5th Guards Tank Army in the wwii. Polygalova L.A.

5th GUARDS TANK ARMY formed on February 25, 1943 on the basis of the directive of the General Staff of February 10, 1943 in the reserve of the Supreme Command Headquarters. It included the 3rd Guards and 29th Tank Corps, the 5th Guards Mechanized Corps, the 994th Light Bomber Aviation Regiment, artillery and other formations and units.
In connection with the breakthrough of the enemy in the Kharkov region, the 3rd Guards Tank Corps, even before the completion of the formation, was withdrawn from the army and sent to the Voronezh Front.
On April 6, the army became part of the Reserve Front (from April 15 - the Steppe Military District). Located in the area of concentration south-west of the city of Stary Oskol, on July 9 it was transferred to the Voronezh front.
During the defensive period of the Battle of Kursk (July 5-23), its troops, reinforced by the 2nd Guards Tank and 2nd Tank Corps, in the oncoming tank battle in the Prokhorovka area, stopped the advance of the enemy strike group and inflicted significant damage.
During the Belgorod-Kharkov strategic operation (August 3-23), acting as part of the Voronezh (from August 9 - Steppe) front, the army, in cooperation with the troops of other armies, defeated a strong enemy group and advanced to a depth of 120 km.
On September 10, 1943, the army was withdrawn to the reserve of the Supreme Command Headquarters, on October 7 - it was included in the Steppe (from October 20 - the 2nd Ukrainian) front, in which in October-December it fought to expand the bridgehead on the Dnieper River southeast of the city of Kremenchug.
In the first half of January 1944, the army took part in the Kirovograd (January 5-16), then in the Korsun-Shevchenko (January 24 - February 17) and Umansko-Botoshansk (March 5 - April 17) offensive operations.In the course of their conduct, the army's troops marched about 500 km in battles; participated in the defeat of large enemy groupings in the regions of Kirovograd and Korsun-Shevchenkovsky, in the forcing of the Southern Bug, Dniester and Prut rivers, the liberation of the cities of Kirovograd (January 8), Zvenigorodok (January 28) and Uman (March 10).
On June 23, 1944, after a short stay in the reserve of the Supreme Command Headquarters, the army was included in the 3rd White-Russian Front, as part of which it participated in the Belarusian strategic operation (June 23 - August 29). The formations and units of the army brought into battle on June 25 in the 5th Army's offensive zone defeated the enemy's reinforced 5th Panzer Division, which was advancing towards the city of Krupki, and reached the Berezina River north and south of Borisov.
After the liberation of Borisov (July 1), the army developed an offensive in the direction of Minsk, Vilnius.
Since July 26, formations and units of the army have been conducting offensive battles with the aim of completing the liberation of the territory of the Lithuanian SSR and reaching the borders of East Prussia.
On August 17, 1944, the army was transferred to the 1st Baltic Front, in October it participated in the Memel offensive operation (October 5-22), on October 20 - it was withdrawn to the reserve of the Supreme Command Headquarters.
In 1945, as part of the 2nd (from January 8), then the 3rd (from February 11) Belorussian fronts, the army took part in the East Prussian strategic operation (January 13 - April 25). Army troops, introduced into the breakthrough on January 17 in the zone of the 48th Army, reached the Mlavsky fortified area by the end of the day, by the morning of January 19 they defeated the garrison that defended it and, developing an offensive in the direction of Elbing, on January 25 reached the Frisches-Huff (Vistinsky) Bay, cutting off the main communications of Army Group Center.
At the end of January - February 1945, the army took part in repelling enemy counterstrikes, which were trying to push back Soviet troops from the coast and restore their ground communications.
In early April, the army, together with the attached 98th Rifle Corps and the 1st Polish Tank Brigade, fought to eliminate the remnants of German troops near the mouth of the Vistula River, where it celebrated Victory Day.
For feats of arms during the war years, over 38 thousand army soldiers were awarded orders and medals, more than 50 of them were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.
Army commanders: Lieutenant General of Tank Forces, since October 1943 - Colonel General of Tank Forces, since February 1944 - Marshal of the Armored Forces Rotmistrov P.A. (February 1943 - August 1944) ; general-lieutenant of tank forces Solomatin M.D. (August 1944); Lieutenant General of Tank Forces, since October 1944 - Colonel General of Tank Forces Volsky V.T. (August 1944 - March 1945);Major General of Tank Forces M.D.Sinenko (March 1945 - until the end of the war).
Member of the Military Council of the Army - Major General of Tank Forces PG Grishin (April 1943 - until the end of the war).
Chiefs of Staff of the Army: Colonel, from June 1943 - Major General of Tank Troops VN Baskakov (April 1943 - May 1944); Major General of Tank Troops PI Kalinichenko (May - November 1944); Major General of Tank Forces G.S. Sidorovich (November 1944 - until the end of the war).

Formed on February 25, 1943 on the basis of the directive of the General Staff of February 10, 1943 in the reserve of the Supreme Command Headquarters. It included the 3rd Guards and 29th Tank Corps, the 5th Guards Mechanized Corps, the 994th Light Bomber Aviation Regiment, artillery and other formations and units. The main divisions of the army have changed throughout its existence. Typically, it consisted of two or more Guards Tank Corps and one or more Guards Mechanized Corps.

According to the military doctrine of the Red Army at that time, the main role of the tank armies was to develop the success of large offensive operations. When the enemy line of defense (usually a shock or combined army) broke through, the tank army rushed into this breakthrough, attacking the rear units and central communication centers, thereby disrupting the interaction of enemy troops. The distances covered by the tank army were supposed to be several hundred kilometers.

In 1943, the army played a significant role in the Battle of Kursk, taking part in the oncoming battle at Prokhorovka. During this period, the army was subordinate to the Steppe Front and included
18th Tank Corps (commander - Major General of Tank Forces Boris Sergeevich Bakharov);
29th Panzer Corps;
2nd Panzer Corps;
5th Guards Mechanized Corps;
32nd Motorized Rifle Brigade (commander - Colonel Mikhail Yemelyanovich Khvatov, until June 28, 1943, his chief of staff, Lieutenant Colonel Ilya Aleksandrovich Stukov, was the acting brigade commander);
110th Tank Brigade (commander - Colonel Ivan Mikhailovich Kolesnikov);
170th Tank Brigade (commander - Lieutenant Colonel Vasily Dmitrievich Tarasov);
181st Tank Brigade (commander - Lieutenant Colonel Vyacheslav Alekseevich Puzyrev);
36th Tank Breakthrough Regiment
29th separate reconnaissance battalion (29orb)
78th separate motorcycle battalion (78OMTSB)
115th separate sapper battalion (115osapb)
292th mortar regiment (292mins)
419th separate communications battalion (419obs)
1000th anti-tank artillery regiment (1000iptap)
1694th anti-aircraft artillery regiment (1694zenap)
repair and other rear services of the corps

With an approximate total of 850 tanks.

In early 1944, the army took part in the Korsun-Shevchenko operation. In the spring of 1944, she took part, as part of the 2nd Ukrainian Front, in the Uman-Botoshan operation.

In June 1944, the 5th Guards Tank Army was used as the main unit to build on the success of the Soviet summer offensive during Operation Bagration. The formation was launched into the offensive after the 11th Guards Army's rifle divisions broke through the enemy defenses, during which they completed the encirclement of Minsk and liberated the city. Further, the army took part in the operation to liberate Vilnius. Large losses in this operation, however, led to the fact that the commander of the army, Marshal of the armored forces Pavel Rotmistrov was relieved of his post and replaced by Vasily Volsky.

At the end of 1944, during the Soviet offensive in the Baltic, the 5th Guards Tank Army was used against the 3rd German Tank Army, which resulted in the encirclement of German troops in the Memel area.

At the beginning of 1945, the army as part of the 2nd Belorussian Front (hereinafter referred to as the 3rd Belorussian Front) took part in the East Prussian operation. In the course of its advance towards Elblag, the army cut off the German troops defending in East Prussia from the main forces of the Wehrmacht, forming the so-called. "Heiligenbeil boiler".

From the end of the war until the collapse of the Soviet Union, the 5th Guards Tank Army was stationed in the Belarusian Military District.

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5th Guards Tank Army- Soviet operational military formation as part of the Armed Forces of the USSR, which participated in many famous battles of the Great Patriotic War.

In June 1944, the 5th Guards Tank Army was used as the main unit to build on the success of the Soviet summer offensive during Operation Bagration. The formation was launched into the offensive after the 11th Guards Army's rifle divisions broke through the enemy defenses, during which they completed the encirclement of Minsk and liberated the city. Then the army took part in the operation to liberate Vilnius. Large losses in this operation, however, led to the fact that the commander of the army, Marshal of the armored forces Pavel Rotmistrov was relieved of his post and replaced by Vasily Volsky.

At the end of 1944, during the Soviet offensive in the Baltic, the 5th Guards Tank Army was used against the 3rd German Tank Army, which resulted in the encirclement of German troops in the area

REPORTING OF THE HEADQUARTERS OF THE 5th GUARDS MECHANIZED CORPS TO THE HEAD OF HEADQUARTERS OF THE 5th GUARDS TANK ARMY,

To Major General T. Baskakov

Parts of Major General Rodimtsev from 15.00 went on the offensive in the general direction at st. Maksimovka, as a result of which they did not advance at all and occupies the previous frontiers.
5 Guards MK rendered assistance to the 32nd regiment with fire, but owing to the passive actions of the 32nd brigade, this aid was also unrealistic.
5 Guards mk occupies a position according to his morning operative. The hull has losses of 2 T-34 and 2 T-70.
The enemy does not show activity, with the exception of artillery fire, which is conducted in response to ours.
According to Shabarov's statement between 12-13.00 19.8.43 at st. Maksimovka passed 2 echelons of covered wagons. With what? Do not know. In addition, during the day there was an active movement of Maksimovka cars - height 217 (both ends).
According to Shabarov's statement, the avenue brought up rocket artillery, which prevails in this area.
With an attack by 15-10 tanks, the avenue took possession of the grove that the southwest. h. 209.5, knocking out parts of Rodimtsev from there.
Rodimtsev decided to act at night in small groups in order to restore his position.

Guards subn. Dokukin

TsAMO RF, f. 5 Guards TA, op. 4949, d. xp. 71, ll. 208-209.

BATTLE REPORT No. 74 of the 5th GUARDS TANK ARMY HEADQUARTERS TO THE COMMANDER OF THE STEPPE FRONT, August 20, 1943

Combat Report No. 74 Shtarm 5th Guards Tank. 12.00 20.08.43 years.

1. By 12.00 20.08.43 there were no changes in the position of the Army units.

The units occupy areas and borders, as indicated in the report No. 73 dated 08.19.43.

2. By order of the General of the Army comrade. Vatutin, transferred on behalf of Comrade. St. George's at 3.00 20.08.43 - 29 TC I prepared for action on Murafa.

Corps, continuing to remain in the MAL area. SENNYANKA and forests to the north, by 8.00 on 20.08.43 conducted a reconnaissance of routes to the MURAF area, crossings across the MERLA river, and also got in touch with the 6th Guards. Army General CHISTYAKOV and 1 TA General KATUKOV.

The commander's intelligence checked: 163 SD - occupies the front south of MURAF at sector 10 HUNDRED, MIRNOE: 71 GSD - defends the line of claim. PEACEFUL. Svkh. KARLOVKA and grove to the north of KHRUSCHEVA NIKITOVKA.

At the turn of 163 SD and 71 Guards. The SD also defends the tank corps from the 1st TA. The hull was not replenished with tanks.

At 11.30 on 08.20.43 from the General of the Army comrade. VATUTINA, I received a second order also on behalf of Comrade. YURIEVA - during the day on 20.08.43, conduct a reconnaissance of the routes of movement for the concentration of the Army (without 29 TC) in the POLOVOE, DERGACHI area, which was done.

29 TC was ordered to be left in place and be ready for action on Murafa.

Due to the fact that during 19 and 20.08.43, the 5th Guards. The army in the section KRYSINO - KADNITSA does not solve active tasks, I think that the further use of 5 GZMK here is not advisable and therefore I ask you to allow 5 GZMK to withdraw 5 Guards from combat formations. Army and concentrate in the area in accordance with the new task of the Army.

4. Shtarm - forest, south. NS. AKHRIMTSEV.

TROOPS COMMANDER 5 GTA

Guard Lieutenant General

Tank Troops

ROTMISTERS

MEMBER OF THE MILITARY COUNCIL 5 GTA

Guard Major General

Tank Troops

HEAD OF STAFF 5 GTA

BASKAKOV

TsAMO RF, f. 5 Guards TA, op. 4948, d. xp. 67, l. 97

PRIVATE BATTLE ORDER No. 20 TO THE COMMANDER OF THE ADVANCED ORDER OF THE ARMY ON ACTION IN THE DIRECTION OF GAVRILOVKA, August 20, 1943

To the commander of the advance detachment of the Guard, Lieutenant Colonel t. Dokudovsky

Private battle order number 20 Shtarm 5th Guards Tank

16.30 h 08.20.43 Map 100.000 1941

Parts of the 53rd Army on 08/20/1943 captured Peresechnaya, Gavrilovka, Kuryazhanka and continue to successfully advance.

I order:

The advance detachment of the army as part of 1 OGKMTsP, 53 Guards. TP, 689 IPTAP - speak

At 16.30. 08.20.43 and by 20.20. On 20.8.43, it will concentrate in the forest area, to the north of the subsidiary. households (5 klm. North gavrilovka).

Upon entering the area, immediately organize reconnaissance in the direction of Gavrilovka, establish contact with the units of the 53rd Army operating in front, and if these units force the r. Uda, occupy and defend the existing crossings, ensuring the crossing of the main forces of the army.

Route of movement: Zaryabinka, B. Rogozyanka, Polevoe.

To inform:

About the performance. Radio signal - 666.

About the exit to the area of concentration. The radio signal is 777.

About the future every two hours.

Shtarm - from 20.00. 08.20.43 in the forest area, north of Polevoe.

Commander of the forces of GTA 5 Member of the Military Council of GTA 5

Guard Lieutenant General of the Guard Major General

Tank forces Tank forces

Rotmistrov Grishin

Chief of Staff 5 GTA

Baskakov

TsAMO RF, f. 2UF, op. 2779, d. xp. 40, l. 206.

COMMANDER COMMANDER OF THE 18th TANK CORPS TO THE COMMANDER OF THE 5th GUARDS TANK ARMY, August 22, 1943

Guards general-l-tu Rotmistrov

7.50 the first echelon left high. 123.1 moved up by 1.5 klm. The enemy with his tanks from the ravine that sowed. Commune 300-400 m up to 4 heavy tanks, 2 self-propelled guns. Two companies of infantry and up to 3 min. Batteries, division art. from high. 182.6 resists. On the line of Art. Shpakovka advances 5 microns, the brigade commanders were sent into battle formations.

I continue to fulfill my task.

I have losses.

The neighbor on the right has not yet begun to move.

I ask you to fire a barrier in the direction of Lyubotin.

Guards gene. Major Trufanov

TsAMO RF, f. 5 Guards TA, op. 4949, d. xp. 71, l. 227.

№ 29

BATTLE REPORT No. 77 of the 5th GUARDS TANK ARMY HEADQUARTERS TO THE COMMANDER OF THE STEPPE FRONT, August 22, 1943

Commander of the STEPPE FRONT, Colonel-General Comrade KONEVU.

Combat report number 77. Staff of the 5th Guards Tank. 11.30 22.08.43

I report:

Parts of the Army at 8.00 on 22.08.43 went on the offensive from the area of Art. SHPAKOVKA (southern railway) on BABAI bypassing KOROTICH from the east.

When advancing in the direction of KOROTICH, the tanks were met with heavy anti-tank fire and enemy tanks from the northern and northern-western heights. SHORT The attack of our tanks with anti-tank gunnery and enemy tanks was stopped.

To accomplish the assigned task, units 18 of the TK and 5 of the GZMK regrouped even closer to the railway and at 10.00 the Army units again went on the offensive.

Our losses from aerial bombardment, anti-tank artillery and enemy tanks are being specified.

At the observation point in the region of 1 km north-east. CROSSESCHNAYA 5 GZMK Major General SWAN.

TROOPS COMMANDER 5 GTA

Guard Lieutenant General

Tank Troops

ROTMISTERS

MEMBER OF THE MILITARY COUNCIL 5 GTA

Guard Major General

Tank Troops

HEAD OF STAFF 5 GTA

Guard Major General of Tank Troops

BASKAKOV

TsAMO RF, f. 5 Guards TA, op. 4948, d. xp. 67, l. 100.

BATTLE REPORT # 87 OF THE STAFF OF THE 18TH TANK CORPS TO THE COMMANDER OF THE 5TH GUARDS TANK ARMY, August 22, 1943

COMMANDER 5 GUARD. TANK. ARMY.

COMBAT REPORT No. 87, Shtakor 18 tank., Forest 2 klm. sowing. GRIGORIEVKA,

08.22.43 to 19.00, map 100.000-42

The enemy stubbornly defends himself on the line: x. SMORODSKY, KAZAROVKA, COMMUNA, KOROTICH, x. SHPAKI his artillery fires from areas: forest sowing. NS. SMORODSKY, LYUBOTIN, KOROTICH, x. SHPAKES.

