Back in 1940, the Barbarossa plan was developed and approved briefly, according to which it was supposed to establish complete total control over the Soviet Union, the only country that, according to Hitler, could resist Germany.

It was planned to do this in a very short time, striking in three directions with the joint efforts of Germany and its allies - Romania, Finland and Hungary. It was supposed to attack in three directions:
in the southern direction - Ukraine was put under attack;
in the northern direction - Leningrad and the Baltic States;
in the central direction - Moscow, Minsk.

Full coordination of the actions of the military leadership to capture the Union and establish full control over it, and the end of the preparation for military operations was supposed to be completed in April 1941. The German leadership mistakenly assumed that it would be able to complete the fleeting conquest of the Soviet Union, according to the developed plan of Barbarossa, much earlier than the war with Great Britain was over.

The whole essence of the Barbarossa plan boiled down to the following.
The main forces of the ground forces of the Soviet Union, which were located on the territory of the western part of Russia, had to be completely destroyed with the help of tank wedges. The main goal of this destruction was the task of preventing the withdrawal of even a part of the combat-ready army. Next, it was necessary to occupy a line from which it would be possible to carry out air raids into the territory of the Reich. The final goal of the Barbarossa plan is a shield that could divide the European and Asian parts of Russia (Volga-Arkhangelsk). In this state of affairs, the Russians would have industrial facilities only in the Urals, which could be destroyed, in case of urgent need, with the help of the Luftwaffe. When developing the Barbarossa plan, a special place was given to the coordination of actions in such a way that the Baltic Fleet would deprive any opportunity to participate in hostilities against Germany. And possible active attacks from the Union air forces were supposed to be prevented by preparing and implementing an attack operation against them. That is, in advance to nullify the air force's ability to effectively defend itself.

When agreeing on the Barbarossa plan, Hitler considered it important that the commanders inform their subordinates that all measures taken in connection with the implementation of such a plan are considered exclusively preventive - so that the Russians could not take a position other than that which was assigned to them by the German leadership. Information about the development of this kind of attack was kept secret. Only a small number of officers were allowed to plan military operations that were supposed to be carried out against the Soviet Union. This is solely due to the fact that an unwanted outflow of information will lead to the onset of the most severe political and military consequences.

Your work "barbarossa plan in brief" has been sent by the client sebastian1 for revision.

Russians in World War II Utkin Anatoly Ivanovich

Chapter 5 THE BARBAROSS PLAN

PLAN "BARBAROSS"

Hitler signed a non-aggression pact with us. Germany is stuck head over heels in the war in the West ”and I believe that Hitler would not risk opening a second front with an attack on the Soviet Union. Hitler is not foolish enough to see Poland in the Soviet Union.

J.V. Stalin, mid-June 1941

Today I have handed over the fate of our state and our people into the hands of our soldiers.

Hitler's decision

The conclusion of a pact with the USSR in no way changed Hitler's attitude towards Russia as a zone of future colonization, an object of German expansion. Despite the flood of pleasantries that followed the fall of Poland, Hitler's overall strategic thinking remained unchanged: "Drang nach Osten."

Less than two months after the signing of the Soviet-German treaty, Hitler ordered the army command to consider the occupied Polish territory as a concentration zone for future German operations.

However, the nightmare of the previous war on two fronts continued to haunt him. In nudging his generals to speed up the planning of operations in the west, Hitler made it clear what was on his mind: "We can only turn against Russia after we have our hands free in the west." He repeatedly promised his generals not to repeat the mistakes of the Kaiser.

In the summer of 1940, Central and Western Europe became the German zone of influence. Admiring the Alpine peaks, Hitler summoned the Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces, von Brauchitsch, and surprised him by putting the English theme aside. Brauchitsch remained in the memoirs of his contemporaries as a competent military leader, but his character had a defect that was fatal for Germany. The general did not know how to behave in the presence of the Fuehrer. His professional qualities lost all value when a former corporal with unlimited ambitions entered the premises. Perhaps Hitler even took pleasure in seeing the suffering of the classical representative of the Prussian military caste, who does not know how to control himself in the presence of an unknown force.

Hitler spoke with Brauchitsch about Eastern Europe. The conversation was in no way reminiscent of a staff discussion. In a historical perspective, Hitler saw the formation of new states dependent on Germany in Ukraine and Belarus, the formation of the Baltic Federation and the expansion of the territorial boundaries of Finland. Achievement of these goals was possible only on one condition: the dismemberment of the Soviet Union.

