Series: Soviet Holidays. Builder's Day
For the first time, the Builder's Day was celebrated in the USSR on August 12, 1956. And it was so. On September 6, 1955, the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR "On the establishment of the annual holiday" Builder's Day "(on the second Sunday of August) was issued. The brevity of the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR is proof that the Builder's Day appeared by no means by chance, and that its appearance seemed to be understood by itself. Here's how the newspapers commented on him:
"A new manifestation of the concern of the party and the government for builders is the Resolution of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Council of Ministers of the USSR" On measures to further industrialize, improve the quality and reduce the cost of construction, "adopted on August 23, 1955. This decree analyzes the state of construction with full completeness and clarity, determines further ways of widespread industrialization of the construction business ”(“ Stroitelnaya Gazeta ”, September 7, 1955).
“We, the builders, have a big day! Newspapers and radio spread throughout the country the message that the Party and the government had adopted a decree on the radical improvement of the construction business. At the same time, the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR was published on the annual holiday - "Builder's Day".
A sense of pride for our country, for our profession and ardent gratitude to the party and government for taking care of us, builders, filled our hearts ... ”.
Builder's Day was celebrated on August 12. On this day, the newspapers wrote: "The Builder's Day, celebrated today for the first time, will henceforth be included in the calendar as a national holiday," and this was not an exaggeration. Today it is difficult to imagine this, but in 1956 the country celebrated the holiday of builders with considerable enthusiasm, including festivities in parks of culture and recreation. Again, newspaper reports allow you to feel the atmosphere of those days:
“Moscow celebrated the builders' holiday with mass festivities, exhibitions, reports and lectures. It was especially crowded in the Gorky Central Park of Culture and Rest. A meeting of builders of the Leninsky district of the capital took place here, who erected the architectural ensemble of the Moscow State University building, quarters of residential buildings in the south-west of the capital, the Lenin stadium, where the flag of the Spartakiad of the peoples of the USSR is now raised. The builders of the district made a decision - to hand over 210 thousand square meters by December 20. m of living space ".
“On Sunday, the Chelyabinsk Park of Culture and Leisure was filled with about forty thousand builders. A meeting took place here ... "
"Baku. A solemn meeting of the Baku City Council of Working People's Deputies took place here, together with representatives of party, Soviet and public organizations, dedicated to the Builder's Day. The meeting was attended by the visiting parliamentary delegation of Uruguay ... ”.
"Tbilisi. In the capital of Georgia, on August 11 and 12, festivities dedicated to the Builder's Day were held. Thousands of workers visited the Permanent Construction Exhibition that opened in the Ordzhonikidze Central Park of Culture and Leisure. It is deployed according to a new thematic plan. The main idea of \u200b\u200bthe exhibition is to show elements of precast concrete, large-block construction and advanced industrial methods of construction and installation work. "
It is curious that many traditions laid down at the dawn of the celebration of the Builder's Day have survived to this day: awards for the holiday, and ceremonial meetings with the participation of representatives of government agencies, and simply feasts, which the press of those years does not mention, but which, without a doubt , took place to be. Only specialized exhibitions are no longer timed to coincide with the Builder's Day. And maybe in vain ... 
Be he in a suit, with a new tie,
Be he in the lime, like a snow woman.
Each builder by phrase, by word,
By the interjection he recognizes the foreman!
Here he stands up to his full height,
Toast loudly:
To everyone who levels the wall
With a spirit level trowel,
Who drives the work
With a kind mother word,
Who dined in the shed,
I ate sausage with radish,
Who hung their feet in the sky
On the mounting belt,
To everyone who works in bad weather
Crowbar, drill and saw
We wish: build happiness!
And don't stand under the arrow!
Entry of troops into Czechoslovakia (1968), also known as Operation Danube or Invasion of Czechoslovakia - the entry of the Warsaw Pact troops (except Romania) into Czechoslovakia, which began on August 21, 1968 and put an end to the reforms of the Prague Spring.
The largest contingent of troops was allocated from the USSR. The united group (up to 500 thousand people and 5 thousand tanks and armored personnel carriers) was commanded by General of the Army I. G. Pavlovsky.
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The Soviet leadership feared that if the Czechoslovak communists carried out an internal policy independent of Moscow, the USSR would lose control over Czechoslovakia. This turn of events threatened to split the East European socialist bloc both politically and strategically. The policy of limited state sovereignty in the countries of the socialist bloc, which, among other things, allows the use of military force if necessary, was called in the West the “Brezhnev doctrine”.
The Soviet side did not rule out the option of NATO troops entering the territory of Czechoslovakia, which conducted maneuvers at the borders of Czechoslovakia under the code name "Black Lion".
Development of an operational plan for the invasion
Taking into account the evolving military-political situation, in the spring of 1968, the joint command of the Warsaw Pact, together with the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces, developed an operation codenamed "Danube".
On April 8, 1968, the commander of the airborne forces, General V.F. Margelov, received a directive, according to which he began planning the use of airborne assault forces on the territory of Czechoslovakia. The directive said: "The Soviet Union and other socialist countries, loyal to their international duty and the Warsaw Pact, should send their troops to assist the Czechoslovak People's Army in defending the Motherland from the danger looming over it." The document also emphasized: “… if the troops of the Czechoslovak People's Army are sympathetic to the appearance of Soviet troops, in this case it is necessary to organize interaction with them and jointly carry out the assigned tasks. If the troops of the ChNA will be hostile to the paratroopers and support the conservative forces, then it is necessary to take measures to localize them, and if this is impossible, disarm them. "
Pressure on Alexander Dubchek
During April-May, Soviet leaders tried to "reason" Alexander Dubchek, to draw his attention to the danger of actions of anti-socialist forces. At the end of April, Marshal I. Yakubovsky, Commander-in-Chief of the Joint Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact countries, arrived in Prague to prepare exercises for the troops of the Warsaw Pact countries on the territory of Czechoslovakia.
On May 4, Brezhnev met with Dubchek in Moscow, but no mutual understanding could be reached there.
1st meeting of the leaders of the countries participating in the entry of troops
On May 8, a closed meeting of the leaders of the USSR, Poland, East Germany, Bulgaria and Hungary was held in Moscow, during which a frank exchange of views took place on measures in connection with the situation in Czechoslovakia. Even then, proposals were made for a military solution. However, at the same time, the leader of Hungary J. Kadar, referring to the experience of 1956, said that the Czechoslovak crisis cannot be solved by military means and a political solution must be sought.
Exercises of the troops of the Warsaw Pact countries "Shumava"
At the end of May, the government of Czechoslovakia agreed to conduct exercises of the troops of the Warsaw Pact countries called "Shumava", which took place on June 20-30 with the involvement of only the headquarters of units, formations and communications troops. From June 20 to June 30, 16 thousand personnel were brought into the territory of Czechoslovakia for the first time in the history of the military bloc of the socialist countries. From July 23 to August 10, 1968 on the territory of the USSR, the German Democratic Republic and Poland, rear-service exercises "Neman" were held, during which the troops were redeployed to enter Czechoslovakia. Since August 11, 1968, a major air defense exercise "Sky Shield" was held. On the territory of Western Ukraine, Poland and the German Democratic Republic, exercises were held for signal troops.
On July 29 - August 1, a meeting was held in Cjerne nad Tisou, in which the full members of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee and the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union took part, together with President L. Svoboda. The Czechoslovak delegation at the negotiations basically acted as a united front, but V. Bilyak adhered to a special position. At the same time, a personal letter was received from A. Kapek, a candidate for membership in the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPC, with a request to provide his country with "fraternal assistance" from socialist countries.
At the end of July, the preparation for the military operation in Czechoslovakia was completed, but the final decision on its conduct had not yet been made. On August 3, 1968, a meeting of the leaders of the six communist parties took place in Bratislava. The statement adopted in Bratislava contained a phrase about collective responsibility in the defense of socialism. In Bratislava, Leonid Brezhnev received a letter from five members of the CPC leadership - Indra, Kolder, Kapek, Shvestka and Bilyak with a request for "effective assistance and support" in order to wrest Czechoslovakia "from the imminent danger of counter-revolution."
