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Mikhail Gorbachev short biography. Election of M.S.

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On March 15, 1990, the Third Extraordinary Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR elected Mikhail Gorbachev as president of the country. He only got to serve a third of his five-year sentence.

The congress opened on March 12. In addition to establishing the post of president, he made another historical change to the constitution: he abolished Article 6 on the leading and guiding role of the CPSU.

17 deputies spoke in the debate. Opinions ranged from “We see in presidential power an important guarantee of the unity of our federation” (Nursultan Nazarbayev) and “Our country has raised a leader of global scale, the author of new political thinking, a leader advocating disarmament, for peace” (Fedor Grigoriev) to “Perestroika will choke presidency" (Nikolai Dzhiba).

Let's not play hide and seek, today we are talking about the election of a specific leader as president of the country - Mikhail Sergeevich Gorbachev Alexander Yakovlev

“An attempt to hastily introduce the post of president here at the congress is a gross, grave political mistake, which will greatly aggravate our difficulties, anxieties and fears,” said co-chairman of the Interregional Deputy Group Yuri Afanasyev. Academician Vitaly Goldansky objected: “We cannot wait, we need intensive care, not sanatorium treatment.”

The proposal to ban the combination of the post of president and leader of a political party, supported by both radical democrats and orthodox communists, who dreamed of seeing Alexander Yakovlev and Yegor Ligachev or Ivan Polozkov in the role of general secretary, respectively, received 1303 votes and would have passed if it had not been for a constitutional amendment. , which required a two-thirds vote.

On March 14, a plenum of the CPSU Central Committee was held, nominating Gorbachev as a presidential candidate. A number of congress deputies proposed the candidacies of Prime Minister Nikolai Ryzhkov and Minister of Internal Affairs Vadim Bakatin, but they refused, and the elections turned out to be uncontested.

We were in a hurry to elect the President. But, perhaps, having been elected, it was not worthwhile to immediately elevate him to this post here, on the stage of the Kremlin Palace. It should have been postponed for one day, announcing that the solemn event would take place, for example, in the St. George Hall of the Kremlin. In the presence of deputies, the government, representatives of the capital's workers, soldiers, the diplomatic corps, and the press, the newspaper "Pravda"

Of the 2,245 deputies (five seats were vacant at that time), exactly two thousand took part in the congress. 1,329 votes were cast for Gorbachev (59.2% of the total number of deputies). 495 opposed, 54 ballots were spoiled. 122 people did not vote.

At the suggestion of Anatoly Lukyanov, who replaced Gorbachev as Chairman of the Supreme Council, the elected president immediately took the oath - going to the podium and placing his hand on the text of the constitution, he uttered a single phrase: “I solemnly swear to faithfully serve the people of our country, strictly follow the Constitution of the USSR, guarantee rights and freedoms citizens, to conscientiously fulfill the high duties assigned to me by the President of the USSR."

The foreign reaction was purely optimistic.

“The Extraordinary Congress of People’s Deputies of the Soviet Union carried out the greatest revolutionary transformations in the life of Soviet society, the likes of which have not been seen in Russia since the revolution of 1917,” Japanese television indicated. “The decisions of the Extraordinary Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR cemented perhaps the most important changes in the political and economic system of the USSR since the Bolshevik revolution in 1917,” echoed the Washington Post.

At the pace of a military operation

It is unknown who came up with the idea of ​​introducing the post of president.

The topic has been discussed in the media since December 1989, but in the form of hypotheses and discussions.

Gorbachev’s assistant Anatoly Chernyaev wrote in his memoirs that in January 1990, the “architect of perestroika” and Secretary of the Central Committee Alexander Yakovlev told him in a terrible secret: once Gorbachev came into his office, upset, worried, lonely. Like, what should I do? Azerbaijan, Lithuania, economy, orthodoxies, radicals, people on edge. Yakovlev said: “We must act. The most important obstacle to perestroika and your entire policy is the Politburo. It is necessary to convene a congress of people’s deputies in the near future, let the congress elect you president.” And Gorbachev agreed.

The decision on presidential rule was so urgent that they decided to convene an extraordinary congress. I didn’t understand such urgency, since only two and a half months passed after the Second Congress of People’s Deputies, where this issue was not even discussed Nikolai Ryzhkov

Be that as it may, on February 14, unexpectedly for everyone, Gorbachev voiced the idea at a session of the Supreme Council, and on February 27 the parliament decided to convene an extraordinary congress. Frankly speaking, not enough time was allocated for preparation and public discussion.

The haste provoked criticism from both the left and the right, who suspected some kind of trick and persistently, but unsuccessfully, tried to get a clear explanation from Gorbachev why he needed it.

The official version set out in the draft law on the establishment of the post of president and the introduction of appropriate amendments to the constitution: “In order to ensure the further development of the deep political and economic transformations taking place in the country, strengthening the constitutional system, the rights, freedoms and security of citizens, improving the interaction of the highest bodies of government and the administration of the USSR" did not satisfy anyone. You'd think Gorbachev didn't have enough power before!

According to historians, the leading reason lay on the surface: the leader wanted, while remaining the General Secretary of the CPSU, to weaken his dependence on the Central Committee, which could at any moment gather at a plenum and deal with him, as in his time with Khrushchev.

After Gorbachev was elected president and the abolition of Article 6, it was no longer so much that he needed the party for his own legitimacy as the party needed him.

Using the powers of the Secretary General, Gorbachev is precisely strengthening the power of the Communist Party. Including its power over the Secretary General himself. Two ideas - the abolition of Article 6 and the introduction of the presidency - are closely related. Only by receiving full state, and not party power, can Gorbachev abolish the party monopoly. Otherwise he will simply lose power Anatoly Sobchak

Since the CPSU had lost official power, the vacuum needed to be filled.

After the events in Tbilisi and Baku, it turned out to be difficult to find out who made the decisions to use the army, and talk intensified about the need for “a person who is responsible for everything.” However, the presidency did not prevent Gorbachev from evading responsibility for the Vilnius drama.

There was another practical consideration.

According to the tradition established by Leonid Brezhnev, the Secretary General simultaneously headed the highest representative body. But, starting in the spring of 1989, the Supreme Council began working on a permanent basis. Gorbachev, who presided over it, had to spend a lot of time at meetings. Other members of management did the same, always copying the behavior of the first person.

I urge you to vote for presidential power and believe that under this condition there will be social justice, national security, including that of the Russian people. Deputy Ivan Polozkov, orthodox communist

Naturally, this made governing the country difficult. And the question arose in society: who is taking care of business while the debate is going on?

Meanwhile, the opinion was expressed that Gorbachev’s personality was more suitable for the role of speaker than head of state. He was brilliant at manipulating a large, diverse audience and achieving the voting results he wanted.

Anatoly Sobchak in his book “Walking into Power” noted that in personal communication, the magic of Gorbachev’s influence was irresistible. “Give in to this charm, and you will begin to act as if under hypnosis,” he wrote.

Main mystery

The main question that researchers are still puzzling over to this day is why Gorbachev did not go to the national elections? Moreover, this was provided for by the law on the introduction of the post of president, and only for the first case a special clause was made.

Many consider this a fatal mistake. As Boris Yeltsin later proved, it is very difficult to legally remove a popularly elected president from power.

Illustration copyright RIA Novosti Image caption According to a number of historians, Gorbachev did not want to directly measure his popularity with Yeltsin

Being elected not by citizens, but by deputies, made Gorbachev’s status insufficiently convincing, since the legitimacy of the congress itself was tarnished. He was elected under Article 6; in the absence of organized opposition, everywhere except Moscow, Leningrad, Sverdlovsk and the Baltic states, a third of the deputy corps were representatives of public organizations.

