5 December 6, 1941 began a counteroffensive under. "A man is stronger than a tank

This day in history: (many photos)

By the beginning of December, the last assault on Moscow had fizzled out, the German command had exhausted all its reserves and began to go over to the defensive. The commander of the German 2nd Panzer Army G. Guderian was forced to admit that the offensive of Army Group Center on Moscow had failed. The Soviet command correctly identified this moment and launched a counterblow. On December 5-6, 1941, the Soviet counteroffensive began in the battle of Moscow. The offensive was attended by the troops of the Kalinin Front under the command of Colonel General I.S.Konev, the Western Front under the command of Army General G.K. Zhukov and the right wing of the Southwestern Front - Marshal S.K. Timoshenko.

The fighting took on a fierce character from the very beginning. On December 8, the commander-in-chief of the German armed forces, Adolf Hitler, was forced to sign Directive No. 39 on the transition to the defense along the entire length of the Soviet-German front. The Red Army, despite the lack of superiority in manpower, tanks and guns, difficult natural conditions, already in the first days of the counteroffensive broke through the defenses of the German troops south of Kalinin and north-west of Moscow, cutting off the railway and the Kalinin-Moscow highway and liberating a number of settlements. It should be noted that the Soviet troops achieved victory, yielding to the enemy in the number of soldiers and technical means. Personnel: Red Army - 1.1 million people, Wehrmacht - 1.7 million (ratio 1: 1.5); tanks: 744 against 1170 (the ratio in favor of the Germans is 1: 1.5); guns and mortars: 7652 against 13500 (1: 1.8).

Simultaneously with the troops that were advancing northwest of the Soviet capital, units of the left wing of the Western and right wings of the Southwestern Fronts launched a counteroffensive. Powerful blows by Soviet troops on the flank groupings of the German Army Group Center, which were intended to envelop and encircle Moscow, forced the enemy command to take measures to save their forces from complete defeat.
On December 9, 1941, the Red Army occupied Rogachevo, Venev and Yelets. On December 11, Soviet troops liberated Stalinogorsk, December 12 - Solnechnogorsk, December 13 - Efremov, December 15 - Klin, December 16 - Kalinin, December 20 - Volokolamsk. On December 25, the Red Army men on a wide front reached the Oka. On December 28, the enemy was driven out of Kozelsk, on December 30 from Kaluga, at the beginning of January 1942 Meshchovsk and Mosalsk were liberated.

The woman meets the Soviet soldiers who liberated her village. Winter 1941 - 1942

By the beginning of January 1942, units of the right wing of the Western Front made their way to the line of the Lama and Ruza rivers. By the same time, the Kalinin Front reached the Pavlikovo-Staritsa line. Troops of the central grouping of the Western Front occupied Naro-Fominsk on December 26, Maloyaroslavets was liberated on January 2, and Borovsk on January 4. The Soviet offensive was also successfully developing on the left wing of the Western Front, as well as in the zone of the Bryansk Front under the command of General Ya. T. Cherevichenko. In general, by January 7, 1942, the counteroffensive near Moscow was completed.

As a result of the Soviet counteroffensive near Moscow, an important event took place - for the first time in World War II, the hitherto invincible Wehrmacht was stopped and then defeated by the Red Army. German troops were thrown back from the Soviet capital by 100-250 kilometers, the threat of capture by the enemy of the most important economic and transport center of the USSR, and the Moscow industrial region was removed. The success was obvious, and its significance went far beyond the purely military task.

It was near Moscow that the Germans for the first time in World War II began to lose their strategic initiative and received a strong blow, the "invincible" German soldiers wavered and fled. Berlin's strategic plan - "lightning war", was ultimately failed. The Third Reich faced the threat of a long, protracted war of attrition, for which the German command was not ready. The military-political leadership of the Reich had to urgently develop a new war plan, rebuild the economy for a long war, and seek out huge material resources. This was Berlin's grave miscalculation. The USSR turned out to be much stronger than the Nazis thought. Germany was not ready for a protracted war. To conduct it, it was necessary to radically rebuild the entire German economy, its foreign and domestic policy, not to mention the military strategy.

During the battle for Moscow, the German army suffered huge losses in personal strength and equipment. So, from the beginning of October 1941 to the end of March 1942, she lost about 650 thousand people killed, wounded and missing in action. For comparison, during the entire military campaign in the West in 1940, the Wehrmacht lost about 27 thousand people. During the period from October 1941 to March 1942, German troops lost 2,340 tanks near Moscow, while German industry was able to produce only 1,890 tanks. Aviation also suffered heavy losses that could not be fully compensated for by industry.

During the battle for Moscow, the strength and morale of the German army were broken. From that moment on, the power of the German machine began to decline, and the strength of the Red Army was constantly increasing. Of particular importance to this strategic success is the fact that the victory was achieved with the superiority of the Germans in manpower, tanks and guns (the Red Army had an advantage only in aviation). The Soviet command managed to compensate for the shortage of soldiers and weapons due to the successful choice of the moment of choosing the transition to the offensive. The German offensive was exhausted, the units were bled out of blood, exhausted by the long battles, the reserves were used up. The German command has not yet managed to go over to strategic defense and build defensive formations, prepare well-fortified positions. In addition, Moscow managed to achieve a surprise offensive. The German command was confident that the Red Army was also drained of blood and could not deliver strong blows. The Germans were unprepared to parry the unexpected blow. As a result, the surprise of the attack became one of the main factors in the success of the counteroffensive. In addition, the Soviet command was able to prepare reserves in the midst of a difficult battle for Moscow. So, for the development of the counteroffensive, 2 armies, 26 rifle and 8 cavalry divisions, 10 rifle brigades, 12 separate ski battalions and about 180 thousand marching reinforcements were involved.

