of the Central Front. According to the Headquarters, such a moment came on July 12, 1943.

A day before the offensive, Lieutenant General I.Kh. Bagramyan conducted reconnaissance in combat on the left flank of 2 TA. As a result, not only was the outline of the enemy’s forward edge and his system of fire corrected, but separate sections German infantry was driven out of the first trench. THEM. Baghramyan gave the order for the immediate start of a general offensive. Introduced on July 13, 1 mk completed the breakthrough of the second band. After that, the 5th shopping mall began to develop an offensive around Bolkhov, and the 1st shopping mall began to attack Khotynets.

The first day of the offensive on the Bryansk Front did not bring tangible results. Operating in the main, Oryol direction, 3A Lieutenant General A.V. Gorbatov and 63A Lieutenant General V.Ya. Kolpakchi by the end of July 13 broke through 14 km, and 61A of Lieutenant General P.A. Belova in the Bolkhov direction wedged into the enemy defenses only 7 km. The offensive of the Central Front, which began on July 15, did not change the situation either. His troops, by the end of July 17, threw back 9A only to the positions that she occupied by the beginning of the Battle of Kursk.

Nevertheless, already on July 19, the threat of encirclement loomed over the Bolkhov group, because. 11 Guards A broke through to the south for 70 km, stubbornly moved towards Bolkhov and 61A. This city was the "key" to Orel, so the warring parties began to build up their forces here. On the direction of the main attack of the Bryansk Front on July 19, the 3rd Guards TA, Lieutenant General P.S. Rybalko, is advanced. Having repulsed the enemy counterattacks, by the end of the day she broke through the second line of defense on the Oleshnya River. The grouping of the Western Front also hastily increased. A significant preponderance of forces, although not quickly, but gave its fruits. On August 5, 1943, one of the largest regional centers of the European part of the USSR, the city of Orel was liberated by the troops of the Bryansk Front.

After the destruction of the grouping in the region of Bolkhov and Orel, the most intense hostilities unfolded on the Khotynets-Kromy front, and on final stage Operation "Kutuzov" the heaviest battles flared up for the city of Karachev, covering the approaches to Bryansk, which was liberated on August 15, 1943.

On August 18, 1943, Soviet troops reached the German defensive line "Hagen", east of Bryansk. This operation "Kutuzov" ended. In 37 days, the Red Army advanced 150 km, a fortified bridgehead and a large enemy grouping were liquidated in a strategically important direction, favorable conditions were created for an attack on Bryansk and further to Belarus.

Belgorod - Kharkov offensive operation

It received the code name "Commander Rumyantsev", was carried out from August 3 to August 23, 1943 by the Voronezh (Army General N.F. Vatutin) and Steppe (Colonel General I.S. Konev) fronts and was the final stage of the Battle of Kursk. The operation was supposed to be carried out in two stages: at the first, to defeat the troops of the left wing of the GA "South" in the area of ​​Belgorod and Tomarovka, and then to liberate Kharkov. The steppe front was supposed to liberate Belgorod and Kharkov, and the Voronezh front was to bypass them from the north-west, to develop success on Poltava. It was planned to deliver the main blow by the armies of the adjacent flanks of the Voronezh and Steppe fronts from the area northwest of Belgorod in the direction of Bogodukhov and Valki, at the junction of 4 TA and AG Kempf, crush them and cut off their path to retreat to the west and southwest. Apply an auxiliary blow to Akhtyrka, with forces 27 and 40A, in order to block the pulling up of reserves to Kharkov. At the same time, the city was to be bypassed from the south by 57A of the South-Western Front. The operation was planned on a front of 200 km and a depth of up to 120 km.

On August 3, 1943, after a powerful artillery preparation, the first echelon of the Voronezh Front - 6 Guards A, Lieutenant General I.M. Chistyakov and 5 Guards A, Lieutenant General A.S. Zhadov crossed the Vorskla River, punched a 5 km gap on the front between Belgorod and Tomarovka, through which the main forces entered - 1TA Lieutenant General M.E. Katukov and 5th Guards TA Lieutenant General P.A. Rotmistrov. Having passed the "corridor" of the breakthrough and deployed in battle formation, their troops dealt a strong blow to Zolochev. By the end of the day, the 5th Guards TA, having penetrated 26 km into the enemy’s defenses, cut off the Belgorod grouping from the Tomarovsky one, and reached the line with. Good Will, and in the morning of the next day broke through to Bessonovka and Orlovka. And the 6th Guards. On the evening of August 3, they broke through to Tomarovka. 4TA put up stubborn resistance. From August 4, 5 Guards. TA was pinned down by enemy counterattacks for two days, although according to the calculations of the Soviet side, on August 5, its brigades were supposed to go west of Kharkov and capture the city of Lyubotin. This delay changed the plan of the entire operation to quickly split the enemy grouping.

After two days of heavy fighting on the outskirts of Belgorod, on August 5, 1943, the 69th and 7th Guards A of the Steppe Front pushed the troops of the Kempf AG to the outskirts and began its assault, which ended in the evening with the clearing of its main part from the invaders. On the evening of August 5, 1943, in honor of the liberation of Orel and Belgorod, for the first time during the war years, a salute was given in Moscow.

On this day, a turning point occurred and in the strip of the Voronezh Front, in the auxiliary direction, the 40A of Lieutenant General K.S. went on the offensive. Moskalenko, in the direction of Boroml and 27A Lieutenant General S.G. Trofimenko, who by the end of August 7 released Grayvoron and advanced to Akhtyrka.

After the liberation of Belgorod, the onslaught of the Steppe Front also intensified. On August 8, 57A of Lieutenant General N.A. was transferred to him. Hagen. Trying to prevent the encirclement of his troops, on August 11, E. von Manstein launched counterattacks on the 1TA and 6 Guards A south of Bogodukhov with the forces of the 3 TC Kempf AG, which slowed down the pace of the offensive not only of the Voronezh, but also of the Steppe Front. Despite the stubborn resistance of the Kempf AG, Konev's troops continued to persistently move towards Kharkov. On August 17, they started fighting on its outskirts.

