Technologies to reduce population under the guise of family planning. Demographic situation in Russia

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Introduction The Rise and Fall of Corporate Heroes Everybody Loves Bob. After all, Bob is a corporate hero. Just a couple of days ago he was watching TV after dinner. But in fact, of course, he didn’t watch it, because he was thinking about work. This happens almost always after perfection

Today we will talk about how, in which countries, programs to reduce the birth rate were implemented, and what results this led to.

“Population control (including Birth Control Policy) is the practice of artificially changing the rate of growth of human populations. Historically, population control was implemented through population control, usually by the government, as a response to various factors, including high or increasing poverty, environmental constraints, overpopulation, or for religious reasons."

It will no longer be news to anyone that the Earth's population will soon exceed the mark of 8 billion people, while the optimal number of people who can coexist peacefully on Earth without interfering with each other, without adversely affecting the environment (and that is relatively ) - only about 6 billion. Still, for any population value, even 1 billion people will have a bad impact on the Earth.

But even before the world’s population began to approach a critical point in terms of numbers, some countries had long ago crossed the line of the maximum possible capacity of citizens on their territory. These countries were:

China, India, Singapore, Iran.

We will tell you one by one how the policy of birth control was applied in them.

China

“The most widespread population control is carried out in modern China. Basically, each family here is allowed to have no more than one child, although there are exceptions. Violation of restrictions results in fines.

The One Family, One Child program was launched in 1978. According to official statistics, the program has helped prevent more than 400 million births. The success of the program is sometimes called into question, since part of the decline in fertility is caused by the country's industrialization and economic factors.

Since 2016, the program has been canceled and permission to have two children has been introduced.”

At the moment, China (with India not far behind, as well as mainland Africa) is the country with the largest population in the world, while the country has the 3rd largest territory in the world, but there is not enough space for everyone. Population density over 143.7 people/km².

Attempts to somehow lead China to prudent childbearing began in the middle of the last century; the “One Family, One Child” program started in the 1970s. If at the beginning of its use there were an average of 5.8 children per woman, today it is 1.8. Here it is worth taking into account population growth and, accordingly, the expansion of growth proportions.

Even during the period of the program, there were exceptional cases where parents were allowed to have two children, for example, national minorities, village residents, spouses who were the only children in their families, in cases of multiple pregnancies and if the first child was a girl or with a defect, the state could also exercise loyalty.

The Chinese, especially those living in the countryside, often lied when compiling the census about the number of children (so that birth control sanctions would not be applied to them and to hide the number of children they already had), thus the data we see today may be greatly underestimated. In fact, even today, despite the lifting of drastic restrictions, birth control exists in China.

What officially decent measures were used to limit the birth rate? They raised the age of marriage, 20 years for girls, 22 years for boys, before marriage, potential parents had to undergo medical examinations and examinations (by a psychiatrist, narcologist, etc.), the prestige of education increased, and extramarital and premarital affairs were condemned. Illegal and cruel methods of reducing the birth rate include forced abortions and sterilization, killing of infants, in particular females, but more on these measures a little later.

Of course, many people are concerned with the question: how were the Chinese able to increase their numbers so quickly? What is the secret of fertility? Perhaps in the scorpion tincture, often consumed since the ancient imperial dynasties throughout China, perhaps in the early puberty and high fertility of women. Another point that concerns all countries with a high birth rate and a growing population is poverty and the inaccessibility of primitive contraceptive measures. Here the situation turns, roughly speaking, not into quality, but into quantity. There are a lot of people, but there is nothing to give them, nothing to occupy them, so the new generation is mainly engaged in making children early.

However, in the case of China, this is debatable - no other country brings us so many innovations, even cheap, harmful, disposable ones.

What cruel measures were used against those who violated the framework of the “One Family, One Child” program? Fines were mainly imposed on local authorities. when, as a result of the census, it was established that there were more children in the family than expected. The fines amounted to several annual salaries, and therefore authorities at the local level were forced to actively combat childbearing using cruel methods. For example, women were forcibly sterilized and aborted long term. Infants were often sent to soups - a long-known practice.

Girls were not considered human beings at all; there were known cases of failure to provide medical care to female children, who subsequently died due to the negligence of doctors. Parents and Chinese citizens themselves often treated girls as second-class citizens. It was possible to perform an abortion long term without indication if the gender of the child was determined to be female.

What did all this lead to? Not only the disorderly birth rate, because it is a consequence of certain processes, but also such a devaluation of human life in the form of a cruel framework for implementing a program to reduce the birth rate.

To the fact that human life in China has become zero...

There are so many Chinese that they don’t feel sorry for themselves, they don’t feel sorry for their own kind. And it's wild.

The first country in the world in terms of the number of death penalties (that is, here not only long-term abortions are legalized as measures of population control, but also the murder of adults for various reasons), a country where they eat soup with babies, and this is not prohibited by law. where gender reassignment, prostitution (of young boys, girls), homosexuality, where the life of girls is often equal to the life of an insect - this is the norm.

India

The population of India today is almost the same as that of China - more than 1.3 billion people (second largest in the world), territory - 7th largest in the world, population density - 364 people / km².

Despite the fact that India is a superpower with nuclear weapons, despite the fact that the country has a well-developed education sector, the percentage of the poor population is too high, the vast majority of residents are below the poverty line by European standards.

Naturally, poverty entails the impossibility of access to contraception, development, and getting a normal job. If you watch films about Indians who live in the deepest areas of poverty, you will understand that not everything is so bad in our country.

People sometimes simply sleep on cardboard, wash in garbage puddles, eat fish caught in a ditch with waste, give birth to 7-8 children, without even noticing the appearance of a new family member. And I feel sorry for such people, they have never known another life, but they also want to live not alone, they want some kind of family... all that they saw from their parents is the same reproduction in poverty...

There are more “affluent” Indians, for example, living in slums, self-built villages. There are relatively rich ones. But basically the population of India is poor people.