110 tbr at 18.05, consisting of: T-34 tanks - 8, MSPB 84 people. I cut the highway and railroad. village KHARKOV – BOGODUKHOV severn. KOROTICH, continues to advance.
170 tbr in the composition of T-34 tanks - 4, T-70 tanks - 2, with 53 gtr - T-34 - 8 tanks by 14-00 reached the Severn. 1.5 klm. SHORT Further advance was suspended by strong enemy artillery fire from the KOROTICH, LYUBOTIN area.

Losses of the brigade per day: 6 T-34 tanks, 2 personnel killed, 10 wounded, the radio was out of order.

181 TBR by 17.20 reached 2 klm. south. Art. PACKING.

In the ranks of T-34 tanks - 2.

32 msbr - south-west. 400 meter st. PACKING against bending r. GOOD LUCK.

Casualties per day: enemy artillery fire disabled two 76 mm cannons.

Mortar fire of the brigade at the height. 182.6 hit 2 enemy vehicles and destroyed up to an infantry company. Suppressed the enemy's minbattery fire on the northeast. env. STAR. LYUBOTIN (at the bridge). Captured a 75 mm cannon (without a propeller) and 10 boxes of shells for it.

I decided: having close ties with neighbors, by the end of 22.8. complete the task.
KP - forest 2 klm. sowing. GAVRILOVKA.

NP - Art. PACKING.

TsAMO RF, f. 5 Guards TA, op. 4949, d. xp. 71, l. 229.

BATTLE REPORT No. 79 of the 5th GUARDS TANK ARMY HEADQUARTERS TO THE COMMANDER OF THE STEPPE FRONT, August 22, 1943

Commander of the STEPPE FRONT, Colonel-General Comrade KONEVU.

Combat report number 79. Staff of the 5th Guards Tank to 21.50 22.08.43.

I report:

1. During the day, units of the Army (without 23 TC), carrying out your order, fought offensive battles in the direction of KOROTICH, BABAI and three times repulsed enemy counterattacks with up to 2 battalions of infantry and tanks from the STAR area. LYUBOTIN at the station. PACKING.

By 19.00 on 22.08.43, units of the 18 TC and 5 GZMK, having broken the enemy's resistance, took possession of KOROTICH and received the task:

a) 18 TC and 5 GZMK- to create detachments of tanks, anti-tank guns and motorized infantry, led by the best initiative commanders and immediately pursue the enemy with the task of taking possession of BABAI, Pokotilovka and cutting off the escape routes of the Kharkov enemy grouping to the south.

The rest of the corps forces continue to carry out the task.

b) Motorcycle shelf- set the task to conduct reconnaissance on BUDY.

2. 29 TC continued to defend BOGODUKHOV from the south in readiness to act to the west.

3. Losses and trophies, after clarification, will be reported by operative information.

Shtarm - forest, north east. auxiliary households

NP - bezym. height, which is 1 km east. INTERCUT.

COMMANDER OF THE TROOPS 5th Guards TA

Guard Lieutenant General

Tank Troops

Rotmistrov

MEMBER OF THE MILITARY COUNCIL 5 GV. TA

Guard Major General

Tank Troops

HEAD OF STAFF 5 GV. TA

Guard Major General of Tank Troops

BASKAKOV

TsAMO RF, f. 5 Guards TA, op. 4948, d. xp. 67, l. 101.

BATTLE REPORT No. 80 of the 5th GUARDS TANK ARMY HEADQUARTERS TO THE COMMANDER OF THE STEPPE FRONT, 23 August 1943

Commander of the STEPPE FRONT, Colonel-General Comrade KONEVU

Combat report number 80. Shtarm 5th Guards Tank. 13.45 23.08.43

I report the situation at 13.00 on 23.08.43:

1. Group of tanks 18 TK in the amount of 7 pcs. with a paratrooper of motorized infantry, thrown out at night from the KOROTICH area to intercept the roads from KHARKOV to MEREFU, reached the KHARKOV highway, MEREFA in the area of the Pokotilovka inscription, where it went over to the defensive and at dawn on 08/23/43 was fighting the enemy, holding the occupied area.

A detachment of tanks 5 GZMK by the dawn of 23.08.43 reached the forest 3 km north. BEREZOVOE, where he fights with the enemy.

The main forces of 5 GZMK and 18 TC are fighting to clear KOROTICH from the enemy, who at dawn on 23.08.43 approached from the direction of Lyubotin and occupied it from the south. South. and southwest. outskirts of KOROTICH.

2. The enemy offers stubborn resistance from the southwest forest area. KOROTICH and from the heights of the south. SHORT

At 10.00, enemy tanks with a total of up to 20 tanks attacked the battle formations of Army units from the STAR area. LYUBOTIN, LYUBOTIN in the direction of KOROTICH, the enemy's attack was repulsed.

In the forests of the West. and southwest. KOROTICH continues to accumulate enemy tanks from the Lyubotin area.

At 11.30 on 23.08.43, over 20 enemy aircraft bombed the combat formations of Army units in the GAVRILOVKA, KOROTICH area.

As a result of the night battle, the combat formations of the Army units were mixed, in connection with which the control in the subunits was disrupted. In the morning of 23.08.43, measures were taken to restore control and organization of the battle, for this purpose, at dawn, the commanders of Shtarm were sent to the unit.

NP - bezym. h. 1 km east INTERCUT.

COMMANDER OF THE TROOPS 5th Guards TA

Guard Lieutenant General

Tank Troops

Rotmistrov

MEMBER OF THE MILITARY COUNCIL 5 GV. TA

Guard Major General

Tank Troops

HEAD OF STAFF 5 GV. TA

Guard Major General of Tank Troops

BASKAKOV

TsAMO RF, f. 5 Guards TA, op. 4948, d. xp. 67, l. 103.

BATTLE REPORT OF THE STAFF OF THE 994th LIGHT BOMBER AIR REGION TO THE HEADQUARTERS OF THE 5th GUARDS TANK ARMY, August 23, 1943

BATTLE REPORT

1. A regiment in the amount of 6 planes worked on a special assignment of 5 g.t., for August 22 made 49 sorties, having flown 30 hours 55 minutes.

2. At the aerodrome there are 8 serviceable aircraft, 1 aircraft is on a long-term business trip, on the instructions of the headquarters of the 5th aircraft.

3. The regiment is provided with shoes and uniforms by 90%, food for 12 days, gasoline B-70 for 1.6 refueling, gasoline for 4.6 refueling, oil “MK” for 7.3 refueling, autol for 4.9 refueling.

4. Ammunition for personal weapons and machine guns "Shkas" 2 ammunition.

5. Communication with the headquarters of gt.a. carried out by plane through a liaison officer.

6. A regiment of 14 aircraft can carry out communications missions.

Time. Beginning headquarters 994 A.P.

Art. those. Lieutenant KONUSHKIN

TsAMO RF, f. 5 Guards TA, op. 4949, d. xp. 71, l. 246.

BATTLE REPORT No. 89 OF THE STAFF OF THE 18TH TANK CORPS TO THE COMMANDER OF THE 5th GUARDS TANK ARMY, 23 August 1943

BATTLE REPORT No. 89, Shtakor 18 tank., Forest 4.5 km. sowing. GAVRILOVKA,

23.8.43 to 19.00, map 100.000-42

1. The enemy leading a strong art. min. fire from the east. NS. RICH, high 200.0, RAJELENOVKA, KOROTICH, continues to stubbornly defend on the line: x. RICH, SHORT

Enemy mortar batteries are located - log sev.-zap. and southeast. KOROTICH, anti-tank guns are located in the north-east. outskirts.

Enemy aviation carried out reconnaissance flights with single aircraft.

2. At 2.00 on 23.8.43, I sent a consolidated detachment under the command of Lieutenant Comrade Ivashchenko, consisting of 7 tanks with a landing party, with the task of cutting the railway. and a highway in the Pokotilovka area.

At about 3.50 23.8 the detachment, according to the oral report of Lieutenant IVASHCHENKO, reached the railway station. in the area indicated above and cut it, 2 tanks were knocked out and burned by the enemy (1 of them was radio).

The tank of the detachment commander, Lieutenant IVASHCHENKO, was knocked out, and IVASHCHENKO was wounded. According to him, the infantry dismounted from the tanks and took up defensive positions; he did not know the further actions of the detachment.

At 10.00 from 11 tbr, I sent a group of scouts to the Pokotilovka area with the task of establishing contact with the consolidated detachment and the reality of the interception. in the area of Pokotilovka.

I have no intelligence results. I take the second steps to establish contact with the detachment.

3. Parts and formations of the corps reached the line:

110 tbr in the composition of T-34 tanks - 9, T-70 tanks - 5 - in the area of the mounds of 1 km. north tail SHORT

170 tbr as part of T-34 tanks - 5, T-70 tanks - 1 - landing 300 meters. south. the highway that sowed. SHORT

181 tbr in the composition of T-34 tanks - 3, T-70 tanks - 2 - 1 klm. sowing. SHORT

32 MSBR - took up defenses along the railway. sowing SHORT

Artillery units have OP in the area: platform. RESORT, Art. PACKING, support the action of the body parts.

4. Condition of the material part:

Tanks on the move T-34 - 18, T-70 - 8

Tanks on the move en route T-34 - 12

In repair: current tanks T-34 - 7, T-70 - 3.

Medium tanks T-34 - 29, T-70 - 3.

Capital. tanks T-34 - 9.

Losses per day: T-34 tanks - 10, of which 9 irrecoverable.

5. KP - forest 4.5 klm. sowing. GAVRILOVKA.

NP - grove 1 klm. south. GAVRILOVKA.

Commander of the 18th military battalion of the guards. Major General of Tank Troops TRUFANOV

Chief of Staff of the 18th shopping mall Colonel VOROBYEV

TsAMO RF, f. 5 Guards TA, op. 4949, d. xp. 71, l. 210.

BATTLE REPORT OF THE HEADQUARTERS OF THE 4th SEPARATE COMMUNICATION REGULATION TO THE COMMANDER OF THE 5th GUARDS TANK ARMY, 23 August 1943

To the commander of the troops

5th Guards Tank Army

Battle report number 94, shtapolka 4

At 19-00 on 23.8.43, card 100.000 - 40

The 4th separate communications regiment occupies the forest concentration area of 2 km. sowing. Kuryazhanka. The regiment serves the communications center for the 5th Guards. that by telephone and mobile communications.

Headquarters battalion.

The telegraph company provides a communications center and puts equipment in order.

The telephone exchange is serviced by an internal telephone connection.

The RPSS serves as a mobile communication facility for the command post of the Shtarm.

Armored company: three T-34 tanks are at the command post of the 5th Guards. that and one T-34 in the location of the regiment. Armored vehicles are located on the POD and the operational department of the headquarters.

2. The radio battalion has radio communication: with the GShKA; with the Voronezh front; with the Steppe Front; with 5 GZMK; 18 TC: 29 TC; with corps artillery; with artillery units of the army; with headquarters: 7th Guards. A; 57 A; 69 A; 53 A; 5 VA. Radio exchange per day: 28 radiograms received - 685 gr .; transmitted - 18 radiograms - 849 groups.

Interruption of communication: with the Steppe front from 22-00 to 14-00 - not the passage of the wave and the malfunction of the radio; from GShKA - communication appeared from 22-00 and lasted until 6-00, from 6-00 to 13-15 - there was a lot of interference; from 18 TC - from 20-00 to 8-00 - not the passage of the wave; from 29 TC from 20-00 to 14-00 the reason is not clear.

The 1st telegraph-cable company, consisting of 2 platoons, provided communication lines: NP 5 GTA - 18 TC; NP 5 GTA - 29 TC. One platoon is in the location of the regiment.

The 2nd telegraph-cable company, consisting of 3 platoons, provides communication lines: TsTS - NP 5 GTA; TsTS - regiment headquarters; TsTS - 53 A; TsTS - - 1 building 53 SA. One platoon is in reserve at the location of the regiment.

1127 OKShR in the composition of 2 platoons provides communication lines, the rest put the equipment in order.

1129 OKSHR is in reserve and is putting the equipment in order.

08/23/1943 at 11-00 while performing combat missions - the regiment's armored vehicle came under enemy fire, while the driver of the armored vehicle ml. Sergeant Kapustin and the commander of the armored vehicle, senior sergeant Gvozdarev, was wounded.

Security:

Ammunition, weapons, basic communications completely.

Incomplete transport:

Cargo. GAZ "AA" - 12 units; passenger cars "Willis" - 8 units; motorcycles - 18; armored vehicles - 2 pcs.

Food:

Crackers - 2.5 s / d; different groats - 6.7 s / d; pasta - ?; canned meat - 4.4 s / d; live cattle - 8.5 s / d; fats - 3.9 s / d; sugar - 5.7 s / d dry rations - 1.8 s / d; canned food are different -?

Gasoline - 0.7 requests; diesel fuel - 1.3 requests; oil - 0.3 dressings; autol - 2.0 requests

Commander of 4 ops guards. Lieutenant Colonel Gorbachev

Chief of Staff of the Guards. Major Shevtsov

TsAMO RF, f. 5 Guards TA, op. 4949, d. xp. 71, l. 247.

BATTLE REPORT No. 81 of the 5th GUARDS TANK ARMY HEADQUARTERS TO THE COMMANDER OF THE STEPPE FRONT, 23 August 1943

Combat Report No. 81 Shtarm 5th Guards Tank. 22.00 23.08.43

I am reporting on the actions of the Army units for 23.08.43:

1. At dawn on 23.08.43, the enemy, by force up to a battalion of infantry with tanks, launched an attack from the LYUBOTIN area and from the side of BUDA on KOROTICH and captured the south. and southwest. env. KOROTICH, taking advantage of the fact that tanks 18 TK and 5 GZMK, which had entered from the evening of 08/22/1943, were sent at night as forward detachments to BEREZOVOE, and by this time the main forces of the corps and infantry had just been concentrated in KOROTICH.

Subsequently, bringing up artillery, mortars and tanks, the enemy launched two counterattacks on KOROTICH from the Lubotin area in order to capture KOROTICH.

Throughout the day, units of the Army were fighting in KOROTICH, which prevented the fulfillment of the task - the attack on BUDY.

2. Fulfilling the task of the offensive on BEREZOVOE, BABAI, the forward detachment of the 5th GZMK by the dawn of 23.08.43 reached the forest 3 km north. BEREZOVOE, where he entered into battle with enemy tanks and artillery. In the future, communication with the detachment was interrupted, the crew of the burnt-out tank of this detachment returned, reported that three tanks had burned out from the fire of enemy tanks, and the fate of the rest of the detachment was unknown.

According to reports, three tanks of this detachment were stationed in the south. env. KOROTICH, where they dug in and stayed throughout the day, fighting with the enemy (data is being verified).

3. The forward detachment of 18 TC, consisting of 7 tanks with a landing of motorized infantry, fulfilling the assigned task, by the morning of 08/23/43 reached the line of the KHARKOV-MEREFA highway and railways in the Pokotilovka area, where it entered into battles with the enemy and, having gone over to the defensive, kept the line occupied throughout the day.

Attempts by 170 TBR to join up with a detachment from the KOROTICH area were unsuccessful.

4. At 19.00 on 23.08.43, after regrouping the forces, the Army units launched a general offensive with the task of completely destroying the enemy in the KOROTICH area and reaching BUDY.

The position of the Army units and the result of the offensive, as well as losses and trophies for 23.08.43, will be reported by an operational report.

NP - on the bezym. h. 1 km post INTERCUT.

COMMANDER OF THE TROOPS 5th Guards TA

Guard Lieutenant General

Tank Troops

Rotmistrov

MEMBER OF THE MILITARY COUNCIL 5 GV. TA

Guard Major General

Tank Troops

HEAD OF STAFF 5 GV. TA

Guard Major General of Tank Troops

BASKAKOV

TsAMO RF, f. 5 Guards TA, op. 4948, d. xp. 67, l 104.

OPERATIONAL SUMMARY OF THE HEADQUARTERS OF THE 5th GUARDS TANK ARMY,

OPERSVODKA No. 41 to 24.00 23.08.43 5 Guards Tank, Shtakor forest, 2 km north. auxiliary households

1. The enemy provides stubborn fire resistance with tanks and artillery. At dawn on 23.08.43, before the enemy infantry battalion with tanks from the LYUBOTIN area and from the BUDA side, they launched an attack on KOROTICH and went to the south. and southwest. env. KOROTICH, taking advantage of the fact that tanks 18 TK and 5 GZMK, which had entered from the evening of 08/22/1943, at night were sent as forward detachments to BEREZOVOE, and by this time the main forces of the corps and infantry were just being concentrated in KOROTICH.

Later, bringing up artillery, mortars and tanks, the enemy launched two more counterattacks on KOROTICH from the Lubotin area.

Enemy aviation in groups of 15-30 aircraft repeatedly bombed the battle formations of the army.

2. The troops of the army (without 29 TC) fought throughout the day in the KOROTICH area, which prevented the fulfillment of the task - the attack on BUDY.

