Su-27 (internal designation: product 10B, according to NATO codification: Flanker, Flanker - English. “Coming from the Flank”, nicknamed “Dude”) is a fourth generation Soviet/Russian multi-role highly maneuverable all-weather fighter developed by the Sukhoi Design Bureau and designed to gain air superiority. The main designers of the Su-27 at different times were Naum Semenovich Chernyakov, Mikhail Petrovich Simonov, A. A. Kolchin and A. I. Knyshev. The first flight of the prototype took place in 1977, and in 1984 the aircraft began to arrive in aviation units. Currently, it is one of the main aircraft of the Russian Air Force; its modifications are in service in the CIS countries, India, China and other countries. A large number of modifications have been developed on the basis of the Su-27: the Su-27UB combat trainer, the Su-33 carrier-based fighter and its combat training modification Su-33UB, the Su-30, Su-27M, Su-35 multi-role fighters, the Su-35 front-line bomber 34 and others.
History of creation
Start of development
At the end of the 1960s, the development of promising fourth-generation fighters began in a number of countries. The United States was the first to begin solving this problem, where back in 1965 the question of creating a successor to the F-4C Phantom tactical fighter was raised. In March 1966, the FX (Fighter Experimental) program was launched. Design of the aircraft according to specified requirements began in 1969, when the aircraft received the designation F-15 Eagle. The winner of the competition to work on the project, McDonnell Douglas, was awarded a contract on December 23, 1969 to build prototype aircraft, and in 1974 the first production fighters F-15A Eagle and F-15B appeared. As an adequate response, the USSR launched its own development program for a promising fourth-generation fighter, which was launched by the Sukhoi Design Bureau in 1969. It was taken into account that the main purpose of the aircraft being created would be the fight for air superiority. Air combat tactics included close maneuver combat, which was again recognized at that time as the main element of the combat use of a fighter.
Prototypes
T-10
T-10-1 - the first prototype of the Su-27 fighter.
In 1975-1976, it became clear that the initial layout of the aircraft had significant shortcomings. However, a prototype aircraft (named T-10-1) was created and took off on May 20, 1977 (pilot - Honored Test Pilot Hero of the Soviet Union Vladimir Ilyushin. In one of the T-10-2 flights, piloted by Evgeniy Solovyov, fell into an unexplored area of resonant modes and collapsed in the air. The pilot died. At this time, data about the American F-15 began to arrive. Suddenly it turned out that in a number of parameters the machine did not meet the technical specifications and was significantly inferior to the F-15. For example, the developers electronic equipment did not fit into the weight and size limits allotted to them. It was also not possible to achieve the specified fuel consumption. The developers faced a difficult dilemma - either bring the aircraft to mass production and hand it over to the customer in its existing form, or undertake a radical redesign of the entire aircraft. It was decided to start creating the aircraft practically from scratch, without releasing a car that lags behind its main competitor in terms of its characteristics.
T-10S
In the shortest possible time, a new vehicle was developed, the design of which took into account the experience of developing the T-10 and the experimental data obtained. And already on April 20, 1981, the experimental T-10-17 aircraft (another designation T-10S-1, that is, the first production one), piloted by V. S. Ilyushin, took to the skies. The machine has been significantly modified, almost all components were created from scratch. There were many innovations in the fuselage design: on the T-10, one of the wing edges was rounded (as on the MiG-29). On the T-10S the wing had a completely trapezoidal shape. On the T-10, the fins were located above the engines, then they were installed on the sides. The nose landing gear was moved back 3 meters so that splashes during takeoff or landing after rain would not enter the air intakes. Previously, the brake flaps were located at the bottom of the fuselage, but when they were released, the plane began to shake. On the T-10S, the brake flap is installed behind the cockpit. In this regard, the cockpit canopy did not move back, as on the T-10, but opened upward. The contours of the nose of the aircraft were changed. The number of missile hardpoints increased from 8 to 10. The data obtained during testing showed that a truly unique aircraft had been created, which in many respects had no analogues in the world. Although this was not without disasters: during a flight on December 22, 1981 at a speed of 2300 km/h in critical mode due to the destruction of the nose of the aircraft, test pilot Alexander Sergeevich Komarov died. Some time later, under the same regime, N. Sadovnikov found himself in a similar situation. Only thanks to the great skill of the test pilot, later Hero of the Soviet Union, world record holder, the flight ended safely. N. F. Sadovnikov landed a damaged plane at the airfield - without most of the wing console, with a chopped off keel - and thereby provided invaluable material to the developers of the aircraft. Measures were urgently taken to modify the aircraft: the structure of the wing and airframe as a whole was strengthened, and the area of the slat was reduced.
Subsequently, the aircraft underwent numerous modifications, including during mass production.
Adoption
The first production Su-27s began to enter service with the troops in 1984. The Su-27 was officially adopted by government decree of August 23, 1990, when all the main deficiencies identified in the tests were eliminated. By this time, the Su-27 had been in operation for more than 5 years. When adopted by the Air Force, the aircraft received the designation Su-27S (serial), and in air defense aviation - Su-27P (interceptor).
Design
Glider
The Su-27 is made according to a normal aerodynamic design and has an integral layout: its wing smoothly mates with the fuselage, forming a single load-bearing body. The wing sweep along the leading edge is 42°. To improve the aerodynamic characteristics of the aircraft at high angles of attack, it is equipped with highly swept root nozzles and automatically deflected noses. The swells also help to increase the lift-to-drag ratio when flying at supersonic speeds. Also on the wing are flaperons, which simultaneously perform the functions of flaps in takeoff and landing modes and ailerons. The horizontal tail consists of an all-moving stabilizer, which, with symmetrical deflection of the consoles, acts as an elevator, and with differential deflection, it serves for roll control. The vertical tail is two-finned. To reduce the overall weight of the structure, titanium is widely used (about 30%). Many modifications of the Su-27 (Su-27M, Su-30, Su-33, Su-34, etc.) have a front horizontal tail. The Su-33, a variant of the sea-based Su-27, also has folding wing and stabilizer consoles to reduce its size, and is also equipped with a brake hook. Su-27 is the first Soviet production aircraft with a fly-by-wire control system (EDCS) in the longitudinal channel. Compared to the booster irreversible control system used on its predecessors, the EDSU has greater speed, accuracy and allows the use of much more complex and efficient control algorithms. The need for its use is due to the fact that in order to improve the maneuverability of the Su-27, it was made statically unstable at subsonic speeds. Averaged over a range of angles ±30° EPR of a glider 10-20 m²
Power point
The basic Su-27 is equipped with a pair of widely spaced AL-31F turbojet engines with afterburners located in engine nacelles under the rear fuselage. The engines developed by the Saturn design bureau are characterized by low fuel consumption both in afterburner and in minimum thrust mode. The engine weight is 1520 kg. Currently produced at the Ufa Engine Production Association (UMPO). The engines consist of a four-stage low-pressure compressor, a nine-stage high-pressure compressor and single-stage cooled high and low pressure turbines and an afterburner. The separation of the engines was dictated by the need to reduce mutual interference, create a wide internal tunnel for the lower weapon mount and simplify the air intake system; Between the engines there is a beam with a brake parachute container. The air intakes are equipped with mesh screens that remain closed until the nose wheel leaves the ground during takeoff. The concentric nozzles of the afterburners are cooled by an air flow passing between two rows of “petals”. On some modifications of the Su-27, it was planned to install a rear-view radar in the tail boom (in this case, the braking parachute was transferred under the aircraft body). The modernized Su-27SM2 fighters are equipped with more powerful and economical AL-31F-M1 engines equipped with thrust vector control. The engine thrust was increased relative to the base AL-31F engine by 1000 kgf, fuel consumption was reduced from 0.75 to 0.68 kg/kgf*h, and an increase in compressor diameter to 924 mm made it possible to increase air consumption to 118 kg/s . AL-31FP (on some modifications of the Su-30) and more advanced “Izdeliye 117S” (on the Su-35), equipped with a rotating nozzle with a thrust vector deflected by ±15°, which significantly increases the maneuverability of the aircraft. Other modifications of the fighter are also equipped with upgraded engines with thrust vector control AL-31F-M1, AL-31FP and Izdeliye 117S. They are equipped with deeply modernized Su-27SM2, Su-30 and Su-35 aircraft, respectively. The engines significantly increase maneuverability and, above all, allow you to control the aircraft at near-zero speeds and reach high angles of attack. The engine nozzles deviate by ±15°, which allows you to freely change the flight direction along both the vertical and horizontal axis. The large volume of fuel tanks (about 12,000 liters) ensures a flight range of up to 3,900 km and a combat radius of up to 1,500 km. The placement of external fuel tanks on base models is not provided.
Onboard equipment and systems
The aircraft's onboard equipment is conventionally divided into 4 independent, functionally related complexes - the weapons control system (WCS), the flight navigation complex (FNC), the communications complex (CS) and the airborne defense complex (ADS).
Optical search and aiming system
As part of the weapons complex of the base Su-27, the OEPS-27 electro-optical system includes a laser range finder (effective range up to 8 km) and an infrared search and targeting system (IRST) (effective range 50-70 km). These systems use the same optics as mirror periscopes, coupled with a coordinating glass ball sensor that moves in elevation (10° when scanning, 15° when aiming) and azimuth (60° and 120°), allowing the sensors to remain "directed". The big advantage of the OEPS-27 is the ability to covertly target a target.
Integrated thrust vectoring and flight control system
The control of the AL-31FP engine nozzles is integrated into the flight control system (FCS) and software. The nozzles are controlled through digital computers, which are part of the entire UPC as a whole. Since the movement of the nozzles is fully automated, the pilot is not busy controlling individual thrust vectors, which allows him to fully concentrate on controlling the aircraft. The SKP system itself reacts to any action of the pilot, who works, as usual, with the stick and pedals. During the existence of the Su-27, the SKP system has undergone significant changes. The original SDU-10 (radio-controlled remote control system), which was installed on early Su-27s, had limitations on the angle of attack and was characterized by vibration of the thrust vector control handle. Modern Su-27s are equipped with a digital control system, in which the traction control functions are duplicated four times, and the yaw control functions are duplicated three times.
Cabin
Cockpit of Su-27
The cabin has a two-section canopy, consisting of a fixed visor and a resettable part that opens up and back. The pilot's workplace is equipped with a K-36DM- ejection seat. In the base model SU-27, the cockpit was equipped with the usual set of analogue dials and a small radar display (the latter was removed from the Russian Knights group). Later models are equipped with modern multifunctional liquid crystal displays with control panels and an indicator displaying navigation and targeting information against the background of the windshield. The steering lever has autopilot control buttons on the front side, trim and target joysticks, a weapon selection switch and a shooting button on the back side.
Weapons and equipment
The H001 airborne pulse-Doppler radar is equipped with a Cassegrain antenna with a diameter of 1076 mm and is capable of detecting air and ground targets in conditions of active interference. In addition, there is a quantum optical location station (KOLS) with a 36Sh laser rangefinder, which tracks targets in simple weather conditions with great accuracy. OLS allows you to target a target at short distances without emitting radio signals or unmasking the fighter. Information from the on-board radar and from the OLS is displayed on the line-of-sight indicator (LOS) and the HUD frame (indication on the windshield).
air-to-air mode
Fighter class (RCS = 3 m² at medium altitude (over 1000 m)),
PPS 80-100 km (150 km in long-range detection mode)
ZPS 25-35 km
Aerial targets, with a probability of 0.5, the minimum target speed is 210 km/h, the minimum difference between the carrier and the target is 150 km/h.
Target detection range
Detection of up to 10 targets
Firing 1 target
Guiding up to 2 missiles at one target
air-to-ground mode(only for Su-30, Su-27SM)
Detection of ground and surface targets in real beam mapping mode
Detection of ground and surface targets in mapping mode with antenna aperture synthesis with medium and high resolution
Detection of ground and surface moving targets in moving target selection mode
Tracking and measuring the coordinates of a ground target;
aircraft carrier (RCS = 50,000 m²): 350
destroyer (RCS = 10000 m²): 250
railway bridge (EPR = 2000 m²): 100
missile boat (RCS = 500 m²): 50-70
boat (EPR = 50 m²): 30
Provides surface mapping
Detection of a tank with an ESR of 10 m or more, moving at a speed of 15-90 km/h (in moving target selection mode)
Detection range, km
MTBF 200 hours
The missile armament is located on the APU-470 and P-72 (aviation launch device) and AKU-470 (aviation ejection device), suspended at 10 points: 6 under the wings, 2 under the engines and 2 under the fuselage between the engines. The main armament is up to six R-27 air-to-air missiles, with radar (R-27R, R-27ER) and two with thermal (R-27T, R-27ET) guidance. And also up to 6 highly maneuverable close-in missiles R-73 equipped with TGSN with combined aerodynamic and gas-dynamic control.
Modifications
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Su-30MK MAKS-2009
T-10 (Flanker-A)- prototype.
T-10S- improved prototype configuration.
Su-27- pre-production version with AL-31 engines.
Su-27S (Su-27) (Flanker-B)- a single-seat Air Force interceptor fighter, the main modification of the aircraft, mass-produced. Equipped with AL-31F engines.
Su-27P- a single-seat fighter-interceptor for the country's air defense forces; the ability to operate on the ground has been removed from the weapons control system.
Su-27UB (T-10U) (Flanker-S)- two-seat combat training fighter. Designed for retraining pilots for the Su-27 aircraft, it retains all the combat capabilities of the Su-27, and the N001 radar is installed in the bow. The first flight of the Su-27UB was carried out on March 7, 1985. It has been serially built in Irkutsk since 1986.
Su-27UP (T-10-30)- training and patrol aircraft for air defense with an in-flight refueling system. Produced in series.
Su-27SK- export modification of the single-seat Su-27 (Su-27S) has been produced since 1991. Normal take-off weight is 23,430 kg, maximum take-off weight is 30,450 kg, fuel reserve in internal tanks is 9,400 kg, maximum combat load weight is 4,430 kg, maximum speed without suspensions is 2 .35 Mach, service ceiling 18,500m, take-off run length at normal take-off weight 450m, flight range 3500 km, armament R-27, R-73, assigned airframe life 2000 hours, engine 900 hours.
Su-27SM- a modernized version of the production aircraft. First flight December 27, 2002 In progress. Radar N001. Passed the first stage of the GSI in 2004.
Su-27SM3- a modernized version of the Su-27, the characteristics of the aircraft are largely similar to the Su-35S, the main difference is the installation of AL-31F-M1 engines with a thrust of 13500 kgf, a reinforced airframe structure, additional suspension points, as well as the installation of 4 displays on which Most of the instruments and sensors in the cockpit were removed.
Su-27SKM- export version of the Su-27SM, first flight 2002
Su-27UBK- export modification of the two-seat combat training fighter Su-27UB.
Su-30 (Su-27PU)- two-seat guidance and target designation aircraft. Built on the basis of the Su-27UB. Capable of simultaneous guidance of four Su-27 interceptors.
See more details: Modifications of the Su-30.
Su-33 - carrier-based fighter
Su-27IB- a prototype of two-seat fighter-bombers Su-32FN and Su-34 with seats arranged side by side. Designed to engage highly protected point targets in any weather conditions and at any time of the day. First flew on April 13, 1990.
P-42 / Su-27 - Record holder
P-42 (T-10-15)- record-breaking aircraft converted from serial Su-27s. In 1986-1990, they set 41 officially registered FAI world records for rate of climb and flight altitude. It is distinguished by the installation of uprated engines and a significantly lightweight design (the maximum take-off weight of the P-42 is 14,100 kg).
Su-33 (Su-27K, T-12) (Flanker-D)- single-seat carrier-based fighter with folding wing consoles. Serial production in small batches at KnAAPO since 1992. Su-33s serve on the TAVKR "Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union Kuznetsov".
Su-33UB (Su-27KUB, T-12UB)- combat training carrier-based fighter with an unconventional combat training vehicle - side-by-side. Previously it was known as Su-27KUB.
Accidents and incidents
The exact number of accidents and disasters involving Su-27 type aircraft is unknown. Some cases are listed below.
Incident in the Barents Sea - on September 13, 1987, a Su-27 touched the propeller blade of an American Orion coastal patrol aircraft with its wingtip. Both planes returned safely to base
Disaster in Vietnam - on December 12, 1995, near the city of Cam Ranh (Vietnam), two Su-27 fighters and one Su-27UB crashed during landing in difficult weather conditions. Four pilots from the Russian Air Force aerobatic team “Russian Knights” died - Nikolai Kordyukov, Nikolai Grechanov, Alexander Syrovoy and Boris Grigoriev. The cause of the disaster was said to be poor flight management.