In mid-August, Leonid Brezhnev called A. Dubcek twice and asked why the personnel reshuffles promised in Bratislava were not taking place, to which Dubcek replied that personnel matters were decided collectively, by the plenum of the Party Central Committee.
On August 16 in Moscow, at a meeting of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU, a discussion of the situation in Czechoslovakia took place and proposals for the introduction of troops were approved. At the same time, a letter from the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee to the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee was adopted. On August 17, Soviet Ambassador S. Chervonenko met with the President of Czechoslovakia L. Svoboda and informed Moscow that at the decisive moment the President would be together with the CPSU and the Soviet Union. On the same day, the materials prepared in Moscow for the text of the Appeal to the Czechoslovak people were sent to a group of "healthy forces" in the CPC. It was planned that they would create a Revolutionary Workers 'and Peasants' Government. A draft appeal was also prepared by the governments of the USSR, the GDR, Poland, Bulgaria and Hungary to the people of Czechoslovakia, as well as to the Czechoslovak army.
2nd meeting of the leaders of the countries participating in the invasion
On August 18, a meeting of the leaders of the USSR, East Germany, Poland, Bulgaria and Hungary took place in Moscow. Relevant measures were agreed, including the speech of the "healthy forces" of the CPC with a request for military assistance. In a message to the President of Czechoslovakia Svoboda on behalf of the participants in the meeting in Moscow, one of the main reasons was the receipt of a request for military assistance to the Czechoslovak people from the "majority" of the members of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia and many members of the government of Czechoslovakia.
Operation
The political goal of the operation was to change the country's political leadership and to establish a regime loyal to the USSR in Czechoslovakia. The troops were supposed to seize the most important objects in Prague, the KGB officers were supposed to arrest the Czech reformers, and then the Plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine and the session of the National Assembly were planned, where the top leadership was to be replaced. At the same time, a large role was assigned to President Svoboda. Political leadership of the operation in Prague was carried out by a member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee K. Mazurov.
The military preparation of the operation was carried out by the commander-in-chief of the United Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact countries, Marshal I.I.
At the first stage, the main role was assigned to the airborne troops. The air defense forces, the Navy and the strategic missile forces were put on high alert.
By August 20, a grouping of troops was prepared, the first echelon of which consisted of up to 250,000 people, and the total number - up to 500,000 people, about 5,000 tanks and armored personnel carriers. To carry out the operation, 26 divisions were involved, of which 18 were Soviet, not counting aviation. The invasion was attended by the troops of the Soviet 1st Guards Tank, 20th Guards Combined Arms, 16th Air Armies (Group of Soviet Forces in Germany), 11th Guards Army (Baltic Military District), 28th Combined Arms Army (Belarusian Military district), the 13th and 38th combined-arms armies (Carpathian military district) and the 14th air army (Odessa military district). The Carpathian and Central Fronts were formed:
- The Carpathian Front was created on the basis of the command and control of the Carpathian Military District and several Polish divisions. It consisted of four armies: 13th, 38th combined-arms, 8th guards tank and 57th air. At the same time, the 8th Guards Tank Army and part of the forces of the 13th Army began to move to the southern regions of Poland, where Polish divisions were additionally included in their composition. Commander Colonel General Vasily Zinovievich Bisarin.
- The central front was formed on the basis of the control of the Baltic Military District, including the troops of the Baltic Military District, the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany and the Northern Group of Forces, as well as individual Polish and East German divisions. This front was deployed in the German Democratic Republic and Poland. The Central Front included the 11th and 20th Guards Combined Arms and 37th Air Armies.
Also, the Southern Front was deployed to cover the active group in Hungary. In addition to this front, operational group Balaton (two Soviet divisions, as well as Bulgarian and Hungarian units) was deployed in Hungary to enter Czechoslovakia.
In general, the number of troops brought into Czechoslovakia was:
The date for the introduction of troops was set for the evening of August 20, when a meeting of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia was held. On the morning of August 20, 1968, a secret order was read out to the officers about the formation of the Danube High Command. General of the Army I. G. Pavlovsky, whose headquarters was deployed in the southern part of Poland, was appointed commander-in-chief. Both fronts (Central and Carpathian) and the "Balaton" task force, as well as two Guards airborne divisions, were subordinate to him. On the first day of the operation, five divisions of military transport aviation were assigned to the Danube Commander-in-Chief to ensure the landing of the landing divisions.
Chronology of events
Upon the news of the invasion in Dubchek's office, the CPC Presidium urgently convened in the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China. The majority - 7 to 4 - voted in favor of the Presidium statement condemning the invasion. Only Presidium members Kolder, Bilyak, Shvestka and Rigo spoke according to the original plan. Barbirek and Piller supported Dubcek and O. Chernik. The calculation of the Soviet leadership was on the advantage of "healthy forces" at the decisive moment - 6 against 5. The statement also contained a call for an urgent convocation of the party congress.
Dubcek himself in his radio call [ ] to the residents of the country, he called on citizens to remain calm and prevent bloodshed and the actual repetition of the 1956 Hungarian events.By 4:30 am on August 21, the Central Committee building was surrounded by Soviet troops and armored vehicles, Soviet paratroopers broke into the building and arrested those present. Dubchek and other members of the Central Committee spent several hours under the control of the paratroopers.
At 5:10 am on August 21, a reconnaissance company of the 350th Guards Parachute Regiment and a separate reconnaissance company of the 103rd Airborne Division landed. Within 10 minutes, they captured Turany airfields and Mix, after which a hasty landing of the main forces began. According to eyewitnesses, transport aircraft landed at the airfields one after another. The landing party jumped off without waiting for a complete stop. By the end of the runway, the plane was already empty and immediately picked up speed for a new takeoff. With a minimum interval, other planes with landing troops and military equipment began to arrive here. Then the paratroopers in their military equipment and in captured civilian vehicles went deep into the territory of the country.
At the call of the President of the country and Czech Radio, the citizens of Czechoslovakia did not provide armed resistance to the invasion troops. Nevertheless, everywhere the troops met passive resistance from the local population. Czechs and Slovaks refused to provide the Soviet troops with drink, food and fuel, changed road signs to hinder the advance of troops, took to the streets, tried to explain to the soldiers the essence of the events taking place in Czechoslovakia, appealed to the Russian-Czechoslovak brotherhood. The citizens demanded the withdrawal of foreign troops and the return of the leaders of the party and government taken to the USSR.
We, not guessing about anything, arrived in Prague in the evening of August 20, wanted to properly examine the Czech miracle - and when we woke up early on the 21st in the morning, it all started! For some reason we were not scared, but it, of course, "got on our nerves" - to see Czechs driven to extremes, and opposite them - poor, innocent, the same driven to extremes Soviet soldiers! It was madness, and we, of course, all four days thought that it was about to "begin" - it was a devilishly conceived pure war of nerves between the citizens of Prague and Soviet soldiers. I do not discount the incident in which one person died, and yet I must say: both opposing groups behaved boldly and humanely.
On the initiative of the Prague City Committee of the CPC, early underground sessions of the XIV Congress of the CPC began on the territory of the plant in Vysočany (Prague region), however, without delegates from Slovakia who did not have time to arrive. Representatives of the conservative-minded group of delegates at the congress were not elected to any of the leading posts in the CPC.
Negotiations in Moscow
The Soviet leadership was forced to seek a compromise solution. Exported to the USSR, members of the leadership of the Central Committee of the CPC were taken to Moscow. President L. Svoboda also arrived in Moscow together with G. Husak, who at that time was the deputy head of the government.
