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On April 3, 1922, another leading position appeared in the complex power structure of Soviet Russia - the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the RCP (b). This post was occupied by Joseph Vissarionovich Stalin for a long 30 years. How one of the most controversial rulers in the history of Russia began his journey to power - in the RT material.
In the first years of the existence of Soviet Russia, power belonged simultaneously to the government of the country (represented by the Council of People's Commissars) and the government of the party (consisted of two non-permanent bodies - the Party Congress and the Central Committee of the RCP (b) - and one permanent - the Politburo). After Lenin's death, the issue of supremacy between these two structures fell away by itself: all the fullness of political power passed into the hands of party bodies, and the government began to solve technical problems.
But in the early 20s there was still a possibility that the Council of People's Commissars would govern the country. Leon Trotsky placed special hopes on this. Lenin, as chairman of the government, head of the party and leader of the revolution, decided otherwise. And Joseph Stalin helped him to bring this decision to life.
Why Stalin?
Stalin was 43 years old in April 1922. Researchers, as a rule, note that the future general secretary was not a member of the major political league and he had a difficult relationship with Lenin. So what helped Stalin climb the communist Olympus? To say that the reason lies in the incredible political genius of Stalin, however, is incorrect, although the personality of the future general secretary did play an important role here. It was the active "black" work in the interests of the party that gave him the necessary knowledge, experience and connections.
Stalin was listed in the ranks of the Bolsheviks from the moment the party was founded: he organized strikes, was engaged in underground work, was imprisoned, served a link, edited Pravda, and was a member of the Central Committee and the government.
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The future general secretary was well known in the widest circles of the party, he was famous for his ability to work with people. Unlike other leaders, Stalin did not stay abroad for a long time, which allowed him "to keep in touch with the practical side of the movement."
Lenin saw in his potential successor not only a strong administrator, but also a capable politician. Stalin understood that it was important to show that he was fighting not for personal power, but for an idea, in other words, he was fighting not with specific people (mainly with Trotsky and his associates), but with their political position. And Lenin, in turn, understood that after his death this very struggle would become inevitable and could lead to the collapse of the entire system.
Together against Trotsky
The situation that had developed by the beginning of 1921 was extremely unstable, largely due to the far-reaching plans of Leon Trotsky. During the Civil War, as a people's commissar of military affairs, he had a very large weight in the government, but after the final victory of Bolshevism, the significance of the position began to decrease. Trotsky, however, did not despair and began to build connections in the secretariat of the Central Committee - in fact, the governing body of the committee. The result was that all three secretaries (who were equal before Stalin's appointment) became ardent Trotskyists, and Trotsky himself could well even openly speak out against Lenin. One of these cases is described by the sister of Vladimir Ilyich - Maria Ulyanova:
“The case of Trotsky is typical in this respect. At one meeting of the PB, Trotsky called Ilyich a "hooligan." IN AND. turned pale as chalk, but restrained himself. "It seems that some people here are playing tricks on their nerves," he said something like this in response to Trotsky's rudeness, according to the comrades who told me about this incident.
However, not only Trotsky, but also other associates of Lenin sought to prove their independence. The situation was complicated by the beginning of the new economic policy. Ordinary communists often misunderstood the return to market relations and private enterprise. They understood the NEP not as a necessary measure for the restoration of the country's economy, but as a betrayal of the idea. In almost all party organizations, there were cases of withdrawal from the RCP (b) "for disagreement with the NEP."
In the light of all these events, the decision of seriously ill Lenin to reorganize the key organs of the state apparatus looks very logical. Vladimir Ilyich began to actively oppose Trotsky at the 10th Party Congress (March 8-16, 1921). Lenin's main task was to fail the people who supported Trotsky in the elections to the Central Committee. The active propaganda work of Lenin and Stalin, as well as the general dissatisfaction with Trotsky and his methods, bore fruit: after the elections, the supporters of the people's commissar for military affairs were in an obvious minority.
Bolsheviks in the early 20s. First row: second from the left - Joseph Stalin, third from the right in a cloak and hat - Lev Trotsky. In the center, marked with a white cross - Nikita Khrushchev
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"I ask you to assist Comrade Stalin..."
Lenin began to introduce Stalin to the course of all affairs. From August 1921, the future Secretary General began to take an active part in solving the most important economic and economic issues of the country. Evidence that this was Lenin's initiative can be, for example, an excerpt from his letter to diplomat Boris Stomonyakov:
“I ask you to assist comrade. Stalin in getting acquainted with all the economic materials of the Council and the State Planning Commission, especially the gold industry, the Baku oil industry, etc.
The strongest blow for Trotsky was that from the autumn of 1921, part of the military power also passed to Stalin: after that, Trotsky was forced to reckon with the opinion of his main opponent, even in his own commissariat. Gradually, Stalin became involved in the external affairs of the state, and on November 29, 1921, he proposed to Lenin a plan for the reorganization of the Politburo, to which Ilyich, judging by his actions, agreed. In his letter to the leader, Stalin noted:
“The Central Committee itself and its top leadership, the Politburo, are structured in such a way that there are almost no experts in economic affairs among them, which also affects (negatively, of course) the preparation of economic issues. Finally, the members of the Politburo are so overwhelmed by the current and sometimes extremely diverse work that the Politburo as a whole is sometimes forced to decide questions on the basis of trust or distrust in this or that commission, without entering into the essence of the matter. It would be possible to put an end to this situation by changing the composition of the Central Committee in general, the Politburo in particular, in favor of experts in economic affairs. I think that this operation should be carried out at the 11th Party Congress (because before the Congress, I think, there is no way to fill this gap).
Position for Stalin
By the beginning of 1922, Stalin - until recently not ranked among the leaders of the party - was ready to accept the highest leadership post. And Lenin created this post for him.
Now it is already difficult to say who exactly came up with the position of General Secretary of the Central Committee of the RCP (b), but this idea, with the general instability of power in the country, was in the air. So, at one of the party forums, Comrade Krestinsky, who at that time was just a secretary and part-time supporter of Trotsky, was named general secretary. Stalin was the first among equals to be designated in his own letter dated February 21, 1922. In it, the future general secretary outlined his views on holding the XI Party Congress and, in particular, described how he sees the new composition of the secretariat: Stalin, Molotov, Kuibyshev. According to the established tradition, primacy in the list meant supremacy.
Joseph Stalin, Alexei Rykov, Grigory Zinoviev and Nikolai Bukharin at the XII Congress of the CPSU(b). Moscow. 1923
© Museum "Moscow House of Photography"
Everything was decided at the already mentioned Eleventh Congress. Lenin's goal was to get ten of his main supporters into the Central Committee. It is important that in the list of candidates opposite Stalin's name, the leader personally wrote "general secretary", which caused obvious disapproval among some of the delegates - the composition of the secretariat was determined by the committee itself, but not by Lenin. Then the supporters of Vladimir Ilyich had to note that the notes in the lists were exclusively advisory in nature.
According to the results of the elections, out of 522 delegates with a decisive vote, 193 voted for Stalin as general secretary, only 16 people voted against, the rest abstained. This was a very good result, given that Lenin and Stalin established a new position that was not very clear to the delegates and arranged a vote not at the plenum of the Central Committee, as expected, but at the party congress.
Such a hasty promotion of the post of general secretary can only mean one thing: Lenin needed not the post itself, but Stalin in this post. The leader of the revolution understood that, if successful, he would be able to increase the authority of Stalin and, in fact, present him as his successor.
The point on this issue was put on April 3, 1922 at the plenum of the Central Committee of the RCP (b). First, the members of the committee decided what to do with the position of chairman of the Central Committee, that is, in fact, the main person in the party. It is not known exactly who initiated its introduction, but it is believed that this was another attempt by Trotsky to thwart Lenin's plan. And it failed: by a unanimous decision of the Central Committee, the position was rejected. Obviously, Lenin would have become the first chairman, but he firmly decided to leave Stalin in the main official position so that the country would not be divided into two fronts after his death.
“My name will be slandered, many atrocities will be attributed to me. World Zionism will strive with all its might to destroy our Union so that Russia can never rise again. The spearhead of the struggle will be aimed at separating the border regions from Russia. Nationalism will raise its head with particular force. Many pygmy leaders will appear, traitors within their nations ... "
I. V. Stalin
“Stalin is the center, the heart of everything that radiates from Moscow all over the world.”
