Current page: 3 (total of the book has 7 pages)
Above: Submarine Growler collided with Japanese vehicles in February 1943. In the photo on 05/05/1943, the boat is being tested after refurbishment.
Three of the 22 naval pilots rescued by the Tang during their second patrol. Rescue operation in the area of Truk Island, April 1944.
Of the 132 ordered "Balao" boats for the last 10 units, the order was canceled due to the end of the war, 21 boats were at the stage of combat training and did not take part in hostilities. All the other 101 submarines took part in the battles with Japan. Most of them entered service too late to make many military campaigns and achieve significant results. In this regard, SS-304 "Seahorse" and SS-306 "Tang" were the exception. 10 boats of the "Balao" class were lost.
At the end of the war, 134 Tench-class boats were ordered. But before the end of hostilities, only 30 managed to launch, of which 11 managed to complete combat training and go on military campaigns. Not a single Tench-class boat was lost.
Characteristics of American submarines of World War II
"Dolphin" boat deckhouse (type N). This cockpit is a light blue-gray color typical of the pre-war coloration of American submarines. Two radio antennas are clearly visible on the sides of the cabin.
Three photographs (1 above and 2 below) show from different sides the deckhouse of the submarine "Bashaw", moored to its floating base, Brisbane, August 9, 1944. Pay attention to the hatch for servicing the deck gun in the bow of the wheelhouse and the TVT, mounted in a box sponson along the side of the wheelhouse (instead of the bow or stern ends, as was usually practiced). The Bashaw is painted in one of two gray / black camouflage patterns adopted in June 1944. This is probably the light-colored Measure 32 / 3SS-B pattern.
Submarine.
Device and weapons
The internal structure of American boats differed little from similar ships in other countries. Although the post-war comparison with captured Japanese, German and Italian boats testifies to the best living conditions, habitability of American submarines (we are, of course, not talking about German boats of the latest series).
Submarine SS-213 "Greenling", 1943
Above: The boat commander is watching the target through an artillery periscope. In the foreground - according to his reports, the navigator makes calculations on a circular slide rule, in the background - the operator enters data into the torpedo firing machine.
Above: Aft double-deck racks of spare torpedoes.
A device TVT (Target Bearing Transmitter).
In the photo below: The living space for the crew was located on the boats in the bow, between the torpedo compartment and the battery compartment. The atmosphere was very Spartan, but such compartments also aroused the envy of submariners from other countries.
In the photo at the bottom right: Submarine central post. Most of it is occupied by a chart table with maps. Instruments for plotting a course are located around.
Above: Two mechanics in the diesel compartment at the propeller / charge switches.
On the left: Photo of the bridge of the submarine "Tinosa". In the frame: TVT (Target Bearing Transmitter - "device for determining the angle of the target"), a compass repeater and an intercom ("squawk box").
An American submariner controls the "Christmas tree" (a panel for indicating the status of outboard holes). Green lights indicated the valve was closed, and red lights were open.
Central post. Operators of rudder control and ballast tank filling.
On the bridge of the submarine "Spadefish". The commander examines the horizon through binoculars, next to the TVT device and the dog "Shakey" - the mascot of the submarine.
Before each military campaign, the noise of the submarines was checked (if it exceeded the norm, its causes were eliminated, although the Japanese sound direction finders were ineffective), and the hulls were demagnetized (after the war, it turned out that the Japanese did not place magnetic mines).
The two photos above show a General Motors Model 16-278A diesel.
Power plant
The boats "Gato" and "Balao" were distinguished by their power plant. First of all, for the first time since the First World War, American submarines have the rated power of four 8-cylinder diesel engines (each 1535hp) General Motors or Fairbanks-Morse corresponded to their real output. Diesels could drive 1100kW generators. The watch of the central post regulated the power of the generators and could use it in order to propel either of the two propeller shafts. If necessary, the power of the generators could be used to charge 252 elements of the bow and stern battery groups.
Appearance and structure of the Mk-14 torpedo.
Torpedo machine
A significant novelty capable of increasing the efficiency of using submarines was the torpedo-firing assault rifle (TDC) on American boats, which appeared on submarines starting with the C series.
The data from the navigator's room was received by the lieutenant at the TDC. The indicators were compared and the averaged data required for torpedo fire control were obtained. The torpedo assault rifle, using an arrow on the screen showing the lead angle during a torpedo attack, provided a schematic diagram of the relative position of the pursuer and target.
The readiness light warned when the optimal moment of launching the torpedoes was reached. Ideally, torpedoes should have been fired at the side of the target from a distance of 920 to 1850 meters. Here, on the torpedo firing machine, the angle of installation of the gyroscope for controlling the torpedo was calculated. These data were transmitted to the torpedo compartments, where they were marked on the card by the movement of the arrow. And the second moving arrow on the other card indicated the gyroscopic angle, which was automatically set on the torpedo gyroscope. This was achieved using a steel rod, which was somewhat reminiscent of a wrench going through the torpedo tube to an internally threaded socket in the torpedo. The rod was automatically retracted when fired.
In the bow and stern torpedo compartments of the apparatus at the combat posts were the foremen-torpedo fighters of the 2nd class. Each of them controlled both pointer arrows. If they did not match, the foreman manually set the torpedo gyroscopes in the torpedo tubes according to one of the pointers.
Unsuccessful torpedoes
The TDC torpedo machine was good, but the American Mk-14 torpedo with a proximity fuse often failed. There is nothing incredible in identifying defects in American torpedoes, especially given the complexity of the equipment and its high cost. The Mk-14 torpedo cost over 10 thousand. dollars, and even such a rich organization as the General Artillery Directorate of the US Navy, could not afford a large number of tests in conditions close to combat.
For a long time, the Main Artillery Directorate left numerous complaints from submariners unanswered. The scandal has matured after in 1943. submarine SS-283 "Tinosa" fired 10 torpedoes at the damaged Japanese tanker "Topap Magi III", which was standing idle, American acoustics detected 8 hits on the target's side, but not a single explosion followed. The epic of finishing touches and improvements began. We changed the details, checked the technology - everything is useless.
On June 24, 1943, the commander of the US Pacific Fleet, Admiral Nimitz, ran out of patience. He ordered to remove proximity fuses from torpedoes and replace them with improved contact fuses. The Main Artillery Directorate expressed bewilderment about this, but Nimitz remained adamant. However, the proximity fuse was removed from the armament of all American submarines only in March 1944, when attempts to bring it to a halt failed.
At the end of 1944. at Pearl Harbor, a new American acoustic torpedo based on the German T4 Zaunkonig was accepted for testing. During tests, it turned out that the torpedo, named Cutie, contains a lot of birth defects. And most importantly, it is not able to hit targets moving faster than 8.5 knots. A series of experiments convinced the military that the use of Cutie from submarines was impractical. It was more successfully used as an aviation anti-submarine torpedo in the Atlantic.
Another major drawback of the main American torpedoes Mk-14 (MkXIV) and Mk-18 (MkXVIII) was the low weight of the warhead. The 500 pounds (226.8 kg) of explosives placed in US torpedoes were smaller than the warheads of the rest of the belligerent countries. This amount of explosives was not enough both in terms of causing serious damage to enemy warships and in terms of hitting tankers, which have become the main target of American submarines since 1943.
In two photos (above and below): the process of loading torpedoes into a submarine.
Below: Sailors on the Spadefish (foreground) meet submarine Tinosa, returning to Pearl Harbor from another cruise.
Artillery
The artillery armament of American submarines has undergone significant changes during the Second World War. At the same time, two main goals are traced - the protection of the boat, forced to be on the surface, from enemy aircraft and artillery weapons for attacking unprotected transports.
The first task at the beginning of the war was to be solved using a 0.5-inch (12.7-mm) water-cooled machine gun mounted on the wheelhouse. Doubting the effectiveness of such systems, submarines began to arm with 20-mm Oerlikon and 40-mm Bofors assault rifles. Firepower undoubtedly increased, but the hopes of fighting off such an anti-aircraft gun from several aircraft looked too optimistic, although the Japanese aviation at the end of the war was no longer what it was at the beginning. By 1945, 12.7-mm machine guns had again come into vogue, although now they are air-cooled land-based ones that retracted into the hull when submerged.
Firing practice from a 3 "gun (in a combat situation, the entire crew of the gun wore helmets).
5 "/ 25ca1 gun.
20mm Oerlikon.
4 "/ 50cal cannon.
40mm Bofors.
12.7mm machine gun with a water-cooled jacket on the "Silverside" submarine. Photo of 1942.
12.7mm air-cooled machine gun. When submerged, the machine guns were removed and retracted inside the boat.
Artillery weapons worked well on German submarines in the First World War. The guns of American submarines at the beginning of World War II were clearly insufficient in caliber - 3 inches. When the transports were shot, the boat had to stay on the surface for a long time and spend a lot of shells. Gradually, 3 inches changed to 4, then 5.
The boats "Gato" and "Balao" ended the war armed with a 5 "cannon in the bow of the deck, a 20 mm Oerlikon on the balcony, 40 mm Bofors in the stern and a pair of portable 12.7 mm machine guns. ...
Mines
Mines that could be placed from torpedo tubes appeared in Germany in 1916. Having appreciated the significance of such an idea back in 1921, the US Navy began developing an anchor contact mine of a 21-inch torpedo caliber. The created sample was named Mk-10. Fuse - galvanic impact. The mine was in service until the mid-1950s. They produced models for setting from the air, from torpedo boats, model 3 had a magnetic fuse, etc. The main advantage of the mines is a very long service life, but the depth of placement was limited by the length of the mine.
A little later, the development of a bottom non-contact mine (magnetic) based on a German type S mine with a charge of 1000 pounds of TNT was started. The mine was carried out in a cylindrical aluminum case and was simply fired from a torpedo tube. The weapon was named Mk-12. A successfully designed sample was declared obsolete and withdrawn from service only in 1957. The weakest point of this model was the guaranteed battery life - 90 days. True, this period strongly depended on local conditions and could change upward. There is a known case of a possible detonation on the Mk-12 mine 23 months after setting. Although, of course, the relatively short period of operation of the electrical equipment reduced the combat value. To finish about boat mines, it should be noted that in 1945 a new model was adopted with urgency and multiplicity devices, proximity fuses, etc. The weight of explosives in the Mk-17 mine increased to 1375 pounds (623.7 kg), but apply they did not have time to do it in combat conditions.