Another factor that led to the victory of the Red Army near Moscow was the high fighting spirit of the Soviet soldiers. Courage, perseverance, perseverance of Soviet soldiers and commanders, the ability to emerge victorious in the most difficult conditions, made it possible to gain the upper hand over the first-class combat vehicle of the Wehrmacht.

The victory near Moscow also had enormous political and international significance. All the peoples of the world have learned that the Red Army is capable of beating German troops. There is no doubt that the success near Moscow had a great influence on the further course of both the Great Patriotic War and the entire Second World War as a whole. This victory became a guarantee for a systematic build-up of efforts by the entire anti-Hitler coalition. The prestige of Nazi Germany and its European allies fell dramatically. The defeat of the Wehrmacht near Moscow had a sobering effect on the Japanese and Turkish ruling circles, from which Berlin demanded an open attack against the USSR. Japan and Turkey were waiting for the fall of Moscow in order to side with Germany, but now they again began to wait.

Several photographs illustrating the glorious counteroffensive of the Red Army near Moscow:

Source: State Zelenograd Museum of History and Local Lore.

A German Mercedes-Benz L3000 truck wrecked and abandoned during the retreat. Winter 1941 - 1942

German cars abandoned during the retreat. Winter 1941 - 1942

Broken German convoy near the village of Kryukovo. Winter 1941 - 1942

A division of Soviet skiers in the village of Kryukovo near Moscow. Winter 1941 - 1942

A group of German soldiers captured during the Battle of Moscow.

The Kubelwagen (Volkswagen Tour 82 Kubelwagen) abandoned during the German retreat. Winter 1941 - 1942

Soviet soldiers are examining a damaged and abandoned German tank Pz.Kpfw.III. Winter 1941 - 1942

SdKfz 251/1 "Hanomag" armored personnel carrier abandoned during a German retreat. Winter 1941 - 1942

Soviet soldier at the abandoned German 105-mm light field howitzer leFH18. Winter 1941 - 1942

Village children sit on the turret of a destroyed and abandoned German tank Pz.Kpfw.III. Winter 1941 -1942

Soviet sapper at demining. Winter 1941 - 1942

German soldiers surrender to the Red Army during the Battle of Moscow. Winter 1941 - 1942

Soviet cavalrymen at the destroyed and abandoned German tank Pz.Kpfw.III. Winter 1941 - 1942

Portrait of a Soviet officer during the battle for Moscow. The officer is armed with a PPSh-41 submachine gun and two F-1 grenades.

Soviet cavalrymen in the ranks during the battle for Moscow. Winter 1941 - 1942

Soviet officers at dinner in a village near Moscow. Winter 1941 - 1942

Soviet armored vehicles BA-10A (the first armored car in the convoy) and BA-6 are moving into combat positions. Winter 1941 - 1942

A group of German soldiers captured during the Battle of Moscow. Winter 1941 -1942

German units in one of the occupied settlements near Moscow. On the road - ACS StuG III Ausf B, in the background armored vehicles Sd.Kfz. 222. December 1941.

Soviet sentry at the railway siding taken from the Germans. In the snow - the bodies of killed German soldiers.

German soldiers, including the wounded, captured by the Red Army during the 1941-1942 winter offensive. Attention is drawn to the almost complete absence of winter uniforms among the Germans.

German soldiers taken prisoner near Moscow.

Soviet armor-piercers are fighting in the winter of 1942. The soldiers are armed with a single-shot anti-tank rifle designed by V.A. Degtyarev PTRD-41.

The cavalrymen of the 2nd Guards Corps, Major General L.M. Dovatora pass through a village in the suburbs. The author's title of the photo is "Advancement of the cavalry to the front line of the enemy for the attack."

Captured by a serviceable 150-mm self-propelled gun sIG 33 (sfl) based on the Pz.I Ausf B tank (self-propelled gun "Bizon"). Western front.

Soviet repairmen inspect an abandoned Pz.Kpfw tank. III from the 10th Panzer Division of the Wehrmacht. Moscow region, January 1942.

A Soviet soldier next to a wrecked German Pz.Kpfw.III tank in the village of Kamenka. The tank belonged to the 5th German Panzer Division (5.Pz.Div.), Which had a tactical sign of a yellow oblique cross in a black square, and was captured by units of the Soviet 7th Guards Rifle Division.

Two German soldiers taken prisoner at Maloyaroslavets, under the escort of a Red Army soldier.

Soviet scouts at Yasnaya Polyana. Counteroffensive near Moscow.

Soviet artillerymen with a 45-mm anti-tank gun.

Know Soviet people that you are the descendants of fearless warriors!
Know, Soviet people, that the blood flows in you great heroes,
Those who gave their lives for the Motherland, without thinking about the benefits!
Know and honor Soviet people the exploits of grandfathers and fathers!

Among the historical events over which time has no power, a special place belongs to the Battle of Moscow, within the framework of which a counter-offensive took place near Moscow. In the harsh days of autumn 1941, when the question of the very existence of our state arose with all urgency, the answer depended on whether or not Moscow could withstand the onslaught of the German Wehrmacht. His motorized and army corps, which had not yet known a single defeat in World War II, sweeping away all obstacles in their path, broke through the strategic front and, having surrounded significant forces of three Soviet fronts near Vyazma and Bryansk, rushed to Moscow.

In such a dramatic environment, it seemed that the worst and irreparable would happen. At that time, not only enemies, but also friends of our country did not doubt that the fate of Moscow was a foregone conclusion, and its downfall was a matter of the next few days.

