Collaboration in the occupied territory of Belarus. Nazi collaboration in the occupied lands of Belarus (10 photos)

Introductions

Chapter 1. Formation of the Belarusian collaboration to the 3rd Reichs before the start of the war

Chapter 2. Collaboration during the German occupation of Belarus

Chapter 3. Major Collaborators the formation

Section 1 Major Collaborators the formation

Section 2. Novogrudok squadron

Chapter 4. Collaboration after the end of the war

Chapter 5. Collaboration and my family

Conclusion

Bibliography

Introduction

Collaboration (fr. Collaboration - cooperation) in the legal interpretation of international law - conscious, voluntary and deliberate cooperation with the enemy, in his interests and to the detriment of his state. The term is often used in a narrower sense - as cooperation with the occupiers. In the criminal legislation of the overwhelming majority of countries in the world, the fact of collaboration is qualified as a crime against their state, usually as high treason. Initially, it meant cooperation of French citizens (to which the nation was called by the head of the Vichy regime, Marshal Pétain in 1940) with the German authorities during the occupation of France during the Second World War. Then it began to be applied to other European governments operating under German occupation (the Quisling government in Norway, the Lokot Republic regime, the activities of the Melnikovites in the occupied territory of the USSR, etc.) or to military organizations of citizens of occupied countries under the control of the Nazi bloc (Vlasov's Russian Liberation Army, national SS divisions in almost all of Europe, etc.).

The Wehrmacht and SS troops added over 1.8 million people from among citizens of other states and nationalities. Of these, 59 divisions, 23 brigades, several separate regiments, legions and battalions were formed during the war years. Belarus was no exception, the main reasons for Belarusian collaborationism are the dissatisfaction of a part of the population with the Soviet regime (including radical changes in Western Belarus, which was annexed to the USSR in 1939) and the activities of nationalist organizations, first of all, the leaders of the Belarusian People's Republic, a group of supporters of Ksenz B Godlevsky (he and some of his followers later became disillusioned with the Germans and went over to an underground struggle against them), etc.

It cannot be said about Belarus that collaborationism was supported by the masses, but the activities of the Belarusian “Germans” to a fairly large extent interfered with the partisan brigades, detachments and underground workers of the Soviet Union, we must also not forget that at the same time the collaborators were fighting the Polish partisans and were part of the regular troops. SS and punitive SD units. In modern state historical publications of Belarus and Russia, absolutely all the collaborators operating on the territory of the BSSR were recognized as bandits and traitors, but in my opinion, many residents of the then Western Belarus did not consider the USSR as their homeland, but most likely as occupiers and enslavers and criticism towards those people who crossed on the side of the Germans has no grounds, they fought and fought not for Hitler, but for the independence of their country, land, homeland and whatever you want to call it, but I repeat once again, in my opinion they cannot be considered traitors.

The objective reasons for the development of collaborationism in Western Belarus can be considered its occupation by the USSR, a tough policy towards the population, the imposition of language and communist ideology.

In my work, I used materials from sites that have articles on this topic, as well as the works of such historians as A. Litvin, A. Soloviev, B. Sokolov and others. In choosing the sources, I was guided by the objectivity and truthfulness of the authors, as well as to ensure that these materials contain the maximum number of clarified facts.

Formation of the Belarusian collaboration by the 3rd Reich before the start of the Second World War

The training of Belarusian collaborators by the Third Reich began in the mid-late 1930s, when a Belarusian representative office was created under the German Ministry of Internal Affairs - first in Berlin, and then in other cities of Germany. It was engaged in the identification and recruitment of persons wishing to provide assistance to Germany in Belarusian issues. Thus, the third president of the Belarusian People's Republic Vasily Zakharka wrote a detailed report on the political, economic and cultural situation in Belarus, and also addressed a memorandum to Hitler with assurances of support. In addition, the Belarusian Self-Help Committee was created, an organization that actively recruited members among Belarusians living in Germany. With the outbreak of World War II, the German command created bases in Warsaw and Bela Podlaska for the transfer of Belarusian nationalist agents to the territory of the USSR. In Berlin, in the Vustavu camp, from among the Belarusian nationalists, courses were organized for propagandists and translators to work in Belarus after its occupation. Due to the large wave of emigration from Belarus of people after the Bolsheviks came to power, there were enough ethnic Belarusians and their descendants in Europe to create the “backbone” of the movement with an anti-communist attitude. Europe, it was possible without a fraction of the exaggeration of the then scientific and political elite of Belarus. The German authorities hoped with the help of Belarusian nationalists who, as they say above, will be thrown into the territory of the BSSR in order to attract as many people as possible to the side of the Germans, covering, of course, their true goals behind the slogans “FOR INDEPENDENT BELARUS”, etc.

Of course, the initial goal of fascist propaganda was Western Belarus, they (the Germans) believed that in the two years that she spent as part of the USSR, they did not penetrate and did not absorb the ideology that the Soviet government imposed on its citizens, but, on the contrary, got angry and considered the Soviet Union an invader.

Collaboration during the German occupation of Belarus. BCR activities

In the created military-administrative occupation apparatus, not the last place was assigned to the Belarusian emigrants who arrived in the train of advancing German units, who were "confidants" of the German military command. With their help, the involvement of local active accomplices of the occupiers was carried out to participate in the creation of administrative structures in Belarus. These persons provided the occupiers with active assistance in suppressing the nascent partisan movement.

To strengthen the "new order" on September 22, 1941, with the direct assistance of V. Kuba, Belarusian self-help began to operate in all districts of Belarus, the functions of which turned out to be similar to the work of the Belarusian self-help committees that operated on the eve of the war in Germany and Poland, Belarusian self-help, recruiting supporters among the Belarusian population, was the mainstay of the occupation administration in V. Cuba.

On the eve of the collapse of the fascist aggressive policy in the East, creating the illusion of the possibility of the formation of an independent Belarusian state under the protectorate of Nazi Germany, having requested permission for this in Berlin, V. Cuba went to the formation in Belarus of the Council of Trust under the General Commissariat, which was formed on June 27, 1943, on the eve of the defeat of the fascist troops near Orel and Kursk, when the specter of "an imminent catastrophe faced Nazi Germany," which the occupation authorities in Belarus could not fail to know.

The press of that time reported that the Rada of Trust included: Vaclav Ivanovsky, Symon Tsitovich, Modest Yatskevich, Yazep Dushevsky, Mikhail Ganko. V. Ivanovskiy was appointed Sergeant Major of the Rada, and Yu. Sobolevskiy was appointed as Deputy.

On June 27, 1943, burgomasters, newspaper and radio correspondents, newspaper and radio correspondents, leaders of Belarusian trade unions, leaders of the Union of Belarusian Youth were present along with representatives of the occupation authorities at a meeting in the General Commissariat on the proclamation of the Rada of Trust, which was then called the Confidence Committee under the General Commissariat of Belarus.