Birth restrictions here began in the same way as in the case of China in the mid-20th century. Families with two or more children were prohibited from being elected to the local government or holding leadership positions. The state helped families with only one child; in general, the path to the top and getting any worthwhile work were closed to families with many children, which again created a vicious circle of poverty in society.

“In India, mass state-sponsored sterilizations of women were carried out, the country showed one of the highest rates in the whole world. In 2011-2014 alone, about 8.6 million women and 200 thousand men underwent surgery (since male sterilization is considered culturally unacceptable in these places), and other methods of contraception for uneducated women living in remote and poor communities are considered government more expensive than mass surgical sterilization campaigns.

In some cases, women receive a one-time payment of 1,400 rupees after surgery, which can exceed two weeks' income in poor regions. Some operations were carried out in inappropriate conditions, without disinfection, without examinations, etc., and led to the death of more than 700 women in 2009-2012. In 2016, the country's supreme court ordered the closure of all sterilization camps over the next 3 years.

The population of India, due to cultural characteristics, can use selective abortions (selective abortions), in which the elimination of women is carried out even before their birth (gendercide, Gendercide; a phenomenon similar to female infanticide). Researchers have noted a change in the ratio of male to female births and suggest a steady increase in the number of selective abortions since the 1990s.”

Due to abortions, selective abortions, when women resorted to abortion when they were pregnant girls, in the country today there is a small gap between the number of men and women: for every 944 women there are 1000 men.

In addition to the women who died from abortions and sterilization, according to official data, many died from illegal procedures and are not counted in statistics, many remained disabled, and the same children lost their mothers.

It is almost an honor to have an abortion in India among the poor - sometimes this is the only way a woman can buy food for her children, because they give money for an abortion.

Of course, the most active and large-scale programs to reduce the birth rate have been and are operating in India and China, and thanks to these countries, we have the most active percentage of global population growth in the world. That is, the world population is growing precisely at the expense of the poor, who do not have access to contraception, even less worthy human benefits, basic living conditions, and sanitation.

Two more countries that also officially implemented a policy of population reduction/control were Iran and Singapore, but within a much less modest framework than the first two.

Iran

Iran has significantly reduced its birth rate in recent years. The state requires courses on contraception before marriage. Since 1993, laws have been in effect that deny welfare benefits and food stamps to third and subsequent children in the family. Families of no more than 2 children and the use of contraception are promoted.

Singapore

Population control in Singapore went through two phases. After the Second World War, measures were taken to reduce the birth rate. Since the 1980s, after the birth rate fell below replacement level, the state has been promoting an increase in the number of children in the family.”

Africa

It is also worth talking about another populous country - Africa (more precisely, the mainland). The population according to 2013 data is 1.1 billion people, that is, at the moment the population is almost on par with India and China.

Africa in its territory has several states, countries, localities where people simply swarm in poverty, the word “live” cannot even be called it.

Africa occupies a special place in the list of countries for birth control, mainly because almost no measures are taken to control and reduce birth rates in Africa, and therefore the catastrophically growing population becomes a real problem for humanity. That is, to put it correctly, it is not people who are the problem, but problems related to overpopulation - increasing poverty, lack of drinking water, lack of civilization, work, education, interethnic strife.

“Demographers were wrong in their forecasts: there has been no reduction in the birth rate in Africa over the past decades, population growth continues on a scale that humanity has never known. If in 1960 there were 280 million people living on the African continent, today there are 1.2 billion, of which one billion are in sub-Saharan Africa. According to UN estimates, in 2050 the continent's population will be 2.5 billion people, and by the end of the century - 4.4 billion. This is more than the entire population of the planet in 1980.

On average, there are 5.6 children per woman in Nigeria, 6.4 in Somalia (even during civil war), and 7.6 in Niger. There are many reasons: thanks to modern medicine, infant mortality has fallen, but Africans are in no hurry to limit the number of children. Women are still viewed as “birthing machines,” Africans practically do not use contraceptives, and family planning does not exist.”

Can you imagine that it is not far off when there will be 4.5 billion Africans??

Together with the Chinese and Indians, who by that time had “multiplied” to the point of chaos, this is just a crowd covering half the planet. But the danger is not at all that the population is growing, but that it is growing in socially disadvantaged areas, where young people see nothing but poverty, lack of education, and often deviant behavior. That is, this is a potentially criminal mass of people...

Already making up the bulk of the world's population.

Poor countries are a colossal potential for powers that have power, because people are, in the mass, a force, productive, working... or just a platform for experiments, for making revolutions, because the crowd is easy to provoke.

Gates uses Africans to experiment with vaccines, perform operations under different types of anesthesia and without anesthesia at all...

Here, no matter how hard you try to convince yourself that man makes the environment, and not man’s environment, the second part of this statement will always be right.

I used Africa as an example of how complete lack of birth control is not good.

Why is the practice of birth control necessary at all?

In your opinion, is the practice of birth control necessary? Many will say that cruel measures, namely sterilization, late-term abortions, discrimination against girls and handicapped children, are evil... However, an increase in the population in poverty will not do anything good. Birth control is definitely needed, but, of course, not through cruel methods.

For example, it is necessary to increase the availability of education, especially for women, make contraception available, and increase the prestige of marriage.

The decline in total fertility accelerated in 2017

In contrast to the general fertility rate, a more adequate integral characteristic of fertility is the total fertility rate, which eliminates the influence of the age structure, although it is itself subject to the influence of changes in the birth calendar (“rejuvenation” or “aging” of the birth rate, a decrease or increase in the average age of the mother at birth children of different order).

The lowest value of the total fertility rate in Russia was noted in 1999 – 1.157 (Fig. 13). In 2000-2015, its value increased (except for 2005) - to 1.777 in 2015, which corresponds approximately to the level of the early 1990s and 15% below the level required for simple reproduction (2.1). In 2016, there was a decline - the value of the total fertility rate was 1.762, and in 2017 it accelerated - the value of the coefficient dropped to 1.621, which is 9% than in 2015, and a quarter lower than necessary for simple population reproduction.