On August 18, GA "South" made a second attempt to stop the advance of two fronts with a counterattack, now on the stretched right flank of 27A. To repel it, N.F. Vatutin brought into battle the 4th Guards A, Lieutenant General G.I. Kulik. But the situation was not quickly reversed. The destruction of the Akhtyrskaya group dragged on until August 25th.

On August 18, the 57A offensive resumed, which, bypassing Kharkov from the southeast, was moving towards Merefa. In this situation, the capture on August 20 by units of 53A of Lieutenant General I.M. Managarov of a resistance center in the forest northeast of Kharkov was of great importance. Using this success, Lieutenant-General VD Kryuchenkona's 69th Army began to bypass the city from the northwest and west. During August 21, the corps of the 5th Guards TA concentrated in the strip 53A, which significantly strengthened the right wing of the Steppe Front. A day later, the Kharkov-Zolochev, Kharkov-Lyubotin-Poltava and Kharkov-Lyubotin highways were cut, and on August 22, 57A went south of Kharkov to the area of ​​​​the villages of Bezlyudovka and Konstantinovka. In this way, most of the enemy's retreat was cut off, so the German command was forced to begin a hasty withdrawal of all troops from the city.

On August 23, 1943, Moscow saluted the liberators of Kharkov. This event marked the victorious completion of the Battle of Kursk by the Red Army.

Results, meaning

About 4,000,000 people, over 69,000 guns and mortars, more than 13,000 tanks and self-propelled (assault) guns, up to 12,000 aircraft took part in the Battle of Kursk, which lasted 49 days. It became one of the most large-scale events of the Great Patriotic War, its significance goes far beyond the Soviet-German front. “A major defeat on the Kursk Bulge was the beginning of a deadly crisis for the German army,” wrote the outstanding commander Marshal Soviet Union A.M. Vasilevsky. - Moscow, Stalingrad and Kursk became three milestones in the fight against the enemy, three historical milestones on the way to victory over Nazi Germany. The initiative for action on the Soviet-German front - the main and decisive front of the entire Second World War - was firmly entrenched in the hands of the Red Army.

70 years ago the Great Battle of Kursk began. The Battle of Kursk is one of the most important battles of the Second World War in terms of its scope, forces and means involved, tension, results and military-strategic consequences. The Great Battle of Kursk lasted 50 incredibly difficult days and nights (July 5 - August 23, 1943). In Soviet and Russian historiography, it is customary to divide this battle into two stages and three operations: the defensive stage - the Kursk defensive operation (July 5 - 12); offensive - Orel (July 12 - August 18) and Belgorod-Kharkov (August 3 - 23) offensive operations. The Germans called the offensive part of their operation "Citadel". In this great battle from the USSR and Germany, about 2.2 million people participated, about 7.7 thousand tanks, self-propelled guns and assault guns, over 29 thousand guns and mortars (with a reserve of more than 35 thousand), more than 4 thousand combat aircraft .

During the winter 1942-1943. offensive of the Red Army and the forced withdrawal of Soviet troops during the Kharkov defensive operation of 1943, the so-called. Kursk ledge. The "Kursk Bulge", a ledge facing west, was up to 200 km wide and up to 150 km deep. During April - June 1943 on Eastern Front there was an operational pause, during which the Soviet and German armed forces were intensely preparing for the summer campaign, which was to be decisive in this war.

The forces of the Central and Voronezh fronts were located on the Kursk ledge, threatening the flanks and rear of the German army groups Center and South. In turn, the German command, having created powerful strike groups on the Oryol and Belgorod-Kharkov bridgeheads, could deliver strong flank attacks on the Soviet troops defending in the Kursk region, surround them and destroy them.

Plans and forces of the parties

Germany. In the spring of 1943, when the enemy forces were exhausted and the mudslide set in, negating the possibility of a quick offensive, it was time to prepare plans for the summer campaign. Despite the defeat in the Battle of Stalingrad and the Battle of the Caucasus, the Wehrmacht retained offensive power and was a very dangerous adversary who craved revenge. Moreover, the German command carried out a number of mobilization measures and by the beginning of the summer campaign of 1943, compared with the number of troops at the beginning of the summer campaign of 1942, the number of Wehrmacht had increased. On the Eastern Front, excluding the SS troops and the Air Force, there were 3.1 million people, almost the same as there were in the Wehrmacht by the beginning of the campaign to the East on June 22, 1941 - 3.2 million people. In terms of the number of formations, the Wehrmacht of the 1943 model surpassed the German armed forces of the 1941 period.

For the German command, unlike the Soviet, a wait-and-see strategy, pure defense, was unacceptable. Moscow could afford to wait with serious offensive operations, time played on it - the power of the armed forces grew, enterprises evacuated to the east began to work at full capacity (they even increased production compared to the pre-war level), partisan struggle in the German rear expanded. The probability of the landing of the Allied armies in Western Europe, the opening of a second front, grew. In addition, to create a strong defense on the Eastern Front, extending from the Northern Arctic Ocean to the Black Sea, it was not possible. In particular, the Army Group "South" was forced to defend with 32 divisions a front with a length of up to 760 km - from Taganrog on the Black Sea to the Sumy region. The balance of forces allowed the Soviet troops, if the enemy was limited only to defense, to carry out offensive operations in various sectors of the Eastern Front, concentrating the maximum number of forces and means, pulling up reserves. The German army could not stick only to defense, it was the path to defeat. Only a maneuver war, with breakthroughs in the front line, with access to the flanks and rear of the Soviet armies, allowed us to hope for a strategic turning point in the war. A major success on the Eastern Front made it possible to hope, if not for victory in the war, then for a satisfactory political solution.