V. Kube addressed the audience, who said: “The Council of Trust will be an administrative commission, which will be an advisory body under the German administration.

I announce that this committee will provide advice to the heads of the departments of the General Commissariat. It will be set up as follows: each district sends one representative through its district commissioner.

Members of the Council of Trust will be provided with various opportunities to work for the benefit of Adolf Hitler's own people and new Europe. This, first of all, includes the spiritual readiness to recognize Jewish Bolshevism as the mortal enemy of the Belarusian people and to fight against it. Here courage and readiness to take the side of Europe must be shown, faithfully fulfilling their duties to the leader and the German army. "

By December 1943, the activities of the Rada of Trust were limited to the fact that members of the Rada actively participated in meetings with the heads of departments of the General Commissariat. They wrote a series of proposals. For example, in the memorandum "On the fight against partisans" transferred to the Commissariat V. Kuba, in particular, it was said: included representatives of the General Commissariat, SD, SS and Belarusians, which would have the goal of developing appropriate measures and controlling their implementation in the fight against partisans; the creation of a Belarusian secret police to fight bandits; revitalization of propaganda through the Belarusian press ... "

The creation of the Council of Trust had nothing to do with V. Kuba's personal "sympathies" for the Belarusian people, which some authors try to talk about in their publications. The Rada of Trust existed for 3 months and was, in fact, the same appendage to the administrative apparatus of the invaders, like other organizations such as Belarusian Self-Help, SBM, etc., which is confirmed by statutes and other organizational documents. Thus, the charter of the Belarusian Self-Help proclaimed the need for its activists and ordinary members to work for the "better cultural development" of the Belarusian people and guardianship of people in need of help. In practice, self-help guardianship departments provided such assistance only to families of police officers, self-helpers and other participants in punitive operations from among Belarusians who suffered in battles with partisans. The schools were taken over by self-help propaganda working in the spirit of Nazi propaganda.

Belarusian Nazi collaborators (like their Ukrainian brothers-in-arms, Bandera) played an important role in maintaining the occupation-terrorist regime during the German occupation of 1941-1944. It should be noted that the share of collaborators among Belarusians was the lowest among the peoples and nationalities living on the territory of the USSR. Those, according to the actual German archives, were no more than 70 thousand people. This is largely due to the great influence of religious affiliation on the disposition to cooperate with the German fascist regime. In particular, the overwhelming majority of Ukrainian Nazis-Bandera belonged to the Uniate church, moreover, the Uniate parochials and even the Uniate metropolitans themselves - the spiritual leaders of the SS Galicia division Andrey (Sheptytsky) and Joseph (Slipy) - were the main inspirers not only of the cooperation of their flock with German Nazis, but directly carrying out punitive actions and the policy of genocide of Russians (including Belarusians), Poles, Jews. The Ukrainian 118th Schutzmanschaft Battalion, being subordinate to the SS Sonder Battalion, burned, along with many others, the famous Belarusian village of Khatyn with all its inhabitants. In general, the largest number of collaborators was among the Crimean Tatars, Latvians and Estonians: for 3 Belarusian punitive battalions (with a much larger number of Belarusians themselves), there were 9 Crimean Tatar, 22 Estonian, 37 Lithuanian, 49 Latvian and 58 Ukrainian ). It is easy to see that among these ethnic groups today there is a rapid revival of neo-Nazism (with special emphasis on Russophobia), supported at the level of political leaders. And the “Belarusian” collaborators themselves, as we will see below, can be called Belarusian very conditionally.

The nucleus of Nazi collaborationism in Belarus was also made up of immigrants from the Polish Catholic or militia population of White Russia. This is not surprising, because even in the second Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth of the interwar period, the Polish nationalist regime of J. Pilsudski (the hero of modern Poland) actively used the methods of the Hitler regime, including the genocide of Belarusians and Russians (a tragic example is one of the first and largest European concentration camps in Bereza-Kartuzskaya, the policy of mass eviction of Belarusians from Western Belarus to Western Poland and Latin America with the simultaneous settling of Belarus by Polish officers-siege with their families). Taking part together with Hitler in the division of Czechoslovakia, Poland was going to jointly with the Third Reich to carry out the seizure and division of the USSR itself. To plan the invasion back in 1938, Hitler's deputy Reichsmarschall and Gestapo leader Hermann Goering personally came to Warsaw and then to Belovezhskaya Pushcha, who met with his bosom friend, President of Poland I. Mostitsky and the top leadership of the Second Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. However, in the previous attacks of the collective West on Russia - in particular, in the Patriotic Wars of 1812 and 1914-1918. - their ancestors actively supported the invaders from Romano-Germanic Europe.

It is not surprising that the basis of the Belarusian collaborators was made up of the founders of the BNR close to Poland during the German occupation in World War I and their successors - members of the BNR in exile. The third president of the BNR V. Zakharka voiced a memorandum in support of Hitler, and under the Nazi government in Berlin, a “Belarusian Kamitset Samapomachi” was created. The first "Belarusian" collaborators sent to the territory of the BSSR before the start of the war were former employees of the Polish Army, of which the Brandenburg 800 regiment was composed. The collaborationist structures of the General District Weiβruthenien were headed by the emigrants who arrived with the Nazi troops, Radoslaw Kazimirovich Ostrovsky, who became the head of the Minsk City Council, and Ivan Abramovich Ermachenko, who headed the “Belarusian People's Samapomach” (occupation police), created by the Germans from the Polish Army. After the war, both managed to escape and move to the United States, where these Nazi minions were warmed by the American authorities and for many years carried out subversive activities against our Motherland. The main collaborative propagandists were the founders of the Belarusian National Socialist Party Vaclav Kozlovsky and Fabian Akinchits, who published the mouthpiece of the pseudo-Belarusian Nazi propaganda Belarusian Gazette, as well as the editor-in-chief of the Belarusian Golas newspaper, Frantisekuma Tovysh. A key role in the collaborationist movement belonged to the group of priest Vincent Godlevsky, who headed the "Belarusian Independent Party" and held a high official position in the Reichskommissariat Ostland. Among the members of this group, it is especially worth highlighting the "right hand" of V. Godlevsky, editor-in-chief of the collaborationist publication "Belaruski Golas" Francysh Oleshkevich, the first burgomaster of Minsk Vitovt Tumash and vice-president of the "Belarusian Central Rada" Mikalai Shkelenok.

