On August 1, 1940, Erich Marx presented the first version of the plan for war against the USSR. This option was based on the idea of a fleeting, lightning-fast war, as a result of which it was planned that German troops would reach the Rostov-Gorky-Arkhangelsk line, and subsequently to the Urals. Decisive importance was given to the capture of Moscow. Erich Marx proceeded from the fact that Moscow is “the heart of Soviet military-political and economic power, its capture will lead to the end of Soviet resistance.”
This plan provided for two strikes - north and south of Polesie. The northern attack was planned as the main one. It was supposed to be applied between Brest-Litovsk and Gumbinen through the Baltic states and Belarus in the direction of Moscow. The southern strike was planned to be carried out from the southeastern part of Poland in the direction of Kyiv. In addition to these attacks, a “private operation to capture the Baku region” was planned. The implementation of the plan took from 9 to 17 weeks.
Erich Marx's plan was played out at the headquarters of the Supreme High Command under the leadership of General Paulus. This check revealed a serious flaw in the presented option: it ignored the possibility of strong flank counterattacks by Soviet troops from the north and south, capable of disrupting the advance of the main group towards Moscow. The Supreme Command headquarters decided to reconsider the plan.
In connection with Keitel’s message about the poor engineering preparation of the bridgehead for an attack on the USSR, the Nazi command on August 9, 1940 issued an order called “Aufbau Ost”. It outlined measures to prepare a theater of military operations against the USSR, repair and construction of railways and highways, bridges, barracks, hospitals, airfields, warehouses, etc. The transfer of troops was carried out more and more intensively. On September 6, 1940, Jodl issued an order that stated: “I order an increase in the number of occupation troops in the east over the next weeks. For security reasons, Russia should not create the impression that Germany is preparing for an offensive in the eastern direction.”
On December 5, 1940, at the next secret military meeting, Halder’s report was heard on the “Otto” plan, as the war plan against the USSR was originally called, and on the results of staff exercises. In accordance with the results of the exercises, it was planned to destroy the flank groupings of the Red Army by developing an offensive on Kyiv and Leningrad before the capture of Moscow. In this form the plan was approved. There were no doubts about its implementation. Supported by all those present, Hitler said: “It is to be expected that the Russian army, at the very first blow of the German troops, will suffer an even greater defeat than the French army in 1940.”3. Hitler demanded that the war plan provide for the complete destruction of all combat-ready forces on Soviet territory.
The meeting participants had no doubt that the war against the USSR would be ended quickly; CPOK~ weeks were also indicated. Therefore, it was planned to provide only a fifth of the personnel with winter uniforms, Hitler’s General Guderian admits in his memoirs published after the war: “In the High Command of the Armed Forces and in the High Command of the Ground Forces, they so confidently expected to finish the campaign by the beginning of winter that in the ground forces Winter uniform was provided only for every fifth soldier." German generals subsequently tried to shift the blame for the unpreparedness of the winter campaign troops to Hitler. But Guderian does not hide the fact that the generals were also to blame. He writes: “I cannot agree with the widespread opinion that Hitler alone is to blame for the lack of winter uniforms in the fall of 1941.”4.
Hitler expressed not only his own opinion, but also the opinion of the German imperialists and generals when, with his characteristic self-confidence, he said in the circle of his entourage: “I will not make the same mistake as Napoleon; when I go to Moscow, I will set out early enough to reach it before winter.”
The day after the meeting, December 6, Jodl instructed General Warlimont to draw up a directive on the war against the USSR based on the decisions made at the meetings. Six days later, Warlimont presented the text of Directive No. 21 to Yodel, who made several corrections to it, and on December 17 it was handed to Hitler for signature. The next day the directive was approved under the name Operation Barbarossa.
When meeting with Hitler in April 1941, the German ambassador in Moscow, Count von Schulenburg, tried to express his doubts about the reality of the plan, a war against the USSR. BUT he only achieved that he fell out of favor forever.
The fascist German generals developed and put into effect a plan for war against the USSR, which met the most predatory desires of the imperialists. Germany's military leaders unanimously supported the implementation of this plan. Only after Germany’s defeat in the war against the USSR, the beaten fascist commanders, for self-rehabilitation, put forward a false version that they objected to the attack on the USSR, but Hitler, despite the opposition shown to him, still started a war in the East. For example, the West German general Btomentritt, a former active Nazi, writes that Rundstedt, Brauchitsch, and Halder dissuaded Hitler from war with Russia. “But all this did not bring any results. Hitler insisted on his own. With a firm hand he took the helm and led Germany onto the rocks of complete defeat.” In reality, not only the “Führer”, but also the entire German generals believed in the “blitzkrieg”, in the possibility of a quick victory over the USSR.
Directive No. 21 stated: “The German armed forces must be prepared to defeat Soviet Russia through a quick military operation even before the end of the war with England” - the main idea of the war plan was defined in the directive as follows: “The military masses of the Russian army located in the western part of Russia armies must be destroyed in bold operations with deep advances of tank units. It is necessary to prevent the retreat of combat-ready units into the vastness of Russian territory... The ultimate goal of the operation is to fence off the common Arkhangelsk-Volga line from Asian Russia.”
On January 31, 1941, the headquarters of the main command of the German ground forces issued the “Troop Concentration Directive,” which set out the general plan of the command, defined the tasks of army groups, and also gave instructions on the location of headquarters, demarcation lines, interaction with the fleet and aviation, etc. This directive, defining the “first intention” of the German army, set before it the task of “splitting the front of the main forces of the Russian army, concentrated in the western part of Russia, with quick and deep strikes of powerful mobile groups north and south of the Pripyat swamps and, using this breakthrough, destroy the separated groupings of enemy troops."
Thus, two main directions for the advance of German troops were outlined: south and north of Polesie. North of Polesie the main blow was delivered by two army groups: “Center” and “North”. Their task was defined as follows: “North of the Pripyat marshes, Army Group Center is advancing under the command of Field Marshal von Bock. Having brought powerful tank formations into battle, it makes a breakthrough from the Warsaw and Suwalki area in the direction of Smolensk; then turns the tank troops to the north and destroys them together with the Finnish army and the German troops sent from Norway for this purpose, finally depriving the enemy of his last defensive capabilities in the northern part of Russia. As a result of these operations, freedom of maneuver will be ensured to carry out subsequent tasks in cooperation with German troops advancing in southern Russia.
In the event of a sudden and complete defeat of Russian forces in the north of Russia, the turn of troops to the north will no longer be necessary and the question of an immediate attack on Moscow may arise.”
It was planned to launch an offensive south of Polesie with Army Group South. Its mission was defined as follows: “South of the Pripyat marshes, Army Group “South” under the command of Field Marshal Rutstedt, using a swift strike from powerful tank formations from the Lublin area, cuts off Soviet troops located in Galicia and Western Ukraine from their communications on the Dnieper, captures crossing the Dnieper River in the Kiev area and to the south of it thus provides freedom of maneuver to solve subsequent tasks in cooperation with troops operating to the north, or to carry out new tasks in the south of Russia.”
The most important strategic goal of Plan Barbarossa was to destroy the main forces of the Red Army concentrated in the western part of the Soviet Union and capture militarily and economically important areas. In the future, German troops in the central direction hoped to quickly reach Moscow and capture it, and in the south - to occupy the Donetsk basin. The plan attached great importance to the capture of Moscow, which, according to the German command, was supposed to bring decisive political, military and economic success to Germany. Hitler's command believed that his plan for war against the USSR would be carried out with German precision.