Some historians suggest that Gorbachev, even with an objective advantage, experienced a mystical fear of Yeltsin, for whom everything somehow worked out. Others say that he followed the lead of the nomenklatura circle, which in principle did not like direct democracy and feared that the election campaign would give reformers an additional opportunity to promote their views.

In conditions of political and economic instability, tempting fate once again and going to national elections is a risk, and a considerable one Anatoly Sobchak

In public speeches, Mikhail Sergeevich mainly emphasized that the situation is difficult, and the country will not survive another day without the president.

“They [interregional deputies] also spoke out for the presidency, but they conditioned it with such reservations and such approaches that this process could be slowed down for a long time, if not buried. In the current situation, serious decisions cannot be postponed. The introduction of the institution of the presidency is necessary for the country today,” - he said at the session of the Supreme Council on February 27.

Democrats' position

Considering in principle the institution of the presidency to be progressive in comparison with the current form of government, the question of the President of the USSR and the procedure for his election cannot be resolved hastily, without the participation of the new Supreme Councils of the republics, without a developed multi-party system in the country, without a free press, without strengthening the current Supreme Council . This issue must be linked to the constitutions of the republics and the new Union Treaty. Without these indispensable conditions, making a decision on the presidency will undoubtedly lead to a new aggravation of relations between the Center and the republics, to limiting the independence of local Soviets and self-government, to the threat of the restoration of a dictatorial regime in the country. From the statement of the Interregional Deputy Group

Supporters of perestroika and renewal are split on the issue of Gorbachev's presidency.

Some continued to see him as the only chance and believed that Gorbachev should be supported in everything, because he knows what he is doing, and because otherwise it will be even worse. The point of view of these people was expressed in a remark from the seat at the congress by a deputy who did not introduce himself: “Is it really that we don’t have food? The most important thing is that we found in history someone like Gorbachev, a pure man, the likes of which we will never find again.”

Some were simply impressed by the word “president”: here we will be, just like in civilized countries!

Others pointed out that this term is associated not only with America and France, but also with Latin American and Asian dictators, and most importantly, they demanded popular alternative elections.

“I believe that only the people can make an appropriate decision,” Alexander Shchelkanov, a member of the Interregional Group, said in the debate at the congress.

Zelenograd resident Shuvalov went on a hunger strike on Teatralnaya Square on the opening day of the congress “in protest against the election of the president only by deputies.”

A supporter of Gorbachev's presidency on the terms he put forward was Anatoly Sobchak, opponents were Yuri Afanasyev and Yuri Chernichenko. The latter, in particular, feared that “we will allow ourselves to be duped again; if the deputies cannot really control the actions of the chairman of the Supreme Council, then it will be even less possible to keep track of the president.”

Illustration copyright RIA Novosti Image caption One of Gorbachev’s main opponents at the congress was deputy Yuri Afanasyev

Boris Yeltsin, as far as is known, has not spoken publicly on this issue.

Sobchak wrote in his memoirs that shortly before the death of Andrei Sakharov, he tried to discuss with him the prospects of Gorbachev’s presidency, but the academician showed no interest in the topic, considering the issue insignificant compared to the development of a new constitution.

Not a new idea

We need to cast aside fears and despondency, gain faith in our strengths and capabilities. And ours are huge. The Russian people and all the peoples united with them into a great multinational state will be able to revive their common Motherland. And they will definitely achieve this along the paths of perestroika and socialist renewal. From Mikhail Gorbachev’s speech at the congress after his election

The idea of ​​establishing a popularly elected president in the USSR was discussed quite seriously in the past: during the preparation of the “Stalinist” constitution of 1936, in the last years of Nikita Khrushchev’s rule and at the dawn of perestroika.

Why Stalin rejected it is not entirely clear. He was guaranteed 99.99% of the votes, and a nationwide expression of support for the “beloved leader” could be turned into a powerful educational and propaganda event.

Khrushchev, according to researchers, simply did not have enough time, and his successors were guided by their deep conservatism and dislike of innovation.

According to the testimony of people who knew him, Leonid Brezhnev liked the address “Mr. President” during his foreign visits, but he did not legitimize the title.

Third try

In 1985, the “architect of perestroika” Alexander Yakovlev suggested that Gorbachev begin political reform with the party and put forward a detailed plan: to organize an all-party discussion, based on its results, to divide the CPSU into two parties - the reformist people's democratic and conservative socialist - to hold elections to the Supreme Council and instruct the winners government formation.

Now, as I observe, Gorbachev presses on the gas and at the same time presses on the brake. The engine roars to the whole world - this is our glasnost. And the car stands still Olzhas Suleimenov, deputy, Kazakh poet

According to Yakovlev’s plan, both parties were to declare their commitment to the basic values ​​of socialism, join an alliance called the Union of Communists, delegate an equal number of members to its Central Council, and nominate the chairman of the council as a joint candidate for the post of President of the USSR.

A political structure in which two parties competing with each other in elections simultaneously enter into some kind of coalition with a single leader would show the world another “Russian miracle.” At the same time, some researchers believe that the implementation of the “Yakovlev Plan” would allow a smooth transition to multi-party democracy and avoid the collapse of the USSR.

Then Gorbachev did not support the idea. Five years later it was too late.

Pyrrhic victory

Gorbachev rushed about in search of alternatives, compromises, the optimal combination of old and new methods of leadership. There were mistakes, miscalculations, delays, and simply absurdities. But they are not the reason for the beginning of the disintegration of society and the state. It was inevitable by the very nature of the transition of a society, complexed and corrupted by a long dictatorship, to freedom, unique in world history, to freedom Anatoly Chernyaev, Gorbachev’s assistant

Historians consider the First Congress of People's Deputies in May 1989 to be the peak of Gorbachev's political career, and his election as president to be the beginning of its end. Soon the leader's rating rapidly and irreversibly went down.

That was the last credit of trust issued by society.

Conservatives hoped that Gorbachev needed presidential powers to “establish order,” while Democrats hoped for bold reform steps. When neither one nor the other happened, although he got everything he wanted, the disappointment turned out to be universal and deadly.

The prediction made at the congress by deputy Teimuraz Avaliani came true: “You will rush here and there, and at this time what we have now will happen.”

After 660 days, Gorbachev resigned (or rather, was forced to resign).

Born on March 2, 1931 in the village. Privolny, Medvedensky district, Stavropol Territory, in a peasant family. The last General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee (1985-1991), the first and only President of the USSR (1990-1991), Nobel Peace Prize laureate (1990), the founder of new thinking in world politics, one of the most famous statesmen in world history.