French writer A. Barbusse
65 years ago, on March 5, 1953, the great people's leader Joseph Stalin passed away. The man who was able to revive the Russian empire in the form of the Soviet Union, who won the Second World War, who created powerful armed forces, a nuclear shield for our Motherland, the best science and education in the world.
In "democratic Russia", created in 1991-1993, he was declared a maniac and a bloody dictator. Why is Stalin so hated by various Westerners, liberals and small-town nationalists? The answer is simple. Stalin was a real people's leader who devoted his whole life to solving the global and national problems of Russian civilization and the Russian people. He forced the government and the Communist Party to serve the Motherland without sparing himself. And after his death, he left no wealth, no accounts in foreign banks, no palaces and villas, no stolen billions and gold. The Soviet superpower became his treasure.
Most importantly, Stalin showed the main path of the future great Russia (USSR) and all mankind - the society of the "golden age", the society of social justice, service and creation. A society where the ethics of conscience dominates, and a person is a creator, a creator, serves the Motherland and the people. Stalin showed an alternative path for the development of all mankind. The masters of the Western project and civilization are building an unjust world order - a global slave, slave-owning, caste civilization, where there is a handful of "masters of life and money", "chosen ones" who are allowed everything, and who have access to genuine knowledge, the most advanced achievements of science, technology, medicine. And the rest of the people are immersed in the darkness of poverty, do not have access to normal education and healthcare, are constantly intoxicated with various drugs: tobacco, alcohol, heavier intoxicants, food surrogates, information-virtual illusions, etc. Their lifespan is deliberately shortened, spirituality , intellect and physical condition are suppressed, descend to the level of two-legged tools, cattle.
At the same time, Western "elites" are constantly developing and implementing plans to reduce the human "biomass". So that more resources remain "chosen", so that you can create a clean planet, without two-legged "viruses" that kill the Earth. This is junk food, and putting people on drugs, with the suppression of normal immunity and the absence of normal programs for the physical and spiritual development of people. This is the creation of a society of stress, where people spin like squirrels in a wheel, extracting resources for a “normal” life, but in reality they ruin their mental and physical health, get addicted to stimulants and intoxicants in order to temporarily forget. This is also a consumer society, which destroys both the planet, its biosphere, and the person himself, as part of a common living system. A person is turned into a consumer animal, completely dependent on the “masters of life”. This is also a system aimed at destroying the reproduction of mankind - propaganda of abortions, contraceptives, ideas of childlessness, homosexual "marriages", various perversions (perverts do not give birth to children), virtual sex, sex robots are next in line, etc.
Under Stalin, a just state and society began to be built in the USSR, a society of service and creation, a society with the dominance of the ethics of conscience. Hence the powerful spiritual impulse of the people, which made it possible not only to create a superpower, to win the most terrible war in mankind, but also to eliminate all the consequences of the most severe world massacre, to create a socialist camp, which made it possible to resist the Western world, based on its colonies and semi-colonies. Popular support made it possible to build an independent national economy that supplied the Soviet people with everything they needed and even supported the allies, created the best armed forces in the world, eliminating the threat of a new open large-scale attack on the USSR-Russia for several generations (most of the inhabitants of Russia live in the world only thanks to this foundation ), to create the world's best science, education, a system that reveals the creative, creative potential of children and youth, and much more.
During the life of Joseph Vissarionovich, the common people idolized him. Songs were sung about him, monuments were erected to him, cities and large enterprises were given his name. Stalin and his government accepted a ruined and devastated Russia, which went through the catastrophe of the former development project in 1917. The Bolsheviks (Russian communists), contrary to popular belief, had practically nothing to do with this catastrophe, they had simply taken power in the dead "old Russia". They offered the people a new project - Soviet civilization, which was in the interests of the vast majority of the people. They managed to create a Soviet superpower - they returned most of the lands lost during the years of unrest, they defeated Japan and Germany, which tsarist Russia lost to. The Soviet Union included half of the planet in its sphere of influence, including China. During the years of Stalin's rule, the national economy was rebuilt, which became more efficient than in the countries of the leaders of the capitalist world, advanced industries were created that only the most advanced powers had - aircraft building, shipbuilding, mechanical engineering, machine tool building, chemical industry, military-industrial complex, rocket science. They created the nuclear industry and created the foundation of the space industry. Unemployment was eliminated, education and health care became free and publicly available. Children from poor peasant families, who had no chance under capitalism, became professors and marshals, aces pilots and ministers under socialism.
Under the leadership of Stalin, World War II was won when the masters of the West allowed the German Nazis, led by Hitler, to take power in Europe. The masters of the West were afraid of the Soviet project. Russia was becoming an alternative center of a new just world order. The sympathies of a significant part of humanity, the best people of the Earth, were on the side of the "sunny" Soviet civilization. As a result, in fact, the "European Union" was created, headed by Germany, and all its power - military-technical, demographic and economic - was thrown against the Soviet civilization, which challenged the dominance of the West over the planet. However, the Russian (Soviet) army defeated a strong and cruel enemy. Eastern and part of Central Europe, including East Germany, entered the sphere of influence of Moscow. The Soviet Union defeated militaristic Japan, taking revenge for the disgrace of the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905. and restored its influence in the Far East. With our help, the Communists won in China and the Celestial Empire recognized the USSR as its “big brother”.
Stalin did not flinch in the face of the atomic threat from the United States, which conducted a bloody "test" of nuclear weapons in Japan. Moscow had such powerful armed forces that the United States and England and their allies did not dare immediately after the end of World War II to start a “hot” World War III (although there were plans). Moscow soon built its own atomic bomb and rapidly built up a first-class nuclear arsenal. The West started the "cold" World War III - the information-ideological, economic, secret war of special services, the war on the territory of other countries (Korean War, etc.).
Therefore, our enemies in the West and Russian Westernizers, who betrayed the USSR and the ideals of socialism, social justice, hate Stalin. They created a mass of black myths to slander the great national leader. However, the truth finds its way even in an atmosphere of total lies. Therefore, the image of Stalin is now again popular among the Russian people. During his reign, people had faith in social justice, in the future of the people and the country. A powerful economic, scientific, technical, educational, cultural and military foundation was created, which allowed Russia to survive to this day.
Even an outspoken enemy of the Union and an implacable anti-communist, the famous British Prime Minister W. Churchill, speaking in the House of Commons on December 21, 1959, on the day of Stalin's 80th birthday, recognized his outstanding role in the world: “He was the most outstanding personality, impressing our changeable and the cruel time of the period in which his life passed. Stalin was a man of extraordinary energy and unbending willpower, sharp, cruel, merciless in conversation, to whom even I, brought up here in the British Parliament, could not oppose anything. Stalin above all had a great sense of humor and sarcasm and the ability to accurately perceive thoughts. This force was so great in Stalin that he seemed unique among the leaders of all times and peoples. Stalin made the greatest impression on us. He possessed deep, devoid of any panic, logically meaningful wisdom. He was an unsurpassed master of finding a way out of the most hopeless situation at difficult moments along the way. In addition, Stalin, at the most critical moments, as well as in moments of triumph, was equally restrained and never succumbed to illusions.
Historians call the dates of Stalin's reign the period from 1929 to 1953. Joseph Stalin (Dzhugashvili) was born on December 21, 1879. Is the founder. Many contemporaries of the Soviet era associate the years of Stalin's rule not only with the victory over fascist Germany and an increase in the level of industrialization of the USSR, but also with numerous repressions of the civilian population.
During the reign of Stalin, about 3 million people were imprisoned and sentenced to death. And if we add to them those sent into exile, dispossessed and deported, then the victims among the civilian population in the Stalin era can be counted as about 20 million people. Now many historians and psychologists are inclined to believe that the situation within the family and upbringing in childhood had a huge impact on Stalin's character.
The formation of Stalin's tough character
From reliable sources it is known that Stalin's childhood was not the happiest and most cloudless. The leader's parents often cursed in front of their son. The father drank a lot and allowed himself to beat his mother in front of little Joseph. The mother, in turn, took out her anger on her son, beat and humiliated him. The unfavorable atmosphere in the family greatly affected Stalin's psyche. Even as a child, Stalin understood a simple truth: whoever is stronger is right. This principle became the motto of the future leader in life. He was also guided by him in governing the country. He was always strict with his.