In January 1941, each of the three army groups received a preliminary task under Directive No. 21 and an order to conduct a war game to test the expected course of battles and obtain material for a detailed development of the operational plan.
In connection with the planned German attack on Yugoslavia and Greece, the start of military operations against the USSR was postponed by 4-5 weeks. On April 3, the high command issued an order that stated: “The start of Operation Barbarossa, due to the operation in the Balkans, is postponed by at least 4 weeks.” On April 30, the German High Command made a preliminary decision to attack the USSR on June 22 1941. The increased transfer of German troops to the Soviet border began in February 1941. Tank and motorized divisions were brought up last, so as not to reveal a premature attack plan.
As soon as they called him... The Devil in the flesh, Antichrist, Black Death - all these nicknames were given to him by ordinary people. Those who were exiled to concentration camps, suffered in the ghetto, went to be shot... Adolf Hitler completely changed the course of history not only in Germany, but also in the whole world. After himself, he left complete devastation in Europe and a document that regulated the work of the remaining Reich government. Hitler's political testament is interesting from a historical point of view; it reveals to us the character of this dangerous man, his secret plans and hidden beliefs.
Main points of the document
The will itself is small. It consists of two parts, in which Adolf Hitler sums up his life, political and military activities. He also speaks candidly about why World War II began. He also names the reasons that prompt him to commit suicide, and thanks his citizens for their love, respect and support. He accuses Himmler and Goering of conspiracy and coup and removes them from all posts. Instead it changes completely
The dictator also disposes of his property, namely: he bequeaths the collection of works of art he collected to the gallery of his hometown of Linz on the Danube, he gives his personal belongings that have a certain value to his loyal associates and colleagues, and everything else - to the National Socialist Workers' Party of Germany. Adolf Hitler asks that his marriage to Eva Braun be recognized as legal and that the newly-made spouses be cremated after their death. He appoints the executor of his last will
Causes of World War II
In his will, the Fuhrer describes the period between the world wars as a time of reflection and the incubation of ideas. All of Hitler's plans during these years were formed, according to him, under the influence of love for his own people and devotion to them. The dictator writes that he did not want to start World War II, but was forced to make this difficult decision in the name of prosperity
His reasons for attacking neighboring countries mainly come down to his personal hatred of the Jews. The rulers of states with such roots or their activities for the benefit of this nation are what provoked his aggression. In the document, he completely absolves himself of blame for starting the bloodshed. And he says that he has repeatedly proposed controlling and limiting the world's armaments.
Hitler's quotes from his political testament are interesting and reveal his actions in solving the German-Polish problem. “In just three days, I made an offer to the British ambassador to eliminate this conflict, but it was rejected, since the British government needed this war,” he writes. Hitler cites the reason for the refusal as the influence of propaganda disseminated by the Jews, and as a result, the increase in business activity beneficial to London.
Why did the Fuhrer choose suicide?
Hitler's political testament also conveys to us the reasons why he decided to take his own life. First of all, it is the impossibility of leaving the Reich. The Fuhrer writes that the strength of his army has weakened, the morale has been undermined from within by traitors and cowards. Therefore, his last will is to share the fate of millions of Germans who decided not to flee, but to remain in the occupied country. But since falling into the hands of the enemy is unacceptable for Hitler, death is the only correct solution.
The Fuhrer writes that he dies with a light heart. He is inspired by the exploits of the rank and file at the front, the exorbitant help from the rear and the ardent hearts of German youth. Hitler's speech in the document contains gratitude to all these people, thanks to whose enormous efforts the Reich flourished, and the glory of Germany thundered throughout the world. The self-sacrifice of ordinary residents and his own death, the ruler of the Reich is confident, will provide grain that in the future will be able to germinate and revive the National Socialist movement. He asks the people not to repeat his suicide, but to save their lives in order to continue the fight and give birth to future heroes of Germany.
Political appointments
The Fuhrer was very disappointed in his close associates, especially Goering. In his will, he excludes him from the party and completely deprives him of his rights. Instead, Admiral Doenitz should take the chair of the Reich President and Commander-in-Chief of the military forces. He also removes Himmler, Reichsfuehrer and Chief Minister from office. At Hitler's request, he should be replaced by Karl Hanke and Paul Giesler.
Himmler and Goering intrigued, but the Fuhrer revealed their secrets. Hitler was informed of their desire to seize power and negotiate with the enemy. All this, according to the ruler of the Reich, caused enormous damage to the country and led to the defeat of his people in this war. Therefore, dying, he wants to atone for his guilt before the Germans by appointing them a worthy and honest cabinet of ministers. The Fuhrer hopes that the new government will be able to continue his work and make Germany "the queen of all nations." Among his followers: Bormann, Greik, Funk, Thierak and other German figures of that time.
Main mission of followers
Hitler's political testament carries the main message to the future generation: they must continue to develop the activities of the National Socialist Workers' Party of Germany. Some members of the new cabinet appointed by the Fuhrer, including Bormann, Goebbels and their wives, also wanted to commit suicide along with their leader. But Hitler orders them not to do this, since their activity, intelligence and resourcefulness should serve the benefit of the country, should revive it from the ruins and raise it from its knees.
The Fuhrer wishes them firmness and justice. They should not give in to fear, because the honor of the nation for his followers should be above all. According to Hitler, the main task of future generations is to continue the development of the party, sacrifice their own interests to it, be faithful to duty and obey the new government to the last drop of blood. The German people are obliged to observe racial laws, and at the same time hate and destroy the poisoner of the whole world - the Jewish community.
The significance of Hitler's political testament
world history
It is huge, as it was able to shed light on many distorted facts and propaganda of the USSR government, the oppressed Jews and other peoples who suffered in that war. It is true that Hitler was a ruthless tyrant and a murderer of millions of innocents. But the fact that he was a weak-minded, nervous hysteric, as Soviet films show us, is a myth. It is clear from the will that it was written by a reasonable person. He was wise enough, he simply directed his activities in the wrong direction, which resulted in the death of millions of people. The document also refutes the version that the Fuhrer allegedly managed to escape to Latin America and there safely live to be a hundred years old. But we see: he loved his ideology so much, placing it above all else, that he wished to die with it.
Hitler's political testament indicates that it was not only the Fuhrer who was responsible for the war. The same England, wanting bloodshed for its own selfish purposes, became the indirect culprit for the beginning of the collapse of Europe. When Churchill realized what he had done, it was already too late to stop the Fuhrer, who had advanced into the very depths of the continent. And the Soviet Union itself was an aggressor similar to Hitler. It was he who unleashed a series of wars from 1938 to 1941: he swallowed up the Baltic and captured parts of Poland and Finland.
Opinion of historians
It is diametrically opposite. Some say that his will is extremist in nature, which is why it was banned from being distributed in many districts and regions of the Russian Federation. In principle, the decision is correct. After all, the legacy of the main murderer of the 20th century became the basis of the policy of neo-Nazis, who have recently intensified their illegal activities throughout the country. The document has no right to life, it must be destroyed just like Hitler himself. But this is only one side of the coin. If you look from a different angle, the will is a historical value, interesting for discovering new facts about this person, his environment and the policies of Nazi Germany.
Other historians evaluate the document and draw attention to the fact that there is not a single bad word about the Russian people in its lines. Despite the fact that Germany fell under Soviet shells and bombs, Hitler’s speech was not riddled with curses against the USSR. As before, he blames the Jews for all the troubles on earth. Hitler's quotes burn with aggression and hatred towards this people.
What happened after the death of the Fuhrer?