Radars
While other fleets experimented with aircraft to increase the limited view from submarines, US NAVY set the opposite task for the developers. In the early 1930s, the design institute NRL (Naval Research Laboratory), in collaboration with other design and production divisions of the Navy, developed a technical device for the directional radiation of radio waves and reception of signals reflected from the target. This device was named "Radio Detecting and Ranging", soon shortened to Radar. At the end of 1938, the first prototype was mounted on the battleship New York. The radar turned out to be cumbersome and highly unreliable, but workable. The process of gradual improvement of the design began. Since May 1940. new, more compact and reliable models began to be installed on ships of the main classes.
The submarines on this list were far from being in the forefront. Nevertheless, at the end of 1941. search anti-aircraft radars were reduced to such a size that their placement became possible on submarines. The first type of "boat" radar was the SD, a non-directional radar with a 6-10 mile radius. Its sufficiently powerful radiation could be received by enemy radio direction finders. However, it was a huge help in detecting aircraft - the main opponents of submarines. Submarine SS-179 "Plunger" left Pearl Harbor on 12/13/1941, having one of the first radar installations on board, became the first American submarine to test its radar on a combat campaign. Soon, as far as possible, other submarines began to be equipped with SD locators.
Only a very small number of submarines received a complete set of radar antennas, as shown in the photo "Mingo", 06/17/1945. The SS anti-aircraft radar of the last years of production has replaced the rectangular SD antenna with a large oval one, shown in the picture. The lifting antenna was now used for long-distance communications and replaced the whip antenna that was previously used for SD duplication.
Early SD
Late SD
Early version of the SJ
Late variant SJ
Submarine "Searaven" is equipped with an antenna system typical for the middle of the war. The boat is equipped with a late oval SJ radar antenna, while thin SD antennas are visible in the background. Also visible are the 3 permanently raised whip antennas. The one in front is for the SPR-1, the middle one is for the VHF and the stern one is for the IFF. Photo dated February 6, 1945.
Radio antenna
Hydrophone JP
In July 1942 SS-231 "Haddock" received the next generation of radars - the SJ, an installation for detecting surface ships. This made it possible to simultaneously determine the azimuth (direction) and distance to the target on the water surface with an accuracy that allows firing torpedoes according to SJ data with good chances of success. As the first prototypes were tested and calibrated, and the radar operators were trained appropriately, submarine commanders truly believed that they could navigate beyond human vision with radar.
In September 1943, the SS-279 "Snook" was the first to be equipped with a new type of radar with a circular indicator with a radial sweep. It displayed in an easily accessible form the situation with azimuths and distances. This new screen, called the PPI (Plan Position Indicator), replaces the previous indicators that displayed target information as a pulse mark on a horizontal scale. PPI screens made radar results available to everyone.
During the war, radars were constantly improved. The SD model introduced at the beginning was gradually replaced by the SS type. Radar turned American boats into a formidable weapon capable of seeing in the dark and in bad weather, saving many lives of American submariners.
Sonar
Against the background of the success of radar, the achievements of sonar were somehow "lost". But sonars were also improving, and the end of the war FM could navigate American boats almost safely through minefields.
Sonars could detect anchor mines at distances up to 3.5 cab. According to American experts, their sonar worked more covertly than the English "Asdic", and made it possible to accurately distinguish anchor mines from other underwater objects.
There was a case when the Americans used submarines to reconnoitre minefields on the approaches to the coast of Japan in order to ensure the safe maneuvering of their surface ships in the area. With his help, on March 13-14, 1945 SS-282 "Tunny" discovered 222 Japanese anchor mines in the East China Sea. Despite this, several US submarines were killed by Japanese mines.
08/13/1944 American submarine SS-250 "Flier", following in the surface position, was blown up by a mine and sank in the Balabak Strait. 13 officers and sailors managed to escape. This example of detonation has little to do with sonar, but the next one is directly related to the topic of this chapter. On November 7, 1944, a Japanese patrol ship noted an underwater explosion within a minefield near Hokkaido in the patrol area of the SS-218 Albacore submarine. This boat is missing. She was probably blown up by a mine and sank.
American submarines who achieved the greatest success during World War II
The submarine was sunk. ships tonnage
SS-222 Bluefisli 12 50.839
SS-291 Crevalle 9 51.814
SS-260 Lapon 1 1 53.443
SS-257 Harder 16 54.002
SS-239 Whale 9 57.716
SS-254 Gurnard 10 57.866
SS-229 Flying Fish 15 58.306
SS-213 Greenling 15 59.234
SS-230 Finback 13 59.383
SS-281 Sunfish 16 59.815
SS-311 Archerfish 2 59.800
SS-238 Wahoo 20 60.038
SS-223 Bonefish 12 61.345
SS-208 Gray back 13 61.655
SS-266 Pogy 16 62.633
SS-283 Tinosa 16 64.655
SS-200 Tresher 17 66.172
SS-287 Bowfin 16 67.882
SS-19S Sealion 1 1 68.297
SS-211 Gudgeon 12 71.047
SS-304 Seahorse 19 71.564
SS-197 Seawolf 18 71.609
SS-199 Tautog 25 71.641
SS-217 Gardfish 19 72.424
SS-279 Snook 17 75.473
SS-259 Jack 15 76.687
SS-228 Drum 15 80.580
SS-237 Trigger 18 86.552
SS-411 Spadefish 21 88.091 + 05.17.45 "Transbalt"
SS-236 Silversides 23 90.080
SS-306 Tang 24 93.824
SS-220 Barb 17 96.628
SS-269 Rasher 18 99.901
SS-249 Flasher 21 100.231
American submarines during World War II
Organization of management
US submarines in the Pacific Ocean were merged into two formations: the submarine forces of the Pacific Fleet and the submarine forces of the Asian fleet - with the corresponding commanders and headquarters. At the beginning of 1942. the submarine forces of the Asian fleet were subordinated to the commander of the submarine forces of the Pacific Ocean. In the Atlantic theater of operations, US submarines were merged into the submarine forces of the Atlantic Fleet.
The headquarters of the submarine forces included departments for operational planning, intelligence, combat training and personnel. The headquarters included research groups that worked out recommendations for choosing the most advantageous salvo distances, torpedo dissolution angles in a salvo, submarine tactics, leading to the greatest losses of the enemy. These recommendations were published at least once a month in the Submariner's Bulletin.
The submarines Grouper and Sego represent 2 variants of the typical 1945 Gato type boats.
Above: Veteran boat Grouper (11 patrols) has a 5-inch cannon in front of the wheelhouse, 40mm Bofors on the balcony and on the bridge.
In the photo below: The boat "Sego" in 1945. 5 "gun behind the wheelhouse, 40-mm machine gun on the" balcony. "SS and SJ radar antennas are visible.
Three American boats in Auckland harbor in 1945. From left to right: Cabrilla, Bluefish and Cod.
Communication with the boats at sea was carried out by command posts. They contained maps with marked locations and routes of the submarine, as well as data on the situation received by radio from the submarine and other forces. From the command posts on the radio to the boats were transmitted data of the situation, orders of the commander, information about the rewards of those who distinguished themselves. But on the reports of submarines, command posts often out of time gave receipts for the reception of their radiograms (delays reached 1 hour or more), which forced the boats to stay above the water for a long time. The Americans did not have effective aerial reconnaissance.
To ensure interaction between submarines, surface ships and aircraft, the Americans created a zonal system. Zones have been identified:
1st - for non-combat activities of submarines and 2nd - security corridors of submarines (in these zones it was forbidden to attack submarines, except in cases of unambiguous identification of the enemy);
3rd - for combat activities of the submarine (entry into the zone for surface ships was prohibited);
4th - air surface - for the actions of surface ships and aircraft (submarines were not allowed to enter it without permission);
5th - united - for the simultaneous actions of submarines, surface ships and aircraft, which, being in it, were guided by the rules of mutual security;
6th - unlimited bombing - for the action of aircraft (boats were prohibited from entering the zone).
However, despite the presence of this system, there were cases of military contacts and collisions of American submarines with each other and their ships. SS-217 "Guardfish" 01.24.1945 sank the rescue vessel (tug) "Extractor", which accidentally ended up in the 3rd zone, mistaking it for an enemy submarine.
The Americans' identification was poorly worked out. The submission of identification signals from submarines was often regarded on surface ships and aircraft as a cunning of the enemy. Until the end of the war, the American command was not able to organize a notification about the location of its submarines when aircraft or surface ships approached them, as a result of which their own aircraft and surface ships posed a very great danger to submariners. Let's give a concrete example.
10/03/1944 Japanese submarine Ro-41 attacked the American formation of escort aircraft carriers CVE-63 "St. Lo "(until 15.9.1944 -" Midway "), CVE-70" Fanshaw Bay "and four escort destroyers (" Shelton "," Richard M. Rowell "," Eversole "," Edmonds ") to the northeast from the island of Morotai. The torpedoes hit the destroyer escort Shelton, which sank fourteen hours later while being towed (02 ° 33 "N, 129 ° 18" E). Destroyer escort Richard M. Rowell attacked the submarine with depth charges, but Ro-41 escaped and soon returned to Kure.
But the search for the Japanese submarine continued. Approximately 3 hours after Shelton was attacked, the aircraft of the aircraft carrier St. Lo discovered the submarine. After a while she was attacked and sunk by the destroyer "Richard M. Rowell". As a result, the United States Navy lost the SS-197 "Seawolf" submarine. All this happened in the "security corridor" (2nd zone) ...
Submarine "Trout" in December 1943. The boat will be sunk by a Japanese destroyer on 02/25/1944. when attacking a convoy.
Submarine S-20 during acceptance tests in New London in 1920.
Submarine Pike leaves the Mayor Island base. On the boat, weapons and a pipe from the period of the beginning of the war. With the installation of radars, the silhouette of the submarines has changed a lot.
During the war, 28 submarines were attacked by their own aircraft, 5 by surface ships; two were sunk, nine injured returned to bases for repair.
This text, perhaps, should start with a short preface. Well, for starters - I had no intention of writing it.
However, my article on the Anglo-German war at sea in 1939-1945 gave rise to a completely unexpected discussion. It contains one phrase - about the Soviet submarine fleet, in which, apparently, large funds were invested before the war, and "... whose contribution to victory turned out to be negligible ...".
The emotional debate this phrase has generated is beside the point.
