September 1, 1939. This is the day of the beginning of the greatest catastrophe, which claimed tens of millions of human lives, destroyed thousands of cities and villages, and eventually led to a new redivision of the world. It was on this day that the troops of Hitlerite Germany crossed the western border of Poland. The Second World War began.
And on September 17, 1939, from the east, Soviet troops struck in the back of defending Poland. Thus began the last partition of Poland, which was the result of a criminal conspiracy between the two greatest totalitarian regimes of the 20th century - the Nazi and the communist. The joint parade of Soviet and Nazi troops on the streets of occupied Polish Brest in 1939 became a shameful symbol of this conspiracy.
Before the storm
The end of the First World War and the Versailles Peace Treaty have created even more controversy and tension in Europe than ever before. And if you add to this the rapid strengthening of the communist Soviet Union, which, in fact, was turned into a giant weapons factory, then it becomes clear that a new war on the European continent was almost inevitable.
After the First World War, Germany was crushed and humiliated: it was forbidden to have a normal army and navy, it lost significant territory, huge reparations caused economic collapse and poverty. This policy of the victorious states was extremely short-sighted: it was clear that the Germans, a talented, hardworking and energetic nation, would not tolerate such humiliation and would strive for revenge. And so it happened: in 1933, Hitler came to power in Germany.
Poland and Germany
After the end of the Great War, Poland again received its statehood. In addition, the Polish state has seriously "grown" with new lands. Part of Poznan and the Pomeranian lands, which were previously part of Prussia, were transferred to Poland. Danzig received the status of a "free city". Part of Silesia became part of Poland, the Poles seized part of Lithuania by force together with Vilnius.
Poland, together with Germany, took part in the annexation of Czechoslovakia, which can in no way be attributed to actions of which one should be proud. In 1938, the Cieszyn region was annexed, under the pretext of protecting the Polish population.
In 1934, a ten-year non-aggression pact was signed between the countries, and a year later - an agreement on economic cooperation. In general, it should be noted that with the rise of Hitler to power, German-Polish relations have improved significantly. But this did not last long.
In March 1939, Germany demanded that Poland return Danzig to her, join the Anti-Comintern Pact and provide a land corridor for Germany to the Baltic coast. Poland did not accept this ultimatum and early in the morning of September 1, German troops crossed the Polish border, and Operation Weiss began.
Poland and the USSR
Relations between Russia and Poland have traditionally been difficult. After the end of the First World War, Poland gained independence and the Soviet-Polish war began almost immediately. Fortune was changeable: first, the Poles reached Kiev and Minsk, and then Soviet troops reached Warsaw. But then there was a "miracle on the Vistula" and the complete defeat of the Red Army.
According to the Riga Peace Treaty, the western parts of Belarus and Ukraine were part of the Polish state. The new eastern border of the country ran along the so-called Curzon Line. In the early 1930s, a friendship and cooperation agreement and a non-aggression agreement were signed. But, despite this, Soviet propaganda portrayed Poland as one of the main enemies of the USSR.
Germany and the USSR
Relations between the USSR and Germany in the period between the two world wars were contradictory. Already in 1922, an agreement was signed on cooperation between the Red Army and the Reichswehr. Germany had severe restrictions under the Treaty of Versailles. Therefore, part of the development of new weapons systems and training of personnel was carried out by the Germans on the territory of the USSR. A flight school and a tank school were opened, among the graduates of which were the best German tankmen and pilots of the Second World War.
After Hitler came to power, relations between the two countries deteriorated, military-technical cooperation was curtailed. Germany again began to be portrayed by official Soviet propaganda as an enemy of the USSR.
On August 23, 1939, the Non-Aggression Pact between Germany and the USSR was signed in Moscow. In fact, in this document, the two dictators Hitler and Stalin divided Eastern Europe among themselves. According to the secret protocol of this document, the territories of the Baltic countries, as well as Finland, parts of Romania were included in the sphere of interests of the USSR. Eastern Poland belonged to the Soviet sphere of influence, and its western part was to go to Germany.
Attack
On September 1, 1939, German aircraft began bombing Polish cities, and ground forces crossed the border. The invasion was preceded by several provocations at the border. The invasion force consisted of five army groups and a reserve. Already on September 9, the Germans reached Warsaw, and the battle for the Polish capital began, which lasted until September 20.
On September 17, practically meeting no resistance, Soviet troops entered Poland from the east. This immediately made the position of the Polish troops almost hopeless. On September 18, the Polish high command crossed the Romanian border. Separate centers of Polish resistance remained until the beginning of October, but that was already agony.
Part of the Polish territories, which were formerly part of Prussia, went to Germany, and the rest was divided into governors general. Polish territories seized by the USSR became part of Ukraine and Belarus.
Poland suffered huge losses during the Second World War. The invaders banned the Polish language, all national educational and cultural institutions and newspapers were closed. Representatives of the Polish intelligentsia and Jews were massacred. In the territories occupied by the USSR, Soviet punitive bodies worked tirelessly. Tens of thousands of captured Polish officers were killed in Katyn and other similar places. Poland lost about 6 million people during the war.
The 20th Congress of the CPSU in 1956 caused a serious crisis in the socialist camp. In many Eastern European countries of the "people's democracy" the exposure of some Stalinist crimes raised hopes of getting rid of the force imposed on them. In Hungary, in the same year, it came to an armed uprising, suppressed by Soviet troops. In a number of places, the regular Hungarian army resisted the Soviet troops. Around the same time, the same thing almost happened in relations between the USSR and Poland.
Growing crisis
After Stalin's death in 1953, in the wake of the termination of the last repressive cases inspired by Stalin in the USSR, the liberation of its opposition leaders of the Communist Party began in Poland (here it was called the Polish United Workers' Party - PUWP). Vladislav Gomulka had the greatest authority among them. He became the same symbol of Poland's democratization as Imre Nagy did in Hungary. But the role played by them turned out to be different. Accordingly, the fate was different.
On February 25, 1956, the XX Congress of the CPSU ended in Moscow, at the last closed meeting of which Nikita Khrushchev made a report on the personality cult of Stalin and its consequences. Despite the secrecy, the report was brought to the attention of the leadership of the fraternal parties. First Secretary of the PUWP Central Committee Boleslav Bierut attended the congress. According to a very widespread version, the shock he experienced during the report was the cause of his death. He died on March 12 without leaving Moscow.
Most likely, Bierut was even more impressed by the loss of control over the situation in Poland. Already on March 3, Khrushchev's report was announced at a wide meeting of the party activists in Warsaw, and on March 10, the central organ of the PUWP "Tribuna lyudu" published an article outlining Khrushchev's speech at the congress.
Fermentation in Poland intensified. On June 28, 1956, Poznan workers took to the streets to protest low wages and poor food supplies, demanding the release of political prisoners and immediate democratic reforms. The demonstrations were brutally suppressed by the police, killing about 70 people. For Moscow, this was a signal that the Polish authorities had lost control of the situation.
Climax
The voices increased in favor of electing Gomulka to Bierut's place. Neither Moscow nor the PUWP leadership objected to this, hoping that Gomulka would be able to cope with the unrest. In August 1956, he was reinstated in the ranks of the PUWP; on October 19, a plenum of the PUWP Central Committee was appointed, where Gomulka's approval for the post of first secretary was expected.