At 19.00 on 23.08.43, after the regrouping of forces, the army units went over to a general offensive with the task of completely destroying the enemy in the KOROTICH area and entering the BUDA area.

3.18 TC with 53 Guards. TP conducted an offensive battle in the KOROTICH area and repulsed enemy counterattacks.

At 19.00 on 23.08.43, after regrouping, the corps units went over to a general offensive from the line:

a) 32 MSBR - railroad sowing road. SHORT

b) 181 TBR - 1 km north. KOROTICH (ledge for 32 HRMS).

c) 140 and 170 TBr - sowing. env. garden that sowed. SHORT

By the end of the day, units of the corps, overcoming stubborn enemy resistance, are fighting in the KOROTICH area, having the task, together with 5 GZMK, to destroy the enemy in the KOROTICH area and go to the BUDA area.

As a result of the battle for 23.08.43, units of the corps destroyed:

Enemy tanks - 4 pcs.

Different caliber guns - 6 pcs.

Mortars - 4 pcs.

The U-88 aircraft was shot down by the fire.

Tanks T-34 - 10 pcs.

Of these, irrecoverable losses - 6 pcs.

85 m / m guns - 2 pcs.

120 m / m mortars - 2 pcs.

Cars - 5 pcs.

Killed personnel - 19 people.

Personnel wounded - 32 people.

The hull has tanks on the move:

Tanks T-34 - 18 pcs.

T-74 tanks - 8 pcs.

53 Guards TP has tanks on the move:

Tanks T-34 - 20 pcs.

Tanks T-70 - 2 pcs.

Total tanks on the move: T-34 - 38 units, T-70 - 10 units.

Security:

Screw chucks -1.6 b / c

Food 7 c / d.

Operative group of the shtakor 1.5 km. south GAVRILOVKA.

4. 5th Guards ZMK - During the day he conducted an offensive battle in the KOROTICH area and repelled counterattacks by enemy tanks and infantry.

From 19.00 on 23.08.43, after regrouping, the corps units went over to the general offensive from the line:

a) 24 Guards. TBr - and 12 Guards. MBr - north okr. SHORT

b) 10 and 11 Guards. MBr - north-east. env. garden that sowed. SHORT

By the end of the day, corps units were fighting in the KOROTICH area, having the task of completely destroying the enemy in the KOROTICH area and reaching the BUDA area.

For 23.08.43, parts of the corps destroyed:

Enemy tanks: destroyed - 2

Destroyed - 2

Weapons - 4

Machine guns - 4

Cars - 3

Soldiers and officers - up to 150 people.

Hull losses for 23.08.43

Tanks T-34 - 4 pcs.

Cars - 2 pcs.

Radio stations - 1 pc.

Personnel killed - 23 people.

Wounded - 34 people.

The hull has tanks on the move:

T-34 - 35 pcs; T-70 - 5 pcs.

Security:

Ammunition 45 and 76 m / m shots - 1 b / k

Screw chucks 1,2

Food 2 s / d.

Operative group shtakor 1 km sow. SHORT

5. 1 OGKMTsK with 689 IPTA (3 guns) - the reserve of the army commander concentrated in the sowing garden. KOROTICH is ready to act in the direction of BUDA - MEREFA.

The regiment has tanks on the move: T-34 - 6 units; active bayonets of motorized infantry - 120 people.

Security:

45 and 76 m / m shots - 1 b / c

Screw chucks - 1

Food - 3 s / d

Losses of the regiment for 23.08.43

Personnel killed - 12 people

6 people were wounded.

6. 29 TC with one brigade (25 TBR) continues to defend BOGODUKHOV from the south at the turn: booth 1 km south NS. SEMENOV YAR, south. env. NS. MUSIYKI.

The rest of the brigades of the corps from 17.30 on 23.08.43 on the march to the concentration area of the forest of the northern podsob. households (6 km. North-east. INTERSECTION).

The hull has tanks on the move:

T-34 - 93 pcs.

T-70 - 11 pcs.

Security:

Ammunition - 45 and 76 m / m shots - 2 b / k

Screw cartridges - 2 b / c

Food for 5 days.

Shtakor - on the march to the area of concentration of the corps.

7. Communication with army troops: radio, telephone, telegraph, mobile means and communications officers.

8. The weather is clear, the roads for all types of transport are passable.

STARM - in the forest 2 km north. auxiliary households / 3 km north-east CROSSING

NP - bezim. h. 1 km north-east CROSSING

CHIEF OF STAFF

5 GUARDS TANK ARMY

GUARD GENERAL-MAYOR

TANK TROOPS

BASKAKOV

HEAD OF OPERATING DEPARTMENT

GUARD COLONEL

BELOZEROV

TsAMO RF, f. 5 Guards TA, op. 4948, d. xp. 82

BATTLE REPORT No. 82 of the 5th GUARDS TANK ARMY HEADQUARTERS TO THE COMMANDER OF THE STEPPE FRONT, August 24, 1943

Commander of the Steppe Front, Colonel-General Comrade Konev.

Battle report number 82. Headquarters of the 5th Guards Tank. By 12.00.

8/24/43 Years Card 100,000 1941

I report:

The enemy in front of the front of the army continues to provide strong fire resistance from the LYUBOTIN, STAR area. LYUBOTIN, from forests and heights west, south and east of KOROTICH.

In KOROTICH, up to 20 tanks and up to a battalion of motorized infantry reinforced with artillery were found.

Army units: 18 TC, 5 GZMK, 1 OGKMTsP, from 4.30. 24.8.43 g.

continue actions to destroy the enemy in KOROTICH.

Overcoming strong enemy resistance and suffering losses, the units made little progress.

29 TC (without 25 TBR) ends concentration in the forest area, north of Kuryazhanka

NP - bezym. h. 1 klm. east Crossing.

TsAMO RF, f. 2UF, op. 2779, d. xp. 40, l. 235.

BATTLE REPORT No. 84 of the 5th GUARDS TANK ARMY HEADQUARTERS TO THE COMMANDER OF THE STEPPE FRONT, 25 August 1943

Commander of the STEPPE FRONT, Colonel-General Comrade KONEVU.

Combat Report No. 84. Staff of the 5th Guards Tank. 20.40 25.8.1943

I report:

29 TC - at 13.00 on 25.8.43, he attacked the enemy in the direction of a division of military personnel. KOMMUNAR / 2 klm. app. KOROTICH /, BUDY, MEREFA.

The enemy continuously conducted a strong artillery fire. At 13.40. attacked from the forest that east. svkh. KOMMUNAR with 8 tanks, counterattack repulsed. At 15.40. the enemy again launched a counterattack of 6-8 TIGER tanks, which was repulsed.

At 18.00, the corps is fighting for the grove, southern. svkh. KOMMUNAR, repulsing the third attack of enemy tanks from the direction of LYUBOTIN.

2.5 GZMK - 24 TBR, 10 GV. ICBM, self-propelled artillery regiment - at 16.00 they reached their starting position for an attack in the direction of the military forces. KOMUNAR, BUDY.

3. 18 TC - at 16.00 received an order to attack the enemy in the direction of the military storage unit. COMMUNAR, BUDY.

4. Losses - up to 20 T-34 tanks. Up to 10 enemy tanks were burned. Data is being verified.

PP - bezym. h. 1 klm. east INTERCUT.

Commander of the 5th Guards TA Member of the Military Council of the 5th Guards. TA

Rotmistrov Grishin

Chief of Staff of the 5th Guards. TA

Guard Major General of Tank Troops

Baskakov

TsAMO RF, f. 2UF, op. 2779, d. xp. 40, l. 236.

BATTLE REPORT No. 85 of the 5th GUARDS TANK ARMY HEADQUARTERS TO THE COMMANDER OF THE STEPPE FRONT, August 26, 1943

Commander of the steppe front, Colonel-General Comrade Konev.

Battle report number 85. Shtarm 5th Guards Tank. 13.30

26.8.43 g.

I report:

Parts of the army during 08.25.43, the night of 08.26.43 and the first half

day 26.8.43, performing the task, with varying success fought with the enemy at the turn

dep. svkh. Kommunar, svkh. Kommunar, Korotich. We took possession of the farm. Kommunar and repulsed four enemy attacks. In the area of dep. svkh. Kommunar, svkh. Kommunar during 08.25.43 more than 50 enemy tanks operated against army units.

For 25.8.43 and during the night of 26.8.43, army units destroyed and destroyed up to 15 enemy tanks.

The enemy conducts strong barrage of artillery, mortar fire and fire from tanks from the area of the forests of the western region. and southwest. TSW Kommunar. At 10.00 on 26.8.43 from the direction of dep. svkh. Kommunar, up to 15 enemy tanks, again attacked units of 29 TK and 5 GZMK on the farm. Kommunar. The attack was repulsed. Destroyed - 5 enemy tanks.

In the area of the farm. Kommunar was taken prisoner, who showed that he belongs to 44 PP of the SS Viking division and as part of the battalion arrived to replenish the SS Viking division on 23.8.43.

18 TK - with fire supported the offensive of 29 TK and 5 GZMK being at the turn of the railway. d. to the sowing. env. Korotich.

By 10.00 26.8.43, 25 TBR 29 TK arrived in the Gavrilovka area, having 13 tanks in its composition. The brigade received the task: after mastering the border of the railway. south. svkh. Kommunar to develop success in the direction of Buda, Merefa.

NP- bezym. height 1 km. east Crossing.

TsAMO RF, f. 2UF, op. 2779, d. xp. 40, l. 247.

COMMANDER COMMANDER OF THE 18th TANK CORPS TO THE COMMANDER OF THE 5th GUARDS TANK ARMY, August 27, 1943

BATTLE REPORT No. 91,

Shtakor 18 south of 1.5 km KURYAZHANKA, 8.40, 27.8.43, map 100.000

1. By 7.40 32 MBr with parts of amplification reached 50-60 m f. e. Booth zap. 1 klm Korotych

2. Pr-k resists - 2 heavy tanks, rifle. bullets. fire from the western environs. Korotich.

3. I roll out artillery to fight tanks to an open position. The infantry crawls forward.

Commander of 18 TC TRUFANOV

TsAMO RF, f. 5 Guards TA, op. 4949, d. xp. 71, l. 278.

BATTLE REPORT No. 87 of the 5th GUARDS TANK ARMY HEADQUARTERS TO THE COMMANDER OF THE STEPPE FRONT, August 27, 1943

Commander of the STEPPE FRONT General of the Army Comrade KONEVU.

Combat report number 87. Staff of the 5th Guards Tank. 14.00 27.08.43

I report:

1. Motorized infantry with anti-tank artillery of the Army during the night on 27.08.43, continuing to perform the task, by 7.00 on 27.08.43 reached the line of 200 meters sown. railway KHARKOV - POLTAVA near the railway booth that app. KOROTICH 1 km, bypassing the farm. COMMUNAR from the west and east.

The enemy during the night with artillery fire and rifle and machine-gun fire delayed the advance of our units.

At dawn on 08/27/43, the enemy fired tanks from the southern environs. svkh. KOMMUNAR - did not allow the attempt of our tanks to go to the railroad track, where our motorized infantry left during the night.

From 12.00 on 27.08.43, bypassing the right flank of the 29th TK, the enemy pulled up to 2 companies of infantry with tanks to the military storage unit. COMMUNAR, from the grove of the south. at the same time counterattacked the Army units from the direction of the military forces. KOMMUNAR, trying to cut off our parts that went to the railway.

2. Senior Sergeant BOLDYREV - scout from the 2nd Guards. Motorcycle battalion 5th Guards. ZMK, which left on the night of 27.08.43 from the RAYELENOVKA area, reported that the enemy was taking up defensive positions along the railway line. in the area of the platforms. RAYELENOVKA. In RAYELENOVKA there is a medical aid station, where he observed a large number of wounded enemy soldiers and officers.

3. I report that the units of the 53rd Army, which were supposed to interact with my tank corps, did not make a single step forward for 3 days and today continue to be inactive, remaining on the sowing line. highway going from LYUBOTIN to PESOCHIN.

4. For 26.08.43, as a result of fierce battles with the enemy in the area of svkh. KOMMUNAR have significant losses, and, in particular, in the command staff.

Killed: Commander of 32 TBR - Colonel LINEV.

Head of the Operations Department 29 TC - Lieutenant Colonel LUKASHIN.

Shell-shocked The commander of the 53rd MRB is Lieutenant Colonel LIPICHEV.

Injured- Commander 110 TBR - Colonel Khlyupin and a number of other responsible commanders and political workers.

Detailed data on losses in personnel and materiel are presented in an operational summary.

5. NP - bezym. h. 1 km east INTERCUT.

COMMANDER OF THE TROOPS 5th Guards TA

Guard Lieutenant General

Tank Troops

Rotmistrov

MEMBER OF THE MILITARY COUNCIL 5 GV. TA

Guard Major General

Tank Troops

HEAD OF STAFF 5 GV. TA

Guard Major General of Tank Troops

BASKAKOV

TsAMO RF, f. 5 Guards TA, op. 4948, d. xp. 67, l. 110.

REPORT OF THE HEADQUARTERS OF THE 5th GUARDS TANK ARMY

TO THE COMMANDER OF THE STEPPE FRONT

General of the Army Comrade KONEVU

I report:

Your order No. 00518 / OP dated August 27, 43 was received by me at 15.45 on August 27, 43.

In pursuance of your order, for communication and clarification of the situation in the area 214 SD - I sent the commanders of the headquarters. I am sending reconnaissance to the sector of this division.

I keep 25 tank brigades of the 29th tank corps in my reserve - in readiness for the development of success on the 214 SD sector or in the direction of the military forces. COMMUNAR, BUDY.

Commander 53 MANAGAROV has been familiarized with your order.

COMMANDER OF THE TROOPS 5th Guards TA

Guard Lieutenant General

Tank Troops

Rotmistrov

MEMBER OF THE MILITARY COUNCIL 5 GV. TA

Guard Major General

Tank Troops

HEAD OF STAFF 5 GV. TA

Guard Major General of Tank Troops

BASKAKOV

TsAMO RF, f. 5 Guards TA, op. 4948, d. xp. 67, l. 112.

BATTLE REPORT OF THE STAFF OF THE 18TH TANK CORPS

COMBAT REPORT No. 91, Shtakor 18 tank., Forest 1 klm. southeast. FIELD,

to 19.00, 08.27.43, map 100.000-42

1. The enemy is on the previous lines of defense. During the day, he conducted artillery fire on the battle formations of corps units.

Enemy aircraft in batches of 25-30 planes bomb our battle formations.

2. Units of the 18th TC entered the reserve of the Commander of the 5th Guards Tank Army with the task of bringing the remaining materiel in order and replenishing the combat materiel to the state.

3.32 MSBR, 292 minregiment consisting of six 120 m / m mortars, 1000 iptap - 4 - 45 m / m and 1 - 76 m / m guns, 170 tbr as part of T-34 tanks - 2, T-70 tanks - 1 - occupy the defense of sowing. railway SHORT

4.110 tbr - southern forest. FIELD

5.170 tbr - south-west forest. FIELD

6.181 tbr - forest zap. SEMENOVKA.

7. Hull parts - southeast forest. FIELD.

8. NP - high. 171, 2 1.5 klm. south. SMOKING.

Commander of the 18th military battalion of the guards. major general tank. troops of TRUFANOV

Chief of Staff of the 18th shopping mall Colonel VOROBYEV

TsAMO RF, f. 5 Guards TA, op. 4949, d. xp. 71, l. 269.

BATTLE REPORT No. 89 of the 5th GUARDS TANK ARMY HEADQUARTERS TO THE COMMANDER OF THE STEPPE FRONT, August 28, 1943

Commander of the STEPPE FRONT, GENERAL OF THE ARMY, T. KONEV.

Battle report number 89 Shtarm 5th Guards Tank 12.10 28.08.43

I report:

1. On the night of 08/28/43, Army units with forward detachments fought offensive battles with the task of capturing a bridgehead across the railway. the village of KHARKOV - POLTAVA in the area to the south of the farm. COMMUNAR. Having met the stubborn resistance of the enemy from the line of the railway line. and from the forest area to the south and southwest of the farm. KOMMUNAR - they had no progress.

At dawn on 08/28/43, the enemy launched two counterattacks with 9 tanks and infantry. The enemy counterattacks were repulsed.

2. On 08/28/43, the army units set the task:

Together with units of the 53rd Army, by a decisive attack at 13.00 on 28.08.43, seize the bridgehead across the railway track. KHARKOV - POLTAVA in the area south of the farm. KOMMUNAR, meaning in the future to develop the offensive on BUDY.

COMMANDER OF THE TROOPS 5th Guards TA

Guard Lieutenant General

Tank Troops

Rotmistrov

MEMBER OF THE MILITARY COUNCIL 5 GV. TA

Guard Major General

Tank Troops

HEAD OF STAFF 5 GV. TA

Guard Major General of Tank Troops

BASKAKOV

TsAMO RF, f. 5 Guards TA, op. 4948, d. xp. 67, l. 113.