However, contrary to all gloomy forecasts, this did not happen. The defenders of the capital, together with the residents of Moscow and the Moscow region, heroically fighting the enemy, turned the city into an impregnable fortress. They fought the invaders day and night, at the front and surrounded, in the enemy's rear and in the sky of the capital. By stubborn defense of their positions, counterattacks and counterattacks, the introduction of fresh reserves and air strikes, they wore down the enemy forces. And now, when the Germans approached the suburbs of the capital and already through binoculars they could see life on the streets of the city ...

Soviet troops went over from defense to counteroffensive

The Soviet command, preparing a counteroffensive, tried to do everything possible to hide its intentions from the enemy. The planning of the operation in the fronts was carried out by an extremely limited circle of people, and the combat documents for it were developed personally by the chief of staff of the front. The army commanders were warned that with the directive they received:

“To inform only the member of the Military Council and the chief of staff about the transition to the counteroffensive. To give orders to the executors in the part concerning them ”.

Any negotiations on the upcoming counteroffensive by technical means of communication were prohibited.

However, it was unlikely to completely conceal such a large-scale regrouping of troops from the enemy, being in direct contact with him. Indeed, as trophy and other documents testify, the information received by the German side from agent, air and other types of reconnaissance allowed it to paint a relatively complete picture of the situation of the Red Army and the intention of its command. The reports noted the advancement of large Russian forces to the north and south of Moscow. But, despite the alarming nature of these messages, they did not receive adequate assessments from the German command. Continuing to remain in captivity of their own illusions, it believed that the Russians were no longer able to bring significant forces into battle, and regarded the fact of the appearance of fresh units near Moscow as an ordinary regrouping of troops from passive sectors to active ones to counter the German offensive. On December 4, the commander of Army Group Center, Field Marshal Fyodor von Bock, reacted to one of such intelligence reports as follows:

"... The combat capabilities of the enemy are not so great that he could with these forces ... start a major counteroffensive at the present time."

The German command turned a blind eye to the increasing resistance of the Soviet troops and their increased activity. Only by the fatigue of its personnel, and most importantly by the influence of weather conditions, it explained the fact that the German troops, which could not withstand the counterattacks, were thrown back at Yakhroma, Kubinka, Naro-Fominsk, Kashira, Tula and in other areas.

Cavalrymen of the 2nd Guards Cavalry Corps of the 16th Army of the Western Front, in the center with a map in their hands - the commander of the guard corps Major General Lev Mikhailovich Dovator

The ratio of forces and means on December 5, 1941

Forces and means	Soviet troops	German fascist troops	Ratio
Personnel, thousand people	1100	1708
Guns and mortars, units	7652	13500
Tanks, units		1170
Aircraft, units	1000

Contrary to his recent declarations like “the enemy will be defeated even before winter begins,” “the enemy will never rise again,” Hitler this time declared that the cold winter was to blame for all the troubles of the Wehrmacht near Moscow, which, moreover, came too early. However, this line of reasoning is not convincing. After all, the average temperature in the Moscow region, as evidenced by the daily intelligence reports of Army Group Center, was kept at minus 4-6 ° C in November. On the contrary, frozen swamps, streams, shallow rivers, together with a still shallow snow cover, dramatically improved the passability conditions of German tanks and motorized units, which were able to operate off roads without getting bogged down in mud, and go out to the flanks and rear of the Soviet troops. These conditions were close to ideal. True, from 5 to 7 December, when the mercury column dropped to minus 30-38 ° C, the position of the troops worsened noticeably. But the very next day, the temperature rose to zero. Consequently, the Fuhrer's motivation reveals his desire to hide the truth about the situation on the eastern front, to absolve himself of responsibility for the unpreparedness of his troops for operations in winter conditions, and most importantly, to preserve the impeccable prestige of the political and military leadership of the Reich.

Meanwhile, the Red Army's counter-offensive continued to gain momentum. The troops of the right wing of the Western Front, interacting with the Kalinin Front, struck at the Klin-Solnechnogorsk and Kalinin enemy groupings, and the adjacent flanks of the Western and South-Western Fronts - at its 2nd tank and 2nd field armies.

Troops of the 30th Army under the command of Major General D.D. Lelyushenko, breaking through with its center the defense front of the 3rd tank group, approached Klin from the northeast. Here the Germans offered especially stubborn resistance. The fact is that the exit of Soviet troops to the close approaches to Klin created a threat of a deep flank attack on the German troops operating north-west of Moscow. That is why the German command had to hastily strengthen its Klin grouping by transferring troops from other sectors. Already on December 7, units of six tank divisions began to be transferred to the Klin area. This circumstance led to a slowdown in the offensive of the 30th Army, but on the other hand, it facilitated the conduct of hostilities for other troops of the right wing of the Western Front.

And, nevertheless, the rate of advance of the Soviet troops remained very low: it was only 1.5-4 km per day. The advancing formations were drawn into battles for the capture of strong points, hastily created by the Germans in settlements, road junctions and on dominant heights, but, unfortunately, they acted extremely ineptly at the same time. Even those of them who proved themselves excellently in defensive battles did not have time to master the art of conducting an offensive battle.

In the Kalinin direction, the counteroffensive developed even more slowly. The 29th Army under the command of Lieutenant General I.I. Maslennikova, instead of striking one blow, launched an offensive simultaneously in three sectors of the front, moreover, distant from one another by 7-8 km. Each of the three advancing divisions struck on a 1.5-kilometer front. The attacking units wedged into the enemy's defenses, but, being shot through by his fire from both flanks, were forced to stop. The next day, the Germans launched strong counterattacks and again pushed the Soviet units back to the left bank of the Volga. In essence, by the end of the fifth day of fighting, the 29th Army's formations remained at the same lines from which they began the offensive. On the contrary, the 31st Army, commanded by Major General V.A. Yushkevich, has achieved success. She captured bridgeheads on the right bank of the Volga and by the end of December 9 had advanced 10-12 km, cutting the Kalinin-Turginovo highway and thereby threatening the rear of the enemy grouping in Kalinin.