Since the mid-1990s, the average age of a mother at birth has steadily increased. Previously, the opposite trend prevailed - the average age of a woman at the birth of a child decreased (except for the 1980s, when the proportion of children of the second and higher birth order increased). By 1994 it had dropped to 24.6 years, down from 27.8 years in the early 1960s. Since 1995, the average age of mothers has been steadily increasing. In 2016, according to Rosstat, it was 28.4 years, and in 2017, judging by the distribution of births by maternal age and the number of women of the corresponding ages, it was up to 28.5 years, which is 3.9 years higher than in 1994, and 0.7 years higher than in the early 1960s. Of course, then, with a higher birth rate, the contribution of births of higher orders (the second child and children of subsequent orders) to the total number of births was higher, which increased the average age of a woman at the birth of a child.

A more indicative characteristic of changes in the age of motherhood is the average age of the mother at the birth of the child. According to S.V. Zakharov, the average age of a mother at the birth of her first child decreased from 25.1 to 22.3 years in 1956-1992, and then, on the contrary, began to grow, increasing to 25.5 years in 2015. According to Rosstat, in 2016 it rose to 25.7 years, and in 2017 – to 25.8 years.

Figure 13. Average age of mother at birth of a child and total fertility rate in the Russian Federation, 1962-2017

The birth rate among Russian women living in rural areas has exceeded the replacement level. In 2012, the total birth rate of rural women in Russia increased to 2,215, and continued to increase in the next two years, rising to 2,318 in 2014 (Fig. 14). Then it began to decline again, amounting to 2.111 in 2015, 2.056 in 2016, and 1.923 in 2017. The birth rate of urban women, despite the increase, remains lower. In 2017, the total fertility rate of the urban population decreased to 1.527.

The birth rate among rural women grew faster in 2000-2015 than among urban women, as a result of which the differences between them began to increase again. If in 2005, when the differences became minimal over the entire observation period, the total birth rate in rural areas was 31% higher than in the city, then in 2013-2014 it was 46%.

Since the birth rate among the rural population began to decline rapidly as early as 2015, and among the urban population gradually only in 2016, the differences between them have narrowed to previously unprecedented levels. In 2016, the excess of the total birth rate of the rural population compared to the urban population was 23%. In 2017, it increased slightly, amounting to 26%, as in 2015.

Figure 14. Total fertility rate in the Russian Federation, 1960-2017*

*Before 1988 - assessment based on data for two adjacent years; 2014-2017 – including Crimea

The decline in fertility to extremely low levels in most Russian regions was accompanied by a decrease in regional differentiation in terms of the total fertility rate. Only in a small number of federal subjects does its importance continue to exceed the level of simple reproduction. In 2017, there were only 4 such regions out of 85: the Republic of Tyva (3.19), Chechnya (2.73), Altai (2.36) and the Nenets Autonomous Okrug (2.35). Among other regions, the value of the total fertility rate varied from 1.22 in the Leningrad region to 2.08 in the Chukotka Autonomous Okrug (Fig. 15). In the central half of the regions, the value of the indicator in 2017 varied in a narrow range from 1.52 to 1.75 with a median value of 1.61.

A decrease in the total fertility rate in 2017 compared to 2015, when the highest value of the indicator was recorded for the entire period since 1991, was noted in all regions-subjects of the federation, with the exception of the Sakhalin region, where it increased slightly (from 2.02 to 2 ,03).

Figure 15. Total fertility rate by regions of the Russian Federation, 2005, 2015 and 2017, children per woman

The change in the main characteristics of fertility is clearly visible if we compare age-specific fertility rates for different years. The age curves for 1990 and 2000 have a similar shape, with a pronounced peak in the 20-24 age group, although at different levels due to sharp declines in fertility at all ages (Figure 16). By 2010, the fertility curve had taken a completely different shape, with the highest birth rates in the 25-29 age group. The birth rate increased noticeably in all age groups 25 years and older, especially significantly - by 32 points per mille - at the ages of 25 to 34 years, although in relative terms the increase was more significant at the ages of 35 years and older (2.5 times) with lower birth rate. The birth rate under 25 years of age has decreased slightly.

The age-specific birth rate curve in 2015 is located noticeably higher, since the birth rate increased in all age groups except the youngest (15-19 years), in which it continued to gradually decrease. The peak birth rate in the 25-29 age group has become more pronounced.

In 2016, the birth rate decreased in ages under 30, and continued to increase in age groups 30 and older. In 2017, the decline affected all age groups, and the fertility curve became more similar to the 2010 curve, but noticeably shifted to the right, towards age groups 30 years and older. Compared to 2015, the birth rate decreased in all age groups under 40 years old, most significantly in the group under 20 years old (by 23%) and in the ages from 20 to 30 years old (10%). At ages 40 and older, the slight increase continued, although the birth rate in these groups is extremely low.

Figure 16. Age-specific fertility rates, Russian Federation, 1990, 2000, 2010 and 2015-2017, births per 1000 women of the corresponding age

* 2015-2017 – including Crimea

The highest birth rate in recent years has been observed in women aged 25-29 years. For the first time, it exceeded the birth rate in the 20-24 year old group in 2008, and over the subsequent years the gap between them only increased, although it narrowed slightly in 2017 (Figure 17). In 2012, the birth rate at the age of 25-29 years for the first time since 1990 exceeded the level of 100 births per 1000 women (107‰ in 2012-2013). In 2015, it rose to 113‰, but then began to decline again, dropping to 100‰ in 2017.

Based on one-year intervals, the highest birth rates in 2017 were observed at the ages of 25 and 26 years (102‰), at the ages of 27 and 28 years it was slightly lower (about 100‰) and even lower at the age of 29 years (98‰).