On March 13, 1943, Adolf Hitler signed Operational Order No. 5, where he set the task of preempting the offensive of the Soviet army and "imposing his will on at least one of the sectors of the front." In other sectors of the front, the task of the troops is reduced to bleeding the advancing enemy forces on defensive lines created in advance. Thus, the strategy of the Wehrmacht was chosen as early as March 1943. It remained to determine where to strike. The Kursk ledge arose at the same time, in March 1943, during the German counteroffensive. Therefore, Hitler, in Order No. 5, demanded converging strikes on the Kursk salient, wanting to destroy the Soviet troops stationed on it. However, in March 1943, the German troops in this direction were significantly weakened by previous battles, and the plan to attack the Kursk salient had to be postponed indefinitely.

On April 15, Hitler signed Operational Order No. 6. Operation Citadel was scheduled to begin as soon as weather conditions allowed. The Army Group "South" was supposed to strike from the Tomarovka-Belgorod line, break through the Soviet front at the Prilepa-Oboyan line, connect at Kursk and east of it with the formations of the Amii "Center". Army Group "Center" struck from the line of Trosna - an area south of Maloarkhangelsk. Its troops were to break through the front in the Fatezh-Veretenovo section, concentrating the main efforts on the eastern flank. And connect with the Army Group "South" in the Kursk region and east of it. The troops between the shock groups, on the western front of the Kursk ledge - the forces of the 2nd Army, were to organize local attacks and, when the Soviet troops retreated, immediately go on the offensive with all their might. The plan was pretty simple and obvious. They wanted to cut off the Kursk ledge with converging blows from the north and south - on the 4th day it was supposed to surround and then destroy the Soviet troops located on it (Voronezh and Central Fronts). This made it possible to create a vast gap in the Soviet front and seize the strategic initiative. In the Orel region, the 9th Army represented the main strike force, in the Belgorod region - the 4th Panzer Army and the Kempf task force. Operation Citadel was to be followed by Operation Panther - a strike to the rear of the Southwestern Front, an offensive in a northeast direction in order to reach the deep rear of the central group of the Red Army and create a threat to Moscow.

The start of the operation was scheduled for mid-May 1943. The commander of Army Group South, Field Marshal Erich von Manstein, believed that it was necessary to strike as early as possible, preempting the Soviet offensive in the Donbass. He was supported by the commander of Army Group Center, Field Marshal Gunther Hans von Kluge. But not all German commanders shared his point of view. Walter Model, commander of the 9th Army, had great authority in the eyes of the Fuhrer and on May 3 prepared a report in which he expressed doubts about the possibility of the successful implementation of Operation Citadel if it began in mid-May. The basis of his skepticism was intelligence data on the defensive potential of the opposing 9th Army of the Central Front. The Soviet command prepared a deeply echeloned and well-organized line of defense, strengthened the artillery and anti-tank potential. And the mechanized units were taken away from the forward positions, removing the enemy from a possible strike.

On May 3-4, a discussion of this report was held in Munich. According to the Model, the Central Front under the command of Konstantin Rokossovsky had an almost double superiority in the number of combat units and equipment over the 9th German Army. 15 infantry divisions of the Model had the number of infantry half as much as regular, in some divisions 3 out of 9 regular infantry battalions were disbanded. Artillery batteries had three guns instead of four, and in some batteries 1-2 guns. By May 16, the divisions of the 9th Army had an average "combat strength" (the number of soldiers directly involved in the battle) of 3.3 thousand people. For comparison, 8 infantry divisions of the 4th Panzer Army and the Kempf group had a “combat strength” of 6.3 thousand people. And the infantry was needed to break into the defensive lines of the Soviet troops. In addition, the 9th Army tested serious problems with transport. Army Group "South", after the Stalingrad disaster, received formations, which in 1942 were reorganized in the rear. Model, on the other hand, had mainly infantry divisions that had been at the front since 1941 and were in urgent need of replenishment.

Model's report made a strong impression on A. Hitler. Other commanders were unable to put forward serious arguments against the calculations of the commander of the 9th Army. As a result, we decided to postpone the start of the operation for a month. This decision of Hitler would then become one of the most criticized by the German generals, who pushed their mistakes onto the Supreme Commander.

Otto Moritz Walter Model (1891 - 1945).

I must say that although this delay led to an increase in the striking power of the German troops, the Soviet armies were also seriously strengthened. The balance of power between Model's army and Rokossovsky's front from May to early July did not improve, and even worsened for the Germans. In April 1943 the Central Front had 538,400 men, 920 tanks, 7,800 guns, and 660 aircraft; in early July - 711.5 thousand people, 1785 tanks and self-propelled guns, 12.4 thousand guns and 1050 aircraft. The 9th Model Army in mid-May had 324,900 men, about 800 tanks and assault guns, and 3,000 guns. In early July, the 9th Army reached 335 thousand people, 1014 tanks, 3368 guns. In addition, it was in May that the Voronezh Front began to receive anti-tank mines, which would become a real scourge of German armored vehicles in the Battle of Kursk. The Soviet economy worked more efficiently, replenishing troops with equipment faster than German industry.

The plan for the advance of the troops of the 9th Army from the Oryol direction was somewhat different from the typical reception for the German school - Model was going to break into the enemy defenses with infantry, and then bring tank units into battle. The infantry was to attack with the support of heavy tanks, assault guns, aircraft and artillery. Of the 8 mobile formations that the 9th Army had, only one was immediately introduced into battle - the 20th Panzer Division. In the zone of the main attack of the 9th Army, the 47th Panzer Corps under the command of Joachim Lemelsen was to advance. The zone of his offensive lay between the villages of Gnilets and Butyrki. Here, according to German intelligence, there was a junction of two Soviet armies - the 13th and 70th. In the first echelon of the 47th Corps, the 6th Infantry and 20th Panzer Divisions advanced, they struck on the first day. The second echelon housed the more powerful 2nd and 9th Panzer Divisions. They should have been introduced already into the breakthrough, after breaking the Soviet defense line. In the direction of Ponyri, on the left flank of the 47th Corps, the 41st Tank Corps advanced under the command of General Josef Harpe. The 86th and 292nd Infantry Divisions were in the first echelon, and the 18th Panzer Division was in reserve. To the left of the 41st Tank Corps was the 23rd Army Corps under General Frisner. He was supposed to inflict a diversionary strike with the forces of the 78th assault and 216th infantry divisions on Maloarkhangelsk. On the right flank of the 47th Corps, the 46th Panzer Corps of General Hans Zorn advanced. In his first strike echelon there were only infantry formations - the 7th, 31st, 102nd and 258th infantry divisions. Three more mobile formations - the 10th motorized (tank-grenadier), 4th and 12th tank divisions were in the reserve of the army group. Their von Kluge was supposed to hand over to Model after the breakthrough of the shock forces into the operational space behind the defensive lines of the Central Front. There is an opinion that Model initially did not want to attack, but was waiting for the Red Army to attack, even prepared additional defensive lines in the rear. And he tried to keep the most valuable mobile formations in the second echelon, so that, if necessary, they could be transferred to a sector that would collapse under the blows of Soviet troops.