The next day, Brauchitsch's subordinate, the chief of staff of the ground forces, General Halder, listed in his diary the goals set by Hitler:

“England hopes for Russia and the United States. If hopes in Russia are not justified, then America will be left on the sidelines, because the destruction of Russia will greatly increase the power of Japan in the Far East ... Russia is the factor that England most relies on ... When Russia is crushed, England's last hope will crumble to dust. Then Germany will become the master of Europe and the Balkans. Solution: The destruction of Russia must be part of this struggle. Spring of 41st. The sooner Russia is crushed, the better. An attack can only succeed if the roots of the Russian state are undermined in one blow. Capturing a part of the country does nothing ... If we start in May 1941, we will have five months to finish everything. It would be best to finish everything in the current year, but coordinated action is not possible at this time. Defeat the Russian army, occupy as much Russian territory as possible, defend Berlin and the Silesian industrial region from possible air attacks. It is advisable to move our positions so far east that our own air force can destroy the most important areas of Russia. "

The commander of the ground forces and his headquarters already had their own plans. In their opinion, the campaign against the USSR should last no more than four or, in extreme cases, six weeks. Brauchitsch believed that to achieve this task would require 80 to 100 German divisions, and from the Soviet side they would be opposed by 50 to 75 "good divisions". (Note that none of the German generals expressed even a hypothetical assumption that the USSR could act preemptively against Germany.)

The fatal decision on the impending attack on the USSR was announced to the German generals at the Berghof on July 31, 1940. General Halder reported, he also recorded Hitler's remarks.

The Fuehrer said at the Berghof that the operation should only be started if Russia could be crushed with one blow. He was not interested in the seizure of territory: “To destroy the very will to live in Russia. This is our goal! " In one of his ecstatic states, Hitler painted a picture of the future battle with broad strokes: Russia will be crushed by two blows. One in the south, in the direction of Kiev, the second in the north, in the direction of Leningrad. Having achieved their goal, both groups turn to each other and close the ring, while the northern group takes Moscow. Hitler also talked about the possibility of a side additional operation to capture Baku. He already knew what to do with the future conquered country. Ukraine, Belarus and the three Baltic republics will directly enter the Reich. The territory to the White Sea will go to Finland. Leaving 60 divisions in the west, the Fuhrer threw 120 divisions against Russia.

The planned operation was developed at three levels. General Warlimont directed planning at the High Command of the Armed Forces (OKW) Operations Headquarters, General Thomas worked in OKW's Economics Department, and Halder directed planning at Army Headquarters (OKW).

The date of the upcoming offensive was indicated by Hitler's order to Goering: to carry out deliveries to the USSR only until the spring of 1941. Thomas's institution meticulously determined the value of individual regions of the USSR, the location of oil production centers. With calm confidence, it prepared not only to get its hands on the Soviet economy, but also to manage it.

Halder was to instruct the direct (at this stage) author of the plan for a new operation - the chief of staff of the eighteenth army, General Marx, who arrived at the main headquarters of the ground forces (OKH). General Marx presented his views on the campaign in the East on 5 August. This grandiose operation, Marx believed, should be aimed at carrying out "the defeat of the Soviet armed forces with the aim of making it impossible to revive Russia as an enemy of Germany in the foreseeable future." The centers of industrial power of the Soviet Union are located in Ukraine, in the Donetsk Basin, Moscow and Leningrad, and the industrial zone to the east of these regions "has no special significance." Marx's plan set the task of seizing territory along the line of the Northern Dvina, the Middle Volga and the Lower Don - the cities of Arkhangelsk, Gorky and Rostov. It should be noted that Marx's views largely determined the course of hostilities in the east.

From now on, the talk - and constantly - was about achieving the above-mentioned geographical line, about the defeat of Soviet troops in the border areas. There was no thought of destroying all the military might of a great country and the possibility of its complete occupation. The theoretical successors of Clausewitz, Moltke and Schlieffen proceeded from the assumption that a powerful blow would crush all the internal structures of the Soviet Union.

The thought of the possibility of a decisive short-term lightning strike blinded German theorists, they did not have enough intellectual courage to look further: what would happen if Russia took the first strike. Hitler, who prided himself on the non-conformism of his military thinking, in this case was completely captured by the academic military science of generals with a monocle. The ideas of a war with Russia, developed in the dazzling months after the victory over France, acquired an inertia that captured both the military and the politicians.

The German military leadership has one more important consideration these days. The Reich was convinced that Soviet troops in the Baltic republics would strike at the flank of the German troops if they immediately rushed from the border to Moscow. From this assumption it followed that it was necessary to allocate forces to counter the Soviet troops in the Baltic States. In addition, the German headquarters command clearly overestimated the power of Soviet bomber aviation, wherever possible, setting the task of capturing territory so deep that Soviet bombers could not bomb German cities.

Why did the line Arkhangelsk - Rostov (later Arkhangelsk - Astrakhan) seem "sufficient" to Hitler and his military entourage? We have already talked about the Germans' belief in the crushing of the first strike. But still, why weren't plans for the advancement to the Far East developed? This is all the more strange because the German generals believed in the collapse of the enemy. Why did the German troops have to stop? What did the headquarters of the Wehrmacht High Command think about the fate of the rest of Russia, the one that extended beyond the zone of occupation desirable for Germany? Some of the military dully hinted at the power of the German bomber aviation, but it is clear that it was impossible to destroy Russia from the air at that time, and the German air force did not have sufficient power.