However, Moscow strongly feared an increase in anti-Soviet demonstrations in connection with this event. As it was said in the language of the time, anti-Soviet elements could seize the moment for a counter-revolutionary coup. To suppress possible hostile sorties, on October 18, the Minister of Defense of the USSR, Marshal Georgy Zhukov, issued a secret order to bring into combat readiness the Northern Group of Soviet Forces stationed in the western and northern parts of Poland, as well as the Red Banner Baltic Fleet. The tank division began its advance towards Warsaw.
On October 19, Gomulka was elected to the post of First Secretary of the PUWP Central Committee. But anti-Soviet demonstrations in Warsaw and other cities did not stop. The protesters burned Soviet flags and portraits of Marshal Rokossovsky - Stalin's "chief overseer" over Poland in the rank of its Minister of Defense. The authorities did not use the police, fearing a repetition of the Poznan events on an even larger scale. And it was no longer possible to rely on the police. In order to get the PUWP leadership to stop anti-Soviet "attacks" on the same day, a delegation of the CPSU Central Committee arrived in Warsaw, consisting of Khrushchev, Vyacheslav Molotov, Anastas Mikoyan and Lazar Kaganovich.
Warsaw was preparing for defense
Khrushchev recalled that his conversation with the Poles was tough, without diplomacy. The question was posed bluntly: the Poles are from the USSR or against? Open pressure was exerted on Gomulka's supporters: motorized columns of Soviet troops were moving towards the capital of Poland.
But the new head of the PUWP was not a bastard. Since the Minister of Defense was a Soviet protege, Gomulka organized his own "military headquarters", whose task was to monitor the movements of Soviet troops and inform the Polish Politburo. A "civilian headquarters" was also created from activists of the spontaneous demonstrations, mainly from the workers of the FSO automobile plant and students. He was supposed to help the "military headquarters". Self-defense units spontaneously emerged. With the knowledge of the authorities, about 800 people were armed, mostly, however, with small arms.
The case was clearly going according to the "Hungarian" scenario (although similar events in Hungary developed with a delay of several days). But there were also differences. One of Moscow's demands was to keep Rokossovsky in the new Politburo of the PUWP Central Committee. But Rokossovsky himself did not strive for this at all. Thus, one of the points of disagreement disappeared.
The key moment, obviously, was the negotiations between Khrushchev and Rokossovsky. When the head of the CPSU asked the marshal if the Polish troops would be able to suppress the anti-Soviet rebellion, Rokossovsky answered bluntly that only certain units would obey such an order.
Compromise
Fear of a full-scale war between Soviet and Polish troops at a time when even more serious events in Hungary suddenly flared up, forced the Soviet leadership to back down. Gomulka and his supporters were actually given carte blanche not only for personnel changes at the top, but also for a serious liberalization of the country's life.
Of course, this was accompanied by reciprocal assurances from Gomulka that in no case would he allow Poland to leave the OVD and would invariably keep Poland in the Soviet bloc. In this he differed from Imre Nagy, who ultimately followed the radical demands and announced Hungary's withdrawal from the Internal Affairs Department. On October 22, the plenum of the PUWP Central Committee relieved Konstantin Rokossovsky of his duties as Polish Minister of Defense and from membership in the PUWP Central Committee. Khrushchev did not mind. The Marshal returned to Moscow on the same day. More than thirty Soviet generals and officers who held high posts in the Polish Army were recalled to the USSR.
On October 24, 1956, Gomulka spoke at a rally of 400,000 in Warsaw, where he promised sweeping democratic reforms. After that, the situation in Poland began to defuse, demonstrations began to subside. In the years that followed, until Solidarity's speeches and the introduction of martial law in December 1981, Poland was consistently considered one of the most liberal states in the Eastern Bloc.
I hope you mean exactly Poland and Russia, and not Poland as part of the USSR, so I'll tell you about the old days.
When was Poland a part of the Russian Empire?
Formally, it ceased to be an independent state on June 7 or 8 (depending on the interpretation of the event) in 1815, after the agreement on the re-division of the Polish lands at the Vienna Congress. As a result, the Principality of Warsaw became part of the Russian Empire and was renamed the Kingdom of Poland. Where and the end of the First World War existed, after which the Russian Empire was able to forcibly hold part of the territories. The Polish elite took advantage of this when they declared independence in 1918.
How much did Poland (Rzeczpospolita, in those days) lose to the Russian Empire?
Two factors should be noted here. First, the Rzeczpospolita began "democratization" in its state and gave too many liberties to the gentry. And since no one limited it (in our time, people do it, in developed countries), they did what they wanted. And the state fell into decay, losing economic and military strength. Yes, and human potential has fallen sharply, good managers have ceased to fall into the ruling structures. This happens when a negative selection of ethyl begins in the community / state.
Secondly, Peter carried out incredibly effective reforms in the Russian Empire. Which improved almost all elements of the state (except for the life of the common people). He reformed the army, turning it into one of the strongest at that time. He raised the economy, removing "nepotism and patronage" from the leadership. Even the boyar retrained to live in a new way, in a European way. Nowadays there is a saying “Peter opened a window to Europe”. And then the Russian Empire continued to move along the predetermined path of the reformation (it slowly, with a creak, moved.)
And then Napoleon appeared and began to take over all of Europe. And in one of the campaigns he went to Russia, with his allies. Among them was the Polish nobility and the army. Napoleon lost and they began to drive him to Paris. On the way, capturing everything you can. And after the capture of Paris, a new division of Europe took place, as a result of which
The disappearance of Poland as a state
The developed constitution of 1791 was called upon to implement the following transformations on the territory of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth:
- the establishment of centralized authority;
- curbing the gentry anarchy;
- elimination of the pernicious principle of "liberum veto";
- softening the social inequality of serfs.
However, Polish tycoons could not come to terms with the abolition of liberties under constitutional norms. The only way out of this situation was for them to intervene on the part of Russia. The formation of a confederation under the leadership of Marshal Potocki, the search for help in St. Petersburg served as a pretext for the introduction of troops by Empress Catherine II into Polish territory. The second partition of the Commonwealth took place between Russia and Prussia (whose troops were on Polish territory).
The main prerequisites for the disappearance of Poland as an independent state from the map of Europe:
- cancellation of the reforms of the Four-Year Diet, including the constitution of 1791;
- the transformation of the rest of Poland into a puppet state;
- defeat of the mass popular uprising of 1794 under the leadership of Tadeusz Kosciuszko;
- the third partition of Poland in 1795 with the participation of Austria.
1807 is marked by the creation by Napoleon of the Duchy of Warsaw, which included the Prussian and Austrian lands of Poland. In 1809 it was joined by the Poles who fought on the side of Napoleon Krakow, Lublin, Radom and Sandomierz. The presence of Poland as part of Russia until 1917 brought both great disappointments and new opportunities to the Polish people.
The period of "Alexandrovsky freedoms"
After the defeat in the war with Russia, the territory of the Duchy of Warsaw, created by Napoleon, turned into Russian property. In 1815, the reign of Alexander I began, who inherited a poor country, devastated by military operations, without a single industry, with neglected trade, with ruined cities and villages, where the people suffered from unbearable taxes and extortions. Taking custody of this country, Alexander made it prosperous.
- All industries were resumed.
- Cities were rebuilt, new villages appeared.
- The drainage of the swamps contributed to the emergence of fertile lands.