Hitler's political testament was written and passed on to his followers. But not all of his comrades were ready to submit to his will. So, the new Reich Chancellor Goebbels appointed by him did not want to stay alive. Out of love and devotion to his Fuhrer or fear of being severely punished by the victors, but he also committed suicide. Other generals did the same: Hitler’s adjutant Burgdorf and the last chief of staff Krebs.
Some say that this is ordinary cowardice. But one can argue with this, since not everyone dares to take their own life. And their death by their own hands now looks, centuries later, more dignified than the death of the same Goering, who breathed his last in an American prison, or Himmler, who died on an English bunk. And this is not to mention those dozens hanged in 1946. No, we don’t sing to the bloodsuckers, we’re just trying to look at events objectively, putting aside personal prejudices and opinions.
History reveals many nuances about the Fuhrer’s habits. Everyone knew Hitler as an ardent vegetarian. He hated people who smoked and fought this bad habit with all possible methods at the state level. His eternal mania for reading and processing book material was known to his associates. They often saw him in libraries, at seminars and conferences. The Fuhrer idolized cleanliness and avoided people with runny noses.
Hitler was always a man of few words. But this only concerned personal communication. When it came to politics, there was no stopping him. Pondering his speech for a long time, he walked silently around the office for hours, but when he began to dictate to the typist, she did not have time to write everything down word for word. The verbal flow was accompanied by quotes, exclamations, active gestures and facial expressions.
Adolf Hitler changed the course of history; we remember him as a tyrant and murderer. Despite the many positive qualities of his character, there is no excuse for the troubles that this evil genius has brought to innocent people all over the world.
Self-confidently stated: “I always try to put myself in the position of the enemy. In fact, he has already lost the war.” Ten days later, in a conversation with the Japanese ambassador in Berlin, Hiroshi Oshima, the Fuhrer predicted that it was not him, but Stalin, who would suffer the fate of Napoleon this time. At the same time, Hitler admiringly called his military leaders “personalities of historical proportions” and the officer corps “exceptional in its kind.” However, by the end of July, in the course of further developments on the Eastern Front, not a trace remained of this confidence.
Despite the successful military operations, the encirclement of the enemy in the area of Bialystok and Minsk and the subsequent attack on Smolensk, despite the first successes of Army Group North in the Leningrad direction and Army Group South in Ukraine, in the second half of July it became obvious that. both army groups operating on the flanks will not be able to cope with the enemy forces opposing them on time and will therefore be forced to use part of the formations of Army Group Center to complete their assigned tasks. Hitler, deciding where to turn the formations of Army Group Center - north or south, called it the most difficult decision of this war. Hitler's confidence that the campaign would proceed as planned was reflected in a series of directives in late July and early August.
On July 19, in OKW Directive No. 33, Hitler demanded that infantry and tank units and formations be turned south to support Army Group South and at the same time also conduct an offensive with mobile units and formations in the northeast direction to support Army Group North, and forces infantry formations of Army Group Center to continue the attack on Moscow. On July 23, in addition to this directive, he even ordered the final transfer of the 2nd Panzer Group to the subordination of Army Group South and the temporary subordination of the 3rd Panzer Group to Army Group North. On July 30, Hitler was forced in the new OKW Directive No. 34 to temporarily cancel his decision, set out in addition to OKW Directive No. 33. The 3rd Panzer Group was not allowed to enter the battle, Army Group Center was ordered to suspend the offensive, the 2nd and the 3rd Panzer Group was supposed to receive reinforcements. This directive was also supplemented by a new instruction dated 12 August, which ordered Army Group Center to conduct offensive operations on the flanks, ensuring close cooperation with neighboring army groups in order to repel the threat of enemy counterattacks.
These directives indicated a difference of opinion in assessing the situation, Hitler’s disagreements with his military advisers, and also the fact that it remained unclear how to continue the campaign, since it was not possible, as planned, to defeat the enemy west of the Dnieper-Western Dvina line. In his training developments, General Marx back in the fall of 1940 proceeded from the fact that the campaign should end west of the Dnieper-Western Dvina line. During the war games, held under the leadership of Lieutenant General Friedrich Paulus, who was then the chief quartermaster of the ground forces, their participants also came to the conviction that the Red Army must be defeated west of this line, because otherwise the German armed forces would be too weak in order to defeat the Soviet Union in the vast Russian expanses. But this was a task that Hitler could not solve when planning operations at the end of January 1941. All initial plans for the campaign against Russia were based on preventing the Red Army from retreating deep into the territory of the Soviet Union. In case this could not be done, plans were not prepared, since the high command of the ground forces, having overestimated their capabilities, did not take into account the likelihood of such a development of the situation.
At the end of July, Hitler realized that his dreams of occupying Moscow on August 15 and ending the war with Russia on October 1 turned out to be unrealistic: the enemy did not take his plans into account. These days, Hitler is increasingly thinking about the time factor, which became the defining moment in the deployment of all subsequent operations. A convincing picture was painted by the OKW Chief of Staff, Field Marshal General Wilhelm Keitel, in a conversation with Field Marshal von Bock during his visit to Army Group Center headquarters in Borisov on July 25.
“Hitler's hope that Japan would use the moment to settle scores with Russia appears to have been dashed. In any case, we can’t count on her performing anytime soon. But in the interests of the Germans, it is necessary to deal a crushing blow to Russia as quickly as possible, since otherwise it is impossible to conquer it.” Assessing the current situation, the Fuhrer anxiously asks himself the question: “How much time do I still have to finish off Russia, and how much more time will I need?”
Keitel arrived at the headquarters of Army Group Center to inform Bock about the political situation, and mainly about Hitler’s new instructions “to move from large-scale encirclement operations to tactical actions of a limited scale with the aim of completely destroying the encircled enemy.” These considerations by Hitler indicated that he, recognizing the shortcomings of previous plans, was looking for new ways to achieve his goals and that his confidence in completing the military campaign in a short time was wavering.
Hitler was amazed by the data on the number, its equipment and weapons, so much so that this was another reason for his uncertainty and hesitation.
On July 14, Hitler, in a conversation with Oshima, spoke about the many surprises that Germany had to endure. On July 21, in a conversation with the Slovak Marshal Kvaternik, he said that the Russians had produced such a large number of aircraft and tanks that if he had been informed in advance, he, the Fuhrer, would not have believed it and decided that it was apparently disinformation. In a conversation with Guderian, who actually warned him about the well-established production of tanks by the Russians, Hitler said on August 4, 19411^- that if he knew that the figures named by Guderian were true, then he would decide to attack the USSR it would be much more difficult for him1.
Although Hitler considered the main goals of further offensive operations to be the capture of Leningrad as the “citadel of Bolshevism”, as well as the capture of Ukraine and the Donetsk basin for military-economic reasons, for a long time he could not come to a decision on how to achieve these goals.
Only as a result of the difficult situation on the front of Army Groups North and South, as well as under the influence of strong Russian counterattacks east of Smolensk, did Hitler decide to give the order to suspend the offensive of Army Group Center and move it to the defensive, and also about the destruction of enemy forces on the flanks of the Eastern Front. Of course, the main reason that determined the transition of German troops to the defense east of Smolensk was not the difficulties encountered in logistically supporting the troops of Army Group Center, but Russian counterattacks.
Bock wrote:
“I am now forced to bring into battle all my combat-ready divisions from the reserve of the army group... I need every person on the front line... Despite the huge losses... the enemy attacks every day in several sectors in such a way that until now it was impossible to regroup forces and bring up reserves. If the Russians are not dealt a crushing blow somewhere in the near future, then the task of completely defeating them will be difficult to accomplish before the onset of winter.”