The command of the Army Group "South" was not limited to the attack on Kursk by the forces of the 4th Panzer Army, Colonel-General Hermann Hoth (52nd Army Corps, 48th Panzer Corps and 2nd SS Panzer Corps). In the northeast direction, the Kempf task force under the command of Werner Kempf was to advance. The group was facing east along the Seversky Donets River. Manstein believed that as soon as the battle began, the Soviet command would throw into battle strong reserves located east and northeast of Kharkov. Therefore, the strike of the 4th Panzer Army on Kursk had to be secured from the east from suitable Soviet tank and mechanized formations. Army Group "Kempf" was supposed to be one of the 42nd Army Corps (39th, 161st and 282nd Infantry Divisions) of General Franz Mattenclot to hold the line of defense on the Donets. Its 3rd Panzer Corps under the command of General of Panzer Troops Herman Bright (6th, 7th, 19th Panzer and 168th Infantry Divisions) and the 11th Army Corps of General of Panzer Troops Erhard Raus, before the start of the operation and Until July 20, it was called the Reserve of the Raus High Command for Special Purposes (106th, 198th and 320th Infantry Divisions), they were supposed to actively ensure the offensive of the 4th Panzer Army. Kempf's group was planned to subordinate another tank corps, which was in the reserve of the army group, after it had captured a sufficient area and secured freedom of action in the northeast direction.

Erich von Manstein (1887 - 1973).

The command of Army Group South was not limited to this innovation. According to the memoirs of the chief of staff of the 4th Panzer Army, General Friedrich Fangor, at a meeting with Manstein on May 10-11, the offensive plan was adjusted at the suggestion of General Hoth. According to intelligence data, a change in the location of Soviet tank and mechanized troops. The Soviet tank reserve could quickly join the battle, passing into the corridor between the Donets and Psyol rivers in the Prokhorovka area. There was a danger of a strong blow to the right flank of the 4th Panzer Army. This situation could lead to disaster. Goth believed that it was necessary to bring into the oncoming battle with the Russian tank forces the most powerful formation that he had. Therefore, the 2nd SS Panzer Corps of Paul Hausser as part of the 1st SS Panzergrenadier Division "Leibstantart Adolf Hitler", the 2nd SS Panzergrenadier Division "Reich" and the 3rd SS Panzergrenadier Division "Totenkopf" (" Dead Head") should not now move directly north along the Psyol River, he should have turned northeast to the Prokhorovka area to destroy Soviet tank reserves.

The experience of the war with the Red Army convinced the German command that there would definitely be strong counterattacks. Therefore, the command of the Army Group "South" tried to minimize their consequences. Both decisions - the strike of the Kempf group and the turn of the 2nd SS Panzer Corps to Prokhorovka had a significant impact on the development of the Battle of Kursk and the actions of the Soviet 5th Guards Tank Army. At the same time, the division of the forces of Army Group South into the main and auxiliary attacks in the northeast direction deprived Manstein of serious reserves. Theoretically, Manstein had a reserve - the 24th tank corps of Walter Nering. But he was a reserve of the army group in case of an offensive by Soviet troops in the Donbass and was located quite far from the impact site on the southern face of the Kursk salient. As a result, it was used for the defense of Donbass. He did not have serious reserves that Manstein could immediately bring into battle.

The best generals and the most combat-ready units of the Wehrmacht were involved in the offensive operation, a total of 50 divisions (including 16 tank and motorized) and a significant number of individual formations. In particular, shortly before the operation, the 39th Tank Regiment (200 Panthers) and the 503rd Heavy Tank Battalion (45 Tigers) arrived in Army Group South. From the air, the strike groups supported the 4th Air Fleet of Field Marshal Wolfram von Richthofen and the 6th Air Fleet under the command of Colonel General Robert Ritter von Greim. In total, over 900 thousand soldiers and officers, about 10 thousand guns and mortars, more than 2700 tanks and assault guns (including 148 new heavy tanks T-VI "Tiger", 200 T-V tanks"Panther" and 90 assault guns "Ferdinand"), about 2050 aircraft.

The German command pinned great hopes on the use of new models military equipment. Waiting for receipt new technology was one of the reasons why the offensive was postponed to a later time. It was assumed that heavily armored tanks (Soviet researchers "Panther", which the Germans considered a medium tank, were classified as heavy) and self-propelled guns would become a ram for Soviet defense. The medium and heavy tanks T-IV, T-V, T-VI, the Ferdinand assault guns that entered service with the Wehrmacht combined good armor protection and strong artillery weapons. Their 75-mm and 88-mm guns with a direct range of 1.5-2.5 km were about 2.5 times the range of the 76.2-mm gun of the main Soviet medium tank T-34. At the same time, due to the high initial speed of the shells, German designers achieved high armor penetration. To combat Soviet tanks, armored self-propelled howitzers, which were part of the artillery regiments of tank divisions, were also used - 105-mm Vespe (German Wespe - “wasp”) and 150-mm Hummel (German “bumblebee”). German combat vehicles had excellent Zeiss optics. The German Air Force received new Focke-Wulf-190 fighters and Henkel-129 attack aircraft. They were supposed to gain air supremacy and carry out assault support for the advancing troops.