At the same time, the armies of the right wing of the Western Front continued to advance. By the end of December 12, they advanced another 7-16 km. Now the front line ran north-west, north and east of Klin and came close to the Istra reservoir, r. Istra. The cities of Solnechnogorsk and Istra were liberated.

The Germans, trying to prevent the advance of the Soviet troops, blew up the dam. The offensive has stopped. To keep the roads leading to the west and ensure the withdrawal of the main forces of the 3rd and 4th tank groups to the Volokolamsk-Ruza line, the enemy continued to fight stubbornly in the area of Klin and the Istra reservoir.

The Soviet command strengthened the troops and carried out regroupings, but the offensive developed as a whole not quickly enough. In the actions of formations and units, frontal attacks of fortified enemy strongpoints still prevailed, rather than encircling them by means of envelopes. That is why General of the Army G.K. Zhukov, with a directive dated December 13, again demanded from the armies of the right wing:

"To complete the defeat of the enemy with a relentless and energetic offensive, the 30th and 1st Shock Armies were to encircle the enemy in the Klin region with part of their forces."

The commander of the Western Front categorically forbade frontal attacks on the enemy's fortified centers of resistance. He ordered:

“Pursue the pursuit swiftly, not allowing the enemy to break away. To widely use strong forward detachments to seize road junctions, gorges, disorganize the enemy's marching and battle formations. "

Since December 11, the formations of the 16th Army of the Western Front under the command of General K.K. Rokossovsky tried to overcome the Istra reservoir. However, after the explosion of the dam, the ice sank by 3-4 m and near the western coast was covered with a half-meter layer of water. In addition, on this coast, which was a rather serious natural obstacle, units of five enemy divisions took up defensive positions. For an offensive bypassing the reservoir from the north, and the river from the south, General Rokossovsky formed two mobile groups. One group was led by General F.T. Remizov, another - General M.E. Katukov. The commander of the Western Front, General G.K. Zhukov transferred the 2nd Guards Cavalry Corps of General L.M. to reinforce the 5th Army. Dovator, two separate tank battalions and other units.

For the development of the offensive on the right wing of the Western Front, the use of mobile groups was of paramount importance. Using their maneuvering capabilities, they delivered sudden and daring attacks on the enemy's flanks, even went into his rear. Particularly impressive results at this stage of the counteroffensive were achieved by the mobile group of L.M. Dovator. This is evidenced not only by the reporting documents of the Soviet headquarters, but also by the operational reports of the Army Group Center.

Despite the difficulties and shortcomings, the counteroffensive developed successfully. For 11 days of the offensive, the troops of the Western Front advanced on their right wing from 30 to 65 km, their average pace was almost 6 km per day. The troops of the left wing of the Kalinin Front covered the distance from 10 to 22 km. Their average pace did not exceed 0.8-1.8 km per day. So, on the near approaches to Moscow, to the north and north-west of it, the elite troops of the Wehrmacht suffered a significant defeat for the first time and were forced to retreat with heavy losses.

On the same days, the troops of the left wing of the Western Front achieved greater successes than those formations that operated north and north-west of the capital. Three main circumstances led to this achievement.

At first, the unfortunate location of the formations of Colonel-General G. Guderian.

Secondly and skilful use of the situation by the command of the Western Front. The main blow was struck at a weak spot in the enemy's operational formation - in the flank and rear of his main grouping.

Thirdly, an offensive with the advancement of troops from the depths, directly from the concentration area, ensured the surprise of the strike.

General F.I. Golikov (left)

L.M. Dovator

L.M. Dovator (right)

P.A. Belov (left)

Taking advantage of the favorable situation, the formations of the 10th Army under the command of General F.I. Golikov, they drove the enemy out of a number of settlements and by the end of December 7 had advanced almost 30 km into the depth of the enemy's location. At that moment, the prospect of not only dismembering, but also of encircling part of the forces of G. Guderian's tank army east of Tula opened up before the Soviet command. In order to prevent the encirclement, General G. Guderian hastened to order the troops to withdraw to the line of the Shat and Don rivers.

Meanwhile, the enemy increased resistance in other sectors as well. By December 9, he brought into battle the 112th Infantry Division, which, together with the retreating units, took up defenses along the western bank of the river. Shat, Shatsk reservoir and r. Don. Relying on these natural obstacles, the Germans stopped the 10th Army, whose parts by that time had managed to advance to a depth of 60 km. However, all attempts by her connections to overcome this position were in vain.

On December 8, General of the Army G.K. Zhukov gave the order: by joint efforts of the forces of the Belov group and the 50th Army, to surround and destroy the German group operating south of Tula, and the 10th Army to strike at Plavsk. An analysis of the progress of the implementation of this order shows that the Soviet troops failed to intercept the enemy's escape routes from the sack east of Tula. The high rates of retreat with the simultaneous use of natural obstacles and obstacles along the Soviet offensive routes allowed Guderian's divisions not only to avoid encirclement in that area, but also to stop the 10th Army.