Although at the end of August Hitler still believed that Germany would defeat the Soviet Union before the end of October, by this time the Fuhrer was beginning to think about the possibility of a longer war on the Eastern Front, going beyond the winter of 1941/42. An OKW memorandum of 27 August 1941 on the strategic situation at the end of the summer of that year revealed these doubts even more clearly:
“The defeat of Russia is the immediate and decisive goal of the war, which must be achieved using all the forces that can be pulled from other fronts. Since this cannot be fully accomplished in 1941, in 1942 the continuation of the eastern campaign should become task number one... Only after Russia has been militarily defeated should military operations be launched in full force in the Atlantic and in the Mediterranean against England, if perhaps with the help of France and Spain. Even if Russia is dealt a crushing blow this year, it is unlikely that until the spring of 1942 it will be possible to free up ground forces and air forces for decisive operations in the Mediterranean, the Atlantic and the Iberian Peninsula.”
From this analysis of the situation it is clear that the initial intention, back in the fall of 1941, to undertake operations against the British in the Middle East and to pull back troops from the Russian front turned out to be impracticable.
Directive No. 32 and the draft plans of July 4, 1941, provided for three covering operations against the Middle East for the post-Barbarossa period. Of all these plans, only the plan for an offensive operation through the Caucasus in the direction of Iran remains in force.
The reorganization and rearmament of the ground forces scheduled for the fall had to be postponed indefinitely, operations planned for the period after Barbarossa were also postponed, since after the expected end of the eastern campaign the army would need time to be replenished with people and equipment. Thus, Hitler signed that his plan for a “lightning war” had failed. In search of the culprits, he sharply criticized the OKH regarding the further conduct of operations and behaved defiantly and even insultingly towards him. How offensive Hitler's reproaches were is evidenced by Halder's offer to Brauchitsch to submit his resignation letter. Brauchitsch, however, rejected this offer. Hitler and the military leadership were forced to admit at the end of August that they had miscalculated their plans for Russia. And among the population, sad voices began to be heard that the war had dragged on for too long and that the army had suffered huge losses.
Casualties on the Eastern Front totaled 585,122 by the end of August—about three times the casualties of the entire French campaign.
During the same time, German troops lost 1,478 tanks and assault guns, that is, approximately 43% of the available tanks and assault guns at the beginning of the war with Russia.
A security report dated August 4, 1941 stated:
“Opinions are often expressed that the campaign is not developing as might have been expected based on the reports published at the beginning of the operation... Now it seems that the Russians have an enormous amount of weapons and equipment and that their resistance is intensifying.”
A report dated September 4, 1941 noted that “many Reich citizens express dissatisfaction with the fact that military operations on the Eastern Front have dragged on for too long. More and more often one can hear statements that the offensive in the East is developing very slowly.”
In order to eliminate these sentiments and restore the population’s faith in the regime, it was necessary to quickly end the war in Russia and end it with victory.
Military-economic issues. In August it was necessary to conclude that the plans for the production of weapons and military equipment planned on July 14, 1941 were also not fully implemented. The planned production output for the newly formed tank and motorized divisions was already reduced by 16% on August 8. Of the originally planned 36 tank divisions of three regiments, only 30 divisions of two regiments were now to be formed, and from 18 motorized divisions - only 15 divisions of two regiments.
At extended meetings in the OKW military economics and armaments department, which lasted from August 14 to 16, 1941, it was decided, due to a lack of labor and raw materials, to reduce the tank production program from 900 to 650 units per month. In addition, a decision was made, along with a partial reduction in production for the needs of the ground forces, to limit the production of anti-aircraft guns, to completely stop production associated with preparations for the landing operation “Seelowe” (“Sea Lion”)®1-, and to agree on an extensive production program for the Air Force with the available possibilities.
The Reich Minister for Armaments and Ammunition, Fritz Todt, who took part in the meeting, stated that the plan for the production of tanks and the expanded program for the production of weapons for the Air Force arose at a time when they hoped, with the end of the war on the Eastern Front, to release 1 million people from the army for the needs of the economy . Now the situation has changed. Even if the figure of 1 million people was 100% overestimated, it still became obvious that the main obstacle to the implementation of weapons production plans was primarily the lack of labor. The OKH Chief of Staff, in his memorandum on the possibilities of reorganizing the ground forces in the fall of 1941, referring to the need to provide effective assistance to the economy with people after the end of operations in the fall of 1941, came to the conclusion that after the end of operations on the Eastern Front, the armed forces could be allocated for the needs of industry are a maximum of 500 thousand people, of which 200 thousand will be World War II veterans discharged from the army and 300 thousand will be specialists who are urgently needed in industry. All plans for the military industry were based on the fact that after the end of the Eastern campaign, during the reorganization of the ground forces, most of the specialist workers would be sent to enterprises.
At the same time, it was planned to disband 49 infantry divisions, as a result of which about 500 thousand people would be freed up for the military industry. Initially, it was planned to disband even 60 infantry divisions, but by August this figure had decreased to 49. In July, manpower requirements amounted to 1.5 million people, and thus could only be met by one third, and in specialists - even only by one fifth. The tense situation at the front made it clear to the leadership of the relevant departments that using the released soldiers in the military industry in the near future was out of the question. Therefore, the existing contradiction between growing demand and available labor reserves for the military industry continued to deepen. Of the 9.9 million unconscripted military personnel belonging to the contingents of 1897-1923, after being called up for active service, the selection of persons subject to armor, and also unfit for military service, by the beginning of August only 72 thousand people remained. This meant that it was impossible to make up for losses in personnel, nor to satisfy the need to increase the number of troops at the front, since the annual natural increase in the contingent of military personnel (350 thousand people) turned out to be exceeded. This problem could be solved only by exposing other areas of the economy or by calling younger people into active service. But the possibilities for this were limited, and mainly because the need for workers for the war industry increased. Although civilian industries could, through various types of internal movements, free up about 30 thousand people every month for military production, this was still not enough.
The way out of this situation, found by the German leadership, was very simple: to use in the military industry about 500 thousand French prisoners of war, previously employed in German agriculture. Russian prisoners of war could take their place in agriculture. The first attempts by the Wehrmacht High Command and the Reich Ministry of Labor to put this plan into practice date back to mid-July, although by then it had already become clear that the use of Russian prisoners of war for work on German territory in accordance with the directives previously issued by the highest authorities was impossible.
In August, the situation cleared up a little after the Wehrmacht High Command, and mainly Goering, as the general commissioner for the implementation of the four-year plan, demanded the replacement of French prisoners of war with Russian ones. On August 2, the Wehrmacht High Command requested the use of Russian prisoners of war in Germany. This measure was seen as a “forced evil.” However, Goering managed to obtain for the military industry, and primarily for the implementation of the aircraft production program, 100 thousand French and only 120 thousand Russian prisoners of war, since Hitler categorically prohibited the use of more Russians on the territory of the empire. Thus, assistance to the military industry was provided, but not to the extent required. Due to the fact that most French prisoners of war needed training for work in the war industry, their efficiency ratio was still low. Moreover, this number of prisoners of war was completely insufficient. Only to fulfill the most urgent and most important military orders was required: the navy - 30 thousand people, the ground forces - 51 thousand people, the air force until the end of 1941 - 316 thousand people, to implement the Krauch program (fuel , aluminum, artificial rubber) - 133,700 people, that is, a total of 530,700 people. The only way to solve the manpower problem - and this became quite obvious in August - was to use Russian manpower in the future.