- The construction of new roads made it possible to cross the country in various directions.
- The emergence of new factories carried out the import of Polish cloth and other goods into Russia.
- The Polish debt was secured and the loan was restored.
- The establishment of a Polish national bank with capital received from the Russian sovereign helped to ensure the rise of all industries.
- An excellent army was created with a sufficient arsenal of weapons
- Education was gaining a fairly rapid pace of development, as evidenced by: the establishment of the University of Warsaw, the opening of departments of higher sciences, the sending of the best Polish students to study in Paris, London, Berlin at the expense of the Russian government, the opening of gymnasiums, military schools, boarding schools for the education of girls in regional Polish cities.
- The introduction of laws in Poland ensured order, inviolability of property and personal safety.
- The population has doubled during the first ten years of being a part of Russia.
- The adoption of the Constituent Charter provided Poles with a special way of government. In Poland, the Senate and the Sejm were created, which were the chambers of the representative assembly. Each new law was passed after approval by a majority vote in both chambers.
- Municipal administration was introduced in Polish cities.
- Typography gained some freedom.
The time of the "Nikolaev reaction"
The main essence of the policy of Nicholas I in the Kingdom of Poland was intensified Russification and forcible conversion to Orthodoxy. The Polish people did not accept these directions, responding with mass protests, creating secret societies to organize uprisings against the government.
The emperor's response was the following: the abolition of the constitution, which Alexander had granted Poland, the abolition of the Polish Sejm and the approval of his proxies in leading positions.
Polish riots
The Polish people dreamed of an independent state. The main organizer of the protests was the student body, which was later joined by soldiers, workers, some of the nobles and landowners. The main demands of the protesters were: the implementation of agrarian reforms, the implementation of democratization of society and the independence of Poland.
Rebellions broke out in different cities (Warsaw - 1830, Poznan - 1846).
The Russian government makes certain decisions, primarily on the introduction of restrictions on the use of the Polish language, on the movement of males.
To eliminate unrest in the country, martial law was introduced in 1861. A recruitment is announced, where unreliable youth are sent.
However, the ascension to the Russian throne of the new ruler, Nicholas II, revived in the souls of the Polish people a certain hope for liberalism in Russia's policy towards the Kingdom of Poland.
In 1897, the National Democratic Party of Poland was created - the main fighter for the country's independence. Over time, it will take a place in the Russian State Duma as the Polish Kolo faction, thereby identifying itself as the leading political force in the struggle for a free autonomous Poland.
Benefits of belonging to an empire
As part of the Russian Empire, Poland had certain advantages:
- The possibility of promotion in the civil service.
- Supervision of banking spheres by Polish aristocrats.
- Receiving subsidies from the state in a larger volume.
- Increased literacy rate among the Polish population thanks to financial support from the government.
- Receiving dividends from participation in railway transportation between Russia and Germany.
- The growth of banks in the major cities of the Kingdom of Poland.
The year 1917, significant for Russia, was the end of the history of "Russian Poland". He gave the Poles the opportunity to establish their own statehood, and the country to gain freedom. However, the expectations of the Russian emperor about the reality of union with Russia did not come true.
Preconditions of the Soviet-Polish war of 1939
Russian-Polish relations have developed in a very difficult way over the centuries. There was no radical change after the October Revolution, when Soviet Russia welcomed the proclamation of Poland's independence. In the 20-30s. these relations were not stable, old prejudices and stereotypes were reflected.
In 1932, a non-aggression pact was signed between the USSR and Poland, which recognized that the 1921 peace treaty was still the basis of their mutual relations and obligations. The parties renounced war as an instrument of national policy, pledged to refrain from aggressive actions or attacks on each other separately or jointly with other powers. Such actions were recognized as "any act of violence that violates the integrity and inviolability of the territory or the political independence" of the other side. At the end of 1938, both governments reaffirmed that the basis of peaceful relations between the countries is the non-aggression pact of 1932, extended in 1934 to 1945.
However, the seemingly peaceful nature of Soviet policy actually covered up the deliberately confrontational nature of the Soviet policy of the Soviet leadership of the 1920s – 1930s. in relation to Poland. The failed attempt to establish a Soviet regime in Poland during the Soviet-Polish war, and the results of the Riga Peace Treaty, and the activities of the Comintern, aimed at destabilizing the internal political situation in Poland and preparing a pro-communist coup, significantly aggravated the mutual mistrust in these years. One cannot but take into account the presence of insurmountable ideological contradictions.
Until 1939, the Soviet leadership considered Poland to be a springboard used by European states for subversive activities against the USSR and a possible military attack. The development of Polish-British and then Polish-German relations was viewed as a potential threat to the security of the USSR. However, Poland itself was perceived as an enemy. The Polish special services, sometimes in cooperation with the British, carried out active intelligence activities to identify military potential, both in the border regions and in the deep regions of the Soviet Union. The understandable desire of the leadership of Poland, which recently survived a massive invasion of the Red Army, to have reliable information about possible Soviet military preparations, was perceived by the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks as Yu. Pilsudski's preparation of aggressive actions against the USSR.
In our opinion, at that time, those special messages from the residents of the Soviet intelligence service from Poland, which most adequately reflected the real situation, were not always perceived correctly. So, for example, at the beginning of 1937 the deputy head of the Foreign Department of the Main Directorate of State Security of the NKVD of the USSR S. Shpigelglas made the following conclusion from the report of the source “Othello”: “The report is undoubtedly interesting. It is replete with facts that are supported by other documents. The main idea of \u200b\u200bthe report: Poland is not an aggressor, she wants to maintain neutrality with the help of England, - by maneuvering between the USSR, Germany, France, - it may turn out to be disinformation. This is the danger of the report. " As you can see, the Polish state was unambiguously viewed as a potential enemy. Obviously, this is one of the main reasons that among the victims of the mass repressions of the Great Terror era, a very significant proportion were Poles and people accused of having ties with Poland.
In 1934-1935. a number of factors determined the intensification of repressions against persons of Polish nationality, and, above all, against representatives of the CPR and its autonomous organizations - the Communist Party of Western Ukraine (KPZU) and the Communist Party of Western Belarus (KPZB). The general change in the attitude of the USSR towards the communist movement was reflected in the repressive policy: it was in 1935 that the 7th Congress of the Comintern made a bet on the creation of a united workers' front, thereby recognizing that the policy of relying only on the Communist Party of the world, including Poland, failed. The attitude of the Soviet leadership towards Poland and the Poles was also toughened by the successful actions of the Polish special services to suppress the subversive activities of the Comintern. The Soviet leadership was especially irritated by the Polish-German agreement of 1934 and the visit to Poland by G. Goering.
In the first months of 1936, purges began among political emigrants. In the process of preparing a special resolution of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks on political emigrants, special attention was paid to the Polish communists. Preparations for mass repressions against persons of Polish nationality manifested itself not only in the registration of political emigrants. In the period preceding the Great Terror, about 35% of those arrested throughout the country for alleged espionage were accused of belonging to Polish intelligence agencies: in 1935, out of 6409 arrested - 2253, and in 1936 out of 3669 - 1275.