BATTLE REPORT No. 90 of the 5th GUARDS TANK ARMY HEADQUARTERS TO THE COMMANDER OF THE STEPPE FRONT, August 28, 1943

Commander of the STEPPE FRONT General of the Army Comrade KONEVU

Combat Report No. 90 Shtarm 5th Guards Tank. 20.30 28.08.43

I report:

1. The enemy, throughout the day on 28.08.43, put up strong resistance to the advancing units of the Army, repeatedly counterattacked with tanks and infantry from the area of a large forest, south-west. svkh. KOMMUNAR in the direction of the farm. COMMUNAR.

In front of the Army front in the area: dep. svkh. KOMMUNAR - KOROTICH - in total, over 20 enemy tanks were recorded on 28.08.43.

2. Parts of the Army fought for the capture of the railway line. south. svkh. KOMMUNAR, exposed to heavy artillery fire and enemy tanks.

The forward detachment of the 5th GZMK by 20.00 on 28.08.43 managed to cross the railroad bed in the area of the booth 1 km west. SHORT

The detachment received the task to capture vys. 200.0.

According to preliminary data, 10 enemy tanks were destroyed on 08/28/43.

3. In the area of the farm. KOMMUNAR on 08/28/43 captured a prisoner belonging to the reconnaissance battalion 106 PD, which showed that the division was being re-equipped in 50 km south-west. KHARKOV (the prisoner does not know the point). Reconnaissance battalion 106 PD, which served as a prisoner, consists of 2 squadrons of 60 people. in everyone. The battalion arrived in the area of the farm. KOMMUNAR 08/25/43

The prisoner personally saw - 10 German tanks, of which - 4 tanks "Tiger" in the area of the railway. canvases south. svkh. COMMUNAR.

On August 27, 43, he watched as for several minutes in the area of the farm. KOMMUNAR were burned - 3 German tanks, of which - 1 "Tiger".

According to the testimony of the prisoner, in the KOROTICH area, SS units are operating, he does not know their radio. Who acts to the left - he also does not know.

4. NP - at the height. 1 km. east INTERCUT.

COMMANDER OF THE TROOPS 5th Guards TA

Guard Lieutenant General

Tank Troops

Rotmistrov

MEMBER OF THE MILITARY COUNCIL 5 GV. TA

Guard Major General

Tank Troops

HEAD OF STAFF 5 GV. TA

Guard Major General of Tank Troops

BASKAKOV

TsAMO RF, f. 5 Guards TA, op. 4948, d. xp. 67, l. 114.

REFERENCE OF THE 5th GUARDS TANK ARMY

ABOUT THE DAMAGE CAUSED TO THE ENEMY AND THEIR LOSSES

ABOUT THE DAMAGE TO THE ENEMY AND THEIR LOSSES FOR 08/28/43 -

5th Guards Tank Army

Destroyed:

1. Enemy tanks: burned - 8.

Destroyed - 7

2. Guns of different caliber - 11

3. Machine guns - 23

4. Cars - 7

5. Soldiers and officers - up to 370 people.

Army losses:

1. Tanks T-34 burned - 3

Destroyed - 4

2. Tanks T-70 - 2

3. Killed personnel - 51 people.

4. Wounded - 169 people.

Note:

The information was compiled on the basis of operational reports of units and formations of the Army.

Supplement to the operative bulletin No. 41.

POM. HEAD OF THE OPERATOR DEPARTMENT OF STAFF 5 GV. TA

Guard captain

TsAMO RF, f. 5 Guards TA, op. 4948, d. xp. 82, l. 101.

BATTLE REPORT No. 91 of the 5th GUARDS TANK ARMY HEADQUARTERS TO THE COMMANDER OF THE STEPPE FRONT, August 29, 1943

Commander of the STEPPE FRONT, Colonel-General Comrade KONEVU.

Combat Report No. 91 Shtarm 5th Guards Tank. 11 hours 30 minutes 08/29/1943

I report:

1. During the night of 08/29/43, Army units fought with the enemy for the capture of the border. d. south. svkh. COMMUNAR. As a result of the battle, the forward units of the 5th GZMK by dawn on August 29, 1943, reached the heights. 300.0 (1 km. South-west. KOROTICH).

From 7.00 on 29.8.43, 25 TBR 29 TCs were sent into battle with the immediate task of capturing the crossings across the river. MEREPH in the BUDA region and further advance on the STARAYA VODOLAGA. At 10.00 on 29.8.43, the brigade fought for BUDA, meeting resistance from enemy tanks and anti-tank artillery from the BUDA line.

2. In the area of the farm. KOMMUNAR captured the prisoners of the SS Reich division and the 198th Infantry Division, which showed that as a result of the great losses they had suffered in previous battles, 80-100 soldiers remained in the regiments of these divisions. The SS Reich division on 28.8.43 had only 30 tanks, of which 10 Tiger tanks.

3. The fact that in the area of svh. KOMMUNAR and in the forests to the south, significant groups of prisoners remained, which are caught by our units, gives reason to assume that the Germans retreated very hastily, without having time to warn their units about the withdrawal.

4. In the forest area, sowing. BUDY, parts of 29 TC were captured - 50 prisoners. Control prisoners were taken from among them, the rest were shot.

I ordered the commanders of the units: - henceforth, the prisoners should not be shot, but delivered to the army headquarters.

5. NP - on the bezym. height 1 km tail. INTERCUT.

The new NP is equipped at a height. 200.0 (1 km. South-west. KOROTICH).

TsAMO RF, f. 2UF, op. 2779, d. xp. 40, l. 264.

BATTLE REPORT No. 92 of the 5th GUARDS TANK ARMY HEADQUARTERS TO THE COMMANDER OF THE STEPPE FRONT, August 29, 1943

Commander of the STEPPE FRONT, Army General Comrade KONEVU

Combat Report No. 92 Shtarm 5th Guards Tank. 14.30 29.08.43

I report:

1. Parts of the Army at 9.30 am on 29.08.43 entered the BUDA and are fighting for the cleansing of the BUDA from the enemy and for the seizure of the river crossings. MEREPH.

From 10.00 on 29.08.43, in the BUDA area, Army units began to establish crossings across the river. MEREPH, after which they will continue to operate on the OLD WATER.

2. In the BUDA area our Il-2 attack aircraft bombed Army units.

I ask you to send aviation to the southern regions. R. MEREFA and along the border of the river. MFA.

3. NP - I am translating to the south. slopes of heights north of BUDA.

COMMANDER OF THE TROOPS 5th Guards TA

Guard Lieutenant General

Tank Troops

Rotmistrov

MEMBER OF THE MILITARY COUNCIL 5 GV. TA

Guard Major General

Tank Troops

HEAD OF STAFF 5 GV. TA

Guard Major General of Tank Troops

BASKAKOV

TsAMO RF, f. 5 Guards TA, op. 4948, d. xp. 67, l. 117

BATTLE REPORT No. 94 of the 5th GUARDS TANK ARMY HEADQUARTERS TO THE COMMANDER OF THE STEPPE FRONT, August 29, 1943

Combat report No. 94 Shtarm 5th Guards Tank 18.00 29.08.43.

I report:

1. At 17.00 on 29.08.43, Army units are finishing clearing BUDA from the enemy and clearing mines across the river. MEREFA, at the same time reconnaissance of fords is carried out in the area of elevation. 119.3 and ferries at GIEVKA.

2. At 12.00 on 29.08.43, the lead company of the 25th Tank Brigade burst into BUDY, reached the crossings in the center of the village, at the same time a column of enemy tanks (10–12 vehicles) approached the same crossings, retreating from the YUZHNY direction. A strong tank battle broke out at the porcelain factory, as a result of which the enemy tanks were forced to withdraw to the southeast. direction.

She lost 25 TBR burned out - 7 T-34 tanks.

When our tanks approached the ferry west of the porcelain factory, the enemy blew up the bridge in the center of the village.

3. I am with Task Force Shtarm - southern. env. SHORT

COMMANDER OF THE TROOPS 5th Guards TA

Guard Lieutenant General

Tank Troops

Rotmistrov

MEMBER OF THE MILITARY COUNCIL 5 GV. TA

Guard Major General

Tank Troops

HEAD OF STAFF 5 GV. TA

Guard Major General of Tank Troops

BASKAKOV

TsAMO RF, f. 5 Guards TA, op. 4948, d. xp. 67, l. 119.

OPERATIONAL BULLETIN No. 47 OF THE HEADQUARTERS OF THE 5th GUARDS TANK ARMY,

Operational bulletin number 47 by 24.00 29.08.43 Shtarm 5th Guards Tank.

1. The enemy from the heights of 175.8; 157.9 is conducting artillery-mortar and rifle-machine-gun fire.

Crossings across the river. MEREFA at the section GIEVKA, BUDY - blown up, the river bed - mined.

2. Parts of the Army, starting an offensive from the railway line. KHARKOV - POLTAVA, on the section KOROTICH - LYUBOTIN, during the day of the battle on August 29, 1943, they captured the height of 200.0; southwest KOROTICH and by the end of the day on 29.08.43 they occupied BUDY, motorized infantry began to cross the river. MEREPH.

3. 29 TC- pursuing the retreating enemy, went to the BUDA area. In the area of the farf. head - BUDS corps units fought with an approaching column of enemy tanks (in the amount of 10-12 units) from the YUZHNY area, as a result of which the enemy suffered losses and retreated to the southeast. direction.

By the end of the day, parts of the corps entered the area:

a) 25 TBR with 33 MRB- porcelain. head - BUD.

b) 31 and 32 TBr- they do not have materiel (tanks), they went to the area of kirs. - BUD.

The corps has the task of crossing the river. MEREPH, by the dawn of 08/30/43 capture the high. 175.8, further attack on STARAYA VODOLAGA.

As a result of the battle with corps units on 08/29/43 destroyed:

Enemy tanks burned and destroyed - 9

Self-propelled guns - 1

Different caliber guns - 3

Machine guns - 17

Soldiers and officers - up to 150 people.

Losses buildings for 29.08.43:

T-34 tanks burned - 4

T-34 shot down - 5

Personnel killed - 24 people.

Wounded - 74 people.

The corps has tanks in service: T-34 - 8, T-70 - 7.

Security:

Ammunition - 45 and 76 mm rounds - 2 b / k

120 mm mines - 1.3 b / c

Screw chucks - 1.5 b / c

Food - 3 days

Shtakor - grove, 1.5 km north. BUDY - K.

4. 5 GZMK- by the end of the day went to the BUDA area and motorized infantry began crossing the river. MEREPH.

a) 12th Guards MBR- at the turn of the river crossing MEREFA in the BUDA area.

b) 11 Guards. MBR- south-west. env. BUD

v) 10 Guards MBr and 24 Gv TBr- materiel (tanks) and motorized infantry do not have, concentrated in the forest, zap. SEMENOVKA for the restoration of the material part and additional staffing.

The corps has the task of crossing the river. MEREPH, by the dawn of 08/30/43 capture the high. 157.9, further attack on STARAYA VODOLOGA.

The corps has tanks in service: T-34 - 13, T-70 - 5.

Security:

120 mm mines - 1 b / c

Screw chucks - 1.25 b / c

Food - 3 days

Shtakor - east edge of the forest, 1.5 km south-west. SHORT

5. 18 TC- 32 MSBR from 53 Guards. TP went to the south. the edge of the forest, BUDY, has the task of crossing the river. MEREPH, by dawn on 08/30/43, go to the gardens to the south. environs, where to defend the front to the south, to ensure the crossings of Army units.

53 Guards TP has tanks in service: T-34 - 13, T-70 - 1.

For 29.08.43, the body destroyed:

Anti-tank guns pr-ka - 1

6-barreled mortars - 4

Machine guns - 1

Mortars - 3

Losses buildings for 29.08.43:

Broken 76 mm guns - 1

Destroyed - 3

Personnel killed - 11 people.

Wounded - 35 people.

The rest of the corps during the day of August 29, 43, remained in the former concentration area and restored the material part.

a) 170 TBr- forest, 1.5 km. south. FIELD.

b) 110 TBr- forest, 1.5 km. southeast. FIELD.

v) 181 TBR- forest, zap. SEMENOVKA.

All the restored tanks of the corps in the amount of T-34 - 19, T-70 - are transferred to 181 TBR, which by 9.00 am on 08/30/43 goes into the forest, sowing. WILL BE in readiness for action on 08/30/43

Security:

120 mm mines - 1 b / c

Screw chucks - 1.5 b / c

Food - 3 days

Shtakor - forest, 1.5 km southeast FIELD.

5. 1 OGKMTSP- went to the south. forest edge 1 km north. BUD. Conducts active reconnaissance at RAKITNOE.

The regiment has tanks in service: T-34 - 4.

Active bayonets of motorized infantry - 166 people.

Security:

Ammunition - 2 b / k

Food - 4 days

8. The weather is clear. Roads for all types of transport are passable.

Task Force of Starm- in the gardens to the south. env. SHORT

HEAD OF STAFF 5 GV. TA

Guard Major General of Tank Troops

BASKAKOV

Guard colonel

BELOZEROV

TsAMO RF, f. 5 Guards TA, op. 4948, d. xp. 83, ll. 1-2.

BATTLE REPORT No. 96 of the 5th GUARDS TANK ARMY HEADQUARTERS TO THE COMMANDER OF THE STEPPE FRONT, August 30, 1943

Commander of the STEPPE FRONT, Army General Comrade KONEVU.

Combat report No. 96 Shtarm 5th Guards Tank 10.00 30.08.43

I report:

1. 6 am 30.08.43, got in touch with the commander of the 69th Lieutenant General Comrade. KRYUCHENKIN.

We will organize joint actions to seize the bridgehead across the river. MEREFA in the BUDA area.

2. Parts of the Army during the night in small groups under rifle and machine-gun fire of the enemy were forwarded across the river. MEREFA in the BUDA area.

Attempts to ferry tanks were unsuccessful. The tanks that approached the crossing were knocked out by enemy tanks and anti-tank guns from the south. river banks MEREPH.

The almost complete absence of motorized infantry in my Army did not allow us to capture and provide a bridgehead for the crossing of tanks.

Reconnaissance conducted in the direction of GIEVKA and to the southeast of BUDA, established that all crossings across the river. Merefa was blown up by the enemy, and the river bed was mined.

3. Parts 5 ГЗМК and 29 ТК occupy the BUDs and the forest to the north.

181 TBr 18 Tk- concentrates in the forest, sowing. WILL BE ready for action on the OLD WATER.

4. Task Force Shtarm - in the gardens, to the south. env. SHORT

COMMANDER OF THE TROOPS 5th Guards TA

Guard Lieutenant General

Tank Troops

Rotmistrov

MEMBER OF THE MILITARY COUNCIL 5 GV. TA

Guard Major General

Tank Troops

HEAD OF STAFF 5 GV. TA

Guard Major General of Tank Troops

BASKAKOV

TsAMO RF, f. 5 Guards TA, op. 4948, d. xp. 67, l. 121.

BATTLE REPORT No. 97 of the 5th GUARDS TANK ARMY HEADQUARTERS TO THE COMMANDER OF THE STEPPE FRONT, August 30, 1943

Commander of the STEPPE FRONT, Colonel-General Comrade KONEVU.-

Combat report number 97 Shtarm 5th Guards Tank. 16.30 08/30/1943

I report:

1. Your combat order No. 0592 of 08/30/43 was received by me at 14:40 on 08/30/43.

Even before receiving a written order in the direction of STARY MERCHIK, a reconnaissance of routes from all units and an operational group of the headquarters were sent.

At 14.00 on 08/30/43, the tanks of the Army units are in BUDA in the combat formations of the infantry of the 69th Army, and the motorized infantry crossed to the southern bank of the river. MEREPH and is fighting to clear him of the enemy. The enemy, occupying command heights on the southern bank of the river. MEREFA, strongly resists the Army units.

During the day, enemy artillery fire destroyed the river crossing three times. MEREPA, directed by units of the Army in the BUDA area.

At 15.00 30.8.43, a joint offensive of units of the 69th Army and 5th Guards began. Tank Army with the task of capturing the infantry bridgehead across the river. MEREPH in the BUDA region, in order to further advance on the STARAYA VODOLAGA.

Preparation and organization of the offensive - were carried out together with General KRYUCHENKIN even before receiving your order.

3. In connection with the current situation, it was decided:

With fire weapons, motorized infantry and part of the tanks - to help the infantry of the 69th army to get out and gain a foothold on the heights south of BUDA, and if successful - to advance here with all your might, fulfilling your earlier task.

If the infantry does not receive the expected advance, then by 17.00 on 08.30.43 I will withdraw the Army units and begin to concentrate in the STARY MERCHIK area.

4. Task Force Shtarm - in the gardens to the south. env. KOROTICH, further in the FEDOROVKA area.

TsAMO RF, f. 2UF, op. 2779, d. xp. 40, l. 269.

BATTLE REPORT No. 94 OF THE STAFF OF THE 18TH TANK CORPS

BATTLE REPORT No. 94 to 19.00 on 08/30/43 Shtakor 18 tank., Forest 1 klm. southeast. FIELD, map 100,000 - 42 y.