The birth rate at the age of 20-24 years, after almost doubling in the second half of the 1980s and in the 2000s, remains relatively stable at about 90 births per 1000 women. The increasing birth rate at the age of 30-34 years is gradually approaching this level (84‰ in 2016). In 2017, the birth rate decreased in both groups, amounting to 81‰ at the age of 20-24 years and 77‰ at the age of 30-34 years.

Compared to the mid-1990s, the birth rate at the age of 35-39 has almost quadrupled (up to 41‰ in 2016 and 39% in 2017).

The birth rate under 20 years of age is slowly but steadily declining, dropping to 19‰ in 2017. In the age group of 40-44 years, on the contrary, it gradually increases, but remains insignificant (9‰). In the age group of 45-49 years, there are also signs of an increase in the birth rate, but in general it has virtually no effect on the overall birth rate, and its level is close to zero.

Figure 17. Age-specific fertility rates, Russian Federation, 1958-2017*, births per 1000 women of the corresponding age (by five-year age groups)

*Before 1988 - assessment based on data for two adjacent years (the second is indicated on the graph); 2014-2017 – including Crimea

Since 2017, Rosstat has been publishing data on the distribution of births by maternal age and birth order. In 2016, most of the second-born children were born (41.1%) and slightly fewer first-born children (39.7%), which have long prevailed. In 2017, their shares were almost equal, amounting to 39% each (Fig. 18). At the same time, the share of children of higher birth order increased to 21% compared to 19% in 2016. These are mainly third children, whose share has risen to 15% compared to 14% in the previous year.

First-borns predominate among mothers of younger age groups (86% under the age of 20); as the mother’s age increases, their share decreases (up to 14% among mothers 40-44 years old). For mothers aged 45 years and older, the proportion of first-born children again increases slightly, which is often associated with attempts to use the last chances to give birth to a child, including with the help of modern reproductive technologies. The share of births to mothers 45 years of age and older is insignificant, but there are signs of its increase: in 2016 it amounted to 0.1% of the total number of live births, in 2017 - 0.2%.

The bulk of births occur to mothers aged 25-29 years (33.5%) and 30-34 years old (28.9%), noticeably fewer among mothers aged 20-24 years (17.8%) and 35-39 years old ( 13.3%).

Since in Russia, due to the wave-like deformation of the age structure, the number of generations of different years of birth differs markedly, it is more correct to talk about the contribution of the birth rate of different age groups to the total birth rate. In recent years, the greatest contribution to it has been made by the birth rate at the age of 29-29 years (about 31% in 2009-2017). The contribution of births aged 20-24 fell to 25% in 2017, although it was 39% in 2000. The contribution of fertility at the age of 30-34 years, on the contrary, increased to 24% (15%), at the age of 35-39 years - to 12% (5%), at the age of 40-44 years - to almost 3% (1%) , 45-49 years old – up to 0.2% (0.04 in 2000).

Figure 18. Distribution of live births by maternal age and birth order,
Russian Federation, 2017, %

The characteristics of fertility in women with different levels of education are also of interest. In the statistical bulletin on the vital statistics of the Russian Federation for 2012, Rosstat for the first time presented data on the distribution of live births by age and education of the mother. Similar data are presented in subsequent bulletins for 2013-2017.

According to these data, the proportion of children born to mothers with higher education is growing. If in 2012 it was 39% (45% for mothers with higher and incomplete higher education) of the total number of mothers whose level of education was indicated when registering the child, then in 2016 and 2017 it was already 50% (54%). Just over a quarter of children are born to mothers with secondary vocational education, but their share has decreased slightly, amounting to 26.6% in 2016 and 2017 versus 29.0% in 2012. As a result, the share of children born to mothers who received higher or secondary vocational education increased from 68% in 2012 to 77% in 2017.

Mothers without vocational education accounted for 19.3% of births in 2017, including 13.4% for women with complete secondary education and 5.0% for women with basic general education. In 2012, the proportion of births to mothers who did not have higher or secondary vocational education exceeded 25%, including 17.8% to mothers with complete secondary general education, and 6.0% to mothers with basic general education.

The proportion of mothers whose level of education is unknown has decreased significantly: in 2017 it was 7.9% compared to 22.5% in 2013 and 26.3% in 2012. The proportion of mothers whose level of education is unknown is higher in younger and older age groups, and especially in the group for which the mother’s age is also unknown.

If we consider the distribution of births by maternal age depending on the level of education, we can note the most pronounced shift towards older ages among women with higher education (Fig. 19). In this group of women who became mothers in 2017, the age groups 25-29 and 30-34 years old accounted for the highest shares of births (38% and 36%, respectively), while the age group 20-24 years old accounted for the lowest (8 %).

Among those born to mothers with incomplete higher education, the peak in the distribution, for obvious reasons, is shifted to the age of 20-24 years (almost 46% of births). The distribution of births to mothers with lower education is also skewed towards younger age groups. Among those born to women who received only basic general education, almost a quarter were born to mothers under 20 years of age (22%), another quarter were born at the age of 20-24 years (26%).

Figure 19. Distribution of live births by maternal age depending on her level of education, Russian Federation, 2017, %

In 2017, for the first time in recent years, the proportion of children born to women who are not in a registered marriage stopped decreasing.

Until the mid-1980s, the proportion of those born out of wedlock barely exceeded 10%, and after 20 years it increased to 30% (in 2005). Similar trends in the growth of out-of-wedlock births were observed during this period or somewhat earlier in many European countries. However, in the second half of the 2000s, the share of births to unmarried Russian women began to decline and dropped to 21.1% in 2016 (Figure 22 in the section on marriage and divorce rates). A similar downward trend in out-of-wedlock births has not been observed in other developed countries. In 2017, the share of children born outside of a registered marriage was 21.2%.

Data on the distribution of those born outside of a registered marriage by maternal age, published by Rosstat for the seventh year in a row in the statistical bulletin on the vital statistics of the Russian population, make it possible to assess the contribution of such births to the total birth rate for individual age groups (Fig. 20).