I received several e-mails accusing me of "... ignorance of the subject ...", "... Russophobia ...", "... suppression of the success of Russian weapons ...", and ". .. conducting an information war against Russia ... ".
In short - in the end I became interested in the subject, and did some excavations. The results amazed me myself - everything was much worse than what I imagined.
The text offered to the readers cannot be called analysis - it is too short and shallow - but it can be useful as a kind of reference.
Here are the submarine forces with which the great powers entered the war:
1. England - 58 submarines.
2. Germany - 57 submarines.
3. USA - 21 submarines (operational, Pacific Fleet).
4. Italy - 68 submarines (calculated by the fleets stationed in Taranto, La Spezia, Tripoli, etc.).
5. Japan - 63 submarines.
6. USSR - 267 submarines.
Statistics are a pretty tricky thing.
First, the number of these combat units is to a certain extent arbitrary. It includes both combat boats and training boats, outdated, repaired, and so on. The only criterion for including a boat on the list is that it exists.
Secondly, the concept itself is not defined - a submarine. For example, a German submarine with a displacement of 250 tons, intended for operations in coastal areas, and a Japanese ocean-going submarine, with a displacement of 5,000 tons, are still not the same thing.
Thirdly, a warship is assessed not by its displacement, but by a combination of many parameters - for example, by speed, by armament, by autonomy, and so on. In the case of a submarine, these parameters include sinking speed, sinking depth, underwater speed, the time the boat can remain underwater - and other things that are long to list. They include, for example, such an important indicator as crew training.
Nevertheless, some conclusions can be drawn from the above table.
For example, it is obvious that the great naval powers - England and the United States - were not particularly actively preparing for the conduct of submarine warfare. And they had few boats, and even this number was "smeared" over the oceans. American Pacific Fleet - two dozen submarines. The British fleet - with possible combat operations on three oceans - the Atlantic, Pacific and Indian - only fifty.
It is also clear that Germany was not ready for a naval war - in total, by September 1939, there were 57 submarines in production.
Here is a table of German submarines - by type (data taken from the book "War At Sea", by S Roskill, vol. 1, page 527):
1. “IA” - ocean, 850 tons - 2 units.
2. “IIA” - coastal, 250 tons - 6 units.
3. “IIB” - coastal, 250 tons - 20 units.
4. “IIC” - coastal, 250 tons - 9 units.
5. “IID” - coastal, 250 tons - 15 units.
6. “VII” - ocean, 750 tons - 5 units.
Thus, for operations in the Atlantic at the very beginning of hostilities, Germany had no more than 8-9 submarines.
The table also shows that the Soviet Union was the absolute champion in the number of submarines in the pre-war period.
Now let's look at the number of submarines that participated in hostilities, by country:
1. England - 209 submarines.
2. Germany - 965 submarines.
3. USA - 182 submarines.
4.Italy - 106 submarines
5. Japan - 160 submarines.
6. CCCP - 170 submarines.
It can be seen that almost all countries during the war came to the conclusion that submarines are a very important type of weapon, began to sharply build up their submarine forces, and used them very widely in hostilities.
The only exception is the Soviet Union. In the USSR, new boats were not built during the war - it was not up to that, and of those built, no more than 60% were brought into business - but this is explained by many quite valid reasons. For example, the fact that the Pacific Fleet practically did not participate in the war - in contrast to the Baltic, Black Sea and Northern.
Germany is the absolute champion in building up the forces of the submarine fleet and in its combat use. This is especially evident if you look at the payroll of the German submarine fleet: by the end of the war - 1,155 units. The big difference between the number of submarines built and the number of those that took part in hostilities is explained by the fact that in the second half of 1944 and in 1945 it was more and more difficult to bring the submarine to a combat readiness state - boat bases were mercilessly bombed, shipyards were a priority target of air raids, training flotillas on the Baltic Sea did not have time to train crews, and so on.
The contribution of the German submarine fleet to military operations was enormous. The numbers of casualties they inflicted on the enemy and the casualties suffered by them vary. According to German sources, during the war years, Doenitz's submarines sank 2,882 enemy merchant ships, with a total tonnage of 14.4 million tons displacement, plus 175 warships, including battleships and aircraft carriers. 779 boats were lost.
The Soviet reference book gives a different figure - 644 German submarines sunk, 2840 merchant ships sunk by them.
The British (“Total War”, by Peter Calviocoressi and Guy Wint) indicate the following figures: 1162 built German submarines, and 941 sunk or surrendered.
I did not find an explanation of the difference in the given statistics. Unfortunately, Captain Roskilde's authoritative work, “War At Sea,” does not provide summary tables. Perhaps the point is in different ways of accounting for sunken and captured boats - say, which column was used to account for a damaged boat that was stranded and abandoned by the crew?
In any case, it can be argued that the German submariners not only inflicted huge losses on the British and American merchant fleets, but also had a profound strategic impact on the entire course of the war.
Hundreds of escort ships and literally thousands of aircraft were thrown to fight them - and even this would not have been enough if not for the successes of the American shipbuilding industry, which made it possible to more than compensate for the entire tonnage sunk by the Germans.
How were the other participants in the war doing?
The Italian submarine fleet showed very poor results, completely disproportionate to its nominally high numbers. The Italian boats were poorly built, poorly equipped, and poorly managed. On their account - 138 sunk targets, while 84 boats were lost.
According to the Italians themselves, their boats sank 132 enemy merchant ships, with a total displacement of 665,000 tons, and 18 warships, for a total of 29,000 tons. Which gives an average of 5,000 tons for transport (equivalent to the average British transport ship of the period), and an average of 1,200 tons for a warship - which corresponds to a destroyer, or English escort sloop.
Most importantly, they did not have any serious impact on the course of hostilities. The Atlantic campaign failed completely. If we talk about the submarine fleet, then the greatest contribution to the military efforts of Italy was made by Italian saboteurs, who successfully attacked British ships of the line in the roadstead of Alexandria.
The British sank 493 merchant ships with a total displacement of 1.5 million tons, 134 warships, plus 34 enemy submarines - while losing 73 boats.
Their successes could have been greater, but they did not have a large number of goals. Their main contribution to the victory was the interception of Italian merchant ships sailing to North Africa and German coasters in the North Sea and off the coast of Norway.
The actions of American and Japanese submarines deserve a separate discussion.
The Japanese submarine fleet looked very impressive in its pre-war phase of development. Its submarines ranged from tiny dwarf boats designed for sabotage operations to huge submarine cruisers.
During the Second World War, 56 submarines with a displacement of more than 3,000 tons were put into operation - and 52 of them were Japanese.
The Japanese fleet included 41 submarines capable of carrying seaplanes (up to 3 at once) - which could not be done by any other boat in any other fleet of the world. Neither German, nor English, nor American.
Japanese submarines had no equal underwater speed. Their small boats could do up to 18 knots under water, and experimental medium-sized boats even showed 19, which exceeded the remarkable results of the German XXI series boats, and was almost three times faster than the speed of the standard German "workhorse" - series VII boats ...
The Japanese torpedo weapon was the best in the world, exceeding the American one three times - in range, twice - in the lethal force of the warhead, and, up to the second half of 1943, had a huge advantage in reliability.
And yet, they did very little. In total, Japanese submarines sank 184 ships with a total displacement of 907,000 tons.
It was a matter of military doctrine - according to the concept of the Japanese navy, the boats were intended to hunt warships, not merchant ships. And since warships went three times faster than the "merchants", and, as a rule, had strong anti-submarine security, the successes were modest. Japanese submariners sank two American aircraft carriers, a cruiser, damaged two battleships - and had virtually no effect on the overall course of hostilities.
Since a certain time, they have been used at all as supply ships for the besieged island garrisons.
Interestingly, the Americans started the war with exactly the same military doctrine - the boat was supposed to track down warships, not "merchants." Moreover, American torpedoes, in theory the most technologically advanced (they should have exploded under the ship under the influence of its magnetic field, breaking an enemy ship in half) turned out to be terribly unreliable.
The defect was eliminated only in the second half of 1943. By the same time, the pragmatic American naval commanders switched their submarines to attacks on the Japanese merchant fleet, and then added another improvement to this - now the Japanese tankers became the priority target.
The effect was devastating.
Of the 10 million tonnes of displacement lost by the Japanese military and merchant navy, 54% were attributed to the submariners.
The American Navy lost 39 submarines during the war.
According to the Russian directory, American submarines sank 180 targets.
If the American reports are correct, 5,400,000 tons divided by 180 "targets" hit gives an unreasonably high figure for each ship sunk - an average of 30,000 tons. An English merchant ship of the Second World War had a displacement of about 5-6 thousand tons, only then the American Liberty transports became twice as large.
Perhaps the reference book took into account only military vessels, because it does not give the total tonnage of targets sunk by the Americans.
According to the Americans, about 1,300 Japanese merchant ships were sunk by their boats during the war, from large tankers to almost sampans. This gives an estimated 3,000 tons for each Maru sunk - which is roughly in line with expectations.
An online reference taken from the usually reliable site: http://www.2worldwar2.com/ - also gives a figure of 1300 Japanese merchant ships sunk by submarines, but estimates the loss of American boats higher: 52 boats lost, out of a total of 288 units ( including training and not participating in hostilities).
It is possible that boats that died as a result of accidents were taken into account - I do not know. The standard American submarine during the Pacific War was the Gato-class, 2,400 tons, equipped with superior optics, superior acoustics, and even radar.
American submarines made a huge contribution to the victory. An analysis of their actions after the war revealed them as the most important factor that strangled the military and civilian industry in Japan.
The actions of Soviet submarines must be considered separately, because the conditions for their use were unique.
The Soviet pre-war submarine fleet was not only the largest in the world. In terms of the number of submarines - 267 units - it was two and a half times more than the English and German fleets combined. Here it is necessary to make a reservation - British and German submarines were counted for September 1939, and Soviet ones for June 1941. Nevertheless, it is clear that the strategic plan for the deployment of the Soviet submarine fleet - if we take the priorities of its development - was better than the German one. The forecast for the time of the outbreak of hostilities was much more realistic than the one that was determined by the German "Plan-Z" - 1944-1946.
The Soviet plan was made on the assumption that the war could start just today, or tomorrow. Accordingly, no funds were invested in battleships that required a long construction. Preference was given to small military vessels - in the pre-war period, only 4 cruisers were built, but there were more than 200 submarines.