The enemy takes up defensive positions along the right bank of the river. Merefa. His fire weapons are located in the area of elevation. 175.8 - anti-tank battery, east. the edge of the forest, in a hollow 1.5 km. app. BUDY - battery of 6-barrel mortars, south. 1 klm. the letters "R" the inscriptions p. MEREFA - artillery battery.

The enemy leads the min. fire on the location of our units.

32 MSBR consisting of: 1st MSPB, 1st line company - 18 people, minibattery 22 people, anti-tank brigade battery 20 people, company of submachine gunners 12 people, artillery division. 101 people, minbat 85 people - takes up defense in the south-east. slopes height 182.8.
181 tbr is the reserve of the Commander of the 5th Guards. TA, by 9.30 am concentrated in the area - a forest of 1.5 km. sowing. BUD.

The composition of the brigade: 1st TB - T-34 - 15, T-70 - 6 (arrived in the concentration area), MSPB - 143 people.

The rest of the building is in the same areas.

The personnel are engaged in the repair of combat materiel and combat training.

NP - high. from mark. 195.9.
The corps commander left in parts.

TsAMO RF, f. 5 Guards TA, op. 4949, d. xp. 71, l. 308.

OPERATIONAL BULLETIN No. 48 OF THE HEADQUARTERS OF THE 5th GUARDS TANK ARMY,

Operational bulletin number 48 by 24.00 30.08.43 Shtarm 5th Guards Tank.

Goruny (2 km northeast. OLD MERCHIK).

1. The enemy, occupying command heights on the southern bank of the river. MEREFA, during the day, provided strong fire resistance to the advancing units of the Army.

During the day of 08/30/43, the enemy repeatedly destroyed the river crossings with artillery fire. MEREPA, directed by units of the Army.

2. Parts of the Army, together with parts of the 69th Army, during the day of 08/30/1943 fought offensive battles with the task of capturing the infantry bridgehead across the river. MEREFA in the BUDA region with further development of success in STARAYA VODOLAGA.

In view of the strong resistance of the enemy, which is at the turn of the command heights, zap. WILL, it was not possible to break it - the infantry did not have the expected success.

According to the order of the STEPNY FRONT commander No. 00592 / OP dated 08/30/43, Army units from 17:00 on 08/30/43 began regrouping in the STARY MERCHIK area with the task of advancing in the direction of CHEREMUSHNAYA, VALKI.

3. 18 TC- all the restored materiel (tanks) and motorized infantry were transferred to 181 TBR, which by 23.00 30.08.43 was concentrated in the south. the edge of the forest, 2 km north. OLD MERCHAN.

The brigade has tanks in service: T-34 - 17, T-70 - 5.

Blown up by mines: T-34 - 1.

The rest of the brigades of the corps, while remaining in the same area of concentration - the forest of the southern. and southeast. POLEVOE, during the day of 08/30/43, the material part was restored.

Security:

Ammunition - 45 and 76 mm rounds - 1.5 b / c

120 mm mines - 1 b / c

Screw cartridges - 1.5 b / c.

Food - 2 days.

Shtakor- in the forest, 1.5 km. southeast. FIELD.

4. 5 GZMK- all the materiel (tanks) and motorized infantry were transferred to the 12th Guards. TBr, which by the end of the day was finishing concentration in the area x. MISHCHENKOV.

The brigade has tanks on the move: T-34 - 13, T-70 - 5.

The rest of the corps brigades, without materiel and motorized infantry, are concentrated in the forest area, west. SEMENOVKA for the restoration of the material part and additional staffing.

Security:

Ammunition - 45 and 76 mm rounds - 1.25 b / c

120 mm mines - 1 b / c

Screw cartridges - 1.25 b / c.

Food - 2 days.

Task Force Shtakor- RED. Dawn.

5. 29 TC- during the day he fought for the seizure of the bridgehead across the river. MEREPH. From 17.00 on 08/30/43, having transferred all the materiel (tanks) and motorized infantry 25 TBR, he began to regroup in the STARY MERCHIK area.

By the end of the day, 08/30/43, 25 TBR, consisting of 13 T-34 tanks, is completing the concentration in the western region. env. NS. MANCHENKO.

The rest of the brigades of the corps of the materiel (tanks) and motorized infantry do not have, they are concentrated in the forest, 2 km north of KURYAZHANKA.

As a result of the battle by parts of the corps, for 30.08. destroyed:

Enemy tanks - 3

Different caliber guns - 5

Machine guns - 6

Self-propelled guns - 2

Soldiers and officers - up to 200 people.

Hull losses for 30.08.43:

T-34 tanks burned - 1

T-34 shot down - 2

Personnel killed - 7 people.

Wounded - 21 people.

Security:

Ammunition - 45 and 76 mm rounds - 3 b / k

120 mm mines - 1 b / c

Screw cartridges - 1.5 b / c.

Food for 6 days.

Task Force Shtakor- app. env. NS. MANCHENKOV.

6. 1 OGKMTSP- in the composition of 160 people. Motorized infantry and 4 T-34 tanks, by the end of 08/30/43 finishes concentrating in the east. env. NS. MANCHENKOV.

Security:

Ammunition - 2 b / k

Food - 3 days

7. Communication with the Army troops: radio, mobile means and communications officers.

8. The weather is cloudy with little precipitation. Roads for all types of transport are passable.

Shtarm - GORUNY (2 km north-east. OLD MERCHIK).

HEAD OF STAFF 5 GV. TA

GUARD MAYOR GENERAL OF TANK FORCES

BASKAKOV

HEAD OF THE OPERATIONAL DEPARTMENT OF HEADQUARTERS 5 GV. TA

GUARD COLONEL

BELOZEROV.

TsAMO RF, f. 5 Guards TA, op. 4948, d. xp. 83, ll. 3-4.

BATTLE REPORT No. 99 of the 5th GUARDS TANK ARMY HEADQUARTERS TO THE COMMANDER OF THE STEPPE FRONT, August 31, 1943

To the Commander of the STEPPE FRONT FORCES, Army General Comrade KONEV.

Combat Report No. 99 Shtarm 5th Guards Tank. 9.30 31.08.43

I report:

1. By 7.00 on 08/31/43, army units were concentrated:

a) 181 TBr - 18 TC in the forest, 1 km south. Art. MERCHIK.

Has tanks T-34 - 10. T-70 - 4.

b) 12 Guards. MBr 5 GZMK - in the area of x. MISHCHENKOV.

Has Tanks T-34 - 13.

c) 25 TBr 29 TC - concentrated in the area x. IVASHCHENKOV.

Has tanks T-34 - 13.

2. Conducted a reconnaissance of the area in the direction of the attack. From 10.00 on 31.08.43, the brigades go to their starting position for the attack - the gardens to the south. env. Kindness.

3. Consolidated corps brigades are united by Major General Comrade. SKVORTSOVY.

I assigned the corps the task of attacking in the direction of DOBROPOLIE, x. DRILLING, Zap. env. CHEREMYSHNAYA - to seize the area of vys. 184.7 x. CHELYUKOVKA, height 200.5 with the exit of 5 GZMK in the area of the west. CHEREMYSHNAYA. An advanced detachment as part of a motorcycle regiment and 58 Guards. TP (11 T-34 tanks), - I throw it on VALKI.

4. Established contact with the left-flank units of Zhadov's army and MANAGAROV's units operating in this direction.

5. The start of the attack, by prior arrangement, was scheduled for 14.00 on 31.08.43.

The final decision of Comrade MANAGAROVA and has not yet received the timing of the attack. I expect at 10.00 on 31.08.43.

6. Headquarters - HURINA (1 km northeast. OLD MERCHIK).

NP - high. 215.6 (2 km south station MERCHIK).

COMMANDER OF THE TROOPS 5th Guards TA

Guard Lieutenant General

Tank Troops

Rotmistrov

MEMBER OF THE MILITARY COUNCIL 5 GV. TA

Guard Major General

Tank Troops

HEAD OF STAFF 5 GV. TA

Guard Major General of Tank Troops

BASKAKOV

Right: Pom. Chief of the Operations Department of the Guard Captain (Left)

TsAMO RF, f. 5 Guards TA, op. 4948, d. xp. 67, l. 124.

BATTLE REPORT No. 162 OF THE STAFF OF THE 181st TANK BRIGADE TO THE COMMANDER OF THE 5TH GUARDS TANK ARMY,

Commander 5 GTA

Copy: To the commander of the 5th GMK, 18th military complex

Battle report number 162

Shtabriga 181 tbr 16.50 31.8.43 map 100000 south. outskirts of sk. Artel

The brigade, performing the assigned task - to act as an agricultural artel, x. Drilling, h. Chelyukovka, by 16.00 on 08/31/1943, fighting, reached a height of 204.3 and continues to perform the assigned task. As a result of the battle, 5 enemy tanks were knocked out. 1 tank of the "Tiger" brand is completely captured and 2 cannons, from which they fire at the enemy. The enemy has a strong art. fire resistance from x. Khvorostov and machine-gun fire kurgan + 00. Up to 2 batteries of mortars are firing from the direction x. Naryzhny. As a result of the battle, I have losses: 2 T-34, 1 T-70, 15 wounded people. Of which Art. Adjutant of the 1st B-on Guards. Art. lei-t Shkurdalov.

Beginning headquarters of 181 t. br. Major Popov

TsAMO RF, f. 5 Guards TA, op. 4949, d. xp. 71, l. 321.

BATTLE REPORT No. 95 OF THE STAFF OF THE 18TH TANK CORPS

TO THE COMMANDER OF THE 5TH GUARDS TANK ARMY,

BATTLE REPORT No. 95 to 19.00 on 31.8.43 Shtakor 18 tank., Forest 1 klm. southeast. FIELD, map 100,000 - 42 y.

1. Parts of the hull in the former areas.

2.110 tbr - to the south of 1.5 km POLEVOE, as part of the T-34 - 4 tanks.

3.170 tbr southwest FIELD

4. 181 tbr as part of the T-34 - 15, T-70 - 6 tanks in the operational subordination of the 5 GZMK, the forest sowing was concentrated. STAR. MERCHIK (11.00).

5. 32 msb - forest concentrated 1, 5 km west. SEMENOVKA.

6. Body parts and art. shelves in the former areas.

7. Shtakor - forest 1 km southeast. FIELD.

8. Komkor and NSh departed in parts.

COMMANDER 18 TC GUARD GENERAL-MAJOR TRUFANOV

HEAD OF STAFF 18 shopping mall GV. Lieutenant Colonel of Seeds

TsAMO RF, f. 5 Guards TA, op. 4949, d. xp. 71, l. 318.

BATTLE REPORT No. 215

HEADQUARTERS of the 5th GUARDS MECHANIZED CORPS

Combat report number 215. Shtakor 5 gZmk,

31.8.43 20.00. Map 100.000 - 42 y.

1. The enemy, after a stubborn resistance at 20.00, retreated behind the railway line. the village of Kharkov-Poltava and is led by a strong art. min. fire from the direction of the forest east. NS. Rogovka, zap. height, which is east. NS. Rogovka 2 km. And south. the edge of the forest, which is east. Likhovki. Observation established up to 20 tanks in the area of x. Likhovka.

At 15.30 5 tanks pr-ka counterattacked 12 guards. mbr from x direction. Shilov's attack was repulsed.

18.30 aircraft pr-ka up to 18 aircraft "Ju-88" and "Ju-87" bombed the battle formations of units and the OP of the corps.

2. Parts of the hull, overcoming the stubborn resistance of the pr-ka, at 20.00 went beyond the railway. etc.

3. 12 Guards. mbr with 285 mp and 1104 iptap, at 15.30 they attacked with ex. h. 203.1 and by 20.00 had gone beyond the train. d. in the region of sowing. NS. Likhovka. In its composition it has: tanks "T-34" - 9, "T-70" - 4, active bayonets - 56. During the day of the battle has losses - tanks "T-34" - 9, personnel killed and wounded about 25 - 30 people

4.181 tbr with 694 iptap, ipa div. 286 megapixels, consisting of: "T-34" - 5 tanks and approx. 80 people infantry at 14.00 attacked in ex. h. 204.3 and by 20.00 had gone beyond the train. d. to the right of the 12th Guards. mbr. During the day of the battle has losses: tanks burned "T-34" - 6, "T-70" - 1. Knocked down "T-70" - 2. Personnel 37 people.

5. 25 tank brigades with 108 Iptapes consisting of 8 T-34 tanks and personnel - 35 people. (act of bayonets) 16.30 attacked for 12 guards. mbr in the direction of north-east. slopes 204.3 and by 20.00 reached the railway line. to the left of the ledge and beyond 12 mbr.

Losses per day of tanks: "T-34" -4, "T-70" - 3, personnel about 20 people.

6.678 GAP, 409 otmd, 76 mm 1529 odp, 737 ipa - reserve.

7. The losses caused to the pr-ku per day are being specified.

8. KP - a garden that is north-east. svkh. Shock

NP - mark. 186.3

9. The corps commander is lightly wounded and is in the command post area.

For the corps commander, Guards. Major General TV (signature)

For the chief of staff of the Guards. captain (signature)

TsAMO RF, f. 5 Guards TA, op. 4949, d. xp. 71, l. 316.

BATTLE REPORT No. 102 of the 5th GUARDS TANK ARMY HEADQUARTERS TO THE COMMANDER OF THE STEPPE FRONT, August 31, 1943

Commander of the STEPPE FRONT, Colonel-General Comrade KONEVU.

Combat report number 102. Staff of the 5th Guards Tank. 08/31/1943

I report:

1. Parts 5 GZMK consisting of 181 TBR, 25 TBR, 12 Guards. MBR, reinforced by all army artillery, at 14.30. 31.8.43 from the turn of the river. Merchik went on the offensive in the direction of vys. 188.7, MTF. GRUSHKI, DRILLING and by the end of the day on 31.8.43 they are fighting:

12th Guards MBR - Mastering MTF. GRUSHKI, high. 207.0, crossed the railway. and 6 tanks went to the heights. 211.1, continues to expand the occupied area, bringing up artillery.

181 TBR - having mastered the height. 188.7 and Datskivka and repulsing a counterattack of enemy tanks from the side of TETYUSCHINA BALK, reached the line: heights of 203.4, 203.1 and continues to advance to the railway line. etc.

25 TBR - attacked opponents in the ravines south of DOBROPOLIE, reached the line of heights. 207.0, BARABASHI and continues to move towards the railroad bed.

2. ADVANCED Squad consisting of: 1 OGKMTSP, 53 Guards. TP, having the task to seize VALKI by the end of the day on 08/31/1943, by 19:00 on 08/31/1943, part of the forces crossed the railroad bed in the area of the booth, 2 km sow. east Khvorostovo, continues to advance in the direction of LIKHOVKA, high. 184.7.

3. At night from 31.8.43. on 1.9.43, set the task of 5 GZMK - to firmly secure a foothold south of the railway in the BURIVKA area, put in order the units so that at dawn on 1.9.43, continue to carry out your task.

4. In the afternoon of 08/31/1943, enemy aircraft bombed the Army units three times.

NP - high. mark 215.8.

TsAMO RF, f. 2UF, op. 2779, d. xp. 40, l. 281.

BATTLE REPORT No. 100 of the 5th GUARDS TANK ARMY TO THE COMMANDER OF THE STEPPE FRONT, August 31, 1943

Commander of the STEPPE FRONT, Army General Comrade KONEVU.

Combat report number 100 Shtarm 5th Guards Tank 21.00 31.08.43

I report:

1. Parts 5 GZMK consisting of 181 TBR, 25 TBR, 12 Guards. MBR reinforced with all army artillery, at 14.30 on 31.08.43 from the border of the river. Merchik went on the offensive in the direction of vys. 188.7, MTF. GRUSHKI, BURIVKA and by the end of the day on 31.08.43 they are fighting:

12th Guards MBR- mastering MTF. GRUSHKI, high. 207.0, crossed the railway. and 6 tanks went to the heights. 211.1 continues to expand the occupied area, bringing up artillery.

181 TBR- having mastered high. 188.7 LATKIVKA and repulsing a counterattack of enemy tanks from the side of TETKIN BALKA reached the line: heights of 204.3, 203.1 and continues to advance to the railroad bed.

2. ADVANCED Squad consisting of: 1 OGKMTSN, 53 Guards. TP, 578 IPTAP having a task by the end of the day on 31.08.43, part of the forces crossed the railroad bed in the area of the booth, 2 km north-east. Khvorostovo, continues to advance in the direction of LIKHOVKA, high. 184.7.

3. On the night of 08/31/43 to 09/01/1943, set the task of 5 GZMK - to firmly secure a foothold south of the railway in the area of LIKHOVKA BURIVKA, put in order the units so that at dawn on 1.09.43, continue to carry out your task ...

The ADVANCED detachment was tasked with developing an offensive against Valki.

4. In the afternoon of August 31, 1943, enemy aircraft bombed the battle formations of Army units three times.

5. During the day of the battle, I have up to 25 tanks knocked out and burned by the enemy. Losses are being clarified.

6. Shtarm - x. HURINA (1 km n.E. OLD MERCHIK)

NP - high. mark 215.8.