Carier start

He began his career at the age of 15, working with his father on a combine; for outstanding results during the harvest he was awarded the Order of the Red Banner of Labor (1949). Graduated from school with a silver medal (1950); in the school theater he successfully played roles from Russian classics, in particular, “Masquerade” by M. Yu. Lermontov. In 1950 he entered and in 1955 he graduated from the Faculty of Law of Moscow State University; member of the CPSU since 1952. At the university he met Raisa Maksimovna Titarenko, who became his wife. After graduating from the university, he was assigned to the prosecutor's office of the Stavropol Territory, where he worked for only 10 days; left the prosecutor's office for a freed Komsomol job. In the Komsomol he proved himself to be an exceptionally successful organizer, rapidly moving up the career ladder. In 1961-1962 - First Secretary of the Regional Committee of the Komsomol. In October 1961 - delegate to the XXII Congress of the CPSU; on April 10, 1970, in agreement with members of the Politburo and personally with L.I. Brezhnev, he was appointed first secretary of the regional committee of the CPSU. In those years, he enjoyed the active support of the Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee for Agriculture F.D. Kulakov, who looked after the young party worker. Since 1971 - member of the CPSU Central Committee. A fateful moment for Gorbachev’s subsequent career was his acquaintance with the most influential member of the Politburo, Chairman of the KGB of the USSR Yu. V. Andropov, who for many years vacationed at a resort in the city of Zheleznovodsk, Stavropol Territory. It was Andropov who saw enormous political potential in the local party leader and actually initiated the idea of ​​Gorbachev’s gradual transfer to Moscow. According to Gorbachev, Andropov sincerely sympathized with him; Despite the age difference, camaraderie arose between them. “For all Andropov’s restraint, I felt his kind attitude, even when, angry, he made comments to me,” M. S. Gorbachev writes in the book of his memoirs. The “gray eminence” of the Brezhnev Politburo, M. A. Suslov, also had sympathy for Gorbachev. “The road to Moscow” was opened for Gorbachev by the unexpected death of his longtime patron, F.D. Kulakov, who was responsible for agriculture in the Politburo. On the initiative of Yu. V. Andropov, on September 17, 1978, at the Mineralnye Vody railway station, the so-called meeting of the “four general secretaries” took place - the current party leader, L. I. Brezhnev, who was traveling by train on vacation, and three future general secretaries - Yu. Andropov, who was on vacation in Zheleznovodsk; K.U. Chernenko and the heads of the Stavropol Territory - M.S. Gorbachev. As Gorbachev recalled, in fact, this meeting was a “bride” for Gorbachev as a potential candidate for transfer to Moscow to the post of Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee for Agriculture, which became vacant after the death of Kulakov. On November 27, 1978, at the Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, Gorbachev was elected Secretary of the Central Committee, and a year later, on November 27, 1979, he became a candidate member of the Politburo; and a year later (October 21, 1980) - a member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee, thus making a rapid party career in Moscow. Gorbachev was distinguished by his exceptional efficiency, diligence, and innate dexterity in bureaucratic intrigues. Gorbachev’s colossal natural charm, his inexhaustible eloquence, ebullient energy, amazing youth by the standards of the Brezhnev Politburo, contributed to Gorbachev’s further advancement through the ranks. The long-term successful alliance with Andropov also played a significant role in the career of the future Secretary General.

Political rise

After the death of Brezhnev on November 10, 1982, Andropov was elected to the post of General Secretary, under whom Gorbachev turned from an “ordinary” member of the Politburo into one of the likely contenders for power. According to some reports, Andropov saw Gorbachev as his successor. Despite the fact that Gorbachev’s position in the Politburo sharply strengthened during Andropov’s short reign, the so-called “Brezhnev guard” - D. F. Ustinov, N. A. Tikhonov, K. U. Chernenko, V. V. Grishin, V. V. Shcherbitsky, M. S. Solomentsev, A. A. Gromyko - have not yet seen Gorbachev in the role of party leader; After the death of Andropov (February 9, 1984), the terminally ill K.U. Chernenko was nominated to the post of General Secretary, whose election provided the continuity so desired by the Kremlin “elders”. At the same time, during the year of Chernenko’s reign, who was unable to perform the duties of head of state due to health reasons, Gorbachev became in fact the second person in the state, holding meetings of the Central Committee Secretariat during Chernenko’s illness. It was during Chernenko’s reign that a strong opinion developed in the party apparatus that Gorbachev, due to his qualities, could cope with the role of a party leader. After Chernenko’s death, Politburo elder A. A. Gromyko nominated Gorbachev to the post of General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee. This nomination took place by preliminary agreement between Gorbachev and Gromyko. The mediators in these secret negotiations were Academician E.M. Primakov and Mikhail Sergeevich’s closest associate, A.N. Yakovlev, on Gorbachev’s side, and his son, Anatoly Anatolyevich, on Gromyko’s side. In fact, Gromyko promised Gorbachev his support in exchange for the latter’s promise to nominate him for the post of Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, i.e., the official head of the Soviet state. Despite various versions according to which Gorbachev had serious competitors (G.V. Romanov, V.V. Grishin and V.V. Shcherbitsky), they did not pose a real danger to him. Even during the Brezhnev era, Romanov was seriously compromised by gossip launched at the initiative of the KGB about his daughter’s incredibly magnificent wedding; Grishin was already old and had negative charisma; Shcherbitsky missed his chance to become secretary general immediately after the death of Brezhnev, who, it seemed, was going to nominate him as his replacement, but did not have time to do so. In addition, not only the country, but also party circles were tired of the “hearse race” and wanted to see the young and proactive Gorbachev in the role of leader, and not one of the hateful “old men.” On March 11, 1985, Gorbachev was elected General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee.

As Secretary General

Gorbachev began his activities as Secretary General with unusual activity.

Already in April 1985, Gorbachev put forward the slogan of accelerating the pace of socio-economic development of the USSR, the goal of which was to stop the stagnation of the Soviet economy and turn towards reviving economic processes and filling the market with consumer goods, increasing the level of well-being of Soviet citizens. This slogan, although correct in itself, did not produce practical results. No less significant in Soviet society was the problem of alcoholization of the population, which caused a literally stream of letters to the CPSU Central Committee from the female part of the country's population demanding to limit the sale of alcohol. Despite the fact that this problem was discussed even under Brezhnev, the start of the anti-alcohol campaign was given precisely under Gorbachev, for which Mikhail Sergeevich earned the ironic nickname “mineral secretary” from the people. The anti-alcohol campaign, which was based on the right idea, eventually turned into a tragic farce, contributing to a sharp increase in the production of moonshine, the death of citizens from surrogate drinks and huge losses. A year after coming to power, in April 1986, speaking in Tolyatti, Gorbachev for the first time uttered the word perestroika, which became the definition of the Gorbachev era. According to Gorbachev, “perestroika had to solve the problem of the country’s exit from totalitarianism. We wanted a society in which universal human values ​​would be present. And this means justice and solidarity, Christian and democratic ideas and concepts. We have opened the way to move on. They did what needed to be done: they gave freedom, openness, political pluralism, they gave democracy. We made man free. We have given the opportunity to choose in conditions of civil freedom, freedom of conscience, thought and speech. And I think that the democratic understanding of socialism also fits within this framework.” In April 1986 at the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant named after. V.I. Lenin there was an accident, the consequences of which were extremely serious: until now, the level of radiation in the area of ​​the accident is many times higher than the prohibitive level. An outstanding role in the aftermath of the liquidation of the accident was played by the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, N. I. Ryzhkov, who was shortly before appointed by Gorbachev to this post. In 1988, he showed colossal energy in helping Armenia, which suffered from a terrible earthquake, for which in 2008 he was awarded the highest award of the republic - the title of National Hero of Armenia.

Perestroika and Gorbachev

One of the main elements of the perestroika policy was the policy of glasnost, i.e. the actual lifting of party censorship on works of literature, the press, cinema and music. Glasnost met the needs of society; The actual slogan of millions of people was a line from the song of the Kino group “We are waiting for change!” The works of N. A. Berdyaev and I. S. Shmelev returned to the Soviet Union; after many years of being on the editor’s desk, A. N. Rybakov’s novel “Children of Arbat” was finally published. Soviet readers had the opportunity to get acquainted with the famous “Essays on the Russian Troubles” by the leader of the White movement, General A. I. Denikin. Another manifestation of the perestroika policy was the lifting of the ban on the opening of private cooperative stores, which had a wider range of products, but had prices that were incomparably higher than in state stores and therefore inaccessible to the average person. At the same time, it was during the perestroika period that the shortage of food and consumer goods reached absolute levels; queues for bread and tobacco products became an attribute of the late 1980s and early 1990s.