On August 26, 1968, near the town of Zvolen (Czechoslovakia), an An-12 from the Tula 374 VTAP (captain N. Nabok) crashed. According to the pilots, the plane with a load (9 tons of butter) was fired upon from the ground from a machine gun at an altitude of 300 meters during the landing approach and as a result of damage to the 4th engine fell, not reaching the runway several kilometers. 5 people were killed (burned alive in the resulting fire), the radio operator survived. ... However, according to Czech historians and archivists, the plane crashed into the mountain.
Near the settlement of Zhandov near the town of Ceska Lipa, a group of citizens, blocking the road to the bridge, impeded the movement of the Soviet T-55 tank of Sergeant Major Yu. I. Andreev, who at high speed was catching up with the convoy that had gone ahead. The foreman decided to turn off the road so as not to crush people and the tank fell off the bridge along with the crew. Three servicemen were killed.
The losses of the USSR in equipment are not exactly known. In the parts of the 38th Army alone, 7 tanks and armored personnel carriers were burned in the first three days on the territory of Slovakia and North Moravia.
Known data on the losses of the armed forces of other countries - participants in the operation. So, the Hungarian army lost 4 soldiers perished (all - non-combat losses: accident, illness, suicide). The Bulgarian army lost 2 people - one sentry was killed at the post by unidentified persons (while a machine gun was stolen), 1 soldier shot himself.
Further developments
At the beginning of September, troops were withdrawn from many cities and towns of Czechoslovakia to specially designated locations. Soviet tanks left Prague on September 11, 1968. On October 16, 1968, an agreement was signed between the governments of the USSR and Czechoslovakia on the conditions for the temporary stay of Soviet troops on the territory of Czechoslovakia, according to which part of the Soviet troops remained on the territory of Czechoslovakia "in order to ensure the security of the socialist community." On October 17, 1968, a phased withdrawal of part of the troops from the territory of Czechoslovakia began, which was completed by mid-November.
On the territory of Czechoslovakia, the Soviet military presence remained until 1991.
International assessment of the invasion
On August 21, representatives of a group of countries (USA, Great Britain, France, Canada, Denmark and Paraguay) addressed the UN Security Council with a demand to bring the "Czechoslovak question" to a meeting of the UN General Assembly. The representatives of Hungary and the USSR voted against. Then the representative of Czechoslovakia demanded that this issue be removed from UN consideration. The governments of four socialist countries - Yugoslavia, Romania, Albania (which withdrew from the Warsaw Pact Organization in September), the PRC, as well as a number of communist parties of Western countries - condemned the military intervention of the five states.
Protests in the USSR
In the Soviet Union, some members of the intelligentsia protested against the introduction of Soviet troops into Czechoslovakia.
Demonstration of protest on August 25, 1968 in Moscow
Rally in memory of Palach
The demonstration on August 25 was not an isolated act of protest against the introduction of Soviet troops into Czechoslovakia.
"There is reason to believe that the number of these cases is much greater than it was possible to find out," writes Chronicle, and gives several examples:
On January 25, 1969, on the day of Jan Palach's funeral, two students from Moscow University came out to Mayakovsky Square with a poster on which two slogans were written: “Eternal memory to Jan Palach” and “Freedom of Czechoslovakia”. They stood in the square, behind the Mayakovsky monument, for about 12 minutes. Gradually a silent crowd began to gather around them. Then a group of young people without bandages approached the girls, calling themselves vigilantes. They took away and tore up the poster, and the students, after consulting, were released.
Leaflets
On August 21, leaflets appeared protesting against the stay of allied troops in Czechoslovakia in Moscow's writers' houses at the Airport and in Zyuzino, as well as in the Moscow State University hostel on the Lenin Hills. One of the three texts of the leaflets was signed by the Union of Communards.
Statements
On August 21 last year, a tragic event took place: the troops of the Warsaw Pact countries invaded friendly Czechoslovakia.
This action was aimed at cutting off the democratic path of development, which the whole country had embarked on. The whole world followed with hope the post-January development of Czechoslovakia. It seemed that the idea of \u200b\u200bsocialism, defamed in the Stalinist era, would now be rehabilitated. The tanks of the Warsaw Pact countries destroyed this hope. On this sad anniversary, we declare that we continue to disagree with this decision, which threatens the future of socialism.
We are in solidarity with the people of Czechoslovakia, who wanted to prove that socialism with a human face is possible.
These lines are dictated by pain for our homeland, which we wish to see truly great, free and happy.
And we are firmly convinced that a people who oppress other peoples cannot be free and happy.
Possible motivations of the reasons for the entry of troops
The military-strategic aspect: the voluntarism of Czechoslovakia in foreign policy during the Cold War threatened the security of the border with NATO countries; until 1968, Czechoslovakia remained the only ATS country where there were no Soviet military bases.
Ideological aspect: the ideas of socialism "with a human face" undermined the idea of \u200b\u200bthe truth of Marxism-Leninism, the dictatorship of the proletariat and the leading role of the communist party, which, in turn, affected the power interests of the party elite.
Political aspect: the harsh reprisal against democratic voluntarism in Czechoslovakia gave the members of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee the opportunity, on the one hand, to deal with the internal opposition, on the other, to increase their authority, in the third, to prevent the disloyalty of the allies and demonstrate military power to potential opponents.
Effects
As a result of Operation Danube, Czechoslovakia remained a member of the East European socialist bloc. The Soviet grouping of troops (up to 130 thousand people) remained in Czechoslovakia until 1991. The agreement on the conditions for the stay of Soviet troops on the territory of Czechoslovakia became one of the main military and political results of the deployment of troops from five states, which satisfied the leadership of the USSR and the Department of Internal Affairs. However, Albania withdrew from the Warsaw Pact as a result of the invasion.
The suppression of the Prague Spring increased the disillusionment of many Western leftists with the theory of Marxism-Leninism and contributed to the growth of ideas of "Eurocommunism" among the leadership and members of Western communist parties - which subsequently led to a split in many of them. The communist parties of Western Europe have lost mass support, since the impossibility of "socialism with a human face" was practically shown.
Paradoxically, the military action in Czechoslovakia in 1968 accelerated the arrival of the so-called "detente" period in relations between East and West, based on the recognition of the territorial status quo that existed in Europe and the implementation of the so-called "new Eastern policy" by Germany under Chancellor Willy Brandt. ...
see also
Notes
- Stolarik, M. Mark. The Prague Spring and the Warsaw Pact Invasion of Czechoslovakia, 1968: Forty Years Later. - Bolchazy-Carducci Publishers, 2010. - P. 137-164. - ISBN 9780865167513.
- Conflicted Memories: Europeanizing Contemporary Histories, edited by Konrad H. Jarausch, Thomas Lindenberger, p. 43
- Back to the Business of Reform, Time Magazine (16 August 1968). Date of treatment April 27, 2010.
- A Look Back… The Prague Spring & the Soviet Invasion of Czechoslovakia. Central Intelligence Agency. Retrieved on 11 June 2016.
- Washington Post, (Final Edition), 21 August 1998, (Page A11)
- http://armada.vojenstvi.cz - Střední skupina sovětských vojsk v Československu
- Soviet Invasion of Czechoslovakia. Globalsecurity.org. Retrieved on 23 June 2011.
- Invaze vojsk Varšavské smlouvy do Československa 21.srpna 1968. armyweb.cz. Retrieved on 11 June 2016.
- Operace Dunaj a oběti na straně okupantů (unspecified) . Country Studies of Russia (Reálie Ruska)... Západočeská univerzita v Plzni. Retrieved November 17, 2015.
- Čs. armada po roce 1945 (unspecified) ... Vojenstvi.cz. Retrieved November 17, 2015.
- Russia and the USSR in the Wars of the 20th Century: A Statistical Study. - M .: OLMA-PRESS, 2001 .-- S. 533.