In 1902, Joseph Vissarionovich organized a demonstration in Batumi, this step was the first for him in his political career. A little later, Stalin became the Bolshevik leader, and Vladimir Ilyich Lenin (Ulyanov) is among his best friends. Stalin fully shares the revolutionary ideas of Lenin.
In 1913, Joseph Vissarionovich Dzhugashvili first used his pseudonym - Stalin. From that time on, he became known by this surname. Few people know that before the surname Stalin, Joseph Vissarionovich tried on about 30 pseudonyms that never took root.
Stalin's reign
The period of Stalin's rule begins in 1929. Almost all the time of the reign of Joseph Stalin is accompanied by collectivization, mass death of the civilian population and famine. In 1932, Stalin adopted the law "on three spikelets". According to this law, a starving peasant who stole ears of wheat from the state was immediately subject to the highest penalty - execution. All the saved bread in the state was sent abroad. This was the first stage in the industrialization of the Soviet state: the purchase of modern foreign-made equipment.
During the reign of Joseph Vissarionovich Stalin, mass repressions of the peaceful population of the USSR were carried out. The beginning of the repressions was laid in 1936, when the post of People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR was taken by Yezhov N.I. In 1938, on the orders of Stalin, his close friend, Bukharin, was shot. During this period, many residents of the USSR were exiled to the Gulag or shot. Despite all the cruelty of the measures taken, Stalin's policy was aimed at raising the state and its development.
Pros and cons of Stalin's rule
Minuses:
- tough government policy:
- the almost complete destruction of the highest army officials, intellectuals and scientists (who thought differently from the government of the USSR);
- repression of wealthy peasants and the believing population;
- widening "chasm" between the elite and the working class;
- oppression of the civilian population: wages in products instead of cash rewards, working hours up to 14 hours;
- propaganda of anti-Semitism;
- about 7 million starvation deaths during the period of collectivization;
- prosperity of slavery;
- selective development of branches of the economy of the Soviet state.
Pros:
- the creation of a protective nuclear shield in the post-war period;
- an increase in the number of schools;
- creation of children's clubs, sections and circles;
- space exploration;
- lower prices for consumer goods;
- low prices for utilities;
- development of the industry of the Soviet state on the world stage.
In the Stalin era, the social system of the USSR was formed, social, political and economic institutions appeared. Iosif Vissarionovich completely abandoned the NEP policy, carried out the modernization of the Soviet state at the expense of the village. Thanks to the strategic qualities of the Soviet leader, the USSR won the Second World War. The Soviet state began to be called a superpower. The USSR became a member of the UN Security Council. The era of Stalin's rule ended in 1953, when. N. Khrushchev replaced him as chairman of the government of the USSR.
Part three
How did Stalin become head of state?
In the crown of thorns revolutions
There is an opinion (and it is widely believed) that Stalin advanced to the main positions in the party only after 1923, with the help of ingenious apparatus intrigues, and his role in the revolution and the civil war is insignificant, almost at the level of petty assignments. In general, this version originally also came from Trotsky: “the most outstanding mediocrity” is the leitmotif of everything that he wrote about Stalin. Just think how many myths go back to this source. No wonder they say among the people: "Lie, lie, let something remain."
From mythology:
In 1917, in order to discredit the Bolsheviks, a rumor was widely spread that, returning from emigration through Germany, Lenin allegedly took money from the Germans for the development of the revolutionary movement. According to the calculations of the Germans, it was supposed to lead to the weakening of Russia, which was at war with them. This rumor was very dangerous for Lenin, because the philistine consciousness, processed by propaganda, was dominated by the ideas of defencism. In the late spring of 1917, Lenin learned that the newspapers of Petrograd were going to widely publish the version about German money. All the threads of this action fell into the hands of Nikolai Chkheidze, chairman of the Petrograd Soviet. It was almost impossible for the leader of the Bolsheviks to agree with the leader of the Mensheviks. Then Lenin focused his attention on Stalin, who could find contact with Chkheidze on the basis of the national compatriot principle. Indeed, Stalin succeeded in persuading Chkheidze to stop publication. Such a valuable service of Stalin, as well as his involvement in information that could have adverse consequences for Lenin, gave some authority to an insignificant figure in the eyes of the people of that time.
From the testimonies of contemporaries:
“This figure is one of the most central figures of the Bolshevik Party ... why this is so, I can’t presume to say: the influences of high environments, far from the people, alien to publicity, irresponsible spheres are so whimsical! But, in any case, one has to be perplexed about the role of Stalin. The Bolshevik Party, despite the low level of its "officer corps", in the mass of ignorant and random, has a number of major figures and worthy leaders among the "generals". Stalin, during his modest activity in the Executive Committee, produced - not only me - the impression of a gray spot, sometimes looming dimly and without a trace. There is really nothing more to say about him.” .
(N. Sukhanov, Menshevik, former member of the Executive Committee of the Petrosoviet)
Sukhanov is probably right, given what the then Central Executive Committee was like and who sat in it. It was something like the Legislative Assembly of St. Petersburg, and elected deputies sat in it. The Executive Committee, which has more than three hundred deputies - go crazy! What kind of work, besides a rally cry, is possible in such an organ? And in general, politicians of that time judged the scale of a figure by articles and oratorical talents. Roughly speaking, the louder the throat, the higher the authority. Why did Stalin need the Central Executive Committee? Probably for the same reason that the Legislative Assembly of St. Petersburg is needed for its current deputies - for solidity, for deputy immunity, in order to interfere with the government. But how can one take "work" seriously in this, so to speak, body?
As for Sukhanov, he, as a Menshevik, could not have known what this or that person in the Bolshevik Party was actually doing. However, his assessment and others like it allowed later to seriously assert that Stalin had very little influence on the events of that time.
However, who among us read Sukhanov? But many read Volkogonov, who claimed: Stalin in 1917 remained in the shadows, which “was the result not only of his social passivity, but also of the role of the performer destined for him, for which he had undoubted data. Stalin was incapable of rising above the ordinary during the critical, turbulent months. Nicely said, but how true? After all, Volkogonov did not drink vodka with Stalin in the staff car, so that he could argue so bravely what he could and what he could not. Yes, and Sukhanov did not drink either - so, they met sometimes in the Council. (It is interesting, by the way, what does Mr. Volkogonov mean by “ordinary” in the life of a professional revolutionary, whose everyday, everyday work is precisely the transfer of everyday life to a “turning point” and “stormy” state? After all, even in calm times, Stalin is not pants sat in meetings.)
On the other hand, the "Short Course" is cunning, asserting that Stalin is the closest assistant and associate of Lenin, that he directly directs the whole matter of preparing the uprising. Here you can quote one of the most famous Stalinist statements: "It was not like that ...".
First of all, everything was wrong because both the “Short Course” and all subsequent historians, both pro-communist and democratic, all brought up on the same “Short Course”, equally gave the history of the February Revolution and the events that followed it through a vision Bolsheviks, as if this party were the axis around which the world revolved. “While the Bolsheviks were preparing for the further development of the revolution, the Provisional Government” was doing this and that, says the Short Course. Meanwhile, it was a low-powered and absolutely uninfluential group that was lucky enough to make a few right moves and gain a certain influence - in a different scenario, information about them would have remained only in the most detailed reference books. And then, at the "moment X", when all more or less sober-minded people were confused, the Bolsheviks, due to their theoretical "frostbite", were not embarrassed by anything. The story seemed to unfold according to their theory (and if not completely according to it, then the theory can be corrected, which, by the way, was done in August!), And they simply embodied their developments, that's all! Although, of course, it was a crazy adventure, if they had stopped and thought, they would probably have been frightened - but they did not stop and did not think, that's the whole point!
Returning to Comrade Stalin and his role in the events of 1917, and peering attentively and unbiasedly into these events, you see that the most surprising thing is that the "Short Course" does not exaggerate the role of this man in the exaltation of the Bolshevik Party from a group of ridiculous radicals to lords of a huge country, but rather downplays it, hides it behind Lenin's back, while the facts speak otherwise...