The proportion of those born outside of a registered marriage is highest in younger age groups (97% among mothers under the age of 15 years, 48% at the age of 15-19 years). The lowest proportion of those born outside of a registered marriage is to mothers who gave birth at the age of 25-29 years (17%). As the mother's age increases, this proportion increases - from 19% in the age group of 30-34 years to 33% in the group of 45 years and older.

Figure 20. Distribution of births by age and marital status of the mother, 2017, thousand people and % of those born in a registered marriage

Births outside of a registered marriage reflect two types of reproductive behavior: unplanned births as a result of a low culture of contraception, primarily among young women, and on the other hand, the planned birth of a child with the intentional formation of a “maternal” family by women, usually of older reproductive ages.

Among Russian regions, significant differentiation remains in the proportion of those born outside of a registered marriage, which is largely due to the preservation of the sociocultural characteristics of the marital and reproductive behavior of various ethnic groups. Thus, in 2017, the share of those born outside of a registered marriage ranged from 10.5% in the Kabardino-Balkarian Republic to 63.3% in the Republic of Tyva (Figure 21). High values ​​of the indicator - up to 30% and above - are typical for a number of regions of the Far East and Siberia, and in the European part of the country - for the northern regions of the Northwestern Federal District (Nenets Autonomous District, Perm Territory).

Compared to 2016, the proportion of those born outside of a registered marriage decreased in 30 of the 85 regions of the federation, and remained at the same level in 9. In 46 regions it increased, but the increase generally did not exceed a percentage point. It was greatest in the Pskov region - by 5 percentage points compared to 2016, but the same share of out-of-wedlock births - 23.4% - was also observed in the region in 2015.

Figure 21. Proportion of those born outside of a registered marriage by region-subjects of the Russian Federation in 2015-2016, % of the total number of live births

For quite a long time it was believed that the decline in fertility was associated with the economic difficulties that arise with the birth of each subsequent child. When we noticed in the 60s that the birth rate was declining, they began to conduct sociological research, using questionnaires to find out the living conditions of families.

To the question: “why don’t you have more children?”, the following answer options were given:

1) there is not enough salary;

2) problem with living conditions;

3) it is difficult to place children in child care institutions;

4) inconvenient operating mode;

5) lack of help from grandparents;

6) ill health of one of the spouses;

7) ill health of existing children;

8) conflicts between spouses.

In general, they thought that if we help solve these problems, the birth rate will rise. It would seem that everything is clear. But to the question: “Under what conditions would you have another child?” - many, especially those with two children, answered: “under no circumstances.”

Gradually, experts began to come to the conclusion that the decline in fertility cannot be studied only from the point of view of interference. A number of authors (V.A. Borisov, A.N. Antonov, V.M. Medkov, V.N. Arkhangelsky, A.B. Sinelnikov, L.E. Darsky) developed the concept of “family needs for children”. It lies in the fact that spouses do not at all want to have an unlimited number of children. A person’s desire to procreate is not biological, but social character, and manifests itself very differently at different times and under different conditions.

The theory of the institutional crisis of the family explains why the birth rate throughout the world falls to a family of one or two children, which automatically means depopulation. According to this theory, people were interested in having many children only in the pre-industrial era. In those days, the expression “family is the unit of society” was much more consistent with the real state of affairs than in our era. The family truly acted as a miniature model of society.

The family was a production team (for families of peasants and artisans, who made up the vast majority of the population). Children from a very early age participated in family production and were of undoubted economic value to their parents.

The family was a school in which children received from their parents all the knowledge and work skills they needed for a future independent life.

The family was a social welfare institution. In those days there were no pensions. Therefore, old people and disabled people who lost their ability to work could only count on help from their children and grandchildren. Those who did not have a family had to beg.

The family was a place of leisure. As a rule, family members relaxed and had fun together.

In the family, that is, in marriage, sexual needs and the need for children were satisfied. Extramarital affairs were condemned by public opinion. It was very difficult to hide them from others in rural areas or small towns, especially if these connections were long-term and regular.

Having children (primarily sons) was a necessary condition in order to be considered a full member of society. Childlessness was condemned by public opinion, and married couples without children suffered psychologically from their inferiority.

Children also performed an emotional and psychological function, since parents experienced joy and a sense of spiritual comfort from communicating with them.

Thus, with all their shortcomings, traditional families basically coped with their functions: they provided for themselves economically, socialized new generations, took care of the older generation and produced as many children as were enough (even with the then very high mortality rate) for physical survival of humanity. At the same time, the population in different historical periods either grew or was relatively stable.

Of course, during disasters - wars, crop failures, epidemics, etc. - the population declined sharply, but subsequently the high birth rate compensated for all these losses. Under normal conditions, that is, in the absence of such cataclysms, there has never been a steady trend towards a decrease in population due to the excess of mortality over the birth rate for a long time - this has become possible only in our era.

With the advent of industrialization, the situation changed dramatically. The family lost its production functions and ceased to be a labor collective. Family members - husband, wife and grown-up children (the use of child labor was especially characteristic of the era of early capitalism) begin to work outside the home. Each of them receives an individual salary, independent of the composition of the family and its presence in general.

Accordingly, there is no need for a sovereign head of the family as the head of family production.

In addition, the increasing complexity of knowledge necessary for socialization and subsequent work activity leads to an extension of the training period. If in a traditional peasant family 7-year-old children already became good helpers for their parents, then in a modern urban family children go to school until they are 17-18 years old, and if they then enter institutes and universities, they remain dependent on their parents until they are 22-23 or more. years.

But even after they start working, they do not give their earnings to their parents and generally leave the parental family at the first opportunity. Their desire for separation is especially intensified after marriage, and unlike the era of majorat and minorat, when the son who inherited the property remained with his parents, all children separated and only housing difficulties could prevent this (which is very typical for our country).

So, in the pre-industrial era, the economic component of the need for children played an important role. But if he were the only one, the birth rate today would drop to zero. The economic value of children in modern conditions is expressed not even by zero, but by a negative value, and a considerable one at that.