- Skomra, Sławomir Brali udział w inwazji na Czechosłowację. Kombatanci? (Polish) (unspecified) ... Agora SA. Date of treatment September 21, 2013.
- Georgi LUKOV. BULGARSKOTO MILITARY PARTICIPATION IN CZECHOSLOVASHKIT KEHOSLOVASHKIT ASSESSMENT 1968 The material was taken out before the Jubilee Scientific Conference on the occasion of the 50th year. CVA, V. Tarnovo, 5 oct. 2001 Publ. on Sat. "Army, Darzhava, Society" 2002
- (Czech) August 1968 - Victims of the Occupation - Ústav pro studium totalitních režimů. Ustrcr.cz. Retrieved on 23 June 2011.
- 21.srpen 1968 (Czech)
- P. Weil In August '68. Rossiyskaya Gazeta, August 20, 2008.
- Jak zemřeli vojáci armád při invazi "68: Bulhara zastřelili Češi, Sověti umírali na silnicích. Hospodářské noviny IHNED.cz. Retrieved on 11 June 2016.
- Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia. European Network Remembrance and Solidarity. Retrieved on 11 June 2016.
- Battles of Russia. Nikolay Shefov. Military History Library. M., 2002.
- V. Musatov... About Prague Spring 1968
- "We were preparing to strike the flank of NATO troops." V. Volodin's interview with retired lieutenant general Alfred Gaponenko. Vremya novostei, No. 143. 08.08.2008.
- A team of authors. Russia (USSR) in the wars of the second half of the 20th century. - M.: Triada-farm, 2002 .-- S. 333 .-- 494 p. - (State program "Patriotic education of citizens of the Russian Federation for 2001-2005." Institute of Military History of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation.). - 1000 copies. with reference to the "Military history of the Fatherland from ancient times to the present day." In 3 vols., T. 3. M .: Institute of Military History, 1995. P. 47.
- "Results" No. 43 (907) dated 28.10.2013
- Pavlovsky I. G. Memories of the introduction of Soviet troops into Czechoslovakia in August 1968. News. August 19, 1989.
- A team of authors.
At two o'clock in the morning on August 21, 1968, a Soviet passenger aircraft An-24 requested an emergency landing at Prague's Ruzyne airport. The controllers gave the go-ahead, the plane landed, and the soldiers of the 7th Guards Airborne Division, stationed in Kaunas, disembarked. The paratroopers, under the threat of using weapons, seized all the facilities of the airfield and began to receive An-12 transport aircraft with paratrooper units and military equipment. Transport An-12 landed on the lane every 30 seconds. This was the beginning of the carefully designed Soviet operation to occupy Czechoslovakia and the end of the so-called The Prague Spring is a process of democratic reforms carried out by the Czechoslovak Communist Party under the leadership of Alexander Dubcek.
In the operation to capture Czechoslovakia, which was named "Danube", the armies of four socialist countries participated: the USSR, Poland, Hungary and Bulgaria. The GDR army was also supposed to enter the territory of Czechoslovakia, but at the last moment the Soviet leadership was afraid of the analogy with 1939 and the Germans did not cross the border. The main striking force of the grouping of troops of the Warsaw Pact countries was the Soviet Army - these were 18 motorized rifle, tank and airborne divisions, 22 air and helicopter regiments, with a total strength of 170,000 to 240,000, according to various sources. About 5000 tanks alone were involved. Two fronts were created - Carpathian and Central, and the number of the united group of troops reached half a million servicemen. The invasion was, according to the usual Soviet habit, presented as assistance to the fraternal Czechoslovak people in the struggle against counter-revolution.
Naturally, there was no scent of counter-revolution in Czechoslovakia. The country fully supported the Communist Party, which began political and economic reforms in January 1968. Czechoslovakia ranked first in the world in terms of the number of communists per 1,000 people. With the beginning of the reforms, censorship was significantly weakened, free discussions took place everywhere, the creation of a multi-party system began. They declared a desire to ensure complete freedom of speech, assembly and movement, establish strict control over the activities of security agencies, facilitate the organization of private enterprises and reduce government control over production. In addition, it was planned to federalize the state and expand the powers of the authorities of the Czechoslovak subjects - the Czech Republic and Slovakia. All this, of course, worried the leadership of the USSR, which pursued a policy of limited sovereignty against its vassals in Europe (the so-called "Brezhnev doctrine"). They tried to persuade Dubcek's team to stay on a short leash with Moscow and not seek to build socialism according to Western standards. The persuasion didn't help. In addition, Czechoslovakia remained a country where the USSR was unable to deploy either its military bases or tactical nuclear weapons. And this moment was, perhaps, the main reason for the military operation so disproportionate to the scale of the country - the Kremlin Politburo needed to force the Czechoslovakians to obey itself at any cost. The leadership of Czechoslovakia, in order to avoid bloodshed and destruction of the country, took the army to the barracks and provided the Soviet troops with the opportunity to freely dispose of the fate of the Czechs and Slovaks. The only kind of resistance that the occupiers faced was civil protest. This was especially evident in Prague, where the unarmed inhabitants of the city staged a real obstruction to the invaders.
At three o'clock in the morning on August 21 (this was also Wednesday), Prime Minister Chernik was arrested by Soviet soldiers. At 4:50 am, a column of tanks and armored personnel carriers headed for the building of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Churches, where a twenty-year-old resident of Prague was shot dead. In Dubcek's office, the Soviet military arrested him and seven members of the Central Committee. At seven in the morning, the tanks headed for Vinogradskaya 12, where Radio Prague was located. Residents managed to build barricades there, tanks began to break through, people were shot at. Seventeen people died outside the Radio building that morning, another 52 were injured and taken to hospital. After 14:00, the arrested leadership of the CPC was boarded a plane and taken to Ukraine with the assistance of the country's President Ludwig Svoboda, who fought the puppet government of Bilyak and Indra as best he could (thanks to Svoboda, Dubcek was saved and then transported to Moscow). A curfew was imposed in the city; in the dark, soldiers opened fire on any moving object.
01. In the evening European time, the UN Security Council held an emergency meeting in New York, at which it adopted a resolution condemning the invasion. The USSR vetoed it.
02. Trucks with students holding national flags began to drive around the city. All key objects of the city were taken under the control of the Soviet troops.
03. At the National Museum. The military equipment was immediately surrounded by the inhabitants of the city and entered into conversations with the soldiers, often very sharp, tense. Shooting was heard in some parts of the city, and the wounded were constantly being taken to hospitals.
06. In the morning, young people began to build barricades, attack tanks, threw stones at them, bottles with a combustible mixture, tried to set fire to military equipment.
08. Inscription on the bus: Soviet Cultural Center.
10. One of the soldiers wounded as a result of shooting at the crowd.
11. Massive acts of sabotage began throughout Prague. To make it difficult for the military to orientate in the city, the citizens of Prague began to destroy street signs, knock down street names and house numbers.
13. Soviet soldiers broke into the Church of St. Martin in Bratislava. First, they fired at the windows and tower of the medieval church, then broke the locks and got inside. An altar and a donation box were opened, an organ and church accessories were broken, paintings were destroyed, benches and a pulpit were broken. The soldiers climbed into the crypt with graves and broke several gravestones there. This church was robbed throughout the day by various groups of military personnel.
14. Units of Soviet troops enter the city of Liberec
15. Killed and wounded after the storming of Prague Radio by the military.
16. Unauthorized entry is strictly prohibited
19. Walls of houses, shop windows, fences have become a platform for merciless criticism of the invaders.
20. “Run home, Ivan, Natasha is waiting for you”, “Not a drop of water, not a piece of bread for the occupants”, “Bravo, guys! Hitler "," USSR, go home "," Twice occupied, twice taught "," 1945 - liberators, 1968 - occupiers "," We were afraid of the West, we were attacked from the East "," Not hands up, but head higher! " , “You conquered the cosmos, but you didn't”, “The elephant's hedgehog cannot be swallowed”, “Don't call it hatred, call it knowledge”, “Long live democracy. Without Moscow ”- these are just a few examples of such wall propaganda.