... So, Petrograd, the beginning of March 1917, a country engulfed in revolutionary madness. Rallies, speakers, endless speeches, people rejoice, complete freedom of parties, speech, everything, anything - I don’t want to go for a walk! Well, the people - they are always ready to take a walk, there would be a reason to gather naked - just gird themselves. But who was not ready for the long-awaited revolution, it's just the Bolsheviks. Not associated with Freemasonry, not represented in the circles of high-ranking conspirators, they turned out to be strangers at this celebration of life, despite the fact that almost twenty years ago they threw out the slogan of overthrowing the autocracy. The revolution turned out to be sudden for them and found the party in a state of complete discord. Some members of the Central Committee were abroad, others were in distant exile. In Petrograd, everything was led by three young members of the illegal Russian Bureau of the Central Committee - Zalutsky, Molotov and Shlyapnikov. Molotov later spoke about how the Bolshevik Party met the revolution:
“When the events of February 26 broke out, Zalutsky and I ... went to our turnout on the Vyborg side to find out how things were anyway. And our third partner, Shlyapnikov, is not. They said that he was probably at Gorky's. We went to Gorky. It's late at night, probably on the 27th. Shooting in the streets, shooting from all sides. We stand with Zalutsky in Gorky's hallway. He came out - that's where I saw him for the first time.
We: "What do you hear? Have you seen Shlyapnikov?"
He: "Now the Petrograd Soviet of Workers' Deputies is already in session," he says, okay.
"Where does he sit?"
"In the Taurida Palace. Shlyapnikov may be there now. He came to me and left."
Well, we came to Tavrichesky, summoned Kerensky, he was the chairman of the Soviet - we introduced ourselves to him: "We are from the Central Committee of the Bolsheviks, we want to participate in the meeting." He led us to the presidium ...
On February 27, Kerensky introduced me to the Petrograd Soviet when it was just being created. There were few Bolsheviks there" .
So the Bolsheviks burst into the revolution, almost missing the train. Young, inexperienced politicians - Molotov, for example, was then only twenty-seven years old! - they took the first steps in strict accordance with the instructions of their "Swiss theorists". The proposals the Bolsheviks made to the Soviet were: not to give any support to the Provisional Government (the long-awaited "democratic government"!), to ban the publication of newspapers that did not support the revolution (with newly acquired freedom of speech!). Both proposals, of course, did not pass, they only ruined the reputation of the Bolsheviks, forcing them to be treated as frivolous and "undemocratic" people. Lenin, however, later approved this activity ...
But, which was more productive, Molotov immediately began to organize the release of the previously banned Pravda. In the first issues of the newspaper, the bureau again demanded the overthrow of the "bourgeois" Provisional Government and the immediate transfer of power to the Soviets. All this is the beginning of March.
On March 12, the first exiles from Siberia returned - State Duma deputy Muranov, Stalin, Kamenev. Directly from the station, Stalin went to the Alliluyevs, appeared to them - all in the same decaying suit, in which he went into exile four years ago, with a hand basket where all his luggage was placed. He was unusually talkative for himself, showed in the faces of station speakers choking from high speeches. Anya Alliluyeva noted the main change in the old friend of their family: “He became cheerful” ...
At first, those who returned were greeted with caution: who are they, what did they come with? Only Muranov was immediately allowed into the bureau, Kamenev, recalling past sins, was refused. Stalin was received with a deliberative voice, referring to "some personal traits", nothing more than the notorious "Stalinist despotism", which, like an awl in a bag, cannot be hidden. He was always very confident and solid. Stalin did not argue and be indignant, but simply began to work - on March 13 he joined the editorial board of Pravda, and on March 14 his first article was published. If he really had difficulties with “theoretical” works, he did not know how to seriously discuss the architecture of castles in the air, now Stalin was on horseback, publishing article after article on the tactical issues of the revolution. (The first was called: "On the Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies." The names of some others: "On the conditions for the victory of the Russian revolution", "On the way to ministerial portfolios", "On the war", "Land to the peasants", "On the results of municipal elections in Petrograd", etc.)
Two days later, Stalin gently but unshakably removed Molotov from the editorial staff, taking the newspaper into his own hands, and on the 15th he entered the Presidium of the Central Committee bureau - it took him only three days to completely change his attitude towards himself. And from then until the beginning of April, he was actually the first person in the party.
Under his influence, the newspaper's policy changed, became more sober and realistic. The amusing calls for the immediate overthrow of the Provisional Government have ceased, replaced by the normal political thesis of "pressure on the government." In the brief days of "defending Leninism" that took place in the late 1980s, Stalin was accused of censoring Lenin. And he was rightly accused, indeed, he subjected him - he did not print Lenin’s “Letters from afar”, arguing that Lenin is abroad, he does not know the situation, and after his arrival in Russia, his views, they say, may change, so it’s better to wait ... I knew if it were Ilyich - he was sure that his every word was a guiding instruction for his comrades-in-arms! Stalin expressed his position at the All-Russian Conference of the Bolsheviks at the end of March, and it was, as it will be in the future, as flexible and conciliatory as possible: “Insofar as the Provisional Government consolidates the steps of the revolution, support, insofar as it is counter-revolutionary, support for the Provisional Government is unacceptable.” The position was very reasonable, and the majority of the meeting supported it, but there was no time left to implement this thesis - on April 3, Lenin and other foreign leaders of the Bolsheviks arrived in Petrograd.
Lenin did not bother to look around, and his views did not change - as soon as he got off the train, he immediately proclaimed the slogan "All power to the Soviets!" True, he did not call for the immediate overthrow of the Provisional Government, but only because the Bolsheviks were extremely weakly represented in the Soviets and, if power had passed to the Soviets, his party would have got only crumbs from the pie. “An explanation to the masses that the Soviet of Workers’ Deputies is the only possible form of a revolutionary government, and that therefore our task, as long as this government yields to the influence of the bourgeoisie, can only be patient, systematic, persistent, adapting especially to the practical needs of the masses, explaining the mistakes of their tactics. As long as we are in the minority, we carry on the work of criticizing and clarifying mistakes, while at the same time preaching the need to transfer all state power to the Soviets of Workers' Deputies ... ”Translated from political into universal language, this meant that as long as the Soviets were not Bolshevik, they would be criticized on all fronts. parameters, and as soon as they become Bolshevik - then all power to the Soviets! Don't say anything, frankly!
The left wing of the party supported Lenin, but many also opposed him. Stalin also criticized the April Theses, but by mid-April he switched to the Leninist point of view. Has he really changed his views? It is hard to believe in this, because his position was much more reasonable than Lenin's, and in the future he constantly opposed Ilyich - only, unlike other associates, he did not enter into disputes, but simply gently torpedoed the leader's guidelines. Most likely there were two reasons for this "agreement". Firstly, there was such a thing as party discipline, which no one canceled, and it was not worth the first persons in the party to set a bad example for the rest. And secondly and most importantly, Lenin's theses did not change anything in everyday work. As a strong practitioner, Stalin, of course, could not help but see all the adventurism of Lenin's plan ... but was there any point in discussing it? The Bolshevik Party was so weak, its influence so negligible, and the prospect of a majority in the Soviets so elusive, that it was worth bringing disagreements into the party for the sake of the skin of not only an unkilled, but even a bear that had not been hunted down, especially since there were already enough quarrelers? By the way, at the April conference a new Central Committee was elected, out of nine members, which included Stalin. That is, even taking into account the returned emigrant elite, he was among the top ten in the party - that's the "gray spot" for you.
Meanwhile, the government of the conspirators, having held power for less than two months, entered its first crisis. The people clearly and definitely waited for him to take steps to get Russia out of the war, which everyone hated. Instead, on April 18, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Provisional Government, Milyukov, declared to the Allies about "the nationwide desire to bring the world war to a decisive victory and the intention of the Provisional Government to fully comply with the obligations assumed in relation to our allies." It took several days for this statement to reach the people and be understood by them. What followed was an explosion. Already on April 20-21 (May 3-4), 1917, a large anti-war demonstration took place, in which at least 100 thousand people participated. On May 2, 1917, Milyukov and Guchkov were removed from the government. A new Provisional Government was formed, a coalition, which, along with liberals of all stripes, included representatives of the most influential left parties - the Mensheviks and the Socialist-Revolutionaries.