Participants in a meeting in the Department of War Economy and Armaments on August 16, 1941 came to the conclusion that even the most important production programs should be reduced due to a lack of raw materials. The commander of the reserve army, Colonel General Fromm, demanded that the Wehrmacht leadership “finally descend from the sky-high heights to the sinful earth.” Real conditions dictated either a sharp reduction in production programs or the seizure of new raw material bases. The missing reserves of raw materials needed to be replenished from the rich depths of the European part of the Soviet Union, and this was one of the main reasons that prompted Hitler to attack the USSR. In his notes on the military-economic significance of the operation in the East, the head of the department of military economics and armaments indicated that Germany would receive relief from raw materials if it was possible to take decisive action to prevent the enemy from liquidating reserves of raw materials, to capture the oil-bearing regions of the Caucasus and solve the transport problem.
It was planned to create a special organization for the exploitation of Russian industry and natural resources, and the issue of this was previously discussed in November 1940. Initially, this organization was transferred to the subordination of Lieutenant General Schubert and was called the “working headquarters of Russia.” On March 19, 1941, it was renamed “special purpose economic headquarters Oldenburg” and reported directly to Goering. The organization was supposed to deal with issues not only of the military, but also of the entire economy as a whole, that is, to put the industry and raw materials of the USSR at the service of the interests of Germany.
The leadership of the Department of War Economy and Armaments was of the opinion that Germany should not only use Russia’s raw materials to continue the war, but also further restore Russian industry and agriculture. Goering, on the contrary, was a supporter of the unbridled plunder of the Soviet Union and did everything possible to achieve this. In June 1941, the organization was renamed "military-economic headquarters Ost". It had under its command “economic inspections” in the rear areas of army groups, one in each army group, one or more “economic commands” in security divisions, and one “economic group” in each army. All of these “economic” organizations were at the disposal of the relevant Wehrmacht command authorities and carried out the tasks of supplying troops.
But their main purpose was to do everything necessary for the fastest and most effective use of the occupied areas in the interests of Germany, that is, in the plunder of the wealth of the Soviet Union. On August 25, 1941, Hitler, in a conversation with Mussolini, noted that the economic occupation and exploitation of the Soviet Union had begun successfully. He even claimed that the captured booty was significantly more than what the German army was counting on. However, Hitler concealed the fact that the captured sources of raw materials, due to severe destruction and damage to mining enterprises, could be used for the German military industry only to a limited extent and that, due to a lack of transport, the transfer of agricultural products from the Soviet Union could not be fully ensured. Nevertheless, in this area, as well as in the area of raw materials, there remained hope that in the future it would be possible to overcome all the growing difficulties that were now becoming obvious if things were better organized and if German troops successfully advanced forward to the East.
The question of raw materials played a decisive role in why Hitler, having disagreed with the OKH regarding the further plan of operations, decided at the end of August to launch the main blow in the south, and not on the front of Army Group Center. The Fuhrer believed that the destruction or seizure of vital raw material bases was much more important than the seizure or destruction of industrial enterprises for processing raw materials.
The need to capture the Donetsk basin and provide cover for the Romanian oil-bearing areas prompted Hitler to, using an operationally advantageous starting position on the inner flanks of Army Groups South and Center, launch an offensive with the goal of destroying the Russian armies in the Kyiv area and opening the way to the Soviet raw material bases. By this time, coal production in Germany was about 18 million tons per month (June 1941), iron ore - 5.5 million tons per year, oil - 4.8 million tons per year®1.
After the successful completion of the first stage of the operation to encircle Kiev, Hitler decided that both main objectives of the campaign had almost been completed - to capture the Crimea and the industrial coal region of Donetsk and cut off Russian oil supply routes from the Caucasus, as well as cut off Leningrad in the north and connect with the Finns. However, by the beginning of September, the German military command understood that the “Russian colossus” was not only not crushed, but also concentrated most of the forces near Moscow, which must be destroyed if you want to achieve a final victory over Russia. By the beginning of September, the Red Army had concentrated about 40% of ground forces and artillery personnel, 35% of tanks, 35% of VVO-Sh- in well-equipped positions near Moscow. Since the Russian command believed that the decisive direction would be the western, it also pulled a large number of manpower reserves and equipment there.
Political situation. Germany's foreign policy situation was such that it needed an early victory over the Soviet Union like air. In their plans for the period after Barbarossa, the German command counted on the support, and perhaps even the entry into the war of Turkey, Spain and Vichy France on the side of the “Great German Empire”. Already in March 1941, the German ambassador to Turkey, Franz von Papen, reported that Turkey would side with the Axis countries only if favorable conditions were created for them. Spain also took a similar position. Hopes of reaching an agreement with Vichy France, mainly on the issue of its North African possessions, were dashed in early September, as France realized that as a result of the weakening of Germany in the war with Russia, it could in the near future again rise to the ranks of great powers . But these were hopes that could only be realized when victory over Russia became obvious, and the countries mentioned above would risk going to war due to this. In addition, after the US occupation of Iceland, Hitler feared, and not without reason, that the United States would enter the war and then he would be able to wage war only if the economic potential of Russia was in his hands. Fear of the United States entering the war while the campaign in Russia was not yet over forced Hitler to do everything possible to prevent America from having any reason to declare war on Germany. He hoped that after the victory over Russia, the United States would not dare to oppose Germany and would remain neutral, especially since American forces would be pinned down in the Pacific by its Axis partner, Japan.
In a conversation with the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, Grand Admiral Erich Raeder, Hitler again emphasized his decision to do everything possible to not give the United States an excuse to enter the war in the near future. The request for permission for German submarines to attack American ships was categorically rejected by Hitler.
Hitler, in contrast to Joachim von Ribbentrop, approved of Japan's performance in Southeast Asia and its restrained position towards the Soviet Union, since it drew part of the British forces from Europe and North Africa and kept the United States from entering the war.
Ribbentrop, who differed with Hitler on foreign policy issues, sought from the very beginning of the Russian campaign to persuade Japan to begin military operations against the Soviet Union as quickly as possible. All his attempts, however, failed, running up against the notorious “selfish considerations” and the realistic assessment of the situation by the Japanese.
Hitler considered a Japanese attack on Russia impossible. However, he made the answer to the question whether such an attack would be beneficial for Germany depend on the developing military situation. In any case, at the beginning of September he believed that he could alone, without the help of Japan, bring Russia to its knees. The Axis partners, however, by this time were no longer so confident in the victorious outcome of the German campaign against the Soviet Union. The Italian General Staff and Mussolini, starting from the second half of July, believed that Germany had overestimated its strength and that Russia would be able to hold out until the winter. The Japanese, impressed by the strength of the Russian resistance near Smolensk and remembering the lessons of the battles with the Red Army at Khalkhin Gol11, decided to seek a political settlement of relations with the Soviet Union. Back in 1941, they did not hide their doubts about the victorious outcome of the Eastern campaign for Germany.
Hitler, who had reached a dead end in early September, saw the only way out of the current situation was to concentrate all his efforts on the Eastern Front in order to secure a strategic advantage for himself back in 1941 and create favorable conditions for the development of operations in the period after Barbarossa in 1942. But for this, Hitler needed to completely defeat the Red Army and achieve operational freedom of action on the European territory of Russia, which was possible only if the Russian troops were defeated near Moscow. Therefore, from Hitler’s point of view, it was logical to listen to the arguments of the OKH, which he had hitherto rejected as untenable, and to bet everything on the trump card, whose name is “Moscow,” in order to thus end the war in the East. The victorious outcome of the offensive in the fall of 1941 was supposed to help resolve the ever-increasing difficulties in the military, economic and political fields.