Self-propelled howitzers "Wespe" ("Wespe") of the 2nd battalion of the artillery regiment "Grossdeutschland" on the march.

Attack aircraft Henschel Hs 129.

The German command tried to keep the operation secret, to achieve the surprise of the strike. To do this, they tried to misinform the Soviet leadership. They carried out intensive preparations for Operation Panther in the zone of Army Group South. They carried out demonstrative reconnaissance, deployed tanks, concentrated crossing facilities, conducted active radio communications, activated their agents, spread rumors, etc. In the offensive zone of Army Group Center, on the contrary, they tried to disguise all actions as much as possible, hide from the enemy. The measures were carried out with German thoroughness and methodicalness, but they did not give the desired results. The Soviet command was well informed about forthcoming offensive enemy.

German shielded tanks Pz.Kpfw. III in a Soviet village before the start of Operation Citadel.

In order to protect their rear from the strike of partisan formations, in May-June 1943, the German command organized and carried out several major punitive operations against Soviet partisans. In particular, 10 divisions were used against approximately 20 thousand Bryansk partisans, and 40 thousand were sent against the partisans in the Zhytomyr region. grouping. However, it was not possible to fully realize the plan, the partisans retained the ability to inflict strong blows on the invaders.

To be continued…

The Battle of Kursk (Battle of the Kursk Bulge), which lasted from July 5 to August 23, 1943, is one of the key battles of the Great Patriotic War. In Soviet and Russian historiography, it is customary to divide the battle into three parts: the Kursk defensive operation (July 5-23); Orel (July 12 - August 18) and Belgorod-Kharkov (August 3-23) offensive.

During the winter offensive of the Red Army and the subsequent counteroffensive of the Wehrmacht in Eastern Ukraine, a ledge up to 150 km deep and up to 200 km wide was formed in the center of the Soviet-German front, facing the west (the so-called "Kursk Bulge"). The German command decided to conduct a strategic operation on the Kursk salient. For this, a military operation was developed and approved in April 1943 under the code name "Citadel". Having information about the preparation of the Nazi troops for the offensive, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command decided to temporarily go on the defensive on the Kursk Bulge and, during the defensive battle, bleed the enemy’s strike groups and thereby create favorable conditions for the transition of the Soviet troops to a counteroffensive, and then to a general strategic offensive. .

To carry out Operation Citadel, the German command concentrated 50 divisions in the area, including 18 tank and motorized divisions. The enemy grouping, according to Soviet sources, consisted of about 900 thousand people, up to 10 thousand guns and mortars, about 2.7 thousand tanks and more than 2 thousand aircraft. Air support for the German troops was provided by the forces of the 4th and 6th air fleets.

By the beginning of the Battle of Kursk, the Headquarters of the Supreme Command had created a grouping (Central and Voronezh fronts), which had more than 1.3 million people, up to 20 thousand guns and mortars, more than 3300 tanks and self-propelled guns, 2650 aircraft. The troops of the Central Front (commander - General of the Army Konstantin Rokossovsky) defended the northern front of the Kursk ledge, and the troops of the Voronezh Front (commander - General of the Army Nikolai Vatutin) - the southern front. The troops that occupied the ledge relied on the Steppe Front as part of the rifle, 3 tank, 3 motorized and 3 cavalry corps (commanded by Colonel General Ivan Konev). The fronts were coordinated by representatives of the Headquarters Marshals of the Soviet Union Georgy Zhukov and Alexander Vasilevsky.

On July 5, 1943, according to the plan of Operation Citadel, German strike groups launched an attack on Kursk from the Orel and Belgorod regions. From the side of Orel, a grouping under the command of Field Marshal Günther Hans von Kluge (Army Group Center) was advancing, from Belgorod, a grouping under the command of Field Marshal Erich von Manstein (Task Force Kempf of the Army Group South).

The task of repelling the offensive from the side of Orel was entrusted to the troops of the Central Front, from the side of Belgorod - the Voronezh Front.

On July 12, in the area of ​​the Prokhorovka railway station, 56 kilometers north of Belgorod, the largest oncoming collision took place. tank battle World War II - a battle between the advancing enemy tank grouping (Task Force Kempf) and the counterattacking Soviet troops. On both sides, up to 1200 tanks and self-propelled guns took part in the battle. The fierce battle lasted all day, by the evening the tank crews, together with the infantry, fought hand to hand. In one day, the enemy lost about 10 thousand people and 400 tanks and was forced to go on the defensive.

On the same day, the troops of the Bryansk, Central and left wing of the Western Fronts launched Operation Kutuzov, which had the goal of crushing the Oryol grouping of the enemy. On July 13, the troops of the Western and Bryansk fronts broke through the enemy defenses in the Bolkhov, Khotynets and Oryol directions and advanced to a depth of 8 to 25 km. On July 16, the troops of the Bryansk Front reached the line of the Oleshnya River, after which the German command began to withdraw its main forces to their original positions. By July 18, the troops of the right wing of the Central Front completely eliminated the enemy's wedge in the Kursk direction. On the same day, the troops of the Steppe Front were introduced into the battle, which began to pursue the retreating enemy.

Developing the offensive, the Soviet ground troops, supported from the air by strikes by the forces of the 2nd and 17th air armies, as well as by long-range aviation, by August 23, 1943, they pushed the enemy westward by 140-150 km, liberated Orel, Belgorod and Kharkov. According to Soviet sources, the Wehrmacht lost 30 selected divisions in the Battle of Kursk, including 7 tank divisions, over 500 thousand soldiers and officers, 1.5 thousand tanks, more than 3.7 thousand aircraft, 3 thousand guns. The losses of the Soviet troops surpassed the German ones; they amounted to 863 thousand people. Near Kursk, the Red Army lost about 6,000 tanks.