The emotional and psychological component of the need for family and children is that family and children give a person emotional satisfaction. In marital relationships, this satisfaction manifests itself in the sexual and psychological spheres. Communication between parents and children brings joy and fills life with meaning.

That is why children do not stop being born even when, from an economic point of view, they no longer bring income to their parents, but, on the contrary, only losses.

Demographic policy that uses only economic levers (benefits and allowances for families with several children, taxes on childlessness) has never produced lasting results. Although quite popular “the concept of obstacles to the birth of children” widespread, including in scientific circles. It is dominated by the opinion that the birth rate is too low due to difficult material living conditions.

It follows from this that it is necessary to alleviate these conditions by providing families with a small child or several children with various benefits and allowances, and the birth rate will increase so much that the threat of depopulation will be eliminated. This point of view is based only on everyday logic and “common sense” considerations, but is not supported by statistics. A low birth rate, which does not provide even simple replacement of generations, is observed in all economically prosperous Western countries. The decline in the birth rate itself occurs not only in conditions of an economic crisis, as is the case in present-day Russia, but also in conditions of economic recovery.

Two centuries have passed since demographers became aware of the feedback paradox. When the birth rate was very high and its artificial limitation in marriage was not practiced, the average number of children born in families of all social groups differed little, and the difference between them was associated mainly with differences in the average age at first marriage among women belonging to different social groups. groups. The average number of surviving children also depended on social differences in mortality. The decline in child mortality began earlier among the most educated, cultural and affluent groups of the population.

Therefore, in these groups (earlier than in others), parents acquired confidence that all their children would survive and began to practice artificial birth control. The birth rate declines first among the social elite, as well as among the intelligentsia, then among workers, and only lastly among peasants. At a time when society as a whole undergoes a transition from a high level of fertility to a low one, the effect of the “feedback” mechanism becomes most noticeable. However, after the process of declining fertility spreads to all social groups, and its level no longer ensures simple replacement of generations, this feedback weakens and may disappear altogether.

Some authors, resorting to data manipulation, tried to prove that in this case the feedback is replaced by a direct one, and rich families have, on average, more children than poor ones. But even when such differences appear in the average number of children between families belonging to different social groups, these differences remain small and unimportant, since none of these groups is no longer able to reproduce itself naturally. In such conditions, it does not really matter in which social groups of the population the birth rate is higher and in which it is lower, since in all groups it is still below the line of simple generational replacement.

In addition to the concept of interference, there is concept of child-centrism(its author is the French scientist A. Landry, and the most active supporter in our country is A.G. Vishnevsky). The child becomes the center of the modern family, which presupposes one child - this is the concept of child-centrism. Still, regardless of the different points of view of demographers, one thing can be recognized - the current family does not think about the death of their children. If previously there was a very high probability of death of young children, now few people take into account that a son or daughter will die before their parents. If the countless media reports about accidents made sure to include the family circumstances of the victims and mention the episodes when they were the only children of their parents, many families would understand that one child is too few.

One of the main factors in the decline in the birth rate is the destruction of the traditional institution of marriage as a contract in which the husband undertakes to support the family, and the wife to bear children and run the household. Now sexual and friendly communication is possible without joint housekeeping, obligations, etc. Illegitimate (formally) children in many countries of Western Europe make up from a third to a half of all births, in Russia - almost 30%. Everywhere, the out-of-wedlock birth rate is growing, but its growth does not compensate for the fall in the marital birth rate—in general, the birth rate is falling.

So the relationship between the problem of declining birth rates and the destruction of marriage is very strong. But in our time there is no direct connection between the birth rate and death rate. In modern Russia, population decline is determined not so much by high mortality as by low birth rate. The nature of the replacement of generations depends on mortality only when the level of the latter is high in childhood and youth, and a significant part of each generation does not live to see the average age of the parents at the birth of children. Nowadays, more than 95% of born girls survive to this age.

A further reduction in mortality is extremely important for humanitarian and economic reasons, but has little effect on the nature of the replacement of generations. With a total fertility rate of 1.2-1.3 children, which is what is observed in today's Russia, the population will decline, even if the average life expectancy reaches 80 years. Therefore, in order to increase the birth rate to a level that ensures at least simple replacement of generations, it is necessary to influence not only the economic component, but also the social and emotional-psychological components.

Over the next decades, social upheavals several times led to declines—demographic crises.

First(1914-1922) began during the First World War and the revolution, and the intervention, epidemics and famine of 1921-1922. Emigration from Russia acquired a large scale. In 1920, the population of Russia was 88.2 million. General demographic losses in Russia for the period 1914-1921. (including losses from declining birth rates) are estimated at 12 to 18 million people.

Second demographic crisis was caused by the famine of 1933-1934. The total losses of the Russian population during this period are estimated at 5 to 6.5 million people.

Third demographic crisis falls during the Great Patriotic War. The population in 1946 was 98 million people, while in 1940 it was 110 million. Taking into account the decline in the birth rate, Russia's total losses during this period are estimated at 21 to 24 million people. To change the birth rate in the late 1960s. and in the mid-1990s. “Demographic waves” were of great importance, caused primarily by a sharp decrease in the number of births during the Great Patriotic War (the length of the demo wave is approximately 26 years).

In the early 1990s. Socio-economic and environmental ones were added to the demographic factors of the decline in the birth rate, which caused a kind of demographic resonance (the combination of the demo wave and socio-economic reasons leads to demographic interference). Information about the beginning appears in periodicals fourth demographic crisis in Russia.

The dynamics of the resident population according to post-war census data are in the table below.

Table 1. Resident population according to census data

From 1989 to 2002, the permanent population of the Russian Federation decreased by 1,840 thousand people, or 1.3%.

The population decline was mainly due to natural population decline, as well as due to the emigration of Russians to “far abroad” countries, which was significantly greater than the volume of immigration from these countries.