K. Reinhardt. Turning near Moscow.
Already at the first stage of the war, it was planned to exterminate 30 million Slavs
On December 18, 1940, Hitler signed Directive No. 21 on the preparation and implementation of Plan Barbarossa. The day before, the Fuhrer, in a conversation with the Chief of the Wehrmacht General Staff, Jodl, especially insisted that Germany must “solve all problems on the European continent in 1941.” This would make it possible, the Fuehrer added, to attack the United States in 1942.
Speaking to the leaders of the Wehrmacht on January 9, 1941, Hitler said that the conquest of Russia would make Germany invulnerable to any enemy. According to the Fuhrer, the military defeat of Soviet Russia is inevitable. This will allow, he emphasized, to transfer troops from defeated Russia by August and re-engage with England.
We can safely say that the development of the concept of a “war of annihilation” against Russia is the fruit of the intellectual efforts of Hitler himself. He probably became somewhat delighted when he began to talk about the “terrible nature of the coming war.” The Fuhrer was sure that it was important not only to conquer the territory of the Soviet Union, but also to clear it of all kinds of “racial garbage” for subsequent total Germanization.
Hitler was a staunch supporter of the "Nordic" theory. “The formation of the Russian state,” he wrote in “Mein Kampf,” “was not the result of the state-political abilities of the Slavs, but was to a greater extent a wonderful example of the state-forming activity of the German element in an inferior race.”
The Norman theory was interpreted in Nazi Germany in such a way that aggression against the Soviet Union looked like the conquest of territories that originally belonged to the “German element.”
From this thesis naturally flowed for the Germans the “right” to “Germanization,” or more precisely, the “re-Germanization” of the eastern territories, that is, the “right” to the physical destruction of the entire population in the occupied territories.
Talk about “helots” was only an ideological cover for these monstrous plans.
Reichsführer Himmler, who showed great interest in the eastern lands (probably also affected by his agricultural education), learned the lessons of his Fuhrer well. He formulated his thesis this way: “As long as man exists on earth, the struggle between humans and subhumans is a historical necessity.”
At another meeting, which was held before the attack on the Soviet Union, Hitler again emphasized the “special character” of the war in the East. This should be, in his opinion, an “ideological war” and a “war of destruction.”
Plans for the physical destruction of tens of millions of people living on the territory of the Soviet Union constituted the main “secret” of Hitler’s plan. This was the true meaning of his “chosenness.” He took upon himself this monstrous sin, as he believed, for the sake of the future happiness of the German nation. And only the German nation. When some “experts” hastily compare the Soviet Union and Germany, they should pay attention to this circumstance.
Hitler, of course, could not completely hide his plans. It is amazing how easily these plans were accepted by the Wehrmacht leadership and its generals.
It’s funny to say that the German military knew nothing and were simply doing their duty. An attempt to deliberately kill tens of millions of innocent people does not fit in with the concept of any kind of nobility.
Moscow received reports of an impending German attack on the Soviet Union from numerous sources. It is difficult to imagine that Stalin completely ignored them. We can agree that Stalin was afraid of breaking the treaty with Germany. And we already know that for Hitler, concluding an agreement with Soviet Russia was a forced step, and he was greatly relieved when Germany violated the terms of this agreement. Public statements at that moment were of little importance, but on June 13, 1941, a TASS report said that rumors regarding the impending war with Germany were completely unfounded. This message also stated that the concentration of German troops near the borders of the Soviet Union is due to the fact that Germany wants to remove them from the attack of Anglo-American aviation.
Western historians believe that Stalin showed Zhukov a letter from Hitler in June 1941, and on June 14 a TASS statement appeared, which presented exactly the same arguments that were contained in the Fuhrer’s letter to Stalin.
At this time, everyone in Berlin was delighted that they had managed to outwit the Kremlin ruler. “Moscow published an official denial,” Goebbels writes in his diary. “They know nothing about preparations for an attack by the Reich. The movements of our troops supposedly serve other purposes. In any case, Moscow is doing nothing to counter such intentions. It's amazing!".
It was widely believed that Hitler underestimated the capabilities and level of technical equipment of the Red Army. This is partly true, but at the same time, on June 14, the Fuhrer warned his generals against underestimating the potential of the Soviet armed forces. However, there is no doubt that both Hitler and his military were contemptuous of their future enemy. The Fuhrer himself considered Soviet Russia a “bastion of world Jewry” that was to be completely destroyed. Soviet Russia seemed to Hitler as a “creepy” country, reminding him of the mysterious ship from Wagner’s opera The Flying Dutchman. Another of the Fuhrer’s sayings is often quoted: “We know absolutely nothing about Russia.” Of course, we cannot take such things literally; we do not know the context, and rather, these kinds of phrases indicate a certain state of mind. And yet, one cannot but agree that he had access to data on the state of the Soviet armed forces.
If anything prevented the Fuhrer from objectively assessing the situation, it was due to racial theories.
A little earlier, on January 19, 1941, Hitler summoned the Italian Duce to his Alpine residence Berghof. The latter, as a person not lacking insight, noted that Hitler was “very anti-Russian.” This anti-Russian sentiment was also due to the fact that the Fuhrer believed that after Stalin’s death, power in the Soviet Union would be able to be seized again by the Jews. That is, there were more than enough reasons for hatred.
The physical destruction of the population of the Soviet Union was a major component of the "Enterprise" or Plan Barbarossa. Himmler and Heydrich in their department at the beginning of the year developed plans for the destruction of 30 million Slavs in the first stage of the war. And this is only at the first stage. The leaders of the SS turn to Brauchitsch on this issue, counting on help from the Wehrmacht in implementing the “project.”
General Georg Thomas, the chief economic specialist of the Wehrmacht, after a meeting with Goering on February 26, notes that the plan is for “the rapid physical destruction of all Soviet leaders.” The number of people to be destroyed has not yet been specified. This freedom leaves great room for interpretation. This is what actually happened.
Chief of the General Staff of the Ground Forces Halder writes in his diary after a meeting with Hitler: “The intelligentsia appointed by Stalin must be destroyed. The control apparatus of the Russian Empire must be broken. On the territory of Great Russia, violence must be used in the most brutal form.”
The Commander-in-Chief of the Wehrmacht ground forces, Field Marshal von Brauchitsch, did not stand aside. In a memorandum sent to the troops, he, in particular, emphasized: “The troops must be clear that the upcoming war is a struggle of one race against another, and here it is necessary to act with the necessary cruelty.”
On March 30, 1941, Hitler invited 200 senior Wehrmacht officers to his Reich Chancellery. He once again emphasized that the upcoming war with the Soviet Union is a war of ideologies with all the ensuing consequences. The physical destruction of the Soviet intelligentsia and Bolshevik commissars is “not a job for military courts,” that is, it is a common task for the SS and the Wehrmacht. Unit commanders must know how to act. “Commissars and employees of the GPU are criminals. - Hitler noted, “and they must be dealt with accordingly.”
Hitler especially insisted that Wehrmacht officers and soldiers should not experience any problems with their conscience when performing this task.
None of the generals - and this is typical - protested. After the war, Brauchitsch stated that after this speech, several indignant officers allegedly approached him. Be that as it may, that was all. This episode once again suggests that at least the senior officers understood the criminal goals of the war against the Soviet Union. Also, after the end of the war, General Warlimont argued that the Wehrmacht generals did not protest, since by this time Hitler was allegedly able to convince them that the “Soviet commissars” were not soldiers, but “criminals.” Warlimont added that everyone was confident that the supreme commander and head of state “cannot do anything illegal.” On May 12, all these instructions on the physical destruction of representatives of the state and party apparatus in Soviet Russia were officially enshrined in the form of a corresponding decree.