Incident in Bratislava - in June 1997, at the SIAD’97 air show in Bratislava (Slovakia), a Su-27 (tail number 15) from the Russian Knights aerobatic team landed with its landing gear not extended. The pilot Sergei Klimov was not injured. The cause of the incident was the pilot's forgetfulness. This incident will be remembered and repeated by the pilots when landing the damaged Su-27UB in Dorokhovo.
Sknilov tragedy - July 27, 2002, during demonstration performances at the Sknilov airfield (Lvov), a Su-27UB of the Ukrainian Air Force fell on a crowd of spectators. Both pilots, Vladimir Toponar and Yuri Egorov, ejected. According to official data, 77 died! people (sometimes another number is called - 86 dead), 241 were injured. The reasons for the tragedy were said to be the error of the pilots and the unsatisfactory work of the flight directors.
Accident in Lithuania - On September 15, 2005, the Su-27 pilot, Major Valery Troyanov, reported loss of orientation. Having exhausted the fuel supply, the pilot ejected. The fighter crashed in the Shakiai region of Lithuania, 55 kilometers from Kaunas; the fall did not cause casualties or destruction. The cause of the incident is believed to have been a failure of navigation equipment. The crash of the Su-27 on Lithuanian territory caused a heated political scandal - the Lithuanian side refused to hand over the pilot and flight recorders of the aircraft to Russia. The pilot was handed over to Russian authorities a few days later.
In aviation history, the 60s. were marked by the entry into service of the air forces of the main aviation powers of the world of supersonic fighters, which, despite all the differences in layout and flight weight, had a number of unifying features. They had a speed twice the sound speed, a ceiling of about 18-20 km, and were equipped with on-board radar stations and air-to-air guided missiles. This coincidence was not accidental, since bombers carrying nuclear bombs were considered the main security threat on both sides of the Iron Curtain. Accordingly, the requirements for new fighters were formed, the main task of which was to intercept high-altitude, high-speed, non-maneuverable targets at any time of the day and in any weather conditions.
As a result, a number of aircraft were born in the USA, USSR and Western Europe, which were subsequently classified as the second generation of fighters based on the combination of their design features and flight performance characteristics. The thesis about the conventionality of any classification was confirmed by the fact that in the same company with the “polished” aerodynamics, “Mirage” III, “Starfighter” and “Draken” were the light fighter F-5 “Freedom Fighter” converted from a training aircraft and the heavy twin-engine double F -4 “Phantom”, nicknamed by the Americans themselves “the victory of brute force over aerodynamics.”
In pursuit of a high maximum speed, designers took the path of introducing wings with a high specific load and a thin profile, which, of course, had great advantages at supersonic speeds, but had a serious drawback - low load-bearing properties at low speeds. As a result, second-generation fighters had unusually high takeoff and landing speeds, and maneuverability turned out to be unimportant. But even the most venerable analysts then believed that in the future, combat aircraft would increasingly resemble a reusable manned rocket. “We will never again see air battles like those that took place during the Second World War...” wrote the famous theorist Camille Rougeron. Time very soon showed how dry the theory was, but several more years passed before another sharp turn occurred in fighter tactics.
In the meantime, it was necessary to get rid of the main shortcomings of the second generation, namely to increase the range and improve takeoff and landing characteristics to ensure basing on poorly prepared airfields. In addition, the inexorably growing price of fighters dictated the need to reduce the absolute size of the fleet while simultaneously expanding the functions of the aircraft. A qualitative leap was not required, although the tactics of air warfare were already changing before our eyes - the widespread development of anti-aircraft guided missiles led to the withering away of the doctrine of a massive invasion of bombers at high altitude. The main focus in strike operations has increasingly begun to be placed on tactical aircraft with nuclear weapons, capable of breaking through air defense lines at low altitude.
To counter them, third generation fighters were intended - Mirage F.1, J37 Viggen. Their entry into service, along with modernized versions of the MiG-21 and F-4, was planned for the early 70s. At the same time, design studies began on both sides of the ocean to create fourth-generation fighters—advanced combat vehicles that would form the basis of the air force in the next decade.
The United States was the first to begin solving this problem, where back in 1965 the question of creating a successor to the F-4C Phantom tactical fighter was raised. In March 1966, the FX (Fighter Experimental) program was launched there. Over the course of several years, the concept of a promising fighter has undergone a number of significant changes. It was most influenced by the experience of using American aviation in Vietnam, where the heavily armed Phantoms had advantages in battles at long and medium distances, but were constantly defeated by the lighter and more maneuverable Vietnamese MiG-21s in close air battles.
F-15 Eagle (Eagle - Eagle)
Design of the aircraft according to specified requirements began in 1969, and in the same year the fighter was given the designation F-15. The companies that have progressed further in the FX program are MacDonell-Douglas, North American, Northrop and Republic. The winner of the competition was the McDonell-Douglas project, which was similar in its aerodynamic configuration to the Soviet MiG-25 interceptor, which then had no analogues in the world in terms of flight data. On December 23, 1969, the company was given a contract for the construction of prototype aircraft, and 2.5 years later, on July 27, 1972, test pilot I. Burrows took on its first flight the prototype of the future “Igla” - the YF-15 experimental fighter. The following year, a two-seat combat training version of the aircraft was flown, and in 1974, the first production fighters F-15A "Eagle" and "sparky" TF-15A (F-15B) appeared.
The progress of the FX program was closely monitored in the USSR. Information leaked onto the pages of the open foreign press (and there was quite a bit of it), as well as information received through intelligence channels, was carefully analyzed. It was clear that it was the F-15 that would have to be relied upon when creating a new generation of Soviet fighters, now called the fourth. The first research in this direction in the three leading domestic “fighter” design bureaus - P.O. Sukhoi (Machine-building plant "Kulon"), A.I. Mikoyan (Moscow machine-building plant "Zenit"), and A.S. Yakovlev (Moscow machine-building plant "Speed" plant) - began in 1969-1970, but at first they were carried out on their own initiative, without the instructions "from above" necessary for their "legalization". Finally, at the beginning of 1971, there was a decision by the Commission on Military-Industrial Issues under the Council of Ministers of the USSR, and then a corresponding order from the Minister of Aviation Industry on the deployment in the Soviet Union of a program to create a “Advanced Front-line Fighter” (PFI), which would be a response to the emergence of in the USA the F-15 aircraft.
Just like overseas, it was decided to create a new generation Soviet fighter, the PFI, which was called “anti-F-15” by the designers among themselves, under the terms of a competition with the participation of the Design Bureau of P.O. Sukhoi, A.I. Mikoyan and A.S. Yakovlev . At the beginning of 1971, P.O. Sukhoi ordered the development of a preliminary design of a promising front-line fighter, which received the factory code T-10 and the then secret name Su-27.
It was decided to base the technical proposal on the first version of the aircraft’s appearance, prepared in February 1970 in the design bureau’s project department, headed by Oleg Sergeevich Samoilovich. The first sketches of the layout of the new fighter were completed at the Sukhoi Design Bureau in the fall of 1969. At first Only one person was involved in this - the designer of the project department Vladimir Ivanovich Antonov. Based on the studies of V.I. Antonov in the project department, the first version of the T-10 layout was prepared. Its direct authors were O.S. Samoilovich, V.I. Antonov and head of the project department team V.A.Nikolaenko. The main feature of the aircraft was to be the interpretation of the so-called integral aerodynamic layout, according to which the airframe was made in the form of a single load-bearing body from a set of deformed airfoils with a smooth coupling of the wing and fuselage. For the first time, the integral layout was applied by the P.O. Sukhoi Design Bureau in the development of the project for the T-4MS strategic multi-mode aircraft.
In front of the fighter's load-bearing body, the head part of the fuselage was “built on”, which included a nose compartment with a radar, a cockpit, a niche for the front landing gear, in-cabin and behind-the-cockpit equipment compartments, and below it in the rear part were suspended two isolated nacelles with turbojet engines, air ducts and adjustable air intakes located under the center section. Consoles of all-moving horizontal and two-fin vertical tails, as well as two ventral ridges, were attached to the engine nacelles. The integrated circuit provided a significant increase in the aerodynamic quality of the fighter and made it possible to organize large internal compartments for storing fuel and equipment. To achieve the specified flight characteristics over a wide range of altitudes and flight speeds and angles of attack, the wing of the new fighter was given an ogive (“sinusoidal”) shape and provided with a developed root bead.
According to the calculations of the developers, the influx was supposed to provide an increase in the load-bearing properties of the aircraft at high angles of attack (more than 8-10º) with a simultaneous increase in the pitching moment. In the presence of a swell at high angles of attack, a stable vortex system of two vortex ropes was formed above the wing (one appeared at the root swell and spread above the wing, the second at the leading edge of the base wing). With increasing angles of attack, the intensity of the vortex ropes increased, while on the surface of the wing under the vortex rope the vacuum increased, and, consequently, the lifting force of the wing increased. The greatest increase in rarefaction was located in front of the aircraft's center of gravity on the part of the wing adjacent to the root flap, as a result of which the focus shifted forward and the pitching moment increased. Root swells also had a great influence on the magnitude and distribution of lateral forces, which led to a decrease in the destabilizing effect of the fuselage head.
Another important feature of the T-10, for the first time in domestic fighter aviation, was to be the implementation of the concept of longitudinal static instability of the aircraft at subsonic flight speeds, ensuring its longitudinal balancing in flight through the automation of a quadruple redundant fly-by-wire control system (EDCS). The idea of replacing traditional mechanical control wiring with EMDS was already used by the Design Bureau when creating the T-4 aircraft, tests of which confirmed the correctness of the basic technical solutions. The adoption of the concept of longitudinal static instability (otherwise known as “electronic stability”) promised serious advantages: to balance the aircraft at high angles of attack, it was necessary to deflect the stabilizer with its toe up, while its lift force was added to the lift force of the wing, which gave a significant improvement in the load-bearing properties of the fighter with a slight the growth of its resistance. Thanks to the use of an integral statically unstable configuration, the Su-27 was supposed to acquire exceptional maneuverability characteristics, allowing it to perform evolutions in the air that are inaccessible to conventional aircraft, and have a long flight range without external tanks.
Problems with the layout of the tricycle chassis on this first version of the T-10 forced the developers to use a bicycle chassis layout, but with load distribution as in a traditional tricycle layout, while the main (rear) landing gear was retracted into a center section niche equipped with a fairing between the engine nacelles , and additional supporting struts were placed in the fairings on the wing consoles between the aileron and the flap.
Blowing of the T-10 model, carried out in the T-106 wind tunnel of the Central Aerohydrodynamic Institute, gave encouraging results: with a moderate wing aspect ratio (3-2), a lift-to-drag ratio of 12.6 was obtained. Despite this, TsAGI specialists strongly recommended not to use an integrated layout on promising fighters. This reflected a certain conservatism of the then leaders of the institute, who also referred to information from abroad (the F-15 was built according to the classical scheme!). In this regard, to some extent, as a backup, and with an eye on the F-15, in the second half of 1971, in the team of the project department of the P.O. Sukhoi Design Bureau, headed by A.M. Polyakov, under the leadership of A. I. Andrianov developed a second version of the T-10 layout according to the traditional design, with a conventional fuselage, high wing, side air intakes and two engines installed side by side in the tail section. In terms of the wing planform and empennage design, this option generally corresponded to the option with an integral layout.
Tests of the T-10 models, made according to the traditional design, did not reveal any advantages over the original layout. Over time, TsAGI realized that their fears were groundless, and the institute became a staunch supporter of the integrated circuit. Later, in the process of in-depth development of the T-10, the OKB created and tested in the TsAGI wind tunnels a significant number of other fighter layout options (over 15 in total), differing mainly in the placement of engines, air intakes and landing gear designs. Standing at the origins of the creation of the fighter, V.I. Antonov recalls that the Su-27 was jokingly called a “variable layout aircraft.” It is noteworthy that in the end, preference was given to the very first option - with an integral layout, isolated engine nacelles, longitudinal static instability and emfs. The changes affected mainly only the landing gear layout and airframe contours (for technological reasons, it was necessary to abandon the widespread use of double-curvature surfaces).
The fact that the Su-27 was built in exactly this configuration is a great merit of the General Designer P.O. Sukhoi. Despite the serious objections of supporters of the traditional design (and there were many of them), even at the very early stages of design, Pavel Osipovich had the courage to decide to use the most advanced innovations in aerodynamics, flight dynamics and aircraft design when creating the Su-27 - such as an integral layout, static unstable circuit, fly-by-wire control system, etc. In his opinion, taking into account the real state of affairs in the USSR in the field of aviation radio-electronic equipment, etc. first of all, the weight and size characteristics of existing and future long-range airborne radar stations, as well as on-board computer systems; only using these unconventional solutions could it be possible to create an aircraft that is not inferior in performance to the best foreign analogues. Time has shown him to be right.
In 1971, the first tactical and technical requirements (TTT) of the Air Force for the promising front-line fighter PFI were formulated. By this time, the requirements for the new American F-15 fighter had become known in the USSR. They were taken as the basis for the development of TTT for PFI. It was stipulated that the Soviet fighter should be 10% superior to its American counterpart in a number of basic parameters. Below are some characteristics that, according to the tactical and technical requirements of the Air Force, the PFI should have:
— maximum flight Mach number — 235-2.5;
— the maximum speed of droppings at an altitude of more than 11 km is 2500–2700 km/h:
- maximum flight speed near the ground - 1400-1500 km/h;
— maximum rate of climb near the ground — 300-350 m/s;
— practical ceiling -21 -22 km;
— singing range without PTB near the ground — 1000 km:
— flight range without PTB at high altitudes - 2500 km;
— maximum operational overload — 8-9;
— acceleration time from 600 km/h to 1100 km/h — 12-14 s;
— acceleration time from 1100 km/h to 1300 km/h — 6-7 s;
— starting thrust-to-weight ratio — 1.1-1.2.
The main combat missions of the PFI were determined to be:
— destruction of enemy fighters in close air combat using guided missiles (UR) and a cannon;
— interception of air targets at long range when targeting from the ground or autonomously using a radar sighting system and conducting air combat at medium distances using guided missiles;
— covering troops and industrial infrastructure from air attack;
— countering enemy aerial reconnaissance means:
— escorting long-range and reconnaissance aircraft and protecting them from enemy fighters;
— conducting aerial reconnaissance;
— destruction of small ground targets in conditions of visual visibility using bombs, unguided missiles and guns.
The preliminary design of the Su-27 aircraft, which generally satisfied the specifications of the Air Force for the PFI, was developed at the Sukhoi Design Bureau in the second half of 1971. It considered two options for the fighter layout - integral and classical, developed in two teams of the project department (chiefs brigades V.A.Nikolaenko and A.M.Polyakov, work supervisors V.I.Antonov and A.I.Andrianov, respectively) and received the code names T-101 and T-102 (not to be confused with the names of the first prototype Su-27 aircraft , which appeared in 1977-1978!).
The version of the aircraft presented in the preliminary design, made using an integrated circuit, generally corresponded to the first appearance of the T-10, prepared in the projects department at the beginning of 1970.
Based on calculations of the main characteristics of the aircraft, carried out at the Design Bureau using initial data on the AL-31F engine (thrust 10,300 kgf), the expected weight characteristics of the components of the avionics equipment and the results of purging the T-10 models in TsAGI wind tunnels, the preliminary design presented the following main aircraft data (for the version with an integral layout, with an estimated ammunition load of two K-25 missiles, six K-60 missiles and full cannon ammunition):
— normal take-off weight (without PTB) -18000 kg; — maximum take-off weight (with PTB) — 21000 kg;
— maximum flight speed at an altitude of 11 km is 2500 km/h;
— maximum flight speed near the ground — 1400 km/h;
- service ceiling with 5096 fuel remaining - 22500m;
— maximum rate of climb at the ground with 50% fuel remaining — 345 m/s;
— maximum operational overload with 50% fuel remaining — 9;
— acceleration time at an altitude of 1000 m with 50% fuel remaining: - from 600 to 1100 km/h -125 s; -from 1100 to 1300 km/h - 6s;
- practical flight range near the ground with an average speed of 800 km/h: - without PTB - 800 km; - with PTB -1400 km;
- practical flight range at high altitude with cruising speed: - without PTB - 2400 km; - with PTB - 3000 km;
— take-off run on a dirt runway: - without PTB — 300 m; — with PTB-500 m;
— run length using a braking parachute — 600 m.
