The insurrectionary movement in the Amur region, in contrast to the movement in the Amur region and Southern Primorye, where it originated on the periphery, began with an uprising in the city. It was initiated by a group of young communists who remained in the Khabarovsk underground. Despite the cruelest terror of the Kalmyks and foreign invaders, already in September 1918 this group managed to gather local communists around itself and form an underground party committee. The committee's first step was to issue a leaflet about the brutal massacres of the White Guards against Soviet people and about the execution of 16 former Magyar prisoners of war in the city garden.
In the first days of October, the committee established contact with the loaders' union, the workers of the arsenal of the Amur River Flotilla and the railway depot. Here an asset was created for conducting revolutionary work.
Taking into account the dissatisfaction of the population with the mobilization of the peasant-Cossack youth announced by Kalmykov, the committee also launched active propaganda among the units of the Khabarovsk garrison. As a result of this work, revolutionary cells arose in some parts of the White troops, which primarily included former Red Army soldiers who came to Kalmykov along with the mobilized.
The unrestrained revelry of the White Guard reaction, supported and encouraged by the interventionists, heated up the atmosphere more and more. Executions became more frequent not only of civilians, but also of soldiers who did not want to participate in punitive expeditions.
On the first anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution, the underground committee decided to prepare an uprising in the Khabarovsk garrison and organize workers' squads. At the same time, a number of party workers went to the villages and villages in order to create initiative groups there from the former Red Guards and revolutionary-minded peasants. Revolutionary propaganda and news received from the villages about robberies, bullying and torture perpetrated by the Kalmyks soon gave their results. By January 1919, the revolutionary cells organized in the White units had already extended their influence to a significant part of the Khabarovsk garrison. Only the scout hundreds of the Wild Division, the commandant's teams and the military school remained loyal to Kalmykov.
In early January, the committee developed a plan for an uprising with the aim of exterminating the counter-revolutionary officers led by Kalmykov and seizing weapons and ammunition. After that, the rebels were supposed to break through the American-Japanese outposts into the region and, together with the rebellious peasants and Cossacks, begin the destruction of the interventionists. It was decided not to draw the workers' squads into battle for the time being, but to gradually send them to the region to organize partisan detachments there.
The uprising began on the night of January 28. The 3rd and 4th hundreds of the Cossack regiment, part of the artillery battalion and the machine-gun team disarmed a company of junkers, killed officers, including Colonel Biryukov, Kalmykov's closest assistant, was killed. Kalmykov himself could not be captured. He managed to escape to the Japanese headquarters and raise the alarm there. The Japanese units occupied all the exits from the city and cut off the escape routes of the rebels. At the same time, the American invaders, hiding behind, as usual, "neutrality", treacherously let the rebels into their zone, and then the disarmed were imprisoned in a concentration camp on Krasnaya Rechka. Only a few rebel cavalry managed to break through and escape across the Amur towards the Chinese border. Unbearable conditions were created for the rebels who ended up in the American concentration camp. Many of them died from disease and starvation.
Although the uprising of the Khabarovsk garrison did not achieve its goal, it nevertheless played a positive role in mobilizing the masses to fight the counter-revolution. The authority of the communist organization has increased. The working people of the Amur region saw in her the only force capable of waging an uncompromising struggle against the American and Japanese invaders and their henchmen in the most difficult conditions of terror by the interventionists and the White Guards. Kalmykov's position was significantly undermined. He lost some of his powers.
After the Khabarovsk uprising, the underground committee decided to shift the center of gravity of the work to the periphery. In February 1919, the initiative revolutionary groups, reinforced by party workers who had arrived from Khabarovsk, launched active preparations for an illegal congress of the working people of the Amur region. This congress took place on March 10-11, 1919 in the village of Sokolovka. It was attended by 76 delegates from the Tunguska, Nekrasovskaya, Dormidontovskaya, Vyazemskaya, Khabarovsk and other underground revolutionary organizations. The congress was held under the slogan of the struggle for Soviet power and laid the foundation for a mass partisan movement in the Amur region.
At the congress, it was decided to declare illegal the orders of the White Guard authorities on mobilization into the army, organize partisan detachments and provide them with comprehensive assistance and support. To lead the partisan movement, the congress elected a military revolutionary headquarters headed by D. I. Boyko-Pavlov.
During March and April, the military revolutionary headquarters, with the help of initiative revolutionary groups previously created in the villages, organized four infantry partisan detachments, one cavalry and one sapper detachment - with a total strength of up to 600 people. Chinese workers from logging on the Khor River took an active part in organizing the detachments. They cracked down on the white administration and turned the lumberyard's food depots into a supply base for the guerrillas. The working squads that arrived from Khabarovsk and the Red Guards of the former Ussuri Front who escaped from the Kalmyk dungeons were the basis for the selection of command personnel.
Active hostilities of the partisans unfolded in May 1919. On May 19, on the orders of the military revolutionary headquarters, the partisan detachments raided the Japanese garrison located at the station. Verino and guarding the railway bridge over the river Khor. The blow took the enemy by surprise. The partisans destroyed the entire enemy garrison and seized weapons, ammunition and uniforms.
The command of the interventionists and the White Guards sent large forces against the partisans. Three Japanese and two White Guard regiments with a total strength of up to 5,000 soldiers and officers were advanced from Knyaz-Volkonsky and from the stations and crossings of Dormidontovka, Khor, Verino, Kruglikovo. The enemy sought to encircle the partisan detachments with a simultaneous offensive from the north, west and south.
On May 23, fierce fighting broke out in the area of the settlement of Marusino and to the southeast. For three days, the partisans held back the onslaught of the enemy, stubbornly defending their positions. However, having suffered significant losses from artillery and machine-gun fire, they were forced, by order of the military revolutionary headquarters, to retreat deep into the taiga to the upper reaches of the tributaries of the Khor River - Matai and Bicheva. Having begun the pursuit, the interventionists and the Whites tried to press the partisans to the Khor River. The partisan sapper detachment quickly equipped a raft crossing and ensured the withdrawal of the main forces. Having set up an ambush on the river bank, the partisans met the enemy with devastating fire and thwarted his plan. Departing from the pursuing enemy and confusing the tracks, the partisans made a huge detour through the taiga wilds. At the end of June, they went to the area of the village of Veseli Kut, where the military revolutionary headquarters established contact with partisan detachments operating in the areas of the lower reaches of the Amur.
After some lull, the partisan movement by the end of the summer of 1919 again covered a significant part of the Amur region. Detachments of people's avengers appeared not only in the areas south and northeast of Khabarovsk, but also to the west of it. Here in the districts of Arkhangelovka, Art. Ying, Art. Volochaevka and to the east, two Tunguska partisan detachments operated: one under the command of I.P. Shevchuk, the other under the command of the workers of the river flotilla in Khabarovsk, brothers Nikolai and Grigory Kochnev. The political leader of Shevchuk's partisan detachment was P.P. Postyshev, a prominent member of the Communist Party in the Far East, who carried out tremendous political work not only in the detachment, but throughout the surrounding region, as well as in Khabarovsk itself. No measures taken by the White Guard authorities and the interventionists could stifle the growing movement. The population of villages and villages met the punitive detachments with fire or went into the taiga, joining the partisan detachments.
The party center and the military revolutionary headquarters faced new tasks. It was necessary to unite and make more purposeful the actions of all partisan forces. The question also arose of creating local organizations that could paralyze the hostile activities of the kulaks and take over the material support of the partisan detachments.
To solve these problems, in the 20th of August in the village of Alekseevka, Nekrasov Volost, a conference of representatives of the partisan detachments of the Amur region and the Khabarovsk underground communist organization was convened. The conference heard information from the party committee on the international situation and on the situation on the fronts of the Soviet Republic, as well as a report from the military revolutionary headquarters on the state of the partisan movement. It discussed the question of the tactics of partisan operations and decided, in order to provide the most effective assistance to the Soviet Army, to intensify work on the disintegration and disorganization of the enemy rear. To do this, all partisan detachments were asked to launch an attack on the enemy's railway and water communications. The conference decided to set up illegal revolutionary committees in the villages and entrust them with the responsibility of providing assistance to partisan detachments and combating counter-revolution in the localities.
After the conference in Alekseevka, the second period of the partisan movement in the Amur region began. It was characterized by more organized and active actions of the partisans, who concentrated their main efforts on the destruction of enemy lines of communication. At the direction of the military revolutionary headquarters, part of the partisan detachments occupied the area adjacent to the Ussuri railway from st. Bikin to st. Verino. The other part of the detachments was sent closer to Khabarovsk and was located along the Ussuri railroad from the station. Verino to st. Krasnaya Rechka, as well as along the Amur River from the village of Voronezhskoye to Verkhne-Tambovsky (280 km northeast of Khabarovsk).
At the end of August and autumn, the partisans won a number of battles with the interventionists and the White Guards. Izotov's detachment, faced with a punitive expedition of whites near the village of Vyatskoye (on the Amur River), fought a tense battle for 16 hours. The enemy was utterly defeated and lost up to 60 people killed. The partisans captured the head of the punitive expedition. A detachment of partisans under the command of Zhukov, operating on the Amur, in response to the massacre of Japanese gunboats with the settlement of Sinda, attacked two enemy steamships - Lux and Kanavino in the Voronezh region and destroyed them together with the White Guard teams in a one-day battle. The second detachment of partisans under the command of Mizin exterminated a group of Kalmyk counterintelligence officers in the region of Lake Qatar, who were operating here under the guise of a working artel. The third detachment captured a Japanese food transport near the village of Malmyzh, heading to Nikolaevsk-on-Amur.