Foreign policy under Gorbachev

From the moment he came to power, Gorbachev paid great attention to foreign policy issues. Gorbachev and his Foreign Minister E. A. Shevardnadze, with unprecedented activity compared to previous times, hold meetings with American President R. Reagan, then with his successor George W. Bush. In total, during his time in power, Gorbachev met with American presidents 11 times. The result of these meetings (Geneva, Reykjavik, Moscow, Malta, etc.) was the signing of a number of important agreements in the field of disarmament. In 1989, a limited contingent of Soviet troops completed the withdrawal from Afghanistan, thereby ending the Afghan war. Also, the USSR actually avoided interference in the affairs of Eastern European countries, excluding its armed intervention in the “velvet revolutions.” It was Gorbachev who played a decisive role in the issue of German unification in 1990. In fact, Gorbachev’s idea boiled down to Germany’s non-bloc status, which, according to him, was fixed in words, and not on paper, in negotiations with German Chancellor Helmet Kohl. At the same time, despite the obvious decrease in tension in relations between the USSR and the countries of Western Europe and the United States, in fact the Soviet Union made only unilateral concessions that contributed to the liquidation of the Warsaw Pact Organization and the further expansion of NATO to the east. The concept of new thinking in international politics developed by Gorbachev and his advisers, which presupposed reliance on universal human values ​​in foreign policy, although it contributed to Gorbachev’s extraordinary popularity in the world, “Gorbymania,” in fact had no practical results, since it did not take into account what was traditional for the Anglo-Saxon world the desire for world hegemony was essentially political idealism. Gorbachev himself believes that the main result of the new thinking was “the end of the Cold War. A long and potentially deadly period in world history has come to an end, when all of humanity lived under the constant threat of nuclear disaster. For several years now there has been a debate about who won and who lost in the Cold War. Such a formulation of the question itself is nothing more than a tribute to Stalinist dogma. According to common sense, everyone wins. The foundations of peace on the planet have been consolidated. Relations with states - both East and West - were introduced into a normal, non-confrontational channel. The path has been paved for an equal partnership that meets the interests of everyone, and above all, our national-state interests...” In fact, the Soviet Union not only ceased to be one of the two superpowers, but also ceased to exist. Gorbachev’s popularity in the world was inversely proportional to his unpopularity in his own country, which saw open capitulation in the foreign policy of its leader.

The national question under Gorbachev

The Gorbachev era also coincided with a sharp rise in nationalism in the Soviet republics, expressed in the formation of nationalist popular fronts in the Transcaucasian and Baltic republics; the most severe state reaction to separatist outbreaks that led to bloodshed. (Tbilisi, Baku, Vilnius). There was an obvious contradiction between Gorbachev’s peacemaking foreign policy and his domestic policy, aimed even at preserving a unified state by force.

Gorbachev and the collapse of the USSR

A clear manifestation of the policy of perestroika was the First Congress of People's Deputies in the USSR, which became a real triumph of freedom of speech. The whole country had the opportunity to watch live the speeches of deputies G. Kh. Popov, A. A. Sobchak, A. D. Sakharov, B. N. Yeltsin, Yu. N. Afanasyev. Many of the deputies were able to make a brilliant political career. Despite the fact that Gorbachev was elected Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Council (1989), and then President of the USSR (1990), his popularity was rapidly declining, while the popularity of his main opponent, former candidate member of the Politburo B. N. Yeltsin, former nominee Gorbachev - grew rapidly. By the end of 1990, against the backdrop of the “parade of sovereignties” of the republics, it became abundantly clear that the issue of preserving the USSR as a single state was on the agenda. In this situation, in the spring of 1991, Gorbachev initiated the holding of the first and only all-Union referendum in the history of the USSR on the issue of preserving the USSR as a renewed federation of sovereign states. To the question “Do you consider it necessary to preserve the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as a renewed federation of equal sovereign republics, in which the rights and freedoms of people of any nationality will be fully guaranteed?” 78% of citizens who took part in the vote answered in the affirmative, which was perceived by Gorbachev as his personal political victory.

By the spring of 1991, there were several conflicts with the President of the USSR, among which we should highlight 1) increasing tension in relations with the extremely popular Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR B. N. Yeltsin; 2) the actual demarcation of the union republics from the union center; 3) Gorbachev’s conflictual relations with the conservative wing of the Soviet leadership represented by his proteges - Chairman of the KGB of the USSR V. A. Kryuchkov, Minister of Defense of the USSR D. T. Yazov, Minister of Internal Affairs of the USSR B. K. Pugo and a number of other Soviet and party leaders ; 4) in addition, Gorbachev’s popularity as head of state and the population’s trust in him as a leader were rapidly falling.

Soon after the All-Union referendum, work began on signing a new union treaty, the so-called Novoogarevo process began, in which 9 republics took part plus the union center (represented by M. S. Gorbachev) as an independent participant in the discussions. By the summer of 1991, these negotiations became known as the 9+1 negotiations. During the meetings, the parties came to the idea of ​​​​transforming the USSR into the USG (Union of Sovereign States; the USG was also popularly deciphered as the union to save Gorbachev). The SSG was intended to be a replacement of a powerful centralized state - the USSR - with a softer one, with weaker power of the center and greater rights for the republics than before. The signing of a new Union Treaty was scheduled for August 20, 1991, but the August putsch prevented this.

On August 18, 1991, a delegation from Moscow arrived at the presidential dacha in Foros (Crimea) (V.I. Boldin, V.I. Varennikov, O.D. Baklanov, O.S. Shenin, in fact, in the form of an ultimatum, they demanded that the president introduce state of emergency in the country. According to a variety of evidence, Gorbachev refused this. For several days the president was cut off from communication and virtually isolated in Foros. On August 19, 1991, the creation of the State Committee for the State of Emergency in USSR (GKChP), while emphasizing the “impossibility” of M. S. Gorbachev fulfilling his powers due to illness. In fact, a coup d’etat took place in the country, and Vice-President of the USSR G. I. Yanaev assumed the duties of the President of the USSR. In history these events remained under the name of the August putsch of August 19-21, 1991. Despite the fact that the State Emergency Committee was formally headed by G. I. Yanaev, the actual leader of the conspiracy was the Chairman of the USSR KGB V. A. Kryuchkov. In addition to Yanaev and Kryuchkov, the State Emergency Committee included D. T. Yazov, O. D. Baklanov, B. K. Pugo, V. S. Pavlov, O. S. Shenin, A. I. Tizyakov, V. A. Starodubtsev . During the days of the putsch, the Secretariat of the CPSU Central Committee actually took a neutral position; Gorbachev’s deputy in the party, V. A. Ivashko, only on August 20 announced the need for a meeting with Gorbachev. To a large extent, the failure of the putsch was ensured by the bold and decisive position of the President of the RSFSR B.N. Yeltsin, who declared that he considered all orders of the State Emergency Committee to be unconstitutional. In essence, by the morning of August 21, the putsch had failed. The leaders of the State Emergency Committee were not ready to shed blood. August 22, 1991 Gorbachev returns to Moscow. The true triumphant of the August events was Yeltsin. From the moment he returned to Moscow, power began to slip away from under Gorbachev’s feet. In effect, he was the powerless president of a sprawling country. Under pressure from the public and Yeltsin, on August 24, 1991, Gorbachev resigned as General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee. In turn, the treaty of alliance was torpedoed; The Novoogaryovsky process was suspended, new negotiations were already underway on the principle of transforming the USSR into a confederation of republics. By the end of November 1991, the negotiations seemed close to success, but on December 8, 1991, the famous Belovezhskaya Agreement was signed by the three leaders of the Slavic republics - Yeltsin, Kravchuk and Shushkevich on the self-dissolution of the USSR. In fact, this agreement was unconstitutional; the key role was played by the desire of the leaders of the republics to get rid of Gorbachev, who in the eyes of the West still remained the leader in the political field of the USSR. After the ratification of the Belovezhskaya Agreement, on December 25, 1991, Gorbachev resigned as president of the USSR.