And the Bolshevik Party at that time was indeed too weak to seriously influence anything. Plekhanov, one of the fathers of Russian Social Democracy, laughed angrily at the April Theses, and he was not the only one who laughed at the Bolsheviks at that time: “Ay, pug, she is strong to know!” In March, the party numbered only about 24,000 people throughout the country. True, its membership grew rapidly - by the end of April it had about 100 thousand people, but other parties also grew, so that, despite the numerical growth, its influence did not increase so much. In June, at the First Congress of Soviets, where the Bolsheviks made up about 10% of the delegates (despite the fact that about 80% of all delegates belonged to any of the political parties), Lenin's statement that the Bolshevik party was ready to take power was greeted with laughter, and if 58 Bolsheviks (18%) were elected to the Central Executive Committee, then this is hardly the merit of Ilyich. Among the Bolsheviks elected to the Central Executive Committee was Stalin, as a result of which he received parliamentary immunity, for the first time in his life becoming inaccessible to the police. But the overwhelming majority of the Soviets continued to follow the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks.
It must be assumed that in the Central Executive Committee Stalin really was a "gray spot", because his activities were concentrated anywhere, but not in the Tauride Palace. A complex, ever-changing situation constantly posed many specific questions, the solution of which required common sense and practical experience. The passengers of the sealed carriage, theoreticians who did not know Russia well, possessed these qualities poorly, and the main organizational and technical work fell on the shoulders of a very small circle of people.
At this time, the Bolsheviks made several right moves. In particular, leaving rallies to lovers of chatter, they focused on work in trade unions and factory committees, which, as early as 1909, Stalin called "the main bastions of the party." The calculation was accurate: the factory committees actually declared themselves parallel power at the enterprises, established control over production, wages, hiring and firing, their authority among the workers was great, and, as a result, the influence of the Bolsheviks grew in the factories.
Bolshevik influence also grew in the army, where military organizations began to be created everywhere. The front-line newspaper Okopnaya Pravda had a great influence - all the more so since the Bolsheviks were not bound by any government obligations and unambiguously advocated Russia's withdrawal from the war, which had long been fed up with everyone.
On May 30 - June 3, 1917, the Petrograd Conference of Factory Committees was held, at which, in contrast to the Congress of Soviets that took place immediately after it, three-quarters of the Delegates were pro-Bolshevik.
... So, on June 3, the First Congress of Soviets opened and lasted three weeks - until June 24. On June 18, 1917, at the grave of the victims of the revolution, the Bolsheviks held a colossal demonstration, which gathered about 400 thousand people. Its main slogan was “Down with the war!”, but there were others: “Down with ten capitalist ministers!”, “All power to the Soviets!”. The number of those gathered spoke of the sharply increased influence of the Bolsheviks. Now they could no longer be taken seriously. The party grew, it put forward popular slogans, including anti-war ones, and became dangerous for the authorities.
By a bitter irony of fate, just on this very day, June 18, an offensive began at the front. Given the state of the army and the situation with shells and cartridges, there was no doubt that it would fail. And it really failed. The authorities, barely recovering from the first crisis, entered a new round of a tailspin. However, one could try to shift the blame from a sick head to a not very sick one, which was immediately done - the Bolsheviks were accused of decomposing the army. Yes, they really persistently and systematically engaged in the decomposition of the army, but they were not the first in this work. All their activities were far from the consequences caused by the famous “Order No. 1” of the Provisional Government, by which its author, the popular lawyer Sokolov, began the decay of the army, calling for the selection of committees from lower ranks to control the commanders and sowing the seeds of distrust in the officers. The Bolsheviks only took advantage of the fruits of his lawmaking. But the government will not beat itself on the head!
It was clearly time for the authorities to take action against these presumptuous radicals - but a pretext was needed, and it was not slow to appear. At the end of June, news of the defeat reached Petrograd. Around the same time, the Provisional Government decided, in order to somewhat normalize the situation in the capital, to disband and send to the front several pro-Bolshevik units of the Petrograd garrison. More precisely, extremely left-wing, because it is difficult to say how Bolshevik they were - in parallel, the anarchist brothers were campaigning there, calling for the immediate overthrow of the government. If Lenin was embarrassed at least by the absence of a majority in the Soviets, then this public was not embarrassed at all. And when on July 3 three cadet ministers resigned, the machine-gun regiment decided - that's it, hurray, the government is collapsing! The machine gunners immediately sent delegates to other units and factories and demanded that the RSDLP (b) immediately act - we sympathize with you, so follow our orders!
That's just what was missing now! Accurately assessing their strength, the meeting of the Central Committee, the PC and the Military Organization of the Bolsheviks decided not to support the performance. (Fortunately, Lenin did not take part in this conference, otherwise it is generally unknown how it would have ended.) But the units are considered Bolshevik! This means that it is the party that must somehow resolve the situation, and negotiations with the Central Executive Committee, with the rebels, with everyone in the world, were entrusted to the most sober, moderate and self-possessed diplomat from the Bolshevik elite - Stalin. He had to simultaneously keep the soldiers from firing, prevent bloodshed from the government, calm the Central Executive Committee, prevent provocations ... And events got out of control - the crowd no longer obeyed the Bolsheviks, it did not obey anyone. Fortunately, they managed to switch the speech from the immediate seizure of power to a peaceful demonstration under the slogan "All power to the Soviets!", In which about half a million people took part - by that time everyone was pretty tired of the Provisional Government. The demonstration was surprisingly peaceful, except for random shooting and minor provocations, there were no excesses - but they could have smashed half the city, imagine what five hundred thousand excited demonstrators are like!
The Central Committee decided to stop the street protests, but it was easier to decide than to do - the people liked to perform. In the meantime, a new scandal arose. At the same time, two messages arrived in the capital: panicked news about the breakthrough of the front by the Germans and materials that Lenin received money from the German General Staff. Lenin was deeply indifferent from whom to receive money for the revolution - from the Germans, from the devils, or from the Martians - but there was no time or place to explain this. Stalin managed to resolve the issue in a Caucasian way, that is, with the help of personal connections. The chairman of the Central Executive Committee, the Menshevik Chkheidze, was his old acquaintance, and he helped the Georgian - Chkheidze phoned the newspapers and asked them not to publish compromising information on Lenin. The authority of the chairman of the CEC was great, and the maneuver was almost a success - the material was printed only by one small newspaper, the Living Word, which someone believed, someone did not believe, but the scandal did not work out.
So, the armed uprising did not take place, the scandal with the exposure also failed, but what was enough for a pretext. On July 5, the Central Executive Committee gave the socialist ministers powers "to fight anarchy", and also declared martial law in the city and organized a military headquarters, which included Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries. The Bolsheviks, who were made responsible for the riots, were presented with rather harsh conditions - they must clear the palace of Kshesinskaya, the Bolshevik-minded garrison of Petropavlovka should be disarmed. Stalin is again negotiating - with the Central Executive Committee, with the garrison, which he persuades to surrender without a fight in order to avoid bloodshed. “You are not surrendering to the government, you are surrendering to the Soviets” - this argument convinced the sailors, and they laid down their arms. At the same time, he had to restrain the ardor of the military representative of the Central Executive Committee, the Socialist-Revolutionary Kuzmin, who also really wanted to take action. If the military detachment of the Soviets entered into battle with the garrison and blood was shed, this would give the government an excuse to use force against the Bolsheviks and crush the party. And if other anti-government units came to the aid of the garrison? At that time, the government still had enough power to call in troops from the front and put an end to both the Soviets and the Bolsheviks at once.
Despite the fact that the incident ended peacefully, harsh measures were taken against the Bolshevik Party. On July 6, a search was carried out in the Kshesinskaya mansion, a pogrom was organized in the Trud printing house, where Bolshevik and trade union materials were printed. A state of siege was actually declared in the city, the disarmament (or at least attempts to do so) of workers, soldiers, and sailors began. Many Bolshevik leaders were arrested. On July 7, an order was issued to arrest Lenin.
The order to arrest Stalin was not given, since there was nothing to arrest him for - everyone remembered him as a peacemaker. It can be said that it was thanks to his Eastern cunning that the party emerged from the July events relatively intact and combat-ready. Moreover, having acquired the halo of the persecuted, it began to gain more and more supporters, so that in August there were already about 240 thousand Bolsheviks - among the newcomers, by the way, there were many people who left the ranks of other leftist parties. However, the "socialist friends" Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks did not know this, believing that the Bolsheviks were defeated and destroyed as a political force. And no one somehow tried to dissuade them in this delusion ...