The geographical conditions for the deployment of the Soviet fleet were very specific - it was necessarily divided into 4 parts - the Black Sea, Baltic, Northern and Pacific - which, in general, could not help each other. Some ships, apparently, managed to pass from the Pacific Ocean to Murmansk, small ships like baby submarines could be transported disassembled by rail - but in general, the interaction of the fleets was very difficult.
Here we come across the first problem - the pivot table indicates the total number of Soviet submarines, but does not say how many of them operated in the Baltic - or the Black Sea, for example.
The Pacific Fleet did not participate in the war until August 1945.
The Black Sea Fleet joined the war almost immediately. In general, he had no enemy at sea - except perhaps the Romanian fleet. Accordingly, there is no information about the successes - due to the absence of the enemy. There is no information about losses either - at least not in detail.
According to AB Shirokorad, the following episode took place: on June 26, 1941, the leaders "Moscow" and "Kharkov" were sent to raid Constantza. While retreating, the leaders came under attack from their own submarine, Shch-206. She was sent on patrol, but was not warned of the raid. As a result, the leader "Moskva" was sunk, and the submarine was sunk by escorts - in particular, the destroyer "Soobrazitelny".
This version is disputed, and it is argued that both ships - the leader and the submarine - died in a Romanian minefield. There is no exact information.
But here is what is absolutely indisputable: in the period from April to May 1944, German and Romanian troops were evacuated from the Crimea to Romania by sea. During April and twenty days of May, the enemy led 251 convoys - many hundreds of targets and with very weak anti-submarine security.
In total, during this period, 11 submarines damaged one (!) Transport in 20 military campaigns. According to the reports of the commanders, several targets were allegedly sunk, but there was no confirmation of this.
The result is striking in terms of inefficiency.
There is no summary information on the Black Sea Fleet - the number of boats, the number of combat exits, the number of targets hit, their type and tonnage. At least I haven't found them anywhere.
The war in the Baltic can be reduced to three phases: the defeat in 1941, the blockade of the fleet in Leningrad and Kronstadt in 1942, 1943, 1944 - and the counteroffensive in 1945.
According to information found on the forums, the Baltic Fleet of the Cross in 1941 conducted 58 exits to German sea communications in the Baltic.
Results:
1. One German submarine, U-144 was sunk. Confirmed by a German reference.
2. Two transports were sunk (5769 brt).
3. Presumably, a Swedish mobilized patrol boat HJVB-285 (56 brt) was also sunk by a torpedo submarine S-6 on 08/22/1941.
This last point is even difficult to comment on - the Swedes were neutral, the boat was - most likely - a bot armed with a machine gun, and was hardly worth the torpedo that was launched at it. In the process of achieving these successes, 27 submarines were lost. And according to other sources - even 36.
Information for 1942 is vague. 24 targets are said to have been hit.
There is no summary information - the number of boats involved, the number of combat exits, the type and tonnage of targets hit.
There is a complete consensus regarding the period from the end of 1942 to July 1944 (the time of Finland's withdrawal from the war): not a single combat exit of submarines on enemy communications. The reason is very good - the Gulf of Finland was blocked not only by minefields, but also by an anti-submarine network barrier.
As a result, throughout this period, the Baltic was a quiet German lake - Doenitz's training flotillas trained there, Swedish ships with important military supplies for Germany - ball bearings, iron ore, and other things - moved German troops - from the Baltic to Finland and back, and so on. Further.
But even at the end of the war, when the nets were removed and Soviet submarines went to the Baltic to intercept German ships, the picture looks rather strange. During the mass evacuation from the Kurland Peninsula and from the Danzig Bay area, in the presence of hundreds of targets, including large-tonnage ones, often with completely conditional anti-submarine security in April-May 1945, 11 submarines in 11 military campaigns sank only one transport, a floating base and a floating battery ...
It was at this time that high-profile victories happened - the sinking of "Gustlov", for example - but nevertheless, the German fleet managed to evacuate about 2.5 million people by sea, the largest rescue operation in history - and it was neither disrupted nor even slowed down by the actions of the Soviet submarines.
There is no summary information about the actions of the Baltic submarine fleet. Again - maybe they exist, but I haven't found them.
The same situation is with the statistics on the actions of the Northern Fleet. The summary data is nowhere to be found, or at least not in public circulation.
There is something on the forums. An example is shown below:
“… On August 4, 1941, the British submarine Tigris, and then the Trident, arrived at Polyarnoye. In early November, they were replaced by two other submarines, Seawulf and Silayen. In total, until December 21, they made 10 military campaigns, destroying 8 targets. Is it a lot or a little? In this case, it is not important, the main thing is that during the same period 19 Soviet submarines in 82 military campaigns sank only 3 targets ... “.
The biggest puzzle comes with information from the pivot table:
http://www.deol.ru/manclub/war/podlodka.htm - Soviet boats.
According to her, 170 Soviet submarines took part in the hostilities. Of these, 81 were killed. 126 targets were hit.
What is their total tonnage? Where were they sunk? How many are warships and how many are merchant ships?
The table on this score simply does not give any answers.
If "Gustlov" was a large ship and was named in the reports - why weren't other ships named? Or at least not listed? After all, both a tug and a four-row boat can be counted as a hit.
The thought of falsification is simply obvious.
The table, by the way, contains another falsification, this time completely obvious.
The victories of the submarines of all the fleets listed in it - English, German, Soviet, Italian, Japanese - contain the sum of the enemy ships sunk by them - merchant and military.
The only exception is the Americans. For some reason, they only counted the warships sunk by them, thereby artificially reducing their indicators - from 1480 to 180.
And this slight modification of the rules is not even stipulated. You can find it only by doing a detailed check of all the data in the table.
The final result of the check is that all data are more or less reliable. Apart from Russians and Americans. The American ones are degraded by a factor of 7 by means of obvious manipulation, and the Russians are hidden in a thick "fog" - by using numbers without explanation, detailing and confirmation.
In general, from the above material, it is obvious that the results of the actions of Soviet submarines during the war were negligible, the losses were great, and the achievements did not correspond at all to the huge level of costs that was invested in the creation of the Soviet submarine fleet in the pre-war period.
The reasons for this are also clear in general terms. In a purely technical sense, the boats did not have enough means of detecting the enemy - their commanders could rely only on not very reliable radio communications, and on their own periscopes. This was generally a common problem, not only for Soviet submariners.
During the first period of the war, German captains created an impromptu mast for themselves - a boat on the surface would push the periscope up to its limit, and a watchman with binoculars climbed onto it, like a pole at a fair. This exotic method helped them little, so they relied more on a tip - either colleagues in the "wolf pack", or reconnaissance aircraft, or the coastal headquarters, which had radio intelligence and decryption service data. Radio direction finders and acoustic stations were in wide use.
It is not known what exactly the Soviet submariners had in this sense, but if we use the analogy with tanks - where orders were transmitted by flags in 1941 - then you can guess that the situation with communications and electronics in the submarine fleet was not the best at that time either.
The same factor reduced the possibility of interaction with aviation, probably with the headquarters on land as well.
The level of training of the crews was an important factor. For example, German submariners - after graduating from the crew members of the corresponding technical schools - sent boats to training flotillas in the Baltic, where for 5 months they practiced tactics in practice, conducted training firing, and so on.
Particular attention was paid to the training of commanders.
Herbert Werner, for example, a German submariner whose memoirs provide a lot of useful information, became a captain only after several campaigns, having managed to be both a junior officer and a first mate, and received a couple of orders in this capacity.
The Soviet fleet was deployed so quickly that there was simply nowhere to take qualified captains, and they were appointed from people with experience in sailing in the merchant marine. In addition, the guiding idea at that time was - “... does not know the case - it doesn’t matter. Learn in battle ... ”.
When handling weapons as complex as a submarine, this is not the best approach.
In conclusion, a few words about learning from mistakes.
The summary table comparing the actions of boats from different countries is taken from the book by A.V. Platonov and V.M. Lurie "Commanders of Soviet submarines 1941-1945."
It was published in the amount of 800 copies - obviously only for official use, and obviously only for commanders of a sufficiently high level - because its circulation is too negligible to be used as a training manual for officers-students of naval academies.
It would seem that in such an audience you can call a spade a spade?
However, the table of indicators is compiled very cunningly.
Take, say, such an indicator (by the way, chosen by the authors of the book), as the ratio of the number of sunk targets to the number of lost submarines.
The German fleet in this sense is estimated in round numbers as follows - 4 targets for 1 boat. If we recalculate this coefficient in another - say, in the sunk tonnage per one lost boat - then we get about 20,000 tons (14 million tons of tonnage divided by 700 lost boats). Since the average ocean-going English merchant ship of the time had a displacement of 5,000 tons, it all fits together.
With the Germans - yes, it does.
And with the Russians - no, it does not fit. Because the coefficient for them - 126 sunk targets versus 81 lost boats - gives a figure of 1.56. Of course, worse than 4, but still nothing.
However, this coefficient, unlike the German one, is unverifiable - the total tonnage of targets sunk by Soviet submarines is not indicated anywhere. And the proud indication of a sunken Swedish tug of as much as fifty tons makes one think that this is far from accidental.
However, this is not all.
The German ratio of 4 goals per boat is the overall result. At the beginning of the war - in fact, up to the middle of 1943 - it was much higher. It turned out and 20, and 30, and even a different time and 50 ships for each boat.
The figure was reduced after the victory of the convoys and their escorts - in the middle of 1943 and until the end of the war.
That is why it is listed in the table - honestly and correctly.
The Americans sank approximately 1,500 targets, losing approximately 40 boats. They would be entitled to a coefficient of 35-40 - much higher than the German one.
If you think about it, this ratio is quite logical - the Germans fought in the Atlantic against the Anglo-American-Canadian escorts equipped with hundreds of ships and thousands of aircraft, and the Americans waged a war against the weakly defended Japanese shipping.
But this simple fact cannot be recognized in any way, and therefore an amendment is introduced.
For the Americans, imperceptibly, they change the rules of the game, and only "military" goals are counted, reducing their coefficient (180/39) to 4.5 - obviously more acceptable for Russian patriotism?
Even now - and even in the narrowly professional military environment for which the book by Platonov and Lurie was published - it turned out to be undesirable to face facts.
Perhaps this is the most unpleasant result of our little investigation.
P.S. The text of the article (the font is better and there are photos) can be viewed here:
Sources, a short list of used Internet sites:
1.http: //www.2worldwar2.com/submarines.htm - American boats.