In 1943, together with the defeats inflicted by the Red Army on the German occupiers on the fronts, the Nazis sharply intensified their support and organization of the collaborationist movement on the territory of Belarus. On June 22, “Sayuz Belarusian moladzi” (an analogue of the Hitler Youth) was created in Minsk under the leadership of the Uniat woman N. Abramova (Teodorovich) and Mikhas Ganko, editor-in-chief of the magazine “Long Live Belarus!”. On June 27, on the initiative of Gauleiter V. Kube, the "Belarusian Rada Davera" was created under the General District Weiβruthenien, an advisory body that was called upon to gather around the German administration under the Gauleiter an asset from local traitors and convinced "Belarusian" nationalists and rally them to serve the Nazi-fascist the occupation authorities. The main task of the "Rade Daver" from the side of the Ostland Reichskommissariat was the fight against the partisans mainly by provocative methods. The Radu was headed by the Pole Vaclav Ivanovsky, a former member of the BNR government in 1918. On December 21, "Belaruskaya Rada Daveru" was transformed into the "Belarusian Central Rada", which was entrusted with police and propaganda functions. The department of propaganda, press and culture of the BCR was headed by Yevgeny Todorovich Kalubovich (a local analogue of Goebbels), who later also found refuge in the United States, became the prime minister of the BNR government "in exile" and carried out active Russophobic and anti-Soviet activities.

A new milestone in the history of Nazi criminals and accomplices who spoke on behalf of the Belarusian people was the creation in Minsk on February 23, 1944 under the Belarusian Central Radz of the military-punitive collaborationist formation Belarusian Regional Abaron under the leadership of SS Standartenfuehrer Frantishak Kushel, a former officer of all that the Polish Army, who had previously been the chief commissioner for Belarusian police forces since August 1943 (chief police officer on the territory of Belarus). F. Kushel's wife was the nationalist poetess N. Arsenyeva, who collaborated with the editorial staff of the "Belaruskaya Gazeta" Vatslav Kozlovsky and became the author of the poem "Malitva for Belarus", according to whom the anthem "Magutna Bozha" was written - the blasphemous political banner of the current pro-Western nationalist opposition. Before A. Lukashenko came to power, this atheism was going to be made the state anthem of the Republic of Belarus. After the war, SS Standartenfuehrer Frantishak Kushel ensured the transition of the "Belarusian" Nazi units to the side of the US Army at the end of April 1945 and together with his wife moved to the "State of Freedom" itself, in which all the offspring of humanity often found "free" refuge. There they predictably got involved in active Russophobic and anti-Soviet activities within the framework of the Belarusian Central Rada in exile and on Radio Svaboda.

A violent conscription was carried out to the "Belarusian regional abarona", including prisoners of war, under the threat of the death penalty. At the same time, it was possible to initially collect about 40,000 people from all over Belarus, of which only 21,700 people who took the oath in Minsk on March 25, 1944, were able to bring to service. But the occupation authorities did not feel much confidence in these battalions of the BKA and provided them with weak weapons. Their discipline was steadily declining, and the main problem was the shortage of officers, which indicated the level of real desire of even these people to fight for the “independence of national Belarus” within the Third Reich. Nevertheless, the BKA took an active part in operations against the partisans until July 1944. The commanders of the BKA were directly subordinate to the command of the SS forces and coordinated their actions directly with the German authorities. Among the operations in which units of the "Belarusian regional abaron" took part together with the SS and the police, the operation "Fryulingsfest" ("Spring Festival"), carried out in the area of ​​Polotsk and Lepel, was distinguished, as a result of which the local units of Soviet partisans lost more than 80% their personnel. By the end of the occupation, the BKA was used to fight partisans, guard various objects and economic work, as well as replenish the "Belarusian" military Nazi formations by recruiting new soldiers, creating auxiliary contingents to use them in the defense system of Nazi Germany against the liberation offensive of the Red Army, organizing anti-Soviet partisan movement on the territory of Belarus - including under the control of the American intelligence and security services.

"Belarusian regional abarona" was defeated on June 23, 1944 by Soviet troops during the large-scale offensive-liberation operation "Bagration". In the chaos of the retreat, many units of the BKA were completely deprived of leadership, communication between the main directorate and many battalions was disrupted. Some of the battalions took part in battles with the advanced units of the Soviet troops and were destroyed, others were disbanded by their commanders, some managed, together with the retreating units of the Wehrmacht, to evacuate to Poland, where they subsequently joined the 30th SS grenadier division or the "Belarusian" airborne battalion "Dalwitz", in the creation of which the future long-term head of the BNR Rada in the USA Yazep Sazhich took an active part. Finally, the remaining collaborators became part of the so-called "Belarusian resign army" (or "Belarusian regional troops", an underground network organization "Black Cat"), which was created by the secret services of the Third Reich for subversive activities in the rear of the Soviet army and state, and later transferred under the command of the US intelligence services. The head of the "Belarusian free army", numbering more than 3,000 people, is a former policeman and punisher of the unarmed population Mikhas Vitushka, who today is one of the main heroes of the pro-Western nationalist opposition of Belarus (like S. Bandera for Ukrainian neo-Nazis) and whose portraits in recent years are often they rise to the standards at opposition rallies with impunity.

The last major action of Nazi collaborators in Minsk was the "Drugog Usebelaruskag Kangres" held in Minsk on June 27, 1944, in which most of the active leaders of Nazi accomplices took part. The congress was held in the conditions of the approach of the Red Army to Minsk, which was conducting a major offensive operation in Belarus. At the congress, it was decided that the "Belarusian Central Rada" is the only legitimate Belarusian government, and also expressed full support for Germany. Plans were also developed for anti-Soviet sabotage and partisan operations in Belarus during the retreat of German troops from its territory.

It should be noted that, despite the defeat of most of the collaborationist formations with the liberation of Belarus, Belarusian collaboration has not disappeared from the face of the earth. Initially, he took root in Russophobic-pro-Western nationalist circles outside the Belarusian land. Many of these and other accomplices of the Nazis, including punishers and SS officers, emigrated to Western countries - primarily to the USA and Canada - where they received powerful support and organizational assistance from the American and other governments, having entered the emigre political formations headed by Rada Belaruskaya national republics ". If in Soviet times they acted from outside Belarus, then after the collapse of the USSR they received complete freedom of action (and even a significant part of state power). Moreover, the former Nazi accomplices (or, in any case, their ideological supporters) gradually began to raise their heads already in the USSR itself along with the death of Stalin: by the time of perestroika, they already felt very confident, were actively seeping into the sphere of science, culture, The media (not without the help of the confused and decayed KGB of the USSR) were ready at any moment to launch a decisive offensive on the ideological and informational fronts. This is exactly what happened with the collapse of the USSR, when, with the help of their fellows from among the descendants of fugitives to the West during the retreating Hitlerite Wehrmacht, they received broad rights and unanimously set about rewriting history textbooks, developing state laws, publishing literature and periodicals, preparing television programs, recruiting like-minded people among young people and the general population. Their main symbols were, as in 1918 and 1941, the white-red-white banner and the “Pursuit” coat of arms, which had never before been used as Belarusian historical symbols and originated from the national symbols of Poland and Lithuania. In particular, the white-red-white flag was first developed by the Polish "Belarusian" Claudius Duzh-Dushevsky in 1917 during the February Revolution at the request of the revolutionary authorities of Petrograd with the aim of symbolically and politically dismembering White Russia from the rest of Russia and tying it to Poland. This anti-Belarusian symbol was used exclusively during the occupation of the Belarusian lands by Germany, Poland and after the collapse of the USSR (in the conditions, in fact, also of the latent western occupation of Belarus).