The German generals dared to ask questions. So, Field Marshal von Bock (who was to command the Army Group Center) asked Hitler what would happen if German troops reached the intended line, and the central government of Soviet Russia still existed? Hitler said that, having suffered a defeat of this magnitude, the communists would ask for the terms of surrender. More vaguely, the Fuhrer hinted that if the Russian government did not do this, the Wehrmacht would reach the Urals. Hitler in this conversation showed an absolute determination to oppose Russia: let those around them not bother themselves looking for options for a different, non-violent solution to the Russian question.

According to von Losberg, who was commissioned by General Jodl in July 1940 to prepare materials for planning the eastern campaign, Hitler believed that the sixty million living beyond the Volga did not pose a threat to Germany. This specialist also captures Hitler's absolute conviction that a terrible first blow will dispel faith in the Bolshevik ideology, cause interracial and interethnic contradictions, and show the whole world that big Russia is an artificial formation. As for the ultimate fate of this country, "the Slavic reptile must be kept under the supervision of the master race." To ensure the solution of this problem, it was necessary to deprive the conquered territories of the system of economic ties, liquidate the communist intelligentsia and Jews, and subordinate the entire mass of the population to the direct command of the High Commissioners of the Reich. The most cruel treatment should have been the Russians themselves - the Great Russians.

It took the High Command of the Ground Forces only a few days to create the first version of the Wehrmacht's operation against the Soviet Union. The staff officers looked at the map and saw a natural barrier - the Pripyat swamps. The offensive had to be carried out either to the north (to Leningrad or Moscow), or to the south - against Ukraine. In the first case, East Prussia and occupied Poland were the bridgehead for the strike, in the second - Southern Poland and Romania. Captured by the opening prospect, representatives of the middle officer echelon initially chose the southern direction, Ukraine. But actions almost on the periphery did not find approval from General Halder, and he demanded that the planned operations be redirected to the north. Having received the appropriate instructions, General Marx outlined Orsha as the primary reference point, he envisaged the creation of an offensive springboard to Moscow in the Orsha region. The left flank of the advancing troops was supposed to cut through the Baltic republics and reach Leningrad. Marx did not forget about the possibilities in the south - there the offensive movement was supposed to pass south of Kiev with a reference point to Baku.

This is how the main outlines of the plan arose, which Germany began to implement a year later. No one particularly rushed the military, their imagination and scope were encouraged, this was the time when the highest generals of the Wehrmacht received field marshal's batons and they had a sense of omnipotence.

However, the euphoria did not soften the tough internal staff struggle. The High Command of the Ground Forces (OKH) (von Brauchitsch and Halder) sought to implement their strategic ideas in secret from Generals Jodl and Warlimont of the High Command of the Armed Forces (OKW). But Jodl realized that not participating in the preparation of such a large-scale enterprise would weaken his position, and he instructed General Warlimont to prepare his own draft, revised by Jodl in September 1940. Jodl was closer to Hitler than the arrogant guardians of caste traditions Brauchitsch and Halder, which is why his project had a special influence on Hitler's inaccessible thought process. Jodl's version involved the creation of three army groups, two of which were to the north of the Pripyat swamps, and one to the south. It is important to note the following reservation of the Jodl plan: since the ultimate goal of the offensive is Moscow, it is supposed to capture the "pre-field" of Moscow in the Smolensk region. Further advancement to the capital will depend on the degree of success of the neighbors on the left and on the right. This idea quite firmly entered the consciousness of Hitler, and he repeatedly turned to it afterwards.

The third version of the preliminary plan was created by the end of October 1940 by the new assistant chief of the operational headquarters (in OKH), General Paulus. In this version, two German groupings, northern and central, were to be used north of the Pripyat bogs, and one in the south. It is necessary to smash the Red Army near the borders, think about the destruction of enemy troops, and not about the seizure of this or that territory. To do this, it was necessary to prevent by any means the systematic withdrawal of the Red Army into the depths of its territory. The Baltic states, where, according to German information, there were only 30 Soviet divisions, little attention was paid in Paulus's plan. In this case, it was chained to Belarus (60 divisions) and Ukraine (70 divisions). Paulus believed that after the defeat of the enemy's troops, all forces should have been thrown into the capture of his capital - precisely the capital, and not industrial centers and strategically advantageous bridgeheads.

Paulus had a very low opinion of the leadership of the Red Army, but emphasized the difficulty of defining the fighting qualities of a Russian soldier. Interethnic tensions in the USSR and in its army were called a favorable element. For the first time, it is Paulus, an Austrian, who moves away from Prussian unbridled arrogance and discusses the significance of the problem of the numerical superiority of the Soviet troops. Halder was pleased with the analysis and planning of his favorite, in the future echoes of some doubts first expressed by Paulus will be reflected in Halder's reasoning.

On the table of the German military leadership were three versions of the plan for the invasion of the USSR. In Directive No. 18 of November 18, 1940, Hitler wrote: “Political discussions were held to clarify the position of Russia. Regardless of the results of these discussions, all preparations for the East, which I spoke about orally, must be continued. Instructions will follow as the army's operational plans are presented to me for approval. " The options for attacking the USSR were listed, but the main thing was not highlighted among them. New was felt in the special attention to Finland and the Balkan countries. Hitler began supplying arms to Finland at the end of July; in September Germany received the right of passage for its troops to Norway through Finland.