Population growth in Russia until the early 1990s. occurred due to both natural and migration growth, which, as a rule, did not exceed a quarter of the total increase. With the onset of natural population decline, migration became the only source of replenishing losses in the Russian population.

The permanent population of the Russian Federation as of January 1, 2009 was 141.9 million people, of which 103.7 million people (73%) were city residents and 38.2 million people (27%) were rural residents. In 2008, 1713.95 thousand people were born, 2075.95 thousand people died, natural decline was 362 thousand people. In 2008, natural decline was replaced by 71.0% by migration growth (in 2007 - by 54.9%, in 2006 - by 22.5%).

The increase in migration from foreign countries amounted to 281.614 thousand people in 2008, and 242.106 thousand people in 2009.

The number of Russian citizens in 2008, taking into account migration growth, decreased by 104.9 thousand people. According to forecasts, by 2030, taking into account fertility, mortality and migration growth, the population of Russia will decrease to 139.4 million people. at the average (most probable) forecast level and up to 128.5 million people. at a low (worst) forecast level.

Among the measures to solve demographic problems in Russia are:

• ensuring the safety of citizens;
• reducing forced and premature death rates;
• reduction of morbidity and disability arising from unsatisfactory working conditions, unfavorable environmental conditions, emergency situations caused, first of all, by low levels of fire and transport safety;

The state and prospects for the development of human potential in the Russian Federation in the structure are fundamental conditions for the well-being of the country and the most important factors, which is based on taking into account the diversity of various factors.

Over the past 20 years, mortality has increased by 1.6-2.4 times. The highest rate of its growth (2 times or more) in men is at the age of 25-50 years, in women - 25-40 years. Currently, the mortality rate of men of working age exceeds the mortality rate of women by 5-7 times, resulting in an unprecedented gap of more than 12 years in average life expectancy between men and women. There is no such gap in life expectancy between men and women in any developed country in the world.

Numerical excess of women over men in the population is observed after 28 years and increases with age. At the beginning of 2008, the number of women exceeded the number of men by 10.6 million people. (16% more).

The average expected survival time of Russian citizens who turned 15 years old in 2008 is: men - 47.8 years, women - 60 years.

The predicted life expectancy of Russians is presented in table. 2.

Table 2. Life expectancy of Russian citizens at birth (number of years)*

* The low version of the forecast is based on extrapolation of existing demographic trends, the high version is focused on achieving the goals defined in the Concept of the Demographic Policy of the Russian Federation for the period up to 2025, the middle version of the forecast is considered the most realistic, it takes into account the existing demographic trends and the demographic policy measures taken .

For comparison in table. Table 3 shows data for some countries of the world on the average predicted survival time of citizens who in 2007-2008. turned 15 years old.

As can be seen from table. 3, In terms of life expectancy, Russia is significantly inferior to developed countries of the world, including the BRIC countries (Brazil-Russia-India-China). In world statistics, out of 192 UN member countries, Russia ranks 131st in life expectancy among men, and 91st among women.

The socio-economic development of the country depends on the state, the quality of which is largely determined by the level of health and the size of the working-age population. According to statistics for 2010, the working-age population is 62.3% (of the total population); children under 15 years old - 16.1%; persons over working age (men over 60 years old, women over 55 years old) - 21.6%.

According to international criteria, a population is considered old if the proportion of people aged 65 years or more in the entire population exceeds 7%. Russia passed this threshold in 1967. Currently, 14% of the country's population, i.e., every seventh Russian, is at this age.

Table 3. Predicted survival time of citizens who in 2007-2008. turned 15 years old, for some countries of the world (number of years)

In 2006, the working age population began to decline(working age: men - 16-59 years, women - 16-54 years), i.e. the most economically active part of the population. In the near future, this process will increase, which may cause a labor shortage in the labor market. According to the most probable forecast estimates, by 2030 the working-age population of Russia will decrease to 54.8% of the total population (76.4 million people). The number of people under working age will be 17% (23.7 million people), and those over working age will be 28.2% (39.3 million people).

Low life expectancy in our country is primarily associated with high mortality rates, especially among men. The overall mortality rate (the number of deaths per 1000 people) over the past 5 years in Russia exceeds 1.9 times the USA and 1.6 times the EU countries. Reducing the mortality rate to the 1990 level would save the lives of more than 650 thousand people - this is 1.8 times more than the natural population decline in the country in 2008.

When analyzing the causes of depopulation processes in Russia, it is also necessary to take into account the quality of reproductive health, which determines the demographic prospects of the country. The total fertility rate in our country in 2008, as a result of measures taken to stimulate the birth rate, became comparable to its value in the countries of the European Union. However, the birth rate in Russia is lower than the total mortality rate, which leads to a continuing decline in the country's population.

In Russia there is an increase general contingent disabled people registered with social security authorities. It has increased only in the last ten years from 7.9 million to 12.7 million people., what is 9% of the country's total population. The number of disabled people of working age is growing and has reached about 600 thousand people. For the first time, more than 1 million people are recognized as disabled each year. On average, from 12 (2008) to 15 (2000) thousand people become disabled per year due to the consequences of industrial injuries and occupational diseases. But these are only official statistics, because disability caused by industrial activities is often not diagnosed, but refers to general diseases.

There has been an alarming decline in the population of our country. It is especially dangerous that there remains a high level of mortality and morbidity among people of working age. The relatively favorable situation with the size of the working-age population may continue for the next few years, and then increasingly smaller categories of citizens born in the 1990s - early 2000s will enter working age, and those born in the 50s - early 60s will retire from working age centuries. Then the indicator of the demographic burden on the working-age population by people of retirement age will increase, while the average age of workers increases, which may worsen the socio-economic situation in the country.

Population is a labor resource on which the economic power of a country depends. For Russia, with its huge territory (more than 17 million sq. km - Russia is the largest country in the world by area), population size is of utmost importance for controlling territory. A further reduction in the population at the same pace could lead to a reduction in population density to a critical level, at which it will not be possible to control the territory purely physically, and this threatens the territorial integrity of Russia.