2.http: //www.valoratsea.com/subwar.htm - submarine warfare.
3.http: //www.paralumun.com/wartwosubmarinesbritain.htm - English boats.
4.http: //www.mikekemble.com/ww2/britsubs.html - English boats.
5.http: //www.combinedfleet.com/ss.htm - Japanese boats.
6.http: //www.geocities.com/SoHo/2270/ww2e.htm - Italian boats.
7.http: //www.deol.ru/manclub/war/podlodka.htm - Soviet boats.
8.http: //vif2ne.ru/nvk/forum/0/archive/84/84929.htm - Soviet boats.
9.http: //vif2ne.ru/nvk/forum/archive/255/255106.htm - Soviet boats.
10.http: //www.2worldwar2.com/submarines.htm - submarine warfare.
11.histclo.com/essay/war/ww2/cou/sov/sea/gpw-sea.html - Soviet boats.
12.http: //vif2ne.ru/nvk/forum/0/archive/46/46644.htm - Soviet boats.
13. - Wikipedia, Soviet boats.
14.http: //en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Soviet_Navy - Wikipedia, Soviet boats.
15.histclo.com/essay/war/ww2/cou/sov/sea/gpw-sea.html - Wikipedia, Soviet boats.
16.http: //www.deol.ru/manclub/war/ - forum, military equipment. Conducted by Sergey Kharlamov, a very intelligent person.
Sources, a short list of books used:
1. "Steel Coffins: German Submarines, 1941-1945", Herbert Werner, translated from German, Moscow, Tsentrpoligraf, 2001
2. “War At Sea”, by S. Roskill, in Russian translation, Voenizdat, Moscow, 1967.
3. “Total War,” by Peter Calvocoressi and Guy Wint, Penguin Books, USA, 1985.
4. “The Longest Battle, The War at Sea, 1939-1945,” by Richard Hough, William Morrow and Company, Inc., New York, 1986.
5. "Secret Raiders", David Woodward, translated from English, Moscow, Tsentrpoligraf, 2004
6. "The Fleet That Destroyed Khrushchev", A.B. Shirokograd, Moscow, VZOI, 2004.
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From a series of medium-sized submarines of the "O" type, by the beginning of the war, 8 units remained in service ("R-1" - "R-7", "R-9"), built at the shipyards "Puget Sound N Yd" and "Fore River ”And commissioned in 1918, the submarines were used for training purposes. The boat "O-9" was lost in 1941, the rest were written off in 1945. Performance characteristics of the boat: full surface displacement - 521 tons, underwater - 629 tons; length - 52.5 m, width - 5.5 m; draft - 4.2 m; immersion depth - 60 m; power plants - 2 diesel engines and 2 electric motors; power - 660/550 HP speed - 13 knots. fuel supply - 88 tons of diesel fuel; cruising range - 5.5 thousand miles; crew - 25 people. Armament: 1x1 - 12.7 mm machine gun; 4 - 450 mm torpedo tubes; 8 torpedoes.
From a series of medium-sized submarines of the "R" type, 19 units remained in service by the beginning of the war ("O-2" - "O-4", "O-6" - "R-20"), built at the shipyards "Union Iron Wks. "And" Fore River "and commissioned in 1918-1919. 3 boats in 1941-1942 were transferred to Great Britain, 1 - died in 1943, the rest were written off in 1945. Performance characteristics of the boat: full surface displacement - 569 tons, underwater - 680 tons; length - 56.8 m, width - 5.5 m; draft - 4.4 m; immersion depth - 60 m; power plants - 2 diesel engines and 2 electric motors; power - 1.2 / 0.9 thousand hp speed - 13 knots. fuel supply - 75 tons of diesel fuel; cruising range - 4.7 thousand miles; crew - 29 people. Armament: 1x1 - 12.7 mm machine gun; 4 - 450 mm torpedo tubes; 8 torpedoes.
From the "Navy Group" of the "S" series, by the beginning of the war, 7 submarines remained in service ("S-11" - "S-17"), built at the shipyards "Portsmouth N Yd", "Lake" and commissioned in 1920-1923 The boats were decommissioned in 1944-1946. Performance characteristics of the boat: full surface displacement - 0.9 thousand tons, underwater - 1.1 thousand tons; length - 70.4 m, width - 6.7 m; draft - 4 m; immersion depth - 60 m; power plants - 2 diesel engines and 2 electric motors; power - 1.4 / 1.2 thousand hp speed - 15 knots. fuel supply - 148 tons of diesel fuel; cruising range - 5 thousand miles; crew - 38 people. Armament: 1x1 - 102 mm gun; 1x1 - 12.7 mm machine gun; 5 - 533 mm torpedo tubes; 14 torpedoes.
By the beginning of the war, 24 submarines (S-1, S-18, S-20 - S-41), built at the Fore River "," Bethlehem "," Union Iron Wks "and commissioned in 1920-1924. During the war, 6 boats were lost, 6 were transferred to Great Britain in 1941-1942, the rest were written off in 1945-1946. Performance characteristics of the boat: full surface displacement - 0.9 thousand tons, underwater - 1.1 thousand tons; length - 70 m, width - 6.3 m; draft - 4.8 m; immersion depth - 60 m; power plants - 2 diesel engines and 2 electric motors; power - 1.2 / 1.5 thousand hp speed - 14 knots. fuel supply - 168 tons of solar oil; cruising range - 3.4 thousand miles; crew - 38 people. Armament: 1x1 - 102 mm gun; 1x1 - 12.7 mm machine gun; 5 - 533 mm torpedo tubes; 12 torpedoes.
Group of submarines "Second Holland Group" series "S" consisted of 6 units ("S-42" - "S-47") built at the shipyard "Bethlehem" and commissioned in 1924-1925. During the war, 1 boat was lost, the rest were written off in 1945. Performance characteristics of the boat: full surface displacement - 0.9 thousand tons, submarine - 1.1 thousand tons; length - 68.7 m, width - 6.3 m; draft - 4.9 m; immersion depth - 60 m; power plants - 2 diesel engines and 2 electric motors; power - 1.2 / 1.2 thousand hp speed - 14 knots. fuel supply - 168 tons of solar oil; cruising range - 2.5 thousand miles; crew - 38 people. Armament: 1x1 - 102 mm gun; 1x1 - 12.7 mm machine gun; 4 - 533 mm torpedo tubes; 12 torpedoes.
From the Second Navy Group of the S series, by the beginning of the war, the S-48 submarine, built at the Lake shipyard and commissioned in 1922, remained in service. The boat was decommissioned in 1945. The performance characteristics of the boat: full surface displacement - 0.9 thousand tons, underwater - 1.1 thousand tons; length - 73.2 m, width - 6.6 m; draft - 4.1 m; immersion depth - 60 m; power plants - 2 diesel engines and 2 electric motors; power - 1.8 / 1.5 thousand hp speed - 14.5 knots. fuel supply - 177 tons of diesel fuel; cruising range - 8 thousand miles; crew - 38 people. Armament: 1x1 - 102 mm gun; 1x1 - 12.7 mm machine gun; 5 - 533 mm torpedo tubes; 14 torpedoes.
The submarines Barracuda, Bass and Bonita were built at Portsmouth N Yd and commissioned in 1924-1926. All boats were written off in 1945. Performance characteristics of the boat: full surface displacement - 2.1 thousand tons, underwater - 2.5 thousand tons; length - 99.1 m, width - 8.4 m; draft - 4.6 m; immersion depth - 60 m; power plants - 2 diesel engines, 2 diesel generators and 2 electric motors; power - 6.2 / 2.4 thousand hp speed - 18.7 knots; fuel supply - 364 tons of diesel fuel; cruising range - 12 thousand miles; crew - 85 people. Armament: 1x1 - 76 mm gun; 2x1 - 20 mm anti-aircraft machine gun; 6 - 533 mm torpedo tubes; 12 torpedoes.
The Agronaut submarine minelayer was built at the Portsmouth N Yd shipyard and commissioned in 1928. In 1940, the diesels were replaced on the submarine, and in 1942 the boat was converted into a transport. The boat was lost in 1943. The performance characteristics of the boat: full surface displacement - 2.9 thousand tons, underwater - 4 thousand tons; length - 109.7 m, width - 10.3 m; draft - 4.9 m; immersion depth - 95 m; power plants - 2 diesel engines, 2 diesel generators and 2 electric motors; power - 6 / 2.2 thousand hp speed - 13.7 knots. fuel supply - 696 tons of diesel fuel; cruising range - 18 thousand miles; crew - 86 people. Armament: 1x1 - 152 mm gun; 2x1 - 7.6 mm machine gun; 4 - 533 mm torpedo tubes; 8 torpedoes; 60 minutes
Submarines "Narwhai" and "Nautilus" were built at the shipyards "Portsmouth N Yd", "Mare Island N Yd" and entered service in 1930. In 1940, diesel engines were replaced on the submarines. Both boats were decommissioned in 1945. Performance characteristics of the boat: full surface displacement - 3 thousand tons, underwater - 4 thousand tons; length - 108.2 m, width - 10.1 m; draft - 5.2 m; immersion depth - 100 m; power plants - 2 diesel engines, 2 diesel generators and 2 electric motors; power - 6 / 1.6 thousand hp speed - 17.4 knots. fuel supply - 732 tons of diesel fuel; cruising range - 18 thousand miles; crew - 89 people. Armament: 1x1 - 152 mm gun; 2x1 - 12.7 mm machine gun; 6-10 - 533-mm torpedo tubes; 12 - 16 torpedoes.
The submarine was built at the Portsmouth N Yd shipyard and commissioned in 1932. The boat underwent rearmament in 1934. Decommissioned in 1945. Performance characteristics of the boat: total surface displacement - 1.7 thousand tons, submarine - 2, 2 thousand tons; length - 97.3 m, width - 8.5 m; draft - 4 m; immersion depth - 75 m; power plants - 2 diesel engines, 2 diesel generators and 2 electric motors; power - 3.5 / 1.8 thousand hp speed - 17 knots. fuel supply - 412 tons of diesel fuel; cruising range - 6 thousand miles; crew - 63 people. Armament: 1x1 - 76 mm gun; 2x1 - 12.7 mm machine gun; 6 - 533 mm torpedo tubes; 18 torpedoes.