Meanwhile, the offensive of the left wing of the Western Front continued to develop. At dawn on December 14, Belov's group liberated Uzlovaya station, and the next day - Dedilovo. On the same day, the troops of the 10th Army stormed Bogoroditsk, continuing their offensive towards Plavsk. But the main thing is that another army, the 49th, headed by General I.G. Zakharkin, with the task of crushing the enemy's Aleksin grouping. By the end of December 16, it had advanced from 5 to 15 km, covering the troops of the 50th Army on the right.

In the zone of the right wing of the Southwestern Front, the 2nd German Army operated under the command of General R. Schmidt, which advanced until December 6, and therefore did not have a prepared defense.

On December 6, the 13th Army of General A.M. Gorodnyansky. On the first day, its troops did not achieve any significant territorial success, but they diverted the enemy's attention from the direction of the front's main attack, forcing the German command to withdraw part of its forces from here to counter the formations of the 13th Army. This made it possible for the front strike group, headed by General Kostenko, to deliver a surprise strike on the weakened German group on the morning of December 7. On the same day, the 13th Army started fighting directly for the town of Yelets. The enemy put up stubborn resistance, but on the night of December 9, under the threat of encirclement, his units began to leave the city. Yelets was released. On the next day, the troops of the army were already advancing in the entire strip. Attempts by the Germans to delay them were unsuccessful. On December 10, units of Lieutenant General A.M. Gorodnyansky advanced from 6 to 16 km, and the enemy hastily retreated in the western and northwestern directions.

To successfully encircle the enemy units retreating to the north-west, it was necessary to first solve two main tasks:

increase the pace of the offensive; change the direction of the attacks of the 13th Army and the Kostenko group, aiming them at the Upper.

On the whole, this was also favored by the general situation. Fulfilling the assigned tasks, the troops under the command of generals A.M. Gorodnyansky and F. Ya. By the end of December 12, Kostenko was half surrounded by the enemy's Yelets group. Its complete encirclement was completed by the end of the 16th, when the left-flank formations of the 3rd army reached the village. Destiny.

Enemy units, trying to break through to the west, repeatedly went over to counterattacks. By their active actions, they often put the troops of F.Ya. Kostenko. So, individual units of the 34th enemy army corps managed to reach the communications of the 5th cavalry corps of General V.D. Kryuchenkin and interrupt its supply. However, soon the troops of the front almost completely defeated the 34th Army Corps, and its remnants were thrown back to the west. The morale of the German soldiers had fallen so badly that the commander of the 2nd Army, General Schmidt, was forced to give the order to identify those who dared to carry on defeatist conversations, and for a clear example to others to immediately shoot them.

At the same time, the troops of Marshal S.K. Tymoshenko, who inflicted a serious defeat on the 2nd Army, advanced 80-100 km westward. In addition, they diverted part of the forces of the 2nd Panzer Army to themselves, thus making it easier for the troops of the left wing of the Western Front to complete the task.

The counter-offensive near Moscow had been going on for the eighth day, and there were no reports of it. Thoughts about the impending disaster hanging over the capital put a heavy burden on people, and the uncertainty only increased their anxiety about the fate of their beloved city. And on the night of December 13, a message from the Soviet Information Bureau sounded on the radio:

“At the last hour. Failure of the German plan to encircle and occupy Moscow. " For the first time, the plans of the enemy were revealed in it, and it was said about the disruption of the "second general offensive on Moscow."

By this time, Soviet troops defeated the enemy's shock tank groupings and, advancing from the baseline 60 km north of the capital, and 120 km south of the capital, eliminated the immediate danger to Moscow. In other words, the troops of the three fronts completed the immediate task and achieved the main goal of the counteroffensive:

On December 16, the Soviet command issued an order to continue pursuing the enemy. The troops were determined by the lines that they had to reach, as well as the timing of the tasks and the methods of solving them. At the same time, the width of the offensive front and the composition of the troops involved increased at the expense of the right wing of the Kalinin, the center of the Western and right wings of the Southwestern Fronts.

The headquarters continuously coordinated the efforts of the fronts. After analyzing the orders given, she established that if the Southwestern Front goes on the offensive on December 18, it will clearly lag 100 km behind the adjacent wing of the Western Front. Therefore, the Headquarters proposed to Marshal S.K. Tymoshenko to speed up the advance of the right flank of the Southwestern Front. In accordance with the instructions received by S.K. Tymoshenko ordered the 61st Army to go on the offensive with part of its forces on December 16, that is, two days earlier. For this, a mobile group was formed, led by General K.I. Novik.

A Soviet ski battalion moves to the front line during the Battle of Moscow.

After the battle in the suburbs. These are the positions of the German troops - four light machine guns ZB vz. 26 Czech production, which were in service with the Wehrmacht.

Soviet fighting dogs in winter capes.

Attention is drawn to the pace with which the armies of the right wing of the Western Front were to advance. The headquarters set it within 10-15 km per day, and G.K. Zhukov increased it to 20-25 km per day, that is, almost doubled, although in those conditions it was almost impossible to achieve such rates.

At the same time, a number of important decisions were made by the Supreme High Command of the Wehrmacht. On December 16, Hitler ordered the troops of Army Group Center to hold out until the last opportunity to buy time to improve transport links and pull up reserves. Having made a decision to hold the front at any cost, Hitler on December 16 came to the conclusion that it was necessary to replace both Brauchitsch and Bock, who, in his opinion, would not be able to cope with the crisis situation. An analysis of these decisions shows that the High Command of the Wehrmacht only by mid-December realized the full extent of the danger hanging over the Army Group Center. Only 12 days after the start of the Soviet counteroffensive near Moscow, it became convinced that their actions led not to tactical breakthroughs of local importance, but to a breakthrough on a strategic scale. As a result, there was a threat of defeat of the largest strategic group of the Wehrmacht. The severity of the situation was aggravated by the fact that its formations could carry out a withdrawal only by abandoning heavy weapons, and without it the German troops would not be able to hold the rear positions to which they were retreating.