Now it was possible to conduct a generalized "brainstorming" of the problem. Between November 28 and December 3, the leadership of the German armed forces held a series of war games. The battle over the maps was led by Paulus. The basic principles (creation of three groups, striking from three bridgeheads) have already become generally accepted initial data. The leaders of the three army groups were given the task of mentally conducting operations independently of their neighbors. All three of the Wehrmacht's best generals felt the breathtaking scale of the battles ahead; They also noted such a feature of the front: as it moved to the east, it became more and more grandiose. The initial length of the front - 2 thousand km - quickly increased to 3 thousand.

From this it followed that if the German armed forces did not destroy the Red Army in the space between the border and the Minsk-Kiev line, then Germany's opportunities for active operations and control over the territory of battles would decrease.

A common problem for the three commanders was the roads. The task was somewhat easier in this regard for the northern grouping (Baltic roads), but Army Groups Center and South had to experience all the difficulties of moving three and a half million soldiers off-road. The problem for the Germans was also the Soviet railway track, which was wider than in Europe. The alarm sounded in a statement from the commander of the reserve Fromm: he had only about half a million soldiers at his disposal - this is all that could compensate for the losses in the summer campaign. The lack of freight transport, especially trucks, was noted. The German command had at its disposal a three-month supply of oil and a one-month supply of diesel fuel. Truly, one had to have boundless faith in one's fortune, starting a mortal struggle with the enemy with such equipment. The deficit of lesser importance is tires. The figures for military production are striking - only 250 tanks and self-propelled guns per year by the beginning of 1941. For a country capable of producing a million motors, this was an unforgivable daring. This daring turned into insolence: imports from the Soviet Union served as one of the main sources of solving the problems of raw materials on the eve of the war.

But the main thing that worried the German generals was the question of whether it was possible to start a war in the east without solving the British problem. We see this kind of doubt about the correctness of Hitler's strategy, above all from Brauchitsch. At an important meeting of the generals with the Fuhrer on December 5, 1940, he pointed out the shortage, first of all, of aircraft, if some of them are occupied in the skies of England. Hitler interrupted the commander of the ground forces and uttered a phrase that was remembered by everyone present: Germany can wage a war against two opponents at once if the eastern campaign does not drag on.

On the eve of this meeting, Hitler had a long conversation with Goering and Jodl, who noted the obvious desire of the Fuehrer to be tough with the representatives of the old Prussian school. In particular, he was very critical of Halder's proposal - an unconditional concentration of forces for a strike in one direction - on Moscow. Halder believed that the fortified flanks of this powerful group would not allow Soviet troops to deliver side strikes from the south and north, from the Baltic and Ukraine. Hitler objected: the economic goals of the war are just as important as the others. The Soviet leadership will strive with all its might to protect its industrial centers in Ukraine and the Baltic states, it needs the Baltic ports and Ukrainian industry. Moreover: "the capture of Moscow is not so important." Army Group Center must retain the ability to turn north and south.

Brauchitsch expressed solidarity with Halder, pointing out the importance of the Smolensk-Moscow line. After all, in the minds of Russians, this is the most important vital road. In response, Hitler said that only an ossified consciousness is able to hold on to such old ideas. As a result of the meeting, it was decided to keep Smolensk and Orsha in mind as a potential foothold in Central Russia and not fantasize about operations beyond this line. Fatal decision ... The German army will pay dearly for it.

Ultimately, the high command of the ground forces abandoned "dangerous" attempts to firmly define the main goal of the upcoming military operations. The professionals submitted to Hitler. Perhaps the world's best team of military theorists now deliberately made "the ultimate goal nothing", relying on the fact that in the course of the unfolding hostilities, it would be able to find the optimal choice between time and space, between the task of defeating enemy troops and the pursuit of his territory. Strategists in officers' uniforms now pinned their hopes on the wartime demands that would force Hitler to come down to earth and realistically assess the situation.

On August 9, 1940, General Warlimont issued the first orders for the deployment of troops on the approaches to the USSR. According to the Aufbau Ost plan, on August 26, two motorized divisions were relocated to Poland. They were followed by ten infantry divisions. According to Hitler's plan, the tank divisions should have been concentrated in southern Poland in order to quickly reach the Romanian oil fields.

The movement of large masses of troops could not go unnoticed. Therefore, the German military attaché in Moscow, E. Kestring, was authorized to notify the Soviet General Staff that this was a massive replacement of skilled workers with younger soldiers. All the main methods of camouflage and disinformation were contained in the instructions given to Jodl on 6 September: "These regroupings should not create in Russia the impression that we are preparing for an offensive in the East."

Soviet intelligence

In late 1940, the new head of Soviet military intelligence, the GRU, Philip Golikov, reviewed the most important parts of the intelligence network.