Submarines "Cachalot" and "Cuttlefich" were built at the shipyards "Portsmouth N Yd", "Electric Boat" and entered service in 1933-1934. In 1938, diesels were replaced on submarines. The boats were decommissioned in 1945-1946. Performance characteristics of the boat: full surface displacement - 1.1 thousand tons, underwater - 1.7 thousand tons; length - 80.8 m, width - 7.5 m; draft - 4.3 m; immersion depth - 75 m; power plants - 2 diesel engines and 2 electric motors; power - 3.1 / 1.6 thousand hp speed - 17 knots. fuel supply - 333 tons of diesel fuel; cruising range - 9 thousand miles; crew - 51 people. Armament: 1x1 - 76 mm gun; 3x1 - 12.7 mm machine gun; 6 - 533 mm torpedo tubes; 16 torpedoes.
The Porpoise and Pike submarines of the P type were built at the Portsmouth N Yd shipyard and commissioned in 1935. In 1938, diesels were replaced on the submarines. The boats were decommissioned in 1956. The performance characteristics of the boats: full surface displacement - 1.3 thousand tons, underwater - 1.9 thousand tons; length - 88.1 m, width - 7.6 m; draft - 4.3 m; immersion depth - 75 m; power plants - 4 diesel generators and 2 electric motors; power - 4.3 / 2.1 thousand hp speed - 19 knots. fuel supply - 347 tons of diesel fuel; cruising range - 10 thousand miles; crew - 54 people. Armament: 1x1 - 76 mm gun; 2x1 - 20 mm anti-aircraft machine gun; 8 - 533 mm torpedo tubes; 18 torpedoes.
The submarines Shark and Tarpon of the P type were built at the Electric Boat shipyard and commissioned in 1936. The Shark was lost in 1942, and the Tarpon was scrapped in 1956. Performance characteristics of the boat: full surface displacement - 1.3 thousand tons, underwater - 2 thousand tons; length - 88.4 m, width - 7.6 m; draft - 4.6 m; immersion depth - 75 m; power plants - 4 diesel generators and 2 electric motors; power - 4.3 / 2.1 thousand hp speed - 19.5 knots. fuel supply - 347 tons of diesel fuel; cruising range - 10 thousand miles; crew - 54 people. Armament: 1x1 - 76 mm gun; 2x1 - 20 mm anti-aircraft machine gun; 8 - 533 mm torpedo tubes; 18 torpedoes.
The series of P-type submarines consisted of 6 units (Perch, Pickerel, Permit, Plunger, Pollack, Pompano), built at the shipyards Electric Boat, Portsmouth N Yd , "Mare Island N Yd" and commissioned in 1936-1937. During the war, 3 boats were lost, the rest were written off in 1946-1947. Performance characteristics of the boat: full surface displacement - 1.3 thousand tons, underwater - 2 thousand tons; length - 89.2 m, width - 7.7 m; draft - 4.6 m; immersion depth - 75 m; power plants - 4 diesel generators and 2 electric motors; power - 4.3 / 2.4 thousand hp speed - 19.3 knots. fuel supply - 373 tons of diesel fuel; cruising range - 10 thousand miles; crew - 54 people. Armament: 1x1 - 76 mm gun; 2x1 - 20 mm anti-aircraft machine gun; 8 - 533 mm torpedo tubes; 18 torpedoes.
Submarines "Salmon", "Seal", "Skipjack", "Snapper", "Stingray", "Sturgeon" were built at the shipyards "Electric Boat", "Portsmouth N Yd", "Mare Island N Yd" and were commissioned in 1937-1938 The boats were decommissioned in 1945-1956. Performance characteristics of the boat: full surface displacement - 1.4 thousand tons, underwater - 2.2 thousand tons; length - 91.4 m, width - 8 m; draft - 4.8 m; immersion depth - 75 m; power plants - 4 diesel engines and 2 electric motors; power - 5.5 / 2.7 thousand hp speed - 21 knots. fuel supply - 384 tons of diesel fuel; cruising range - 11 thousand miles; crew - 59 people. Armament: 1x1 - 76 mm or 102 mm or 127 mm gun; 2x1 - 20 mm anti-aircraft machine gun; 8 - 533 mm torpedo tubes; 24 torpedoes or 32 mines.
Submarines Sargo, Saury, Spearfish, Sculpin, Sailfish, Swordfish, Seadragon, Sealion, Searaven, Seawolf were built at Electric Boat yards, "Portsmouth N Yd", "Mare Island N Yd" and were commissioned in 1939. During the war, 4 boats were lost, the rest were decommissioned in 1946-1948. Performance characteristics of the boat: full surface displacement - 1.4 thousand tons, underwater - 2.2 thousand tons; length - 92.2 m, width - 8.2 m; draft - 5 m; immersion depth - 75 m; power plants - 4 diesel engines and 2 electric motors; power - 5.5 / 2.7 thousand hp speed - 20 knots. fuel supply - 428 tons of diesel fuel; cruising range - 11 thousand miles; crew - 59 people. Armament: 1x1 - 102 mm or 127 mm gun; 2x1 - 20 mm anti-aircraft machine gun; 8 - 533 mm torpedo tubes; 24 torpedoes or 32 mines.
The series of submarines of the Tambor class consisted of 12 units (Tambor, Tautog, Thresher, Triton, Trout, Tuna, Gar, Grampus, Grayback, Grayling "," Grenadier "," Gudgeon "), built at the shipyards" Electric Boat "," Portsmouth N Yd "," Mare Island N Yd "and commissioned in 1940-1941. During the war, 7 boats were lost, the rest were decommissioned in 1948-1959. Performance characteristics of the boat: full surface displacement - 1.5 thousand tons, underwater - 2.4 thousand tons; length - 92.2 m, width - 8.3 m; draft - 4.6 m; immersion depth - 75 m; power plants - 4 diesel engines and 2 electric motors; power - 5.4 / 2.7 thousand hp speed - 20 knots. fuel supply - 385 tons of diesel fuel; cruising range - 11 thousand miles; crew - 60 people. Armament: 1x1 - 102 mm or 127 mm gun; 1x1 - 40mm or 1x1 - 20mm or 2x1 - 20mm anti-aircraft machine gun; 8 - 533 mm torpedo tubes; 24 torpedoes or 40 min.
Submarines "Mackerel" and "Marlin" were built at the shipyard "Electric Boat", "Portsmouth N Yd" and commissioned in 1941. Both boats were decommissioned in 1945. Performance characteristics of the boat: total surface displacement - 0.9 thousand tons, underwater - 1.2 thousand tons; length - 73 m, width - 6.7 m; draft - 4.3 m; immersion depth - 75 m; power plants - 4 diesel engines and 2 electric motors; power - 3.4 / 1.5 thousand hp speed - 16 knots: fuel reserve - 116 tons of diesel fuel; cruising range - 7 thousand miles; crew - 42 people. Armament: 1x1 - 127 mm gun; 2x1 - 20 mm anti-aircraft machine gun; 1x1 - 12.7 mm machine gun; 6 - 533 mm torpedo tubes; 12 torpedoes.
The series of submarines of the "Gato" type consisted of 73 units ("SS-212" - "SS-284"), built at the shipyards "Electric Boat", "Portsmouth N Yd", "Mare Island N Yd", "Manitowoc SB" and commissioned in 1941-1944. During the war, 20 boats were lost, 5 were converted into museums, the rest were decommissioned in 1946-1971. Performance characteristics of the boat: full surface displacement - 1.6 thousand tons, underwater - 2.5 thousand tons; length - 95 m, width - 8.3 m; draft - 4.7 m; immersion depth - 90 m; power plants - 4 diesel engines and 2 electric motors; power - 5.4 / 2.7 thousand hp speed - 20 knots; fuel supply - 378 tons of diesel fuel; cruising range - 11 thousand miles; crew - 80 people. Armament: 1x1 - 76 mm or 102 mm gun; 2x1 - 20 mm anti-aircraft machine gun or 2x1 - 12.7 mm machine gun; 2x1 - 7.62 mm machine gun; 10 - 533 mm torpedo tubes; 24 torpedoes.
The series of submarines of the "Balao" type consisted of 112 units ("SS-285" - "SS-302", "SS-304" - "SS-345", "SS-361" - "SS-377", "SS -381 "-" SS-415 "), built at the shipyards" Electric Boat "," Portsmouth N Yd "," Cramp "," Mare Island N Yd "," Manitowoc SB "and commissioned in 1942-1944. During the war, 23 boats were lost, 41 were transferred or sold to 9 allied countries at the end of the war, 7 were converted into museums, the rest were decommissioned in 1960-1973. Performance characteristics of the boat: full surface displacement - 1.8 thousand tons, underwater - 2.4 thousand tons; length - 92.2 m, width - 8.3 m; draft - 4.7 m; immersion depth - 120 m; power plants - 4 diesel generators and 2 electric motors; power - 5.4 / 2.7 thousand hp speed - 20 knots. fuel supply - 472 tons of diesel fuel; cruising range - 11 thousand miles; crew - 60 people. Armament: 1x1 - 102 mm or 127 mm gun; 2x1 - 20-mm or 40-mm anti-aircraft machine guns; 10 - 533 mm torpedo tubes; 24 torpedoes.
From a series of submarines of the "Tench" type during the war at the shipyard "Portsmouth N Yd" 19 units were completed ("SS-417" - "SS-424", "SS-475" - "SS-486") and commissioned in 1944-1945. The boats were decommissioned, sold or transferred to the Allied countries in 1963-1973. The boat "SS-423" was transformed into a museum. Performance characteristics of the boat: full surface displacement - 1.8 thousand tons, underwater - 2.4 thousand tons; length - 92.2 m, width - 8.3 m; draft - 4.7 m; immersion depth - 120 - 135 m; power plants - 4 diesel generators and 2 electric motors; power - 5.4 / 2.7 thousand hp speed - 20 knots. fuel supply - 378 - 472 tons of solar oil; cruising range - 11-12 thousand miles; crew - 60 people. Armament: 1-2x1 - 127 mm guns; 1x1 - 20-mm and 40-mm anti-aircraft machine gun; 10 - 533 mm torpedo tubes; 24 -28 torpedoes or 40 min.
September 1939 was the beginning of a successful and long hunt for German submarines. Over the course of several years, England sometimes lost more ships (primarily transport) from their torpedoes than her shipyards could build. At the very beginning of the great confrontation in the ocean, which went down in history as the "Battle of the Atlantic", military fortune was on the side of the Kriegsmarine submarine hunters ... After the war, Winston Churchill admitted in the pages of his book "World War II" that it was German submarines , not the aces of the Luftwaffe, were the main threat to Great Britain.