However, objectively assessing the state and possibilities of resistance of Army Group Center, it should be noted that with the reduction of the front line, the position of the German troops improved somewhat. By this time, the density of the 3rd and 4th tank groups has increased 1.4 times, and that of the Guderian army group - 1.8 times. That is why the troops of Army Group Center had a real opportunity to conduct a stubborn defense and to offer quite active resistance to the advancing Red Army. That is why Hitler's demand for the troops to provide fanatical resistance in their positions looks quite justified, since it corresponded to the current situation and the combat potential of the German troops. Having removed Brauchitsch from the post of commander-in-chief of the ground forces, Hitler himself decided to become the head of the ground forces and personally supervise all measures to save the eastern front.

The second stage of the counteroffensive of the Red Army near Moscow

All these important events, which took place in mid-December, had a significant impact on the nature of hostilities. Under the influence of the factors considered, the second stage of the Red Army's counteroffensive near Moscow began. The troops of the left wing of the Kalinin Front continued their offensive in the southern and southwestern directions.

On December 16, the commander of the Kalinin Front, General Konev, gave an order according to which the 30th and 31st armies were to advance from the east to Staritsa, and the 22nd and 29th armies from the north, delivering the main blows with their adjacent flanks. In the course of these actions, it was planned not only to defeat most of the troops of the 9th Army, but also to create conditions for a subsequent attack on the flank and rear of the main forces of Army Group Center.

To implement the idea of I.S. Konev, the armies of the left wing of the front were required to advance quickly towards Staritsa. However, the command of the 30th Army was unable to create the necessary grouping in a short time.

Its main forces entered the battle only on December 19. The offensive of the neighboring 31st Army also proceeded very slowly. By the 20th, she had not made a difficult turn to the west, continuing to advance to the southwest. By the end of December 20, both armies advanced only 12-15 km, and the pace of the offensive did not exceed 3-4 km per day.

Nevertheless, the commander of the Kalinin Front, Colonel-General I.S. Konev did not consider it possible to abandon active operations in the Torzhok-Rzhev direction. He ordered her commander, General I.I. Maslennikov go on the offensive with two divisions, continuing to pull up the remaining six. Having completed the concentration of formations, the army intensified the onslaught and by the end of December, interacting with the left-flank divisions of the 22nd army of General V.I. Vostrukhova, fought its way into the depth of the enemy defense by 15-20 km.

By this time, the troops of the 29th and 31st armies inflicted a serious defeat on the enemy and reached the approaches to Staritsa. This city, located on the steep banks of the Volga, the Germans turned into a powerful center of resistance, but could not hold it. Under the onslaught of the troops of General V.I. Shvetsov, units of the 6th Army Corps were forced to hastily leave Staritsa. Attempts by the enemy to rectify the situation were unsuccessful. Soviet divisions rushed to Rzhev. The successful advance of the troops of the right wing and the center of the Kalinin Front put the enemy in a difficult position. After all, the continuation of the struggle northeast of Rzhev created a threat of a breakthrough in the defense in the center of the 9th Army. However, even in this situation, and on January 2, Hitler did not give permission to withdraw the troops of this army.

By January 7, the formations of the 22nd and 39th armies broke the enemy's resistance and reached the line of the r. Volga, a railway to the west of Rzhev, opening the way for an attack on Vyazma. By this time, using the success of the 39th Army, they were developing an offensive in the direction of Rzhev and looming over the Rzhev group of the enemy from the northeast of the 29th Army formations, and from the east - of the 31st Army. As for the 30th Army, its progress was still minimal. Thus, at the second stage of the counteroffensive, the troops of the Kalinin Front inflicted another blow on the 9th German army, forcing it to retreat 50-60 km in the Torzhok-Rzhev direction, and 90-100 km in the Kalinin-Rzhev direction. On the right wing, they reached the Volga line, in the center, they covered Rzhev in a half ring. With regard to the main forces of Army Group Center, the front continued to occupy an enveloping position. All this created the preconditions for the development of the offensive towards Vyazma. In accordance with the instructions of the Headquarters, the Kalinin Front began regrouping troops in the interests of a new operation.

The troops of the right wing of the Western Front from the morning of December 17 continued to pursue the enemy, having the task of reaching the Zubtsov, Gzhatsk line, that is, 112-120 km west of the line they had reached by that time. The German command, covering the retreat with strong rearguards, withdrew the main forces of the tank groups to an intermediate position prepared along the banks of the Lama and Ruza rivers, while barriers were widely used, especially in settlements and at road junctions. In many sectors of the front, the enemy retreated indiscriminately, abandoning weapons, equipment and vehicles.

German soldiers freezing in the snow near Moscow.

Trophy German motorcycles captured by Soviet troops during the Battle of Moscow.

Soviet officers inspect captured weapons in front of a line of captured German soldiers. Battle for Moscow.

Troops of the 1st Shock Army of General V.I. Kuznetsov on December 18 with a battle took a large stronghold Teryaeva Sloboda and went to the border of the river. Big Sister, more than 20 km forward. 20th Army, pursuing the enemy with units of the mobile group of Major General F.T. Remizova, moved westward by about 20 km and by the end of December 18 reached the line 18 km east of Volokolamsk. On December 19, troops of the 20th Army started fighting for Volokolamsk. At the same time, the group of F.T. Remizov together with the 64th Naval Rifle Brigade of Colonel I.M. Chistyakov attacked the city from the north and east, and the group of Colonel M.E. Katukova - from the southwest.