After the resignation of M. S. Gorbachev participated in the 1996 elections, but received less than one percent of the votes. The head of the foundation for studying political processes, the Gorbachev Foundation, which he founded, the author of a large number of articles on various topics, books and memoirs. He actively supported the entry of Crimea and Sevastopol into the Russian Federation, stating that “using its sovereignty, Crimea expressed its desire to be with Russia. Which means it's happiness. This is freedom of choice, without which nothing should exist.”

The main works of M. S. Gorbachev

Gorbachev M. S. August putsch (causes and consequences). M.: Publishing house "Novosti", 1991. - 96 p.: ill.

Gorbachev M. S. December-91. My position. M.: Publishing house "Novosti", 1992. 224 p.

Gorbachev M. S. Life and reforms. In two books. Book 1. M.: JSC Publishing House “Novosti”, 1995. - 600 pp.; Book 2. M.: JSC Publishing House “Novosti”, 1995. - 656 p.

Gorbachev M. S. Alone with myself / M. Gorbachev. - M.: Green Street, 2012. - 688 p., ill.

Gorbachev M.S., Perestroika and new thinking for our country and for the whole world. - M: Politizdat, 1987. - 270, p. ; 21 cm

Gorbachev M. S. Understanding perestroika... Why is it important now / M. S. Gorbachev. - M.: Alpina Business Books, 2006. - 400 p.

Gorbachev M. S. After the Kremlin. M.: Publishing house “Ves Mir”, 2014. - 416 p.

Gorbachev M. S. Reflections on the past and future. - 2nd ed. St. Petersburg: Publishing house of the St. Petersburg branch of the Gorbachev Foundation, 2002. - 336 p.

Memoirs

Aleksandrov-Agentov A.M., From Kollontai to Gorbachev: Memoirs of a diplomat, adviser A.A. Gromyko, assistant L.I. Brezhnev, Yu.V. Andropova, K.U. Chernenko and M.S. Gorbachev / Under the general. ed. I.F. Ogorodnikova. - M: International. relations, 1994. - 299 p. : portrait ; 21 cm. - Bibliography. in note: p. 296-298

Baibakov N.K., From Stalin to Yeltsin / N.K. Baibakov. - . - Moscow: Oil and Gas, 2005. - 307 p., l. portrait, color portrait ; 25 cm

Baklanov O. D., Space is my destiny: notes from “Sailor’s Silence”: [diaries, memories] / Oleg Baklanov. - Moscow: Society for the Preservation of Literary Heritage, 2012. - 25 cm

Bobkov F.D., KGB and power / Philip Bobkov. - M: EKSMO Algorithm-Book 2003. - 410, p., l. ill., portrait ; 21 cm - (For official use)

Boldin V.I., Collapse of the pedestal: Touches to the portrait. M.S. Gorbachev. - M: Republic, 1995. - 445, p., l. ill. ; 22 cm

Vorotnikov V.I. Chronicle of the absurd: the separation of Russia from the USSR / Vitaly Vorotnikov. - M.: Eksmo: Algorithm, 2011. - 320 p. - (The Court of History).

Grishin V.V., Catastrophe, From Khrushchev to Gorbachev: [political portraits. Memoirs] / Viktor Grishin. - Moscow: Algorithm Eksmo, 2010. - 269, p. ; 21 cm - (Judgment of History)

Dobrynin A.F. Purely confidential. Ambassador to Washington under six US presidents (1962 - 1986). M.: Author, 1996. - 688 pp.: ill.

Yeltsin B.N., Notes of the President: [reflections, memories, impressions...] / Boris Yeltsin. - Moscow: AST, 2006 (M.: First Exemplary Printing House). - 447 p., l. color ill., portrait ; 24 cm

Kornienko G. M. “Cold War.” Certificate of its participant. M.: OLMA-PRESS, 2001. - 415 p.

Kryuchkov V. A., Personal file / Vladimir Kryuchkov. - M: EKSMO Algorithm-book, 2003. - 477, p., l. ill., portrait ; 21 cm - (For official use)

Lukyanov A.I. August 91st. Was there a conspiracy? M.: Algorithm; Eksmo, 2010. - 240 p.

Medvedev V. A., In Gorbachev’s team: A look from the inside. - M: Bylina, 1994. - 239 p., l. ill. ; 21 cm

Medvedev V.T., The Man Behind Your Back / V.T. Medvedev. - . - Moscow: UP Print, 2010. - 179, p., l. ill. : ill., portrait ; 23 cm

Prokofiev Yu. A. Before and after the ban of the CPSU. The first secretary of the Moscow City Committee of the CPSU remembers... M.: Algorithm Publishing House, EKSMO Publishing House, 2005. - 288 pp.: ill. - (Results of the Soviet era).

Ryzhkov N.I., Ten years of great upheavals. - M: Assoc. "Book. Enlightenment. Mercy", 1995. - 574, p., l. ill. : portrait ; 21 cm

Solomentsev M.S., Cleansing in the Politburo: how Gorbachev removed the “enemies of perestroika” / Mikhail Solomentsev. - Moscow: Eksmo Algorithm, 2011. - 221, p. ; 21 cm. - (The Court of History) Sukhodrev V.M., My language is my friend: from Khrushchev to Gorbachev.. / V.M. Sukhodrev. - Ed. 2nd, revised and additional - Moscow: TONCHU publishing house, 2008. - 535, p. : ill., portrait ; 21 cm - (Moscow book)

Falin V.M., Without discounts on circumstances: [Polit. memories] / Valentin Falin. - M: Republic Sovremennik, 1999. - 462 p., l. portrait ; 21 cm - (Cruel Age: Kremlin secrets)

Chazov E.I., Health and power: memoirs of a Kremlin doctor / Evgeny Chazov. - Moscow: Tsentrpoligraf, 2015. - 413, p., p. ill., portrait ; 23 cm - (Our 20th century)

Chernyaev A.S. Six years with Gorbachev: According to diary entries. M.: Publishing group “Progress” - “Culture”, 1993. - 528 p.

Shakhnazarov G. Kh. With and without leaders. M.: Vagrius, 2001. 592 p.

Shevardnadze E. A. When the Iron Curtain Collapsed. Meetings and memories / Transl. with him. G. Leonova. M.: Publishing house "Europe", 2009. - 428 p.

Yakovlev A. N., Twilight / Alexander Yakovlev; [Federal book publishing program Russia]. - M: Mainland, 2003. - 687 p. : portrait ; 22 cm.

Yanaev G.I., State Emergency Committee against Gorbachev: the last battle for the USSR / Gennady Yanaev. - Moscow: Algorithm Eksmo, 2010. - 237, p. ; 21 cm - (Judgment of History)

Gorbachev Mikhail Sergeevich - politician, statesman, first and only President of the USSR.

Winner of the Nobel Peace Prize for improving relations with foreign countries, including ending the Cold War with the United States.

During his activities, the most significant events took place that had a great influence on the further development of the country.

Childhood and adolescence

On March 2, 1931, Mikhail Gorbachev was born in the Stavropol Territory, the village of Privolnoye. His parents were ordinary peasants.

Father - Sergei Andreevich Gorbachev was a foreman, and his father was the chairman of the local collective farm. Gopkalo's mother Maria Panteleevna was Ukrainian.

The childhood of the future statesman coincided with the beginning of the Great Patriotic War.

My father immediately went to the front, and Misha and his mother ended up in a village occupied by the Nazis.

Mikhail with his parents as a child

They lived under the yoke of German soldiers for 5 months. After liberation, the family received news from the front about the death of their father.

Mikhail had to combine his studies at school with work on the collective farm. At the age of 15, he already held the position of assistant combine operator.

For conscientious work and exceeding the plan in 1948, Mikhail was awarded the Order of the Red Banner of Labor.

Despite the difficulties and work, Mikhail graduated from school with a “silver” medal.

This allowed him to enter the Faculty of Law at Moscow State University without entrance exams, where he became the head of the Komsomol organization.