Due to the fact that the calculated range characteristics of the Su-27 were somewhat inferior to the requirements of the Air Force, proposals were formulated in the preliminary design to bring them into compliance with the technical specifications. Such measures included: increasing the internal fuel supply and take-off weight (up to 18,800 kg), reducing the specific weight of the engine being developed (from 0.12 to 0.1) while maintaining its thrust, reducing the estimated ammunition load of K-60 missiles from 6 to 4, using on-board products equipment with less weight. In addition, to increase the combat effectiveness of the fighter, it was proposed in the future to equip it with new generation medium-range missiles (type K-27) and modernized K-60M close-range missiles.
In 1972, a meeting of the joint Scientific and Technical Council (STC) of the Ministry of Aviation Industry (MAP) and the Air Force was held, which reviewed the state of work on promising fighters within the framework of the PFI program. Representatives of all three design bureaus made presentations. On behalf of MMZ "Zenith" named after. A.I. Mikoyan was reported by G.E. Lozino-Lozinsky, who presented the commission with a fighter project (still in a version of the classic layout, with a high-mounted trapezoidal wing, side air intakes and a single-tail tail). MZ "Kulon" presented the preliminary design of the Su-27 at the NTS, with the main focus of the speaker O.S. Samoilovich focused on the option with an integrated layout (the posters also showed a second, “spare” version of the Su-27 - a classic design). General Designer A.S. spoke on behalf of MMZ “Speed”. Yakovlev with projects for the Yak-45I light fighter (based on the Yak-45 light attack aircraft) and the Yak-47 heavy fighter. Both were developments of the Yak-33 supersonic interceptor design with a variable-sweep wing and engine nacelles with frontal air intakes installed at the fracture site of its leading edge and differed from each other mainly only in size and weight.
Two months later, the second meeting of the NTS took place. The composition of the participants has not changed, but OKB im. A.I. Mikoyan presented a fundamentally new project for the MiG-29 fighter, now made using an integrated circuit and having a smaller dimension (normal take-off weight 12800 kg). As a result of two meetings of the Scientific and Technical Development Bureau, the A.S. Yakovlev Design Bureau dropped out of the competition due to the need to refine the aerodynamic design to ensure the safety of continued flight of the fighter in the event of failure of one of the engines installed on the wing, while the other two participants faced the “third round”.
And here the management of MMZ "Zenith" named after. A.I. Mikoyan proposed another solution to the problem - to divide the PFI program into two separate programs, within the framework of which it would be possible to continue the creation of both the Su-27 aircraft (as a heavy, promising multi-role front-line fighter) and the MiG-29 (as a light, promising front-line fighter ), ensuring the unification of both aircraft in a number of equipment systems and weapons. As an argument, the first results of research launched in 1971 by industry and customer institutes on the formation of a concept for building a fleet of fighter aircraft (IA) of the country's Air Force of the 80s were presented. based on two types of fighters - heavy and light, just as the US Air Force planned to do.
The proposal of MMZ Zenit was accepted, and both design bureaus were thereby spared the need to participate in the grueling race to obtain a profitable order. Thus, the competition exhausted itself, and in the summer of 1972, orders were issued by the Minister of Aviation Industry, “legitimizing” the continuation of the development of both fighters - the Su-27 and MiG-29.
THE BIRTH OF SU-27
In accordance with the order of the MAP, the Sukhoi Design Bureau in the second half of 1972 began an in-depth study of the preliminary design, and then the creation of a preliminary design of the T-10 aircraft. Due to the need to expand the scope of work, the design of the Su-27 in February 1973 was transferred to the design team headed by Leonid Ivanovich Bondarenko. At the end of the year, the theme also had a chief designer. It was Naum Semenovich Chernyakov, who had previously led the creation of the T-4 (“100”) aircraft, the design of the T-4MS (“200”) and the Korshun UAV.
One of the most difficult tasks in the development of the Su-27 was maintaining weight limits. Reducing the weight of the aircraft structure was given top priority. Even in the early stages of development of the T-10, the head of the projects department O.S. Samoilovich obtained disappointing data on the increase in the take-off weight of a fighter when using new equipment systems: calculations showed that an increase in the weight of avionics by 1 kg entailed an increase in the take-off weight of the entire aircraft by as much as 9 kg! For the engine and aircraft systems, these figures were 4 and 3 kg, respectively. It was clear that without every possible lightening of the design, the take-off weight of the fighter could go beyond all conceivable limits, and the required flight characteristics would not be achieved. The issues of maintaining a high weight culture were dealt with by the First Deputy General Designer Evgeniy Alekseevich Ivanov, who personally carefully monitored the development of almost every design unit where there were reserves for weight reduction. It was E.A. Ivanov gave instructions to Deputy Chief Designer for Strength N.S. Dubinin to carry out a strength calculation of the Su-27 under the condition of exposure to loads amounting to 85% of the calculated ones, with possible subsequent strengthening of the structure based on the results of static tests.
In addition, we managed to convince the customer to clarify the technical specifications in terms of maximum operational overload with full filling of fuel tanks. The fact is that the first version of the requirements for the Su-27 provided for approximately 10 percent superiority of the new fighter over its American counterpart. Thus, if the flight range of the F-15 without external fuel tanks was 2300 km, then for the Su-27 it was necessary to obtain 2500 km, which, given the consumption characteristics of the power plant, required about 5.5 tons of fuel. An in-depth study of the Su-27 design showed that the integral layout of the airframe of an aircraft of the selected dimension allows it to accommodate almost 9 tons of kerosene. According to the strength standards that existed in the USSR, the calculated flight weight of an aircraft was taken to be the weight with 80% remaining from a full fuel load. Naturally, to achieve the same overload with a flight weight of 3-5 tons greater, significant reinforcement was required, and, consequently, a heavier structure. The aircraft had to reach the required range even with incomplete refueling of the tanks. At the same time, giving up the “extra” almost 1,500 km of range, which was provided by the full supply of fuel placed in the internal volumes of the developed integral layout, seemed impractical to the Sukhovites.
As a result, a compromise solution was found. The technical specifications for the Su-27 aircraft were divided into two parts:
- with the main (incomplete) refueling option (about 5.5 tons), which ensured the required flight range (2500 km) and all other flight characteristics, including maximum operational overload (8);
- with a full supply of fuel (about 9 tons), which ensured the maximum flight range (4000 km), and the maximum operational overload was limited based on maintaining a constant product of flight weight and overload.
Thus, the full refueling option began to be considered as an option with a kind of “internal hanging tank”. Of course, no one demanded that a fighter with a PTB have the same maneuverability characteristics as an aircraft without external tanks. Thus, on the one hand, it was possible to avoid overweighting the structure due to the conditions of ensuring strength, and on the other hand, to obtain a flight range without real drop tanks even greater than that of other fighters with PTBs placed in the flow.
The use of carbon fiber-based composite materials had great prospects for reducing the weight of the structure. At the Kulon plant, a workshop was specially built for the production of parts from composites, but even before the assembly of the first prototypes of the aircraft, the widespread use of composite materials in the design of the Su-27 was abandoned due to the instability of their characteristics. By the way, the creators of the MiG-29 also had to deal with this insidious property of composites, only this happened much later. Already during the operation of the MiGs, cases of destruction of composite structures began to be observed. It was necessary to urgently replace composites in a number of MiG-29 units (for example, engine air ducts and deflectable wing tips) with traditional aluminum alloys. As a result, on the Su-27, composite materials were used mainly only in the design of fairings for various radio-electronic devices.
The widespread introduction of titanium alloys and the development of advanced technologies, primarily welding titanium parts in an argon environment, as well as chemical milling, shaping with the effect of superplasticity of the metal, etc., helped reduce the weight of the aircraft. During the detailed design process, unique welded titanium structures were developed and then manufactured during the construction of prototypes of the T-10 - center section panels, rear fuselage panels, power frames, etc. Only the use of titanium center section panels reduced the weight of the airframe structure by more than 100 kg. A significant contribution to the development of new technological processes in the pilot production of the P.O. Sukhoi Design Bureau, which were then transferred to the serial plant, was made by the director of the Kulon plant A.S. Zazhigip, the chief engineer G.T. Lebedev, the chief welder V.V. Redchits , deputy chief engineer V.V. Tareev, production manager A.V. Kurkov and others.
By 1975, work on the preliminary design of the Su-27 was completed, the aerodynamic and structural-power schemes of the aircraft were formed, the main design solutions were found, and it was possible to begin producing working drawings and building prototypes. A year later, in 1976, a decree was finally issued by the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Council of Ministers of the USSR on the creation of the Su-27 aircraft - the main document in the “biography” of any aircraft in the Soviet Union.
FIRST FLIGHTS
The main volume of design work on the Su-27 aircraft was generally completed by the mid-70s. In 1975, production of working drawings began, and soon the Kulon plant began manufacturing the first prototypes of the aircraft. Unfortunately, Pavel Osipovich Sukhoi did not wait for the birth of a new fighter: he died on September 15, 1975, and the design bureau, which received his name, was headed by Sukhoi’s first deputy Evgeniy Alekseevich Ivanov (for two years he was acting General Designer and only in at the end of 1977 he was officially approved for this position). Soon the head of the Su-27 topic also changed: due to N.S.’s illness. Chernyakov, Mikhail Petrovich Simonov was appointed chief designer of the aircraft in February 1976. Under his direct leadership until the end of 1979, when Simonov went to work at the USSR Ministry of Aviation Industry, all work was carried out on the construction of prototypes of the T-10, their flight tests and the design of modifications of the aircraft.
The assembly of the first prototype of the Su-27, the T-101 aircraft, was completed at the beginning of 1977, and it was relocated to the OKB flight station at the LII airfield in Zhukovsky. As mentioned above, the new generation AL-31F bypass turbojet engines envisaged by the project were not yet ready by this time, and they decided to equip the first T-10 with AL-21F-ZAI engines, which are a modification of the serial AL-21F-3 turbofan engines, which were widely used on other aircraft of the company (Su-17M, Su-17M2, Su-17MZ, Su-17UM, Su-20, Su-24). The installation of the AL-21F-3 - albeit less powerful, less economical and heavier compared to the standard AL-31F, but already mastered in production and operation - made it possible to begin testing the Su-27 already in 1977, while the first operational AL-31F could appear only in 1978-1979. On aircraft with the AL-21F-3, it was possible to work out the aerodynamics of the new layout scheme in real flight tests, determine the main characteristics of stability and controllability, some flight data, and fine-tune the new set of on-board equipment and weapons. Thus, without waiting for the first flight copies of the standard engine to be received, it was planned to carry out a significant amount of testing under the program, and consequently, speed up the time for the aircraft to be put into service.
Chief pilot of the Ministry of Health named after was appointed the lead test pilot of the T-101. BY. Sukhoi Hero of the Soviet Union Honored Test Pilot of the USSR Major General of Aviation Vladimir Sergeevich Ilyushin. The preparation of the aircraft for testing was carried out under the leadership of leading engineer Rafail Grigoryevich Yarmarkov, the test team also included engineers N.P. Ivan and N.F. Nikitin (later the chief designer of the Su-27M aircraft, and now the General Designer and General Director of the military-industrial complex " MAPO). After carrying out the necessary ground checks and performing high-speed taxis, permission was received from the LII methodological council for the first flight, and on May 20, 1977, V.S. Ilyushin took the T-101 into the air. The first flight of the T-101, which received tail number 10 , was successful. Subsequently, this copy was used to determine the characteristics of stability and controllability, as well as fine-tuning the control system of the new fighter. The weapons control system was not installed on it. During the first 8 months of testing, 38 flights were carried out on the T-101. After the transition R N.F. Nikitin was appointed to another aircraft as the leading engineer for testing the T-101. In 1985... when all the tasks assigned to 110-1 were completed, the aircraft was transferred to the Air Force Museum in Monino, near Moscow.
In 1978, in the pilot production of the Ministry of Health named after. P.O. Sukhoi built the second prototype aircraft (T-102). Its flight tests were carried out by OKB test pilot Evgeniy Stepanovich Solovyov, the leading engineer was Mark Belenky. Unfortunately, this specimen did not fly for long: on July 7, 1978, it suffered a crash in which E.S. died. Soloviev.
The cause of the incident was the destruction of the aircraft in the air due to its unintentional overload exceeding the maximum permissible. In accordance with the assigned task, the pilot conducted tests to select the optimal gear ratios for the fighter's remote control system. Similar studies had previously been carried out by V.S. Ilyushin on the T-101, while both pilots had already assessed the functioning of the system at high and medium altitudes. Solovyov had to go further and obtain controllability characteristics at an altitude of 1000 m and a speed of 1000 km/h.
The execution of two “sites” at altitudes of 11 and 5 km did not cause any problems with assessing the operation of the SDS. Soloviev dropped to 1000 m. And here the reaction of the plane to pulling the stick turned out to be unexpected. The load was significantly higher than expected. By reflexively moving the stick away from himself, the pilot tried to level the plane, but this created a negative G-force of 8 units. Another grab of the handle - and the overload exceeded the destructive one. The objective control system films deciphered after the disaster indicated that the T-102 had entered a previously unexplored area of resonant modes with the aircraft “swinging” in the longitudinal channel with increasing amplitudes. The development of the emergency situation was so fleeting that the most experienced pilot, Honored Test Pilot of the USSR, Hero of the Soviet Union E.S. Soloviev, who gave more than one Su aircraft a ticket into the sky, did not even have time to resort to using rescue means. An analysis of the circumstances of the disaster made it possible to establish the true cause of the tragedy and make the necessary changes to the settings of the remote control system.
In the same 1978, at the Far Eastern Machine-Building Plant named after. Yu.A. Gagarin in Komsomolsk-on-Amur began preparing the production of an installation batch of Su-27 with AL-21F-ZAI engines. At the same time, two prototypes were being built here), on which AL-31F engines were planned to be installed for the first time. These two vehicles were named T-103 and T-104. The final assembly and retrofitting of the aircraft was supposed to be carried out in the pilot production of the Moscow Plant. Sukhoi in Moscow. Construction of the T-103 (serial number 01-01) at the Komsomol plant was completed in August 1978 and at the end of the same month, after the wing and empennage consoles were undocking from it, on a special transport device in the cabin of the An-22 Antey cargo aircraft. it was delivered to the LII airfield in Zhukovsky, and then transported to the MZ named after. P.O. Sukhoi. The delivery of the first flight copies of the AL-31F engines had to wait several more months. Finally, in March 1979, the assembly of the T-103 was completed, and the aircraft was relocated to the OKB flight station in Zhukovsky.
Under the leadership of the leading flight test engineer V.P. Ivanov, the necessary ground checks were carried out, and V.S. Ilyushin performed the first taxiing tests on the T-103. However, the LII methodological council, headed by the head of the institute V.V. Utkin, was in no hurry to issue a conclusion on the first flight: the first copies of the new engine had too many flight restrictions. As a result, it was decided to remove the engines from the aircraft and send them for modification to the Saturn plant. (Specialists from the A.M. Lyulka Design Bureau managed to complete the necessary work in a short time, and most of the restrictions on the first AL-31F were lifted. Finally, on August 23, 1979, V.S. Ilyushin took the T-103 on its first flight. A month later, the T-104 (serial number 01-02), on which the Sword airborne radar station was then installed for the first time (in its first version with a slot antenna). The first flight on the T-104 was carried out on October 31, 1979. Both machines were initially used for flight testing of new engines. Then the T-103 was modified for research at the Nitka training complex in the interests of creating a naval modification of the Su-27, and radar tests were carried out on the T-104. Basic flight characteristics, such as maximum speed or the flight range on these machines, as well as on the first two experimental T-10s, was not determined.
It is worth noting here that the AL-31F engines used on the T-103 and T-104 aircraft differed from all subsequent ones, which began to be equipped with the production Su-27 fighters, in the lower location of the remote boxes of the aircraft units (VKA). This scheme had a number of operational advantages: generators and hydraulic pumps located under the engine were easier and more convenient to service from the ground, and fire safety was also higher - oil accidentally leaking from the units could not get on hot engine parts. There was only one drawback: the lower location of the VKA required an increase in the cross-section of the engine nacelles, which led to an increase in drag. Later, for reasons of aerodynamics, the layout of the engine assembly box was changed to an upper one, but at that stage, preference was given to the AL-31F variant with lower VKA.
DIFFICULT PATH TO THE SERIES
By the end of 1979, three prototype aircraft (T-101, T-103 and T-104) had already taken part in the Su-27 testing program; soon the first aircraft of the installation series were to join them. It seemed that everything was going according to plans and in a couple of years the new fighter could enter service. However, chief designer M.P. categorically objected to the production launch of the aircraft in the existing configuration... Simonov.