During the winter offensive of the Red Army and the subsequent counter-offensive of the Wehrmacht in Eastern Ukraine, a ledge up to 150 km deep and up to 200 km wide was formed in the center of the Soviet-German front, facing the west (the so-called "Kursk Bulge"). During April-June, there was an operational pause at the front, during which the parties were preparing for the summer campaign.

Plans and forces of the parties

The German command decided to conduct a major strategic operation on the Kursk ledge in the summer of 1943. It was planned to launch converging strikes from the areas of the cities of Orel (from the north) and Belgorod (from the south). The shock groups were to link up in the Kursk region, surrounding the troops of the Central and Voronezh Fronts of the Red Army. The operation received the code name "Citadel". At a meeting with Manstein on May 10-11, the plan was adjusted at the suggestion of Gott: the 2nd such SS corps turns from the Oboyansky direction towards Prokhorovka, where terrain conditions allow for a global battle with the armored reserves of Soviet troops. And, based on the losses, continue the offensive or go on the defensive. (From the interrogation of the chief of staff of the 4th tank army, General Fangor)

Kursk defensive operation

The German offensive began on the morning of July 5, 1943. Since the Soviet command knew exactly the start time of the operation - 3 a.m. (the German army fought according to Berlin time - translated into Moscow 5 a.m.), at 22:30 and 2:20 Moscow time, counter-barrage preparation was carried out by the forces of two fronts with the amount of ammunition 0.25 ammo. German reports noted significant damage to communication lines and minor losses in manpower. An unsuccessful air raid was also carried out by the forces of the 2nd and 17th air armies (more than 400 attack aircraft and fighters) on the Kharkov and Belgorod enemy air hubs.

Battle of Prokhorovka

On July 12, the largest oncoming tank battle in history took place in the Prokhorovka area. From the German side, according to V. Zamulin, the 2nd SS Panzer Corps participated in it, which had 494 tanks and self-propelled guns, including 15 Tigers and not a single Panther. According to Soviet sources, about 700 tanks and assault guns participated in the battle from the German side. On the Soviet side, the 5th Panzer Army of P. Rotmistrov, numbering about 850 tanks, participated in the battle. After a massive air strike [source not specified 237 days], the battle on both sides entered its active phase and continued until the end of the day. By the end of July 12, the battle ended with unclear results, only to resume on the afternoon of July 13 and 14. After the battle, the German troops could not move forward in any significant way, despite the fact that the losses of the Soviet tank army, caused by the tactical mistakes of its command, were much greater. Having advanced 35 kilometers on July 5-12, Manstein's troops were forced, having trampled on the achieved lines for three days in vain attempts to break into the Soviet defenses, to begin the withdrawal of troops from the captured "bridgehead". During the battle there was a turning point. The Soviet troops, which went on the offensive on July 23, threw back the German armies in the south of the Kursk Bulge to their original positions.

Losses

According to Soviet data, about 400 German tanks, 300 vehicles, over 3,500 soldiers and officers remained on the battlefield in the battle of Prokhorovka. However, these numbers are being questioned. For example, according to the calculations of G. A. Oleinikov, more than 300 German tanks could not take part in the battle. According to the research of A. Tomzov, referring to the data of the German Federal Military Archive, during the battles on July 12-13, the Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler division irretrievably lost 2 Pz.IV tanks, 2 Pz.IV and 2 Pz.III tanks were sent for long-term repairs , in the short term - 15 Pz.IV and 1 Pz.III tanks. The total losses of tanks and assault guns of the 2nd SS TC on July 12 amounted to about 80 tanks and assault guns, including at least 40 units lost by the Totenkopf Division.

- At the same time, the Soviet 18th and 29th tank corps of the 5th Guards Tank Army lost up to 70% of their tanks

The central front involved in the battle in the north of the arc, for July 5-11, 1943, suffered losses of 33,897 people, of which 15,336 were irretrievable, its enemy, the 9th Army of the Model, lost 20,720 people over the same period, which gives a loss ratio of 1.64:1. The Voronezh and Steppe Fronts, which participated in the battle on the southern face of the arc, lost 143,950 people on July 5-23, 1943, according to modern official estimates (2002), of which 54,996 were irrevocable. Including only the Voronezh Front - 73,892 total losses. However, the chief of staff of the Voronezh Front, Lieutenant General Ivanov, and the head of the operational department of the front headquarters, Major General Teteshkin, thought differently: they considered the losses of their front at 100,932 people, of which 46,500 were irretrievable. If, contrary to Soviet documents of the war period, the official numbers are considered correct, then taking into account German losses on the southern front of 29,102 people, the ratio of the losses of the Soviet and German sides is 4.95: 1 here.

- For the period from July 5 to July 12, 1943, the Central Front used up 1079 wagons of ammunition, and Voronezh - 417 wagons, almost two and a half times less.

Results of the defensive phase of the battle

The reason that the losses of the Voronezh Front so sharply exceeded the losses of the Central Front is in the smaller massing of forces and means in the direction of the German attack, which allowed the Germans to actually achieve an operational breakthrough on the southern face of the Kursk salient. Although the breakthrough was closed by the forces of the Steppe Front, it allowed the attackers to achieve favorable tactical conditions for their troops. It should be noted that only the absence of homogeneous independent tank formations did not give the German command the opportunity to concentrate its armored forces in the direction of the breakthrough and develop it in depth.

Oryol offensive operation (Operation Kutuzov). On July 12, the Western (commanded by Colonel General Vasily Sokolovsky) and Bryansk (commanded by Colonel General Markian Popov) fronts launched an offensive against the 2nd Panzer and 9th armies of the enemy in the Orel region. By the end of the day on July 13, Soviet troops broke through the enemy defenses. On July 26, the Germans left the Orlovsky bridgehead and began to withdraw to the Hagen defensive line (east of Bryansk). On August 5, at 05-45, Soviet troops completely liberated Oryol.