The unfolding catastrophe was largely suppressed only with the coming to power of Alexander Lukashenko, but its ideological basis for 25 years was actively supported by the United States and its satellites in the European Union (especially Poland and the Baltic countries). However, even now they have the opportunity - including with the help of the media and especially the Internet - to conduct diverse propaganda among the white-bearers (especially young people), which at first gently, and then more and more openly, praises anti-national traitors, Western collaborators and criminals of the past different centuries, picking up collaborators of the 1940s, implants false nationalist myths, recruits and trains militants in a number of neighboring states - including on the “heroic” example of their historical predecessors, punitive and saboteurs.

Similar support was received from the West by the Ukrainian accomplices of the Third Reich and the neo-Nazis-Bandera, most of whom fled from the advancing Soviet troops and found refuge mainly in the same Canada and the United States. Having received complete freedom of action with the collapse of the USSR, they, together with their few (at first) henchmen from among the former citizens of the USSR (especially many of them were found among the former leaders and activists of the Ukrainian Communist Party and the Komsomol), conducted their systematic propaganda-ideological and military-preparatory activities and , in the end, achieved their goals. In modern Ukraine, the founding day of the Nazi Ukrainian Insurgent Army has been declared a state holiday and a day of military glory, processions of veterans of the SS Galicia division and neo-Nazi torchlight processions are held in cities, and the first meeting of the new Verkhovna Rada was opened by its deputy Yuriy Shukhevych, son of Roman Shukhevych, the Hauptman of the troops -SS, the commander of the Nazi battalion "Nachtigall", the deputy commander of the 201st battalion of the Schutzmanschaft, which carried out punitive operations against the Belarusian partisans. More recently, the incredible, the property of nightmares has become a reality of our days.

And, despite the fact that since the mid-1990s, the direct and ideological descendants of members of the Belarusian Central Rada and Belarusian Regional Abarons have been deprived of the opportunity to freely spread their ideology and movement in Belarus (and the share of the supporters of Russophobic and anti-Belarusian pro-Western nationalism was even during the years of the War itself orders of magnitude less in comparison with neighboring countries), the people of White Russia should be especially vigilant in this matter: suffice it to say that the ideology and glorification of Ukrainian neo-Nazism and collaborationism, under the influence of skillful and technological suggestions, captured many residents (especially young) in central and eastern Ukraine, where during the Great Patriotic War the level of collaboration was even lower than the Belarusian one (since it had almost no ethno-religious basis under it).

Distortion of history, an attempt to oppose Belarusians to their Russian brothers from Russia, implantation and propaganda of neo-paganism and Uniatism, inciting pride and aggression among young people (especially at rock concerts and mass sports events) with the addition of neo-Nazi symbols, slogans and portraits of collaborators from different times - these and many other ways of instilling lies and anger with the active financial and technological assistance of Western states and elites, as well as the presence of sympathizers among the officials and the creative intelligentsia - especially in an extremely open media and Internet space, almost unlimited pluralism (chaos) in culture - they are quite capable of leading to the most tragic consequences for our state and people.

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Introduction

... I swear that I would rather give my life than allow my wife and children, parents and sisters and the entire Belarusian people to endure Bolshevik abuse and bondage again ...

From the oath of the soldiers of the Belarusian Regional Defense

In the Soviet literature on the Great Patriotic War, the name “partisan republic” was firmly entrenched in Belarus. This name reflected everything: the excellent conditions for a small war, and the number of partisan detachments, and the heroism of the people's avengers in their struggle against the German invaders. Giving such a name to Belarus, historians and publicists seemed to imply that all, without exception, the population of this republic was either partisans or sympathized with them. In many ways, it was so. But, and this is no longer a secret, there were those who could quite sincerely cooperate with the enemy in the name of some of their goals.

Now historians define the activities of these individuals unequivocally - collaboration. However, this problem cannot be viewed only from a purely academic point of view. Many socio-political "challenges" of our time, to which our entire post-Soviet society has to "respond", have their roots in the years of the Second World War and are connected precisely with the problem of collaborationism. Moreover, these "challenges" are not simply associated with it, but are a direct consequence of those controversial and tragic events when more than a million Soviet citizens of different nationalities joined the ranks of the German army and fought against their compatriots until the very last salvo of the war.

Soviet researchers and publicists interpreted the choice of collaborators in an unambiguously negative way. This position did not make it possible even to come closer to an objective understanding of this problem. Nevertheless, there were reasons for this. As is now known, most of the collaborationist manifestations were based on nationalism and anti-communism. And this is the other side of the problem of cooperation of Soviet citizens with the military-political structures of the Third Reich. Someone did it on the basis of social motives, and someone - guided by the principles of their ideology.

Now it is difficult to say what was better in those conditions: to keep silent or to comprehensively discuss this painful topic. The fact remains that in the difficult socio-political conditions that have developed after the collapse of the USSR, the national background of collaborationism has fully manifested itself. This was largely due to the national revival in the former Soviet republics.

Often this process boiled down to transplanting onto the post-Soviet soil those ideas that the ideological predecessors of the current generation of nationalists had developed before World War II, and had already developed and tried to implement with the assistance of the Nazis. This, for example, happened in all the Baltic countries. In Belarus, they also tried to do something similar, but after the coming to power of President Alexander Lukashenko, this issue was closed.

In this regard, it should be emphasized that a comprehensive study of the history of Belarusian collaborationist formations, a scientific, and not an ideological approach to it, are not exclusively Belarusian in nature. In general, this is part of the problem of military collaboration of Soviet citizens during the Second World War. And it, along with its nuances, has much in common with similar phenomena in other Soviet republics and among other nations and nationalities of the USSR. Therefore, the scientific-practical and socio-political relevance of these seemingly past events is beyond doubt.

Thus, the focus of the monograph is on Belarusian military collaboration and its use in the foreign, occupation and national policies of Nazi Germany during the Second World War. In this regard, the author set himself the following goal: to study the full picture of the military cooperation of the Belarusian national movement with the military-political leadership of Nazi Germany. However, in order to find out the extent and effectiveness of this cooperation, it is necessary to analyze a number of points that are key to this problem. Namely:

Features of military collaboration of Soviet citizens during the Second World War, its characteristic features;

Comparative number of personnel of Belarusian collaborationist formations, both within this category, and in relation to the number of personnel of foreign volunteer formations and the German armed forces;

Military-political reasons and conditions that contributed to the creation in the system of foreign volunteer formations of such a category as Belarusian collaborationist formations;

Interethnic relations on the territory of Belarus and their impact on the problem of collaboration;

The role of the Belarusian national movement in the process of creating and using Belarusian collaborationist formations;

Features of the organization, training and combat use of Belarusian collaborationist formations and the principles that were taken as their basis.