To implement the Barbarossa plan, the necessary military and legal grounds were prepared. In other words, Wehrmacht soldiers were exempt from responsibility for killing the local population in the occupied territories of the Soviet Union. It was possible to shoot partisans, all kinds of dissenters and instigators without trial or investigation. It was allowed to take hostages and “deal with them on the spot” using weapons. All these developments were collected and set out in the so-called “law on commissioners”, which was promulgated on May 13, 1941.
The English historian Ian Kershaw calls all this preparation for a criminal war against the Soviet Union “deliberate barbarism.” It is difficult to disagree with this, and it inexorably follows that the punishment for this type of crime should be extremely severe.
It can be said with a fair degree of confidence that the criminal nature of the “Commissar Law” was obvious to the majority of Wehrmacht officers, as well as to many soldiers.
On April 2, 1941, Hitler summoned Reichsleiter Rosenberg to appear. “Your great hour has come, Rosenberg,” - with these words Hitler ended a two-hour conversation with his plenipotentiary for worldview. The conversation partly took place in the winter garden, where the Fuhrer outlined his intentions regarding Soviet Russia.
We can only guess what exactly the Fuhrer said that day. Here is what Rosenberg himself says about this in his diary: “Then the Fuhrer outlined in detail the likely course of events in the east, but I will not write about that today. But I can never forget it.”
Many believe that Hitler then initiated Rosenberg into his plans for the physical destruction of the population of Soviet Russia.
Of course, Hitler planned to destroy the Jews living on the territory of the Soviet Union. But even if we take the working figures of the planned genocide, that is, 35-50 million, then this figure clearly exceeds the number of victims of the Holocaust.
50 million was a “working” preliminary figure, which was used at the beginning of the war against the Soviet Union by a variety of organizations of the Third Reich, not least the Office for Strengthening the German Nationality under the leadership of Reichsführer Himmler.
In his diary entry about the meeting, Rosenberg uses the word “millions” several times. Millions, he says, will curse the implementation of the Fuhrer’s plans, but “what do we care if the immediate future blesses us with a great Germany to come.” We can say that Rosenberg is trying to use this future to hide his mental turmoil, unconsciously repeating “millions ... millions.” The tasks before the armchair “ideologist” were now set completely different. With his direct participation, millions of people must be exterminated for the future happiness of the German people.
A very characteristic admission regarding the true nature of the plans for the resettlement of people in German-occupied territory was made by the head of the special department for racial policy in the Eastern Ministry, Erhard Wetzel. He openly stated that at the first stage of military operations against Soviet Russia, 31 million people from the “alien” population, including 5-6 million Jews, should be “destroyed through resettlement.”
The start of military operations in the eastern direction was planned for April. However, the Fuhrer was forced to postpone the start of the operation, which he informed Rosenberg about. He, in turn, said that the harvest begins in Ukraine on June 20. Therefore, Rosenberg reported, the offensive should begin either on June 20 or a few weeks after this date.
“From a practical point of view,” Rosenberg writes in his diary, “the Fuhrer places at my disposal the fate of such a large territory, which, in his own words, is a “continent” with a population of 180 million inhabitants, of which about 100 million live directly in our area of operations." It is not clear whether Rosenberg speaks with enthusiasm about the millions, or whether he is gradually realizing the task set before him. Rosenberg even opened the atlas of the Niedermayer publishing house in order to better imagine the true scale of the tasks assigned to him by the Fuhrer.
There were no protests from the military, just as there were none during punitive actions against the civilian population in Poland. In fact, the Wehrmacht has already become an accomplice in all these crimes.
General Hoepner understood well what was required of him. On May 2, 1941, he made the following entry in his diary: “The war against Russia is an inevitable consequence of the struggle for existence imposed on us. This is the old struggle of the Germans against the Slavs, the defense of European culture against the Muscovite invasion, the defense against Jewish Bolshevism.
The goal of this war must be the destruction of modern Russia, and therefore it will be waged with unheard-of cruelty. Every combat action... must be carried out ruthlessly and with an iron will with the goal of completely destroying the enemy.
Especially there should be no mercy for representatives of the modern Russian-Bolshevik system.” General Hepner has no doubts about Hitler's plans for Russia. His reputation in history cannot be saved by the fact that he would later be associated with the opposition and participants in the assassination attempt on Hitler.
Let us also recall that on May 13, 1941, a special decree was issued releasing Wehrmacht soldiers from legal liability for crimes committed on the territory of Soviet Russia. In addition, on June 6, 1941, the “Commissars Law”, shameful for Germany, came into force. Thus, the Wehrmacht was directly and openly involved in carrying out openly criminal actions on our territory.
Of course, special functions were also assigned to the special forces of the SS and the Security Service. They were, among other things, given the task of destroying Jewry as “biological carriers of Bolshevism.”
It cannot be said that absolutely all the Wehrmacht generals were ready to implement these terrible laws that cover the German armed forces with indelible shame. But these were only exceptional cases, and everything was limited to the manifestation of disagreement in private. The career German diplomat Ulrich von Hassell learned from Colonel General Beck about these decrees. "By obeying these orders from Hitler, Brauchitsch sacrifices the honor of the German army." It should be said that von Hassell would also become a participant in the conspiracy against Hitler and was arrested and hanged on September 8, 1944.
The attack on the Soviet Union by Germany was supposed to begin earlier, but this was prevented by the need to conduct a military operation in May 1941 against Serbia and Greece. Hitler did this in order to support his Italian friend the Duce. The German Fuhrer sent a letter to him on the night of June 21-22 and informed him of the decision to attack Soviet Russia. “After making this decision, I feel internally free again. Cooperation with the Soviet Union, with all the justice of the intentions aimed at achieving a detente, nevertheless weighed heavily on me, because, to some extent, it seemed to me a break with my entire past, with my views and my previous obligations.
It cannot be said that Hitler was completely confident in himself... “I have a feeling,” he admitted on the night before the attack on the Soviet Union, “as if I were opening a door leading to some dark, previously unknown space, and I didn’t I know what lurks behind that door.”
In general, concluding a non-aggression pact with Soviet Russia was an extremely unpleasant necessity for Hitler. He did not even hide his feelings from the people he met in those days. Thus, in a conversation with the famous Swiss diplomat and historian Karl Burckhardt, the Fuhrer, in particular, noted: “Everything I do is directed against Russia. If the West is too stupid or too blind to understand this, then I will be forced to make an agreement with the Russians, turn around and strike at the West, and after its defeat, turn around and, combining my capabilities, attack Russia. I also need Ukraine, and then no one will be able to force us to starve, as was the case during the last war.”
In August of the same year, Hitler once again met with Burkhard at his Alpine residence and once again emphasized in a conversation with him: “I don’t need anything from the West, neither today nor tomorrow... But I must have free hands in the East.”
Having received Directive No. 21, the Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces, Walter von Brauchitsch, could not believe his eyes. He even asked Adjutant Engel to clarify with the Fuhrer whether he was really planning an attack on the Soviet Union, or was it just a bluff? In response to this, it was brought to the attention of Brauchitsch that the Fuhrer had never taken treaties with Soviet Russia seriously, since “the ideological abyss separating us is too great.” The goals of the Barbarossa plan were not entirely clear to the Chief of the General Staff of the Ground Forces, Colonel General Franz Halder. He also asked the Fuhrer to provide him with the appropriate explanations.
After the military defeat of France, both Brauchitsch and Halder greatly reduced their ambitions. They resigned themselves to the role of “technical executors” of the will of the Fuhrer of the German nation. Therefore, they did not protest, but only humbly asked to be properly informed.