Along with actions on the river routes, the partisans delivered a number of blows on the Ussuri railroad. In September, a mixed infantry and cavalry detachment under the command of Boyko-Pavlov attacked st. Korfovsky. The partisans defeated the White Guard garrison stationed here, blew up the bridges and burned the station.
At the end of October, one of the detachments ambushed between the stations of Korfovskaya and Krasnaya Rechka and derailed a train with soldiers and officers of the 14th Japanese Infantry Division, heading from Vladivostok to Blagoveshchensk. Despite the defeat of the underground party center in Khabarovsk by the Kalmyks in mid-October, the partisan movement continued to grow. It covered more and more new areas, spreading down the Amur in the direction of Nikolaevsk-on-Amur.
On November 1-2, 1919, the 2nd joint conference of representatives of partisan detachments, revolutionary peasants and urban underground organizations took place in the village of Anastasyevka. The conference discussed the issues of zoning the actions of partisan detachments, the transfer of part of the forces to deploy the fight on Sakhalin, the strengthening of leadership of the partisan movement by the Communists and the organization of revolutionary committees as bodies of Soviet power in the areas liberated from the White Guards. The conference elected a joint military-revolutionary headquarters of the partisan detachments of the Khabarovsk, Nikolaevsky districts and the Sakhalin region and issued an appeal to the Cossacks, peasants and workers with an appeal to join the partisan detachments.
The detachments operating on the Ussuri railroad were merged into the 1st combat area; the detachments operating in the lower reaches of the Amur formed the 3rd combat region. The partisans, grouped west of Khabarovsk along the Tunguska River, united in consolidated detachments under the general command of Shevchuk. Boyko-Pavlov was again elected chairman of the military revolutionary headquarters and commander of all detachments.
After the Anastasiev Conference, the third period of the partisan movement in the Amur region began. It was marked, on the one hand, by overcoming the unhealthy tendency towards independence in actions on the part of some commanders, the establishment of mass political and educational work and raising the combat effectiveness of partisan detachments, and, on the other hand, by the deployment of decisive battles with the interventionists and the White Guards. During this period, the struggle reached its highest tension.
In an attempt to starve out the population that did not want to submit, in November 1919 Kalmykov issued an order forbidding the export of food and other goods from the city to the villages and villages. In response, the military revolutionary headquarters announced an economic blockade of Khabarovsk, calling on the peasants to stop bringing food, fodder and fuel to the city. As a result of the blockade, the Kalmyks were forced to cancel their order.
In the 20th of November, the military-revolutionary headquarters ordered all partisan detachments operating in the direction of the Ussuri railway the order to act simultaneously on November 25 to blow up the railway track and destroy railway structures.
The blow of the partisan detachment at the station. Razengartovka was not crowned with success. The actions of other units were more successful. Between the Gedike and Snarsky sidings, a Japanese armored train was derailed. A detachment of partisans near the village of Otradnoye destroyed the train of interventionists with troops and cargo, blew up the bridge and destroyed the railway track for 8 km. At st. Dormidontovka was defeated by the White Guard garrison and the railway track was destroyed. At the same time, two other detachments of partisans defeated a Japanese garrison up to a regiment on the Khor River and captured the regimental banner, cash desk, machine guns and 120 carts with military equipment. As a result of the defeat of this garrison, the 1st district managed to establish contact with the partisans operating in the Iman valley and in the area of st. Bikin. At the same time, Shevchuk's detachment raided the Japanese garrison, located at the station. Ying, and inflicted significant losses on him.
On December 20, partisan detachments suddenly attacked the Gedike junction and captured a Japanese train with weapons, uniforms and food there. 6 Japanese bombers and 4 machine guns fell into the hands of the partisans. The guerrillas took the seized property to the taiga on carts. In pursuit of them, the invaders abandoned from Art. Vyazemsky strong detachment. The enemy surrounded the partisan barracks, located 28-30 km from the Gedike junction, and after a 2-hour battle recaptured part of the captured property. Pulling up forces, the partisans went on the offensive. They used Japanese bombers and machine guns and, in a fierce 5-hour battle, defeated the invaders and forced them to a hasty retreat. Pursuing the enemy, one detachment of partisans went to the rear and set up an ambush between the Gedike and Kotikovo sidings. At the same time, another detachment continued to push the enemy from the front. Having stumbled upon an ambush, the enemy lost over 200 people killed and wounded and left all the weapons on the battlefield. Only a few interventionists managed to escape to St. Vyazemskaya.
The daring attacks of the partisans, carried out on an increasing scale every day, completely disorganized the communication routes of the interventionists. The combat activity of partisan detachments in December 1919 already covered a huge strip to the south and west of Khabarovsk. Telegraph communication and a significant part of the railroad track from the station. Bikin to st. Vira for 420 km were put out of action by the partisans. The American-Japanese and White Guard garrisons scattered around the stations and sidings lived under constant fear of attack. They did not dare to go beyond their fortifications. For restoration work, the interventionists were forced to send special repair and construction echelons. Trains could move only in the daytime and only under the protection of armored trains.
In connection with the growth of the partisan movement, in November 1919 Kalmykov introduced a state of siege in the Amur region, and in December announced an additional mobilization of ten ages of the Cossacks. But the overwhelming majority of the Cossacks went to the partisans instead of going to the assembly points.
Trying to extinguish the flames of the people's war with the blood of the families of the partisans, the interventionists equipped several large punitive expeditions.
One of these expeditions, formed from parts of the Wild Division, was sent in late December along the Tunguska River against partisan detachments operating west of Khabarovsk. Having burst into the village of Arkhangelovka, the White Guards perpetrated a brutal massacre on the locals and burned half of the village. To combat the punishers, an urgent mobilization of the peasants was carried out, which gave up to 600 fighters within two days. At night, the partisans surrounded the White Guards and defeated them in a heated battle. The second detachment, thrown by the invaders to help the first one in the village of Vostorgovka (north-west of Arkhangelovka), turned out to be less reliable. Some of his soldiers, having established contact with the partisans, killed the officers, disarmed the rest of the units and went over to the side of the partisans.
Having thus mastered two mountain guns and three machine guns, Shevchuk's partisan detachment joined the rebel soldiers and launched an offensive against the Insk garrison of the interventionists. After a fierce battle that lasted a whole day, on January 1, 1920, the partisans occupied Art. Ying, cutting off the communication between Khabarovsk and Blagoveshchensk. After the defeat of the punitive expeditions sent by the invaders and the Japanese garrison at st. The partisan-insurgent movement began to spread towards Khabarovsk with increasing force.
At the same time, partisan detachments operating along the Ussuri railroad were approaching st. Red River. Here were the parts of the American brigade of Colonel Moor, transferred by this time from Khabarovsk. The American interventionists, having occupied Krasnaya Rechka, subjected to barbarous shelling the state Soviet colony for orphans located in the station village. They destroyed and burned all the premises of the colony. Many children died during the shelling and fire. The partisans decided to teach the American military a lesson. On January 19, they made an unexpected raid on st. Krasnaya Rechka and the radio station and appeared in Muravyovskaya Slobidka (a suburb of Khabarovsk), causing panic among the interventionists and the White Guards.
In January 1920, the uprisings engulfed a significant part of the Amur region. In this regard, on January 18-21, at the initiative of the party committee, a congress of workers, peasants, soldiers and Cossack deputies of the Khabarovsk district was held in the village of Kukelevsky. The congress elected the Soviet and passed a decision on the recall of persons serving in government institutions and in the white troops, and also demanded the removal of interventionist troops from the Far East.
At the end of January, the partisan detachments of the 1st district, having joined with the Tungus partisans, formed the Khabarovsk Front and began preparations for an attack on Khabarovsk. No less active actions developed during this period also to the northeast of Khabarovsk in the 3rd combat region. Here, at the end of October 1919, the partisans defeated the White garrison near Zimmermanovka and captured all the weapons of the enemy.
In November, the interventionists and the White Guards sent a punitive expedition to the Obor River and the village of Vyatskoye, which managed to capture the taiga base of the partisans. Avoiding persecution, the partisans moved down the Amur, raising uprisings in the villages lying on the way. All the peasants who had weapons went to the partisan detachments, the rest actively helped the partisans in organizing supplies and rear bases. The workers of the mines without exception joined the partisans. In the villages and villages liberated from the white administration, revolutionary committees were created. In January 1920, the partisan detachment advancing in the direction of Nikolaevsk-on-Amur already numbered several thousand fighters. He had two full-blooded regiments and teams of skiers.
Having attached to itself the insurgent garrison of the white villages of Mariinsk, this detachment at the end of January launched an offensive against the Chnyrrakh fortress, located 12 km from Nikolaevsk-on-Amur.
(Excerpt.)
"Dark spots" of the heroes of the Civil War after the revolution, etc., Suchan (Partizansk), Primorsky Krai and beyond ....
Transbaikalia. Semyonov front.