21. “I had a soldier, I loved him. I had a watch - the Red Army took it "
22. On the Old Town Square.
25. I remember a modern interview with a Prazhanka who on the 21st, together with her university friends, went out into the city to look at the Soviet military. “We thought there were some terrible invaders, but in fact, very young guys with peasant faces were sitting on the armored personnel carriers, a little scared, constantly grabbing weapons, not understanding what they were doing here and why the crowd was reacting so aggressively to them. The commanders told them that they had to go and save the Czech people from the counter-revolution ”.
39. A self-made leaflet from those that they tried to distribute to Soviet soldiers.
40. Today, outside the Prague Radio building, where the people who defended the radio station were killed on August 21, 1968, a memorial ceremony was held, wreaths were laid, that morning broadcast from 1968 was broadcast when the radio reported the attack on the country. The announcer reads the text, while shooting in the street is heard in the background.
49. Candles are burning at the site near the National Museum, where a monument to the self-immolating student Jan Palach is erected.
51. At the beginning of Wenceslas Square there is an exhibition - a documentary about the events of the Prague Spring and August 1968 is shown on a large screen, there is an infantry fighting vehicle with a characteristic white line, an ambulance car of those years, stands with photographs and reproductions of Prague graffiti.
57.1945: we kissed your fathers\u003e 1968: you shed our blood and take our freedom.
According to modern data, during the invasion 108 citizens of Czechoslovakia were killed and more than 500 wounded, the vast majority of them civilians. On the first day of the invasion alone, 58 people were killed or mortally wounded, including seven women and an eight-year-old child.
The result of the operation to displace the leadership of the CPC and the occupation of the country was the deployment of a Soviet military contingent in Czechoslovakia: five motorized rifle divisions, totaling up to 130,000 people, 1,412 tanks, 2,563 armored personnel carriers and Temp-S operational-tactical missile systems with nuclear warheads. A leadership loyal to Moscow was brought to power, and a purge was carried out in the party. The reforms of the Prague Spring were completed only after 1991.
Photos: Josef Koudelka, Libor Hajsky, CTK, Reuters, drugoi
Operation Danube. This is how the strategic doctrine of the troops of the five Warsaw Pact member states was called in the documents, the purpose of which was "to defend the socialist gains in Czechoslovakia." Under Gorbachev, the introduction of troops into Czechoslovakia on August 21, 1968 was described as "suppression of the construction of socialism with a human face", and after the collapse of the USSR, these events are described only in a sharply condemning and rude form, the foreign policy of the USSR is considered aggressive, Soviet soldiers are called "occupiers" etc…
Today's publicists do not want to reckon with the fact that all events in the world have taken place, and indeed are happening, in a specific international or domestic situation at a given time, and judge the past by the standards of today. The question is: could the leadership of the countries of the socialist camp and, first of all, of the Soviet Union at that time make a different decision?
International environment
At that time, there were two worlds in Europe, opposite in ideology - the socialist and the capitalist. Two economic organizations - the so-called "Common Market" in the West and the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance in the East.
There were two opposing military blocs - NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Now they only remember that in 1968 in the GDR there was a Group of Soviet Forces in Germany, in Poland - the Northern Group of Soviet Forces and in Hungary - the Southern Group of Forces.
But for some reason they do not remember that the troops of the USA, Great Britain, Belgium were stationed on the territory of the FRG and the army corps of the Netherlands and France were ready to move forward if necessary. Both military groupings were in a state of full combat readiness.
Each of the parties defended their interests and, observing external decency, by any means tried to weaken the other.
Socio-political situation in Czechoslovakia
At the January 1968 Plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine, mistakes and shortcomings of the country's leadership were justly criticized, and a decision was made on the need for changes in the management of the state's economy.
Aleksandr Dubchek was elected General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine, who headed the implementation of reforms, later called "the construction of socialism with a human face." The country's top leadership changed (except for President L. Svoboda), and with it, domestic and foreign policies began to change.
Using the criticism of the leadership voiced at the Plenum, the opposition political forces, speculating with the demands of the "expansion" of democracy, began to discredit the Communist Party, power structures, state security agencies and socialism in general. Covert preparations began for a change in the state system.
The mass media demanded on behalf of the people: the abolition of the party's leadership in economic and political life, the announcement of the CPC a criminal organization, a ban on its activities, the dissolution of the state security organs and the People's Militia. (People's militia is the name of the armed party workers' detachments, which were subordinate directly to the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, which has survived since 1948.)
Various "clubs" ("Club 231", "Club of active non-partisans") and other organizations arose throughout the country, the main goal and task of which was to blacken the history of the country after 1945, to rally the opposition, and to conduct anti-constitutional propaganda.
By mid-1968, the Ministry of Internal Affairs had received about 70 applications for registration of new organizations and associations. Thus, "Club 231" (On the basis of Article 231 of the Law on the Protection of the Constitution, anti-state and anti-constitutional activities were punished) was established in Prague on March 31, 1968, although it did not have permission from the Ministry of Internal Affairs.
The club brought together over 40 thousand people, including former criminals and state criminals. As noted by the newspaper "Rude Pravo", among the members of the club were former Nazis, SS men, Henlein's men, ministers of the puppet "Slovak State", representatives of the reactionary clergy.
At one of the meetings, the general secretary of the club, Yaroslav Brodsky, said: "The best communist is a dead communist, and if he is still alive, he should pull his legs out." Branches of the club were created at enterprises and in various organizations, which were called "Societies for the Defense of the Word and the Press."
One of the most striking anti-constitutional materials can be considered the appeal of the underground organization "Revolutionary Committee of the Democratic Party of Slovakia", which was distributed in June in organizations and enterprises of the city of Svit.
It put forward demands: to dissolve collective farms and cooperatives, to distribute land to the peasants, to hold elections under the control of England, the USA, Italy and France, to stop criticism of Western states in the press, and to focus it on the USSR, to allow the legal activities of political parties that existed in bourgeois Czechoslovakia, to annex already in 1968 "Transcarpathian Rus" to Czechoslovakia. The appeal ended with an appeal: "Death of the Communist Party!"
On May 6, the French weekly Express cited a statement by Antonin Lima, editor of the foreign department of the newspaper Literarni Listy, on May 6: “Today in Czechoslovakia there is a question of seizing power.” The activities of the Social Democratic Party and the Labor Party were revived underground.
In order to create a kind of counterbalance to the Warsaw Pact, the idea of \u200b\u200bcreating the Little Entente was revived as a regional bloc of socialist and capitalist states and a buffer between the great powers.
Publications on this topic were picked up by the Western press. Noteworthy was the remark of an analyst of the French newspaper Le Figaro: "The geographical position of Czechoslovakia can turn it both into the bolt of the Warsaw Pact, the Pact, and into a gap that opens the entire military system of the Eastern bloc."
In May, a group of employees of the Prague Military-Political Academy published "Notes on the Development of the Action Program of the Czechoslovak People's Army". The authors proposed "the withdrawal of Czechoslovakia from the Warsaw Pact or, possibly, joint actions of Czechoslovakia with other socialist countries to liquidate the Warsaw Pact as a whole and replace it with a system of bilateral relations." Alternatively, there was a proposal to take a position of "consistent neutrality" in foreign policy.
Serious attacks from the standpoint of "sound economic calculation" were made against the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance.
On June 14, the Czechoslovak opposition invited the well-known "Sovietologist" Zbigniew Brzezinski to lecture in Prague in which he outlined his strategy of "liberalization", called for the destruction of the CPC, as well as the elimination of the police and state security. According to him, he fully "supported the interesting Czechoslovak experiment."
A direct undermining of the national interests of Czechoslovakia was the calls for "rapprochement" with the FRG, which sounded not only in the media, but also in the speeches of some of the country's leaders.