The causes of diseases leading to death, disability, loss of ability to work, and degree of work activity are varied. These include socio-economic living conditions, and increasing information, mental and emotional stress. A significant role in the causes of diseases belongs to the state of the environment and working conditions. It is not yet possible to reliably assess the contribution to mortality and premature decline in working capacity made by the environmental situation and working conditions that occur during the onset of the disease or preceding it. However, according to most scientists, this contribution is very significant.

Population crisis in Russia

At the turn of the century, Russia continues to experience a deep and protracted demographic crisis, which is manifested in a population decline, a deterioration in its quality, a decrease in average life expectancy, and an aging population. The birth rate of the population fell to 1.3 million people in 1999 from 2.4 million in 1985, or by 45.8%, and the mortality rate increased from 1.6 to 2.3 million people (then decreased to 2 million) . Fertility rate, i.e. The average number of children born to one woman in her lifetime has fallen from 2.1 in 1985-1986. to 1.2 in 1999. In other words, over the past 15 years, simple population reproduction has not been ensured in Russia, i.e. Each generation of children is smaller than the generation of parents.

Life expectancy over these years decreased for the entire population from 69.26 to 67.02 years; for men - from 63.83 to 61.3; for women - from 73 to 72.93. The quality of public health is declining. The number of disabled children has exceeded 600 thousand. During a medical examination, 90% of schoolchildren are diagnosed with a variety of diseases. Of the young people of military age, more than half are “limitedly fit”, i.e. essentially sick.

We are now seeing a downward trend in the number of children in a family. According to Goskomstat, the majority of Russians today consider it most acceptable to have one child.

If previously three or four children in a family were absolutely normal, now large families are much less common. But, as before, rural families typically have a larger number of children than urban ones.

If current trends are not overcome, then in the 21st century. Russia will face the problem of the survival of the nation and the preservation of its statehood. The current demographic situation dictates the need for further research into possible options for the development of socio-demographic processes in Russia.

There are three main directions for overcoming the demographic crisis.

First - changing the reproductive behavior of the population, orienting the value systems of young people towards family and children.

Second direction - reducing population mortality, improving people's quality of life. In the current situation, the birth rate is unlikely to increase, so we must do everything we can to help the family save those already born and raise them to be healthy physically and morally.

Third direction - assessment of the possibility of compensating for losses of the Russian population through more complete use of the migration potential of the CIS countries. This direction can give the most tangible results in improving the demographic situation, or at least stabilizing it, at the lowest cost and in a shorter time. The latter is very important, given the need to quickly respond to depopulation processes.

Before World War I, the birth rate in Russia was one of the highest among European countries - 47.8 per 1000 people (1913). Such a high birth rate was explained by early marriage, the high marriage rate of the population, and the predominance of the rural population, which always had a higher level of fertility. However, since the 1930s there has been a decline in this level. The Second World War only intensified this process. The post-war compensatory rise in the birth rate, which continued until the end of the 40s, did not restore the pre-war level.

The decline in the birth rate resumed in the 50s, which was greatly facilitated by the abolition of the ban on abortion in 1955. In the next decade, the dynamics of fertility rates reflected the continued transition to a new type of reproductive behavior. Since the late 60s in

In Russia, the two-child family model began to prevail, the birth rate dropped to a level slightly lower than necessary to ensure simple reproduction of the population.

In subsequent decades, fertility rates stabilized and fluctuated under the influence of market factors (economic, political, social), without deviating far from the level of two children born per woman. These fluctuations include the rise in birth rates in the early 80s, which began shortly after the introduction of state support for families with children aimed at stimulating the birth rate (extension of paid parental leave, increase in child benefits and other benefits) . By 1987, the total fertility rate for the first time since the mid-60s rose to a level significantly higher than simple population replacement. But the effect of these measures was short-lived, which only confirms the experience of other countries.

The sharp drop in the birth rate in the early 90s can no longer be interpreted only as a normal fluctuation in the process. It is explained not so much by the influence of radical socio-political and socio-economic transformations, but by changes in the “calendar” of births caused by socio-demographic policy measures introduced in the early 80s. Social benefits have encouraged families to have planned children earlier than they expected. But since the intentions of the spouses regarding the total number of children in the family did not change, the contingent of potential parents turned out to be largely exhausted, which caused a reduction in the absolute number of births in subsequent years.

The socio-economic crisis, to a certain extent, accelerated the process of transition from traditional to a new type of reproductive behavior, in which intra-family regulation of childbirth becomes widespread and becomes the main factor determining the level of fertility.

If, with regard to the process of reducing the birth rate, Russia followed the path of the countries of Western Europe, then the dynamics of mortality in our country fits into the so-called model of demographic transition. Improvements in living standards and the quality of medical care in developed countries have contributed to a significant increase in life expectancy. The decline in mortality as a result of changing life priorities was followed by a fall in the birth rate.

The model of demographic development in Russia, as well as in most Eastern European countries, currently combines the low birth rate characteristic of highly developed countries with the lower average life expectancy that was observed during the recovery period of post-war Europe. Thus, there is some delay in the aging process, which is explained by a large number of premature deaths, especially among men.

The long-term decline in the level of natural reproduction of the population, combined with an increase in the absolute number of older people, made the process of demographic aging of the population almost irreversible, and the sharp decline in the birth rate in the 90s accelerated it.

According to international criteria, a country's population is considered old if the proportion of people aged 65 years and older exceeds 7% of the total population. According to this indicator, Russia can be classified as an aging country since the late 60s, and currently 12.5% ​​of its residents (i.e., every eighth Russian) is over 65 years old.

However, thanks to a well-funded national project to increase the birth rate in Russia, a turning point in this trend occurred in 2007: for the first time in the last 20 years, the population of Russia stopped declining, and a trend towards an increase in the birth rate began to form.