Of all the Soviet residencies, the Berlin was perhaps the most important. There was the largest number of agents here, and they had unique information. The station was headed by the military attaché of the Soviet embassy, ​​Major General Vasily Tupikov (codename Arnold). The direct assistants were the air force attaché Colonel N.D. Skornyakov (Meteor), Khlopov, Bazhanov, Zaitsev. The latter was responsible for contacts with "Alta" (Ilse Stoebe) and "Aryan". "Aryan" worked in the information section of the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

No sooner had Hitler made a decision to attack the Soviet Union, as the "Aryan" on September 29, 1940 reported on the deterioration of relations between Germany and the USSR. "Hitler intends to solve the problems in the east in the spring of 1941." As a source, he named Karl Schnurre, head of the Russian sector of the Foreign Ministry's economic department. And on December 29, 1940, the "Aryan" reported from "the highest-ranking circles" that Hitler had given the order to prepare a war against the USSR. "War will be declared in March 1941." Golikov wrote this message to the People's Commissar Tymoshenko and the Chief of the General Staff. Stalin received two copies, and the chief of the General Staff, Kiril Meretskov, was also notified. Voices sounded: who is the source?

According to the inquiry, “Aryan” reported on January 4, 1941, that “he received this information from a friend in military circles. Moreover, it is not based on rumors, but on a special order from Hitler, extremely secret and known only to very few people. " On February 28, 1941, "Aryan" sent a report on German preparations for war against the USSR: "The people involved in the project confirm that the war against the USSR will begin this year (1941)." Three army groups are organized under the leadership of Field Marshals von Bock, von Rundstedt and von Leeb to attack Leningrad, Moscow and Kiev. The beginning of the offensive is tentatively on May 20. In the Pinsk area, forces are concentrated in 120 German divisions. In the course of preparatory measures, Russian-speaking persons are appointed as commanders. Trains with a wide gauge, like in Russia, have been prepared. "

From a person close to Goering, “Aryan” heard that “Hitler intends to take out three million slaves from Russia in order to use them in industry - to raise its capacity.

Golikov and a number of the heads of the GRU departments were newcomers, and they did not attach due importance to the messages of the "Aryan".

IN AND. Tupikov arrived in Berlin in December 1940 as a military attaché. At the end of April 1941, after looking around in Berlin and studying the reports of agents (including "Aryan"), Tupikov wrote an unusual personal letter to Golikov:

"one. Current German plans call for a war against the USSR as the next enemy.

2. The conflict will take place this year. " Golikov circulated Tulikov's report to the proper addressees (including Zhukov), but omitted Tulikov's above conclusions. But they fully confirmed the conclusions of the "Aryan". On May 9, Tupikov sent letters to Zhukov and Timoshenko personally, describing the German plans. "The defeat of the Red Army will be achieved within one and a half months - with the Germans reaching the Moscow meridian."

The GRU resident in Helsinki was Colonel I. V. Smirnov ("Ostwald"), his assistant was Major Ermolov. In reports dated June 15 and 17, 1941, they talk about the military preparations of the Finnish side, about mobilization, about the evacuation of children and women from big cities, about anti-aircraft guns arriving in Helsinki.

The GRU recruited the head of Czech military intelligence, Colonel Frantisek Moravec. In France, Leopold Treper (aka Jean Gilbert) informed the resident - General Susloparov on June 21, 1941 that "the Wehrmacht command has completed the transfer of troops to the Soviet borders and tomorrow, June 22, they will launch a surprise attack against the Soviet Union." Stalin read this report and wrote in the margin: “This information is a British provocation. Find the author and punish him. "

From Switzerland, the head of the intelligence network, Alexander Rado ("Dora"), on February 21, 1941, sent a report to Moscow based on data from the Swiss General Staff: "Germany has 150 divisions in the east ... The German offensive will begin at the end of May." One gets the impression that Golikov firmly knew that Stalin was skeptical about the warnings of an attack in 1941 and therefore did not publish reports contradicting the leader's views. On April 6, 1941, Dora reports that all German motorized divisions are in the east. Of interest is the message of June 2: "All German motorized divisions are on the border of the USSR in a state of constant readiness ... In contrast to the April-May period, preparations along the Russian border are carried out less demonstratively, but with greater intensity."

The first report from Richard Sorge came to Moscow on November 18, 1940 - about German preparations for a war against the Soviet Union. On December 28, he reports that the reserve army was created by the Germans in 40 divisions in the Leipzig area. 80 German divisions were stationed on the Soviet border with Romania.

On May 1, 1941, Sorge reports that twenty German divisions have left France for the Soviet borders. On May 5, 1941, Sorge handed over a microfilm of Ribbentrop's telegram to the German ambassador to Japan, Ott, stating that "Germany will start a war against Russia in mid-June 1941." June 13: "I repeat: nine armies with a total of 150 divisions will begin the offensive on the morning of June 22." Ambassador Ott told Sorge on June 20 that "a war between Germany and the USSR is inevitable." Stalin's notes in the margin of Sorge's dispatches prevent him from believing that he trusted his best intelligence officer. Proskurov once demanded an award for Sorge, and Golikov cut his monthly subsidies in half.