In 1918 he became a member of the Central Executive Committee of Siberia (Centro-Siberia). Tsentrsibir itself was a multi-party body, which included S.G. Lazo, a member of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party. Here he was engaged in the formation of international divisions2. Somewhat later, the members of Centsibiri ended up among the Bolsheviks, and in the Zemstvo of Primorye, and among the Kolchakites, and at the ataman Semenov.
Soon, the twenty-three-year-old second lieutenant, by order of "Centrosibir"3, was appointed commander of the Daursky (Smenovsky) Front. Here we should make a digression and say a few words about the heroes of the civil war from the side of the Reds. Everyone knows the names of the red commanders of the former officers and non-commissioned officers of the tsarist army: non-commissioned officer Blucher, warrant officer Chapaev, staff captain Kovtyukh, senior non-commissioned officer Budyonny. They were not only skilled front-line commanders, but also true Heroes of the First World War. All of them were Knights of St. George, and the last three had crosses of all four degrees, and Budyonny "full St. George's bow" i.e. four crosses and four medals. For various reasons, they ended up on the side of the Reds. And they started the civil war as commanders of minor partisan detachments, then, having shown skill in command, they received regiments, divisions, armies and successfully commanded them. In this they were assisted by military experts, as well as vast military and life experience, which cannot be replaced by any textbooks. It may be objected that there were others, for example, M.V. Frunze, who did not even hold a rifle in his hands before the start of the civil war. This is a special example. In the first year of the civil war, he was helped by military specialists, and most of all by the former General Novitskaya, who was practically his "shadow". He provided the future commander with assistance both theoretically and practically. Frunze was in battle almost constantly, commanding large formations of the Red Army and fronts. He passed a serious way from a student of the tsarist generals and officers to an independent military commander. By the end of the war, having acquired the relevant experience and knowledge, he was already independently solving major strategic and tactical tasks, but all this did not arise immediately and not suddenly. It took years. Lazo had neither the experience of participants in the First World War, nor, moreover, the experience of Frunze, and could not have had it. So what put him in the category of red commanders and heroes of the civil war?
On the Daurian front, S.G. Lazo was opposed by an experienced warrior G.M. Semenov, who, at the age of twenty-four, got to the front, during the three years of the war he was awarded all officer military orders of that time, up to George 4th degree and Golden Geor -gievsky weapons (total 14 awards4). By the time they began their opposition, the young captain, the current rank, equal to captain5, was twenty-seven years old6. He arrived in Transbaikalia from Petrograd with the mandate of the Military Commissar of the Far East with the right to form units from the Buryats and Mongols for the front.
Lazo arrived at the front with recommendations from "Centrosibir" on the conduct of hostilities7. Matveev N., in his article, like many other authors, speaks in the most serious way about the victory of Lazo over Semenov in late February and early March 1918. In fact, at this time the ataman was only forming his detachment. His small groups crossed the border from time to time to establish contacts among the local population and in search of weapons. Such detachments of the Semenovites, on the territory of Bolshevik Russia, easily disarmed large detachments of the Red Guard, and the selected weapons were taken to their location, causing a lot of trouble for the Bolshevik authorities. It is impossible to call these sorties military operations; rather, it was a stage of the white guerrilla war. The Reds complained to the Chinese authorities and they undertook an obligation from Semyonov not to cross the borders until April 5th. On April 7, 1918, the ataman crossed the border and entered the borders of Transbaikalia.
Ataman G.M. Semenov in his memoirs, recalling the battles on the Daurian front, pointed out the reasons for his relative failures: 1. He did not have a single officer of the General Staff, officers who did not know staff work worked in his headquarters. 2. Lazo had a tenfold advantage. 3. Many Cossacks of the border villages welcomed his arrival, but they were in no hurry to join his detachment.
The ataman really did not have staff workers and, like his young opponent, he also had no experience in commanding large military formations. Lazo was assisted by the Siberian Headquarters, staffed by qualified staff workers, headed by the former Lieutenant General of the General Staff, Baron von Taube (later died of typhus in a White Guard prison), who personally advised the red commander on tactics, strategy, and staff affairs and provided him with necessary literature.
As for the tenfold superiority, perhaps the brave chieftain lied a little. However, it is easy to calculate. The entire Special Manchurian Detachment (OMO) of Semenov consisted of 2200 sabers, plus a Japanese volunteer battalion - about 600 people, under the command of Captain Kuroka, and Chinese units, which, like the Chinese red, were unreliable in battle, as well as those who joined him several hundred Trans-Baikal Cossacks. The entire "army" of Semenov consisted of 3500-4000 people with armored trains. But the Cossack whose cunning of the ataman misled the Reds about the number and deployment of his troops. “The maneuverability of the units of the O.M.O., thanks to the double set of horses, misled the enemy and forced him to greatly exaggerate the forces of the detachment8.” During the day, his horse units, changing horses, could move a hundred or more miles. And the Reds for one day, the same Semenov detachment, were mistaken for different military units.
Parts of Semenov, for the most part, consisted of officers and Cossacks who had gone through the crucible of the First World War. Part of his cavalry was staffed by people from their Buryat tribes - Burguts and Chahars, who were excellent grunts and riders, but weak in military discipline.
It is not difficult to approximately calculate the forces of Lazo. Initially, he had under his command the 1st Argun Regiment, staffed by Red Cossacks who had passed through the German front, under the command of the combat commander Yesaul Metelitsa, in 1000 sabers9, to match the Arguns there was also the 2nd Chita Cossack Regiment and 1500-2000 thousand Red Guards. Then the Bolsheviks gathered Cossacks - volunteers, which gave an additional amount of cavalry, and then mobilized Cossacks into the Red Army of four draft ages - this gave several more cavalry regiments. Detachments of the Red Guard arrived from Khabarovsk, Irkutsk, Omsk, Novonikolaevsk, Krasnoyarsk, Cheremkhovo, Kurgan, Kansk and other cities. They were well armed and equipped. So the Far Eastern Red Guard Detachment (commander Borodavkin, commissar - Gubel-man), numbered in its ranks 1000 infantry, 250 cavalry, 14 guns, more than 10 machine guns10, was well armed and uniformed. Sailors from the Amur and Siberian flotillas, workers from mines, Chita factories and the railway arrived. Detachments of anarchists arrived at the front. From the criminal elements of the Trans-Baikal prisons, detachments were formed under the command of Comrade Yakov Tryapitsin and Commissar Nina Lebedeva*. But the criminals "were in no hurry to turn into conscious Red Army soldiers and caused a lot of trouble for Lazo himself, robbing the population11."
Not far from the front, red partisan detachments operated, the composition of which ranged from 15-30 to 100 sabers, but they did not obey Lazo, acted independently and their total number is not known. International units were formed: Magyar cavalry, battalions of Chinese, Germans, Austrians. I would like to say a special word about these internationalists. Germans, Austrians and Magyars represented the armies of Russia's recent enemies in the First World War. On the territory of our country, they decided not "international" interests, but the aspirations of their governments, which were vitally interested in Russia not again entering the war against them. The guarantor against the prospect of fighting again on two fronts: in the West against France and England, and in the East with Russia was Soviet power, for which they were ready to fight, fulfilling the decisions of their governments. When revolutions took place in Germany and Austria-Hungary, all these "internationalists", for the most part, abandoned the red fronts and returned to their homeland. The Chinese fought on both sides of the front solely because of salaries and did not show much heroism on either side.
All this could give the Reds about 10,000 sabers, 15-17 thousand bayonets and several armored trains, although there was no tenfold superiority, yet Lazo had an overwhelming advantage. The Primorsky local historian G.I. I think that the truth is in the middle, i.e. in a sevenfold superiority of the reds. All the accounting I have cited is based on Soviet sources published in historical and semi-historical literature, and therefore cannot claim absolute accuracy. But in general, the balance of forces is calculated correctly. Of course, other figures can be found in various reference books, but this is how the world works: to diminish one's own strength and increase the strength of the enemy.
All this mass of red fighters was noticeably inferior in combat readiness to the Semenovites. The mobilized Cossacks, perfectly trained militarily, did not burn with a special desire to fight with their own, and often, alone and in groups, went over to the side of the whites. The Cossack youth, who made up the majority of the Red Cossack volunteers, knew how to handle weapons from childhood, but had no combat experience. The basis of any war is the infantry, which consisted of the Chinese and the Red Guards, not trained in military affairs. N.K. Ilyukhov recalled the Primorye Red Guards: “There was a lot of enthusiasm and readiness to fight for the power of the Soviets, but hardly all of them even knew how to wield a rifle. The elected command staff was not much different from ordinary fighters in terms of military training13. The former Red Guard of Suchan and partisan F.K. Borovik very eloquently recalled their combat training: “When we were lined up, the platoon commander asked us: “Who does not know how to load a rifle - look! That's how it charges, that's how it shoots" and fired upwards14 ". And after such "preparation" into battle. Parts manned by captured Germans, Austrians, Magyars, Czechoslovaks and others stood out significantly for the better, as they had rich combat experience.