At the beginning of 1936, the change in attitudes towards immigrants from other countries, primarily from Poland, was reflected in the "purge" not only of the Comintern apparatus, one of the instruments of the USSR's foreign policy, but also of the NKVD apparatus, the most important instrument for implementing domestic policy. In organizing the campaign against the Poles (in particular, employees of the NKVD organs), the secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, chairman of the Party Control Commission N.I. Yezhov, skillfully arousing Stalin's maniacal suspicion, played a huge role. Yezhov, who replaced Yagoda in September 1936 as People's Commissar for Internal Affairs, sharply intensified the campaign against Polish espionage.
On August 23, 1939, the Soviet-German non-aggression pact was signed, on September 28, 1939 - the friendship and border treaty, and secret protocols to them. These documents were directly related to the fate of the Polish state.
The entry of Soviet troops into the eastern voivodships of Poland and their advance to the line of the Narew-Vistula-San rivers, in principle, were predetermined by the content of the secret protocol of 23 August. But the German side was naturally interested in joint actions with the Red Army from the very beginning of the war against Poland.
The high command of the German army admitted the possibility of Soviet troops entering Poland, but did not know its timing. As for the commanders in the field army, and especially the commanders of the forward units, they were completely not oriented in the general situation and planned their actions deep down to the border with the Soviet Union.
Using the delay in the entry of Soviet troops into Poland, the German command from September 1 (the date of the attack of Nazi Germany on Poland) to September 16 moved its troops up to 200 km east of the agreed Narew-Vistula-San line. The movement of German troops to the twice changing line of "state interests" on the territory of Poland was completed only on October 14, 1939.
There was a real danger of intervention by the Western powers. Chamberlain and Halifax publicly announced on August 24 that Great Britain would fight for Poland. The Soviet government became aware of this position the very next day, when the British Foreign Secretary and the Polish Ambassador in London signed a pact establishing that the parties would provide assistance to each other in the event of an attack by a third country. Stalin and Molotov could not fail to understand the consequences if the Soviet Union had intervened from the very beginning and the German-Polish conflict on the side of Germany. In response to Ribbentrop's request, Molotov replied through Schulenburg that the Soviet Union would begin concrete actions at the appropriate time, but “we believe, however, that this time has not yet come. We may be wrong, but it seems to us that too much haste can harm us and help to unite our enemies. "
The Soviet leadership had to wait until the final clarification of the situation in Poland. Only on September 17, 1939, at 5:40 am, Soviet troops crossed the Soviet-Polish border.
Military campaign of Soviet troops against Poland
A fairly large grouping of Soviet troops was created for the Polish operation.
By the evening of September 16, the troops of the Belorussian and Ukrainian fronts were deployed in the starting areas for the offensive. The Soviet group united 8 rifle, 5 cavalry and 2 tank corps, 21 rifle and 13 cavalry divisions, 16 tank, 2 motorized brigades and the Dnieper military flotilla (DVF). The air forces of the fronts, taking into account the 1st, 2nd and 3rd special-purpose aviation armies redeployed on September 9-10, totaled 3,298 aircraft. In addition, about 16.5 thousand border guards of the Belarusian and Kiev border districts served on the border.
On the eastern border of Poland, apart from 25 battalions and 7 squadrons of border guards (about 12 thousand people, or 8 soldiers per 1 km of the border), there were practically no other troops, which was well known to Soviet intelligence. So, according to the intelligence of the 4th Army, “the border strip to the river. Shchara is not occupied by field wars, and the KOP battalions are weak in their combat training and combat effectiveness ... Serious resistance from the Polish army up to the river. Shchara is unlikely to be expected from the Poles. At 5:00 on September 17, the forward and assault detachments of the Soviet armies and border troops crossed the border and defeated the Polish border guard. The crossing of the border confirmed the data of Soviet intelligence about the absence of significant groupings of Polish troops, which made it possible to accelerate the offensive.
For the Polish leadership, the intervention of the USSR was completely unexpected. Polish intelligence did not record any threatening movements of the Red Army, and the information received on September 1-5 was perceived as an understandable reaction to the outbreak of war in Europe. And although on September 12 information was received from Paris about the possible action of the USSR against Poland, they were not taken seriously.
The behavior of the Soviet troops also seemed strange - they, as a rule, did not shoot first, they treated the Polish troops with demonstrative goodwill, treated them to cigarettes and said that they had come to the rescue against the Germans. The local authorities were waiting for the instructions of the commander-in-chief. At first, the commander-in-chief of the Polish army, Rydz-Smigly, was inclined to give the order to repel the Soviet invasion. However, a closer examination of the situation showed that there were no forces in Eastern Poland, except for the KOP battalions and a certain number of rear and spare parts of the army. These weakly armed forces had no chance in the battle with the Red Army. As a result, on September 17, the Polish leadership was faced with a fait accompli and, based on the statements of the Soviet government and its notes, believed that the Red Army was being introduced in order to limit the zone of German occupation. Therefore, at about 11.40 pm on September 17, the order of Rydz-Smigla was broadcast on the radio: “The Soviets invaded. I order to carry out the retreat to Romania and Hungary by the shortest routes. Not to conduct hostilities with the Soviets, only in case of an attempt on their part to disarm our units. The task for Warsaw and Modlin, which must defend against the Germans, no change. The units, to which the Soviets have approached, must negotiate with them with the aim of leaving the garrisons in Romania, or Hungary. " Only the KOP units retreating from the Zbruch to the Dniester and the units covering the “Romanian suburb” were ordered to continue resistance.
Of course, the Polish command had a plan for the deployment of troops on the eastern border - "Wshud", which was developed from 1935-1936. On the eastern border, it was planned to deploy all available forces of the Polish Army. Of course, in the real situation in the second half of September 1939, when Poland spent all its available defense potential on attempts to continue to resist Nazi Germany, which surpassed the Poles in manpower and equipment and had practically won the war, this whole plan remained on paper.
On the right flank of the Byelorussian Front of the Red Army from the Latvian border to Begoml, the 3rd Army was deployed, which had the task of reaching the Sharkovshchina - Dunilovichi - lake by the end of the first day of the offensive. Blyada - Yabluny, and the next day to the front of Sventsiany, Mikhalishki and further advance to Vilna. The main blow was delivered by the right wing of the army, where the troops of the 4th rifle corps and the mobile group were concentrated as part of the 24th cavalry division and the 22nd tank brigade under the command of the divisional commander of the 24th brigade commander P. Akhlyustin.
To the south of the 3rd Army, on the front from Begoml to Ivanets, troops of the 11th Army were deployed, which had the task to occupy Molodechno, Volozhin by the end of September 17, the next day - Oshmyany, Ivye and move on to Grodno. Having crossed the border at 5 o'clock on September 17, the 6th tank brigade occupied Volozhin at 12 o'clock, the formations of the 16th rifle corps at the same time entered Krasnoe, and by 19 o'clock reached Molodechno, Benzovets. The formations of the 3rd cavalry corps had already reached the Rachinety, Poryche, Marshalki area by 15 o'clock, and in the morning on September 18 moved further towards Lida, reaching the Rynovich, Constant, Voishtovich front by 10 o'clock. At this time, the 3rd Cavalry Corps and the 6th Tank Brigade were given the task of advancing on Vilna, which was ordered to occupy.