It cannot be said, of course, that this problem was "ignored" by researchers and did not find its reflection in the historiography of World War II. And although interest in it is significantly inferior to interest, for example, in Russian or Ukrainian collaborationism, issues related to its Belarusian variety were touched upon in their works by Soviet, foreign and emigre authors. However, trying, to the best of their capabilities and views, to be objective, they all could not avoid the same tendency: either to belittle the role of Belarusian collaborators, bringing them down to the level of ordinary traitors, or to raise this role to such heights that it was not imagined even these collaborators. As usual, the truth lies somewhere in between.

Of course, neither the author nor his research claims to this truth. Paradoxical as it may sound, even relying on the rarest and most reliable documents, it is difficult to be an objectivist. "What, then, is this book?" - the reader will ask. Rather, it is a kind of invitation to further constructive discussion of the issues raised, to discussion, no matter how acute it may be. Nevertheless, I would like to hope that this book will become another, albeit small, but step towards understanding such a painful, complex and multifaceted problem, which the problem of collaboration is still today.

The author expresses his deep gratitude to all those who kindly agreed to provide their materials and help for the preparation of this work. First of all, I would like to thank Antonio Muñoz (New York, USA), without whose full support this project would hardly have been implemented. In addition to him, great help was provided by the following persons: Jochen Behler (Jena, Germany), Karel Berkhoff (Amsterdam, Netherlands), Dariusz Wierzhos (Warsaw, Poland), Victor Denninghaus (Moscow, Russian Federation), Samuel Mitchum (Monroe, Louisiana , USA), Dietmar Neutatz (Freiburg, Germany), George Neifsiger (West Chester, Ohio, USA) and, unfortunately, the already late Dr. Joachim Hoffmann (Ebringen, Germany).

The author expresses his special gratitude to all employees of the State Archives of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea (Simferopol, Ukraine), the National Archives of the Republic of Belarus (Minsk, Belarus), the Belarusian State Archives of Film, Photo and Sound Documents (Dzerzhinsk, Belarus), the Federal Military Archive of the Federal Republic of Germany (Freiburg , Germany), the Russian State Archive of Socio-Political History (Moscow, Russian Federation) and the Archive of the New History of Poland (Warsaw, Poland), which provided invaluable assistance in the selection of documents and materials for this book.

Chapter 1
"Eastern" volunteer formations during the Second World War

An important component of the German occupation and nationality policy was to attract the population of the occupied Soviet territories to cooperation. Therefore, it makes sense to say a few words about the problem of collaboration.

In Soviet historical literature, everyone who collaborated with the military-political structures of Nazi Germany was usually portrayed only from the negative side and at the same time extremely simplified. This, of course, did not contribute to the understanding of such a socio-political phenomenon as collaboration was. In reality, this phenomenon was much more complex and throughout its existence depended on a number of factors that influenced it in one way or another.

In our opinion, the following definition is suitable for the concept of “collaborationism”: it is voluntary cooperation with the Nazi military-political leadership on the territory of Germany or the countries occupied by it in order to establish or strengthen a new administrative-political regime. Based on the spheres of such cooperation, it is customary to single out the political, administrative, military, economic, cultural and everyday varieties of collaboration. And the first three varieties are classified as the most active. Thus, administrative collaboration is work in the bodies of local "self-government", organized with the support of the invaders. Political collaboration - participation in the activities of all kinds of "governments", "councils" and "committees" created with the aim of gaining power and influence on the politics of the occupiers. Finally, military collaboration is service in the security forces of Nazi Germany (Wehrmacht, SS troops and police) 1
Romanko O.V. OUN and UPA in the Other World: Struggle for the National Vizolnenya and Protistyanske Community // Historical Journal. 2007. No. 3. P. 3 - 4. For a general table of the number of foreign volunteers in the German armed forces for the period from 1940 to 1945, see: Appendices (Table A.5).

Another extreme, characteristic, for example, of Western historiography, is an attempt to put Soviet collaboration on a par with similar phenomena that took place in Nazi-occupied Europe. 2
Neulen H.-W. An Deutscher Seite: Internationale Freiwillige von Wehrmacht und Waffen-SS. München 1985 S. 39-49; Seidler F.W. Die Kollaboration: 1939 - 1945. Mönchen, 1995.S. 8 - 42.

Indeed, there are many similarities between them. Nevertheless, and this should be emphasized, Soviet collaboration was, in fact, a continuation of the events of the Civil War of 1918 - 1920, and its prerequisites were the features of the socio-political development of the pre-war USSR. Among them, first of all, one should name repression, collectivization, religious oppression, etc.

The prerequisites that influenced the emergence of collaborationism also include those that had a deeper character and developed over a longer historical period. Among them, the most significant were national contradictions. During the years of the revolution and the Civil War, their significant aggravation took place, which brought the national question out of the cultural sphere into the political sphere. Therefore, in the twenty post-revolutionary years, national contradictions could only be externally settled by the Soviet regime and had a significant conflict-generating nature.

By the early 1940s, these prerequisites led to the formation of persistent protest moods in a certain part of Soviet society, which in some cases resulted in an insurrectionary movement. 3
Popov A.Yu. 15 meetings with KGB general Belchenko. M., 2002.S. 99 - 118.

All of the above can be called internal prerequisites. However, there were also external factors that also played a role. These factors include the German geopolitical plans for the Soviet Union, the activities of the anti-Soviet emigration and its place within the framework of these plans. After the outbreak of World War II, two more significant factors were added to them: the peculiarities of the German occupation regime in a particular region of the USSR and the situation on the fronts 4
Romanko O.V. The problem of military collaboration of Soviet citizens during the Second World War // Military Crimea. Simferopol, 2009. No. 13.P. 28.

The reasons that led to the creation of collaborationist groups were of two types. Conventionally, they can be called "German" and "national", that is, those that were guided, respectively, by representatives of the German leadership and representatives of certain national movements. By attracting volunteers from the population of the occupied Soviet territories, the German military-political leadership, firstly, hoped to replenish human resources, in the use of which an obvious crisis was outlined by the winter of 1941. Second, it planned to create effective forces to combat the growing partisan movement. Moreover, it should be noted that, along with a purely military issue, there was also a certain propaganda effect - to force the partisans to fight with their compatriots. Third, at a certain stage, the recruitment of volunteers began to symbolize the beginning of a "new" German policy. It is known that before the offensive in the Caucasus, numerous formations were created from among the representatives of the peoples inhabiting it. Finally, fourthly, the creation of collaborationist formations on a national basis was an effective instrument of the national policy of the Nazis. 5
Br? Utigam O.? berblick? ber die besetzen Ostgebiete w? hrend des 2. Weltkrieges. T? Bingen: Institut f? R Besatzungsfragen, 1954, S. 84 - 90; Simon G. Nationalismus und Nationalit? Tenpolitik in der Sowjetunion: von der totalit? Ren Diktatur zur nachstalinschen Gesellschaft. Baden-Baden 1986 S. 217-228.