The Red Guards were poorly prepared not only militarily, but even weaker ideologically. Having acted as volunteers, they did not fully understand who was opposing them and why they were going to fight. Seeing off the Red Guards to the Daurian Front, the chairman of the Primorsky Regional Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks said in his speech: “The bandit Semyonov, having recruited officers expelled from the regiments, the same as himself, Cossack cutthroats and other dark, ignorant people, Japanese cannons and machine guns, moved on us, on our revolution. He wants to take away all the gains of freedom, land and worker control, with fire and sword he wants to destroy everything that the working people have gained with blood. Of course, after such cave speeches, the Red Guards should have formed the opinion that they were going to fight not against the defenders of Russia, but against some humanoid animals. By and large, the ideology for many "fighters" faded into the background -
this whole bunch was pretty good, at that time, they were paid, and this is understandable - if a fighter does not have ideological convictions, then he will willingly go to fight for money. So the private received a very substantial amount of fifty rubles, then, with the promotion of the position, the official salary also increased - the regiment commander received six hundred rubles16. Accordingly, the commander of a division, army, the salary could be several thousand rubles. The Front Commander has even more. The "internationalists" received the same money. In this regard, we can consider the Bolshevik army in Transbaikalia as ordinary mercenaries.
All of these were different people, not only in their social position, but also in their understanding of freedom. It was a time when the word "freedom" meant the freedom to plunder. Looting, drunkenness, and a brutal attitude towards captive Cossacks flourished among this motley mass that arrived at the front. Here it is necessary to pay tribute to Lazo, as the Commander and educator. In a short time, he and his assistants partially established discipline. Ma-roders, by decision of the field courts, began to be publicly shot. Tough measures fought against drunkenness and rallies. “They fought against the immediate reprisal against prisoners without interrogation and trial19.” These events strengthened the rear of the army and discipline. Looting could not be allowed not only because this act is immoral, but also because it destroyed the rear of the front, which was Cossack and the robberies of the population could cause uprisings on the communications of Lazo. With prisoners, everything is simple. Firstly, a prisoner is a source of information, even if he is silent. Secondly, as Lazo believed, there were also random persons in Semenov's troops. Thirdly, by reprisals against prisoners, the Reds did not give the Semenovites the right to choose: the Bolsheviks did not consciously create conditions under which the Whites could either fight to the last opportunity and die, or win, or be captured and take a terrible death. The Cossacks preferred not to give up. Extrajudicial reprisals against prisoners made the white units more steadfast and strong. Lazo understood this very well, but due to his inexperience and the general mood of the crowd, there was little he could do.
The Red Guards, who arrived from different parts of Siberia and the Far East, immediately joined the battle. It was here that the lack of combat experience of the young red commander and most of his fighters affected. As a result of the fighting on the Daurian front, the Reds, having an overwhelming advantage, destroyed half the Japanese battalion, which withstood the main onslaught of thousands of enemy crowds. Under their blows, the Chinese companies dispersed, and the slightly battered OMO of Yesaul G.M. Semenov, under the cover of armored trains, retreated into the right-of-way of the CER. Lazo commanded the front for 114 days and, having at least a sevenfold superiority, could not achieve the main goal: the Special Manchurian Detachment was not destroyed.
The ataman had his weaknesses both in command and in command and control. The Semyonovsky Front was not a front in the usual military sense. “The front line, in the sense as it is commonly understood, did not exist at all - the front was a narrow ribbon of a railway track and had only one dimension - in depth ... There were no positions; if there were fortified combat sectors, they were so short that they did not give even the slightest idea of \u200b\u200ba certain sector of the front. Rather, these were fortified nests that served as a thin axis of the operating detachment, which, relying on them, performed an independent task and ensured the operation of all the forces of O.M.O.20. The fact that the "fortified nests" of the ataman were not destroyed by the Reds, and with their loss the White Front would cease to exist, suggests that the young Red commander, due to the lack of elementary military knowledge and experience, was unable to properly organize reconnaissance, and , perhaps he did not have one, since from all of the above, it turns out that Lazo had no idea about the White front. Instead of destroying the enemy's fortified bases, the red command preferred unsuccessful attempts to overtake and destroy the OMO and the chieftain's headquarters. If the Red Command knew how the enemy’s front was built, and used at least a quarter of the weak points of Ataman Semenov, then his OMO would have been utterly defeated in one to two weeks.
Some too zealous historians claim that it would be quite feasible for Lazo to defeat Semenov on the territory of China, "forgetting" that China is a sovereign state and crossing its border with red units would mean the beginning of a war between Soviet Russia and China . In addition, Semenov did not stay in China, but went to the territory of the Chinese Eastern (CER) railway, the right-of-way of which was then considered Russian and was under the jurisdiction of General D.L. Horvat.
Perhaps the main reason why Lazo could not defeat the chieftain, Soviet historians considered serious help from China. In fact, the Chinese civil and military authorities were aggressive towards the Semenov detachment and positive towards the Bolsheviks. Ataman recalled: “On three sides we were pressed by the Reds, whose forces were more than ten times the size of the detachment. Our rear rested on the border, guarded from Manchuria by Chinese troops. The mood of these troops was clearly hostile to us due to some agreement that existed between the Chinese command and Lazo21.
In this situation, a Chinese military delegation arrived at the headquarters of the ataman, led by Major Liu, who demanded that they be allowed through the front line to the headquarters of Lazo.
“As a result of Major Liu’s trip to Lazo’s headquarters, the Chinese command officially offered me to hand over weapons on Russian territory to the Bolshevik receivers, but with Chinese intermediaries, because otherwise the Chinese would be forced to allow the Reds into Manchuria to receive the weapons I handed over. I promised to discuss this issue, not for a minute intending to surrender my weapons at all and wishing only to buy time and divert the attention of the enemy from myself. That is, it is clearly seen here that there was an undisguised collusion between the Chinese and Lazo's headquarters. In fact, the Chinese were on the side of the Bolsheviks………………………………………………………………………………
“As a result of continuous heavy fighting, the situation became truly critical; we could not hold out longer against the pressing Reds. We had to either lay down our arms and surrender to the protection of the Chinese, with the risk of being extradited to the Reds, or try to get out of the situation with honor by some exceptionally flexible maneuver23. The ataman was not going to give up: “In those days I was 27 years old, and I did not yet know that open force in many cases was successfully replaced by diplomacy built on skillful and subtle lies24.” The chieftain spread information that the Reds intended to capture the Manchuria station. The Chinese believed and began, together with Semenov, to prepare to repel a possible crossing of the border with China by the Reds.
Assessing the situation, Semenov left from under the nose of Lazo from Chinese territory, to the CER, which created a conflict between the Red and Chinese authorities: accused the Chinese of duplicity. Relations between them deteriorated, and I got the opportunity to give my units a calm and well-deserved rest.
The Bolsheviks themselves did not refuse that they received help from the Chinese. On this occasion, Commissioner Moses Gubelman recalled: “The Chinese sent their delegation to us for negotiations ... The delegation was met by Lazo and M.A. Trilisser. After long negotiations, they concluded an agreement with the Chinese that the Chinese government would disarm the Semenovites and no longer allow them to the Soviet border.
During the fighting on the Daurian front, in August 1918, Lazo left the ranks of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party and went over to the Bolsheviks.
In fiction and semi-historical literature about those events, the phrase allegedly said by ataman Semenov often flashes: “If I had such officers as S. Lazo, then I would have won27.” First, judging by the events on the Semenov and Baikal fronts, there is no reason to say that the ataman lost. Secondly, in his memoirs there is not even a hint of such a characterization. Apparently this aphorism was invented by the authors, who at that time were sure that Soviet readers would never read the memoirs of the ataman.
Baikal Front.
Soon, an uprising of the Czechoslovak corps broke out in the rear of the Reds. In the Middle Ages, Czechs and Slovaks lost their national independence and were incorporated into Austria-Hungary. The First World War gave a chance to regain independence. The military personnel of this corps pursued goals opposite to those of the Bolshevik "internationalists". If the latter supported Lenin because his government had withdrawn from the war and concluded a shameful peace with Germany, then the people, in order to gain independence, needed a war on the part of Russia to a victorious end. Therefore, the Czechs were vitally interested in overthrowing the power of the Bolsheviks. The Czechoslovak corps was formed back in 1915 from among the soldiers and officers of the Slavic peoples of the Austro-Hungarian Empire who surrendered. In view of their, to put it mildly, non-belligerence, they were never sent to the front. The coming Provisional Government also did not dare to send them into battle. After the October coup, they were asked to return home by sea through Vladivostok. The corps plunged into echelons and moved east. On the way of its movement, the corps increased its personnel to sixty thousand people, mainly due to the Czechs and Slovaks living in Russia. Due to the lack of command staff, Russian officers and generals were appointed to command positions. They then helped to overthrow the Bolsheviks from the Volga to the Pacific Ocean. And here, as well as the fronts of the First World War, they did not distinguish themselves with special heroism. Almost throughout Siberia, the armed forces of the Reds consisted of the Red Guard, which was poorly trained militarily and poorly organized, therefore, along the path of movement of the corps, resistance, despite Moscow’s formidable orders to bring down “severe punishment” on the local authorities, the Czechoslovaks were shown almost no resistance. There were no organized fights. Most of these warriors, who ended up in the territory controlled by the Bolsheviks, went over to them. In total, according to various sources, there were from fifteen to twenty thousand people on the side of the Reds. In particular, this was the case in Vladivostok. Both white and red Czechs and Slovaks hoped to get home as soon as possible. But life decreed otherwise, they had to take part in the battles on the Eastern Front, when Admiral A.V. Kolchak came to power in Siberia, and those who went over to the side of the Reds, in the battles on the Ussuri and other fronts. But even against the poorly organized Red Army, they showed themselves only in the robberies of the civilian population, and when these units left the front to the east, the admiral only sighed with relief. They lost all interest in military operations in Russia at the end of 1918, when, as a result of the revolution, Germany capitulated and Czechoslovakia received the long-awaited independence. Almost until the very end of the civil war, they hung around Siberia, doing their business.