It wasn’t just words.
The western borders of Czechoslovakia were opened, border barriers and fortifications began to be eliminated. By order of the Minister of State Security Pavel, the spies of Western countries identified by counterintelligence were not detained, but given the opportunity to leave. (In 1969, the authorities of Czechoslovakia put Pavel on trial and shot.)
Activities of foreign authorities, military and media
During this period, consultative meetings of representatives of NATO countries were held, at which possible measures were studied to lead Czechoslovakia out of the socialist camp. The United States expressed its readiness to influence Czechoslovakia on the issue of obtaining a loan from capitalist countries, using the interest of Czechoslovakia in returning her gold reserves.
In 1968, the Vatican intensified its activities in Czechoslovakia. His leadership recommended directing the Catholic Church's activities to merge with the movement for "independence" and "liberalization", as well as take on the role of "pillar and freedom in Eastern Europe", focusing on Czechoslovakia, Poland and the GDR.
The population of Czechoslovakia was persistently instilled in the idea that from the FRG there was no danger of revanchism, that one could think about the return of the Sudeten Germans to the country. The newspaper General Anzeiger (FRG) wrote: "The Sudeten Germans will expect from Czechoslovakia, liberated from communism, a return to the Munich Agreement, according to which the Sudetenland became part of Germany in the fall of 1938."
In the program of the National Democratic Party of Germany, one of the points read: "The Sudetenland must become German again, because they were acquired by Nazi Germany within the framework of the Munich Treaty, which is an effective international agreement." This program was actively supported by the "Sudeten Germans' Association" and the neo-fascist organization "Vitikobund".
And the editor of the Czech trade union newspaper Prace, Iříček, told German television: “About 150 thousand Germans live in our country. It is hoped that the remaining 100-200 thousand could return home a little later. " Of course, no one anywhere recalled the persecution of Czechs by the Sudeten Germans.
In the correspondence of the ADN agency it was reported that the officers of the Bundeswehr were repeatedly sent to Czechoslovakia with intelligence purposes. This applied, above all, to the officers of the 2nd Army Corps, whose formations were stationed near the border of Czechoslovakia.
Later it became known that in preparation for the Black Lion exercise of the FRG troops scheduled for autumn, the entire command staff of the 2nd corps, including the battalion commander, visited Czechoslovakia as tourists and traveled along the likely routes of movement of their units.
With the beginning of the "exercise", it was planned to take a short throw to the territories seized by Germany in 1938, and to present the international community with a fact. The calculation was based on the fact that if the USSR and the United States did not go to war over the Arab territories captured by Israel in 1967, they would not do it now.
With the aim of creating a situation in Czechoslovakia that would facilitate the withdrawal of Czechoslovakia from the Warsaw Pact, the NATO Council developed the Zephyr program.
In an article by the Finnish newspaper Päivyan sanomat of September 6, 1968, it was reported that in the region of Regensburg (FRG) “a body to track the Czechoslovak events worked and continues to function. In July, a special Observation and Command Center, which American officers call the "Strike Group Headquarters", became operational. It has over 300 employees, including intelligence officers and political advisers.
The center three times a day reported information about the situation in Czechoslovakia to the NATO headquarters. " An interesting remark by a representative of the NATO headquarters: - "Although, due to the entry of Warsaw Pact troops into Czechoslovakia and the conclusion of the Moscow Agreement, the special center did not solve the tasks assigned to it, its activities were and still remain a valuable experience for the future."
Choice
Thus, by the spring of 1968, the countries of the socialist camp faced a choice:
- to allow the opposition forces to push Czechoslovakia off the socialist path;
- to open the way to the East for a potential enemy, endangering not only the groupings of the Warsaw Pact troops, but also the results of the Second World War;OR
- by the forces of the countries of the commonwealth to protect the socialist system in Czechoslovakia and to help develop its economy;
- once and for all put an end to the Munich policy, discarding all the claims of Hitler's revanchist heirs;
- to put an obstacle in front of the new "Drang nach Osten", showing the whole world that no one will be able to redraw the post-war borders established as a result of the struggle of many peoples against fascism.
Based on the current situation, the latter was chosen at the end of July 1968. However, if the leadership of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia had not shown such weakness and tolerance towards the enemies of the ruling party and the existing state system, nothing like this would have happened.
The military-political leadership of the USSR and other Warsaw Pact countries closely followed the events in Czechoslovakia and tried to convey their assessment to the authorities of Czechoslovakia. The meetings of the top leadership of the Warsaw Pact countries were held in Prague, Dresden, Warsaw, Cierna nad Tisou. During the meetings, the developing situation was discussed, recommendations were given to the Czech leadership, but it was useless.
In the last days of July, at a meeting in Čierna nad Tisou, A. Dubcek was told that in case of refusal to carry out the recommended measures, the troops of the socialist countries would enter Czechoslovakia. Dubcek not only did not take any measures, but also did not convey this warning to the members of the Central Committee and the government of the country.
From a military point of view, there could be no other solution. The severing of the Sudetenland from Czechoslovakia, and even more so the entire country from the Warsaw Pact and its alliance with NATO, put the groupings of commonwealth forces in the GDR, Poland and Hungary under a flank attack. The potential enemy received direct access to the border of the Soviet Union.
From the memoirs of the commander of the "Alpha" group of the KGB of the USSR, Hero of the Soviet Union, retired Major General Gennady Nikolayevich Zaitsev (in 1968 - the head of the group of the 7th Directorate of the KGB of the USSR during the "Danube" operation):
« At that time, the situation in Czechoslovakia looked like this.
... It was not even the “progressives” from the Communist Party of the Communist Party that began to come to the fore, but non-party forces - members of various “public” and “political” clubs, which were distinguished by their orientation towards the West and hatred of Russians. June marked the beginning of a new phase of exacerbation of the situation in Czechoslovakia and the leadership of the CPC, and in mid-August, Dub-chek's team completely lost control over the situation in the country.
It is also noteworthy that some leaders of the "Prague Spring" believed that the sympathies of the West would certainly materialize in the form of a tough anti-Soviet position of the United States in the event of forceful actions by the Soviet Union».
The task was set: a group led by G.N. Zaitsev to enter the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Czechoslovakia and take it under control. Interior Minister I. Pavel managed to escape the day before. According to numerous testimonies, I. Pavel, as the "Prague Spring" developed, gradually liquidated the state security organs, getting rid of the communist cadres and supporters of Moscow.
He threatened reprisals to his employees who were trying to neutralize the so-called "progressives" (the Club of Non-Party Activists and the K-231 organization). Prior to the government's decision, they were ordered to immediately stop jamming foreign broadcasts and begin dismantling equipment.
... The documents contained information that the Minister of Internal Affairs I. Pavel and the head of the department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, General Prhlik, "prepared a project for the establishment of a leading center, which should take all state power into its own hands during political tensions in the country." It also spoke about the implementation of "preventive security measures against the actions of conservative forces, including the creation of labor camps."
In other words, the country was carrying out a hidden, but quite real preparation for the creation of concentration camps, where all forces opposing the regime with a human face were to be hidden ... Czechoslovakia from the Eastern Bloc, the overall picture of events did not look as clear-cut as they are trying to assure us of this.
... How did you manage to capture a by no means small European country in the shortest possible time and with minimal losses? A significant role in this course of events was played by the neutral position of the Czechoslovak army (which is about 200 thousand people, armed at that time with modern military equipment). I want to emphasize that General Martin Dzur played a key role in that very difficult situation. But the main reason for the small number of victims was the behavior of Soviet soldiers, who displayed amazing restraint in Czechoslovakia.
... According to Czech historians, about a hundred people died during the introduction of troops, about a thousand were wounded and injured.