In 1976, when the T-101 was still under construction, a number of circumstances emerged that jeopardized the implementation of some points of the technical specifications (TOR) concerning the requirements for the flight characteristics of the future Su-27. As noted above, problems with the creation of uncooled engine turbine blades and the need to introduce their cooling with air bleed from the compressor led to an increase in specific fuel consumption in cruising mode by 5% (already in the preliminary design of the AL-31F the minimum specific fuel consumption of 0.64 kg/ (kgf-h) instead of the specified 0.61 kg/(kgf-h), and in practice it increased by almost another 5%) and to a decrease in engine thrust characteristics when flying at high speed at altitude and near the ground (the bench thrust remained at the specified level 12500 kgf). Secondly, the developers of radio-electronic equipment “did not fit” into the weight characteristics determined by the technical specifications for the corresponding complexes.
The total excess weight of the equipment was several hundred kilograms, which, naturally, entailed a general overweight of the aircraft, and most importantly, a shift in its centering forward, as a result of which the T-10 became statically stable in the longitudinal channel. As a result, the main advantage of the developed statically unstable arrangement was lost - the absence of balancing losses. Now, in order to balance the plane, it was necessary to deflect the stabilizer with its toe down, and its lift was no longer added, but was subtracted from the lift of the wing. Naturally, the load-bearing properties of the aircraft decreased. Weight limits were also exceeded by the creators of missile weapons.
A refined calculation of the flight performance characteristics of the Su-27 aircraft, taking into account all these circumstances, clearly demonstrated: the maximum flight range of the fighter with a full fuel load only slightly exceeded 3000 km, the maximum flight speed was 2230 km/h, and the ground speed was 1350 km/h , i.e. according to these three main indicators, the Su-27 was 10-20% inferior to the TTT. The calculations were confirmed by research by specialists from the Siberian Scientific Research Institute of Aviation (SibNIA), where the bulk of aerodynamic research on the Su-27 has been carried out since 1972. The updated data of the Su-27 and F-15 were used in mathematical and semi-natural modeling of air battles with the participation of these aircraft, which was carried out at NIIAS MAP in the department headed by Doctor of Technical Sciences A.S. Isaev. The results of this modeling also turned out to be disappointing: there was no longer any unconditional superiority over the American counterpart.
There was a growing need for a radical revision of the Su-27 project. Back in 1975-1976. The OKB and SibNIA formulated the main directions for improving the design of the T-10, thanks to which, in the current conditions, it was possible to achieve the specified characteristics. To increase the flight range and speed, it was necessary to significantly reduce the aerodynamic drag of the aircraft by reducing the curvature of the wing profile, as well as the washed surface and midsection of the fuselage and center section. An increase in the internal fuel supply could also increase the range; you just had to find a place where you could still “pour” kerosene. To improve the aircraft's performance at high angles of attack and glide, it was proposed to introduce mechanization of the leading edge of the wing and change the location of the vertical tail. Thus, such fundamental elements of the aircraft layout as the shape and area of the wing, the configuration of the cross sections of the fuselage head, center section and engine nacelles, and the placement of the empennage had to be subject to revision.
Chief designer M.P. Simonov was a staunch supporter of this approach, but the leadership of the Ministry of Aviation Industry had a different opinion. Minister V.A. Kazakov counted on the possibility of gradually fine-tuning the fighter of the adopted layout through minor design modifications, increasing the fuel supply, etc. Many representatives of the customer also supported him. In principle, General Designer E.A. Ivanov was not against it either. Too much expense had already been incurred, and the cessation of serial production being mastered in Komsomolsk-on-Amur with the transfer of the plant to the production of a new model meant not only new expenses, but also a further delay in the adoption of the aircraft for service.
However, M.N. Simonov stubbornly insisted on the need for a radical reworking of the project, especially since the group of like-minded people he led with the participation of SibNIA scientists back in 1976-1977. a new fighter layout, devoid of the shortcomings of the existing one, was created on its own initiative, and in the next two years it was tested in a wind tunnel. The Chief Designer (and from the end of 1977, the First Deputy General Designer) showed exceptional energy and was able to convince the management to take risks and take measures to radically change the design of the aircraft that had already been tested. The positive resolution of this issue was influenced by the support of Simonov by Deputy Minister of Aviation Industry I.S. Silaev (in 1981-1985 - Minister of Aviation Industry of the USSR).
This is how M.P. Simonov himself recalls this: “We set the task of creating an aircraft that would be superior in combat effectiveness to any other fighter in service with the Air Force at that time - an aircraft for gaining air superiority. To meet this purpose, an aircraft was needed redesign. It was necessary to obtain permission for this MAP. We turned to Ivan Stepanovich Silaev, who was then deputy minister. We told him: “Everything is based on calculation data and mathematical half-scale modeling.” Silaev courageously supported us. He only asked me: “Are you sure there is no other way?” "Of course, I am sure, although there is another: to mass-produce hundreds and thousands of mediocre fighters, and if there is no war, no one will know about their mediocrity. But we are working for that rainy day when our weapons must be at the highest level , and therefore there is no other way!
Soon after this, M.P. Simonov went to work at the ministry, to the position of Deputy Minister of Aviation Industry for New Technology. He was appointed chief designer of the Su-27 in December 1979. Artem Aleksandrovich Kolchin, under whose leadership work was carried out to create a fundamentally new version of the aircraft. As time has shown, the difficult decision made turned out to be the only correct one, and as a result, a fighter was created, which even now, after almost two decades, is considered one of the best in the world. The release of the Su-27 in the final version of the layout of the MZ named after. P.O. Sukhoi confirmed his reputation as a world leader in the aircraft industry, remaining faithful to the many years of traditions of the Design Bureau not to put into service mediocre aircraft.
FROM T-10 TO T-10S
A version of the fighter with a new layout was given the code T-10S by the OKB. Full-scale work on its design began in 1979. Preliminary studies to find ways to overcome the shortcomings of the T-10 “first edition” and ensure the characteristics specified in the technical specifications were carried out at the Design Bureau and SibNIA (here this work was led by the chief aerodynamicist of the institute, candidate of technical sciences Stanislav Timorkaevich Kashafutdipov ), made it possible to formulate the main directions for modifying the original layout. As they were developed, the T-10S moved further and further away from the T-10 in terms of design and layout. As a result, it became clear that the designers would have to design an essentially new aircraft. According to the figurative expression of M.P. Simonov, only the tires of the wheels of the main landing gear and the pilot’s ejection seat were preserved from the T-10 to the T-10S. Not only were the general principles laid down in the Su-27 project by P.O. Sukhim cast into doubt - the integral layout of the load-bearing body, the statically unstable circuit, the fly-by-wire control system, the placement of engines in isolated nacelles with air intakes under the load-bearing body, etc.
TESTS
In 1980, when at the MZ named after. P.O. Sukhoi, work was already in full swing on the production of prototypes of a fighter of a new layout; the assembly of the first aircraft of the pilot batch was completed at the plant in Komsomolsk-on-Amur. Structurally, they were almost completely consistent with the experimental T-101 and T-102, only their keels were installed with some camber, like the T-103. Their power plant still included AL-21F-ZAI engines. Despite the fact that they had very little in common with the future production Su-27, they decided not to abandon the completion of the pilot batch aircraft and use them to test and fine-tune the weapons control system and other equipment of the fighter while they are being manufactured and undergoing the initial stage flight tests of the first T-10S. In this way, they planned to compensate for the inevitable delay in deadlines associated with the need to readjust production to produce an aircraft of a new layout.
The lead copy of the pilot batch, which received the code T-105 and serial No. 02-02 (No. 02-01 had a copy for static tests), was ready in June 1980. In the same year it was followed by T-106 (No. 02-03 ) and T-109 (No. 02-04) (ciphers T-107 and T-108 were reserved for the first T-10S). In 1981, the Komsomol plant built two more vehicles - T-1010 (No. 03-01) and T-1011 (No. 03-02), bringing the number of produced pilot copies of the pilot batch to five (to distinguish them from future production vehicles, they were called "Su -27 type T-105"). In total, taking into account the prototypes collected at the Ministry of Health named after. P.O. Sukhoi, by 1982, 9 flight copies of the original configuration aircraft and one copy for static tests were manufactured.
The pilot batch aircraft were used for flight testing and fine-tuning of avionics. At the beginning of 1981, the original version of the OEPS-27 optical-electronic sighting system with an Argon-15 digital computer was installed on the T-105 aircraft for the first time. This specimen was specially allocated for autonomous testing of OEPS. Somewhat later, the T-1011 was equipped for the same purposes. Tests of the OEPS-27 “first edition” were carried out until mid-1982, when a decision was made to replace the Argon-15 on-board computer with a more advanced Ts100, which required reworking the entire OEPS-27 software. At the end of 1982, a modified optical-electronic sighting system was installed on the T-1011 for testing as part of the S-27 weapons control system.
The State Research Institute of Aviation Systems (at that time NIIAS MAP), headed by Academician E.A. Fedosov, played a significant role in the design and development of the avionics complex of the Su-27 fighter. GosNIIAS created and debugged all the software for the on-board computers of 4th generation fighters. To test radar and optical-electronic sighting systems and improve the algorithmic support of the SUV S-27, the institute built a semi-natural modeling complex KPM-2700. It was at the stands of this complex that all elements of the S-27 SUV were first checked and tested, and only after that they were installed on prototype aircraft.
The construction of the first prototype of a fighter in the T-10S configuration, called T-107 (otherwise - T-10S-1, serial number 04-03), was completed at the MZ named after. P.O. Sukhoi at the end of 1980. In March 1981, he was relocated to the OKB flight station in Zhukovsky. Preparations for the first flight began. Just like 4 years ago, when the first T-10 entered testing, R.G. Yarmarkov was appointed lead engineer for the aircraft, and V.S. Ilyushin was appointed test pilot. On April 20, 1981, Ilyushin took the T-107 into the air for the first time. The flight was successful. In the same year, the static (T-108, or T-10S-0, serial No. 04-04) and second flight (T-1012, or T-10S-2, No. 04-05) copies of the T-10S fighter were assembled . The T-107 and T-1012 aircraft were used to determine the basic flight performance, stability and controllability characteristics of the new aircraft layout, as well as to evaluate the performance of the new power plant with upper drive boxes.
Unfortunately, both cars were not destined to have a long life. On September 3, 1981, the T-107 was lost: while carrying out a mission to determine the maximum flight duration at a training ground not far from the LII, the plane unexpectedly left the pilot without fuel, and V.S. Ilyushin had to eject. The car with almost empty tanks fell to the ground and collapsed, and for the first time in his life, Ilyushin, who had ejected, landed safely by parachute. The “organizational conclusions” were not long in coming: chief designer A.A. Kolchin was removed from his post, leading engineer R.G. Yarmarkov was fired, and V.S. Ilyushin was permanently suspended from flying. On December 23 of the same year, the T-1012 also suffered a catastrophe: when flying at the maximum speed (Mach number = 2.35, velocity pressure about 9450 kg/m2), the head part of the fuselage was destroyed, and the plane fell apart in the air, piloted by an OKB test pilot Alexander Sergeevich Komarov died.
The causes of the accident by A.S. Komarov were never found out. According to one version, the culprits of the tragedy were blocks of control and recording equipment installed during testing in the wing influx compartment, which fell from their places during the maneuver of the aircraft at the maximum permissible speed and damaged one of the power elements of the structure of the head part of the fuselage, as a result of which an accident occurred. its destruction in the air. However, the official conclusion of the emergency commission indicated that the cause of this disaster, which occurred at the Bely Omut training ground 70 km east of the LII airfield, could not be established. And although no claims were made to the material part, the Komarov disaster influenced the fate of the General Designer E.A. Ivanov. It was Ivanov, who at that time was preparing for elections to the Academy of Sciences, who was the direct initiator of this first flight at the limit. Some time later, at the end of 1982, he was transferred to another job at NIIAS MAP and, deprived of the opportunity to do what he loved, he soon died (this happened on July 10, 1983).
After the dismissal of A.A. Kolchin, Alexey Ivanovich Knyshev was appointed chief designer of the Su-27 in 1981, who had previously headed a branch of the P.O. Sukhoi Design Bureau at the aircraft plant in Komsomolsk-on-Amur and had invested a lot of work in developing the serial production first T-10, and then T-10S. A.I. Knyshev still manages all work on the Su-27 aircraft. In 1983, General Designer of the MZ named after. P.O. Sukhoi was appointed M.P. Simonov, under whose general leadership work continued on fine-tuning the Su-27 and creating new modifications based on it.
Meanwhile, fate was preparing another blow for the program. The results of flight tests of the first version of the Mech radar station, which began in accordance with the scheduled dates, indicated that the radar did not meet the requirements of the technical specifications in a number of ways. A whole list of shortcomings was identified, which, according to experts, did not make it possible to ensure the specified characteristics even in the conditions of a fairly lengthy refinement of the equipment. The main complaints were made about the digital computer and the slot antenna with electronic scanning of the beam in the vertical plane; there was also a significant lag in the development of the RLPK software.
As a result, in May 1982, it was decided to stop testing and further development of the Mech radar in its first version and to develop for it a new antenna with mechanical scanning based on the Rubin radar antenna of the MiG-29 aircraft, but with one and a half times larger diameter (the use of a radar with a slot antenna was postponed until the creation of a modified version of the fighter - the Su-27M). The creation of such an antenna was entrusted to PIIR specialists. Instead of the computer developed by NIIP, it was proposed to use the new generation digital computer Ts100, created at the Research Institute of Digital Electronic Computing Technology (NIITSEVT, Moscow). The development of new software was entrusted to NII-AS MAP. V. K. Grishin was relieved of his post as General Designer of NPO "Phazotron" and chief designer of the unified SUV for Su-27 and MiG-29 fighters and appointed chief designer of the S-27 SUV, T.O. Bekirbaev became his deputy.
Thanks to the efforts of specialists from four institutes - NIIP, NIIR, NIITSEVT and NIIAS - the task was completed in a very short time. Already in March 1983, a conclusion was prepared on the readiness of the updated radar (it received the code H001) for flight tests as part of the S-27 SUV on Su-27 aircraft. They were carried out at the Air Force Research Institute in Akhtubinsk (now the GLITs named after V.P. Chkalov) and were completed at the beginning of 1984. The radar was submitted for joint testing, which was successfully completed in just two months. After minor modifications to the software in 1985, the CUB S-27 was recommended for adoption.
And although not all of the designers’ ideas were ultimately realized, the N001 radar fully met modern requirements. For the first time in domestic aviation radar, during the creation of this radar, the problems of providing a medium frequency repetition rate of IM pulses for detecting and tracking a target from the rear hemisphere at low altitudes, a radio correction mode for controlling the first stage of guidance of R-27 type missiles, and the use of a single transmitter were solved for radar operation and target illumination for a guided missile, operating sequentially in pulsed and continuous radiation modes. The use of new technical solutions and modern element base made it possible to reduce the weight and size characteristics of the equipment by approximately half compared to the previous generation equipment. The following main characteristics of the radar were obtained: detection range of a fighter-type target - 100 km from the front hemisphere and 40 km from the rear hemisphere, number of simultaneously tracked targets on the pass - 10, number of simultaneously attacked targets - 1, number of simultaneously guided missiles - 2, the range of heights of detected targets in a solid angle of 120º is from 50-100 m to 25 km. At the same time, protection was provided from almost all types of interference that existed at that time.
In 1982, the first aircraft of the new layout, manufactured at the serial plant in Komsomolsk-on-Amur, the T-1015 (serial number 05-01), joined the testing program for the new fighter. T-1017 (No. 05-02) and, a little later, T-1016 (No. 05-04). The first production Su-27 was flown on June 2, 1982 by OKB test pilot Alexander Nikolaevich Isakov. The following year, the Komsomol plant delivered another 9 aircraft of the 5th, 6th and 7th series (OKB codes T-1018, T-1020, T-1021, T-1022, T-1023, T-1024, T1O-25, T- 1026 and T-1027), most of which took part in the State Joint Tests (GST) of the Su-27 fighter, carried out in parallel with the deployment of serial production and the beginning of the development of the new machine in the army. On the T-1018 and T-1022 aircraft, in particular, the OEPS-27 optical-electronic sighting system was developed. With the new Ts100 computer, group actions of fighters were practiced on the T-1020 and T-1022.