Under the threat of encirclement, the enemy's 35th Infantry Division, covered by rear guards, at dawn on December 20, began to hastily retreat to the western bank of the river. Lama. On the shoulders of the retreating Germans, units of both mobile groups and Pacific sailors rushed into Volokolamsk and, with decisive actions, knocked out the enemy's rearguard from it. So the enemy lost a large stronghold in his defense system at the Lama line.

By this time, the 16th Army of General K.K. Rokossovsky went to the river. Ruze, but, having met stubborn resistance from the enemy, she could not advance further. 5th Army of General L.A. Govorova during December 19 and 20 on her right flank and in the center fought fierce battles with enemy units that had retreated beyond the Ruza and Moscow rivers. With well-organized artillery, mortar and machine-gun fire, the Germans put up stubborn resistance on this natural line and on the approaches to the city of Ruza. All attempts by army units to break through its defenses and liberate the city ended in failure. Here, on the outskirts of Ruza, near the village. Palashkino On December 19, the commander of the 2nd Guards Cavalry Corps, General L.M. Dovator.

So, at the second stage of the counteroffensive, the armies of the right wing of the Western Front advanced another 40 km, which was about 1.5 times less than at the first stage. The reasons are that the offensive capabilities of the armies have dried up, the factor of surprise has exhausted itself, the enemy has managed to organize a fairly strong defense at the intermediate line. Attempts to overcome it on the move were unsuccessful.

At a time when the troops of the right wing of the Western Front began to prepare for an operation to break through the enemy's defenses, the main events unfolded on its left wing. In the process of completing the offensive near Tula, the front command directed troops for subsequent actions in the northwestern and western directions. On the evening of December 16, General Zhukov ordered the 10th, 49th, 50th armies and Belov's group to continue non-stop pursuit of the enemy and liberate Kaluga.

Realizing the assigned tasks, the troops of the left wing of the Western Front increased the pressure on the enemy. Under their pressure, the 2nd Panzer Army of the enemy with its main forces retreated in the southwestern direction to Oryol, and with its left flank - to the west. A gap formed between these groups, the width of which reached 30 km by the evening of December 17. G.K. Zhukov, deciding to use the gap in the enemy's front to quickly capture Kaluga with a blow from the south, ordered the commander of the 50th Army, General I.V. Boldin to create a mobile group. At the same time, Belov's group was to quickly reach the Oka, force it north of Belyov and, then turning the main forces to the north-west, capture Yukhnovo on December 28 and thus cut off the enemy's escape route from Kaluga and Maloyaroslavets. The 10th Army received an order to quickly occupy Belev and Sukhinichi. Zhukov pursued the goal of depriving the Germans of the opportunity to gain a foothold at intermediate lines and hold the most important road junctions.

Created in the 50th Army for the liberation of Kaluga, a mobile group consisting of rifle, tank and cavalry divisions, as well as a Tula workers' regiment and a tank battalion under the command of General B.C. Popova on the night of December 18 began to fulfill her task. Bypassing settlements and not getting involved in battles with the enemy, by the end of December 20, she secretly approached Kaluga from the south.

On the morning of December 21, part of the mobile group V.S. Popov captured the bridge across the Oka, broke into Kaluga and started street battles with the city's garrison. The German command strove to keep Kaluga behind at all costs. As a result of active operations by superior enemy forces, Popov's group was soon dismembered. She had to fight in the encirclement, which took on a protracted nature and continued until the end of December.

The forced retreat of the 43rd Army Corps to Kaluga led to the fact that the gap between the adjacent flanks of the 4th field and 2nd tank armies increased even more. Belov's group was directed into this gap, which on December 24 reached the Oka south of Likhvin (now Chekalin). The offensive of the group and the exit of its units to the Oka had a favorable effect on the actions of the left-flank formations of the 50th Army, since the threat of a strike from the south was eliminated. The army quickly advanced to Likhvin and liberated the city on December 26. Now its left-flank divisions were able to cover Kaluga from the southwest. By this time, the right-flank formations of the army were fighting the enemy east and southeast of Kaluga, trying to cover it also from the northeast. On December 30, after ten days of intense fighting, Popov's group, together with the arriving units of the 290th and 258th rifle divisions, cleared the ancient Russian city of Kaluga from the invaders.

The last to launch a counteroffensive were the troops operating in the center of the Western Front. It should be noted that the conditions for this turned out to be the most unfavorable compared to those on the flanks of the Western Front. German troops relied on a previously prepared defensive line. It took two months to build and by mid-December had fully equipped strongholds with full-profile trenches, dugouts and communication trenches. There were anti-tank and anti-personnel obstacles, mainly mine-explosive obstacles, as well as a well-organized fire system with a sufficient supply of shells, mines, and cartridges. Most of the formations of the 4th field army defending in this sector did not conduct active hostilities for a month, and therefore suffered the least losses. In addition, the operational density of its troops, which amounted to 5.4 km per division, turned out to be the highest in Army Group Center.

On the morning of December 18, after an hour-long artillery preparation, the troops of the center of the Western Front went on the offensive. Some units of the 33rd Army of General M.G. Efremov managed to cross to the western bank of the river. Nars to the north of Naro-Fominsk, but they were driven back by an enemy counterattack. The next day, the 110th Rifle Division, part of its forces, crossed to the western bank of the river near the village. Elagino (3 km south of Naro-Fominsk) and started fighting there. December 20, General M.G. Efremov brought the 201st rifle division into battle. However, this maneuver did not change the situation. Protracted battles were fought on the previous lines. Only the 222nd Infantry Division on December 21 managed to capture a small bridgehead on the western bank of the Nara near the village of Tashirovo.