... I am convinced that at that time there was simply no other way out of the crisis. In my opinion, the results of the Prague Spring are very instructive. If it were not for the tough actions of the USSR and its allies, the Czech leadership, having instantly passed the stage of "socialism with a human face," would have found itself in the arms of the West. The Warsaw bloc would have lost a strategically important state in the center of Europe, NATO would have found itself at the borders of the USSR.
Let's be completely honest: the operation in Czechoslovakia gave peace to two generations of Soviet children. Or not? After “letting go” of Czechoslovakia, the Soviet Union would inevitably face the effect of a house of cards. Unrest would have erupted in Poland and Hungary. Then it would be the turn of the Baltics, and after it the Transcaucasia. "
Start
On the night of August 21, the troops of the five countries of the Warsaw Pact entered the territory of Czechoslovakia, and a landing party landed on the Prague airfield. The troops were ordered not to open fire until they were fired upon. The columns were moving at high speeds, the stopped cars were pushed off the road so as not to interfere with the movement.
By morning, all the advanced military units of the countries of the commonwealth had reached the designated areas. The Czechoslovak troops were ordered not to leave the barracks. Their military camps were blocked, batteries were removed from armored vehicles, fuel was drained from tractors.
Interestingly, in early August, representatives of the People's Militia units met with their commander A. Dubchek and presented an ultimatum: either he changes the policy of the leadership, or on August 22 the People's Militia will put all important objects under its control, take power into its own hands, and remove him from his post Secretary General and will require the convocation of a party congress. Dubcek listened to them, but did not answer anything concrete.
Most importantly, he did not tell the personally subordinate commanders of the party's armed detachments about the ultimatum he received in Cierna nad Tisou from the leaders of the GDR, Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland and the USSR. Apparently he was counting on something. And when the troops of the Warsaw Pact entered Czechoslovakia on August 21, the leadership of the detachments and ordinary communists considered it an insult.
They believed that they could cope with the situation in the country themselves, without the introduction of foreign troops. Life has shown that then they overestimated their strength. Only after the defeat of the opposition in August 1969 did the opponents of the regime go underground for a long time.
Attitude of the local population
At first, the attitude of the local population towards the military personnel of the countries of the commonwealth was bad. Intoxicated by hostile propaganda, duplicitous behavior of top officials of the state, lack of information about the true reasons for the introduction of troops, and sometimes intimidated by local oppositionists, people not only looked askance at foreign soldiers.
Stones flew into the cars, at night the locations of the troops were fired upon from small arms. Signs and signs were demolished on the roads, and the walls of houses were painted with slogans like "Invaders, go home!", "Shoot the occupier!" etc.
Sometimes local residents secretly came to military units and asked why the Soviet troops had come. And it would be okay, only Russians came, otherwise they brought the "Caucasians" with "narrow-eyed" with them. In the center of Europe (!) People were surprised that the Soviet army was multinational.
Opposition forces' actions
The entry of the Allied forces showed the Czech opposition forces and their foreign inspirers that hopes of a seizure of power were dashed. However, they decided not to surrender, but called for armed resistance. In addition to the shelling of cars, helicopters and the locations of the allied forces, terrorist attacks began against Czech workers of party bodies and employees of the special services.
The evening edition of the British newspaper Sunday Times on August 27 published an interview with one of the leaders of the underground. He said that by August "the underground numbered about 40 thousand people armed with automatic weapons." A significant part of the weapons were secretly supplied from the West, primarily from the FRG. However, it was not possible to use it.
In the very first days after the entry of the allied forces, in cooperation with the Czech security agencies, several thousand machine guns, hundreds of machine guns and grenade launchers were seized from many caches and basements. Even mortars were found.
Thus, even in the Prague House of Journalists, which was led by extreme opposition figures, 13 machine guns, 81 submachine guns and 150 boxes of ammunition were found. At the beginning of 1969, a finished concentration camp was discovered in the Tatra Mountains. Who built it and for whom was unknown at that time.
Information-psychological warfare
Another evidence of the existence of organized anti-constitutional forces in Czechoslovakia is the fact that by 8 o'clock on August 21, underground radio stations began to work in all regions of the country, on some days up to 30-35 units.
Used not only radio stations pre-installed on cars, trains and in secret shelters, but also equipment seized in the Air Defense Forces, in the offices of the Union for Cooperation with the Army (such as DOSAAF in the USSR), in large farms.
Clandestine radio transmitters were integrated into a system that determined the time and duration of operation. The seizure teams found working radio stations deployed in apartments, hidden in the safes of the leaders of various organizations. There were also radio stations in special suitcases along with tables of wave propagation at different times of the day. Install the antenna attached to the station and work.
Radio stations, as well as four underground television channels, disseminated false information, rumors, calls for the destruction of Allied troops, sabotage, and sabotage. They also transmitted encrypted information and code signals to the forces of the underground.
The radio transmitters of the West German 701st Psychological Warfare Battalion fit well into this "chorus".
At first, Soviet radio intelligence officers were surprised that a number of anti-government stations were taking bearings in the west, but their guesses on September 8 were confirmed by the Stern magazine (FRG).
The magazine reported that on 23 August the newspaper Literarni Listsy, followed by underground radio, reported that “the allied troops were firing at the children's hospital on Karlovo Square. Broken windows, ceilings, expensive medical equipment ... ”A FRG television reporter rushed to the area, but the hospital building was unharmed.
According to the magazine Stern, "this false information was transmitted not from Czech, but from West German territory." The magazine noted that the events of those days "provided an ideal opportunity for the practical training of the 701st Battalion."
If the first leaflets with a message about the introduction of the allied forces were issued by official government or party bodies and printing houses, then on the subsequent there was no output. In many cases, the texts and calls in different parts of the country were the same.
A change of scenery
Slowly, but the situation changed.
The Central Group of Forces was formed, Soviet military units began to settle down in the Czech military towns liberated for them, where the chimneys were heaped up with bricks, the sewage system was clogged, and the windows were broken. In April 1969 A. Dubchek was replaced by G. Husak, the country's leadership was replaced.
Emergency laws were adopted, according to which, in particular, a kulak shown to a Russian "cost" up to three months of imprisonment, and a provoked fight with the Russians - six. At the end of 1969, servicemen were allowed to bring families to the garrisons where the construction battalions built housing. Construction of family housing continued until 1972.
So, what kind of "invaders" are they who sacrificed their lives so that civilians would not die, did not respond with a shot to the most insolent provocations, saved people unknown to them from reprisals? Who lived in hangars and warehouses, and the beds, even in the officers' and women's (for medical staff, typists, waitresses) hostels, were in two tiers? Who preferred to act not as soldiers, but as agitators, explaining the situation and their tasks to the population?
Output
The introduction of the troops of the Warsaw Pact countries into Czechoslovakia was a forced measure aimed at preserving the unity of the countries of the socialist camp, as well as at preventing the withdrawal of NATO troops to the borders of the USSR.
Soviet soldiers were not occupiers and did not behave like invaders. No matter how pathetic it sounds, but in August 1968, they defended their country at the forefront of the socialist camp. The tasks assigned to the army were completed with minimal losses.
No matter what modern political scientists may say, in that situation, the government of the USSR and other countries of the socialist camp made a decision adequate to the current situation. Even the current generation of Czechs should be grateful to the Soviet army for the fact that the Sudetenland remained part of the Czechoslovakia and their state exists within its modern borders.
"Notes in the margin"
But here's what is interesting and raises questions.
The soldiers who were the first (!) To be called "Internationalist Warriors" are not even recognized as such in Russia, although by Order of the Minister of Defense Marshal of the Soviet Union A. Grechko No. 242 of 10/17/1968 they were grateful for the fulfillment of their international duty.
By the order of the Minister of Defense of the USSR No. 220 of 05.07.1990 "The list of states, cities, territories and periods of military operations with the participation of citizens of the Russian Federation" was supplemented by the Republic of Cuba.
For some unknown reason, Czechoslovakia (the only one!) Was not included in the list, and, as a result, the relevant documents were not handed over to former servicemen performing their international duty in this country.