Thus, the German side was the clear initiator of this process. However, the role of the second type of reasons also cannot be underestimated. In a number of cases, representatives of national movements played an equally active role. As a rule, the following motives were decisive in this case: collaborationist formations as an instrument of pressure on the Germans, as a means of fighting against their ideological opponents and, at the final stage of the war, as an object of bargaining with the Western allies 6
Romanko O.V. The problem of military collaboration of Soviet citizens ... P. 28.

It should be emphasized that there was no consensus among the German military-political leadership regarding Soviet collaboration. In fact, the discussions continued until the very end of the war. In general, the German policy of attracting the population of the occupied Soviet territories to cooperation can be conditionally divided into three stages. Carrying out an occupation policy in the first of them (June 1941 - December 1942), the Germans used terror and coercion as its main method: while the Wehrmacht was winning victories on the fronts, and a powerful partisan movement had not yet developed in the rear, allies among the local population to Hitler were not needed. “Even if in specific circumstances it turns out to be easier to turn to some conquered peoples for military assistance,” he said at one of the meetings, “it would be a mistake. Sooner or later they will turn their weapons against us ... " 7
Cit. on: Bethell N. The last secret. M., 1992.S. 85.

Therefore, the attraction of the population to cooperation was limited in general by the following points: permission for a very curtailed self-government and cultural activities; the creation of reconnaissance and sabotage units, the use of "volunteer assistants" in army units or the recruitment of a contingent in the part of the auxiliary police; and some concessions in the field of land use 8
Dallin A. German Rule in Russia 1941 - 1945: A Study of occupation policies. London: Macmillan, 1957. P. 538-542.

Hitler's point of view was dominant and reflected the real views of the majority of members of the Nazi party on the implementation of "Eastern" policy 9
Ilnytzkyj R. Deutschland und die Ukraine 1934 - 1945: Tatsachen europ? Ischer Ostpolitik: ein Vorbericht: In 2 Bd. M? Nchen, 1958. Bd. 1.S. 15 - 30.

Almost everyone, of course, agreed with her, at least outwardly. For example, the most consistent supporters of Hitler's version of politics were M. Bormann, G. Goering, Reichskommissar of the "Ukraine" E. Koch and, up to a certain point, SS Reichsfuehrer G. Himmler 10
Rosenberg A. Memoirs. Kharkov, 2005.S. 356 - 358.

However, despite the totalitarianism of the German state machine, there were at least four other points of view that differed from Hitler's. In general, a general thesis was taken as a basis: the population of the occupied eastern regions should be more actively involved in cooperation. The whole difference between these points of view was only in the methods, means, the scale of the intended use.

It is difficult to call the first of them a politically or ideologically grounded position. This point of view was brought to life by a momentary coincidence. Nevertheless, it is impossible not to mention it, since it certainly played its role at the lower administrative level. Thus, some officials and officers of the military occupation zone believed that Soviet citizens would become more loyal if they were treated “like a gentleman”. As a rule, these were people far from politics, whose convictions were based on the experience of the First World War. 11
Guderian G. Memories of a soldier. Smolensk, 1998.S. 206, 207.

The next point of view on "Eastern" politics has received the name "utilitarianism" in historiography. It differed from the first position already in that its bearer was a completely separate (although far from unified) group of persons (both convinced Hitlerites and those who did not belong to the Nazi party), which was supposed to act according to a certain program. As it is already clear from the very name of this group, there was a little more ideology and politics in its actions than in the previous one. The main goal of the supporters of the policy of "utilitarianism" was the maximum benefit that Germany could derive from cooperation with the local population. It is interesting that the unofficial leader of the Nazi wing of the "utilitarians" was such a cunning politician as the Minister of Propaganda and Education of the Third Reich, Dr. J. Goebbels. In particular, he believed that, first of all, it was necessary to intensify the propaganda processing of the "eastern" peoples, removing from it all references to their inferiority, the colonial nature of the war of Germany against the USSR, etc. In place of these theses, vague promises of freedom and independence, but only in the future, after the end of the war 12
Zagorulko M.M., Yudenkov A.F. The collapse of the "Oldenburg" plan (on the disruption of the economic plans of Nazi Germany in the temporarily occupied territory of the USSR). M., 1980.S. 138 - 142.

Such, for example, instructions are contained in one of the documents of his ministry, entitled "On the propaganda processing of European peoples" and sent out on February 15, 1943 to all the highest functionaries of the Nazi party and local leaders of propaganda. In it, in particular, it was said: "You cannot call the Eastern peoples, expecting liberation from us, cattle, barbarians, etc., and in this case, expect them to be interested in the German victory." 13
Müller N. Wehrmacht and occupation (1941 - 1944). M., 1974.S. 377 - 380.

Dr. Goebbels' "utilitarianism" was more associated with psychological warfare and did not go beyond the usual propaganda slogans. Moreover, it was unclear how soon such a policy would bring the desired results. However, this group had another wing - the military, whose adherents paid attention exclusively to the practical side of cooperation with the population of the occupied Soviet territories and Soviet citizens in general. First of all, they were the highest officers of the Wehrmacht, interested in the greatest possible effectiveness of this cooperation. And in the shortest possible time. Thus, the most ambitious action of this group of persons was the recruitment of Soviet prisoners of war into the ranks of the so-called "volunteer assistants" or "hivi", which will be discussed below. It remains to add that the most outstanding exponent of this point of view was the Quartermaster General of the General Staff of the Ground Forces, Major General E. Wagner 14
Fischer G. Soviet Opposition to Stalin. A Case Study in World War II. Cambridge, Mass. 1952. P. 14-15.

And supporters of the attitude towards the Soviet population "in a gentleman's way" and "utilitarians" played, of course, their definite role in the emergence and development of military collaboration. However, their significance should not be exaggerated. Firstly, both of these positions were just modifications (albeit somewhat unexpected) of Hitler's policy and therefore already a priori did not consider the "eastern" peoples as equal partners. Secondly, despite the fact that the bearers of these points of view were people who were very influential and close to Hitler, their ideas remained on the periphery of "Eastern" politics. At best, they acted as a continuation or an integral part of the following two positions, the struggle between which was the defining moment in the cooperation of the German leadership with Soviet citizens. A few words about them have already been said above. Here we will dwell in more detail on the characteristics of these positions.