Nevertheless, the situation began to change in a direction favorable to the armies of the center of the Western Front. The fact is that as a result of the offensive of the left wing of this front and the withdrawal of German troops to Kaluga, a gap was formed between the 13th and 43rd Army Corps in the enemy's zone of operations. The left-flank formations of the 49th Army of General I.G. Zakharkina. By the end of December 22, they, having advanced 52 km, threatened to envelop the 4th German army from the south.

The beginning of the withdrawal of German troops served General of the Army G.K. Zhukov as a reason to order General Efremov to increase pressure on the enemy. The battles for Naro-Fominsk flared up with renewed vigor. Overcoming fierce enemy opposition from the 222nd Rifle Division of Colonel F.A. Bobrov captured the city from the north, and the 1st Guards Motorized Rifle Division of Colonel S.I. Iovleva - from the southwest. On December 26, Naro-Fominsk was taken. On the same day, Zhukov gave the order to pursue the enemy in the Mozhaisk and Maloyaroslavets directions. Balabanovo was released on December 28, and Maloyaroslavets on January 2.

Fiercely resisting, the Germans did not allow the 33rd Army's right flank and center formations to advance west of Naro-Fominsk. For three days and three nights, five rifle divisions of the 33rd and 43rd armies fought street battles of exceptional fierceness before they were able to clear the enemy of Borovsk, which covered the approaches to the Minsk highway from the south. It happened on January 4, and in the next four days, the adjacent formations of the same armies advanced another 10-25 km, but due to stubborn resistance and powerful counterattacks from the units of the 20th and the formations of the 7th and 9th that came to their aid. enemy army corps were forced to stop. By January 7, 1942, the Red Army's counteroffensive was over.

The victory near Moscow was won by the courage and steadfastness of the Russian soldier.

So, in December 1941, near Moscow, a significant event took place: for the first time in World War II, the troops of the Red Army stopped and then inflicted a major defeat on the German army that had previously considered itself invincible and, having thrown it back from Moscow by 100-250 km, removed the threat to the capital and Moscow industrial area. This success was indisputable and extremely important, and its significance went far beyond the scope of a purely military task.

After all, it was near Moscow that the Germans not only began to lose their strategic initiative and learned the bitterness of defeat, but, and this is the main thing, they lost their "blitzkrieg war" against the Soviet Union. The collapse of the blitzkrieg strategy presented the Third Reich with the prospect of a long, protracted war. Such a war demanded that its rulers restructure the Barbarossa plan, new strategic planning for the coming years, and additional exploration of enormous material resources. Germany was not ready for a protracted war. Its conduct required a radical restructuring of the country's economy, its domestic and foreign policy, not to mention the strategy.

The defeat near Moscow was measured by other criteria.

“The myth of the invincibility of the German army has been shattered,” wrote Halder. - With the onset of summer, the German army will achieve new victories in Russia, but this will no longer restore the myth of its invincibility. Therefore, December 6, 1941 can be considered a turning point, and one of the most fateful moments in the brief history of the Third Reich. The strength and power of Hitler reached their apogee, starting from that moment they began to decline ... ".

The special significance of this success of the Red Army is given by the fact that it was achieved with an unfavorable balance of forces and means for the offensive. However, the Soviet command managed to compensate for this shortcoming by successfully choosing the moment to go over to the counteroffensive, when the enemy stopped, but had not yet managed to go over to the defensive and build defensive positions, as well as due to the surprise of the counteroffensive. The enemy, not prepared to parry unexpected blows, found himself in unfavorable conditions, he had to hastily change plans and adapt to the actions of the Red Army. It was surprise that was one of the most important conditions for a successful counteroffensive at its first stage. In addition, success was achieved through the use of additional forces. For the development of the counter-offensive, 2 combined-arms armies, 26 rifle and 8 cavalry divisions, 10 rifle brigades, 12 separate ski battalions and about 180 thousand marching reinforcements were involved.

All these factors, as well as the losses incurred by the enemy, especially in military equipment, and his lack of operational reserves led to a change in the balance of forces and assets of the sides. As a result, by the end of the counteroffensive, it was equalized in artillery, and in men and tanks, it became in favor of the fronts of the western direction, respectively, by 1.1 and 1.4 times.

The decisive factor in achieving victory over the invaders in the counteroffensive near Moscow was the high morale of Soviet soldiers. The famous English military theorist and historian B. Liddell Hart emphasized that this victory was won:

"First of all, by the courage and resilience of the Russian soldier, his ability to endure hardships and continuous battles in conditions that would finish off any Western army."

And this is absolutely true.

In the days of December 1941, the peoples of the whole world learned that the Red Army could not only retreat, but was also capable of resisting the Wehrmacht troops. Another thing is undoubted:

the success near Moscow had a huge impact on the further course of both the Great Patriotic War and the entire Second World War as a whole.

Another very important event of a global scale took place: on January 1, 1942, representatives of 26 states signed the Declaration of the United Nations. All of them pledged to use their economic and military resources to fight against Germany, Italy, Japan and the countries that joined them, and in addition, to cooperate with each other and not to conclude a separate truce or peace with the states of the fascist bloc. This was the key to creating a favorable atmosphere for the planned build-up of the military power of the anti-Hitler coalition.

The Battle of Moscow was marked by massive heroism and self-sacrifice of the Soviet people. For valor and courage shown in battles, 40 units and formations were awarded the title of guards, 36 thousand soldiers were awarded orders and medals, 187 people were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union and Hero of the Russian Federation.

Killed German soldiers and abandoned German artillery during the December Red Army counteroffensive near Moscow. For added effect, a flock of crows was added to the photo with the help of montage.