Occupying a public position, he was surrounded by fairly free-thinking fellow students.

His circle of friends included Zdenek Mlynar, who would become one of the leaders of the Prague Spring in the future.

In 1952, he joined the CPSU party. After 3 years, he received a law degree and was assigned to work in the Stavropol prosecutor's office.

In 1967 he received a second higher education as an economist-agronomist.

Starting a career in politics

He worked at the prosecutor's office for only a week. He was immediately accepted into the regional committee of the Komsomol in the department of agitation and propaganda. He worked there for 7 years, from 1955 - 1962.

During this time, he served as first secretary of the city Komsomol committee, then as 2nd and 1st secretary of the regional committee of the Komsomol.

Afterwards, having support in the person of F.D. Kulakov, Mikhail Gorbachev’s career quickly began to grow upward.

By 1970, he was the first secretary of the regional committee of the CPSU. In addition, Mikhail has gained a good reputation in the agricultural sector.

Then he was elected a member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee. He spent 12 years in this service. He rose to the post of Chairman.

Years of Presidency and removal from office

In March 1985, a plenum of the CPSU Central Committee was held, at which Mikhail Gorbachev officially assumed the position of General Secretary of the central committee.

He became the political leader of one of the world superpowers - the USSR. Subsequently, his career growth began to grow rapidly.

In 1989 he joined the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR as its chairman.

A year later he becomes President and Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces.

He initiated a series of major reforms, called “perestroika,” which lasted in the country for 6 years (1985-1991).

As head of state, he carried out an anti-alcohol campaign, which was considered a big mistake.

His decisions in the international arena led to the end of the Cold War, the reduction of the threat of the use of nuclear weapons, and the unification of Germany.

Mikhail Gorbachev sought to reduce tensions between countries.

However, discontent was growing within the country, and against its background, external achievements did not look advantageous.

On June 12, 1990, a decree was signed proclaiming the independence of the RSFSR. As a result, other republics began to follow this example.

In 1991, the August Putsch occurred, which became the culmination of internal tensions, and its failure only completed the collapse of the allied power.

After such events, Mikhail Gorbachev was accused of treason and a criminal case was opened.

After some time, it was closed, and M. Gorbachev himself resigned from the post of head of state.

This happened on December 25, 1991. He led the country for only 1 year.

Afterwards he became the head of an international foundation that was engaged in socio-economic and political research.

People called it the “Gorbachev Foundation”. After 2 years, he headed the international environmental organization Green Cross.

Activities after retirement

In 1996, Mikhail again participated in the elections of the President of the Russian Federation. However, his candidacy was able to gain only 0.51% of the total votes.

In 2000, he took the post of head of the Social Democratic Russian Party, which a year later merged with the SDPR (Social Democratic Party).

For the next 3 years he was the leader of this party. In 2007, by court decision, SDPR was liquidated.

In the same year, Mikhail Gorbachev created the social movement “Union of Social Democrats” and headed it.

In 2008, he was invited to a program with Vladimir Pozner. In an interview, he admitted his mistakes that led to the collapse of the USSR.

On the occasion of his 80th anniversary on March 2, 2011, the current President signed a decree awarding M. Gorbachev the Order. Holy Apostle Andrew the First-Called.

In 2014, he went to Germany, where he opened an exhibition dedicated to the 25th anniversary of the fall of the wall separating the eastern and western parts of Berlin.

On the last day of February, the ex-president of the USSR presented a book about himself, “Gorbachev in Life,” at his foundation.

In the spring of 2016, a meeting with future economists took place at the Moscow School at Moscow State University.

There he publicly acknowledged responsibility for his government decisions.

Personal life

Mikhail Gorbachev was married once. His first, faithful and only legal companion was Raisa Maksimovna Titarenko.

They met during their student years at one of the parties organized by Raisa’s friend.

Raisa was an exemplary student and spent all her time in the library. And at first she didn’t like Mikhail.

However, an incident changed everything. Raisa had serious health problems, and the only person who was nearby all the time was Mikhail.

With his wife Raisa

On September 25, 1953, the young couple registered their relationship. Parents were simply presented with a fait accompli.

Family life almost immediately began to test the strength of the young family’s feelings.

In the first year, Raisa became pregnant, but doctors forbade her to give birth due to heart problems.

The couple had to make a difficult decision - to agree to an abortion. Then, on the recommendation of the doctor, Mikhail and his wife decide to change the climate.

They move to Stavropol, to a small village. A new life begins there, and in 1957 Raisa safely gives birth to a girl, Irina.

At first, Raisa helps Mikhail in every possible way in his career. However, she herself does not sit at home either.

Raisa Gorbacheva begins teaching after moving to the capital.

Mikhail Sergeevich Gorbachev is the former General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, the first and only president of the Soviet Union.

The activities of the Soviet leader influenced the course of world history, in particular, it led to the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan and the Warsaw Pact countries, ensured the signing of an agreement with the United States on reducing the number of medium-range missiles, and contributed to the reunification of Germany. These and other merits of his became a compelling reason for awarding the politician the Nobel Peace Prize.

In the post-Soviet space, the historical role of the ex-president is assessed ambiguously - some consider him an outstanding political figure who managed to break a powerful totalitarian system, others blame him for the deliberate collapse of the state and even for all the current troubles of the Russian Federation.

Childhood

The future leader of the superpower was born in the Stavropol region on March 2, 1931 in the Russian-Ukrainian family of collective farmers Sergei Andreevich and Maria Panteleevna (nee Gopkalo). Both of his grandfathers suffered from the Soviet regime: his paternal grandfather was exiled to Siberia, his maternal grandfather was accused of “anti-Leninism” and was almost executed.


During the Second World War, his father fought, and Mikhail and his mother fell into occupation. After the liberation of the village, he continued his studies at school, from the age of 15 he worked as an assistant combine operator, and at the age of 17 he was awarded his first order - the Red Banner of Labor.


In 1950, the young man received a certificate and without exams (as an order bearer) became a student at the Faculty of Law of Moscow State University, and 2 years later - a member of the CPSU. Upon completion of his education in 1955, he was assigned to work in the prosecutor's office of the city of Stavropol.

Career Development

Mikhail Sergeevich worked in his specialty for a little more than a week, and then switched to Komsomol work - he headed the regional propaganda department of the youth organization of the Communist Party.


Successfully advancing in his career, in 1956 he already became the secretary of the city committee, and 5 years later he took a similar post in the regional committee of the Komsomol. In 1961, he was nominated as a delegate to the XXII Congress of the CPSU, a year later - party organizer of the regional committee of agricultural administration, then - head of the department of regional party organizations. He studied in absentia at the economics department of the Stavropol Agricultural Institute and earned a reputation as a promising, thoughtful and principled party worker. In 1966, Gorbachev headed the city party committee.


Many top officials of the country came to Stavropol on vacation, with whom the future Secretary General had good relations. It is known that Yuri Andropov valued Gorbachev, called him a “Stavropol nugget” and considered his candidacy for the position of deputy chairman of the KGB of the Soviet Union.


In 1970, he was appointed first secretary of the regional party committee. The young and proactive party functionary, in addition to Andropov, was highly valued by other first-echelon leaders, including Brezhnev, Gromyko and Suslov. In 1978, he was elected Secretary of the Central Committee, and he moved to the capital. Two years later he was included in the Politburo.


In 1985, he was nominated for the post of General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee. Since 1988, Gorbachev began to combine it with the post of head of the Supreme Council. Once at the pinnacle of power, he became the initiator of processes that remained in history under the names “perestroika”, “acceleration”, “glasnost”, “prohibition”. Among the achievements of his reign are also the right to choose one’s religion and the opportunity to travel abroad. On March 15, 1990, the politician became President of the USSR and Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the military forces.