(In the early 1960s, when the Franco-German film "Who are you, Doctor Sorge?" Was shown to the leading military leaders, an angry Zhukov approached Golikov. "Why, Philip Ivanovich, did you not show his reports to me? General Staff? "Golikov replied:" What should I have reported to you if Sorge was a double agent - both ours and theirs ").

Since the beginning of the war, the Soviet leadership was interested in one - the main question: what will Japan's behavior be during the Soviet-German war?

Diplomatic preparations

Hitler showed the most keen interest in the Balkans - after the second Vienna arbitration, Romania, which had significantly shrunk in territory, asked Berlin for guarantees. Germany (and after it Italy) gave guarantees to the new Romania, which entered the zone of influence of the "axis" countries. According to a secret directive dated September 20, 1940, Hitler ordered military missions to be sent to Romania. “For the outside world, their task will be to help friendly Romania in organizing and managing its armed forces. The real task, which should not be known to either the Romanians or our own troops, will be the protection of the oil fields ... the preparation of the deployment from the Romanian bases of German and Romanian troops in the event of a war with Soviet Russia. "

Romania's guarantees have raised serious concerns in the Kremlin. Ribbentrop tried in lengthy dispatches to explain the meaning and results of the Vienna Arbitration, Ambassador Schulenburg conducted reassuring conversations with Molotov, but in vain. Schulenburg reported that Molotov, "unlike previous contacts, was closed." Moreover, an oral protest followed from the Soviet side, in which the German government was accused of violating Article III of the Soviet-German treaty, which provided for bilateral Soviet-German consultations in such cases. In the incident with Romania, the Soviet Union was faced with a fait accompli.

Ribbentrop refused to admit that Germany had violated the August treaty. He "launched a counteroffensive" on September 3, 1940, accusing the USSR of arbitrary actions against the Baltic states and Romanian provinces. The Soviet leadership's response on September 21 was written in harsh language. It indicated that Germany had violated the treaty and that the Soviet Union was interested in Romania for many reasons. An absolutely new note was the proposal, not devoid of sarcasm, to cancel or amend the clause on mutual consultations "if it contains certain inconveniences" for the German side.

The second area of ​​divergence of interests was found in the North. The Soviet leadership was informed about the appearance of German troops in Finland. As explained, they were heading to Norway, but the fact remains: German units appeared on the territory of a country that had a huge common border with the USSR (which was just a front line). The German embassy reported to Berlin: "The Soviet embassy wants to receive the text of the agreement on the passage of troops through Finland, including its secret paragraphs ... to receive information about the purpose of the agreement, against whom it is directed, what purposes it serves."

The third reason for the disagreement arose after a telegram sent to the German embassy on September 25, marked with the highest classification of secrecy: Germany, Japan and Italy intend to sign an agreement on a military alliance in Berlin. “This alliance is directed exclusively against American warmongers. Of course, this, as usual, is not said directly in the treaty, but such a conclusion follows unmistakably from its terms ... Its sole purpose is to bring to life those elements that are fighting for America's entry into the war by demonstrating that in the event of their intervention in the current conflict, they will automatically deal with the three great powers as adversaries. "

In the wake of victories in the west, Hitler decided to strengthen ties with Italy and Japan. In September 1940, Hitler concluded that such an alliance would strengthen German positions in both the east and west. Ribbentrop pointed out that the pact would strengthen America's isolation in the West and would have an impact on Russia - a policy of friendship with it should have clearly delineated boundaries. Hitler's decision led to Mussolini's invitation to the Brenner Pass in early October 1940. An eyewitness - Ciano - wrote in his diary: “I rarely saw the Duce in such a good mood. The conversation was cordial and definitely the most interesting I have heard. Hitler laid out at least a few of his cards on the table and shared with us his plans for the future ... Hitler was energetic and again took an extremely anti-Bolshevik position. "Bolshevism," he said, "is the doctrine of people who are at the lowest level of civilization."

Germany's alliance with Italy and Japan created a bloc that opposed the British Empire. An essential question arose: what is the position of the USSR in the new alignment of forces? On the one hand, Germany was already planning an attack on the Soviet Union; on the other hand, it tried to find the possibility of its peaceful incorporation into the German orbit. The time to prioritize this or that trend was November 1940.

Hitler dictated a letter to Ribbentrop in Moscow: the trilateral pact signed on September 27 between Germany, Italy and Japan was directed exclusively against Britain and the United States. Stalin was asked to join him.

Stalin answered with restraint:

"I got your letter. I am sincerely grateful for your trust, as well as for an instructive analysis of recent events ... V.M. Molotov considers himself obliged to make a return visit to Berlin ... As for the discussion of some problems with the participation of the Japanese and Italians, I am of the opinion (not rejecting this idea in principle) that this issue should be submitted for preliminary consideration. " On the day of Molotov's arrival, Hitler's top-secret directive was issued: "Regardless of the results of these discussions, all preparations related to the East, about which oral orders have already been made, must continue."