Later, in order to keep the “Slav brothers” idle, the allied command entrusted them with protecting the railways from partisans in order to occupy them with something. One of the leaders of the White Cause in Primorye, Colonel N.A. Andrushkevich, later recalled:
“This protection of the Czechs by almost all the powers of the world aroused universal laughter. As if they couldn't protect themselves.
And in fact, the Czechs did not have a military appearance. Filled up, rounded off on Russian bread, on Siberian butter, the Czechs looked like good-natured, stupid brewers, anything but soldiers ... According to my observations and conclusions of many who lived side by side with the Czechs, the Czechs no longer had the courage, the heroism of the soul, the ability to feat; all this seems to be unfamiliar and alien to them, they are forever immersed in calculations and thoughts about benefits ...
Chekhov was not loved. But to say "didn't like" is not enough. It is difficult to convey the feeling of Russians towards the Czechs. Disappointment, vexation with oneself and contempt for the "brothers" intertwined in this feeling. Subsequently, having betrayed and handed over to the Reds Admiral A.V. Kolchak3, they bargained with the Bolsheviks for the right to freely escape to their homeland. And this "army", in an effort to get home as quickly as possible, moved east. There was almost no resistance to them, because by that time the population had already tried communist rule and was glad to see anyone who was not red, anti-Bolshevik uprisings broke out in many areas, detachments of workers and peasants of Siberia who rose to fight against red tyranny reached tens of thousands of people . Ideologically, they were democrats and stood a mountain against the monarchy, which subsequently caused an open betrayal of the representatives of the Czechoslovak corps of the interests of the White Cause in the East of Russia. They, the recent enemies of the Entente, came out on the side of Russia's allies, they, apparently, should be called "white internationalists."
In Eastern Siberia, an attempt was made to stop the Czechoslovaks. The only city that tried to fulfill Moscow's formidable directive was Irkutsk.
The Baikal Front was formed against the rebellious Czechoslovak corps and the Siberian rebels, S.G. Lazo was appointed commander. But neither in historical, nor in fiction, nor in the memoirs of his associates, nor in the diaries of Lazo himself, this period of his activity is reflected with the necessary specifics. In the archives of the Khabarovsk Regional Committee of the CPSU, I managed to find a unique document - the recommendations of the CPSU for historians "What to write about Lazo" (Appendix 2). Among the twenty-three points, there is also no instruction to write about the events in the Baikal region, in other words, the party did not want to focus on this chapter of life. In the questionnaire filled out by Sergei Lazo himself4, there is not even a mention of this front. Why such modesty? Why did Soviet historians and Lazo himself not devote space in their works to the next exploits? Let's try to figure it out. The Reds concentrated large forces in Irkutsk and Chita and closed the road to the east for the Czechoslovak corps. Without providing a rear, Lazo began military operations against the Czechs and Siberian rebels. Here, for the second time, he makes an absurd mistake for the Front Commander - intelligence again does not work for him, and therefore his headquarters missed the moment when his old acquaintance, Ataman Semenov, quickly left the CER area and hit the rear with the Reds. The staff members fled in different directions. Lazo himself escaped on an armored train. On this occasion, many years later, the ataman recalled: “With a quick raid, the OMO cavalry occupied the Olovyannaya station, capturing the Lazo Headquarters and dispersing it5.” The liquidation of the Red Command Headquarters brought complete confusion and confusion into their ranks. The initiative passed to the rebels. This made it possible for the Czechs to take Irkutsk and the Circum-Baikal Railway. At this time, Ataman Semyonov was advancing on Chita. What happened on the Red Front can be judged from the words of the Commander himself: “Sending me to the front, they hoped that I would be able to organize it. This, of course, is a utopia. It is impossible to hold the front... Some units are scattered, retreating in disarray and abandoning the wounded6. A few days later, the Baikal Front practically ceased to exist and, a little later, by the decision of the Far Eastern Council of People's Commissars, the Baikal and Ussuri fronts were officially liquidated. On this, Lazo's career as Commander ended.
Subsequently, the Bolsheviks assured readers that after the liquidation of the fronts, it was they who became the organizers of the partisan movement in Eastern Siberia and the Far East. In particular, Moses Gubelman wrote: “Stop the fight against the enemy by an organized front. Declare all counter-revolutionaries the worst enemies of the working people and move on to a new form of struggle - guerrilla warfare. The Bolshevik commissar was cunning, but simply deceived the reader, but it was like this ...
During the liquidation of the red fronts, at the Extraordinary Congress in Chita on August 28, 1918, there was a major incident between representatives of Central Siberia, headed by Pavel Postyshev, and the Far Eastern Council of People's Commissars, headed by Chairman of the Government Abram Tabelson (party nickname - Krasnoshchek) . P.P. Postyshev arrived with a directive from Central Siberia, which proposed to create partisan detachments from the Red Guard. Tabelson was against it. Many years later, the commander of the Ussuri Front, Sakovich, recalled: “The Central Siberians suggested that the Red troops break up into separate detachments and immediately launch a partisan war8.” It was not only about the Ussuri and Baikal fronts, it was proposed to cover the whole of Eastern Siberia and the Far East with the partisan movement. Chairman of the Far East Council of People's Commissars A. Tabelson proposed disbanding the Red Guard in the houses. The majority supported the opinion of the Far Eastern Council of People's Commissars: "a different point of view was mastered, which was represented by Comrade Krasnoshchek (A. Tabelson), Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the Far East, who proposed disbanding the Red Guard detachments to their homes9." Analyzing the current situation, Ilyukhov said: “By going home, many Red Guards, especially internationalists, paid for the mistakes of the decisions of the congress due to language barriers.” If you decipher his words, it turns out that after the liquidation of the fronts, the Red Guards did not need the Bolsheviks, many of them, going home, died. And if they had a goal - to reach their home, then the internationalists: Czechs, Germans, Austrians, Magyars and others, did not have a home - the Bolsheviks of the Far East SNK simply threw them out into the street as unnecessary. For a long time, the former Red Guards and their commanders could not forgive the communists for this betrayal. S.G. Lazo himself shared the fate of most of the soldiers of the front. He, too, was abandoned to the mercy of fate by the leadership of the Siberian Bolsheviks. Did he understand that the new owners abandoned him as useless material? By virtue of his education and intellect, of course, he had to give an unambiguous assessment of the actions of the communists from the Far East SNK. Lazo, by that time, had gone through a certain life path: he was the son of a man whose life was ruined by the socialists, then a member of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party and, finally, a Bolshevik. There is no reason to consider him a fanatic. Of course, he, like every young man, was flattered by the position that he received. His weather in the white units were often ordinary fighters in officer companies, at best they commanded platoons or companies, and he, having the rank of junior officer, immediately jumped into the red generals. Ambition, of course, was not in last place. However, in spite of everything, in the current situation, he had no choice. Captivity meant death - no one has yet forgotten the terrible reprisals against the rebels at the end of 1917 - at the beginning of 1918, in which Lazo was one of the main performers. The success of a possible attempt to break through to the west was equal to zero. There was only one road left - to the east. Not finding any of the former rulers of the Far East, he decides, together with his wife, to make their own way to Vladivostok.
Yes, in all the biographies of S.G. Lazo it appears that after the liquidation of the Baikal Front, he hid for some time, and then moved to Vladivostok and became part of the Bolshevik underground. All this seems to be true if not for the dates. The decision to dissolve the fronts was made on August 28, 1918, and he only got to Vladivostok in January 1919. Blimey! We do not know where he was and what he did for almost six months! Does not reveal this secret and his wife Olga. In her memoirs, she says that their group reached Nevers station on an armored train and tried to reach Yakutsk through the taiga, but on the way they learned that the city was taken by the Whites and turned back, Olga Lazo herself was captured by the Whites. We do not know where Lazo was. Unfortunately, this fact will not be the first "blank spot" in the biography of the hero.
Dear Sirs!
For the past few years, I have been researching the Civil War in the Su-chan Valley, Primorsky Krai. In various archives, I found many documents that relatively truthfully reflect the events of that time. A lot of material has also been accumulated, not previously published anywhere, about the Bolshevik activist Sergei Lazo. The very one about which I read in childhood that he was “burned alive by the Japanese in a locomotive firebox”, and a little later that he was “burned by the Cossacks of Ataman Semenov”. Found documents show the absurdity of these legends. But it's not about that. I have three questions for you.
1. I remember very well another legend about the death of S. Lazo, which was told to me, in the mid-70s, by my relative Uncle Lesha (Makarevsky A.G.). My mother grew up in a large family. Her older sister was married to the former red partisan N.M. Shashura, and her younger sister was married to Makarevsky. I think that he heard the story I am about to tell from his elder brother-in-law, as he was vice-chairman of the Civil War Veterans Section.