7. Infantry 53 Arm. There is no Comrade Managarov behind the battle formations of the 5th MK.

COMMANDER OF THE TROOPS 5th Guards TA

Guard Lieutenant General

Tank Troops

Rotmistrov

MEMBER OF THE MILITARY COUNCIL 5 GV. TA

Guard Major General

Tank Troops

HEAD OF STAFF 5 GV. TA

Guard Major General of Tank Troops

BASKAKOV

TsAMO RF, f. 5 Guards TA, op. 4948, d. xp. 67, l. 125.

OPERATIONAL BULLETIN No. 49 OF THE HEADQUARTERS OF THE 5th GUARDS TANK ARMY,

Operational bulletin number 49 to 24.00 31.08.43 Shtarm 5th Guards Tank. GORUNS (1 km northeast. OLD MERCHIK).

1. The enemy was driven out of the occupied line by Army units - the heights of the south. DOBROPOLIE and withdrew behind the line of the KHARKOV-POLTAVA railway, where it renders fire resistance to the advancing Army units.

At 15.30 31.08.43 - 5 enemy tanks from the TETYUSHIN BALK area counterattacked the 12th Guards. MBR - the attack was repulsed.

In the afternoon, enemy aviation in groups of up to 25 aircraft bombed the battle formations of Army units three times.

2. Parts 5 GZMK- composed of: 12 Guards. MBr, 181 TBr 18 TK, 25 TBr 29 TK, reinforced with all army artillery, at 14.30 on 08/31/43 from the border of the river. Merchik went on the offensive in the direction of vys. 188, MTF 3. GRUSHKI, DRILLING with the task of mastering Cheryomushnaya and then advancing on VALKI.

Having broken the enemy's resistance at the turn of the heights. south of DOBROPOLIE, repelling a counterattack - 5 enemy tanks, parts of the corps went south. yellow dor. KHARKOV - POLTAVA, by the end of the day they are fighting at the turn:

a) 181 TBr - behind the railway line. d. in the area of the south. railway booths (1 km north-east. KHVOROSTOV).

b) 12 Guards. MBr - south. slope height 211.1 that sowing. FEVER.

c) 25 TBR - at the railway line in the area of the north high. 211.1 (1 km north. LIKHOVKA).

On the night of 31.08 to 1.09.43, the corps was tasked with firmly securing the southern bridgehead. railway in the area of LIKHOVKA, BURIVKA, put in order the units and from the dawn of 1.09.43 continue to carry out the assigned task.

Losses of the corps during the day of the battle:

T-34 tanks - 19 pcs.

T-70 tanks - 6 pcs.

Personnel were killed - up to 75 people.

Losses and trophies are just what.

The hull has tanks on the move: T-34 - 23 units, T-70 - 4 units.

Active bayonets of motorized infantry - 171 people.

Security:

Ammunition - 45 and 76 mm rounds - 1 b / c

120 mm mines - 1 b / c

Screw cartridges - 1.5 b / c.

Food - 6 days

The rest of the corps brigades (10th, 11th Guards. MBR and 24th Guards. TBR) do not have the materiel (tanks) and motorized infantry. Concentrated in the area of the forest zap. SEMENOVKA for the restoration of the material part and supplemented

Shtakor - garden, southern SHOCK.

3. Forward Detachment consisting of: 1 OGKMTSP, 53 Guards. TP, having the task of capturing VALKI by the end of August 31, 1943, crossed the railway line by the end of the day. in the area of the booth (1 km northeast of KHVOROSTOV). The detachment continues to advance in the direction of LIKHOVKA, vys. 184.3 ROLLS.

The detachment has tanks on the move: T-34 - 11.

Active bayonets of motorized infantry - 160 people.

Security:

Ammunition - 45 and 76 mm rounds - 1.75 b / c

Screw cartridges - 1.5 b / c.

Food - 3 days

4. 18 TC(without 181 TBR) - no materiel (tanks) and motorized infantry.

During the day of 08/31/43, he restored the material part in the former concentration area - forest, southern, and southeast. FIELD.

Shtakor - in the forest, 1.5 km southeast. FIELD.

5. 29 TC(without 25 TBR) - no materiel (tanks) and motorized infantry. Concentrated in the forest 2 km sowing. KURYAZHANKA for the restoration of the material part and replenishment.

Shtakor - in the forest, 2 km north. KURYAZHANKA.

6. Communication with the Army troops - radio, mobile means and communications officers.

7. The weather is cloudy with little precipitation. Roads for all types of transport are passable.

Shtarm - GORUNY (1 km northeast. OLD MERCHIK).

KP - high from mark. 215.8.

HEAD OF STAFF 5 GV. TA

GUARD MAYOR GENERAL OF TANK FORCES

BASKAKOV

HEAD OF THE OPERATIONAL DEPARTMENT OF HEADQUARTERS 5 GV. TA

BELOZEROV

TsAMO RF, f. 5 Guards TA, op. 4948, d. xp. 83, ll. 5-6.

REPORT OF THE COMMANDER AND HEADQUARTERS OF THE 5th GUARDS TANK ARMY TO THE COMMANDER OF THE STEPPE FRONT ON THE LOSSES IN JULY-AUGUST 1943, THE NUMBER AND STATE OF EQUIPMENT AND NEEDS

OWL. SECRET

CONTROL

5 Guards

TANK ARMY

combatant

Ref No. 00350

COMMANDING THE STEPPE FRONT

General of the Army Comrade KONEVU.

Coming out of the area of OSTROZHSK on 6.7.43, the 5th Guards Tank Army spent 2 months of heavy offensive battles.

By the oncoming tank battle under PROKHOROVKA, the Army participated in the liquidation of the summer offensive of the German army, breaking the main tank group advancing on KURSK from the south. Further, advancing west of BELGOROD on ZOLOCHEV, and with one corps cutting off the enemy's withdrawal from BELGOROD to the south, the 5th Guards Tank Army took part in the capture of BELGOROD.

In connection with the current situation in the Bogodukhov area, where the enemy was creating a tank group, having the task of reaching the flank and rear of our troops advancing on KHARKOV from the north, in order to disrupt this offensive, the 5th Guards Tank Army, on the orders of Marshal of the Soviet Union comrade. ZHUKOVA, for one day concentrated in the area of BOGODUKHOV, subsequently, maneuvering in this area, did not allow the enemy to carry out his plan.

Subsequently, the 5th Guards Tank Army was again deployed to the east and, having received the task of advancing from PERESECHNAYA to BUDA, entering the KOROTICH area created a threat to the enemy of encirclement in KHARKOV. As a result, the enemy left the city of KHARKOV.

In subsequent battles, the 5th Guards Tank Army received the task of attacking VALKI, which it continues to carry out.

All these battles were fought in critical sectors of the front, where the enemy offered strong resistance, often disregarding even losses.

The SS Panzer Corps, which is considered one of the strongest and most reliable units of the German army, acted against the Army, from the first day of entering the battle.

In all these battles, the 5th Guards Tank Army suffered heavy losses in materiel, weapons and personnel.

In two months of fighting, the Army lost a large number of leading officers. The deputy commander of the 5th GZMK - Major General Comrade SWAN. Of the 12 brigade commanders, 6 were killed and wounded. In total, 1624 officers were out of action. Losses of all personnel are equal - 18,219 people.

The army suffered heavy losses in armament.

On 08/30/43, the following is missing to the state:

	Established by state	Missing.
Howitzers 122 mm

Cannons 85 mm
Cannons 76 mm
Cannons 45 mm
Mortars 120 mm
Mortars 82 mm
Easel machine guns
Hand machine guns
PPSh and PPD

The army is short of staff - 1468 vehicles.

From enemy fire, 142 radio stations were eliminated, as a result of which control is extremely difficult.

All this speaks for the fact that the Army requires replenishment not only with tanks, but also with personnel, artillery, transport, communications, etc. conducting with them at least one or two exercises based on the experience of the battles of the summer campaign of 1943.

Reporting to you on the state of the Army - I PLEASE you to equip it with tanks and other types of combat equipment at least 80% of its regular strength, in particular, to bring the number of tanks in the Army to at least 450-500 tanks.

In the same case, when the number of tanks in the Army is reduced to 150-200 tanks, the organization of tank brigades is completely disrupted and the opportunity to deliver a massive tank strike and develop an offensive in depth is not provided.

Commander of the 5th Guards TA Member of the military council of the 5th Guards rifle regiment.

Lieutenant General Tank. Troops of the Guards. Major General of Tank Forces

Rotmistrov Grishin

Chief of Staff of the 5th Guards TA

Guard Major General of Tank Troops

Baskakov

TsAMO RF, f. 2UF, op. 2779, d. xp. 40, ll. 288-290.

PERSONAL LOSS REPORT OF THE 5th GUARDS TANK ARMY, August 1943

Name

connections

Killed and died

Got sick

Missing

For other reasons

6th Anti-Aircraft Artillery Division

1st GKMTSKP

76th Guards. min. regiment

678th gang RGK

689th Iptap

1549th TSAP

1329th TSAP

377th engineer. regiment

82nd dep. R. medin strengthening

218th p. service

Arm. troph. company

Ar.mast. rem. wednesday St.

Management of the 5th GTA

Tank troops of the USSR ["Cavalry" of the Second World War] Daines Vladimir Ottovich

5th Guards Tank Army

According to the GKO decree of January 28, 1943, the fifth tank army was supposed to be formed by March 30 of the same year. On February 22, the USSR People's Commissar for Defense I.V. Stalin signed Directive No. 1124821 on the formation of the 5th Guards Tank Army five days earlier in the Millerovo area. In the directive No. 36736 of the General Staff of the Red Army, sent on February 27 to the commander of the Southern Front, it was noted that the army included the 3rd Guards Kotelnikovsky and 29th Tank, 5th Guards Zimovnikovsky Mechanized Corps, as well as army reinforcement units. By March 5, it was required by order of the Front Military Council to concentrate the 3rd Guards Kotelnikovsky Tank and 5th Guards Zimovnikovsky Mechanized Corps in the Millerovo area, and the rest of the units, formations and institutions were to arrive from March 5 to 12. The use of the army was allowed only on the special instructions of the Supreme Command Headquarters. The commander of the army was appointed Lieutenant General of the tank forces P.A. Rotmistrov (see Appendix No. 3).

P.A. Rotmistrov, recalling his appointment to the post of army commander, in the book "Steel Guard" tells in detail about the meeting with I.V. Stalin in mid-February 1943 in the Kremlin. "I.V. Stalin was also interested in the views I expressed on the use of tank armies in offensive operations, writes Rotmistrov. - They boiled down to the fact that tank armies should be used as a means of the front commander or even the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command for delivering massive strikes, first of all, against enemy tank groupings in the main directions without indicating to them the offensive zones, which only hamper the maneuver of tanks. It was felt that Stalin was well aware of the importance of the massive use of tank troops and he was not the only one who heard me on this issue. " At the end of the meeting, Stalin offered Rotmistrov to lead one of the tank armies. The first deputy commander of the army was appointed Major General I.A. Pliev, the second deputy is Major General K.G. Trufanov, a member of the Military Council - Major General of Tank Forces P.G. Grishin and the chief of staff of the army - Colonel V.N. Baskakov.

In the course of its formation, the composition of the army was subjected to changes more than once, as well as the place of its deployment and subordination. So, on March 4, directive No. 211 / org of the General Staff was issued on the urgent resupply of the 3rd Guards Kotelnikovsky tank corps with personnel, weapons, vehicles and other property. The corps was ordered to be loaded at the Glubokaya station and sent to Starobelsk by March 7. It included the 266th mortar regiment, the 1436th self-propelled artillery regiment and the 73rd motorcycle battalion. On March 8, a directive of the Supreme Command Headquarters was issued on the transfer of the corps to the disposal of Marshal of the Soviet Union A.M. Vasilevsky to use it for the defense of Kharkov. Subsequently, after the arrival of new forces in the Kharkov region from the headquarters reserve, the 5th Guards Tank Army was ordered to be transferred to the subordination of the commander of the Southwestern Front. Thus, only two corps remained in the army (29th tank, 5th Zimovnikovsky guards mechanized). In this composition, according to directive No. 46076 of the Supreme Command Headquarters of March 19, by the end of March 24 by rail, it was supposed to concentrate in the area of the Pukhovo station, Rybalchino, Evdakovo station, Khrestiki, Kolomeytsevo. This was not the end of the army's "ordeals". According to directive No. 4610 ° of the Supreme Command Headquarters dated April 6, it became part of the Reserve Front being formed. According to the directive № 12941 of the General Staff of 6 July, another corps was transferred to it - the 18th tank corps.

While the Supreme Command Headquarters and the General Staff of the Red Army were resolving issues related to the formation and regrouping of troops of the 5th Guards Tank Army, they were engaged in combat training. On May 21, an order was issued by General Rotmistrov on the implementation of the "Brief instructions on some issues of the combat use of units and formations of the 5th Guards Tank Army in connection with the partial redistribution of tanks and artillery in army units." Its appearance was due to the fact that the composition and equipment of the compounds were not the same. So, the 32nd tank brigade of the 29th tank corps and the 24th tank brigade of the 5th guards Zimovnikovsky mechanized corps had T-34 tanks (a total of 65 tanks in the brigade). In the 25th and 31st tank brigades, the first tank battalions were equipped with T-34 tanks (in the battalion 31 tanks), and the second battalions with T-70 tanks (in the battalion 31 tanks).

The Instruction noted that "the experience of combat operations of tank and mechanized corps showed that in all types of combat the corps commander must have a strong reserve in his hands," and it is advisable to include in his composition not randomly assigned subunits or units, but one strong tank brigade. To this end, it was considered necessary to carry out a partial redistribution of tanks in the tank and mechanized brigades of the 29th Tank Corps and the 5th Guards Zimovnikovsky Mechanized Corps in order to create one strong tank brigade in each corps at the expense of reserve tanks. The 32nd tank brigade of the 29th tank corps, equipped only with T-34 tanks, was required to keep the corps commander in reserve and use it to parry an enemy strike and conduct counterattacks. She was supposed to conduct independent actions in the most important directions, on the flanks of the corps or at the junction between the brigades. In the same way, it was planned to use the 24th tank brigade of the 5th Guards Zimovnikovsky Mechanized Corps. The 25th and 31st tank brigades, equipped with T-34 and T-70 tanks, were supposed to be used in the first echelon of the corps together with the 53rd motorized rifle brigade, including for conducting defense together with this brigade or independently. To support a tank attack, corps anti-tank artillery and self-propelled artillery regiments should be involved.

The troops of the 5th Guards Tank Army, engaged in combat training, were preparing for the Kursk strategic defensive operation.

In the chapter "The First Guards Tank Army" we got acquainted with the situation at the beginning of the Battle of Kursk, the forces of the parties and their plans. Therefore, we will immediately turn to the description of the hostilities.

On July 5, 1943, the enemy launched an offensive on the Kursk Bulge. In the strip of the Voronezh Front, he struck with the forces of the 4th Panzer Army (2nd SS Panzer Corps, 48th Panzer and 52nd Army Corps; about 1,000 tanks and assault guns) of General G. Goth and the Kempf Army Group "(Over 400 tanks and assault guns). After fierce five days of fighting, the enemy managed to wedge into the defenses in the Oboyan direction to a depth of about 35 km and in the Korochansky direction - up to 10 km. On the morning of July 10, General Goth planned to launch a powerful new strike to the northeast. To this end, the 2nd SS Panzer Corps was to defeat the troops of the Voronezh Front southwest of Prokhorovka and push them back to the east. The 48th Panzer Corps was to destroy the Soviet 6th Guards Tank Corps on the western bank of the river in front of Oboyan. Pena and continue the offensive from the Novoselovka area in the southwestern direction. The 52nd Army Corps was required to maintain its former positions in readiness to advance across the Pena in the Alekseevka-Zavidovka sector.

In connection with the tense situation in the Belgorod-Kursk direction, the commander of the Voronezh Front, General of the Army N.F. On July 7, Vatutin turned to I.V. Stalin with a request to strengthen the front with two armies from the strategic reserve. They were intended to "firmly cover the Oboyan direction and, most importantly, to ensure the timely transition of troops to the counteroffensive at the most favorable moment." It was planned to move both armies to the areas of Oboyan, Prokhorovka, Maryino and Ghost. By Stalin's decision, the Voronezh Front was reinforced from the Steppe Front by the 5th Guards Army of General A.S. Zhadov and the 5th Guards Tank Army. At the same time, by the end of July 9, the tank army was to concentrate in the Bobryshevo, Bolshaya Psinka, Prelestnoe, Prokhorovka area with the task of being ready to repel the enemy's offensive, which occupied Kochetovka on July 8. Army General Zhadov had to go to the river. Psel, take up defensive positions and prevent further advance of the enemy to the north and northeast.