Another point of view was a number of middle-ranking Wehrmacht officers and German politicians and diplomats of the "old school" who believed that the "Eastern" peoples should be used in the most active way, involving them in both the military and political struggle against Bolshevism. They also believed that the citizens of the occupied Soviet territories should be treated humanly, but they should be given some real perspective right now. It should be said that many of these officers were implicated in a failed conspiracy against Hitler (July 1944). One of the projects of this group was the so-called Vlasov movement and the Russian Liberation Army (ROA), in which they saw not only tools in the war against the USSR, but also future allies of non-Nazi Germany 15
Steenberg S. General Wlassow: der F? Hrer der russischen Befreiungsarmee Verr? Ter oder Patriot. Rastatt, 1986. S. 71 - 75.

The main difference between this group and the two previous ones was that they paid special attention to the national question in "eastern" politics. So, one of its leaders, Count K. von Stauffenberg, believed that first of all it was necessary to win the sympathy of the Russian people. He considered other peoples of the USSR to be completely subordinate to the Russian, and their national movements were weak and insignificant. In his opinion, they could hardly become serious allies of Germany, and "all flirting with them could only prevent an alliance with the Russian people, who are very sensitive to the territorial integrity of their state." 16
Dallin A. Op. cit. P. 502 - 503.

Largely thanks to the efforts of this group, which enjoyed a certain amount of support in the Wehrmacht High Command (OKW), on June 6, 1941, the document “Instructions on the use of propaganda according to the Barbarossa variant” was drawn up. It is interesting that in this purely special document, along with the fact that “the enemies of Germany are not the peoples of the Soviet Union, but exclusively the Jewish-Bolshevik Soviet government”, it was emphasized that “for the time being, one should not conduct propaganda aimed at dismembering the USSR into separate states. " 17
Nuremberg trial of the main German war criminals: Sat. Mat .: In 7 vol. M., 1958.Vol. 2.P. 573, 574.

With the permission of the Nazis and under their leadership, pro-fascist organizations of collaborators (from the French collaboration - cooperation) were created - the Belarusian People's Self-Help, the Belarusian Self-Defense Corps, the Union of Belarusian Youth. Among the people, the collaborators were called traitors, Hitler's henchmen. Their main goal was to create, with the help of the Germans, an "independent Belarus" under the auspices of Nazi Germany. The Belarusian collaborators used the historical coat of arms “Pursuit” and the white-red-white flag as symbols, greeted each other with the exclamation “Long live Belarus!” with throwing out in a fascist way hands forward.

With the participation of henchmen, the Nazis plundered the population, taking away raw materials, industrial products, and cultural values. By force of arms, for low wages, they forced people to work 12-14 hours a day, pay taxes, and hand over agricultural products. Economic oppression was accompanied by spiritual oppression. In the school system operating in the occupied territory, the educational process had a pro-German and pro-fascist orientation. A portrait of A. Hitler was supposed to hang in the classroom. The teacher, entering the classroom, had to greet the students with a raised right hand with the exclamation "Heil Hitler!" or "Long live Belarus!" The disciples had to answer him in the same way. Before the lessons began, conversations were held about the biography of Hitler and his associates, about the life of the people in New Europe, the victories of the Wehrmacht.

In nature lessons, students had to master the topics "The concept of races", "Characteristics of races", "The Aryan race as the highest cultural and civilized race of mankind", in history lessons - the topics "Belarus and Germany", "Belarus in the construction of a New Europe", "The Life of Adolf Hitler" et al. V. Kube warned: "Any Bolshevik influence emanating from the school will be punished with death." At the end of the 1941/42 academic year, the Latin alphabet began to be used.

Newspapers and magazines were published on the territory of occupied Belarus. There were radio broadcasts, films were shown. There were separate theaters and amateur art circles. The Germans even issued an order, according to which the artists of the Minsk Drama Theater had to pass an exam in the Belarusian language, as well as learn the German anthem, marches, and poems dedicated to Hitler.

Preparation of the Belarusian collaboration before the start of the war

The training of Belarusian collaborators by the Third Reich began in the mid-late-ies, when a Belarusian representative office was created under the German Ministry of Internal Affairs - first in Berlin, and then in other cities of Germany. It was engaged in the identification and recruitment of persons wishing to provide assistance to Germany in Belarusian issues. So, the third president of the BNR Vasily Zakharka wrote a detailed report on the political, economic and cultural situation in Belarus, and also addressed a memorandum to Hitler with assurances of support. In addition, the Belarusian Self-Help Committee was created, an organization that actively recruited members among Belarusians living in Germany. With the outbreak of World War II, the German command created bases in Warsaw and Biala Podlaska for the transfer of Belarusian nationalist agents to the territory of the USSR. In Berlin, in the Vustavu camp, courses for propagandists and translators were organized from among the Belarusian nationalists to work in Belarus after the change of power.

Before the attack on the USSR

In 1940, the leadership of the “right-wing Belarusian emigration” proposed to the German leadership to organize the activities of the Belarusian National Socialists, including training sabotage personnel from among the prisoners of the Polish Army in order to send them to the territory of the USSR.

In the spring of 1941, the formation of the first Belarusian unit began. As part of the Brandenburg 800 regiment, the 1st assault platoon in the amount of 50 people was prepared. Likewise, the Germans trained the paratroopers of the Warsaw-Belarusian Committee, which included captive Belarusians-volunteers of the former Polish army. Once formed, these two units were placed under the operational control of Valley Headquarters.

The tasks of the saboteurs were sabotage in the near Soviet rear, the physical destruction of the command and command staff of the Red Army, the transmission of intelligence information by radio.

During the German occupation of Belarus

Together with the advancing units of the German army, the main figures of the Belarusian nationalist movement from emigration arrived in Belarus: Fabian Akinchits, Vladislav Kozlovsky, activists of the Belarusian National Socialist Party, Ivan Ermachenko, Radoslav Ostrovsky and others. In the initial period of the war, the development of political and military collaboration took place at an insignificant pace, which is explained by the successes of the Germans at the front and the lack of the need for them to develop collaborationist structures. The German leadership hoped for a quick victory in the war and was skeptical about the ability of the Belarusian population to build nation-state due to the weakness of ethnic identity. The activities of collaborators during this period were mainly reduced to the work of non-political structures, the largest of which was the one created on October 22, 1941, whose purpose was to proclaim concern for health care, education and culture.

With the help of Belarusian collaborators, the German authorities tried to use for their own purposes the scientific personnel who ended up in the occupied territory. In June 1942, they created the “Belarusian Scientific Association”. Gauleiter of Belarus V. Kube became its honorary president. However, Belarusian scientists boycotted the work of the partnership, and it existed only on paper. Also, other non-political collaborationist structures were created ("Women's League", trade unions, etc.). At the same time, attempts to create a Belarusian Free Self-Defense Corps were unsuccessful due to the opposition of the military authorities and the SS. Its creation was announced in June 1942 in the amount of 3 divisions. However, about 20 battalions were created, which did not dare to arm, and in the spring of 1943 they were disbanded. An attempt to create Belarusian autocephaly with the aim of separating Belarusian believers from the Moscow Patriarchate was also unsuccessful.