The point is the following. In the 60s, former partisans were invited to the regional committee of the CPSU, who were shown photographs of an elderly man and explained that there was reason to believe that this was Sergey Lazo. Through the Soviet embassy in Japan, people turned who claimed that they were Lazo's children and that he lived in Japan all the years, got married, started a family and died a natural death. They wanted to meet their half-sister Ada Georgievna Lazo. I do not know how this closed meeting took place, but the following decision was made: to ask the authors of the letter not to seek contacts with A.S. Lazo, so as not to cause her moral harm. And this means that if this event actually took place, then the party authorities recognized that S. Lazo was not killed by either the Japanese or the Semenovites ... From all this the question follows: is it possible to answer positively about Lazo's stay in Japan after 1920 of the year.
2. The second question is the following. In Maybogov's book K.L. “Black Stone” (Book 2, Primorsky Book Publishing House, Vladivostok, 1953, p. 54.) There is an episode in which two workers in the city of Suchan, at mine No. 2, in 1918 decided to burn Japanese soldier. They didn't do that in the book, but what about in real life? Were there cases of similar brutal reprisals by the Reds against Japanese military personnel?
3. The third question is more personal. In the book of the white emigrant Serebryannikov I.I., in his diary for December 16, 1932, there is an entry: “In Shanghai, information was again received from Tokyo on December 5 of a terrifying nature. They report: a boat with 4 refugees from Svetlaya Bay washed up on the shores of Japan. Three of the fugitives were half-dead, one turned out to be dead... According to the testimonies collected from the arrivals, they are fleeing from the horror of death that guards all...”. I would like to know more about this episode. The fact is that from 1931 to 1935, my grandfather, Turovnik Kupriyan Vladimirovich, was also in hard labor in Svetlaya Bay, Terneisky District, Primorsky Territory. Of course, I did not hope that the fugitives knew his name, but I would like to know their stories about living conditions in a concentration camp in more detail. For ten years I have been collecting information about the difficult life of my grandfather and this information would be a good addition.
I really hope that I get answers to my questions. After all, of course, in Japan there are research institutions employees who study the history of the Civil War in the Russian Primorye.
Sincerely, Turovnik G.S.
On August 25, 1918, the 5th Extraordinary Regional Congress of Soviets opened in Khabarovsk, where the only correct decision was made - to switch to partisan forms of struggle, to use all opportunities to defeat the counter-revolution and foreign intervention.
In the autumn of 1918, independently of each other, 2 underground groups appeared in Khabarovsk: one of the workers under the leadership of D. Boyko, the other of the representatives of Central Siberia, who arrived from Siberia, leaving the White Guard terror. In 1918-1922. throughout the Far East, partisan detachments were formed in the taiga. Among the partisan leaders, Sergei Georgievich Lazo (1894-1920), one of the leaders of the struggle for Soviet power in Siberia and Primorye, a hero of the Civil War, was especially popular. In the Bolshevik Party since 1918, a member of the Central Siberia. In 1920, a member of the Military Council of Primorye, the Far Eastern Bureau of the Central Committee of the Party. After the fall of Soviet power in the Far East, he went into the taiga along with other Bolsheviks. In the spring of 1919, he was appointed commander of all partisan detachments in Primorye. The grandiose guerrilla war that unfolded from the Urals to the Pacific Ocean facilitated the advance of the Red Army.
On the territory of the future JAO, there were 2 large partisan detachments: Tunguska and Kuldur.
Tunguska partisan detachment was formed in the village of Arkhangelovka, located about 10 km. from st. Volochaevka. The core of the detachment was the Khabarovsk porters. From here, the detachment made sabotage attacks on the railway, raids on Japanese garrisons, defended their village from extortions and confiscations. The detachment was led by Ivan Pavlovich Shevchuk, in 1914-1917. was on the German front, where he joined the Bolshevik Party. In 1919, the detachment consisted of 30 people, organized its own flotilla, first from boats, then they got a steamer. Soon the detachment grew, by 1920 there were 900 fighters in Shevchuk's detachment.
Kuldur partisan detachment was organized in the taiga in the village of Kuldur, this place was chosen because of the proximity of the railway. And on the railroad, at all stations and sidings, there were Japanese. The commander of the Kuldur detachment was at first Fyodor Vorobyov, and after his death (shot by the Japanese) in 1919 - Anatoly Fedorovich Bolshakov-Musin. Maxim Trofimovich Onishchenko was the deputy chairman of the detachment committee.
The detachment first consisted of 6 people, and then grew to 300. From the moment it was formed, the detachment was engaged in blocking the movement of the interventionists and the White Guards by rail - they set fire to bridges, mined the railroad, derailed and pushed enemy trains against each other. Later, they began to mine roads when the White Guards or interventionists approached the villages located on the territory of the future JAO, in protection. In 1920, the detachment joined the regular units of the Red Army.
In 1917, Nikolai Trofimovich Onishchenko was elected to the first Vladivostok Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies. In 1918 he worked at the Dalsovnarkom. During the occupation of the Amur region by foreign invaders and with the formation of the Ussuri Front in the summer of 1918, as a gifted speaker, he worked on agitating the population to attract volunteers to the Red Guard, then he was put for underground work at the station. Bira. Nikolai Trofimovich and his wife Alexandra Grigorievna kept in touch with the Kuldur partisan detachment, campaigned among Japanese soldiers, and distributed political literature. In May 1919, Onishchenko was extradited by provocateurs and brutally tortured by the Japanese, they mocked his wife, then they shot him and threw the corpse into the Bira River.
The Japanese interventionists, seeing that their positions in the Far East were becoming more and more precarious, more than once tried to create a pretext for continuing the intervention. On the night of April 4-5, 1920, with the consent and blessing of the Americans, who gave the Japanese "freedom of hands", Japanese performances took place in almost all cities of the Far East. Under the guise of exercises, they took advantageous strategic positions and unexpectedly opened fire on the location of the partisans, cold-bloodedly beaten civilians. However, the partisans managed to get out of the encirclement with fighting. But the Japanese managed to capture the leader of the partisans Sergei Lazo, members of the military council of Sibirtsev and Lutsky. They were burned in a locomotive furnace. In total, about 7,000 people died. Over Vladivostok, where Russian flags used to be, Japanese ones flew up. And again, the taiga became a defensive fortress, from where the partisans attacked the enemy.
The grandiose guerrilla war that unfolded in the rear of Kolchak from the Urals to the Pacific Ocean greatly facilitated the advance of the Red Army to the East and the implementation of the plan to defeat the 1st campaign of the Entente. The military situation in the Far East changed when Admiral Kolchak was shot in January 1920 by a revolutionary tribunal. The Americans, the British, and the French were forced to evacuate. And the Japanese declared neutrality.
1. Shishkin S. N. Civil war in the Far East, 1918-1922. - M .: Military Publishing House, 1957.
TOKUEV Grigory Arkadievich (12/23/1917, Potashevskaya village, now Shenursky district of the Arkhangelsk region - 1995, Belarus).
Graduated from a seven-year school. He worked in the Arkhangelsk flying club. In the army since 1938. Member of the Soviet-Finnish war of 1939 - 1940.
Member of the Great Patriotic War since June 1941. From June 1942 he was the commander of a partisan subversive group, from August 1943 he was the commander of a sabotage detachment operating in the Kopatkevichi and Petrikov districts of the Gomel region. The partisans under his command derailed 55 echelons of the enemy, on the personal account of the commander - 19. The title of Hero of the Soviet Union Grigory Arkadievich Tokuev was awarded on 08/15/1944.
After the liberation of Belarus, G.A. Tokuev graduated from the College of Physical Education in Minsk. He worked as deputy chairman of the republican DSO "Spartak" and in other positions.
He was awarded the Orders of Lenin, the Order of the Patriotic War of the 1st degree, and medals.
Tokuev's name is immortalized on the central obelisk of the Verkhopadengskaya rural administration.
In Belarusian forests
Hero of the Soviet Union commander of the partisan youth detachment Grigory Arkadyevich Tokuev. The title was awarded by the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on August 15, 1944. During the Great Patriotic War, our countryman Grigory Arkadyevich Tokuev was the pride of the Belarusian partisans.
Tokuev was born in the village of Potashevka, Shenkur district, into a poor peasant family. He spent his youthful years in Arkhangelsk. Here began his working biography and sporting successes.
The second homeland for Tokuev was Belarus with its hospitable people and mild nature. There, in the airborne unit, he served in active military service. In Belarus, where the blood-splattered chariot of the Nazi invasion was the first to pass, Tokuev received his first baptism of fire.
At the beginning of the war, Grigory Arkadievich was not lucky. Seriously wounded, unconscious, he was taken prisoner. The agonizing days of wandering around the fascist death camps began.
But the Soviet patriot could not live in slavery. Tokuev escaped from captivity several times and, after long wanderings in the summer of 1942, finally ends up with the partisans of the Belarusian Polesie.
Polissya is a heroic land. Like spring waters, the partisan movement overflowed in it, White Russia raged. The partisans firmly settled in the forest. Every sprawling oak, every bush was an ally of the patriots and their stepfathers. The boundless forests have become a school of struggle for the freedom and independence of the Motherland for the formidable avengers.
In one of the detachments of the Polesye formation, Tokuev led a sabotage group. In the summer of 1942, Grigory Arkadievich, along with two companions along the difficult partisan path, for the first time "sang the demolitionist's song to the Nazis." He mined the railway and derailed an enemy train with a punitive detachment of SS men. Military class cars were crushed into chips, about 200 soldiers of the Fuhrer lay down in bones. In a word, it turned out to be a “guerrilla steak”. The personal account of the enemy was opened.