At that time, only insignificant Polish units were in Vilna: about 16 infantry battalions (approximately 7 thousand soldiers and 14 thousand militias) with 14 light weapons. However, the Polish command in Vilna did not have a general attitude towards the Bolshevik invasion. At 9 o'clock on September 18, the commander of the garrison, Colonel Y. Okulich-Kozarin, gave the order: “We are not at war with the Bolsheviks, the units will leave Vilna on an additional order and cross the Lithuanian border; non-combat units can start leaving the city, combat units remain in positions, but cannot shoot without an order. " However, since some of the officers perceived this order as treason, and rumors spread in the city about a coup in Germany and a declaration of war by Romania and Hungary, Colonel Okulich-Kozarin at about 16.30 decided to refrain from giving the order to retreat until 20 o'clock.
At about 19.10 the commander of the 2nd battalion, deployed on the southern and southwestern outskirts of the city, Lieutenant Colonel S. Shileiko reported on the appearance of Soviet tanks and asked if he could open fire. While Okulich-Kozarin gave the order to open fire, while this order was passed on to the troops, 8 tanks had already passed the first line of defense and reserve units were sent to fight them. At about 20 o'clock Okulich-Kozarin gave an order for the withdrawal of troops from the city and sent Lieutenant Colonel T. Podvysotsky to the location of Soviet troops in order to notify them that the Polish side did not want to fight with them and demand that they leave the city. After that, Okulich-Kozarin himself left Vilna, and Podvysotsky, who returned at about 21:00, decided to defend the city and at about 21.45 issued an order to suspend the withdrawal of troops. At that time, uncoordinated battles were going on in the city, in which the Vilna Polish youth played an important role. The teacher G. Osiński organized volunteer teams from the gymnasium students who took up positions on the hills. The elders fired, the rest delivered ammunition, organized communications, etc.
Approaching at about 19.30 on September 18 to Vilna, the 8th and 7th tank regiments began a battle for the southern part of the city. The 8th Panzer Regiment broke into the southern part of the city at 20.30. The 7th Panzer Regiment, faced with a stubborn defense, only at dawn was able to enter the southwestern part of the city. Due to stubborn defense, the city was captured only the next day.
While all these turbulent events were taking place in the Vilna region, the troops of the 16th Rifle Corps of the 11th Army were turned to the northwest and moved towards Lida.
While the troops of the 3rd and 11th armies occupied the northeastern part of Western Belarus, further south on the front from Fanipol to Nesvizh, the KMG units went on the offensive, which had the task of reaching Lyubcha, Kirin on the first day of the offensive, and the next day to force the river. Silence and move to Volkovysk. Attacking on the southern flank of the group, the 15th Panzer Corps crossed the border at 5.00 and, breaking the insignificant resistance of the Polish border guards, moved west. By the evening of September 17, the 27th tank brigade crossed the river. Servech, 2nd tank brigade - r. Usha, and the 20th motorized brigade was pulling up to the border. At about 4 pm on September 18, the 2nd Tank Brigade entered Slonim.
In Grodno there were insignificant forces of Polish troops: 2 improvised battalions and an assault company of the reserve center of the 29th Infantry Division, the 31st guard battalion, 5 platoons of positional artillery (5 guns), 2 anti-aircraft machine gun companies, a two-battalion detachment of Colonel J. Blumsky the national defense battalion "Postava", the dismounted 32nd division of the Podlaska cavalry brigade, there were many gendarmerie and police in the city. The commander of the “Grodno” district, Colonel B. Adamovich, was determined to evacuate units to Lithuania. On September 18, riots took place in the city in connection with the release of prisoners from the city prison and an anti-Polish protest by local "red" activists. Soviet troops were expected from the east, but they approached the city from the south, which was advantageous for the defenders, since the right bank of the Neman was steep.
Only as the fuel came from the 15th Panzer Corps from 7:00 on September 20, they began to move to Grodno in peculiar waves. At 13:00 50 tanks of the 27th Tank Brigade approached the southern outskirts of Grodno. The tankers attacked the enemy on the move and by evening occupied the southern part of the city, reaching the bank of the Neman. Several tanks managed to break through the bridge to the north bank into the city center. However, without infantry support, the tanks were attacked by soldiers, police and youth, who used a few guns and Molotov cocktails. As a result, some of the tanks were destroyed, and some were withdrawn back beyond the Niemen. The 27th Tank Brigade, with the support of the 119th Infantry Regiment of the 13th Infantry Division, which arrived from 18:00, occupied the southern part of the city. A group of junior lieutenant Shaikhuddinov, with the help of local workers in boats, crossed to the right bank of the Neman, 2 km east of the city. On the other side, fighting began for the cemetery, where machine-gun nests were equipped. During the night battle, the 119th regiment managed to gain a foothold on the right bank and reach the approaches to the eastern outskirts of the city.
By the morning of September 21, the 101st Rifle Regiment approached, which also crossed to the right bank and deployed north of the 119th Regiment. From 6 o'clock on September 21, the regiments, reinforced with 4 guns and 2 tanks, attacked the city and by 12 o'clock, despite the counterattacks of the Poles, reached the railway line, and by 14 o'clock they reached the center of Grodno, but by the evening they were again withdrawn to the outskirts. In these battles, the regiments were supported by a motorized group of the 16th Rifle Corps, which, after spending the night on the highway several kilometers from Skidel, at dawn on September 21, moved towards Grodno. Having approached the city, the tanks suppressed firing points on its eastern outskirts, thereby providing support to the 119th and 101st rifle regiments. The attack of the city from the east was successful, but after crossing the railway line, the main forces of the rifle units again retreated to the outskirts. As a result, the tanks were forced to fight alone.
In the second echelon behind KM G, the troops of the 10th Army attacked, which on September 19 crossed the border with the task of reaching the Novogrudok, Gorodishche front and moving further to the Palace. By the end of the first day of the offensive, the troops of the 10th Army reached the pp. Neman and Usha. Continuing the slow advance in the second echelon of the Belorussian Front, by the end of September 20, the army's troops reached the Naliboki, Derevna, Mir line, where they received the task of advancing to the Sokolka front. Bolshaya Berestovitsa, Svisloch, Novy Dvor, Pruzhany. In the evening, by order of the commander of the Belorussian Front No. 04 of the army, the troops of the 5th rifle, 6th cavalry and 15th tank corps were subordinated. However, during negotiations between the commanders of the 10th Army, KMG and the Belorussian Front on September 21, it was decided to leave the 6th Cavalry and 15th Tank Corps as part of the KMR.
On the front of the 4th Army, which had the task of advancing on Baranovichi with an exit by the end of the first day of the operation on the Snov, Zhilichi line, the offensive began at 5 a.m. on September 17. At 22:00, the 29th tank brigade occupied Baranovichi and the fortified area located here, which was not occupied by Polish troops. The first to enter the city was a tank battalion under the command of I. D. Chernyakhovsky. In the Baranovichi region, up to 5 thousand Polish soldiers were captured, 4 anti-tank guns and 2 echelons of food were Soviet trophies.
Remaining on the outskirts of Pruzhany, the 29th tank brigade on September 20 was engaged in technical inspection of tanks and conducted reconnaissance in the direction of Brest. At Vidoml, contact was established with the German units. As the brigade commander, brigade commander S. M. Krivoshey later recalled, “intelligence sent ahead under the command of Vladimir Yulianovich Borovitsky, secretary of the brigade's party commission, soon returned with a dozen soldiers and officers of the German motorized corps of General Guderian, who had managed to occupy the city of Brest. Lacking precise instructions on how to deal with the Germans, I asked the chief of staff to contact the army commander [Chuikov], and myself with the commissar engaged in a non-binding conversation with them. The conversation took place in Lenin's tent, where on the folding portable stands, along with indicators of combat training and the growth of the industrial power of our country, were hung posters calling for the destruction of fascism. Many Germans had cameras. After looking around, they asked permission to photograph the tent and those present in it. One of them filmed the commissar and me in a group of German officers against the background of an anti-fascist poster.