Molotov's visit

A lot of potentially contentious issues have accumulated between the two countries. Hitler watched, without any approval, as the USSR restored the "pre-Versailles" position in Eastern Europe, while Germany canceled the results of Versailles in the West. The USSR and Germany were now simply obliged to draw a line of demarcation of their actions in the Balkans.

American journalist Shearer wrote in his diary on November 12, 1940: “A dark rainy day, Molotov arrived, he was received extremely dryly and formally. Driving along Unter den Linden to the Soviet embassy, ​​he seemed to me a constrained provincial school teacher ... The Germans cheekily talk about the fact that they can allow Moscow to fulfill the old Russian dream of taking over the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles, while they take over the rest of the Balkans: Romania, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria ". At the entire distance from the border with the USSR to Berlin, a guard of honor stood along the canvas.

Germanic records even contain descriptions of the clothes of those present. Molotov wore an unremarkable civilian suit, while Ribbentrop was wearing a blue-green uniform, high boots and a cap with a high crown (which he himself had made). The first meeting took place at a round table in the former presidential palace recently taken over by the Reich minister. Molotov himself recalls Hitler's huge, high office, where everyone, except for the owner, allowed themselves only remarks. Goering's study, hung with paintings and tapestries, also made an impression. The premises in the Central Committee of the NSDAP were much simpler. Hess, who hosted there, was sitting in a completely modest office. Molotov was impressed by Hitler's translator Hilger, who was born in Odessa and spoke pure Russian. Ambassador Schulenburg spoke only a little Russian. Leaving Moscow with Molotov, he forgot his embassy uniform at his embassy - he was forced to return by train and catch up with the train by car. After conversations with Hitler and Ribbentrop, Molotov sent long telegrams to Stalin every evening.

Ribbentrop also began by proclaiming the end of the British Empire. The British hope only for help from America, but “the entry of the United States into the war will have no consequences for Germany. Germany and Italy will never allow the Anglo-Saxons to land on the European continent ... The Axis countries are now pondering not how to win the war, but how to end the already won war. " The time has come when Russia, Germany, Italy and Japan must define their spheres of influence. The Fuehrer believes that all four powers should turn their eyes to the south. Japan to South Asia, Italy to Africa. Germany, having established a "new order" in Western Europe, will deal with Central Africa. Ribbentrop was interested to know if Russia would also turn in the direction of the southern seas, "whether it would not turn to the south to gain access to the open sea, which is so important for her."

The picture painted by Ribbentrop, contrary to expectations, did not arouse enthusiasm. Molotov interrupted the Reich Minister: "To which sea?" Ribbentrop's stream of eloquence suddenly dried up. He could not directly answer the question posed. Beating around the bush, the Reichsminister kept talking about the huge changes in the world. Only when Molotov repeated his question, Ribbentrop allowed greater clarity: "The most advantageous outlet to the sea for Russia could be found in the direction of the Persian Gulf and the Arabian Sea." According to the notes of the translator Schmidt, Molotov commented with an impenetrable face on these words of Ribbentrop: "Clarity and caution are necessary in determining the areas of interest."

After lunch, Hitler made an attempt to turn the head of the extremely grounded Molotov in the Reich Chancellery. The Fuhrer greeted Molotov with a Nazi greeting and shook hands with all the members of the Soviet delegation. Representatives from both sides settled in a pompous reception room at a low table. Hitler began the conversation in the most pompous tone: “An attempt should be made to determine the course of development of nations for a long period of time in the future, and, if this proves possible, it should be done in such a way as to avoid friction and elements of conflict, as far as humanly possible. This is especially important to keep in mind when two nations, Germany and Russia, are led by people who have enough power to determine the direction of development of their countries. "

Hitler tried to divert attention from the Balkans and Finland. He proposed to bring the discussion of German-Soviet relations to the highest - global - level, "above all petty considerations" and for a long period of time. The buildup of American power, which has more solid foundations of power than Britain, must be anticipated in advance. European powers must coordinate their policies to keep the Anglo-Saxons out of Europe. Hitler promised that as the weather improved with the help of aircraft "England will be dealt the final blow." America will be a problem, but the United States "will not be able to threaten the freedom of other nations until 1970 or 1980 ... They don't care about Europe, or Africa, or Asia."

Molotov managed to underestimate the pathos of this geopolitician: “The statements of the Fuehrer are of a general nature. For his part, he (Molotov) is ready to present the considerations of Stalin, who gave him clear instructions. " Translator Schmidt recalled: "Not a single foreign visitor spoke to the Fuehrer in this way." Molotov's questions dispelled the aura of Hitler as the creator of a new European order. Molotov was interested in what is the meaning of the trilateral pact, what the Germans are doing in Finland, how Hitler sees the future situation in Asia. The conversation quickly approached the main topic: the Balkans. The People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs bluntly stated that he was interested in "clarifying issues concerning the Balkan and Black Sea interests of Russia in relation to Bulgaria, Romania and Turkey." Hitler offered to share the British inheritance, he pushed Russia into Asia. Stalin was interested in what was happening in the Balkans.