This arrangement, of course, completely suited Hitler himself. “I became a commander against my will; I am only involved in military issues because at the moment there is no person who could do it better than me. If I had Moltke today, I would give him freedom of action.”
From Hitler’s point of view, of the states occupied by Germany in the east, only Finland could remain conditionally independent for some time. The remaining “states” received the status of commissariats. To their number was added another commissariat - Russia itself. The main task for the first period for these territories was to provide a satisfying life for the population of Germany. “We understand,” Rosenberg emphasized, “that this is due to a severe necessity that is beyond the scope of any feeling. Undoubtedly, all this will inevitably lead to the need for large-scale evacuation, and, of course, the Russian nation has difficult years ahead.”
All these are euphemisms, but even this German “humanism” makes your hair stand on end. It should not be forgotten that everyone in Germany understood this party dialect well. In this dialect, the word "evacuation" meant physical destruction. How else can one imagine the resettlement of millions of people beyond the Urals!
Christian Gerlach was developing a plan at this time, called “Hunger”. According to this plan, everything that will be grown in the vastness of the former Soviet Union will be eaten by the Germans.
The Germans needed land for the German plow, they did not need people. This is “severe necessity”.
The German historian Ernst Pieper, discussing the war of annihilation against the Soviet Union, rightly notes that during the First World War, the actions of the Germans towards Russia differed significantly from what happened during the occupation of other countries, including Poland. German-occupied Russian territories remained under military rather than civilian command.
Two days after the meeting with the military (June 16), Hitler summoned Goebbels. The Minister of Propaganda was received warmly. The Fuhrer expressed his satisfaction regarding the bad weather - this means that the grain in the fields of Ukraine has not yet ripened. This means that the Germans will be able to capture the entire harvest. We also talked about Napoleon. Hitler intended not to repeat his mistakes, to quickly and lightningly defeat the Red Army and seize the territories of the Soviet Union. However, the mention of Napoleon rather indicated a certain amount of uncertainty - the Fuhrer was afraid to repeat the sad experience of the Corsican. Hitler was even pleased with the fact that the Russians concentrated so many divisions on the border with Germany. He believed that he could easily break through the defenses of the Red Army, and then completely destroy it.
The Fuhrer believed that the operation would take about four months. Goebbels was even more optimistic and expressed the opinion that the Bolshevik empire would “collapse like a house of cards.”
“Whether we are right or wrong,” Hitler said at the end of the conversation, “we must win. We are not given anything else. This is necessary and morally right. When we achieve victory, who will ask us about methods? In any case, we have already done so much that we need to win, otherwise our entire people - and first of all, ourselves with everything that is so dear to us - will be swept away."
At 2:30 am on June 22, 1941, Hitler told Goebbels that he now wanted to sleep for a couple of hours. The Minister of Propaganda went to his place, but could not sleep. At 5:30 a.m., that is, about two hours after the start of the artillery shelling of the border Soviet territories, “Russian fanfares” by composer Franz Liszt sounded on the radio. Goebbels read out Hitler's previously written appeal.
In this address, the Fuhrer once again emphasized that he intended to put an end to the Jewish rulers “in their Moscow Bolshevik headquarters.” In a slightly modified form, this appeal was also read out to those Wehrmacht soldiers who had already entered the territory of the Soviet Union.
Sergey Drozhzhin
Special for the Centenary
Operation Barbarossa (Barbarossa plan 1941) - a plan for a military attack and rapid seizure of USSR territory by Hitler’s troops during.
The plan and essence of Operation Barbarossa was to quickly and unexpectedly attack Soviet troops on their own territory and, taking advantage of the enemy’s confusion, defeat the Red Army. Then, within two months, the German army was to advance deep into the country and conquer Moscow. Control over the USSR gave Germany the opportunity to fight with the United States for the right to dictate its terms in world politics.
Hitler, who had already managed to conquer almost all of Europe, was confident of his victory over the USSR. However, the Barbarossa plan turned out to be a failure; the protracted operation turned into a long war.
The Barbarossa plan received its name in honor of the medieval king of Germany, Frederick 1st, who bore the nickname Barbarossa and was famous for his military achievements.
Contents of Operation Barbarossa. Hitler's plans
Although Germany and the USSR made peace in 1939, Hitler still decided to attack Russia, as this was a necessary step towards world domination by Germany and the Third Reich. Hitler instructed the German command to collect information about the composition of the Soviet army and, on this basis, draw up an attack plan. This is how Plan Barbarossa came into being.
After an inspection, German intelligence officers came to the conclusion that the Soviet army was in many ways inferior to the German: it was less organized, less prepared, and the technical equipment of Russian soldiers left much to be desired. Focusing precisely on these principles, Hitler created a plan for a rapid attack that was supposed to ensure Germany's victory in record time.
The essence of the Barbarossa plan was to attack the USSR on the borders of the country and, taking advantage of the enemy’s unpreparedness, defeat the army and then destroy it. Hitler placed the main emphasis on modern military equipment that belonged to Germany and the effect of surprise.
The plan was to be carried out at the beginning of 1941. First, German troops were to attack the Russian army in Belarus, where the bulk of it was gathered. Having defeated Soviet soldiers in Belarus, Hitler planned to advance towards Ukraine, conquer Kyiv and the sea routes, cutting off Russia from the Dnieper. At the same time, a blow was to be delivered to Murmansk from Norway. Hitler planned to launch an attack on Moscow, surrounding the capital from all sides.
Despite careful preparation in an atmosphere of secrecy, it became clear from the first weeks that the Barbarossa plan was a failure.
Implementation of the Barbarossa plan and results
From the very first days, the operation began to not be as successful as planned. First of all, this happened due to the fact that Hitler and the German command underestimated the Soviet troops. According to historians, the Russian army was not only equal in strength to the German one, but in many ways superior to it.
The Soviet troops turned out to be well prepared, in addition, military operations took place on Russian territory, so the soldiers could use the natural conditions, which they knew better than the Germans, to their advantage. The Soviet army was also able to hold its own and not fall apart into separate units thanks to good command and the ability to mobilize and make lightning-fast decisions.
At the beginning of the attack, Hitler planned to quickly advance deep into the Soviet army and begin to split it into pieces, separating units from each other in order to avoid mass operations from the Russians. He managed to advance, but failed to break the front: Russian detachments quickly gathered together and brought up new forces. This led to the fact that Hitler’s army, although winning, moved deeper into the country catastrophically slowly, not by kilometers, as planned, but by meters.
Only a few months later, Hitler managed to approach Moscow, but the German army did not dare to launch an attack - the soldiers were exhausted from prolonged military operations, and the city was never bombed, although something else was planned. Hitler also failed to bomb Leningrad, which was besieged and blockaded, but did not surrender and was not destroyed from the air.
It began, which lasted from 1941 to 1945 and ended with the defeat of Hitler.
Reasons for the failure of Plan Barbarossa
Hitler's plan failed for several reasons:
- the Russian army turned out to be stronger and more prepared than the German command expected: the Russians compensated for the lack of modern military equipment with the ability to fight in difficult natural conditions, as well as competent command;
- the Soviet army had excellent counterintelligence: thanks to intelligence officers, the command almost always knew about the enemy’s next move, which made it possible to quickly and adequately respond to the actions of the attackers;
- inaccessibility of territories: the Germans did not know the territory of the USSR well, since it was extremely difficult to get maps. In addition, they did not know how to fight in impenetrable forests;
- loss of control over the course of the war: the Barbarossa plan quickly showed its inconsistency, and after a few months Hitler completely lost control over the course of hostilities.