Having fed the Germans rich Russian borscht and kebab in Kars (all this was devoured by the guests with enviable zeal), we sent them home, ordering them to convey "warm greetings" to General Guderian. " The brigade commander forgot to mention that the brigade band played several marches during lunch.
In Polesie, troops of the 23rd Rifle Corps were deployed, which were forbidden to cross the border until further notice. The corps commander's appeal to the Military Council of the Belorussian Front with a request to go over to the offensive together with the rest of the front's troops was rejected. As a result, the corps crossed the border at 16.25 on 18 September. At 11 o'clock on September 19, the advance detachment of the 52nd Infantry Division occupied Lakhva. Moving on, the Soviet troops in Kozhan-Gorodok were fired upon by a detachment of the 16th battalion of the KOP. Unfolding, the units entered the battle and soon pushed the Poles into the forest north of Kozhan-Gorodok. During the battle, Soviet units lost 3 people killed and 4 wounded. 85 Polish soldiers were taken prisoner, 3 of them were wounded and 4 were killed. At about 5 pm, the 205th rifle regiment with the 1st division of the 158th artillery regiment, after a small battle, occupied David-Gorodok. At 19.30, units of the 52nd Rifle Division occupied Luninets. Meanwhile, the ships of the Soviet Dnieper flotilla reached the mouth of the Goryn River, where they were forced to stop because of the shoals and sunken Polish ships.
The troops of the Ukrainian Front also crossed the Polish border on September 17 and began to advance deep into Poland. On the northern flank, on the front from Olevsk to Yampol, troops of the 5th Army deployed, which was tasked with "delivering a powerful and lightning-fast blow to the Polish troops, decisively and quickly advancing in the direction of Rovno." The 60th Rifle Division was concentrated in the Olevsk area, which had the task of attacking Sarny. In the Gorodnitsa - Korets area, troops of the 15th Rifle Corps deployed, with the immediate task of reaching the river. Goryn, and by the end of September 17 to occupy Rivne. The 8th Rifle Corps, deployed in the Ostrog-Slavuta region, was to occupy Dubno by the end of the day. On September 18, both corps were to occupy Lutsk and move towards Volodymyr-Volynsky.
By the end of September 22, the troops of the 5th Army reached the Kovel - Rozhitsa - Vladimir-Volynsky - Ivanichi line. To the south, on the Teofipol - Voytovtsy front, the troops of the 6th Army deployed, with the task of advancing on Tarnopol, Ezerna and Kozova, then reaching the Buek - Peremyshlyany front and further on Lvov.
At 4:00 on September 17, an assault group of border guards and Red Army soldiers captured the Volochysky border bridge. At 4.30, the troops of the 17th Rifle Corps delivered an artillery strike at the enemy firing points and strongholds, and at 5.00 they began to force the river. Zbruch, using the captured bridge and established crossings. Forcing r. practically without any enemy resistance, units of the 17th Rifle Corps at about 8.00 turned into marching columns and moved towards Tarnopol. The mobile formations quickly overtook the infantry and after 18:00 on September 17, the 10th Panzer Brigade entered Tarnopol. The 24th tank brigade advancing north of the city with the 136th rifle regiment of the 97th rifle division already at 12:00 passed Dobrovody and, bypassing Tarnopol from the north-west, about 22:00 reached its western outskirts and began to clear it of Polish units ... At 19:00, 11 tanks of the 5th Cavalry Division of the 2nd Cavalry Corps entered the city from the north, however, not knowing the situation, the tankers decided to wait until morning with the attack. Having entered Tarnopol, the 5th division had to deal with cleaning the city of scattered groups of Polish officers, gendarmes and just the local population. During the skirmishes in the city between 10.20 and 14.00 on September 18, the division lost 3 people killed and 37 wounded. At the same time, at 10.30 am, the rifle divisions of the 17th rifle corps entered the city. Up to 600 Polish soldiers were taken prisoner.
The advancing north of the compound of the 2nd Cavalry Corps in the morning of September 18 forced the river. Seret and at 10.00 received an order from the command of the Ukrainian Front to march towards Lvov and capture the city with a forced march.
The combined motor detachment of the 2nd cavalry corps and the 24th tank brigade with 35 bales at about 2.00 on September 19 approached Lviv. After stubborn battles, the city was taken.
On September 20, the troops of the 12th Army advanced to the Nikolaev - Stryi line. In the Stryi area, at about 17.00, contact was established with German troops, which on September 22 transferred the city to the Red Army. On September 23, the 26th Tank Brigade approached the same place. As a result of the negotiations, the Soviet troops were stopped on the line they had reached.
At 10.30 on September 21, the headquarters of the Belorussian and Ukrainian fronts received an order from the People's Commissar of Defense No. 16693, demanding to stop the troops on the line reached by the forward units by 20.00 on 20 September. The task of the troops was to bring up the lagging units and rear services, establish stable communications, be in a state of full combat readiness, be vigilant and take measures to protect the rear services and headquarters. In addition, the command of the Belorussian Front was allowed to continue the offensive in the Suwalki salient. At 22.15 on September 21, the headquarters of the Belarusian and Ukrainian fronts received an order from the People's Commissar of Defense No. 156, which outlined the content of the Soviet-German protocol and was allowed to start moving westward at dawn on September 23. The next day, the Military Council of the Belorussian Front issued the corresponding order No. 05. On September 25, the troops received a directive from the People's Commissar of Defense No. 011 and an order from the Military Council of the Belorussian Front No. 06, warning that “when the army moves from the Augustow-Bialystok-Brest-Litovsk line to the west on the territory left by the German army, it is possible that the Poles will be crumbling to gather the units into detachments and gangs, which together with the Polish troops operating near Warsaw, can show us stubborn resistance and in some places deliver counterstrikes. "
On September 21, the 2nd Tank Brigade in Sokolka formed a detachment for operations in the Augustow - Suwalki area under the command of Major F.P. Chuvakin, which consisted of 470 people, 252 rifles, 74 machine guns, 46 guns, 34 BT tanks - 7, 6 armored vehicles and 34 cars. Moving north, the detachment at about 5 o'clock on September 22 at Sopotskin caught up with the Poles retreating from Grodno, who hoped to gain a foothold in. old forts of the Grodno fortress, where there were military warehouses. In the ensuing battle, which lasted until 10 o'clock, 11 Red Army soldiers were killed and 14 wounded, 4 tanks and 5 vehicles were knocked out. The enemy widely used Molotov cocktails, which created significant problems in the conditions of tank operations without infantry cover.
Meanwhile, a detachment of the 27th Tank Brigade of 20 BT-7 tanks and 1 armored vehicle under the command of Major Bogdanov combed the border line with Lithuania and arrived in Suwalki at 24 hours on 24 September.
The troops of the 3rd Army continued to guard the Latvian and Lithuanian borders from Drissa to Druskininkai. The 11th Army began redeploying along the Lithuanian border towards Grodno. The formations of the 16th Rifle Corps continued to advance towards Grodno and on September 21 they occupied Eishishki. By September 24, the corps troops deployed on the Lithuanian and German borders north and northwest of Grodno.