Mikhail Gorbachev announces the introduction of Prohibition

In 1991, a number of party functionaries, major security officials, members of the government and the KGB announced the formation of the State Emergency Committee and reported that the leader of the state was unwell.


In August, the Soviet leader resigned as secretary general, and in November he resigned from the CPSU. In December, the leaders of the union republics signed an agreement to create the Commonwealth of Independent States, ending the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Later, the ex-leader did not acknowledge responsibility for the collapse of the USSR and shifted it onto Russia and Boris Yeltsin.

Mikhail Gorbachev on the Belovezhskaya Accords

Having decided to resign, the former head of the superpower began to engage in active social activities. He organized the Foundation for Socio-Economic and Political Research, wrote a number of scientific papers, and published the works “Alone with Myself,” “Life after the Kremlin,” and “Gorbachev in Life.”

Mikhail Gorbachev. First and last

In 2016, he received congratulations from Vladimir Putin on his 85th birthday. The ex-president sometimes criticized the policies of the leader of the state, but on the whole he always supported them. In 2017, he presented his memoirs “I Remain an Optimist” at a meeting with readers in the capital’s “House of Books.”

Personal life

The former president is a widower. He met his late wife Raisa Maksimovna (before Titarenko’s marriage) during his student years. They got married in 1953 and after graduation they moved to the North Caucasus together.


In 1957, the couple had a daughter, Irina. His wife worked as a lecturer for the Knowledge Society and taught at the philosophy department of the Medical and Agricultural Institute. After moving to the capital, she lectured at Moscow State University, was involved in social activities and always supported her husband’s progressive endeavors.

Mikhail Sergeevich and Raisa Maksimovna Gorbachev. Love story

In 1999, she was diagnosed with leukemia and, despite the efforts of German oncologists, she died. This was a huge blow for Mikhail Sergeevich. In 2009, with the help

On March 15, 1990, the Third Extraordinary Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR elected Mikhail Gorbachev as president of the country. He only got to serve a third of his five-year sentence.

The congress opened on March 12. In addition to establishing the post of president, he made another historical change to the constitution: he abolished Article 6 on the leading and guiding role of the CPSU.

17 deputies spoke in the debate. Opinions ranged from “We see in presidential power an important guarantee of the unity of our federation” (Nursultan Nazarbayev) and “Our country has raised a leader of global scale, the author of new political thinking, a leader advocating disarmament, for peace” (Fedor Grigoriev) to “Perestroika will choke presidency" (Nikolai Dzhiba).

Let's not play hide and seek, today we are talking about the election of a specific leader as president of the country - Mikhail Sergeevich Gorbachev Alexander Yakovlev

“An attempt to hastily introduce the post of president here at the congress is a gross, grave political mistake, which will greatly aggravate our difficulties, anxieties and fears,” said co-chairman of the Interregional Deputy Group Yuri Afanasyev. Academician Vitaly Goldansky objected: “We cannot wait, we need intensive care, not sanatorium treatment.”

The proposal to ban the combination of the post of president and leader of a political party, supported by both radical democrats and orthodox communists, who dreamed of seeing Alexander Yakovlev and Yegor Ligachev or Ivan Polozkov in the role of general secretary, respectively, received 1303 votes and would have passed if it had not been for a constitutional amendment. , which required a two-thirds vote.

On March 14, a plenum of the CPSU Central Committee was held, nominating Gorbachev as a presidential candidate. A number of congress deputies proposed the candidacies of Prime Minister Nikolai Ryzhkov and Minister of Internal Affairs Vadim Bakatin, but they refused, and the elections turned out to be uncontested.

We were in a hurry to elect the President. But, perhaps, having been elected, it was not worthwhile to immediately elevate him to this post here, on the stage of the Kremlin Palace. It should have been postponed for one day, announcing that the solemn event would take place, for example, in the St. George Hall of the Kremlin. In the presence of deputies, the government, representatives of the capital's workers, soldiers, the diplomatic corps, and the press, the newspaper "Pravda"

Of the 2,245 deputies (five seats were vacant at that time), exactly two thousand took part in the congress. 1,329 votes were cast for Gorbachev (59.2% of the total number of deputies). 495 opposed, 54 ballots were spoiled. 122 people did not vote.

At the suggestion of Anatoly Lukyanov, who replaced Gorbachev as Chairman of the Supreme Council, the elected president immediately took the oath - going to the podium and placing his hand on the text of the constitution, he uttered a single phrase: “I solemnly swear to faithfully serve the people of our country, strictly follow the Constitution of the USSR, guarantee rights and freedoms citizens, to conscientiously fulfill the high duties assigned to me by the President of the USSR."

The foreign reaction was purely optimistic.

“The Extraordinary Congress of People’s Deputies of the Soviet Union carried out the greatest revolutionary transformations in the life of Soviet society, the likes of which have not been seen in Russia since the revolution of 1917,” Japanese television indicated. “The decisions of the Extraordinary Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR cemented perhaps the most important changes in the political and economic system of the USSR since the Bolshevik revolution in 1917,” echoed the Washington Post.

At the pace of a military operation

It is unknown who came up with the idea of ​​introducing the post of president.

The topic has been discussed in the media since December 1989, but in the form of hypotheses and discussions.

Gorbachev’s assistant Anatoly Chernyaev wrote in his memoirs that in January 1990, the “architect of perestroika” and Secretary of the Central Committee Alexander Yakovlev told him in a terrible secret: once Gorbachev came into his office, upset, worried, lonely. Like, what should I do? Azerbaijan, Lithuania, economy, orthodoxies, radicals, people on edge. Yakovlev said: “We must act. The most important obstacle to perestroika and your entire policy is the Politburo. It is necessary to convene a congress of people’s deputies in the near future, let the congress elect you president.” And Gorbachev agreed.

The decision on presidential rule was so urgent that they decided to convene an extraordinary congress. I didn’t understand such urgency, since only two and a half months passed after the Second Congress of People’s Deputies, where this issue was not even discussed Nikolai Ryzhkov

Be that as it may, on February 14, unexpectedly for everyone, Gorbachev voiced the idea at a session of the Supreme Council, and on February 27 the parliament decided to convene an extraordinary congress. Frankly speaking, not enough time was allocated for preparation and public discussion.

The haste provoked criticism from both the left and the right, who suspected some kind of trick and persistently, but unsuccessfully, tried to get a clear explanation from Gorbachev why he needed it.

The official version set out in the draft law on the establishment of the post of president and the introduction of appropriate amendments to the constitution: “In order to ensure the further development of the deep political and economic transformations taking place in the country, strengthening the constitutional system, the rights, freedoms and security of citizens, improving the interaction of the highest bodies of government and the administration of the USSR" did not satisfy anyone. You'd think Gorbachev didn't have enough power before!

According to historians, the leading reason lay on the surface: the leader wanted, while remaining the General Secretary of the CPSU, to weaken his dependence on the Central Committee, which could at any moment hold a plenum and deal with him, as in his time with Khrushchev.

After Gorbachev was elected president and the abolition of Article 6, it was no longer so much that he needed the party for his own legitimacy as the party needed him.

Using the powers of the Secretary General, Gorbachev is precisely strengthening the power of the Communist Party. Including its power over the Secretary General himself. Two ideas - the abolition of Article 6 and the introduction of the presidency - are closely related. Only by receiving full state, and not party power, can Gorbachev abolish the party monopoly. Otherwise he will simply lose power Anatoly Sobchak

Since the CPSU had lost official power, the vacuum needed to be filled.

After the events in Tbilisi and Baku, it turned out to be difficult to find out who made the decisions to use the army, and talk intensified about the need for “a person who is responsible for everything.” However, the presidency did not prevent Gorbachev from evading responsibility for the Vilnius drama.

There was another practical consideration.