Despite the impressive achievements of submarines (especially German ones) in the First World War, after its end, in the eyes of many military experts, submarines continued to be just an auxiliary means of fighting at sea. Few of the specialists believed then that small submarines with imperfect weapons and a limited range of action could seriously compete with the mighty battleships. However, the chilling Hollywood movie stories about bearded pirates from the depths of the sea filled the general public with a lot of fear. For many, the memories of the Lusitania passenger liner sunk on May 7, 1915 and its 1,198 dead passengers were still fresh. Captain Walter Schwiger commanded the attacking submarine U-20.
The situation began to change by the beginning of the 30s of the XX century as the design of submarines improved. Japan, in particular, has achieved considerable success in this area. On the eve of World War II, very interesting ships appeared in the composition of its imperial fleet: for example, a submarine, on the deck of which there was a reconnaissance seaplane in a closed hangar. By the way, before the attack on the American naval base Pearl Harbor, it was repeatedly photographed from the air by similar "underwater" seaplanes. The Japanese also actively worked on the creation of midget boats: already in the mid-30s, Mitsubishi built the first such boat - officially for underwater research. Five of these boats took part in the famous attack on the Pacific American naval base.
As for Germany, the Treaty of Versailles of 1919 largely impeded the revival of its power in this area. Under its terms, the Germans were strictly forbidden to have a submarine fleet, but its secret construction never stopped. The Reichswehr and the navy placed their military orders on the territory of friendly countries. For example, tanks and combat aircraft were actively designed and built on the territory of the USSR; German pilots and tank crews were trained in Lipetsk and Kazan. In Germany itself, when scandalous information leaked to the press, noisy proceedings were arranged. So, in 1927, as a result of a parliamentary investigation related to information about the construction of submarines for the Krupp controlled by the Krupp company for the Kriegsmarine, the head of the naval command, Hans Adolf Zenker, was forced to resign.
In the mid-1930s, the British government began to actively seek ways to establish a civilized dialogue with the Hitler regime, considering it as a natural counterbalance to the growing USSR. One of the first actions of the "appeasement" policy was the signing in 1935 of the Anglo-German Maritime Agreement. Under this agreement, Germany received the right to begin large-scale construction of the fleet, the total displacement of which was not to exceed 35% of the British. This ratio applied to all classes of ships, except for submarines, for which a 45 percent limit was separately agreed. In displacement, this was expressed in a rather modest 24 thousand tons. However, the Germans quickly found a way how, without violating the terms of the agreement, to achieve maximum results in building up their submarine forces. And here we must pay tribute to the then leadership of the German fleet, which listened to the opinion of their own experts. When choosing a promising type of submarine, the Germans managed to avoid the rather widespread belief at that time that a submarine must certainly be a large ship - after all, the combat power of a submarine does not increase in direct proportion to its size, like other warships. On the contrary, if a certain tonnage limit is exceeded, the combat qualities of the submarine deteriorate: the diving time required for the boat to go from the surface position to a safe depth increases, a tendency to an increase in bow trim is found, that is, a spontaneous hull tilt and deeper depths. Therefore, instead of large submarines with a displacement of 2,000 tons, it was decided to build four 500-ton submarines each. The core of the submarine fleet of the Third Reich was to be made up of series VII boats - having four bow and one stern torpedo tubes, surface speed of 16 knots, and a cruising range of 6,200 nautical miles. By the beginning of the war, 10 such ships were launched.
In December 1938, Germany notified the British government that it would maintain a submarine fleet equal to the British. And on April 28, 1939, Hitler announced in the Reichstag the termination of the Anglo-German naval agreement. By this time, the fascist fleet already had 46 submarines of various classes on the move, and 11 more submarines were laid on the stocks. 22 submarines were prepared for combat in the Atlantic.
On August 19, 1939, 39 submarines entered positions off the north-east coast of England. However, later (during the first period of the war) no more than 7 submarines were on duty in this region.
Favorite of the nation
The Third Reich knew how to create idols. One of these poster idols created by propaganda was undoubtedly the hero-submariner Gunther Prin. He had the perfect biography of a popular guy who made a career out of the new government. At the age of 15, he was hired as a cabin boy on a merchant ship. He achieved a captain's diploma solely thanks to his hard work and natural intelligence. During the Great Depression, Prien was unemployed. After the Nazis came to power, the young man volunteered to join the reviving Navy as an ordinary sailor and quickly managed to prove himself from the best side. Then there were studies at a privileged school for submariners and the war in Spain, in which Prien already participated as a submarine captain. In the first months of World War II, he immediately managed to achieve good results, sinking several English and French ships in the Bay of Biscay, for which he was awarded the 2nd degree Iron Cross from the commander of the naval forces - Admiral Erich Raeder. And then there was a fantastically audacious attack on the largest English battleship Royal Oak in the main British naval base Scapa Flow. For the accomplished feat, the Fuhrer awarded the entire U-47 crew with the Iron Cross of the 2nd degree, and the commander himself was honored to receive the Knight's Cross from Hitler's hands. However, according to the recollections of people who knew him at that time, the glory did not spoil Pryn. In communicating with his subordinates and acquaintances, he remained the same caring commander and charming guy. For a little more than a year, the underwater ace continued to create his own legend: cheerful reports about the exploits of U-47 appeared almost weekly in the film releases of Dr. Goebbels' favorite brainchild, Die Deutsche Wochenchau. Ordinary Germans really had something to admire: in June 1940, German boats sank 140 ships from Allied convoys in the Atlantic with a total displacement of 585,496 tons, of which about 10% were on Prine and his crew! And then suddenly everything quieted down at once, as if there was no hero. For quite a long time, official sources did not report anything at all about Germany's most famous submariner, but it was impossible to hush up the truth: on May 23, 1941, the naval command officially recognized the loss of the U-47. She was sunk on March 7, 1941 on the way to Iceland by the British destroyer Wolverine ("Wolverine"). The sub, waiting for the convoy, surfaced next to the guard destroyer and was immediately attacked by it. Having received minor damage, U-47 lay on the ground, hoping to lie down and leave unnoticed, but due to the damage to the propeller, the boat, trying to sail, created a terrible noise, hearing which the Wolverine hydroacoustics initiated a second attack, as a result of which the submarine was finally sunk, thrown with depth charges ... However, the most incredible rumors about Prine and his sailors spread for a long time in the Reich. In particular, it was rumored that he did not die at all, but that he had raised a riot on his boat, for which he ended up either in a penal battalion on the Eastern Front, or in a concentration camp. First blood
The first victim of a submarine in World War II is considered to be the British passenger liner Athenia, torpedoed on September 3, 1939, 200 miles from the Hebrides. As a result of the U-30 attack, 128 crew members and passengers of the liner, including many children, were killed. And yet, for the sake of objectivity, it should be admitted that this barbaric episode is not very typical for the first months of the war. At the initial stage, many commanders of German submarines tried to comply with the conditions of the 1936 London Protocol on the rules of conducting submarine warfare: first, on the surface, stop a merchant ship and disembark a search team on board for a search. If, under the terms of the prize law (a set of international legal norms governing the seizure of merchant ships and cargo at sea by belligerent countries), the sinking of a ship was allowed due to its apparent belonging to the enemy's fleet, then the submarine's team waited until the sailors from the transport transferred to lifeboats and went to a safe distance from the doomed ship.However, very soon the warring parties stopped playing gentlemen: the commanders of the submarines began to report that the single ships they encountered were actively using the artillery pieces installed on their decks or immediately broadcast a special signal about the detection of the submarine - SSS. And the Germans themselves were less and less eager to breed politeness with the enemy, trying to end the war, which had begun favorably for them, as soon as possible.
Submarine U-29 (Captain Schuhard) achieved great success on September 17, 1939, attacking the aircraft carrier Koreyges with a three-torpedo salvo. For the British Admiralty, the loss of a ship of this class and 500 crew members was a big blow. So the debut of German submarines as a whole turned out to be very impressive, but it could have become even more painful for the enemy, if not for the constant failures when using torpedoes with magnetic fuses. By the way, practically all the participants experienced technical problems at the initial stage of the war.
Breakthrough in Scapa Flow
If the loss of an aircraft carrier in the very first month of the war was a very sensitive blow for the British, then the event that occurred on the night of October 13-14, 1939, was already a knockdown. The planning of the operation was personally supervised by Admiral Karl Doenitz. At first glance, the anchorage of the Royal Navy ships in Scapa Flow seemed completely impregnable, at least from the sea. There were strong and treacherous currents here. And the approaches to the base were guarded around the clock by patrolmen, covered with special anti-submarine nets, boom barriers, and flooded ships. And nevertheless, thanks to detailed aerial photographs of the area and data obtained from other submarines, the Germans still managed to find one loophole.A responsible mission was entrusted to the U-47 and its successful commander Gunther Prien. On the night of October 14, this boat, having passed a narrow strait, crept through an accidentally left open boom barrier and thus ended up in the main roadstead of the enemy base. Prien made two surface torpedo attacks against two English ships at anchor. The battleship Royal Oak, a modernized WWI veteran with a displacement of 27,500 tons, exploded and sank with 833 crew members, and Admiral Blangrove on board was also killed. The British were taken by surprise, they decided that the base was attacked by German bombers, and opened fire in the air, so that U-47 safely escaped retaliation. Returning to Germany, Prin was greeted as a hero and awarded the Knight's Cross with Oak Leaves. After his death, his personal emblem "Scapa Flow Bull" became the emblem of the 7th Flotilla.
The submarine U-47 under the command of Gunther Prien sank a dozen and a half ships in the Atlantic in June 1940 alone.