The first success inspired Tokuevites. A few days later, the second train with shells went downhill, then the third, fourth, fifth. The Tokuyevites harassed their partisan formations on the section of the railway, along which the front was continuously supplied with people, equipment, weapons, and fuel. Every day, a sabotage was committed on the "piece of iron".
The headquarters of the partisan movement reported to the Arkhangelsk regional committee of the Komsomol: “The Komsomol member of your organization Tokuev Grigory Arkadyevich is fighting the German invaders in their deep rear in Belarus. We are happy to report that he is behaving like a hero. Tokuev commands the Komsomol group of demolitionists. This group blew up 11 enemy echelons. In all the operations carried out by the detachment, Tokuev serves as a model of heroism.
Good fame about Tokuev went throughout Polesie. News about the military affairs of the bomber and his friends was passed from mouth to mouth, supplemented by storytellers, reborn into a legend. Forest soldiers lovingly called Grigory "Tokuy", and the Fritz dubbed him "the white-haired devil" and were afraid of meeting with a daring and elusive sportsman-saboteur like fire.
The German command was extremely concerned about the subversive strikes of the Polesye partisans. The invaders were forced to reorganize the railway guard. If in the first days of the war the Nazis entrusted the protection of the road to the peasants of the surrounding villages, then after the more frequent cases of train crashes, the Germans themselves carried the protection of the railway track.
Increased enemy vigilance. Bunkers with machine-gun nests were made along the entire line every three hundred meters, and every one and a half hundred meters there was a sentry. There were two observation towers with heavy machine guns per kilometer of the way. In order to prevent the partisans from approaching the embankment secretly, the Nazis on both sides of the canvas cut down trees and bushes for a hundred meters. Villages near the railroad were burned. Residents were shot or driven to hard labor.
Ambushes for bombers became more frequent. Battalions of SS men with artillery, aircraft, and tanks removed from the front were sent to fight them.
Train traffic has changed. Ahead of the military personnel, the Germans began to launch a control maneuverable locomotive with five or six commodity platforms loaded with sand. It also happened that several safety platforms with ballast were rolled in front of a steam locomotive pulling a military echelon.
All these measures did not save the invaders. The demolition men still went out to combat operations, laid mines with a delayed fuse, mines "on the cord." Explosions on the railroad did not stop.
In the summer of 1943, an important event occurred in the life of the illustrious demolitionist, who by this time had mastered the complex partisan science and had already been awarded the Order of Lenin for his exploits.
The so-called "active intelligence" (or "aktivka"), which the Intelligence Directorate of the Red Army Headquarters was so energetically and purposefully engaged in in the 1920s on the western borders against Poland and Romania (see "NVO" ## 34 and 44, 2005), in due to a number of reasons of an international character, by the beginning of the 1930s it was curtailed. But in the Far East in the same period, it truly gained a second wind, since there were very favorable factors for this.
front of the secret war
First of all, it should be noted a huge border thousands of kilometers long with convenient places for crossing the Amur and Ussuri and the local partisan movement on the territory of the "independent" state of Manchukuo, which the USSR never recognized. The Chinese partisan detachments, pressed by the Japanese troops to the border, crossed over to the Soviet side, rested there, here they were provided with medical assistance, supplied with weapons and ammunition, radio communications, and money. And what was no less important - the partisan commanders received instructions on further combat activities.
Such support for the Chinese insurgents acquired a particularly wide scope immediately after the occupation of Manchuria by Japanese troops. Moreover, the command of the Soviet Separate Red Banner Far Eastern Army tried to coordinate the actions of partisan detachments, giving instructions not only on the methods of daily combat work, but also on the deployment of a mass insurgent movement on Manchurian territory in the event of a war between Japan and the Soviet Union, considering Chinese partisans as their saboteurs and scouts abandoned behind enemy lines.
Of course, all this could be seen as interference in the internal affairs of a neighboring country. But in those years when any means were good to strengthen the defensive power of the Far Eastern borders, neither Khabarovsk nor Moscow thought about this. In addition, Tokyo formally could not present any claims to the Soviet Union, because the partisan movement was not unfolding on the Japanese islands. And the opinion of the unrecognized "independent" state could not be taken into account.
Meanwhile, in the spring of 1939, the situation in the Far East was becoming more and more alarming, intelligence warned of the possibility of serious actions by the Japanese Kwantung Army. On April 16, the heads of the NKVD departments of the Khabarovsk and Primorsky territories, the Chita region, as well as the heads of the border troops of the Khabarovsk, Primorsky and Chita districts received an encrypted telegram # 7770 from Moscow. It stated the following: "In order to more fully use the Chinese partisan movement in Manchuria and its further Organizational strengthening, the Military Councils of the 1st and 2nd OKA are allowed, in cases where the leadership of Chinese partisan detachments requests, to provide assistance to partisans with weapons, ammunition, food and medicine of foreign origin or in an impersonal form, and also to supervise their work. be transferred in groups back to Manchuria for reconnaissance purposes and in order to assist the partisan movement. Work with partisans should be carried out only by military councils "
The Chekist leadership was to provide the command of the 1st and 2nd Separate Red Banner Armies (OKA) with full assistance, in particular, to ensure both the crossing of partisan groups and signalmen to the territory of Manchuria and their return. In addition, a group of 350 Chinese partisans was transferred to the military council of the 1st OKA, who were checked by the NKVD and found reliable (how many of the same Chinese were found unreliable and went to Soviet concentration camps is still unknown). The previously interned leaders of the Zhao-Shangzhi and Dai-Hongbing partisan detachments were sent to the disposal of the military council of the 2nd OKA, who were then supposed to be transferred to Manchuria.
It is impossible not to pay attention to the fact that under the Moscow encryption were the signatures of two people's commissars - Kliment Voroshilov and Lavrenty Beria. But they were unlikely to make independent decisions on such a serious matter, and therefore there is no doubt: the whole range of issues related to the Chinese partisan movement was agreed with Stalin.
It seems that the Kremlin was not even embarrassed by the possibility of a serious diplomatic conflict with the Japanese, if the latter discovered that several hundred militants had been sent to the region under their control. And this is what needs to be said here. Japanese intelligence also illegally sent saboteurs (the same partisans) recruited from among the white emigrants to the USSR. When they were discovered, captured or destroyed, Soviet newspapers would certainly write about it, stigmatizing the aggressive Japanese military. Diplomats were also involved: calls to the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs of the Ambassador of the Land of the Rising Sun, notes of protest, etc. When "ours" came across and the Japanese raised a fuss, the citizens of the USSR, of course, knew nothing and did not know.
Just one document
Naturally, the contacts of the Soviet command with the leaders of the partisan movement in Manchuria were surrounded by a veil of impenetrable secrecy. Such meetings, which took place on Soviet territory, were documented very rarely. And if something did get on paper, then, as a rule, it was stamped "Soviet secret. Of special importance. The only copy." They are provided, for example, with a record of a conversation between the commander of the 2nd Army, commander of the 2nd rank, Ivan Konev (the future Marshal of the Soviet Union) and a member of the military council of the 2nd OKA, corps commissar Biryukov, with the head of partisan detachments in Northern Manchuria, Zhao-Shangzhi, and commanders of the 6th of the 1st and 11th detachments by Dai-Hongbing and Qi-Jijong, held in Khabarovsk on May 30, 1939. The conversation (judging by the transcript, it was conducted correctly and politely) was attended by the head of the intelligence department of the army, Major Aleshin.
The purpose of the meeting was to analyze the considerations presented by Zhao-Shangzhi: the resolution of issues of transfer, further work and relations with the USSR. First of all, the leader of the partisan movement was asked to contact the detachments subordinate to him operating in the Sungari River basin, unite their management, create a strong headquarters, clear the ranks of the insurgents from unstable, decayed elements and Japanese agents, and also create a department to combat Japanese espionage among the partisans. (apparently, the partisans were hard hit by Japanese intelligence).
As a further task, a demand was put forward to strengthen and expand the partisan movement in Manchuria. For which, for example, it was considered useful to organize several large raids on Japanese garrisons in order to raise the morale of the rebels. It was also proposed to organize secret bases of partisans in hard-to-reach areas of the Lesser Khingan for the accumulation of weapons, ammunition and equipment. All this was recommended to be obtained during attacks on Japanese warehouses. The Chinese commanders were advised to contact the local communist organization to launch political agitation among the population and carry out measures to decompose parts of the Manchu army, supply the partisans with everything necessary through the propagandized military personnel.
The Soviet comrades emphasized Zhao-Shangzhi's great experience in guerrilla warfare and talked about his training before crossing into Manchuria. Reliable communication and comprehensive assistance were promised in the future on all the problems that were discussed at the meeting.
As for the actions of Chinese insurgents during a possible war between Japan and the USSR, during this period it was proposed to carry out destructive work in the rear of the Kwantung Army, to attack the most important objects there on the instructions of the Soviet command (partisans were supposed to receive specific tasks at the beginning of the war). Konev and Biryukov also argued that "the Manchukuo army is not strong, the Japanese do not trust it. The partisans should use this circumstance and take measures to disintegrate the Manchukuo army."