Not everything was smooth at this stage of testing. In one of the flights in 1983, a part of the wing console collapsed on the T-1017 aircraft, which was piloted by test pilot Nikolai Fedorovich Sadovnikov, while performing a “platform” at low altitude and high speed, and debris from the structure damaged the vertical tail. Only thanks to the great skill of the tester, later a Hero of the Soviet Union and world record holder, the flight ended safely. N.F. Sadovnikov landed a damaged plane at the airfield - without most of the wing console, with a chopped off keel and, thereby, provided invaluable material to the developers of the aircraft. It was found that the cause of the destruction was an incorrectly calculated hinge moment that occurs when the rotary tip of the wing is deflected in some flight modes. Sadovpikov’s flight dotted all the i’s in the investigation of another incident with one of the first production Su-27 T-1021 (serial number 05-03), which at about the same time found itself in a similar situation during testing at the LII. However, unlike the T-1017, this vehicle was lost, and the pilot managed to eject. Measures were urgently taken to refine the aircraft: the structure of the wing and the airframe as a whole was strengthened.
Based on the test results, the design of the aircraft was subjected to further modifications several times: the head section of the fuselage and wing were strengthened (previously produced fighters were equipped with additional external strength linings, and newly built ones had reinforced power kits and skin panels); the shape of the tips of the vertical tail has changed; the weight balancers previously installed on the keels were abolished; to accommodate passive interference emission units, the length and construction height of the aft “fin”—the section of the rear fuselage between the central beam and engine nacelles, etc.—has been increased.
During the tests, the Shchel-ZUM helmet-mounted target designation system (NSS) was introduced into the OEPS-27. This equipment, developed at the Kiev Arsenal plant (chief designer A.K. Mikhailik), included a helmet-mounted sighting device and an optical location unit with a scanner device for determining the angle of rotation of the pilot’s head. The NSC made it possible to measure the coordinates of the line of sight while visually tracking the target by the pilot in a zone of +60º in azimuth and from -15º to +60º in elevation at a line of sight speed of up to 20º/s, as well as to target the automatic acquisition zone of OLS with simultaneous transmission coordinates of the target line of sight in the radar and missile homing heads. The combined use of NSC and OLS made it possible in close maneuver combat to reduce aiming time, quickly acquire a target, provide target designation to missile homing heads before the target enters the cone of possible target acquisition angles by the head, and thereby launch missiles at the maximum permissible angles.
In the mid-80s. state tests were completed, and a new generation of air-to-air guided missiles was adopted: medium-range missiles R-27R and R-27T with semi-active radar and thermal homing heads (in 1984), missiles for short-range maneuverable air combat R- 73 with a thermal homing head (in 1985) and extended-range missile launchers R-27ER and R-27ET (in 1987). Thus, by this time, the composition of the weapon system and on-board equipment of the Su-27 aircraft had finally taken shape.
The basis of the avionics was the S-27 weapons control system, including: the RLPK-27 radar sighting system with the N001 radar, state identification interrogator and Ts100 digital computer; optical-electronic sighting system OEPS-27 with optical-location station OLS-27, helmet-mounted target designation system "Schel-ZUM" and digital computer Ts100; the SEI-31 “Narcissus” unified display system with an aiming and flight indicator against the background of the windshield and a direct vision indicator; weapon control system. The SUV interacted with the PNK-10 flight and navigation complex, the onboard part of the Spectrum command radio control line, the state identification system, telecode communication equipment (TCS) and the equipment of the onboard defense complex (the Bereza radiation warning station, the Sorptsiya active jamming station and passive interference emission devices APP-50). The S-27 SUV ensured the use of the Su-27 aircraft in ground-based guidance systems with command control and semi-autonomous actions with targeting of both a single aircraft and a group. In addition, autonomous group actions of fighters were ensured (up to 12 aircraft in a group).
The first Su-27s entered the armed forces in 1984, by the end of the next year a significant number of such fighters had already been produced, and a massive re-equipment of fighter aviation units of the air defense and air forces with a new type of aircraft began. State joint tests of the Su-27 were completed in 1985. The results obtained indicated that a truly outstanding aircraft had been created, unrivaled in fighter aviation in terms of maneuverability, flight range and combat effectiveness. However, some systems of on-board radio-electronic equipment (primarily, electronic control equipment and the group action control system) required additional tests, which were carried out according to special programs after the end of the GSI. After debugging the entire avionics complex, by Decree of the Council of Ministers of the USSR dated August 23, 1990, the Su-27 was officially adopted into service with the Air Force and Air Defense Aviation of the Soviet Union.
The completion of the Su-27 aircraft was marked by a number of state awards and prizes, which were presented to the developers, testers and manufacturers of the fighter. The team of authors consisting of:
— Sukhoi Pavel Osipovich (General Designer of the OKB until 1975), posthumously;
- Mikhail Petrovich Simonov (General Designer of the Sukhoi Design Bureau since 1983, in 1976-1979 - Chief Designer of the Su-27 aircraft);
— Avramenko Vladimir Nikolaevich (during the development of serial production of the Su-27 - director of the Komsomolsk-on-Amur APO, then director of the P.O. Sukhoi Ministry of Health);
— Antonov Vladimir Ivanovich (Deputy Head of the Projects Department of the Sukhoi Design Bureau, one of the authors of the Su-27 layout):
— Ilyushin Vladimir Sergeevich (leading test pilot of the Sukhoi Design Bureau, who took the first flight and tested the prototype T-10 and T-10S aircraft, currently deputy chief designer of the Sukhoi Design Bureau);
— Kashafutdinov Stanislav Timorkaevich (chief aerodynamicist of SibNIA, one of the authors of the aerodynamic layout of the Su-27);
— Knyshev Alexey Ivanovich (chief designer of the Su-27 aircraft since 1981);
- Pogosyan Mikhail Aslanovich (during the development of modifications of the Su-27K, Su-27M, Su-27UB - head of the fighter brigade of the project department, then head of the project department, chief designer, 1st deputy general designer, currently - General Director of OKB Sukhoi").
MASS PRODUCTION
Serial production of Su-27 fighters began in 1982 at the aircraft plant in Komsomolsk-on-Amur. This enterprise, which by that time had a history of almost half a century, had been building supersonic Su brand aircraft for more than 20 years.
The mastery of serial production of the 4th generation Su-27 fighters, preparation for which began in 1976, required full effort from the plant’s specialists. In terms of design and technology, the new fighter was too different from the Su-17 aircraft being built at the enterprise at that time, and the deadlines set by the government for readjusting production were too strict. The main features of the Su-27, which the Komsomol members had to get used to, included the widespread use in the design of the aircraft of titanium alloys, large-sized monolithic panels, welding as one of the main technological assembly processes, as well as the use of a complex set of avionics on the fighter.
The structural and technological features of the aircraft posed many difficult tasks for the production workers. The number of new technological processes to be mastered amounted to many dozens. The complexity of manufacturing individual units and assemblies was prohibitively high, which limited the possibility of quickly deploying mass production.
A wide range of scientific and technical problems were associated with the use of high-strength titanium alloys in aircraft construction. Mechanical processing of titanium power units had to be carried out on metal-cutting machines with cutters and cutters of increased rigidity, capable of developing high torques at low cutting speeds. Technological sections equipped with such CNC machines were created in machine shops. It was also necessary to create specialized areas to carry out fire-hazardous processes of cleaning titanium components after machining.
The deployment of serial production of the Su-27 required the reconstruction and technical re-equipment of almost all main and auxiliary production workshops. The plant was replenished with hundreds of units of modern technological equipment.
Despite the high complexity of the item-by-item tasks, the hard work of the plant team in Komsomolsk-on-Amur ensured that the deadlines for launching the aircraft into serial production were met. As a result, already in 1979 at the DMZ named after. Yu. A. Gagarin, the first samples of the Su-27 in the original configuration were built, and in 1981 - the first aircraft of the serial configuration. A great contribution to the organization of serial production of the Su-27 aircraft was made by plant director V.N. Avramenko, chief engineer V.G. Kutsepko, and chief metallurgist T.B... Betlievsky. Deputy Chief Engineer O.V. Glushko and B.V. Tselybeev. Significant assistance in mastering the production of the Su-27 in Komsomolsk-on-Amur was provided by specialists from the branch of the P.O. Sukhoi Design Bureau created at the plant, headed at that time by A.N. Knyshev. After the appointment of L.I. Knyshev to the position of chief designer of the Su-27 aircraft design bureau, the branch of the design bureau at the DMZ was headed by A. Maranov.
In 1985, the company produced an initial batch of two-seat combat training aircraft Su-27UB, in 1989 the production of ship-borne fighters Su-27K (Su-33) began, in 1992 - modernized multi-role fighters Su-27M (Su-35 p Su-37). Since the mid-80s. The plant in Komsomolsk-on-Amur is the main and only enterprise of the domestic aviation industry for the production of all single-seat modifications of the Su-27 fighter family. Since the late 90s. Here, the development of production of new two-seat variants has begun - the shipborne combat training Su-27KUB and the multi-purpose Su-30MKK.
The production of components for Su-27 fighters was established at various enterprises in the aviation, radio engineering, electronics, defense and other industries. Thus, gas turbine starter-energy units GTDE-117 are produced by the St. Petersburg Machine-Building Enterprise "Red October", on-board radar sighting systems RLPK-27 - by the State Ryazan Instrument Plant and PA "October" (Kamenets-Uralsk), optical-electronic sighting systems OEPS-27 - Ural Optical-Mechanical Plant (Ekaterinburg).
SU-27: THE SECRET BECOMES CLEAR
The first mentions of the development of a new generation of fighters in the USSR appeared in the Western aviation press in the second half of the 70s. In August 1977, the Swiss magazine International Defense Review reported that a new Soviet fighter called the MiG-29 was being tested at the Moscow Flight Research Institute (called the Ramenskoye Test Center in the West at that time). It is worth noting that at this time the MiG-29 had not yet flown, and the author of the article most likely had in mind the Su-27 - flights of its first prototype, the T-101, began in May 1977. The following circumstances served as the reason for the publication. In 1977, an American reconnaissance satellite monitoring “events” on the territory of the LII took photographs of two new fighters, to which the US Department of Defense assigned temporary code designations Ram-K and Ram-L (these names were given by the Pentagon to all new unidentified Soviet combat aircraft, discovered at an airfield near Ramenskoye). The first of them, as it turned out later, was the Su-27, the second - the MiG-29.
The United States, however, was in no hurry to make official statements regarding the materials received and publish photographs. The Pentagon disseminated the first information about the existence of the new Sukhoi Design Bureau fighter in the press in March 1979, and “spy” satellite images were published only in November 1983, when the new MiG and Sukhoi had already been put into mass production and the American intelligence began to have more complete information about these aircraft. The name Su-27 first appeared in the foreign press in 1982, at which time the temporary code Ram-K was replaced by the standard “NATO” name Flanker. The quality of the first “satellite” photographs left much to be desired: by and large, only the general aerodynamic design of the fighter could be seen on them. However, these photographs made a great impression on foreign experts. In the West, for example, back in 1982 they were sure that the Su-27 was equipped with a variable-geometry wing (!), and it was in this version that the aircraft was being prepared for mass production with the possible start of deliveries to combat units in 1983. Until the mid-80s 's There were still no high-quality photographs of the aircraft, and the drawings published in foreign open publications were very, very approximate.
The official Soviet press remained completely silent about the existence of new fighters in the country. The first meager information on this matter appeared only in the summer of 1985, when a documentary film dedicated to the life and work of General Designer P.O. Sukhoi was shown on Central Television in connection with his 90th birthday. In the film, among other things, a ten-second story about the Su-27 flashed: several frames were shown depicting the takeoff and flight of the experienced T-101. In the same year, the first copy of the aircraft was transferred to the exhibition of the Air Force Museum in Monino, near Moscow. Western aviation journalists rushed to comment and analyze the information received from the television screen, reproduced in the form of photographs in the foreign press in December 1985 (access to Monino for foreigners was still very limited at that time). It is noteworthy that, while making mistakes in the details and getting an idea of the appearance of only the first prototype of the fighter, which, as we know, was significantly different from subsequent production vehicles, in general they came to the correct conclusions about the purpose and general characteristics of the Su-27. The assessment of the aircraft was enthusiastic: “The new development of the Sukhoi Design Bureau is a wonderful aircraft, the appearance of which is almost as striking as the American F-14 and F-15 fighters in their time.” But even then, the West knew that the production version of the aircraft would be quite different from the T-101 (according to NATO classification - Flanker-A), demonstrated on television, in particular, in the design of the wing and tail. The modified version of the aircraft received the NATO code Flanker-B.
Since by the end of 1986 Su-27 fighters were already widely used in the air defense and air forces of the Soviet Union and began to be involved in patrol flights over neutral waters, it became inevitable that Western pilots would meet them in the air, often carrying cameras to photograph potential aircraft. enemy. As a result of one of these “meetings” in the air, the crew of the Norwegian Orion aircraft took the first photographs of the serial Su-27 with tail number 21, published in Oslo on April 26, 1987, and then replicated by the foreign aviation press. After this, photographs of serial Su-27s began to appear in the Soviet aviation and military press (at that time without indicating the name of the aircraft). The first of them were published in June 1987 in the magazine “Equipment and Weapons”.
In the fall of 1987, a detailed photo report circulated the pages of Western magazines, capturing from close range a Su-27 with tail number 36 and suspended missile weapons. It was filmed under rather piquant circumstances. On September 13, 1987, a patrol aircraft of the 333rd Squadron of the Norwegian Air Force Lockheed P-3B "Orion" carried out surveillance of a group of Soviet warships in the neutral waters of the Barents Sea, 260 km southeast of Vardo in northern Norway and 90 km from the nearest Soviet territory. According to some reports, the pilot of a nearby Su-27 fighter, V. Tsimbal, was given the command to carry out a training interception of a NATO reconnaissance aircraft. At 10:39 a.m. local time, the Su-27 approached the Orion, passing at a distance of only 2 m from it.
A quarter of an hour later, the Soviet fighter reappeared behind and below the reconnaissance aircraft. As a result of dangerous maneuvering, the vehicles came into contact: the fighter touched the radio-transparent tip of the left fin with the rotating propeller blades of the rightmost Orion engine, as a result of which they were destroyed, and fragments of the propeller pierced the reconnaissance fuselage. Fortunately, there were no casualties: the Orion crew turned off the right engine, feathered the propeller, and turned the plane towards the shore. At 11:57 a.m., Orion landed safely at Banak airfield; landed at his airfield and the Su-27. On the same day, Norway lodged a formal protest with the Soviet embassy. As Flight magazine reported a week after the incident, “The Norwegians believe that the incident was caused by the pilot’s indiscipline, and not by an attempt to prevent the P-3 aircraft from observing Soviet naval maneuvers. Norwegian Air Force P-3 aircraft patrol the Barents Sea area almost daily and are routinely intercepted by Soviet fighters. However, until now, Soviet interceptors have not passed in such close proximity.”
An interesting version of this incident was described in the English aviation magazine Air International in August 1988: “An Orion aircraft was patrolling over the Barents Sea when it was intercepted by a Flanker aircraft, the pilot of which, no doubt, intended to get some good photographs of this Norwegian aircraft: in the fairings on the lower part of the nacelles behind the landing gear compartments, there were apparently built-in cameras directed to the sides for precisely this purpose. Unfortunately, the Soviet pilot, probably momentarily caught up in the enthusiasm of getting a real close-up photograph to decorate the wall in the crew room, forgetting about the size of his aircraft, allowed the left fin of his aircraft to come into contact with the outer right propeller of the Orion aircraft. Pieces of the destroyed propeller pierced the fuselage of the Orion aircraft, and there is little doubt that the fin of the Flanker aircraft also required repairs after that. Fortunately, both planes returned safely to their bases, although it is believed that the Soviet pilot is now “flying at the table”!”
Based on these first photographs of the Su-27, very professional diagrams of the general views and layout of the aircraft were prepared and published in the West. The estimates of the main characteristics of the fighter were also very close to the truth. Not yet having the opportunity to really “touch” the new Soviet fighter, foreign experts “hit the mark” with determining some geometric parameters (for example, the wingspan was determined to the nearest centimeter), flight speed, on-board radar range, etc. The manufacturer of serial fighters was correctly indicated, as well as the fact that “in the deck version, this aircraft can be used on a large Soviet aircraft carrier currently under construction in Nikolaev.” However, there were also a number of serious mistakes. Thus, the aircraft’s engines were attributed to the S.K. Tumapsky Design Bureau (the designation P-32, provided by the Soviet side to the FAI when registering the aviation records of the P-42 aircraft in 1986, was misleading, which will be discussed below, and how, wrote the same source, “there is reason to believe that the fighter, designated by the Soviet Union P-42, is a specially prepared version of the Su-27 aircraft”). It is worth recalling that the Su-27 was finally declassified only at the beginning of 1989, and before that one could only dream of publishing in the Soviet press any details about the aircraft, and even more so its characteristics.