So, Lenin and Zinoviev are in Razliv, Kamenev is in prison. Who remained at the head of the party? At the VI, the underground congress of the RSDLP (b), Stalin made a report and a report on the political situation in the country, which the leader was supposed to read by rank - so judge who is in charge. Having quarreled with the CEC, the Bolsheviks removed the slogan “All power to the Soviets!”, which made the situation completely surreal: down with the government, but it is not known in whose favor. In favor of the Bolshevik Party? But what about Marx? Another topic of discussion at the congress was the theoretical question: is it possible for a bourgeois revolution to grow into a socialist one and build socialism in Russia earlier than in the West? Preobrazhensky, for example, proposed in the resolution on the conquest of power that it would be possible to direct the country along the socialist path only if there was a proletarian revolution in the West. On this occasion, Stalin objected to him, simultaneously opening a new direction of Marxism. “The possibility is not ruled out,” he said, “that it is Russia that will be the country that paves the way to socialism ... We must cast aside the obsolete idea that only Europe can show us the way. There is dogmatic Marxism and creative Marxism. I stand on the ground of the latter." Something, but he knew how to convince. Naturally, these purely theoretical nuances would not affect real work, which was far from being determined by theories, but it would be better if no one at the moment of making a decision shouted over his ear: “This is not according to Marx!” And "creative Marxism" was just a brilliant find - it allowed in the future to substantiate anything.
At the same congress, the economic program of the Bolsheviks was approved: the confiscation of landowners' land and the nationalization of all land in the country, the nationalization of banks and large-scale industry, workers' control over production and distribution. Hardly anyone thought about how it would be implemented, because the prospect of the Bolsheviks seizing power seriously and for a long time was as illusory as before. But on the other hand, this super-populist program made it possible to acquire new supporters, especially in the countryside.
And among other things, at the congress, a small group of so-called "mezhraiontsy" entered the party, which was formed in 1913 and consisted of Mensheviks and former Bolsheviks who had left the party at one time. In their views, the group occupied an intermediate position between the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks, and finally, in August 1917, made the final choice. Some members of this group later became prominent Bolsheviks, such as Volodarsky or Uritsky. The leader of the “mezhraiontsy” at that time was the prominent Menshevik Lev Bronstein, known under the party pseudonym Trotsky.
Meanwhile, the liberal conspirators, who had let the genie out of the bottle, were powerless to drive it back. The country quickly entered the taste of the revolution, which everywhere grew into a classic Russian revolt. The people had fun as best they could: in the cities, the crowds smashed government offices, in the villages, the peasants burned the landowners' estates. The workers were more engaged in sorting out relations with the administration than in work. To complete the “democratization”, Kerensky, being the Minister of Justice, carried out an amnesty - and the criminals, having received powerful reinforcements, terrorized the cities, and spontaneous self-defense detachments, mistaking for criminals everyone who seemed suspicious to them, terrorized the population no worse than the “Kerensky chicks”, as immediately called the amnestied people. The front was falling apart before our eyes, the soldiers, seizing weapons, rushed home - the command responded with military courts and executions. On August 3, Commander-in-Chief General Kornilov demanded the introduction of the death penalty not only at the front, but also in the rear - a formidable sign of an impending military dictatorship.
As usual in troubled times, rapid inflation began. The volume of industrial production decreased by almost 40%. But this is not so bad, and trouble threatened from the other side: the railway transport was under the threat of stopping. It was high time to put things in order in the country - that's enough, have fun! - but it was precisely this that the Provisional Government proved incapable of. It more and more resembled an inept rider on a furious horse, the question was only about one thing - when the rider would fall.
At the end of August, General Kornilov was the first to start “putting things in order”, supported by the propertied sections of society, tired of the revolution, and the allies. These plans can hardly be called a "conspiracy", as it is now accepted to qualify the actions of the general. At least those who took power in February were much more conspirators - do not forget that Kornilov was, after all, the commander in chief. Moreover, his plan - to move troops to Petrograd, capture the city and establish a military dictatorship - he previously agreed with Kerensky, who, however, at the last moment betrayed his ally, dissociating himself from his actions.
On August 25, Kornilov moved the 3rd cavalry corps under the command of General Krymov to Petrograd. This was clearly not enough, the general underestimated the enemy. The Red Guards, members of the trade unions were mobilized against the attackers, the revolutionary military units were put on alert. Several thousand Kronstadters arrived to defend Petrograd. Skilled agitators were sent to the troops advancing on Petrograd. As a result of all these actions, Kornilov's attempt to restore order failed. General Krymov shot himself, generals Kornilov, Denikin and Lukomsky were arrested - however, soon Kerensky, true to himself in his inconsistency, released them.
Finally, Lenin's dream of Bolshevik Soviets came true. However, the Soviets gradually became Bolshevik all the way, since the deputies were constantly re-elected and the Bolsheviks came to replace the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks. But now there is a breakthrough. On August 30, the Kornilov uprising was crushed, and on August 31, the Petrograd Soviet and on September 5, the Moscow Soviet went over to the side of the Bolsheviks, for which reason the slogan "All power to the Soviets!" Was again revived.
The rebellion brought another unexpected result: the frightened "socialist brothers" from the Soviets began to release the arrested Bolsheviks and even return their weapons, allowed them to create Red Guard detachments - after all, the future Kornilovs were their common enemy and in the event of a military coup, everyone would swing on neighboring pillars. As a result, the Bolsheviks not only created fighting squads, but, again, implementing Stalin's ideas, entered into an alliance with the Left Social Revolutionaries and Mensheviks, since the irreconcilable Lenin was in Finland.
The government, headed by Kerensky now, had for a long time directed no one and nothing. In September 1917, the English writer and part-time intelligence officer William Somerset Maugham - by the way, in Petrograd he did not collect material for the next book, but carried out the task of British intelligence - wrote: “Kerensky ... made endless speeches. There was a moment when the danger arose that the Germans would move on Petrograd. Kerensky made speeches. Food shortages became more and more threatening, winter was approaching and there was no fuel. Kerensky made speeches. Lenin was hiding in Petrograd, it was said that Kerensky knew where he was, but did not dare to arrest him. He made speeches."
The last attempt to restore at least some semblance of order was the All-Russian Democratic Conference convened on September 12, 1917, in which representatives of the socialist parties, Soviets, trade unions, zemstvos, commercial and industrial circles and military units took part. The meeting elected the Pre-Parliament (Provisional Council of the Republic), which the workers immediately dubbed the "waiting room." But these were already convulsions of agonizing power. The country was heading towards complete chaos.
... Maugham was wrong - Lenin was in Helsingfors at that time, bombarding the Central Committee with demands for an immediate uprising, in support of which he cited completely deadly theoretical arguments about the existence of "objective and subjective conditions", about the "active majority of revolutionary elements" and even about the beginning of "military uprisings in Germany, which were not there at all. The “conditions” and “elements” were there, everyone saw it, but it was completely incomprehensible what these “elements” wanted, who they would follow and whom they would smash, so before making a revolution, it would be worthwhile to first find out this question . The most sober minds suggested that the seizure of power should be delayed until the Congress of Soviets, which was to meet at the end of October and could give the new government at least a semblance of legitimacy, while the Democratic Conference would never have taken such a step. But Lenin was adamant. He demanded the immediate creation of insurgent detachments, the arrest of the general staff and the government. The Democratic Conference should have been dispersed and its members arrested, that is, relations with the trade unions, Zemstvos, and especially with the army should have been spoiled at once, since most of the delegates were from the front. However, it was useless to prove anything to Lenin, he did not hear any arguments - still, his finest hour had come, the peak of his whole life! And he continued to insist, demand: "Waiting for the Congress of Soviets is a game of formality, a shameful game of formality ... Waiting is a crime before the revolution."
The Bolshevik elite reacted differently to Ilyich's angry letters. Zinoviev and Kamenev got angry and argued with Lenin. Trotsky immediately put forward his own alternative course of action. Stalin, without entering into disputes, simply sabotaged the plans of the leader, offering ... to transfer his directives to the party organizations for consideration! The plan is ingenious: absolutely correct from the point of view of party ethics and completely sabotage. I wonder if anyone would venture to assert that at that time Lenin was in charge of the party, and Stalin was his "faithful assistant"?