Perhaps for the first time, Hitler received the signal of the air raid over Berlin with relief. He suggested postponing the discussion until the next day.

In the morning, Molotov repeated his questions to Hitler. It was Europe, not Asia, that became the subject of detailed discussions. Hitler disputed Molotov's claim that Finland was occupied by German troops. They are there in transit on their way to Norway. For his part, the Fuhrer insisted that the USSR was preparing for a war with Finland, and asked when this war would begin. The new Soviet-Finnish conflict could lead to far-reaching consequences. Molotov perked up: what does the Fuehrer mean? Then he noted: "A new factor has been introduced into the discussion by this statement." The oppressive silence was interrupted by the frightened course of the conversation, Ribbentrop: the Finnish question should not be dramatized, the tension that arose was caused by a misunderstanding. This intervention allowed Hitler to collect his thoughts and abruptly change the topic of conversation:

“Let's turn to more important issues. After the conquest of England, the British Empire will be a gigantic, world-wide, bankrupt estate of forty million square kilometers. Russia will have access to an ice-free and truly open ocean. Until now, a minority of forty-five million Englishmen ruled the six hundred million inhabitants of the British Empire. The day is not far away when he (Hitler) will crush this minority ... There are prospects of a global scale ... All countries that are interested in bankrupt ownership should stop squabbling among themselves and focus exclusively on the division of the British Empire. "

Molotov replied that Hitler's arguments were undoubtedly of interest, but first of all it was necessary to clarify German-Soviet relations. He discovered a lack of enthusiasm on the German side when he asked to direct the discussion closer to the problems of Europe - Turkey, Bulgaria, Romania. "The Soviet government adheres to the point of view that the German guarantees of Romania are directed against the interests of the Soviet Union." Germany must cancel its guarantees. What would be the reaction of Germany if the USSR provided guarantees to Bulgaria on the same terms as Germany and Italy to Romania?

Hitler darkened upon hearing this question. Has Bulgaria asked for such guarantees? He had not heard of such a request. In any case, he must first consult with Mussolini. After that, Hitler, famous for his unbridled torrent of words, was silent for a long time, then drew the guest's attention to the late hour.

Hitler did not go to the banquet at the Soviet embassy. The moment Ribbentrop stood up to deliver a toast in return, an air raid alert was announced. In a bomb shelter, Ribbentrop, renowned for his tactlessness, took out of his pocket a draft agreement that turned a three-sided pact into a four-sided one. According to the second article, Germany, Italy, Japan and the Soviet Union pledged to "respect each other's naturally formed spheres of influence" by resolving conflicts among themselves "in a friendly manner." Ribbentrop intended to announce the fact of the conclusion of a treaty with the USSR, but to keep secret the secret protocol, according to which the Soviet Union was asked to concentrate its troops in the southern direction in the Indian Ocean region. The desire to redirect the USSR to a southern direction is clearly visible. For this, Ribbentrop promised to ensure Moscow signing a non-aggression pact with Japan, to achieve Japan's recognition of Outer Mongolia and Xinjiang, which are in the sphere of Soviet interests.

For the third time, Molotov refused to discuss the Asian direction. The Baltic, the Balkans and the Black Sea straits - that was what worried him in the first place. “Questions of interest to the Soviet Union concern not only Turkey, but also Bulgaria ... The fate of Romania and Hungary is also of interest to the USSR, and under no circumstances will it be indifferent to their fate. The Soviet government would also like to know what are the plans of the Axis countries with regard to Yugoslavia and Greece, as well as what Germany intends to do with Poland ... The Soviet government is interested in Swedish neutrality ... In addition, there is the issue of leaving the Baltic Sea. " Ribbentrop, who rushed about, asked not to ask him questions point-blank. He repeated over and over that "the main issue is the readiness of the Soviet Union to take part in the forthcoming partition of the British Empire." In response, Molotov allowed himself a tough joke: "If Britain is over, then why are we in this bomb shelter and whose bombs are falling on the city?" He said that he is being asked to discuss the “great problems of tomorrow,” and he is most interested in the current problems.

No one can say with complete certainty how the involvement of the USSR in the trilateral pact (and consent to the "Indian direction") would have affected Hitler's plans to start a war. His absolute determination is evident from the documents, from the orders already given for the deployment of the German military machine to the east. Perhaps only the servility of the USSR could have pushed Hitler to "solve the British question" in the beginning. But this hypothesis also has no solid grounds. Molotov's harshness did not slow down (and perhaps hasten) Hitler's preparations for the eastern campaign. Obviously, the last doubts were dropped. Stalin from Berlin was seen as ready for defensive measures, interested in the fate of Finland, Sweden, Poland, Hungary, Romania, Yugoslavia, Turkey - the entire belt of countries between the USSR and Germany. It was not possible to make Russia a satellite at the expense of promises of admission to the partition of the British Empire.