Until the war began, it was planned to organize a detachment of about 100 fighters from the Chinese partisans who were on Soviet territory and transport it across the Amur to Manchuria in one step at the end of June. Such a number of this formation was dictated by the available number of combat-ready partisans who were at that time on the territory of the USSR. The rest of the partisans who remained in the Soviet Far East were to be trained as machine gunners, grenade launchers, propagandists, orderlies, and then cross the Amur in small groups. The Soviet command assured Zhao-Shangzhi that weapons, ammunition, food, medicine, money would be allocated in accordance with his requests.
The success of the operations of the rebel detachments largely depended on reliable communications both between them and with the headquarters of the partisan movement, and the latter with Soviet territory. To do this, it was proposed to pick up 10 competent fighters, carefully tested and dedicated to the cause of the revolution, and send them for radio training in the USSR. After that, they, equipped with walkie-talkies, ciphers, money, will be transported to China. During the conversation, the Soviet military leaders expressed their wishes: “It is desirable for us to receive maps of Manchuria from you, which you will get from the Japanese-Manchurian troops (maps made in Japan), Japanese and other documents - orders, reports, reports. ciphers. It is desirable that you supplied us with samples of new Japanese weapons." The basic principle that you have to pay for all services was observed here as well. Supporting and developing the partisan movement, Soviet military intelligence received in return an extensive network of agents in a neighboring country.
An interesting question is how and when Zhao-Shangzhi came to the USSR and where he was until the spring of 1939.
Since the transcript of the conversation is so far the only document on this case that has been found in the archive, only a few assumptions can be made. It is possible that the Chinese partisan leader was summoned to the USSR shortly after the repressions that hit the intelligence department of the OKDVA headquarters in the fall of 1937, when the head of the RO, Colonel Pokladok, his two deputies and several employees of a lower rank were arrested by the NKVD (they were shot on the standard charge as " Japanese spies). All contacts and lines of communication with the Chinese partisans were cut off. As soon as Zhao-Shangzhi crossed into Soviet territory at that time, he was apparently immediately arrested and spent a year and a half in prison or in a camp. It was only in the spring of 1939 that the surviving Chinese partisan leader was released after a check. This version looks quite plausible.
Of course, all this Konev and Biryukov could not say during the conversation and had to dodge, stating that they were not aware of the presence of one of the leaders of the Chinese rebels in the Soviet Union. Or maybe, as people in Khabarovsk are new, only recently appointed, they really did not know who was in the camps and prisons. This is also not excluded.
Zhao-Shangzhi wanted to include more fighters in his units: after all, at one time they moved to the Soviet Union in considerable numbers. The partisan leader was assured that most of the partisans who had previously ended up in the USSR had already been sent to China (at the end of the 1930s, many Chinese partisans were transported from the Far East to Central Asia and from there along the Z-Alma-Ata-Lanzhou highway to China), and all that remain will be given to him for selection. Zhao-Shangzhi received everything he asked for - there were no refusals. At the end of the conversation, he was told again: "We consider you the main leader of the partisan movement in Manchuria and through you we will give instructions on all issues. At the same time, we will maintain contact with the detachments operating territorially close to the Soviet border."
The last issue that was discussed at this meeting was the emergence of a conflict between the USSR and Japan as a result of the transfer of a partisan detachment from the Soviet Union to Manchuria. Apparently, this option was by no means excluded at the army headquarters. However, in connection with the beginning of the fighting at Khalkhin Gol, Soviet-Japanese relations deteriorated to the limit, and another possible incident meant little. Or maybe the army authorities received carte blanche to conduct partisan operations. The Chinese partisan was told: “You are going to fulfill the will of the Party and do not bear any responsibility for possible conflicts. When crossing, take all the precautions in your power. None of the partisans should in any case say that he was in the USSR. Disclosure of the secret of the transition will make it difficult to further contacts with the partisans, will make it difficult to transfer weapons, ammunition, medicines, etc.”
The final phrase clearly indicates that the partisan movement in Northern Manchuria was never independent and existed under complete control because of the Amur. Of course, a similar situation developed in Primorye, where the 1st OKA was stationed. Although other partisan detachments were operating outside the border that ran along the Ussuri, which were also led by the intelligence department of the headquarters of this army.
Exchange of militants and saboteurs
Several months have passed. Zhao-Shangzhi, together with his detachment, safely crossed the Amur, established contact with other partisan detachments. Joint operations began against the Japanese-Manchu troops. The battles went on with varying success. There were victories, but there were also defeats. I managed to capture some documents that were very interested in Khabarovsk. Messengers left for Soviet territory, carrying samples of new military equipment and reports on the course of hostilities. In the intelligence department of the 2nd OKA, after a thorough study of all the materials received from beyond the Amur and an analysis of the situation in Northern Manchuria, they drafted a new directive for the partisans.
Zhao-Shangzhi's letter was approved by the commander of the army, Konev, and the new member of the military council, divisional commissar Fominykh. On the first page, the date: August 25, 1939, and a resolution with the same signatures: "To transfer the entire directive by separate orders."
This document stated that the main task before winter was to strengthen and increase the detachments, to obtain weapons, ammunition and food. On the eve of winter, it was recommended to create secret bases in inaccessible places, to equip them with dwellings, and to accumulate stocks of food and clothing. Bases must be prepared for defense. The partisans were advised for the time being to refrain from destroying mines, railways and bridges, since they still had little strength and means to carry out these tasks.
The rebels were asked to carry out smaller operations to attack railway trains, gold mines, warehouses, mines, police stations. The main purpose of such strikes is to obtain weapons, ammunition, food and equipment. It was also pointed out that these actions must be carefully prepared: reconnaissance of the object of attack, draw up a plan and discuss it with the commanders of the detachments. Otherwise, losses and failures are inevitable. There were also recommendations for Zhao-Shangzhi in this directive: “You yourself should not personally lead the attacks. Do not forget that you are the leader of the partisan movement, and not the commander of the detachment. take risks on any occasion. You must train commanders"
The rebels were promised to send dynamite and experienced instructors who knew how to use it, as well as food, propaganda literature and topographic maps. Soviet intelligence officers thanked the Chinese comrades for the materials captured during the raids on the Japanese and Manchurian garrisons, topographic maps, for the report of the Japanese topographic detachment, as well as new sights and rangefinders.
Judging by this directive, things were going well for the Chinese insurgents. They carried out, in general, successful operations, conducted reconnaissance and agitation, stocked up for the winter (and winters are harsh in those parts) with everything they needed. And in the spring of 1940, the partisan movement in Manchuria, with active support from beyond the Amur, unfolded on an even larger scale ...
Japanese intelligence, of course, knew that the leadership of the partisan detachments in North China was carried out from the USSR. It was impossible to hide this during the mass transfer of fighters, weapons and ammunition across the border. The methods of fighting the Japanese against the rebels are analyzed in the certificate of the NKVD Directorate for the Khabarovsk Territory, compiled in September 1940. Punitive operations against the Manchurian partisans, the document says, were carried out from the very beginning of the emergence of the partisan movement, i.e. since the early 1930s. But more sophisticated methods have been used recently. To this end, false revolutionary organizations and false partisan groups are being created on the territory of Manchuria. The main task is to pour them into the active detachments of insurgents in order to decompose them from the inside. False supply bases for the rebels are also organized. The Japanese seek to infiltrate their agents into partisan detachments and, with their help, win a decisive victory over the rebels.
At the same time, Japanese intelligence tried to use partisan detachments as a channel for bringing its agents into the Soviet Union. So, at the end of 1939, the NKVD managed to uncover a large Korean "revolutionary" organization created by the intelligence department of the Kwantung Army headquarters. The members of this organization were supposed to be transported through the connections of the Chinese rebels to the territory of the USSR for espionage and sabotage.
In order to find channels for the Soviet leadership of the partisan movement in Manchuria, the Japanese made several attempts to send their spies to the USSR under the guise of underground communists. They had the task of getting a military-political education in the Soviet Union, and then returning back to Manchuria and taking leading positions in partisan detachments. Naturally, the Soviet counterintelligence did everything possible to clear the Manchurian partisan formations from Japanese agents.
When you get acquainted with the documents on the activities of the Soviet and Japanese intelligence services, you involuntarily get a feeling of mirror reflection. It's the same on both sides. Soviet military intelligence uses the local Chinese and Korean population to organize partisan detachments on the territory of Manchuria, arm them, supply them with ammunition and food, and send help across the Amur and Ussuri. Japanese military intelligence, in turn, relies on white emigrants who have gone to Manchuria, also equips them, provides them and transports them through the Amur and Ussuri to Soviet territory.
Leaders of Chinese and Korean partisan detachments are being trained at Soviet intelligence training centers. The leaders of emigrant sabotage groups are in special schools of Japanese intelligence. The commander of the Kwantung Army gives instructions to former subjects of the fallen Russian Empire. The command of the 1st and 2nd OKA - to the Chinese communist rebels. Chinese partisans conducted reconnaissance in Manchuria on the instructions of the Soviet special services. White émigré sabotage detachments were engaged in espionage on Soviet territory on assignments from Japanese intelligence.
True, it can be said that the Chinese partisans fought for the liberation of their homeland from the Japanese invaders and therefore enjoyed help from abroad. But the white emigrants also believed that they were fighting for the liberation of Russia from the Bolsheviks ... In general, there was no difference in the actions of both sides. On both banks of the border rivers sat two seasoned predators, who growled at each other, bared their fangs and tried, at an opportunity, to grab each other's throats.