Daddy Carl's Wolf Packs
The period 1940-1941, when the Germans, at the cost of relatively small losses, achieved amazing successes in submarine warfare, they later called the "fat years." German submarines went out to sea one after another, reducing their route to the Atlantic to a minimum, since after the capture of France, their main bases were located on the Atlantic coast - in close proximity to enemy communications. The tonnage of sunken ships of the Allies began to grow rapidly. Every month the British lost about 400,000 tons of the merchant fleet, which put Great Britain in an extremely difficult position. The country began to feel a shortage of food and strategic materials. At some point, it even seemed to the main Nazi ideologue of total submarine war that his submarines would very soon bring the proud British to their knees. The commander of the Reich submarine fleet, Admiral Doenitz, had the opportunity, managing everything from his Paris headquarters, to fully implement in practice the tactics of "wolf packs" developed by him back in 1938. Usually everything happened like this: having approximate data on the route of the convoy, a group of submarines of 6-9 units dispersed in a fan on its way. The commander, who first noticed the prey, immediately broadcast an encrypted message and waited for the rest of the hunters to come along. And then the "feast" began. Single ships were destroyed immediately, groups were attacked around the clock. The first flock attack (Rudeltaktik) was carried out in mid-October 1939 by a formation of five boats. They managed to sink 3 ships, losing 2 submarines.As soon as the British established effective coastal patrolling by aviation, the "packs of wolves" immediately moved further into the ocean - beyond the mark of 19 degrees west longitude. There, far from the British shores, no one bothered the German submariners to launch ship after ship to the bottom, sometimes chasing their victims for weeks. The British tried to somehow cover their ships in the dead zone, inaccessible to coastal aviation - in the center of the ocean for this they even hastily converted the merchant ship Odesity into an escort aircraft carrier with six combat aircraft on board. But in December 1941, "Odessity" was sunk, and the mournful list of victims of the "packs of wolves" again began to rapidly replenish. In 1941, 4,398 ships with a total displacement of 2,100,000 tons were sunk and 35 German boats were lost.
Loyal Lion
The successes achieved during the Second World War, the German submarine fleet owes much to Karl Doenitz. Himself a former commander of a submarine, he perfectly understood the needs of his subordinates. The admiral personally met each submarine returning from a military campaign, organized special sanatoriums for crews exhausted by many months at sea, and attended the graduations of the submariners' school. The sailors called their commander "daddy Karl" or "Lion" behind the backs. In fact, Doenitz was the engine of the revival of the Third Reich's submarine fleet. Soon after the signing of the Anglo-German agreement, which lifted the restrictions of the Treaty of Versailles, he was appointed by Hitler "Fuehrer of submarines" and led the 1st submarine flotilla. In his new position, he had to face active opposition from the supporters of large ships from the leadership of the Navy. However, the talent of a brilliant administrator and political strategist has always allowed the chief of submariners to lobby the interests of his department in the highest state spheres. Doenitz was one of the few staunch National Socialists among the senior naval officers. The admiral used every opportunity presented to him to publicly praise the Fuhrer. Once, speaking in front of Berliners, he was so carried away that he began to assure the audience that Hitler foresaw a great future for Germany and therefore could not be wrong: "We are worms in comparison with him!" During the first years of the war, when the actions of his submariners were extremely successful, Doenitz enjoyed the full confidence of Hitler. And soon his finest hour came. This take-off was preceded by very tragic events for the German fleet. By the middle of the war, the pride of the German fleet - the heavy ships of the Tirpitz and Scharnhost types - actually turned out to be neutralized by the enemy. The situation demanded a radical change in landmarks in the war at sea: to replace the "batch of battleships" a new team was to come, professing the philosophy of large-scale submarine warfare. After the retirement of Erich Raeder on January 30, 1943, Doenitz was appointed as his successor as Commander-in-Chief of the German Navy, with the title of "Grand Admiral". And two months later, the German submariners achieved record figures, having sent 120 Allied ships with a total tonnage of 623,000 tons to the bottom during March, for which their chief was awarded the Knight's Cross with Oak Leaves. However, the period of great victories was drawing to a close. Already in May 1943, Doenitz was forced to withdraw his boats from the Atlantic, fearing that soon he would have nothing to command. (By the end of this month, the Grand Admiral could have summed up a terrible result for himself: 41 boats and more than 1,000 submariners were lost, among whom was the youngest son of Doenitz, Peter.) This decision infuriated Hitler, and he demanded that Doenitz cancel the order while declaring: “There can be no question of ending the participation of submarines in the war. The Atlantic is my first line of defense in the west. " By the fall of 1943, the Germans had to pay with one of their own boats for each sunken Allied ship. In the last months of the war, the admiral was forced to send his people to almost certain death. And yet he remained loyal to his Fuehrer to the very end. Before taking his own life, Hitler appointed Doenitz as his successor. On May 23, 1945, the new head of state was captured by the Allies. At the Nuremberg trials, the organizer of the German submarine fleet managed to escape responsibility on charges of issuing orders according to which his subordinates shot sailors who escaped from torpedo ships. The admiral received his ten-year term for fulfilling Hitler's orders, according to which the captured crews of British torpedo boats were transferred to the SS for execution. After his release from West Berlin's Spandau prison in October 1956, Doenitz began writing his memoirs. The admiral died in December 1980 at the age of 90. According to the testimonies of people who knew him closely, he always kept with him a folder with letters from officers of the Allied fleets, in which former opponents expressed their respect to him. Drown everyone!
“It is forbidden to make any attempt to rescue the crews of sunken ships and vessels, transfer them to lifeboats, return overturned boats to their normal position, supply the injured with provisions and water. Rescue contradicts the very first rule of warfare at sea, requiring the destruction of enemy ships and their teams, ”- this order from Doenitz was given to the commanders of German submarines on September 17, 1942. Later, the grand admiral motivated this decision by the fact that any generosity shown to the enemy is too costly for his people. He referred to the Laconia incident five days before the order was issued, that is, on 12 September. Having sunk this British transport, the commander of the German submarine U-156 raised the Red Cross flag on his bridge and began to rescue the sailors in the water. A message was broadcast from U-156 on the international wave several times that the German submarine was carrying out rescue operations and guaranteed complete safety to any vessel ready to take on board sailors from the sunken steamer. Nevertheless, some time later, U-156 attacked the American Liberator. Then air attacks began to follow one after another. The boat miraculously managed to avoid death. Hot on the heels of this incident, the German command of the submarine forces has developed extremely tough instructions, the essence of which can be expressed in a laconic order: "Take no prisoners!" However, it cannot be argued that it was after this incident that the Germans were forced to "take off their white gloves" - cruelty and even atrocity have long become commonplace in this war.From January 1942, German submarines began to be supplied with fuel and supplies from special cargo underwater tankers, the so-called "milk cows", which, among other things, were carrying a repair team and a naval hospital. This made it possible to transfer active hostilities to the very coast of the United States. The Americans turned out to be completely unprepared for the war to come to their shores: for almost six months, Hitler's underwater aces hunted with impunity for single ships in the coastal zone, shooting brightly lit cities and factories from artillery guns at night. Here is what one American intellectual, whose house overlooked the ocean, wrote about this: “The view of the boundless sea space, which used to inspire me so much for life and creativity, now makes me sad and terrified. Fear penetrates me especially strongly at night, when it is impossible to think about anything more than about these calculating Germans choosing where to send a shell or a torpedo ... "
Only by the summer of 1942, the US Air Force and Navy managed to jointly organize a reliable defense of their coast: now dozens of aircraft, ships, airships and private speedboats were constantly monitoring the enemy. The US 10th Fleet organized special "assassin groups", each of which included a small aircraft carrier, equipped with attack aircraft, and several destroyers. Patrolling by long-range aircraft equipped with radars capable of detecting antennas and snorkels of submarines, as well as the use of new destroyers and Hedgehog naval bombers with powerful depth charges, changed the balance of forces.
In 1942, German submarines began to appear in polar waters off the coast of the USSR. With their active participation, the Murmansk convoy PQ-17 was destroyed. Of its 36 transports, 23 were killed, while 16 sank submarines. On April 30, 1942, the U-456 submarine knocked out the English cruiser Edinburgh with two torpedoes, sailing from Murmansk to England with several tons of Russian gold to pay for Lend-Lease deliveries. The cargo lay at the bottom for 40 years and was lifted only in the 80s.
Submarine U-453 with enhanced anti-aircraft weapons. Sunk 21 May 1944 off the island of Sicily
Wolf hunt
By the end of 1944, the Germans had already finally lost the "Battle of the Atlantic". Even the latest XXI series boats, equipped with a snorkel, a device that allows a significant amount of time not to float to recharge batteries, discharges exhaust gases and replenishes oxygen reserves, could no longer change anything (the snorkel was also used on submarines of earlier series, but not very successfully). The Germans managed to make only two such boats with a speed of 18 knots and diving to a depth of 260 m, and while they were on alert, the Second World War ended.Countless Allied aircraft equipped with radars were constantly on duty in the Bay of Biscay, which became a veritable graveyard of German submarines leaving their French bases. Reinforced concrete shelters, which became vulnerable after the development of the British 5-ton concrete-piercing bombs "Tallboy", turned into traps for submarines, from which only a few managed to escape. In the ocean, submarine crews were often pursued for days by air and sea hunters. Now the "Doenitz wolves" were getting less and less a chance to attack well-protected convoys and were increasingly preoccupied with the problem of their own survival under the maddening impulses of search sonars, methodically "probing" the water column. Often, the Anglo-American destroyers did not have enough casualties, and they pounced on any submarine they found with a pack of hounds, literally bombarding it with depth charges. Such, for example, was the fate of U-546, which was simultaneously bombed by eight American destroyers! Until recently, the formidable German submarine fleet was not rescued by either perfect radars or enhanced booking, and new homing acoustic torpedoes and anti-aircraft weapons did not help. The situation was aggravated by the fact that the enemy had been able to read German ciphers for a long time. But the German command until the very end of the war was completely confident that the codes of the Enigma encryption machine could not be broken! Nevertheless, the British, having obtained the first sample of this machine from the Poles in 1939, by the middle of the war created an effective system for decrypting enemy messages, codenamed "Ultra", using, among other things, the world's first electronic calculating machine "Colossus". And the most important "gift" the British received on May 8, 1941 during the capture of the German submarine U-111 - they got into their hands not only a serviceable car, but also the entire set of documents of covert communication. From that time on, for German submariners, going on the air for the purpose of transmitting data was often tantamount to a death sentence. Apparently, at the end of the war, Doenitz guessed about this, as he once wrote in his diary lines full of helpless despair: “The enemy holds a trump card, covers all areas with long-range aviation and uses detection methods for which we are not ready. The enemy knows all our secrets, but we don't know anything about their secrets! "
According to official German statistics, out of 40 thousand German submariners, about 32 thousand people died. That is, many more than every second! After Germany's surrender, most of the submarines captured by the Allies were sunk during Operation Lethal Fire.