According to the tradition established by Leonid Brezhnev, the Secretary General simultaneously headed the highest representative body. But, starting in the spring of 1989, the Supreme Council began working on a permanent basis. Gorbachev, who presided over it, had to spend a lot of time at meetings. Other members of management did the same, always copying the behavior of the first person.

I urge you to vote for presidential power and believe that under this condition there will be social justice, national security, including that of the Russian people. Deputy Ivan Polozkov, orthodox communist

Naturally, this made governing the country difficult. And the question arose in society: who is taking care of business while the debate is going on?

Meanwhile, the opinion was expressed that Gorbachev’s personality was more suitable for the role of speaker than head of state. He was brilliant at manipulating a large, diverse audience and achieving the voting results he wanted.

Anatoly Sobchak in his book “Walking into Power” noted that in personal communication, the magic of Gorbachev’s influence was irresistible. “Give in to this charm, and you will begin to act as if under hypnosis,” he wrote.

Main mystery

The main question that researchers are still puzzling over to this day is why Gorbachev did not go to the national elections? Moreover, this was provided for by the law on the introduction of the post of president, and only for the first case a special clause was made.

Many consider this a fatal mistake. As Boris Yeltsin later proved, it is very difficult to legally remove a popularly elected president from power.

According to a number of historians, Gorbachev did not want to directly measure his popularity with Yeltsin

Being elected not by citizens, but by deputies, made Gorbachev’s status insufficiently convincing, since the legitimacy of the congress itself was tarnished. He was elected under Article 6; in the absence of organized opposition, everywhere except Moscow, Leningrad, Sverdlovsk and the Baltic states, a third of the deputy corps were representatives of public organizations.

Some historians suggest that Gorbachev, even with an objective advantage, experienced a mystical fear of Yeltsin, for whom everything somehow worked out. Others say that he followed the lead of the nomenklatura circle, which in principle did not like direct democracy and feared that the election campaign would give reformers an additional opportunity to promote their views.

In conditions of political and economic instability, tempting fate once again and going to national elections is a risk, and a considerable one Anatoly Sobchak

In public speeches, Mikhail Sergeevich mainly emphasized that the situation is difficult, and the country will not survive another day without the president.

“They [interregional deputies] also spoke out for the presidency, but they conditioned it with such reservations and such approaches that this process could be slowed down for a long time, if not buried. In the current situation, serious decisions cannot be postponed. The introduction of the institution of the presidency is necessary for the country today,” - he said at the session of the Supreme Council on February 27.

Democrats' position

Supporters of perestroika and renewal are split on the issue of Gorbachev's presidency.

Considering in principle the institution of the presidency to be progressive in comparison with the current form of government, the question of the President of the USSR and the procedure for his election cannot be resolved hastily, without the participation of the new Supreme Councils of the republics, without a developed multi-party system in the country, without a free press, without strengthening the current Supreme Council . This issue must be linked to the constitutions of the republics and the new Union Treaty. Without these indispensable conditions, making a decision on the presidency will undoubtedly lead to a new aggravation of relations between the Center and the republics, to limiting the independence of local Soviets and self-government, to the threat of the restoration of a dictatorial regime in the country. From the statement of the Interregional Deputy Group

Some continued to see him as the only chance and believed that Gorbachev should be supported in everything, because he knows what he is doing, and because otherwise it will be even worse. The point of view of these people was expressed in a remark from the seat at the congress by a deputy who did not introduce himself: “Is it really that we don’t have food? The most important thing is that we found in history someone like Gorbachev, a pure man, the likes of which we will never find again.”

Some were simply impressed by the word “president”: here we will be, just like in civilized countries!

Others pointed out that this term is associated not only with America and France, but also with Latin American and Asian dictators, and most importantly, they demanded popular alternative elections.

“I believe that only the people can make an appropriate decision,” Alexander Shchelkanov, a member of the Interregional Group, said in the debate at the congress.

Zelenograd resident Shuvalov went on a hunger strike on Teatralnaya Square on the opening day of the congress “in protest against the election of the president only by deputies.”

A supporter of Gorbachev's presidency on the terms he put forward was Anatoly Sobchak, opponents were Yuri Afanasyev and Yuri Chernichenko. The latter, in particular, feared that “we will allow ourselves to be duped again; if the deputies cannot really control the actions of the chairman of the Supreme Council, then it will be even less possible to keep track of the president.”

One of Gorbachev’s main opponents at the congress was deputy Yuri Afanasyev

Boris Yeltsin, as far as is known, has not spoken publicly on this issue.

Sobchak wrote in his memoirs that shortly before the death of Andrei Sakharov, he tried to discuss with him the prospects of Gorbachev’s presidency, but the academician showed no interest in the topic, considering the issue insignificant compared to the development of a new constitution.

Not a new idea

We need to cast aside fears and despondency, gain faith in our strengths and capabilities. And ours are huge. The Russian people and all the peoples united with them into a great multinational state will be able to revive their common Motherland. And they will definitely achieve this along the paths of perestroika and socialist renewal. From Mikhail Gorbachev’s speech at the congress after his election

The idea of ​​establishing a popularly elected president in the USSR was discussed quite seriously in the past: during the preparation of the “Stalinist” constitution of 1936, in the last years of Nikita Khrushchev’s rule and at the dawn of perestroika.

Why Stalin rejected it is not entirely clear. He was guaranteed 99.99% of the votes, and a nationwide expression of support for the “beloved leader” could be turned into a powerful educational and propaganda event.

Khrushchev, according to researchers, simply did not have enough time, and his successors were guided by their deep conservatism and dislike of innovation.

According to the testimony of people who knew him, Leonid Brezhnev liked the address “Mr. President” during his foreign visits, but he did not legitimize the title.

Third try

In 1985, the “architect of perestroika” Alexander Yakovlev suggested that Gorbachev begin political reform with the party and put forward a detailed plan: to organize an all-party discussion, based on its results, to divide the CPSU into two parties - the reformist people's democratic and conservative socialist - to hold elections to the Supreme Council and instruct the winners government formation.

Now, as I observe, Gorbachev presses on the gas and at the same time presses on the brake. The engine roars to the whole world - this is our glasnost. And the car stands still Olzhas Suleimenov, deputy, Kazakh poet

According to Yakovlev’s plan, both parties were to declare their commitment to the basic values ​​of socialism, join an alliance called the Union of Communists, delegate an equal number of members to its Central Council, and nominate the chairman of the council as a joint candidate for the post of President of the USSR.

A political structure in which two parties competing with each other in elections simultaneously enter into some kind of coalition with a single leader would show the world another “Russian miracle.” At the same time, some researchers believe that the implementation of the “Yakovlev Plan” would allow a smooth transition to multi-party democracy and avoid the collapse of the USSR.

Then Gorbachev did not support the idea. Five years later it was too late.

Pyrrhic victory

Gorbachev rushed about in search of alternatives, compromises, the optimal combination of old and new methods of leadership. There were mistakes, miscalculations, delays, and simply absurdities. But they are not the reason for the beginning of the disintegration of society and the state. It was inevitable by the very nature of the transition of a society, complexed and corrupted by a long dictatorship, to freedom, unique in world history, to freedom Anatoly Chernyaev, Gorbachev’s assistant

Historians consider the First Congress of People's Deputies in May 1989 to be the peak of Gorbachev's political career, and his election as president to be the beginning of its end. Soon the leader's rating rapidly and irreversibly went down.

That was the last credit of trust issued by society.

Conservatives hoped that Gorbachev needed presidential powers to “establish order,” while Democrats hoped for bold reform steps. When neither one nor the other happened, although he got everything he wanted, the disappointment turned out to be universal and deadly.

The prediction made at the congress by deputy Teimuraz Avaliani came true: “You will rush here and there, and at this time what we have now will happen.”

After 660 days, Gorbachev resigned (or rather, was forced to resign).