Belgorod-Kharkov offensive operation (Operation Rumyantsev). On the southern front, the counteroffensive by the forces of the Voronezh and Steppe fronts began on August 3. On August 5, at about 18-00, Belgorod was liberated, on August 7 - Bogodukhov. Developing the offensive, the Soviet troops on August 11 cut railway Kharkov-Poltava, August 23 captured Kharkov. The German counterattacks were not successful.

- On August 5, the first salute in the entire war was given in Moscow - in honor of the liberation of Orel and Belgorod.

Results of the Battle of Kursk

- The victory near Kursk marked the transition of the strategic initiative to the Red Army. By the time the front was stabilized, Soviet troops had reached their starting positions for an offensive on the Dnieper.

- After the end of the battle on the Kursk Bulge, the German command lost the opportunity to conduct strategic offensive operations. Local massive offensives, such as Watch on the Rhine (1944) or the Balaton operation (1945) were also not successful.

- Field Marshal Erich von Manstein, who developed and carried out Operation Citadel, later wrote:

- It was the last attempt to keep our initiative in the East. With her failure, tantamount to failure, the initiative finally passed to the Soviet side. Therefore, Operation Citadel is a decisive turning point in the war on the Eastern Front.

- - Manstein E. Lost victories. Per. with him. - M., 1957. - S. 423

- According to Guderian,

- As a result of the failure of the Citadel offensive, we suffered a decisive defeat. The armored forces, replenished with such great difficulty, were put out of action for a long time due to heavy losses in people and equipment.

- - Guderian G. Memoirs of a soldier. - Smolensk: Rusich, 1999

Differences in loss estimates

- The losses of the parties in the battle remain unclear. Thus, Soviet historians, including Academician of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR A. M. Samsonov, speak of more than 500,000 killed, wounded and captured, 1,500 tanks and over 3,700 aircraft.

However, German archival data show that in July-August 1943, the Wehrmacht lost 537,533 people on the entire Eastern Front. These figures include those killed, wounded, sick, missing (the number of German prisoners in this operation was insignificant). And even despite the fact that the main fighting at that time took place in the Kursk region, the Soviet figures for German losses of 500,000 look somewhat exaggerated.

- In addition, according to German documents, on the entire Eastern Front, the Luftwaffe lost 1696 aircraft in July-August 1943.

On the other hand, even Soviet commanders during the war years did not consider the Soviet military reports about German losses to be true. Thus, General Malinin (chief of staff of the front) wrote to the lower headquarters: “Looking through the daily results of the day on the amount of manpower and equipment destroyed and captured trophies, I came to the conclusion that these data are significantly overestimated and, therefore, do not correspond to reality.”

A nation that forgets its past has no future. So once said ancient Greek philosopher Plato. In the middle of the last century, "fifteen sister republics", united " Great Russia”, inflicted a crushing defeat on the plague of mankind - fascism. The fierce battle was marked by a number of victories of the Red Army, which can be called key. The topic of this article is one of the decisive battles of the Second World War - the Kursk Bulge, one of the fateful battles that marked the final mastery of the strategic initiative by our grandfathers and great-grandfathers. From that time on, the German occupiers began to be smashed at all frontiers. A purposeful movement of fronts to the West began. Since that time, the Nazis have forgotten what it means "forward to the East."

Historical parallels

The Kursk confrontation took place on 07/05/1943 - 08/23/1943 on the primordially Russian Land, over which the great noble prince Alexander Nevsky once held his shield. His prophetic warning to Western conquerors (who came to us with a sword) about imminent death from the onslaught of the Russian sword that met them once again gained strength. It is characteristic that the Kursk Bulge was somewhat similar to the battle given by Prince Alexander by the Teutonic Knights on 04/05/1242. Of course, the weapons of the armies, the scale and time of these two battles are incommensurable. But the scenario of both battles is somewhat similar: the Germans with their main forces tried to break through the Russian battle formation in the center, but were crushed by the offensive actions of the flanks.

If we pragmatically try to say what is unique about the Kursk Bulge, the summary will be as follows: unprecedented in history (before and after) operational-tactical density per 1 km of the front.

Battle disposition

The offensive of the Red Army after the Battle of Stalingrad from November 1942 to March 1943 was marked by the defeat of about 100 enemy divisions, driven back from North Caucasus, Don, Volga. But due to the losses suffered by our side, by the beginning of the spring of 1943, the front had stabilized. On the map of hostilities in the center of the front line with the Germans, in the direction of the Nazi army, a ledge stood out, to which the military gave the name Kursk Bulge. The spring of 1943 brought a lull to the front: no one attacked, both sides forcedly accumulated forces in order to again seize the strategic initiative.

Preparation of Nazi Germany

After the Stalingrad defeat, Hitler announced mobilization, as a result of which the Wehrmacht grew, more than covering the losses incurred. "Under arms" were 9.5 million people (including 2.3 million reservists). 75% of the most combat-ready active troops (5.3 million people) were on the Soviet-German front.

The Führer was eager to seize the strategic initiative in the war. The turning point, in his opinion, was to occur precisely on that sector of the front, where the Kursk Bulge was located. To implement the plan, the Wehrmacht headquarters developed the strategic operation "Citadel". The plan envisaged the application of attacks converging to Kursk (from the north - from the region of the city of Orel; from the south - from the region of the city of Belgorod). In this way, the troops of the Voronezh and Central fronts fell into the "cauldron".

Under this operation, 50 divisions were concentrated in this sector of the front, incl. 16 armored and motorized, totaling 0.9 million selected, fully equipped troops; 2.7 thousand tanks; 2.5 thousand aircraft; 10 thousand mortars and guns.

In this grouping, the transition to new weapons was mainly carried out: Panther and Tiger tanks, Ferdinand assault guns.

In preparing the Soviet troops for battle, one should pay tribute to the military talent of the Deputy Supreme Commander-in-Chief G.K. Zhukov. Together with the Chief of the General Staff A.M. Vasilevsky, he reported to the Supreme Commander-in-Chief I.V. Stalin the assumption that the Kursk Bulge would become the main future battlefield, and also predicted the approximate strength of the advancing enemy grouping.