In occupied Belarus, many collaborationist newspapers and magazines were published: Belaruskaya Gazeta, Pagonya ( Chase), "Biełaruski hołas" ( Belarusian voice), "Nowy shlyakh" ( New way), etc. These publications carried out anti-Semitic, anti-Soviet and pro-fascist propaganda. In a special article published on September 25, 1943 after the destruction of Cuba in “Belorusskaya Gazeta”, the editor of this newspaper Vladislav Kozlovsky wrote: “The heart is squeezed by grief ... He (that is, Cuba - author) is no longer among us. Commissioner General Wilhelm Kube was one of the best, the most heartfelt friends ... who thought and spoke like every Belarusian nationalist ... ”.

The invincibility of Belarus and the Belarusian national idea, meanwhile, was evidenced by the Second World War. From 1941 to 1944, central Belarus (in which the German civil administration headed by V. Cuba operated) experienced a powerful national upsurge. This completely puzzled the Bolsheviks and infuriated Moscow. With the return of the Soviets to Belarus, hundreds of thousands of conscientious Belarusians emigrated to the West.

Major collaborationist formations

Belarusian Liberation Army

In the German armed forces

• 1st Belarusian assault platoon
• Belarusian Railway Guard Battalion
• 13th Belarusian SD Police Battalion
• 1st Personnel Battalion of the Belarusian Regional Defense
• The Belarusian Self-Defense Corps (BSA). The leader is Ivan Ermachenko.
• Belarusian Central Rada (BCR). President Radoslaw Ostrovsky.
• Belarusian Regional Defense (BKA). Commander Franz Kuschel.
• Union of Belarusian Youth (UBM). Leaders - Nadezhda Abramova (1942-1943), Mikhail Ganko (from 1943).
• Belarusian People's Self-Help (BNS) is the occupation police. The leader is Yuri Sobolevsky.
• Belarusian glad to trust. Chairman Vaclav Ivanovsky.

Belarusian schutzmannschaft battalions

The table shows data on the Belarusian Schutzmanschaft battalions from 1943 to 1944.

Collaborators after the liberation of Belarus

Immediately after the II All-Belarusian Congress, the leadership and formations of collaborationists were evacuated to Germany, where they continued their activities. In July-August, the Abwehr training center in Dahlwitz (East Prussia) was transferred to the BTSR's disposal, which received a large replenishment from the evacuated battalions of the BKO. In early April, an agreement was reached with representatives of the secret services of the Third Reich under the leadership of SS Sturmbannfuehrer Otto Skorzeny on the deployment of a special battalion "Dahlwitz" of up to 700-800 people on the basis of this center. In addition, by order of SS Rechsfuehrer Himmler, a new 30th SS division (Belorussian No. 1) was created, also called the SS assault brigade "Belarus". Yazep Sazhich (who in 1982 became the sixth "president" of the Belarusian People's Republic) played an active part in the formation of these units, who transferred 101 cadets of the school of junior officers trained by him to the SS brigade. On April 30, 1945, the division surrendered to American forces.

After the end of the war, most of the leaders of the collaborationist movement moved to the USA (including Radoslaw Ostrovsky), the countries of Western Europe and Australia, where they created Belarusian national organizations or joined the ranks of the existing ones used to fight the USSR. It is known about the cooperation of some representatives of the Belarusian movement with the CIA, which organized anti-Soviet sabotage detachments, in which some former collaborators, for example, Mikhail Vitushka or Ivan Filistovich, participated.

Personalities and destinies

• Radoslav Ostrovsky - President of the BCR, emigrated.
• Nikolai Shkelyonok - 1st vice-president of the BCR, executed, according to other sources, died in battle.
• Vaclav Ivanovsky - burgomaster of Minsk (1942-1943), killed by partisans.
• Vitovt Tumash - burgomaster of Minsk (1941-1942), emigrated.
• Vaclav (Vladislav) Kozlovsky - editor of Belorusskaya Gazeta, killed by partisans.
• Vasily Zakharka - President of the Belarusian People's Republic in exile, died (died?) In Prague in 1943
• Adam Demidovich-Demidetsky - Deputy Mayor of Minsk.
• Nikolai Abramchik - President of the Belarusian People's Republic in exile after the death of V. Zakharka, lived in exile.
• Olekhnovich, Frantisek - playwright, killed by partisans.
• Konstantin Ezovitov - leader of the armed formations, executed in the USSR.
• Franz Kushel - the head of the Belarusian regional defense, emigrated to the United States.
• Fabian Akinchits - journalist, killed by partisans.
• Vladimir Syabura - editor of the magazine "Novy shlyakh", emigrated to the United States.
• Ivan Ermachenko - emigrated.
• Mikhail Ganko - the head of the SBM, emigrated to the West, possibly later illegally entered Belarus and died.
• Nadezhda Abramova - former head of the SBM, emigrated, died in the late 1970s in West Germany.
• Yuri Sobolevsky - Chief of Police at the BCR, emigrated, died under unclear circumstances in Munich.
• Peter Kasatsky
• Yazep Sazic - emigrated, headed the government of the Belarusian People's Republic in exile.
• Stanislav Stankevich - burgomaster of Borisov, journalist, after the war - an active figure in the Belarusian emigration.
• Gelda, Ivan - commander of the Dahlwitz battalion, executed.

see also

Notes (edit)

Literature

• Belarus near Vyalikay Aichynnai Vaine, 1941-1945 Entsyklapedya. - Minsk: 1990
• Zalessky K.A. Who was who in World War II. Allies of Germany. - M .: AST, 2004 .-- T. 2. - 492 p. - ISBN 5-271-07619-9
• Soloviev A. Belarusian Central Rada: creation, activity and collapse. - Minsk: 1995

Links

• List of funds of Belarusian collaborationism in the National Archives of Belarus
• “Belarusian collaborationist formations in emigration (1944-1945): Organization and combat use” // Romanko O. V. Brown shadows in Poland. Belarus 1941-1945. - M .: Veche, 2008.
• Romanko O. V. Parts of law enforcement: from self-defense to the Belarusian police
• Belarusian nationalities: Davydnik. Ukladalnik: Kazak P. - Minsk: Golas Krayu, 2001. (Belarusian) (Belarusian nationalism - reference book)
• Staka Kube in Belarusian nationalities // Turonak, South Belarus pad nyametskay acupatsiyay / Translated from Polish V. Zhdanovich. - Minsk: Belarus, 1993 (belor.)
• Litvin A. Local auxiliary police on the territory of Belarus (July 1941 - July 1944) // "Belarus ў XX stagodzi" ("Belarus in the XX century") - 2003, Issue 2