FOREIGN DEBUT
In the fall of 1988, glasnost proclaimed in the USSR finally affected military aircraft. At the traditional international aviation exhibition in Farnborough (Great Britain), the Soviet side presented two military aircraft: the MiG-29 fighter and the MiG-29UB combat trainer. The unprecedented demonstration of the newest Soviet fighter made a great impression on the world community and business circles. There are real prospects for signing contracts for the export of modern military equipment abroad. Satisfied with the success, the Soviet leadership in February 1989 decided to show for the first time several combat aircraft from the Sukhoi Design Bureau at the next air show in Le Bourget. Among them were two Su-27 fighters - a single-seat (serial No. 24-04, OKB code - T-1041, which had tail number 41. Later changed to “exhibition” No. 388), piloted by OKB test pilot P.O. Sukhoi V.G. Pugachev, and combat training (“exhibition” No. 389), piloted by E.I. Frolov. At the beginning of June 1989, the planes arrived in Paris. The flight from Moscow to Le Bourget, with a length of 2384 km, was completed without intermediate stops in 3 hours of flight time.
Reputable Western experts called the supersonic fighter Su-27 “the star of the showroom.” Those present at the airfield were greatly impressed by the aerobatic complex performed on this machine by test pilot Hero of the Soviet Union V.G. Pugachev. The “highlight” of the performance, which consisted of an alternation of complex and aerobatic maneuvers, was the performance of a unique maneuver - the so-called dynamic braking, or dynamic approach to ultra-large angles of attack, which received the name “Pugachev’s Cobra” in honor of its first performer. Its essence is as follows: an airplane performing a horizontal flight suddenly suddenly throws up my nose. but does not go up, but continues to fly forward. At the same time, the angle of attack increases, passes the 90-degree mark and reaches 120º. The plane actually flies tail first. In a few moments, the speed drops to 150 km/h, then the car lowers its nose and returns to normal horizontal flight. This technique is not available to any other combat aircraft in the world. Experts indicated that dynamic braking can be used in air combat when attacking a target from a disadvantageous position, for example, to launch missiles into the rear hemisphere
V.G. Pugachev began testing the dynamic approach to ultra-high angles of attack in March 1989 on the experimental T-10U-1 twin, equipped for safety purposes with an anti-spin parachute and anti-spin missiles, in preparation for the first demonstration of the Su-27 on foreign air show. On April 28, 1989, test pilot Pugachev demonstrated the famous “Cobra” to specialists at the LII for the first time. At an altitude of 500-1000 m, the pilot performed about 10 such maneuvers in three passes. In total, during the tests, dynamic braking was carried out several hundred times, which made it possible to fully work out this maneuver and make it an aerobatics maneuver. However, even before Pugachev completed his first “Cobra”, test pilot LII I.P. Volk on the Su-27 No. 09-06 (factory code - T-1030) carried out a large volume of tests to assess the behavior of the aircraft at near-critical angles of attack and in spin mode. It was shown that the aircraft can fly and be controlled reliably at very high angles of attack, even exceeding 90º, and that recovering from various types of spin on the Su-27 does not pose any significant problem. It was within the framework of these studies that the famous “cobra” was born.
In the skies of France, Soviet aircraft were a huge success. Here's what Reuters reported on June 15, 1989: “The Soviet Union appears to have won the fight for superiority of its fighters over US fighters in the skies of Le Bourget. The Russians managed to achieve this with their snake-like aircraft, whose advanced design and ease of control amazed experts. The plane attracted everyone's attention. Soviet designers created an amazing machine, aviation experts say. The US Air Force was represented by the sleek F-16 and F-18 aircraft, but they were overshadowed by the Soviet Su-27, which demonstrated amazing aerodynamic qualities and the ability to almost sit on its own tail.” A correspondent for the Parisian newspaper Libération reported on June 9, 1989: “The new Soviet Su-27 aircraft made a great impression on those gathered. It had never left the territory of the Soviet Union before, and its arrival at the exhibition and subsequent demonstration in flight amazed experts. This aircraft appears to be one of the most impressive fighter-interceptors in the world. The designers created an aircraft that is in no way inferior to the best models available in the West. And for those who have not yet been convinced of this, it was enough to see the gaping mouths of the pilots watching the flight carried out by Viktor Pugachev.”
An interesting article was published in the English weekly The Economist on June 30, 1989 after the end of the exhibition in Le Bourget. Here are some quotes from it: “The Russian aerospace industry, which was looked down upon in the West as outdated, has produced a generation of aircraft that rank among the best in the world. The star of the Le Bourget air show was the Su-27 fighter. This is, above all, the result more advanced aerodynamics of the aircraft. Compared to Western-made aircraft, it remains stable at much higher angles of attack (110º for the Su-27, 35 for the F-16, 45º for the Rafale). The aerobatic element performed by the Soviet pilot is especially impressive - "cobra", when it lifts its nose to such an extent that, in fact, it flies tail first. In the event of a fight in the air, the F-15 will have a hard time. The ability of sharp braking and raising the nose in a few seconds is provided by the Su-27 aircraft at present undeniable tactical superiority over modern Western aircraft F-15, F-16, F-18, Mirage-2000 and Rafale, which cannot perform such a maneuver. In addition, the execution of the “cobra” figure suggests that the Su-27 has very high maneuverability and controllability, not only at the extreme conditions demonstrated by Viktor Pugachev. In practical terms, the Su-27 has already gone beyond the limits of such extreme flight modes for which it is planned to use the Western experimental aircraft X-29 and the promising X-31; but the Su-27 is a combat aircraft in service! As a result, it may turn out that the next generation maneuverable fighter, which all Western designers and the Air Force dream of, already exists, but “on the other side of the barricades” ... "
The survivability of Su-27 aircraft was proven in Paris by an emergency incident that occurred on the first day of the show. June 8, 1989, with a two-seat Su-27UB piloted by K.I. Frolov. The weather over Paris was not good at that time, it was raining, and a thunderstorm front was passing nearby. As a result, the Su-27UB, which was performing a loop from takeoff, was struck by lightning. This is how E.I. Frolov recalled this incident: “I immediately received a bunch of refusals. You could say that all the “electrics” were turned off, and only “control” remained. We had to stop the program and urgently land.” Having lost contact and with inoperative instruments, Frolov masterfully landed the Su-27UB on the Le Bourget runway. And after inspecting the aircraft and the necessary repairs to the equipment, it soon took off again for aerobatics into the Parisian sky.
In August 1989, the Su-27 aerobatics system was first shown to Muscovites and guests of the capital at an aviation festival in Tushino dedicated to USSR Air Fleet Day. It was then that the tradition of holding large-scale air parades with the participation of military equipment in our country was revived (such events had not been held in the Soviet Union for more than 20 years - the last large-scale aviation festival took place in July 1967 in Domodedovo). On Sunday, August 20, 1989, in the sky above the capital’s Tushino airfield, Muscovites were finally able to see what had previously been reported only by short television reports from Le Bourget. The highlight of the show, without a doubt, was the Su-27 fighters. LII pilots A.V. Krutov and E.M. Kozlov demonstrated the unique capabilities of the new fighter, in particular - flying at minimum speed, when a pair of Su-27 confidently passed in the same formation with the Mi-24 helicopter (crew commander - V. Lebenkov) . There was also the sensational “Cobra” - it was brilliantly carried out by Sukhoi Design Bureau test pilot V.G. Pugachev, who repeated his Paris program in the skies over Tushino.
At the same time, from August 19 to August 27, 1089, an exhibition of aviation equipment was launched at the Moscow Central Airfield (Khodynka), the exhibits of which were two Su-27 fighters - a single-seat with tail number 22 (T1O-22) and a double-seat with number 389. previously shown at Le Bourget. For the first time, everyone had the opportunity to get up close and personal with the new combat aircraft. Soon after the exhibition closed, the National Aviation Museum was organized on Khodynka, the exhibit of which for some time was one of the first production Su-27 with tail number 31 (T-1031). Later, another aircraft of this type was transferred to the museum - the experimental T-1020.
On August 15, 1989, the Kubinka garrison near Moscow opened its gates for the first time, where military pilots performed demonstration flights on fighters. On August 19, 1989, an air parade took place in Zhukovsky, where testers from the Flight Research Institute and several design bureaus demonstrated in flight the capabilities of a number of aircraft, including, of course, the Su-27. The parade in Zhukovsky became a kind of rehearsal before the capital's premiere of new combat aircraft. It is worth noting that this was not the first air festival organized by the leadership of LII; previously, such events were of a “local” nature and were not advertised in the press. It was at one of these parades, held over the Moscow River near the walls of the LIP in August 1988 (i.e., even before the demonstration of new Soviet fighters in Farnborough and Le Bourget), that the Su-27 fighter was first shown. True, only residents of the “aviation capital of Russia” could see it then, and a small number of meticulous aviation enthusiasts who accidentally learned about the upcoming event and specially came to Zhukovsky.
At that celebration, it was planned to demonstrate a group flight of a pair of Su-27s accompanying the Il-76 heavy transport aircraft. The fighters were to be piloted by LII testers A.V. Shchukin and S.N. Presvyatsky. But the work of a test pilot is rightfully considered one of the most difficult and dangerous. Literally on the eve of the parade in Zhukovsky, A.V. Shchukin, one of the leading LII pilots, a member of a group of test cosmonauts preparing for a flight on the Buran reusable spacecraft, did not return from a test flight on a light sports aircraft Su-26M.
The holiday in Zhukovsky still took place. In memory of the fallen comrade, the flight of the Il-76 and Su-27 formation was not cancelled. Only there was only one fighter in this formation, and the place of the Shukin Su-27 behind the left wing of the “silt” remained empty... After the solemn and mournful flight of the pair Il-7b (crew commander V. Aleksandrov) and Su-27, S.N Tresvyatsky demonstrated aerobatics on this fighter with No. 14, dedicating the flight to the memory of A.V. Shchukin. Sukhoi Design Bureau test pilot V.G. Putachev also showed his skills by flying a record version of the Su-27 aircraft, the P-42.
The enormous success that the 1989 parades had in Zhukovsky and Tushino prompted the country's leadership to the idea of organizing a regular aerospace exhibition. The first of them, called “Mosaeroshow-92”, took place on the territory of the Flight Research Institute in Zhukovsky in August 1992. LII test pilots A.N. Kvochur, S.N. Tresvyatsky and A. took part in the extensive flight program of the exhibition. G. Beschastnov, who performed on Su-27P and Su-27PU aircraft, and Sukhoi Design Bureau pilots I.V. Votintsev and E.G. Revunov, who demonstrated aerobatics on Su-27UB and Su-27IB aircraft. In the static exhibition "Mosaeroshow-92" the shipborne fighter Su-27K and the flying laboratory LMK-2405 based on the Su-27 were shown for the first time. Starting next year, the exhibition acquired international status and became known as the International Aerospace Salon (MAKS). Aircraft of the Su-27 family are traditional participants in the MAKS airsalopes, which have been held every two years since 1993.
With the Paris premiere of the Su-27 and Su-27UB in June 1989, the triumphant march of Su fighters through foreign aviation salons and air shows began. In 1990, two Su-27 aircraft were demonstrated for the first time in Southeast Asia, at an exhibition in Singapore. On the way back, the “dry” landed in New Delhi and were introduced to the command of the Indian Armed Forces. In the summer of the same year, Su-27 aircraft visited the North American continent for the first time. LII test pilots S.N. Tresvyatsky and R.A. -A. Stankevicius on two Su-27s were invited to participate in the annual aviation festival in Zverette (near Seattle). Soon after returning from the USA, Stankevicius went to Italy, where an air show was to take place at the J. Carrer airfield near the city of Salgareda.
Unfortunately, the demonstration flight of the Su-27 with tail number 14 in Italy on September 9, 1990 was the last in the biography of the remarkable test pilot, deputy head of the complex of test cosmonauts of the reusable space system "Buran" Rimantas Antapas-Antano Stankevičius. When performing a vertical aerobatics maneuver, the aircraft entered the loop at an altitude slightly lower than the calculated one. Coming out of the loop, Stankevičius almost leveled the plane, but was no longer able to cope with the resulting altitude drop in the aircraft. The plane touched the ground almost flat. An explosion occurred that claimed the life of the pilot and Silvio Moretto, a member of the security service of the air show organizing committee, who was at the scene of the crash.
The Su-27 crash in Italy did not affect the further participation of aircraft of this type in various air shows and air shows, especially since the commission to investigate the causes of the accident did not make any claims to the material.
Over the past 15 years, Su-27 fighters have visited many countries in Europe, Asia, North and Latin America, Africa and Australia. They have held air shows and air shows in the USA, Canada, and France. Great Britain. Germany. Belgium, Switzerland, the Netherlands, Norway, Austria, Luxembourg, 11olyps, Czech Republic, Slovakia, China. India Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia, Australia, United Arab Emirates, Chile, etc.
The Su-35 aircraft is deservedly considered the most formidable military fighter of the Russian Air Force. The powerful military air transport was created by talented Russian engineers based on the Su-27 fighter model created by Soviet designers.
Su-35 aircraft
After numerous upgrades, not one powerful engine was installed on modern aircraft, but two at once. At the very first test, the aircraft was able to demonstrate the development of enormous speed and rapid climb to altitude.
The technical characteristics of the Su-35, the modern electronic equipment provided in the aircraft, and weapons have turned the model in question into what can be said to be the most dangerous adversary for any enemy force that decides to engage in aerial combat with the Russian air force.
Creating a Model
Russian designers began working on the creation of the first trial model in 2006. According to the previously approved plan, testing of the test sample was supposed to begin at the end of 2007, but the deadline had to be postponed by almost a whole year.
The first test flight of the Su-35 was carried out in early 2008. At the helm of the military equipment was an experienced test pilot S. Bogdanov, who more than once proved his professionalism in practice.
The performance characteristics of the Su-35 pleasantly surprised everyone present at the site of the first test flight. And the next day, military equipment was presented to V.V. Putin for review. And in the second trial test, air transport was able to confirm its incredible technical capabilities.
Considering the obvious advantages of the new fighter, it was decided to conclude a deal to purchase a large batch of military fighters, which in the future will be able to replenish the Russian Air Force. Initially, the cost of the Su-35 was agreed upon between the aircraft manufacturer Sukhoi and the Russian military departments. Having found a compromise regarding the cost of military equipment, the business partners signed an impressive contract for the creation of more than 47 units of aircraft over 3 years from 2012 to 2015.
The first models of production aircraft were presented to the Russian public at the end of 2011. The letter “C” was added to the name of the fighter, indicating that the vehicle is in mass production.
The Sukhoi automobile industrial enterprise successfully coped with the task assigned to it - in 2016, the Russian army had more than 64 Su-35S units in service.
Su-35 cockpit
Design features
Impressive and at the same time aesthetic – this is how you can describe the appearance of a military fighter in a nutshell. And the photo with full weapons leads to some confusion, because the power of military transport is truly amazing. The external shape of the Su-35 in some way resembles a predator soaring in the sky, proudly spreading its huge wings. The winged, menacing “bird” has rotating steering panels installed in the rear of the hull.
The designers managed to significantly improve controllability by equipping the aircraft with additional horizontal tail surfaces. Among the most significant changes made to the base model of the Su-27 are the following:
- a durable base made of durable aluminum and titanium was used to make the case;
- the cockpit was equipped with a modern ejection seat of the K-36 model;
- it was decided to equip the nose part of the aircraft with a so-called receiver for the flow of air masses, made in a spear-shaped design;
- thanks to the increase in the area of the vertical tail, it was possible to increase the flight range and significantly improve the maneuverability of military air transport;
- changed its location and the parachute needed during braking: the designers decided to move it to the upper part of the fuselage.
It is impossible not to mention the secret coating of the aircraft called “Stealth”, thanks to which both the thermal and radar signature of a military fighter is reduced several times.
The Su-35 engine, or rather two aircraft engines equipped with ATC thrust vectors, model Al-41-F1S, deserves special attention. This design is a prototype of the engine that was equipped with 5th generation military aircraft.
After carrying out certain modernizations, engineers managed to reduce both afterburner and afterburner thrust, which in turn reduced the service life several times. Such an engine helps the aircraft reach supersonic speed even without switching to a mode called “Afterburner”. The twin-engine power plant is controlled in electronic-mechanical mode.
Each Su-35 model is equipped with a modern radar system capable of detecting a target at a distance exceeding 350 km, called “Irbis, Radar-NO-35”. In addition to this design there is an OEIS and a location station.