By September 26-28, the Troops of the 3rd and 11th armies were entrenched on the border with Lithuania and East Prussia from Druskininkai to Shchuchin. Meanwhile, on September 21, at negotiations in Volkovysk, representatives of the German command and the 6th cavalry corps agreed on the procedure for withdrawing the Wehrmacht from Bialystok.
To the north, the 20th motorized brigade, transferred to the 10th Army, was operating, which on September 25 at 15:00 took Osovets from the Germans, on September 26, moving along the bank of the river. Biebrza, entered Sokoly, and by the evening of September 29 reached Zambruva. On September 27, the forward detachments of the 5th Rifle Corps occupied Nur and Chizhev, and in the Gainuyka area, corps units again stumbled upon a Polish warehouse, where Soviet trophies were about 14 thousand shells, 5 million cartridges, 1 tankette, 2 armored vehicles, 2 vehicles and 2 barrels of fuel.
In the southern sector of the front, the troops of the 4th Army moved westward. At 15:00 on September 22, the 29th Panzer Brigade entered Brest, which was occupied by the troops of the 19th Motorized Corps of the Wehrmacht. As Krivoshey later recalled, during negotiations with General G. Guderian, he proposed the following parade procedure: “At 16 o'clock, units of your corps in a marching column, with standards in front, leave the city, my units, also in a marching column, enter the city, stop at streets, where the German regiments are passing, and saluting the passing units with their banners. The orchestras perform military marches. " In the end, Guderian, who insisted on holding a full-fledged parade with a preliminary formation, agreed to the proposed option, "however, stipulating that he would stand with me on the podium and greet the passing units."
By September 29, the troops of the Belorussian Front had advanced to the Shchuchin - Staviski - Lomza - Zambrow - Ciechanovec - Kosow Lacki - Sokolow Podlaski - Siedlce - Lukow - Wohyn line. On October 1, the commander of the 4th Army, Divisional Commander Chuikov, issued an order, which demanded "with the forward detachments to have one commander of the headquarters and one political department for negotiating with the German troops."
By the end of September 29, the troops of the Ukrainian Front were on the line Pugachuv - Piaski - Piotrkuv - Krzhemen - Bilgorai - Przemysl - the upper reaches of the river. San.
Here we should dwell on another side of the Polish campaign of the Red Army, associated with various military crimes of the Soviet servicemen. Lynching, looting and plunder as manifestations of the class struggle were not only not persecuted, but encouraged. Here are some very illustrative examples.
On September 21, after disarming the Polish troops, units of the 14th Cavalry Division released the soldiers to their homes, and the officers and gendarmes were left until further notice in the Sasuva scale. At 19 o'clock, the prisoners entered the basement of the school, killed the worker guarding the weapon, and opened fire from the windows. The battalion commissar Ponomarev with the Red Army men suppressed the uprising of the officers and, having arrived at the headquarters of the 14th Cavalry Division, told about what had happened. At the same time, he expressed the idea that all the officers and gendarmes are bastards that need to be destroyed. Impressed by what they heard, on September 22, in the village of Boshevitsy, 4 Red Army men, under various pretexts, took 4 prisoner officers from the custody of the people's militia and shot them.
On September 22, during the battles for Grodno, at about 10 o'clock, the commander of the communications platoon, junior lieutenant Dubovik, received an order to escort 80-90 prisoners to the rear. Moving 1.5-2 km from the city, Dubovik interrogated the prisoners in order to identify the officers and persons who took part in the murder of the Bolsheviks. Promising to release the prisoners, he sought confessions and shot 29 people. The rest of the prisoners were returned to Grodno. This was known to the command of the 101st Infantry Regiment of the 4th Infantry Division, but no measures were taken against Dubovik. Moreover, the commander of the 3rd battalion, senior lieutenant Tolochko, gave a direct order to shoot the officers.
On September 21, the Military Council of the 6th Army, represented by the commander of corps commander Golikov and a member of the Military Council, Brigadier Commissar Zakharychev, being in units of the 2nd Cavalry Corps, issued an obviously criminal decision on the production and procedure of lynching - the execution of 10 people (names are not indicated in the decision). On this basis, the head of the special department of the 2nd cavalry corps, Koberniuk, went to the city of Zlochów, and made arrests of various employees of the Polish prison, police, etc., such as V.V. prison, Kuchmirovsky K.B., pom. early prison, Lukashevsky M.S., vice city prosecutor. Plakhta I. - an official of the bitted headman and others, in the amount of 10 people, and all these persons, at the expense of the limit established by the Military Council of the 6th Army, was shot in the prison building. This lynching was attended by ordinary prison officials. This criminal decision of the Military Council on lynching was quickly transferred to the leading circles of commanders and commissars of formations and units of the 2nd Cavalry Corps, and this led to dire consequences when a number of commanders, military commissars and even Red Army men, following the example of their leaders, began to lynch prisoners, suspicious detainees and etc.
The question deserves attention, what tasks were assigned to the troops during the action in Poland. For example, the commander of the troops of the Ukrainian Front, Army Commander 1st Rank Semyon Timoshenko, in his order noted that "the Polish government of landlords and generals involved the peoples of Poland in an adventurous war." Approximately the same was said in the order of the commander of the troops of the Belorussian Front, Army Commander 2nd Rank Kovalev. They called on the population to turn "their weapons against the landlords and capitalists," but did not say anything about the fate of the western regions of Ukraine and Belarus. This was apparently explained by the fact that after the Riga Peace Treaty of 1921, the Soviet government never raised the issue of reuniting the western regions of Ukraine and Belarus. But subsequent documents noted such a task of the troops as saving the Ukrainian and Belarusian peoples from the threat of "devastation and beating" from the enemies, it was emphasized that Soviet troops were going to Poland not as conquerors, but as liberators of Belarusians, Ukrainians and working people of Poland.
The actions of the Red Army on the territory of Poland lasted 12 days. During this time, the troops advanced 250-300 km and occupied an area with a total area of \u200b\u200bover 190 thousand square meters. km with a population of over 12 million people, including more than 6 million Ukrainians and about 3 million Belarusians.
Partition by the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany of Polish territories
After the entry of Soviet troops into Poland, relations between Britain and France with the Soviet Union sharply deteriorated. On September 19, an Anglo-French note was received in Moscow, in which it was required to stop the advance and withdraw Soviet troops from Poland. Otherwise, the note said, in accordance with the Polish-French allied treaty, the declaration of war on the Soviet Union could happen automatically.
Stalin and his entourage could not fail to understand that the nature of Soviet-German relations and the actions of the Soviet Union in Poland could make an extremely negative impression on world public opinion. Therefore, in the joint German-Soviet communiqué, adopted at the suggestion of Ribbentrop on September 18, 1939, but published only on September 20, it was said that the goal of the German and Soviet troops was “to restore order and tranquility in Poland, disturbed by the collapse of the Polish state, and to help the population Poland to reorganize the conditions of its state existence ”.