By the end of July 9, the 5th Guards Tank Army entered the area indicated to it. At eleven o'clock in the evening, General Rotmistrov assigned the following tasks to the troops. 29th Tank Corps, Major General of Tank Forces I.F. By dawn on July 10, Kirichenko was supposed to take up defenses along the southern edge of the forest (5 km south of Maryino), the southern outskirts of Svinnoe, Pogorelovka, Zhuravka. The reserve required at least two tank brigades. The task of the corps is to be ready to repel enemy attacks and proceed to active offensive actions. 5th Guards Zimovnikovsky Mechanized Corps, Major General of Tank Forces B.M. Skvortsov had two brigades to take up defenses along the northern bank of the river. Psel on the site of the river. Zapselets, (lawsuit) Vesely, with one tank and one motorized rifle brigade in reserve. 18th Tank Corps, Major General of Tank Forces B.S. Bakharov was ordered to go over to the defensive along the northern bank of the river. Psel on the site Vesely, Polezhaev, southern outskirts of Prelestnoye, southern outskirts of Aleksandrovsky. The order did not indicate how the change of positions should be carried out, who is responsible for the stability of the defense, and there is also no mention of the 5th Guards Army entering this line, which had the task of organizing a solid defense at the same line.

On the morning of July 10, the formations of the 2nd SS Panzer Corps went over to the offensive. However, as a result of the stubborn defense of the 6th Guards and 69th armies, the enemy's advance by the end of the day was stopped. The enemy offensive on July 11 in the Prokhorovka direction was not crowned with success either. However, General Goth did not give up hope for the defeat of the troops of the Voronezh Front. He decided with the forces of the 48th Panzer Corps to push back the 10th Panzer Corps, attached to the 1st Panzer Army of General M.E. Katukov, beyond Psel southeast of Oboyan. In the future, turning to the northeast, create conditions for a planned offensive through Psel by the remaining forces of the 4th Panzer Army. The 52nd Army Corps would continue to cover the left flank of the 48th Panzer Corps, ready to exploit its success on its right flank. On the left flank of the army, the 167th Infantry Division was supposed to support the offensive of the 2nd SS Panzer Corps to Provorot, defeating the Soviet units near Leskov, and subsequently advancing to the heights east of Teterevin. The 2nd SS Panzer Corps received the task of crushing Soviet troops south of Prokhorovka and creating the preconditions for a further offensive through Prokhorovka.

In turn, the commander of the Voronezh Front, on the night of July 11, made a decision on the transition of part of the forces to a counteroffensive in order to encircle and defeat the main enemy grouping, rushing to Oboyan and Prokhorovka. To this end, it was planned to launch a powerful counterstrike from the Prokhorovka area in the morning of July 12 by the forces of the 5th Guards and 5th Guards Tank Armies, and the 6th Guards and 1st Tank Armies - from the Melovoe, Orlovka line in the general direction to Yakovlevo. Parts of the forces of the 40th, 69th and 7th Guards armies were also involved in the counterattack. The ground forces covered the 2nd and 17th air armies from the air.

The decisive role in the counterstrike was assigned to the 5th Guards Tank Army. By order of the front commander, the 2nd and 2nd Guards Tatsinsky tank corps, numbering only 187 tanks and a small amount of artillery, were transferred to operational subordination to General Rotmistrov. The army was reinforced by the 10th Anti-Tank Artillery Brigade, 1529th Regiment SAU-152, 1148th and 1529th Howitzer Regiments, 93rd and 148th Cannon Artillery Regiments, 16th and 80th Guards Mortar Regiments BM-13. All these units had a large shortage of standard weapons and personnel due to losses in previous battles. According to the army headquarters, by July 12 it consisted of 793 tanks and 45 self-propelled guns, 79 guns, 330 anti-tank guns, 495 mortars and 39 BM-13 rocket launchers. P.A. Rotmistrov gives other information: along with the attached tank formations, the army had about 850 tanks and self-propelled guns.

General Rotmistrov decided to deliver the main blow with the forces of the 18th, 29th and 2nd Guards Tatsinsky tank corps along the railways and highways and further to Pokrovka and Yakovlevo. The 18th Panzer Corps was to strike along the river. Psel to destroy the enemy in Krasnaya Dubrava, Bolshiye Mayachki, Krasnaya Polyana, and later, turning the front to the north, ensure the offensive of the remaining army forces in the southern direction. The 29th Panzer Corps was ordered to strike along the railroad to destroy the enemy in the area of Luchki, Bolshiye Mayachki, Pokrovka and to be ready for further operations in a southerly direction. The 2nd Guards Tatsinsky Tank Corps received the task of attacking Kalinin, Luchki, to destroy the enemy in the Yakovlevo area, the forest to the east, and then be ready to act in a southern direction. The 2nd Panzer Corps was ordered, while remaining in its positions, to cover the army's entrance to the battle line, and when the attack began to support the tank corps with all its firepower. The following were allocated to the reserve of the army commander: 5th Guards Zimovnikovsky Mechanized Corps; detachment of Major General K.G. Trufanov (1st Guards motorcycle, 53rd Guards heavy tank, 57th howitzer artillery, 689th anti-tank artillery regiment).

By three o'clock in the morning on July 12, the troops of the 5th Guards Tank Army and a division of the 33rd Guards Rifle Corps took up their starting positions for the transition to the attack. “A combat report has already been signed and sent that the army has taken the starting position for a counterstrike and is ready to carry out the assigned task. But at four o'clock in the morning, - recalled P.A. Rotmistrov, - was followed by the order of the front commander, Army General N.F. Vatutin urgently send my reserve to the zone of the 69th Army. It turned out that the enemy, by bringing the main forces of the 3rd Panzer Corps of Operational Group Kempf into battle, threw back units of the 81st and 92nd Guards Rifle Divisions and captured the settlements of Rzhavets, Ryndinka, Vypolzovka. In the event of further advancement of the enemy's mobile units to the north, not only a threat was created to the left flank and rear of the 5th Guards Tank Army, but also the stability of all the troops of the left wing of the Voronezh Front was disrupted. " In this regard, General Rotmistrov ordered the commander of the consolidated detachment, General Trufanov, to advance into the zone of the 69th Army in the area of the breakthrough with a forced march and "together with its troops, stop the enemy tanks, preventing their advance in the northern direction."

By six o'clock in the morning it became known that the enemy's 3rd Panzer Corps was continuing its advance and was located 28 kilometers southeast of Prokhorovka. By order of the representative of the Headquarters, Marshal Vasilevsky, the commander of the 5th Guards Tank Army ordered the commander of the 5th Guards Zimovnikovsky Mechanized Corps to send the 11th and 12th mechanized brigades from the Krasnoye area to reinforce General Trufanov's consolidated detachment. The commander of the 2nd Guards Tatsin Tank Corps was ordered to deploy the 26th Tank Brigade in the Raft area with a front to the south and cover the left flank of the army. Soon, the commander of the Voronezh Front ordered to combine all these units under the command of General Trufanov into an operational group with a task: together with the 81st and 92nd Guards Rifle Divisions and the 96th Tank Brigade of the 69th Army of General V.D. Kryuchenkin "to surround and destroy the enemy in the Ryndinka, Rzhavets area and by the end of the day to reach the Shakhovo - Shchelkanovo line."

As a result, the forces of the 5th Guards Tank Army were dispersed, and General Rotmistrov lost his powerful reserve. Two of the four brigades remained in the 5th Guards Zimovnikovsky Mechanized Corps: the 24th Tank and 10th Mechanized.

At 0830 hours on July 12, after aviation and artillery preparation, the troops of the 6th and 5th Guards Armies, the 1st and 5th Guards Tank Armies went on the offensive. In the direction of the main attack in the sector of the Oktyabrsky and Yamki state farm, the most powerful in composition was the 29th Panzer Corps of the 5th Guards Tank Army. To the right, between the r. Psel and the Oktyabrsky state farm, its 18th tank corps advanced, and to the left - the 2nd Guards Tatsinsky tank corps. The 42nd Guards Rifle and 9th Guards Airborne Divisions were also involved in the direction of the main attack. In this regard, the statement of P.A. Rotmistrov that in this unprecedented scale tank battle "in the battle formations of tanks in the direction of the main attack of the infantry there was almost no one on either side."

At the same time, the enemy's strike group went on the offensive. A large oncoming tank battle began, in which 1160 tanks and self-propelled (assault) guns participated on both sides (from the Soviet side - 670, from the enemy side - 490). In the "Report on the hostilities of the 5th Guards. TA in the period from 7 to 27.7.43 " it was noted that "a tank battle, unusual in its scale, unfolded, in which more than 1,500 tanks participated in a narrow sector of the front on both sides."

The oncoming tank battle was characterized by frequent and abrupt changes in the situation, activity, decisiveness and a wide variety of forms and methods of combat operations. Oncoming battles unfolded in some directions, in others - defensive actions combined with counterattacks, in others - offensive with repulsing counterattacks.

Parts of the 18th Panzer Corps of General B.S. Bakharova, having broken the fierce resistance of the enemy, by the evening of July 12 advanced only 3-4 km, having lost 55 tanks. The corps commander decided to abandon further fruitless attacks and go on the defensive. Perhaps that is why General Bakharov, by order of the People's Commissar of Defense of Stalin on July 25, was relieved of his post and appointed deputy commander of the 9th Panzer Corps.

The 29th Panzer Corps under the command of General I.F. Kirichenko also overcame the resistance of the enemy and by the end of the day advanced 1.5 km. The enemy was forced to withdraw to the Greznoye area. At the same time, the corps, which had 212 tanks and self-propelled guns, lost 150 vehicles. The 2nd Guards Tatsinsky Tank Corps launched an attack at 10 o'clock in the morning, knocked down the enemy's cover and began to slowly advance in the direction of Yasnaya Polyana. However, the enemy, having created superiority in manpower and equipment, stopped the corps units, and in some areas pushed them back. Of the 94 tanks that took part in the offensive, the enemy destroyed 54. Parts of General Trufanov's consolidated detachment managed to stop the advance of the enemy's 3rd tank corps. At the same time, the interaction between parts and connections was not properly organized. As a result, the 53rd Guards Separate Tank Regiment attacked the battle formations of the 92nd Guards Rifle Division and the 96th Separate Tank Brigade. After that, the regiment entered into a fire battle with enemy tanks, and then received an order to withdraw. By order of the commander of the 69th Army, General Trufanov was reprimanded, and the commander of the 92nd Guards Rifle Division, Colonel V.F. Trunin was later removed from his post.

The troops of the 5th Guards Army with their right flank, overcoming the resistance of the enemy troops, reached the northern outskirts of Kochetovka, and on the left flank fought defensive battles on the river. Psel. The troops of the 6th Guards and 1st Tank Armies, although they took part in the counterattack, advanced to an insignificant depth. This is mainly due to the lack of time that they had at their disposal to prepare for the counterattack, and weak artillery and engineering support.

Thus, the troops of the Voronezh Front were unable to defeat the enemy grouping, which had wedged into the defenses for 30–35 km. General of the Army Vatutin reported to Stalin at midnight on July 12: “The Panzer Army of Rotmistrov with the 2nd and 2nd Guards attached to it. mk directly south-west of Prokhorovka on a narrow sector of the front immediately entered into a counter battle with the SS Panzer Corps and 17 TD of the enemy, which moved towards Rotmistrov. As a result, a fierce massive tank battle took place on a small field. The enemy was defeated here, but Rotmistrov suffered losses and hardly advanced forward. True, Rotmistrov did not bring in the troops of his mechanized corps and Trufanov's detachment, which were partially used to parry enemy attacks on Kryuchenkin's army and on the left flank of Zhadov's army. According to updated data, the enemy lost 200 tanks and assault guns out of 420 on July 12, and the 5th Guards Tank Army lost 500 tanks and self-propelled guns out of 951.

At half past four in the morning on July 13, General Rotmistrov ordered the commander of the 18th Panzer Corps to gain a foothold on the occupied line, paying special attention to ensuring the right flank on the Petrovka-Mikhailovka line. Other corps received the same orders.

However, all attempts by the divisions of the 33rd Guards Rifle Corps and the corps of the 5th Guards Tank Army to press the enemy on July 13 were unsuccessful. At about three o'clock in the morning on July 14, Marshal Vasilevsky reported to Stalin: “... Yesterday he personally observed a tank battle of our 18th and 29th corps with more than two hundred enemy tanks in a counterattack south-west of Prokhorovka. At the same time, hundreds of guns and all the PCs we have took part in the battle. As a result, the entire field was littered with burning German and our tanks for an hour. Within two days of fighting, Rotmistrov's 29th Panzer Corps lost 60% irrecoverable and temporarily out of order, and 18th Corps - up to 30% of its tanks. The next day, the threat of a breakthrough of enemy tanks from the south in the area of Shakhovo, Avdeevka, Aleksandrovka continues to be real. During the night I take all measures to remove the IPTAP shelves. Considering the large tank forces of the enemy in the Prokhorovka direction, here on July 14, the main forces of Rotmistrov, together with Zhadov's rifle corps, were tasked with crushing the enemy in the Storozhevoye area, north of Storozhevoy, the Komsomolets state farm, reaching the Greznoye - Yasnaya Polyana line, and all the more firmly to provide a Prokhorovka direction ”.

The offensive of the 5th Guards and 5th Guards Tank Armies on July 14-15 was also unsuccessful. This forced on July 16 the commander of the Voronezh Front to give the order to go over to a tough defense. By this time, as noted earlier, the Supreme High Command of the Wehrmacht also decided to stop further offensive on the Kursk Bulge. On July 16, the enemy began a systematic withdrawal of its main forces to their initial position. The troops of the Voronezh, and on the night of July 19 and the Steppe fronts, switched to pursuit him and by July 23 reached the line Cherkasskoye, (claim.) Zadelnoe, Melekhovo and further along the left bank of the river. Seversky Donets. Basically, this was the line occupied by Soviet troops before the start of the operation. This ended the Kursk strategic defensive operation. The idea of Operation Citadel was finally buried. The Soviet command not only unraveled the plans of the enemy, but also quite accurately determined the place and time of his strikes. The transition to deliberate defense played a role.

Subsequently P.A. Rotmistrov, summing up the results of the battle at Prokhorovka, noted: “At the same time, it should be noted that the 5th Guards Tank Army, which was tasked with reaching the Yakovlevo area, Pokrovka on July 12, did not fulfill this task. There were many reasons for this. " He referred to them: superiority of the enemy in forces over the first echelon of the 5th Guards Tank Army in the main direction; the withdrawal of the active forces in front and the loss of the army's deployment lines on July 11, which frustrated the results of two days of intense organizational work; the absence of a reserve for the development of success in the direction of the main attack at the height of the battle of the army commander; insufficient artillery and air support for the tank army's counterstrike. All these reasons were the result of miscalculations made by both the command of the Voronezh Front and the 5th Guards Tank Army. In addition, the entry into battle of the army was planned and was carried out in the forehead of a powerful enemy tank group.

On the night of July 24, 1943, the 5th Guards Tank Army, without the 2nd Guards Tatsinsky and 2nd Tank Corps transferred to the 5th Guards Army, was withdrawn into the reserve of the Voronezh Front. The commanders and staffs immediately began to put their units and formations in order. The army, together with the 1st Tank Army, was to take part in the Belgorod-Kharkov strategic offensive operation.

Belgorod-Kharkov strategic offensive operation "Commander Rumyantsev" (August 3-23, 1943)

In accordance with the concept of Operation Commander Rumyantsev, set out in the chapter "First Guards Tank Army", the troops of the 5th Guards Tank Army were to develop their success in the direction of Zolochev, Olshany, by the end of the third day, capture the Olshany area, Lyubotin and cut off the escape routes of the Kharkov grouping to the west. The depth of the task is about 100 km.

10 days were allotted to prepare for the offensive. During this time, the command staff of the 5th Guards Tank Army studied the terrain in the zone of impending actions, the nature of the enemy's defense and organized interaction. At the same time, military equipment was being repaired and stocks of materiel were replenished. With all interacting parts and connections, telephone and radio communications were organized, as well as communications using mobile means. Task forces were created in the army, which were supposed to move behind the first echelon of the advancing troops. In preparation for the offensive, training and exercises were conducted on boxes of sand with headquarters officers to practice command and control. Much attention was paid to the conduct of measures to misinform the enemy, which made it possible to draw his attention to the Sumy direction and ensure the surprise of strikes in the Belgorod region. The army headquarters worked out a plan of interaction and a scheme for bringing the army into battle. Support issues were reflected in the plans of the chiefs of engineering troops, reconnaissance and rear of the army. The political department drew up a work plan for the period from 2 to 5 August.

The army consisted of one mechanized and two tank corps, a separate tank, motorcycle, two self-propelled artillery, howitzer artillery, anti-tank artillery, guards mortar and light bomber regiments, an anti-aircraft artillery division and a separate engineer battalion. The army had 550 tanks.

General Rotmistrov decided to lead the army into a breakthrough in a two-echelon formation: in the first - the 18th and 29th tank corps, in the second - the 5th Guards Zimovnikovsky Mechanized Corps. A detachment of General K.G. Trufanov. To coordinate issues of interaction between the 5th Guards Army, the 1st Tank and 5th Guards Tank Armies at the command post of the commander of the 5th Guards Army, General A.S. Zhadov, a meeting was held. Generals A.S. Zhadov, P.A. Rotmistrov and M.E. Katukov discussed all issues of interaction in terms of the stages of the operation, outlined the routes of movement of tank corps introduced into the breakthrough in the 5th Guards Army's offensive zone.