On the front line, the Nazis were opposed by the Voronezh (commander - General Vatutin N.F.) and the Central Fronts (commander - General Rokossovsky K.K.) with a total number of 1.34 million people. They were armed with 19 thousand mortars and guns; 3.4 thousand tanks; 2.5 thousand aircraft. (As you can see, the advantage was on their side). Secretly from the enemy, behind the listed fronts, the reserve Steppe Front (commander I.S. Konev) was located. It consisted of a tank, aviation and five combined arms armies, supplemented by separate corps.

The control and coordination of the actions of this group was carried out personally by G.K. Zhukov and A.M. Vasilevsky.

tactical battle plan

The idea of ​​Marshal Zhukov assumed that the battle on the Kursk Bulge would have two phases. The first is defensive, the second is offensive.

A bridgehead in depth (300 km deep) was equipped. The total length of its trenches was approximately equal to the distance "Moscow - Vladivostok". It had 8 powerful lines of defense. The purpose of such a defense was to weaken the enemy as much as possible, to deprive him of the initiative, making the task of the attackers as easy as possible. In the second, offensive phase of the battle, it was planned to carry out two offensive operations. First: the operation "Kutuzov" with the aim of eliminating the fascist group and liberating the city of "Eagle". Second: "Commander Rumyantsev" for the destruction of the Belgorod-Kharkov group of invaders.

Thus, with the actual advantage of the Red Army, the battle on the Kursk Bulge took place from the Soviet side "on defense". For offensive actions, as tactics teach, two or three times the number of troops was required.

Shelling

It so happened that the time of the offensive of the fascist troops became known in advance. On the eve of the German sappers began to make passages in the minefields. Soviet front-line intelligence started a fight with them and took prisoners. From the "tongues" it became known the time of the offensive: 03-00 07/05/1943

The reaction was prompt and adequate: On July 5, 1943, Marshal Rokossovsky K.K. (Commander of the Central Front), with the approval of the Deputy Supreme Commander-in-Chief G.K. It was an innovation in combat tactics. Hundreds of Katyushas, ​​600 guns, 460 mortars were fired at the invaders. For the Nazis, this was a complete surprise, they suffered losses.

Only at 4-30, having regrouped, they were able to carry out their artillery preparation, and at 5-30 go on the offensive. The Battle of Kursk has begun.

The beginning of the battle

Of course, our generals could not predict everything. In particular, both the General Staff and the Headquarters expected the main blow from the Nazis in the southern direction, to the city of Orel (which was defended by the Central Front, the commander was General Vatutin N.F.). In reality, the battle on the Kursk Bulge from the German troops was focused on the Voronezh front, from the north. Two battalions of heavy tanks, eight tank divisions, a division of assault guns, and one motorized division moved against the troops of Nikolai Fedorovich. In the first phase of the battle, the first hot spot was the village of Cherkasskoye (virtually wiped off the face of the earth), where two Soviet rifle divisions during the day they held back the advance of five enemy divisions.

German offensive tactics

This Great War is famous for martial art. The Kursk Bulge fully demonstrated the confrontation between the two strategies. What did the German offensive look like? Heavy equipment was moving ahead along the attack front: 15-20 Tiger tanks and Ferdinand self-propelled guns. They were followed by from fifty to a hundred Panther medium tanks, accompanied by infantry. Driven back, they regrouped and repeated the attack. The attacks were like the ebb and flow of the sea, following each other.

Let's follow the advice of the famous military historian, Marshal of the Soviet Union, Professor Zakharov Matvey Vasilievich, we will not idealize our defense of the 1943 model, we will present it objectively.

We have to talk about the German tactics of tank combat. The Kursk Bulge (this should be admitted) demonstrated the art of Colonel-General Herman Goth, he "jewellery", so to speak about tanks, brought his 4th Army into battle. At the same time, our 40th Army with 237 tanks, the most equipped with artillery (35.4 units per 1 km), under the command of General Kirill Semenovich Moskalenko, turned out to be much to the left, i.e. out of business. The opposing 6th Guards Army (commander I. M. Chistyakov) had a density of guns per 1 km - 24.4 with 135 tanks. Mainly on the 6th Army, far from the most powerful, came the blow of Army Group South, commanded by the most gifted strategist of the Wehrmacht, Erich von Manstein. (By the way, this man was one of the few who constantly argued on issues of strategy and tactics with Adolf Hitler, for which in 1944, in fact, he was dismissed).

Tank battle near Prokhorovka

In the current difficult situation, in order to eliminate the breakthrough, the Red Army brought into battle strategic reserves: the 5th Guards Tank Army (Commander Rotmistrov P.A.) and the 5th Guards Army (Commander Zhadov A.S.)

The possibility of a flank attack by the Soviet tank army in the area of ​​​​the village of Prokhorovka was previously considered by the German General Staff. Therefore, the divisions "Dead Head" and "Leibstandarte" the direction of the strike was changed to 90 0 - for a head-on collision with the army of General Pavel Alekseevich Rotmistrov.

Tanks on the Kursk Bulge: 700 combat vehicles went into battle from the German side, 850 from ours. An impressive and terrible picture. As eyewitnesses recall, the roar was such that blood flowed from the ears. They had to shoot point-blank, from which the towers turned off. Coming to the enemy from the rear, they tried to fire on the tanks, from which the tanks flared with torches. The tankers were, as it were, in prostration - while he was alive, he had to fight. It was impossible to retreat, to hide.

Of course, it was unreasonable to attack the enemy in the first phase of the operation (if during the defense we suffered losses one to five, what would they be like during the offensive?!). In the same time Soviet soldiers real heroism was shown on this battlefield. 100,000 people were awarded orders and medals, and 180 of them were awarded the high title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

In our time, the day of its end - August 23 - is annually met by residents of the country as Russia.