The issues of recognizing or not the participants in the operation as warriors-internationalists and veterans of hostilities were repeatedly discussed at various levels.
A group of scientists, having analyzed the materials available for study, and after meetings with direct participants in the Czechoslovak events, stated that “in 1968 in Czechoslovakia, an excellently planned and impeccably implemented military operation was conducted in Czechoslovakia, during which military operations were conducted. Both from the point of view of military science and the real situation of the use of forces and means. "
And the soldiers and officers who fulfilled their duty during the Danube operation have every right to be called internationalist soldiers and fall under the category of “combatants”.
However, the Russian Ministry of Defense does not recognize them as such, and to questions and requests from regional organizations of the participants in Operation Danube, it replies that there were “only clashes”, and they were grateful for “fulfilling their international duty”, and not for participating in hostilities.
Today, the youngest participants in the Danube operation are already 64 years old, and every year their ranks become less frequent. The latter, according to the author of the article, an appeal only by the Rostov organization of the participants in the operation "Danube" was sent to the Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation in January this year. Let's wait for the answer from the new minister.
In Czechoslovakia, dissatisfaction with the economic situation in the summer and autumn of 1967 intensified oppositional sentiments in all strata of society. In June, the Congress of Writers of Czechoslovakia sharply criticized the policies of the Communists, and in November there were mass demonstrations by Prague students. After these events, the opposition began to gain strength in the party. This led in January 1968 to a change in political leadership. The plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party dismissed the former leader, conservative A. Novotny, and elected A. Dubchek as the first secretary of the Central Committee of the party. It was decided to start economic reforms. Their essence boiled down to a significant increase in the independence of enterprises, the introduction of their full self-sufficiency on the basis of cost accounting. In the early spring of 1968, a broad democratization of society began: many political clubs arose throughout the country, there was an informal discussion of the situation, demands were made to abolish the leading role of the Communist Party and liquidate the political police. At the same time, the Social Democratic Party was revived, the authority of which began to grow rapidly, the initiative gradually left the hands of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia. This development of events was called the "Prague Spring of 1968".
In the summer of 1968, the "ferment of society" with the continued economic tension developed into a socio-political crisis. The media got out of the party censorship, the authority of the CPC was rapidly falling, Dubchek practically did not control the situation either in the party or in the Central Committee. The situation was aggravated by the fact that elections to the National Assembly were scheduled for the fall, as a result of which the CPC could quite realistically lose a monopoly of power. Trying to regain authority in society, the leadership of the CPC decided to reform the party from above. To this end, it was proposed to amend the charter, in particular, to change the formulation of the principle of democratic centralism, giving greater independence to grassroots organizations.
The situation in Czechoslovakia caused wariness and misunderstanding in the countries of the "socialist camp". Moscow received expressions of dissatisfaction from Poland, whose authorities feared the spread of the "Prague Spring" to their territory. Dubcek's very loyal position towards the FRG authorities, which considered the possibility of providing Czechoslovakia with a loan for economic reforms, irritated the GDR. In addition, Dubcek took a special position, different from Moscow, in relations with Yugoslavia and Romania. The Kremlin regarded this step at the same time as the unification of the opposition forces within the "socialist camp" and, more importantly, as a significant weakening of the southern flank of the Warsaw Pact.
At the meeting between Brezhnev and Dubcek in Cierna nad Tisou and at a meeting of fraternal parties (with the participation of the CPSU, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the Communist Parties of Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland and the GDR) on August 3, 1968, Dubcek's concrete concessions to the "rightists" were discussed in order to maintain power. All subsequent steps by Brezhnev, Kadar and other leaders of the "socialist camp" have strengthened their confidence that Dubchek insists on continuing reforms. In addition, he does not want and cannot conclude a compromise with the "right-wing" forces in the party, since his authority and ability to control the situation have been exhausted. The end of Soviet socialism in Czechoslovakia was obvious to everyone. After prolonged hesitation, Brezhnev, under strong pressure from the leadership of the GDR, decided to begin the intervention of the united troops of the Warsaw Pact member states on the territory of Czechoslovakia.
On the night of August 20-21, 1968, the troops entered the territory of Czechoslovakia. In military terms, the operation was well planned and, on the whole, bloodshed was avoided, although there were killed and wounded on both sides. However, the intervention suffered a complete political defeat: a wave of mass protests by the population swept across Czechoslovakia. On August 21, the Soviet consulate in Bratislava was surrounded by a crowd of thousands of Slovaks, which was dispersed by tank shots over the heads of the protesters. The invasion by the OVD troops was completely rejected by the party, where, according to Moscow, there were no "healthy forces." This forced the leadership of the CPSU to enter the second stage of negotiations with Dubcek and his supporters. In September Dubcek was forced to sign a protocol in Moscow, according to which the August events were regarded as an "anti-socialist coup." The process of "normalizing the situation" dragged on for many years. The first step was the dismissal of Dubcek and his entourage on April 17, 1969. G. Husak was appointed First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China. On May 6, 1970, Gusak signed a revised alliance treaty with the USSR and exerted strong pressure on the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, which "approved" the Soviet intervention. Reforms in Czechoslovakia began to gradually curtail.
The significance of the "Czechoslovak events" went far beyond relations within the "socialist camp"... The Brezhnev leadership grew more and more convinced of the "limits of reform" of socialism. The economic reforms in the USSR began to be emasculated. The already conservative ideological course has become much tougher, irreconcilable to any manifestation of dissent. Within the country, even a slight "turn to man" was stopped. The ideas of revolutionary romanticism and communist illusions were dealt a crushing blow.
"Brezhnev Doctrine"
The events of 1968 revealed close interweaving of inter-party and geopolitical interests... The way out of the crisis was seen as "the all-round strengthening of the unity of the socialist camp," which in those years was increasingly called the "socialist community." Although "proletarian internationalism" remained the theoretical basis of relations between the countries of the "commonwealth" during these years, its content was expanded and became part of the policy aimed at consolidation of the post-war structure of Europe.
The development of the principle of "proletarian internationalism" in the late 1960s - early 1980s was implemented in the doctrine "limited sovereignty", which was called in the West the "Brezhnev doctrine". It proceeded from the fact that in the chain of countries of the "socialist community", due to deviations from the "general laws of socialist construction", the emergence of individual "weak links" was allowed. It is in these "weak links" that the potential for the restoration of capitalism could arise and, consequently, the threat to the independence and sovereignty of such countries from imperialism. Thus, an equal sign was put between the collapse of socialism and the loss of sovereignty. According to this logic, the unity of the "socialist community" could be violated, which posed a danger to the entire socialist bloc as a whole. From this followed the provision that the sovereignty of any socialist state is the common property and "concern of all socialist countries."
Therefore, in a calm atmosphere, it was a question of "supervising" the observance of the "general laws of socialism" by the socialist countries, in other words, adherence to the Soviet model. Objectively, this led to her conservation and replication of crisis phenomena on the scale of the entire "community"... If there was a threat to the "cause of socialism" in a particular country, the entire community should act as a united front and provide this country with fraternal assistance. "Help" was provided due to the collective responsibility for the fate of socialism "of all members of the socialist community, primarily the USSR." Who exactly determined the danger to the "fate of socialism" in this or that country was kept silent. In addition, it remained unclear whether a request for assistance from the leadership of the "in distress" country was mandatory or not. At the same time, it was stated that the policy of "non-intervention" in this situation directly contradicted the interests of the defense of the "fraternal states."
The main provisions of the "doctrine of limited sovereignty" began to be especially actively promoted as the crisis in Czechoslovakia intensified, and after 1968 to justify military intervention in this country. This political line was also characterized by an increase in the economic dependence of the countries of the "socialist commonwealth" on the USSR, constant political patronage over them. The threat of force or its use became the instrument of maintaining "limited sovereignty".