Technical characteristics of a military fighter
- the body length parameter reaches 21.9 meters;
- aircraft height – 5.9 meters;
- the maximum speed of the Su-35 fighter is 2250 km/h, at an altitude of 11 thousand meters;
- the wingspan reaches 15.3 meters;
- maximum take-off weight – 34500 kg;
- combat load weight - 8 tons;
- when fully refueled at the maximum permissible altitude, the flight range at cruising speed is 3600 km;
- with a normal take-off weight, the length of the takeoff run is 420-450 meters;
- the length of the landing distance when using a special braking parachute is 680 meters;
- rate of climb reaches 300 m/s;
- the weight of fuel with tanks is 14295 kg;
- fuel mass without tanks – 11520 kg;
- the combat radius is 1650 km;
- distance near the ground at a speed of Mach 0.7 is 1590 km.
The modern military fighter Su-35 is flown by a single pilot.
The global aviation industry continues to grow and develop. Given this fact, it can be assumed that Russian engineers will also try to create a more advanced model of the Su-35 military fighter.
Currently, some ideas for the next modernization are already being considered. For example, engineers set out to install a functional radar blocker in the air intake. Another idea is also being considered, the essence of which is the additional installation of weapons. Engineers are also thinking about improving the dual-circuit turbojet power plant.
The prospects for the military fighter in question are very obvious. The Su-35 is of interest to both domestic buyers and aviation markets operating in foreign countries.
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The fourth generation multi-role highly maneuverable all-weather fighter Su-27 (NATO designation: Flanker, “Flanker”) was originally created as an interceptor for the USSR air defense forces as a response to the US development of the new F-15 Eagle fighter. The main “specialization” of the Su-27 fighter is gaining air superiority.
HISTORY OF THE CREATION OF THE SU-27 FIGHTER The first development of a promising fourth-generation fighter began at P.O. Sukhoi on the initiative of the head of the general types department O.S. Samoilovich in the late 1960s almost underground. The first version of the aircraft layout, which received the “branded” designation T-10, was developed by V.I. Antonov. At the origins of the creation of the famous aircraft were O.S. Samoilovich, V.I. Antonov, V.A. Nikolaenko and P.O. himself. Dry. The requirements for the new fighter were high maneuverability, long flight range, powerful weapons and a modern avionics system necessary to effectively counter the American F-15 fighter. The first version of the “Soviet answer” to the F-15 was prepared in February 1970. It received the designation T-10. The preliminary design turned out to be somewhat unusual for that time - an integral layout combined with a moderately swept wing with developed root overhangs. On aircraft of this type, there is no fuselage as such. The lift is created not only by the wing, but also by the body. Due to this, it was possible to increase the internal volumes of the airframe by placing high-capacity fuel tanks and electronic equipment in them. The T-10 was initially designed as a statically unstable aircraft in the pitch channel. Stability was ensured by a fly-by-wire control system. For the first time in the world, the Sukhoi Design Bureau installed the EDSU on the long-range missile carrier T-4; this system, in a modified form, was transferred to the future Su-27. Officially, the USSR Air Force formulated the requirements for a promising front-line fighter (PFI) in 1971; They took the characteristics of the American F-15 as a basis, increasing them by 10%. During this period, the US Air Force adopted the concept of a fighter fleet consisting of two types of vehicles: light - F-16 and heavy - F-15. The Soviet Union did exactly the same. Calculations have shown that the optimal composition of the fighter fleet of the USSR Air Force should include one third of heavy and two thirds of light fighters (in the modern Russian Air Force, Su-27 fighters are considered heavy, and MiG-29 fighters are considered light). In the summer of 1972, the country's leadership decided on the full-scale development of promising front-line fighters. The first chief designer on the T-10 topic was N.S. Chernyakov, the design was carried out by the team of L.I. Bondarenko
During the design process, the designers encountered an unusual problem: in the USSR, the calculated flight weight was considered to be the weight of an aircraft with 80% fueling, but in terms of tank capacity, the T-10 turned out to be much closer to a front-line bomber than to a fighter. Refusal of “extra” fuel made it possible to reduce weight and satisfy customer requirements at the expense of the effectiveness of combat use. The developers and customers managed to find a compromise solution - they divided the requirements for the T-10 into two parts: with the main refueling option (approximately 5.5 tons of kerosene) and with full refueling (about 9 tons) while reducing the requirements for maximum operational overload. As a result, the Su-27 fighter's range when fully fueled exceeds that of most fighters with external fuel tanks. The preliminary design was completed in 1975, and in 1976 the USSR Council of Ministers issued a decree on the development of the Su-27 aircraft. Since February 1976, M.P. became the chief designer of the Su-27. Simonov. The first flight of the T-10-1 was performed on May 20, 1977 by B.C. Ilyushin, In 1978, the assembly of pilot batch aircraft began in Komsomolsk-on-Amur. It turned out that although the aircraft could be put into mass production, it did not meet the technical requirements for a number of parameters, moreover, it was inferior to the F-15. Therefore, at the insistence of M.P. Simonov, this version of the fighter was never put into mass production. De facto, the fighter had to be redesigned. Without the strong support of the Minister of Aviation Industry I.S. Silaev's Su-27 (T-10S) fighter in its world-famous guise would hardly have come to fruition - too much time and money was spent on the design and construction of the first T-10. The first T-10S (T10-7) took off from the LII airfield in Zhukovsky on April 20, 1981 B.C. Ilyushin. State tests of the Su-27 were completed in 1985, while serial production began earlier - in 1982. Serial Su-27s began to enter service with the troops in 1984, but were officially accepted into service only in 1990, after the shortcomings identified during operation were eliminated. The fighters entering service with the Air Force were designated Su-27S (serial), and the Air Defense Forces - Su-27P (interceptor).
DESIGN OF THE SU-27 FIGHTER The Su-27 fighter is a twin-engine monoplane with a two-fin tail and a trapezoidal wing with moderate sweep along the leading edge, with developed root overhangs. The fighter body is all metal. Titanium alloys are widely used. Composite materials are used to a limited extent. The aircraft has an integral layout, the wing smoothly mates with the fuselage. The fuselage of the Su-27 fighter consists of a head, middle and tail sections. The head section houses the radar and other systems of the sighting and navigation complex, the pilot's cockpit, and the nose landing gear niche. The pressurized cabin contains a K-36 DM zero-zero ejection seat; the cabin is closed by a drop-shaped canopy with a movable segment that opens upwards and backwards; on two-seat aircraft, the crew members are positioned in tandem. The middle part of the fuselage includes the wing center section, fuel tanks are located in it, and a large-area air brake deflected upward is installed on the upper surface. The tail section includes two engine nacelles spaced from the longitudinal axis of the airframe and a central boom with a fuel tank, an equipment compartment and a brake parachute compartment.
The wing is of a three-spar caisson structure, the sweep angle along the leading edge is 42 degrees, the negative transverse angle V is 2.5 degrees. The wing mechanization consists of flaperons that perform the functions of flaps and ailerons, and adaptive deflectable two-section wing tips. The tail of the Su-27 fighter includes a differentially deflectable stabilizer and two fins with rudders. The landing gear is retractable, tricycle with single-wheel struts. All supports are retracted by turning forward in flight, the nose one - into the fuselage, the main ones - into the center section. The Su-27 power plant consists of two turbojet engines with an AL-31F afterburner with a maximum thrust of 7770 kgf, and in the afterburner mode - 12500 kgf. The total capacity of the five fuel tanks is 12,000 liters (fuel weight is 9,400 kg). Thanks to its large fuel reserve, the Su-27 has a solid combat radius for a fighter: 1,400 km, with a flight range of 3,900 km. The ability to mount external tanks is not provided, but with such a fuel supply it is not really needed. The Su-27 fighter is equipped with a fly-by-wire control system with four-fold redundancy in the pitch channel and three-fold redundancy in the roll and heading channels, which ensures normal piloting in case of static instability in the longitudinal channel of up to 5% and automatic deflection of the wing tips depending on the flight mode. The instrumentation of the Su-27 cockpit is made on the basis of analog instruments, taking into account ergonomic requirements. The instrumentation of the Su-27 of the latest modifications is made according to the “glass cockpit” principle using color displays. Traditional controls: RUS and RUDs. The target equipment includes the RLPK-27 “Sword” radar sighting system based on the N-007 radar with a detection range of 80-100 km in the front hemisphere of a fighter-type target; The radar is capable of simultaneously tracking up to 10 targets, including against the background of the earth's surface, and ensuring the destruction of one of them. The RLPK-27 is supplemented with an optical-electronic sighting system OEPS-27 based on the OLS-2 optical-location station, including a heat direction finder and a laser rangefinder; OLS-27 sensors are placed under a transparent spherical fairing installed in front of the canopy canopy. The PNK-10 flight and navigation system ensures aircraft piloting day and night in normal and adverse weather conditions. The main elements of the complex are an inertial heading system and a short-range navigation radio system. The Su-27 fighter is equipped with all the necessary general aircraft systems and electronic warfare equipment. The Su-27 fighter is armed with a built-in 30-mm GSh-301 cannon with 150 rounds of ammunition. The guided weapons of the original Su-27 version are limited to the R-27 R/T/ER/ET air-to-air missiles and the highly maneuverable R-73 close-in missiles. The fighter is equipped with ten hardpoints - two under the center section between the engine nacelles (UR R-27), one under the air intakes (R-27), three under each wing console (internal - R-27, two external - R-73). Initially, the Su-27 was intended to be armed with conventional bombs and unguided missiles, but the equipment allowing the use of such weapons was dismantled under the terms of the Treaty on Offensive Arms Reductions in Europe. The range of weapons for export modifications of the Su-27 and the Su-27SM variant has been expanded to include air-to-surface guided weapons. The maximum combat load of the Su-27 is 6000 kg.
OPERATION AND COMBAT USE OF THE SU-27 The first in the USSR Air Force to receive Su-27 fighters in 1984 was the 60th Air Defense Fighter Regiment, stationed at the Dzemgi airfield (Komsomolsk-on-Amur). Pilots were trained on the new one at the Air Force Combat Use Centers in Lipetsk and Air Defense Fighter Aviation Centers in Savaslake. In the West, the Su-27 fighter became widely known after the collision on September 13, 1987 of a Su-27 with a patrol P-3S of the Norwegian Air Force. "Orion" was flying over the Northern Fleet exercise area. The Soviet fighter was supposed to push him out of the exercise area. As a result of the collision, both aircraft were slightly damaged. After this event, photographs of the Su-27 with full missile armament circulated throughout the Western press.
The Su-27, in fact, in its basic configuration, was in service with both the Air Force and fighter aircraft (IA) of the USSR air defense. Before the collapse of the Soviet Union, most of the Su-27s stationed on the European territory of the Union belonged to the air defense forces. In 1991, the USSR Air Force and Air Defense Agency had about 500 Su-27 fighters in service. The Su-27 has been successfully demonstrated at air shows around the world. Its maneuverability allows it to perform a number of unique aerobatics (“Pugachev’s Cobra”, “Bell”). True, only pilots cleared to fly at extreme conditions can perform them. However, even without the implementation of these figures, not a single fighter in the world could compare with the Su-27 in terms of maneuverability in the 1990s. By the way, the well-known Russian Knights aerobatics team is equipped with Su-27 fighters. Now the Su-27, along with the MiG-29, remains the main fighter of the Russian Air Force and Air Defense, and perhaps one of the most effective in the world. Currently, Russia has approximately 350 Su-27 fighters. In general, only large states can afford to have heavy fighters in their air forces en masse. Other countries, if they have similar aircraft, do so only in very modest quantities. In this regard, it is worth mentioning the unspoken confrontation between the MiG and Su in the 90s, due to the fact that the Sukhoi management strongly lobbied for the replacement of the MiG-29 fighters with the Su-27. If these plans were implemented, the fighter fleet of the Russian Air Force would consist of 100% heavy fighters, which would place too high a burden on the budget. Ultimately, about 300 twenty-niners remained in the Russian Air Force. After the collapse of the USSR, regiments armed with Su-27 remained in Ukraine (831st IAP, Mirgorod; 136th IAP Air Defense, Kirov, Crimea; now Ukraine has 70 Su-27s, of which only 16 are operational) and Uzbekistan (9th Guards Air Defense IAP, Andijan). Belarus “inherited” from the USSR more than 20 Su-27s that were being repaired in Baranovichi. Kazakhstan received the Su-27 in the 1990s from Russia in exchange for the Tu-95MS strategic missile carriers. The first four Su-27s arrived in Kazakhstan in 1996. Su-27s are in service with the Air Forces of Angola (14 units) and Eritrea (10 units). The planes were presumably supplied to Angola by Belarus. In 1998-1999, the Ethiopian Air Force was supplied with eight Su-27/Su-27UB, previously in service with the Russian Air Force. Unlike the MiG-29, until now there have not been many cases of the Su-27 being used in real combat. During the 1999 Ethiopian-Eritrean armed conflict, Ethiopian Su-27s clashed three times in air battles with Eritrean MiG-29s, in each of which they shot down one MiG without suffering losses. The advantage of the Su-27 in speed and maneuverability was felt. According to some reports, former Soviet pilots fought in the air on both sides (Russians on Ethiopian planes, and Ukrainians on Eritrean planes). In 2000, the Eritrean Ambassador to the Russian Federation even directly stated that a number of former Soviet officers participated in the conflict on the Ethiopian side, indicating their names and military ranks. In 2000, the Angolan Air Force lost a Su-27 fighter to ground fire. In 1992, Georgian air defense shot down a Russian Su-27 while patrolling in the area of the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict. During the “five-day war” of 2008, Russian Su-27s, together with Mig-29s, controlled the airspace over South Ossetia. The Su-27 fighter has never operated in real combat against its main competitor, the F-15. But the Su-27 had to face it in simulated battles at various air shows and joint exercises. In close combat between the Su-27 and the F-15, the Russian fighter has an unconditional advantage, easily “getting on the tail” of the American. The maneuverability and thrust-to-weight ratio of the Su-27 are significantly higher. But the F-15 avionics are considered more advanced, which could give the American fighter an advantage in long-range missile combat. However, in the Cope India 2004 exercise, where the Indian Air Force Su-27 and the US Air Force F-15C fought, the Americans looked pale, losing 2/3 of the total number of air battles. Indian pilots used unconventional tactics: they turned off the radar and approached the enemy within range of targeted cannon fire, using the optical-electronic systems of their Su-27s. True, under the terms of the exercise, the Americans did not use their AIM-120 missiles, but it was with the help of these missiles that American fighters effectively shot down MiG-29s in Yugoslavia.
MODIFICATIONS OF THE SU-27 The Su-27 family includes many modifications. Within this family of aircraft, four “lines” can be traced: the single-seat Su-27 fighter, the two-seat Su-27UB (combat trainer) and the Su-30 (designed to control the actions of groups of fighters); carrier-based fighter Su-33 (for the Admiral Kuznetsov TAVKR air group, 26 units were produced); front-line bomber Su-32FN/Su-34. Modifications of the single-seat Su-27 fighter will be considered here. T-10 The first prototypes that never went into production. Su-27 (T-10S) A radically modernized T-10, actually a new aircraft, the letter “S” stands for “Serial”. The shape of the airframe was almost completely changed; a wing with straight tips was installed. The keel tips of the first production Su-27s were made straight, later they began to be beveled, the shape of the central tail boom changed, and anti-flutter weights disappeared from the keels. The maximum take-off weight of late-built aircraft increased to 33,000 kg, and the flight range to 4,000 km. On some aircraft, instead of external pylons, containers with electronic warfare equipment are installed (at the ends of the wing). Su-27P Single-seat fighter-interceptor for air defense forces. The possibility of working on the ground is excluded from the weapons control system; The composition of the avionics has been slightly changed. Su-27SK Serial commercial version of the Su-27 fighter. Produced since 1991 in Komsomolsk-on-Amur. Often designated simply as Su-27K (previously the designation Su-27K was adopted for carrier-based fighters, but then they were renamed Su-33). Su-27SKM The export version of the Su-27SKM was developed in the mid-1990s; it differs from the Su-27SK in the updated composition of its avionics, the number of missile hardpoints has been increased to 12. The aircraft's missile armament is supplemented with RVV-AE air-to-air missiles and guided weapons air-to-surface class, including the Kh-29T guided missile, Kh-31 anti-ship missiles and KAB-500 laser-guided bombs. Combat load increased to 8000 kg. The ability to attach two fuel tanks with a capacity of 2000 liters to the underwing units has been added. Su-27M (Su-35) The Su-27M has been developed since 1988 as a multi-role air superiority fighter with even greater maneuverability than the Su-27. At the same time, its strike capabilities have become wider than those of the Su-27. In 1993, this fighter received the designation Su-35.