In 1920, at the celebration of Lenin's 50th birthday, Stalin, not without irony, recalled this time: “It seemed to us that all the ravines, pits and potholes on our path are more visible to us, practitioners. But Ilyich is great, he is not afraid of pits, potholes, or ravines on his way, he is not afraid of dangers and says: "Get up and go straight to the goal." We, the practitioners, believed that it was unprofitable then to act in such a way that it was necessary to bypass all obstacles in order to take the bull by the horns. And, despite all the demands of Ilyich, we did not listen to him, went further along the path of strengthening the Soviets and brought the matter to the Congress of Soviets on October 25, to a successful uprising. Ilyich was already in Petrograd then. Smiling and slyly looking at us, he said: "Yes, you were probably right" ... Comrade Lenin was not afraid to admit his mistakes. It is difficult to say how sweet such congratulations were to Comrade Lenin ...
In general, until Ilyich returned to St. Petersburg, nothing moved in the preparation of the revolution. But in October, when he arrived with his demand for an armed uprising that had not changed one iota, the majority of the Central Committee supported him. In fact, ten days remain before the opening of the congress, when should we start, if not now? On October 16, a resolution was adopted on the preparation of an armed uprising. 19 members of the Central Committee voted in favor, four abstained and two opposed - Zinoviev and Kamenev. What followed is well known. Kamenev resigned from the Central Committee in protest, and the next day he and Zinoviev published a letter to the Central Committee in the Novaya Zhizn newspaper - in fact, a printed denunciation of the Bolshevik elite, in which they did not speak directly, but made it clear what plans the Bolsheviks cherished. An enraged Lenin called them scabs, traitors and offered to expel them from the party. Why weren't they excluded? And because Ilyich did not find support in the Central Committee, moreover, Stalin gave Zinoviev the opportunity to publish his material directed against Lenin in the newspaper Rabochy Put, which he edited, despite the fact that he did not agree with Zinoviev's position. Well, who is the despot after that?
No, it was far from easy. Stalin could not but see that Zinoviev and Kamenev were right - there were no conditions for a speech with the aim of seizing power. Moreover, they could not exist - objective conditions for the seizure of power by a radical party, because radical parties are not created to seize power. The Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries understood this very well, and that is why they strove for a coalition government; the old oppositionists Zinoviev and Kamenev also understood this. The radical party can talk about power, it can go for it, it feeds on the desire for power - but it never takes it. The seizure of power by such a party has nothing to do with objectivity, it is always an insane adventure ... but after all, the insane adventurer was at the head of the Bolshevik Party! It is enough to look at the portrait, to see this gambling sparkle of narrowed eyes, this cruel thin-lipped mouth... There is such a favorite character in American cartoons - a scientist who is ready to destroy the whole world for the sake of his experiments. This high-browed theoretician was ready to risk everything for the sake of experimental verification of his theories - both the country and his own life.
Yes, but the situation required the Bolsheviks to risk everything. They had no choice. It was clear that the revolution had already crossed all boundaries, that Russia needed to be pacified, and that this pacification would be bloody, no matter who carried it out - whether General Alekseev with front-line units, the Germans or anyone else. And in any case, the Bolsheviks, along with other revolutionary parties, had one road - to the wall. And one alternative: if you don't want to be hushed, hush yourself. This is what the opponents of the speech did not understand. But this was perfectly understood, Stalin could not but understand. No, there was no certainty of success, but the situation forced everything to be at stake. And besides, Stalin was never an opposition politician - he, despite all the many years of political work, still remained Koba - a romantic hero, a selfless fighter for the kingdom of justice, and he had never been so close to the realization of his childhood dream.
So, on October 16, the Military Revolutionary Committee was formed, the task of which was the technical preparation of the uprising. Lenin did not enter into it. Bubnov, Dzerzhinsky, Sverdlov, Stalin, Uritsky became members of the VRC - all strong practical organizers, and not a single theoretician.
The provisional government also took its own measures. On October 19, troops from the front were called to Petrograd. Reinforced patrols began to drive around the streets. There was even a plan: the day before the opening and the Congress of Soviets, attack and occupy Smolny, the leading center of the Bolsheviks. But things didn't work out as expected. At a meeting of the Petrograd Soviet, Trotsky blurted out in an oratorical fervor about the specific date for the start of the uprising, as a result of which the date was postponed by a day, which, by the way, was more convenient - to put the congress in front of an already accomplished fact.
Where was Stalin at that time? Early in the morning of October 24, at half past five in the morning, cadets and police officers seized the editorial office of the Rabochy Put newspaper. They broke stereotypes, confiscated ready-made numbers, sealed up the printing house. Shortly after eight o'clock, the Central Committee met in Smolny, making a decision: to send guards to the printing house and start publishing a newspaper. The editor of Stalin's newspaper was not at this meeting - without waiting for the decision, he was already doing all this anyway. At 11 o'clock in the morning the issue of the newspaper came out. By the way, those who have an idea about the power of the press will agree that the editor of a newspaper at such a time is one of the most important posts.
On October 24, Lenin arrived at Smolny at night. All night long, revolutionary soldiers, sailors, and Red Guards were drawn up to Smolny. On October 25 (November 7), railway stations, post office, telegraph, ministries, and the state bank were occupied. On the same day, the Bolsheviks' appeal "To the Citizens of Russia" was published, which stated that the Provisional Government had been overthrown and state power had passed into the hands of the Soviets. But so far everything was not quite so, because there was still the Winter Palace, in which now a purely nominal government sat. But Zimny, at least for the sake of form, had to be taken.
Why did Stalin lead the party and the country
The process of transition of political leadership from Lenin to Stalin took about four years. Its beginning can be conditionally designated as April 3, 1922, from the date of the establishment "under Stalin" of the post of General Secretary of the Central Committee of the RCP (b). The turning point can be considered May 1, 1924, when at an extraordinary plenum of the Central Committee the "testament of Lenin" containing criticism of Stalin was read out, but Stalin was again re-elected General Secretary in the configuration of the collective leadership of the party. And Stalin's sole leadership became undeniable and already irreversible on January 1, 1926 at the Plenum of the Central Committee, which extended his powers as General Secretary. After the death of Lenin, Stalin himself, in connection with the "testament of Lenin" several times - until December 1927 - raised the question of his resignation before the plenum of the Central Committee and each time was refused as confirmation of his lack of alternative.
Trotsky, Stalin's main rival, lost to him a decades-long trench war to inherit leadership status. By the way, Lenin foresaw that it was between these two figures that a struggle would unfold with all the risks for the party and the country. On January 4, 1923, Lenin dictated an addendum to a letter dated December 24, 1922: “Stalin is too rude, and this shortcoming, quite tolerable in the environment and in communications between us communists, becomes intolerable in the position of general secretary. Therefore, I suggest that the comrades consider a way to move Stalin from this place and appoint another person to this place, who in all other respects differs from Comrade. Stalin with only one advantage, namely, more tolerant, more loyal, more polite and more attentive to comrades, less capriciousness, etc. This circumstance may seem like an insignificant trifle. But I think that from the point of view of preventing a split and from the point of view of what I wrote above about the relationship between Stalin and Trotsky, this is not a trifle, or it is such a trifle that can become decisive.
Stalin outplayed Trotsky, who was striving for the increasingly decorative post of Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars in the party bureaucratic field. Subordinate to Stalin, the Secretariat of the Central Committee, under the pretext of fighting "parochial interests," began to strongly recommend candidates for the election of secretaries of lower party committees in the localities. Starting in 1922 to select his people for the posts of secretaries of the provincial party committees - and through them the future composition of delegates to party congresses - Iosif Vissarionovich in 1926 was able to reap the results of many years of work in the form of the Central Committee and the Politburo controlled by him. In addition, positioning himself as a centrist, he fully turned on the mechanism of very temporary coalitions according to the principle “Against whom are we friends?” (No wonder Lenin warned: "Do not trust Stalin: he will make a rotten compromise and deceive").
The question of the mechanism for the transition of leadership to Stalin, of course, could not be avoided in covering the history of the RSDLP-RKP(b)-CPSU. The answer to it traditionally comes down to a scheme: the bright talented Trotsky lost because, due to his penchant for narcissism, he underestimated the “cunning apparatchik” Stalin. Here, of course, you can’t argue against the facts related to the psychological portraits of Joseph Vissarionovich and Lev Davidovich. But this is only part of the facts that are worth considering objectively. The role of personality in history, as we know, is great. But still, in addition to psychology, it is worth considering the sociological context of the question of why it was Stalin, and not Trotsky, who received the support of the majority - if not party members, then most of the apparatus significant figures in the party.