The Soviet leadership went even further with respect to the "Polish question" during the negotiations and the conclusion of the friendship and border treaty of September 28, 1939. These negotiations, dedicated to clarifying the border of the "state interests" of the USSR and Germany in Poland, began at the initiative of the Soviet side. On September 20, Schulenburg informed Ribbentrop that, in Molotov's opinion, the time had come to jointly decide the fate of Poland and that Stalin was inclined to divide it along the Tissa-Narev-Vistula-San line: “The Soviet government wants to immediately resolve this issue at the talks in Moscow with the participation of the highest statesmen of both countries ”. In a reply telegram to Molotov on September 23, Ribbentrop said that "the Russian point of view on the passage of the future border along four rivers is acceptable." Ribbentrop himself testifies to the atmosphere in which the negotiations took place in Moscow, who said that in the Kremlin he "felt like among the old partygenosses."
The adopted document established the border of the "state interests" of both states on the territory of Poland, although in the German-Soviet communique of September 22, 1939 it was also called the "demarcation line between the German and Soviet armies" and was supposed to run much east of the line agreed on August 23 1939 g.
It is interesting to note that both texts of the treaty - in German and Russian - were recognized as authentic. But at the same time it becomes unclear why the word “friendship” is placed after the word “border” in the title of the treaty in German, and vice versa in the text in Russian. Is this really due to the difference in the stylistics of both languages, or is there a political meaning behind it: that Stalin was more interested in the "friendship" he offered than Hitler?
In one confidential and two secret protocols annexed to the September 28 treaty, certain territorial changes in the strip from the Baltic to the Black Seas were clarified. In particular, the territory of Lithuania was included in the sphere of "state interests" of the USSR, and the territory of the Lublin and part of the Warsaw Voivodeships was relegated to the sphere of "state interests" of Germany. The parties also agreed that they would suppress the actions of the Polish population against the other side.
In the agreement of September 28, there is not a word about the right of the Polish people to state existence; The "reorganization" of Poland declared in it is considered only from the point of view of "further development of friendly relations" between the USSR and Germany.
Some Soviet studies assert that the Soviet leadership decisively obstructed the advance of German troops east of the agreed border line with the Soviet Union. However, in the light of the German documents, a different picture emerges. So, back on September 5, 1939, Molotov informed Ribbentrop that the Soviet leadership understood that “during operations, one of the sides or both sides may be forced to temporarily cross the demarcation line between their spheres of influence, but such cases should not interfere with the direct implementation of the planned plan. ". On September 15, Ribbentrop informed Molotov for the second time that Germany was tied by delimiting spheres of influence in Poland and therefore would welcome the imminent action of the Red Army, which "would free us from the need to destroy the remnants of the Polish army, pursuing them all the way to the Russian border."
In Berlin, at the beginning of hostilities, the idea arose of the possibility of creating a "residual Polish state" somewhere in the zone between the lines of interests of Germany and the USSR as a buffer. On this issue, General Halder wrote in his diary on September 7: “The Poles propose to start negotiations. We are ready for them on the following conditions: the break of Poland with England and France; the remainder of Poland will be preserved; areas from Narew to Warsaw - Poland; industrial area - to us; Krakow - Poland; the northern outskirts of the Beskydy - to us; the regions of Western Ukraine are independent. " As is clear from the September 10 record, the German leadership prepared a special appeal to the population of Western Ukraine, in which it promised them an "independent state" under the auspices of Germany.
Ribbentrop also spoke about the variants of the dismemberment of Poland on September 12. With reference to Hitler, he said that with this version of the "solution of the Polish question" it would be possible, if necessary, to negotiate the conclusion of an "Eastern peace". At the same time, Ribbentrop did not rule out the option that would provide for the dismemberment of Poland into separate component parts, including Western Ukraine.
But Hitler did not yet know what the position of Stalin and Molotov would be on this issue. Schulenburg found this out only the next day and told the Fuehrer that Stalin was resolutely against the preservation of the "Polish residual state" and for the partition of Poland. On September 28, Stalin announced that the dismemberment of areas with a purely Polish population would inevitably cause his desire for national unity, which could lead to friction between the USSR and Germany.
The decision of the German and Soviet governments of September 28 to divide the territory of Poland caused serious concern of the Polish people and officials. Thus, the Polish ambassador in Paris, according to the Havas news agency, expressed a protest to the French government, calling the Soviet-German treaty a violation of the rights of a sovereign state and people, international obligations and human morality.
The position of the Polish patriots was aggravated by the fact that there was a Soviet-German agreement on cooperation in the fight against Polish agitation. This was not a formal declaration; Such cooperation between the military authorities of Germany and the USSR in the Polish campaign, as General Kestring, the German military attaché in Moscow, declared, was a reality and proceeded impeccably at all levels. To establish cooperation between the Gestapo and the NKVD in December 1939 in Zakopane, i.e. a joint training center was established on Polish territory occupied by Germany.
After the delegations of the USSR and Germany delimited the border between the "spheres of interest", by mid-October 1939 it was demarcated. Thus, if earlier the border of the USSR with Poland was 1446 km long, then the border with Germany was 1952 km, i.e. 506 km more - from the village of Marinovo (the southern point of the USSR-Latvia border) to the village of Kazachuvka (the northern point on the Soviet-Romanian border). Having retained the Lvov-Drohobych oil-bearing region, which was occupied by the German troops in the first half of September, Stalin undertook to supply Germany from this region with 300 thousand tons of oil annually.
On September 21, a secret protocol was signed, according to which, in particular, the German command was obliged to ensure the safety and transfer of all abandoned facilities to the Soviet troops. It was also agreed that "to destroy the Polish bands along the route, Soviet and German troops will act together."
A clear example of the interaction between the Wehrmacht and the Red Army at that time is the agreement on the use of the Minsk radio station to direct German bombers to Polish cities. It is worth recalling that Goering, as a token of gratitude for combat cooperation in the fight against a common enemy, presented the USSR People's Commissar for Defense Voroshilov with an airplane.
In the course of hostilities, the commanders of the forward units of the German and Soviet armies exchanged liaison officers. Cooperation was also established with the command of the German Navy in the Baltic. Joint parades were held in Grodno, Brest, Pinsk and in a number of other cities even before the surrender of Warsaw. For example, in Grodno, along with the German general, the parade was received by the corps commander Chuikov, in Brest - by General Guderian and the brigade commander Krivoshein.
The statements of high-ranking Soviet political and military leaders indicate that the actions of the Soviet Union in Poland, and later in the Baltic states and against Finland were viewed mainly in terms of expanding the territory, increasing the population of the USSR and other military-strategic advantages. It was this concept that Mehlis formulated at the 18th Congress of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks), referring to Stalin's opinion: “If the second imperialist war turns its edge against the world's first socialist state, then it is necessary to transfer military operations to the enemy's territory, fulfill our international duties and multiply the number Soviet republics ".
At the solemn meeting on the occasion of the anniversary of October 6 November 1939, Molotov emphasized that after the annexation of Western Ukraine and Western Belarus, the population of the USSR had grown from 170 to 183 million people. In June 1941, the draft directive of the Main Directorate of Political Propaganda "On the tasks of political propaganda in the Red Army in the near future" said: "The entire personnel of the Red Army should be imbued with the consciousness that the increased political, economic and military power of the Soviet Union allows us to carry out an offensive foreign policy, decisively eliminating hotbeds of war at their borders, expanding their territories ... ". When discussing the project at the Main Military Council, Zhdanov said: “We have become stronger, we can set more active tasks. The wars with Poland and Finland were not defensive wars. We have already embarked on an offensive policy. "