On the evening of August 2, units of the first echelon of the 5th Guards Tank Army (18th and 29th Panzer Corps) began to move to their original areas. At two o'clock in the morning on August 3, they concentrated on the Bykovka, Krapivenskiye Dvory line, where the army artillery that had been transferred the day before the tanks arrived, took up firing positions.

On the morning of August 3, after a powerful artillery and air preparation, the shock groups of the Voronezh and Steppe fronts went over to the offensive. At the same time, the partisans began to conduct Operation Rail War behind enemy lines. On the Voronezh Front, the 5th and 6th Guards armies advanced only 4–5 km by mid-afternoon. Therefore, to build up the strike in the zone of the 5th Guards Army, the formations of the first echelon of tank armies and the 5th Guards Tank Corps were brought into battle. The entry was carried out in a narrow strip: the 1st Tank Army - 4-6 km, and the 5th Guards Tank Army - about 5 km. From the air, General Rotmistrov's formations were supported by the 291st Assault Aviation Division of General A.N. Vitruk and the 10th Fighter Aviation Corps of Colonel M.M. Smut.

Building on the success of the rifle divisions, the tank armies completed the breakthrough of the tactical defense zone, advanced units to the Tomarovka-Orlovka line, advancing 12–26 km. As a result, the Tomarovsk and Belgorod nodes of enemy resistance were disunited. In the offensive zone of the 53rd and 69th armies of the Steppe Front, the 1st Mechanized Corps entered the battle, which completed the breakthrough of the enemy's main defense zone and entered the area north of Rakov.

On the morning of August 4, the shock group of the Voronezh Front moved on to pursuit the enemy. By nine o'clock, the forward detachments of the corps of the first echelon of the 5th Guards Tank Army reached Orlovka and Kozichev. But here they were stopped by the German 6th Panzer Division, reinforced by units of other formations. The enemy, relying on a previously prepared defense along the impassable river Gostenka, put up stubborn resistance. As a result, part of the 18th Panzer Corps of General A.V. Egorov were forced to suspend the offensive. The 29th Panzer Corps of General I.F. Kirichenko. The commander of the army was forced to bring up the artillery and bring into the battle the second echelon of the army - the 5th Guards Zimovnikovsky Mechanized Corps of General B.M. Skvortsova. He was ordered to strike at Kazachev, Udy, bypassing the left flank of the 6th tank division of the enemy and by the end of the day to reach the Zolochev area. But this plan remained unfulfilled, since the commander of the Voronezh Front demanded that the 5th Guards Zimovnikovsky Mechanized Corps be turned to Belgorod in order to assist the troops of the Steppe Front in capturing the city.

General Rotmistrov, left without a second echelon, urgently brought into battle his reserve (the detachment of General K.G. Trufanov), giving him the same task as the 5th Guards Zimovnikovsky Mechanized Corps. At the same time, the 18th Panzer Corps was ordered to bypass Orlovka from the north-west to Gomzino, and the 29th Panzer Corps, in cooperation with the troops of the 5th Guards Army, to destroy the enemy in the Orlovka area.

Fulfilling the assigned tasks, the 18th Panzer Corps, bypassing Orlovka from the west, by 5 pm on August 5, with the forces of the 110th Tank and 32nd Motorized Rifle Brigades, reached the Gomzino line and launched an offensive against Shchetinovka. Parts of the 29th Panzer Corps, having captured Orlovka, developed their success to the southwest. The 5th Guards Zimovnikovsky Mechanized Corps in the Greznoye area came into contact with units of the 1st Mechanized Corps. On the same day, the troops of the Steppe Front liberated Belgorod.

General Rotmistrov, in order to increase the pace of the offensive, ordered the formations of the first echelon to conduct hostilities at night. At the same time, tank brigades advancing in the second echelon of corps and, therefore, having a lower daily consumption of ammunition and fuel, moved to the first echelon by nightfall. At this time, the rear was pulled up, ammunition, fuel, tanks restored by repairmen were brought in for the withdrawn units of the first echelon. This refreshing of forces made it possible to maintain a high pace of the offensive. On the night of August 8, the 181st tank brigade of Lieutenant Colonel V.A. Puzyreva, acting as the vanguard of the 18th Panzer Corps, went through an overgrown country road to the rear of the enemy and suddenly burst into the town of Zolochev. The main forces of the corps, knocking the enemy out of Shchetinovka and Uda, came to the aid of the 181st Tank Brigade. By evening, the enemy was finally defeated and driven back from Zolochev to the southwest.

The 6th Panzer Corps of the 1st Tank Army on August 7 with a sudden blow freed Bohodukhiv, and the 5th Guards Tank Corps liberated Grayvoron, cutting off the enemy's escape routes to the west and south.

As a result of the successful actions of the troops of the Voronezh and Steppe fronts, the enemy's defense was broken through in a strip 120 km wide. The formations of the 1st Tank and 5th Guards Tank Armies advanced up to 100 km, and the combined arms armies - 60–65 km. This forced the enemy to begin advancing on the Belgorod-Kharkov axis of the Reich, Dead's Head, Viking divisions, the 3rd Panzer Division from Donbass and the Great Germany motorized division from the Oryol region.

On August 6, the representative of the Supreme Command Headquarters, Marshal G.K. Zhukov and the commander of the Steppe Front, General I.S. Konev was introduced by I.V. Stalin had a plan to defeat the enemy in the Belgorod-Kharkov direction in two stages.

At the first stage, the troops of the 53rd Army with the 1st Mechanized Corps were to advance along the Belgorod-Kharkov highway, delivering the main blow in the direction of Dergachi, reaching the Olshany-Dergachi line, where they would replace units of the 5th Guards Army. The 69th Army was entrusted with the task of advancing in the direction of Cheremoshny, capturing this settlement and then moving into the reserve of the Steppe Front. The formations of the 7th Guards Army were ordered to advance from the Pushkarnoye area to Brodok and Bochkovka, to seize the Cherkasskoye, Lozovoye, Tsirkuny, Klyuchkin line. Part of the forces the army was supposed to attack on Murom, Ternovaya, to help the 57th Army of the Southwestern Front cross the river. Seversky Donets near Rubizhne, Old Saltov. This army was ordered to strike in the direction of the Uncovered, state farm named after. Frunze. At the same time, it was proposed to transfer the army to the Steppe Front.

For the second stage (Kharkov operation), it was planned to transfer the 5th Guards Tank Army to the Steppe Front, which was supposed to go to the area of Olshany, Staryi Merchik, Ogultsy. The operation was planned as follows. The troops of the 53rd Army, in cooperation with the 5th Guards Tank Army, were to cover Kharkov from the west and southwest. From north to south from the line of Tsirkuny, Dergachi, the 7th Guards Army was to attack, from the east from the line of the state farm im. Frunze, Rogan, covering Kharkov from the south, - the 57th Army. It was planned to deploy the troops of the 69th Army at the junction between the 5th Guards and 53rd armies in the Olshany area with the task of advancing south to support the Kharkov operation from the south. The left flank of the Voronezh Front was to be brought to the Otrada, Kolomak, Snezhkov Kut line. This task was to be carried out by the 5th Guards Army and the left flank of the 27th Army. The 1st Panzer Army was planned to be concentrated in the area of Kovyagi, Alekseevka, Merefa.

At the same time, it was proposed that the forces of the Southwestern Front strike from the Zamoć region on both banks of the river. Mzha to Merefa. Part of the forces, the front was supposed to advance through Chuguev to Osnova, and also to clear the forest from the enemy south of Zamosty and reach the line Novoselovka, Okhochaya, Verkhniy Bishkin, Geevka.

For the second stage of the operation, Marshal Zhukov and General Konev asked for 35 thousand reinforcements, 200 T-34 tanks, 100 T-70 tanks and 35 KB tanks, four self-propelled artillery regiments, two engineering brigades and 190 aircraft to reinforce the troops.

Stalin approved the presented plan. By his decision, the 57th Army from 24 hours on August 8 was transferred to the Steppe Front from the South-Western Front with the task of attacking bypassing Kharkov from the south to assist the main grouping of the Steppe Front in capturing the city. The main task of the Southwestern Front is to deliver the main blow to the south in the general direction of Golaya Dolina, Krasnoarmeyskoye, defeat, in cooperation with the Southern Front, the enemy's Donbass grouping and capture the Gorlovka, Stalino (Donetsk) area. The southern front was to deliver the main blow in the general direction of Kuibyshevo, Stalino in order to connect with the shock group of the Southwestern Front. Readiness for the offensive of the Southwestern and Southern Fronts - August 13-14. Marshal Zhukov was responsible for coordinating the actions of the Voronezh and Steppe fronts, Marshal Vasilevsky for the Southwestern and Southern fronts.

The troops of the 5th Guards Tank Army, transferred to the command of the Steppe Front on August 9, began to regroup the next day in the Bogodukhov area. The main forces of the 1st Panzer Army by this time reached the r. Merchik. The troops of the 6th Guards Army entered the Krasnokutsk area, and the formations of the 5th Guards Army captured Kharkov from the west. The troops of the Steppe Front approached the outer defensive line of the city and loomed over it from the north. The formations of the 57th Army, transferred on August 8 to the Steppe Front, approached Kharkov from the southeast.

On August 10, Stalin sent Directive No. 30163 to the representative of the Supreme Command Headquarters, Marshal Zhukov, on the use of tank armies to isolate the enemy's Kharkov grouping:

“The headquarters of the Supreme High Command considers it necessary to isolate Kharkov by the earliest possible interception of the main railway and highways of communication in the directions to Poltava, Krasnograd, Lozovaya and thereby accelerate the liberation of Kharkov.

For this purpose, the 1st Tank Army of Katukov cut the main routes in the area of Kovyaga, Valka, and the 5th Guards. tank army Rotmistrov, bypassing Kharkov from the south-west, cut the path in the area of Merefa. "

Field Marshal E. von Manstein, seeking to eliminate the breakthrough of the Soviet troops, pulled up the 3rd Panzer Corps (about 360 tanks) to Kharkov, which he intended to use together with the Kempf task force to strike on the eastern flank of the wedged Soviet troops. “Simultaneously,” writes Manstein, “the 4th Panzer Army was to strike on the western flank with the forces of two tank divisions returned by the Center Group and one motorized division. But it was clear that these forces, and the forces of the group in general, could no longer hold the front line. "

On August 11, a counter battle took place between the 1st Tank Army and the 3rd Tank Corps of the enemy, during which he managed to stop the army's troops. On the same day, the Supreme Command Headquarters, by its directive No. 30164, ordered the commander of the Steppe Front to take all measures to ensure that the 5th Guards Tank Army, without expecting full concentration, set out along the route of Kovyagi, Valki, Novaya Vodolaga and closed the enemy's escape routes from the area Merephs. Part of the forces required to occupy the crossings on the river. Mzha on the site Sokolovo, Merefa.

On the morning of August 12, an oncoming battle broke out between the 1st Panzer Army (134 tanks) and the 3rd Panzer Corps (about 400 tanks), during which the enemy forced the army to go over to the defensive, and then pushed it 3-4 km. Units of the 5th Guards Tank Army and the 32nd Guards Rifle Corps came to the aid of the 1st Panzer Army in the middle of the day. Together they stopped the enemy. The next day, the formations of the 6th and 5th Guards armies entered the battle. With the support of front-line aviation, ground forces inflicted heavy losses on the enemy, and then threw it back to its original position.

After that, the troops of the 1st and 5th Guards Tank Armies went on the defensive. It was carried out in those battle formations in which they conducted offensive operations, trying to concentrate their main efforts on securing the occupied line. Therefore, the second echelons and corps reserves were located at a distance of 2-3 km from the forward edge, and then the depth of defense gradually increased. The defense was of a focal nature with the creation of a system of tank ambushes, anti-tank areas and mine-explosive obstacles. The ambushes were staggered to a depth of 2-3 km, together with subunits of machine gunners and anti-tank artillery. Anti-tank areas (an anti-tank artillery battalion or regiment in each) were created in the corps and army units in the most important sectors.

Tank armies had a one-echelon formation and rather low densities of forces and equipment. They carried out defensive operations in conjunction with the approaching rifle formations of the combined-arms armies: the 1st Tank Army with the 23rd Guards Rifle Corps of the 6th Guards Army; 5th Guards Tank Army with the 32nd Guards Rifle Corps of the 5th Guards Army.

A quick transition to the defense and its skillful conduct allowed the 5th Guards Tank Army to repel enemy counterstrikes. At the same time, she suffered small losses within three days - only 38 tanks and self-propelled guns.

On August 12, the Supreme Command Headquarters by Directive No. 10165 set new tasks for the troops of the Voronezh, Steppe and Southwestern Fronts. They are described in detail in the chapter "First Guards Tank Army". We will only recall that the Voronezh Front was ordered to strike by the 1st Tank Army in the general direction of Valka, Novaya Vodolaga, together with the 5th Guards Tank Army, to cut off the withdrawal routes of the Kharkov group to the south and southwest. After its defeat and the capture of Kharkov, it was ordered to continue the offensive in the general direction of Poltava, Kremenchug, and by August 23-24 to reach the line with the main forces at the line Yareski, Poltava, (claim) Karlovka. In the future, it was planned to go to the river. Dnieper on the Kremenchug, Orlik section, providing for the capture of river crossings by mobile units. To ensure the offensive of the strike grouping, the right wing of the front had to reach the river by 23-24 August. Psel, where to firmly gain a foothold.

Meanwhile, the enemy did not abandon his plan. After unsuccessful attempts to break through the defenses of the first echelon formations of the 5th Guards Tank Army, he decided to bypass it from the left flank. On August 15, units of the SS Panzer Division "Reich" broke through the defenses of the 13th Guards Rifle Division, which was defending on the left flank of the 5th Guards Tank Army, and rushed in the direction of Lozovaya, Bohodukhiv. General Rotmistrov at 10 o'clock on August 16 ordered the 53rd tank regiment (general reserve) and the artillery-anti-tank reserve of the army to move from Bogodukhov to the area south of Lozovaya. By three o'clock in the afternoon, they arrived at the designated area, took up defenses and, meeting the enemy with fire of all means, stopped his advance. The timely maneuver of reserves largely contributed to the enemy's refusal of further offensive actions in this direction.

The enemy struck a new blow on the morning of August 18 from the Akhtyrka area with the forces of two tank and two motorized divisions and a separate tank battalion equipped with Tiger and Panther tanks. They managed to break through the defenses of the 27th Army. At the same time, from the area south of Krasnokutsk, the Panzer Division "Death's Head" struck at Kaplunovka. The attempt of the commander of the Voronezh Front to defeat the enemy's Akhtyr grouping with a counterattack was unsuccessful. He managed to stop the offensive of the troops of the Voronezh Front and even in some places to press them out. After Stalin's intervention, the representative of the Supreme Command Headquarters, Marshal Zhukov, and the commander of the Voronezh Front took measures to localize the breakthrough of the enemy's Akhtyr grouping. The 4th Guards Army with the 3rd Guards Tank Corps and the 47th Army with the 3rd Guards Mechanized Corps were brought into the battle. They, in cooperation with the troops of the 27th and 6th Guards armies, the 2nd and 10th tank corps, by August 27, defeated the enemy's Akhtyr grouping and began to advance towards the Dnieper.

During these days, the 53rd Army of the Steppe Front continued to press the enemy in the Kharkov direction. The 1st Mechanized Corps started fighting for Peresechnaya, and rifle units cleared the forest north-west of Kharkov. Troops of the 69th Army began to flow around Kharkov from the north-west and west. To speed up the liberation of the city, the 5th Guards Tank Army (without the 29th Tank Corps) was transferred from Bogodukhov to the area northwest of Kharkov. Breaking down enemy resistance, units of the 18th tank and 5th guards Zimovnikovsky mechanized corps liberated Korotich by the end of the day on August 22, and tank brigades of the 57th army reached the Bezlyudovka line and further south, engulfing the enemy's Kharkov grouping from the southeast. On the night of 23 August, the storming of the city began. In the morning Kharkov was completely cleared of the enemy.

With the liberation of Kharkov, the Belgorod-Kharkov strategic offensive operation ended, and with it the entire Battle of Kursk. Their results are summarized in the chapter on the 1st Guards Tank Army.

After the completion of the Belgorod-Kharkov operation, the commander of the Steppe Front, General I.S. Konev, trying to prevent an organized enemy withdrawal to the Dnieper, on August 27, 1943, assigned the 5th Guards Tank Army, together with the 5th Guards Army, to push the enemy back from Kharkov to the southwest. By this time, in the formations of the 5th Guards Tank Army, there were only 66 serviceable tanks, which was 12% of their initial strength. Corps headquarters had a staffing of officers that did not exceed 30–35%, almost 85% of company and battalion commanders were out of action.

Under these conditions, General P.A. Rotmistrov decided to equip the remaining tanks and personnel with one brigade in each corps, reinforce them with artillery means and combine them into a consolidated army detachment under the command of General B.M. Skvortsov - Commander of the 5th Guards Zimovnikovsky Mechanized Corps. The rest of the composition was withdrawn to the concentration area to complete and restore the combat capability of the units.

From the book The Battle of Berlin. Collection of memories the author Rokossovsky Konstantin Konstantinovich

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