The aircraft is designed according to the “integral triplane” design with a front horizontal tail. Composite materials are used more widely in the airframe design than in previous modifications. Additional fuel tanks are located in the larger keels; the capacity of the internal tanks has increased by 1,500 kg. The fighter was able to refuel in the air. The retractable fuel receiver is mounted on the left side in front of the cabin. Onboard electronic warfare equipment is capable of providing both individual and group protection. To a limited extent, the aircraft is capable of conducting electronic reconnaissance. It is equipped with a new optical location station and N-011 radar with a target detection range of up to 400 km, capable of simultaneously tracking up to 15 targets and launching missiles at six of them. The aircraft is capable of using air-to-surface guided weapons. The instrumentation is made according to the “glass cockpit” principle. The super-maneuverable multirole fighter Su-35 is a deep modernization of the Su-27 and belongs to the “4++” generation. Its design began in 2002. The Su-35 uses 5th generation fighter technology and radically improved avionics. The power plant consists of two AL-41 turbofans of increased thrust with nozzles rotating in two planes. The fighter is equipped with a H035 Irbis passive phased array radar. A total of 12 Su-27M/Su-35 were built, some of them were transferred to the Russian Knights aerobatic team. However, the Su-35 fighter construction program is currently closed. Su-27SM In 2004-2009, 48 Su-27 fighters were repaired and upgraded to the Su-27SM variant for the Russian Air Force. Under the so-called “small modernization” program, cockpit instrumentation and part of the avionics were replaced (there is the ability to detect ground and surface targets), the airframe was modified; the aircraft gained the ability to use air-to-surface guided weapons. P-42 One of the first production Su-27 (T-10-15), maximally lightweight for setting a world rate of climb record; in order to reduce weight, the paint was even washed off from the aircraft. The take-off weight was reduced to 14,100 kg, the afterburner thrust of each engine was increased to 29,955 kN. In 1986-1988, the P-42 set 27 world speed and climb records. T-10-20 The serial T-10-20 was modified into a version for breaking the speed record on a closed 500-km route; no world record was set. The aircraft was lightened, ogive-shaped tips were installed on the wing (similar to the first T10), the fuel supply was increased to 12900 kg T-10-24 The serial T-10-24 was converted into a flying laboratory to evaluate the influence of the front horizontal tail (FH) on stability and controllability. T-10-26 (LL-UV (KS)) Another flying laboratory for testing the AL-31F engine with an experimental rotary nozzle. The T-10-24 was converted into it. Su-37 In 1995, the Su-27M No. 711 was equipped with AL-31 FP engines with a thrust of 14510 kgf in afterburner and thrust vectoring. This fighter was named Su-37.
The avionics and control system of the fighter were significantly modernized. The instrumentation is made according to the “glass cockpit” principle, equipped with four large-format color displays and a wide-angle indicator on the windshield. The aircraft is equipped with a quad-duplex digital fly-by-wire control system. Instead of the usual control stick, a side joystick was installed in the cockpit, and the engine controls were changed. The Su-37 fighter was equipped with two radars: an upgraded pulse-Doppler N011M with phased array, located in the forward part of the fuselage, and a rear hemisphere viewing station, which provides control of missiles launched into the rear hemisphere. The optical-electronic systems of the fighter included a thermal imager combined with a laser rangefinder-target designator. The aircraft was able to refuel in the air by being equipped with a retractable fuel receiver boom. The controlled thrust vector allowed this fighter to perform effective combat maneuvers at near-zero speeds, which are simply impossible to perform on the Su-27 with conventional engines. Among them are the well-known maneuver “Frolov’s Chakra” (“dead loop”, only with a very small radius, actually turning the aircraft around its tail), a forced combat turn (in less than 10 seconds) and others. Unfortunately, fighter No. 711 crashed during a test flight in 2002. The Su-37 program has now been discontinued. Chinese Su-27 In 1991, a contract was signed to supply China with 20 Su-27SK, and in 1996 - for another 16 Su-27SK. In China, the aircraft was designated J-11. Deliveries began in 1992. The aircraft of the second batch were distinguished by the ability to install Sorption electronic warfare containers, a reinforced landing gear and the ability to use unguided air-to-surface weapons. In 1996, China acquired a license to produce 200 Su-27SK aircraft without the right to re-export to third countries. China has repeatedly insisted on modernizing the J-11 by replacing the H001 radar with a more advanced one, expanding the range of air-to-air missiles and installing multifunctional indicators in the cockpit. By 2006, about 60 J-11s had been modified into the J-11A variant. The country was also developing its own version of the Su-27 with WS-10A engines, a new Chinese-designed radar and the ability to use Chinese-designed guided weapons. China officially confirmed the existence of the J-11B in May 2007. In 2010, it was officially announced that the J-11B fighters were entering service with the Chinese Air Force, which supposedly have nothing in common with the Su-27. In total, the Chinese Air Force currently operates a total of 276 Su-27, Su-30 and J-11 aircraft.
When comparing this or that domestic combat aircraft with its foreign counterpart, numerous aviation enthusiasts turn to the officially published performance characteristics tables of competitors. However, only a few of them know that such “comparison tables” are in fact of little use for making a correct comparative assessment.
After all, a modern combat aircraft is a complex means of armed warfare and is characterized by hundreds of different parameters. These include not only performance characteristics, but also indicators of on-board radio-electronic complexes and weapons systems, information on visibility and survivability, various operational and technological characteristics, data on the cost of production, operation and combat use. The effectiveness of the aviation complex as a whole depends on how well the combination of these parameters meets the specific conditions of aircraft production and use. Therefore, the fastest, highest altitude or any other “best” aircraft very rarely turn out to be successful, because in order to improve a single indicator, the designers inevitably had to worsen many others. And the title of the best, as a rule, is won by cars with performance characteristics that are not the most outstanding for their time.
When studying the tables, you should always remember that in the modern world an airplane is a commodity; and the numbers in the tables are his advertisement, so they always give a slightly more optimistic picture. Of course, there should be no doubt about the integrity of respected aircraft manufacturing companies. You can trust these numbers one hundred percent. You just need to know what they mean. For example, the maximum speed of a fighter is indicated. But at the same time it is silent that this speed was achieved by a specially manufactured specimen, piloted by a test pilot of the highest qualifications, during a specially organized flight. And what speed will a combat vehicle of this type develop after 10 years of operation, with a tank on an external sling, under the control of a young lieutenant, if the engines have already undergone two repairs, and the tanks are filled with low-grade kerosene? There is no such figure in such tables. But it is the real operational characteristics that should interest us in the first place if we want to correctly compare two aircraft.
All these general comments are intended only to give an idea of how difficult the task of comparing aircraft according to their official characteristics is and how little confidence can be placed in the result. Another thing is to analyze real air battles involving competing aircraft during military conflicts. In this case, the picture turns out to be close to reality. But even here, an important role is played by factors not directly related to the aircraft, such as the qualifications of the pilots, the degree of their determination to fight, the quality of the work of the supporting services, etc.
Fortunately, recently it has become possible to compare various competing fighters in the air during friendly mutual visits of pilots from Russia, Ukraine, the USA, France and Canada. Thus, in August 1992, Langley Air Force Base (Virginia), where the 1st Tactical Fighter Wing of the US Air Force, armed with F-15C/D, is based, was visited by pilots from the Lipetsk Center for Combat Use and Retraining of Flight Personnel of the Russian Air Force: Major General N. Chaga, Colonel A. Kharchevsky and Major E. Karabasov. They arrived on two combat Su-27UBs, the escort group arrived on an Il-76. After a friendly meeting and a short rest, E. Karabasov proposed holding a demonstration air battle between the Su-27 and F-15 directly above Langley airfield in the presence of spectators. However, the Americans did not agree to this show, which was too militaristic, in their opinion. In return, they proposed to conduct “joint maneuvering” in the flight zone over the ocean (200 km from the coast). According to the scenario, first the F-15D- should have escaped pursuit of the Su-27UB, then the planes should have swapped places, and the Sukhoi should have “thrown the Eagle off its tail.” E Karabasov was in the front cockpit of the Su-27UB, and an American pilot was in the rear cockpit. An F-15C flew out to observe the battle.
F-15D
On the command to begin joint maneuvering, the Eagle, turning on full afterburner, immediately tried to break away from the Su-27UB, but this turned out to be impossible: using only the minimum afterburner mode and maximum non-afterburner thrust, E. Karabasov easily “hung on the tail” of the American. At the same time, the angle of attack of the Su-27UB never exceeded 18 degrees (When operating the Su-27 in combat units of the Air Force, the angle of attack is limited to 26 degrees. Although the aircraft allows maneuvering at significantly higher angles of attack (up to 120 degrees, when performing “Pugachev’s Cobra” )).
After the planes swapped places, E. Karabasov switched the throttle to full afterburner and began to move away from the F-15D with an energetic turn and climb. "Eagle" followed, but immediately fell behind. After one and a half full turns, the Su-27UB came into the tail of the F-15, but the Russian pilot made a mistake and “shot down” not the F-15D, but the F-15C observer flying behind. Realizing the mistake, he soon caught the two-seater Eagle in his sights. All further attempts by the American pilot to get rid of the persecution led nowhere. At this point the “air battle” ended.
So, in close maneuver combat, the Su-27 convincingly demonstrated complete superiority over the F-15 thanks to smaller turning radii, higher roll and climb rates, and better acceleration characteristics. Please note: it was not the maximum speed and other similar parameters that provided these advantages, but other indicators that more deeply characterize the aircraft.
Su-27
It is known that the degree of maneuverability of an aircraft is numerically expressed by the amount of available overload, i.e. the ratio of the maximum lift force developed by an aircraft to its weight at a given moment. Consequently, the greater the area involved in creating the lift force, the greater the specific lift force of each square meter of this area, and the less the weight of the aircraft, the higher the maneuverability. The characteristics of the aircraft's power plant and control system have a significant impact on maneuverability.
First of all, let's estimate the weight of the fighters on that flight. For F-15D: 13240 kgf - empty weight; plus 290 kgf - the weight of the equipment, including two pilots; plus 6600 kgf - the weight of the fuel consumed (for a flight to the flight zone and back with a range reserve of 25%, maneuvering for half an hour, of which 5 minutes in full afterburner mode); plus 150 kgf - the weight of the external fuel tank (PTB) structure, because the required amount of fuel exceeds the capacity of the internal tanks; in total, without combat load (cannon shells and missiles), the takeoff weight of the F-15D was approximately 20,330 kgf. At the time of the start of “joint maneuvering”, due to fuel consumption, the flight weight decreased to 19,400 kgf. Determining the appropriate values for the Su-27UB is somewhat complicated by the fact that the empty weight of the aircraft, 17,500 kgf, given in KR No. 3"93, seems to be overestimated. The most general analysis shows that if the trainer F-15D exceeds the empty weight of the F-15C by 360 kgf , then the Su-27UB, which has retained almost all the combat capabilities of a single-seat interceptor, may differ from it in this indicator by no more than 900 kgf. Therefore, the probable weight of the empty Su-27UB seems to be 16650 kgf. Similarly, calculating the weight of the fuel, we obtain the take-off weight of the Sukhoi " 24200 kgf, and the weight at the beginning of the "battle" is about 23100 kgf.
Comparison table of performance characteristics of Su-27 and F-15
*According to the author's assessment
Due to the fact that for both aircraft under consideration the fuselage and tail play a significant role in creating lift, the resulting weights will be attributed to the entire area of their planned projections. Areas can be determined from published fighter designs. We find that at the beginning of the fight, the load on the planned projection of the Su-27UB was 220 kgf/m2. and the F-15D is 205 kgf/m2, that is, almost the same (a difference of the order of the calculation error).
Thus, the better maneuverability characteristics of the Su-27 compared to the F-15 were achieved not by increasing the load-bearing area, but by using it more efficiently, i.e. better aerodynamic configuration of the aircraft. Unlike its competitor, the Su-27 is made according to the so-called integrated design, in which the fuselage and wing of the aircraft form a single load-bearing body, which ensures high lift coefficient values during maneuvers and a low level of drag, especially at trans- and supersonic speeds. In addition, the integral layout, characterized by a smooth transition of the fuselage into the wing, compared to the traditional layout with a separate fuselage, provides a significantly larger volume of internal fuel tanks and eliminates the use of PTB. This also has a positive effect on the weight and aerodynamic quality of the Su-27.
The positive aspects of the Sukhoi integrated layout are significantly enhanced by its careful development. Thus, the pointed root swells of the Su-27, in contrast to the blunted swells of the F-15, not only create a positive increase in load-bearing properties at angles of attack greater than 10°, but “also provide a reduction in pressure pulsations on the upper surface of the wing, which cause shaking of the aircraft and limit its maneuverability.
An important feature of the Su-27 is the wing. with a deformed middle surface, giving it a characteristic “snake-like” appearance. This wing is "tuned" to provide maximum lift-to-drag performance in the middle of the close combat maneuvering area. In these modes, the quality of a deformed wing is 1.5 times higher than the quality of a flat wing, and the gain occurs in a fairly wide range of angles of attack. Thus, the aerodynamic configuration of the Su-27 provides not only an increase in lift, but also a decrease in drag, which has a positive effect on the acceleration characteristics of the aircraft.
After the “battle,” E. Karabasov, noting the superiority of the Sukhoi in this regard, explained it by the greater thrust-to-weight ratio of his fighter. However, this version does not stand up to criticism: it is not difficult to calculate that at the beginning of the fight, the thrust-to-weight ratio of the Su-27UB at the ground in full afterburner mode was 1.08, and the F-15D was 1.11. The point is different - the thrust per 1 m2 of the aircraft's midsection is almost 20% greater for the Su-27 than for the Igla (6330 kgf/m and 5300 kgf/m, respectively). In combination with the better throttle response of the AL-31F engine, this ensures minimal acceleration time for the aircraft. According to David North, deputy editor-in-chief of Aviation Week & Space Technology magazine, who made a familiarization flight on the Su-27UB at the Farnborough-90 exhibition, the acceleration of the Russian fighter from 600 km/h to 1000 km/h at full afterburner takes only 10 seconds. D. North especially notes the good throttle response of the engines.
Another important characteristic on which the horizontal maneuverability of a fighter depends is the speed at which the aircraft enters a roll and the speed of its rotation around the longitudinal axis. The higher these speeds, determined by the efficiency of the lateral controls and the mass-inertial characteristics of the machine, the faster the aircraft turns into a turn and goes into a counter-rotating turn. The ability to quickly change the direction of a turn is the most important tactical advantage, because allows you to effectively escape from the enemy’s attack and launch an attack yourself. D. North, citing Viktor Pugachev, claims that the angular roll rate of the Su-27 is close to 270 degrees / s. This value is higher than the F-15 and is approximately equal to the F/A-18.
The positive aspects of the aerodynamic layout and power plant of the Su-27 are fully manifested due to its static instability.
Unlike the stable F-15, the Sukhoi seems to independently strive to change the direction of flight, and only the constant operation of the fly-by-wire control system keeps it in a balanced position. The essence of controlling a statically unstable fighter is that the pilot does not “force” him to perform this or that maneuver, but “allows” the aircraft to perform it. Therefore, the time required to exit any steady flight mode and begin maneuvering is significantly less for the Su-27 than for the F-15, which was also one of the components of the Sukhoi’s success in the duel with the Eagle.
Thus, the outstanding maneuverability characteristics of the Su-27, so convincingly demonstrated in the skies of Virginia, are a completely logical result of a set of design solutions that distinguish this fourth-generation fighter from the F-15. Discussing the merits of the Sukhoi, along with its maneuverability, the Western press notes the unprecedentedly long range and duration of flight without a fire-fighting tank, a wide range of weapons, and the ability to operate from poorly equipped airfields without numerous ground checks.
However, when it comes to the equipment of the Su-27, there is certainly an insufficient implementation of computer technology and a low level of system integration. This puts the Sukhoi pilot in a worse position than his Western counterparts, particularly in so-called "situational confidence" - an accurate understanding of what is happening in and around the aircraft at any given moment. This is perhaps the most serious drawback of the Su-27, since in a difficult tactical situation it will inevitably lead to the loss of valuable time and can negate the numerous advantages of this fighter.
1993
Literature:
1. V.E. Ilyin. "Needles" and "Flaikers". TsAGI, No. 18, 1992
2. M. Levin. "The Magnificent Seven" "Wings of the Motherland", No. 3, 1993
3. McDonell-Douglas F-15 Eagle fighter. Technical information TsAGI, No. 13, 1986.
4. D.M. North. Aviation Week editor's flight on the best Soviet fighter-interceptor. Aviation Week & Space Technology, Russian edition, spring 1991.
5. M.P. Simonov et al. Some features of the aerodynamic configuration of the Su-27 aircraft. Air fleet equipment, No. 2, 1990
6. Jane's 1991/92.