And here, with any careful approach, it is impossible to bypass the extremely delicate aspect due to its explosiveness for the official history of the CPSU, connected with the national affiliation of the leading party activists. It is clear that the RSDLP has always positioned itself in politics as an internationalist organization that equally defends the interests of the proletarians of all nationalities. However, when studying the history of the party, one too often gets the feeling that until 1917 it was a project of predominantly one nationality - the Jewish one. The degree of dominance of this nationality at different stages of the projects was different, but judging by the composition of the governing bodies in the pre-revolutionary period, it never fell below 60%.
Let's see the facts. One of the three co-founders of the RSDLP at the I (Minsk) Congress was the General Jewish Workers' Union in Lithuania, Poland and Russia, better known as the BUND. Jews made up the majority of the participants in the founding congress, namely five out of nine (Shmuel Katz, Aron Kremer, Abram Mutnik, Boris Eidelman and Natan Vigdorchik). The first composition of the Central Committee of the party included three: Stepan Radchenko, Boris Eidelman and Aron Kremer.
Jews were also significantly represented among the 57 delegates of the 2nd Congress in 1903. If we focus only on the names and surnames of the delegates, then the following comrades should be mentioned: Aizenstadt Isai Lvovich, Axelrod Pavel (Pinkhus) Borisovich, Halberstadt Rozalia Samsonovna, Ganetsky (Fürstenberg) Yakov Stanislavovich, Ginzburg Boris Abramovich, Goldman Mikhail Isaakovich, Drabkin Yakov Davidovich, Deutsch Lev Grigorievich, Zborovsky Mikhail Solomonovich, Zemlyachka (Zalkind) Rosalia Samoilovna, Levinson Mendel Yakovlevich, Kremer Aron (Arkady) Iosifovich, Levin Efim Yakovlevich, Lokerman Alexander Samoilovich, Lyadov (Mandelstam) Martyn Nikolaevich, Makadzyub Mark Saulovich, Mandelberg Victor Evseevich, Martov L (Tsederbaum Julius Osipovich), Martynov (Pikker) Alexander Samoilovich, Makhlin Lazar Davidovich, Makhnovets (Brucker) Lilia Petrovna, Medem Vladimir Davidovich, Moshinsky Joseph Nikolaevich, Portnoy Ikoisiel (Bergman Noeh), Trotsky (Bronstein) Lev Davidovich, Zeitlin Lev Solomonovich .
And some part of the delegates, undoubtedly, had an admixture of Jewish blood - among them we will mention the brothers Vladimir and Dmitry Ulyanov. After the Jews, the Caucasians were the most numerous national group among the congress delegates. In a word, it was rather a meeting of representatives of national minorities with the dominance of Jews. In any case, it is definitely not necessary to talk about any proportional representation in the governing bodies of the RSDPR of all nationalities living on the territory of the Russian Empire. We also mention that the second item on the agenda at the Second Congress (the question of the party program was only the third, and the first question was organizational and mandate) was the report of Mikhail Goldman and Julius Zederbaum "The Place of the Bund in the RSDLP".
However, for the sake of historical fairness, it should be noted that at the Second Congress a split began into a "relatively more Jewish" party of the Mensheviks and a "relatively less Jewish" party of the Bolsheviks. The national composition of the rank and file members of the RSDLP (b) at the beginning of 1905 according to the data of researchers M.S. Volin and V.V. Lozhkin: Russians - 40.8%, Jews - 38.8%, Little Russians - 10.8%, Georgians - 6.4%, representatives of other nations and nationalities - 3.2%.
The predominance of party members of Jewish origin in the governing bodies of the RSDLP (b) can be traced throughout the entire pre-revolutionary period. After 1905, a multi-party system developed in Russia and the RSDLP until 1912 (when the party managed to get 6 deputies - out of 442 - into the Fourth State Duma), was part of that part of it, which, in modern terms, was a non-systemic opposition. Apparently, the perception of this party in the bulk of Russian society was associated primarily with the terrorist image (because of the resonant "exes" of the Bolsheviks) and the image of the unpatriotic "party of rebellious foreigners."
At the time of the February Revolution of 1917, the number of the RSDLP (b) was 24-25 thousand people. The rapid growth of the party's ranks (in October it already had 350,000 members) was associated with desperate populism in the course of democratization and "Sovietization" of Russia's social and political life after the overthrow of the tsar and rather serious financing of the party from Jewish circles (it is known, for example, that Recruited from among the unemployed, the Red Guard detachments in Petrograd, numbering up to 50 thousand fighters, were quite decently paid).
The Politburo of the Central Committee of the RSDLP (b) formed on October 10 (23), 1917 included Andrei Sergeevich Bubnov, Grigory Evseevich Zinoviev, Lev Borisovich Kamenev (Rosenfeld), Vladimir Ilyich Ulyanov-Lenin. Grigory Yakovlevich Sokolnikov (Girsh Yankelevich Brilliant), Joseph Vissarionovich Stalin and Lev Davidovich Trotsky (Bronstein). In a word, only one Slav was present in the top leadership of the internationalist party, Andrey Bubnov, who was quickly forced out by the dominant nationality to a third-rate role.
Obviously, the dominance of Jews in the party leadership in different periods was perceived differently by ordinary members of the party. One situation was in 1905, when 38.8% of the members of the RSDLP were Jews. And a completely different situation arose after the summer of 1917, when the membership of the party began to grow rapidly and, accordingly, the proportion of Jews among the rank-and-file members of the party began to erode, gradually tending to the proportion of Jews among the population.
According to the 1922 census, the national composition of the members of the RCP (b) looked like this: Russians - 270409 people (71.9% of party members, while Russians made up 51.3% of the country's population), Ukrainians 22078 people (5.9% - Ukrainians made up 21 % of the country's population), Jews - 19564 people (5.2% - Jews accounted for 2.1% of the country's population), Latvians - 9510 people (2.5% - 03%), Georgians - 7379 people (2.0% - Georgians accounted for 1.3% of the country's population), Poles - 5645 people (1.5% - Poles accounted for 0.6% of the country's population). By the way, based on these figures, we can calculate the percentage of involvement of different nationalities in the RCP(b). As of 1922, it will be the highest among Latvians - 1.83% (this record is explained by the small number of Latvians living in Soviet Russia), followed by: Poles - 0.62%, Jews - 0.61%, Georgians - 0, 37%, Russians - 0.34%, etc.
Probably, it is not worth arguing that absolutely all members of the RCP (b) were so internationalists that they completely ousted questions of their own national identity from their self-consciousness. Inevitably, at the everyday level and in the party environment, questions should have arisen about why Jews dominate the leadership of the party, among the rank-and-file members of which there are less than 5% Jews. And Stalin, better than all members of the Politburo, exploited these moods for the purposes of his career. As a matter of fact, among those who were part of the Politburo under Lenin, the circle of non-Jews and persons not married to Jewish women was very narrow. Only three: Joseph Stalin, along with the unambitious Alexei Rykov and Mikhail Tomsky. So it is not surprising that anti-Semitic sentiments in the party were saddled by ... also a foreigner (in the legislation of the Russian Empire there was such a legal status for subjects of non-Slavic nationality, where, among others, Jews and mountaineers of the Caucasus were included). And an anti-Semitic figure in the leadership of the party was in demand locally by the party rank and file.
In 1924, Stalin's so-called "Leninist draft into the party" of 230,000 new members (with a target figure of 100,000) slightly increased the proportion of non-Jews in the leadership of regional party organizations. In 1924, the party consisted of 735,000 people; in 1927, 1,236,000.
On November 7, 1927, alternative demonstrations of the party opposition take place in Moscow and Leningrad in honor of the tenth anniversary of the October Revolution. In Moscow, the alternative demonstration was organized by Smilga and Preobrazhensky, in Leningrad by Zinoviev, Radek and Lashevich. Both demonstrations were attacked, not by the police, but by “spontaneous” crowds beating the demonstrators while shouting “Down with the Jewish oppositionists!” And by the end of 1927, Stalin was already in complete control of the situation, having ceased to need a collective mechanism for managing the party.
Stalin's further behavior in the Jewish question may be the subject of analysis in the next article in this cycle. In the meantime, as a conclusion, let us emphasize the fact that the arrival of Stalin in supreme power was largely the result of an inadequately high degree of “mono-nationality” of the party leadership in the Lenin period. One way or another, but for the violation of the balance of interests of different nationalities, society always has to pay a high price ...