Download the combat regulations of the Red Army of 1927. Combat regulations of the armored and mechanized forces of the Red Army

Any weapon produces an effect only when used appropriately. Naturally, the VET system developed during the Second World War not only in technical terms, but also in “tactical” terms. The specialty of tank destroyer was determined in the infantry.” Tank destroyers were armed and organized accordingly. determined the order of their combat work within the unit and interaction with other units. The details of the tactics of “tank destroyers” and armor-piercing soldiers have already been indicated above.” Now let’s look at some aspects of the general organization of infantry anti-tank weapons. Since tank destroyer tactics were an integral part of the general anti-tank missile system, closely linked to the state and the actions of its remaining elements, we will have to touch upon the evolution of the anti-tank system and its organization in various types of combat.

In the USSR, by the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, the issues of VET were not sufficiently worked out. The Temporary Field Regulations of the Red Army of 1936 and the draft Field Regulations of 1940 rightly provided for artillery in combination with engineering barriers as the basis for anti-tank weapons. Back in 1935. A platoon of anti-tank guns (45 mm guns) was added to the staff of rifle battalions. and in 19391 a battery of six 45 mm cannons was added to the staff of the rifle regiment. In the presence of reinforcement means, a mobile anti-tank artillery reserve was also envisaged, including groups of sappers. The infantry had to fire from rifles and machine guns at the viewing slots of the tanks with armor-piercing bullets. The infantry combat regulations of 1938 and 1940 proposed creating groups of tank destroyers with bundles of grenades and incendiary bottles to combat tanks that had broken through. However, the importance of infantry PTS on the eve of the war was clearly underestimated. Anti-tank fire was organized using 45-mm guns (we have already mentioned that their production ceased just before the war), combined with anti-tank obstacles, fire from divisional and partly regimental artillery. However, neither regimental nor divisional guns had special anti-tank shells. the average density of anti-tank artillery would be 4 guns per 1 km of front - in no way sufficient to repel a massive tank attack. The artillery was asked to take positions behind natural anti-tank obstacles - but at the same time, tank-dangerous directions and roads turned out to be poorly covered, along which, in fact, enemy tanks preferred to quickly advance. The anti-tank areas were supposed to provide all-round defense and be reinforced with anti-tank obstacles in certain directions. In forests and populated areas, explosive barriers had to be supplemented with anti-tank debris. According to pre-war calculations, a rifle battalion on its own could create 1 km of blockage in 1 hour. According to the same calculations, the battalion could prepare 1 km of anti-tank ditch during the day (Eng. P-39). In reality, rifle units did not have such deadlines and opportunities. However, both rubble and anti-tank ditches were created locally, including by strengthening existing natural obstacles.

In general, according to pre-war regulations and instructions, the anti-tank missile system was built linearly and shallowly, along lines, with an even distribution of anti-tank vehicles along the front and in depth, with a weak reserve and anti-tank missile area in the rear (at second echelon positions) in inaccessible terrain for tanks. Strong points and positions were not connected by trenches - it was believed that fire communication was sufficient in a maneuverable war. Cut-off positions were created using anti-tank ditches and scarps, but their preparation required considerable time. The interaction between artillery, infantry and engineering troops and general control were not worked out. This clearly did not correspond to the conditions when the enemy resorted to quick deep breakthroughs with a massing of tanks in selected directions, detours and envelopments. Combat with tanks turned out to be even more difficult and unequal for the infantry, which did not have sufficient anti-tank weapons. By the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, the Red Army had 14.5 thousand anti-tank guns against the planned 14.8 thousand; these guns then constituted, in fact, the entire military anti-tank artillery. But since these guns were taken out of production just before the war, there was no way to make up for their losses in the first weeks of the war. Regimental and divisional guns were ineffective in the fight against mobile tanks and turned out to be more of an auxiliary weapon. It is not surprising that under these conditions anti-aircraft guns became one of the main anti-aircraft weapons of artillery (however, the 88-mm anti-aircraft gun was also recognized as the most effective anti-aircraft gun of the German Wehrmacht). And the Red Army infantry itself was poorly prepared to fight tanks.

Already July 6, 1941 An order from the Headquarters of the Supreme Command to intensify the fight against tanks demanded “the immediate creation of companies and teams for the destruction of tanks in regiments and battalions,” and added “packages with explosives and ... flamethrowers for light tanks” to grenades and incendiary bottles. Additionally, a directive was issued on night operations against tanks, that is, attacks by specially selected groups of fighters on enemy tanks in parking lots in front of the front line. To combat tanks, the most experienced “grenade launchers” were assigned to rifle units. They were supplied with anti-tank grenades and incendiary bottles and were located in single trenches and crevices in tank-hazardous directions. Interaction with anti-tank artillery, even where it was available, was still poorly organized - batteries of anti-tank guns were rarely deployed to tank-dangerous directions. In combination with the short - no more than 25 m - range of grenades and bottles, this reduced the effectiveness of the “tank destruction teams” and led to large losses of personnel.

However, already in the initial period of the war, “anti-tank units” began to be used in defense, in which anti-tank guns were located, covering them with rifle or machine-gun units. And in August 1941, the headquarters of the Supreme High Command demanded that the troops create anti-tank strongholds (ATS) and areas in the most important tank-dangerous directions - the linear formation of the TOP had to be abandoned. PTOPs were supposed to dismember the massive attack of tanks and destroy them piece by piece. Artillery commanders were appointed heads of the PTOP - not least of all this was caused by the poor ability of combined arms (infantry) commanders to organize a fire system. PTOP included 2-4 guns and PTS of rifle units. In defense near Moscow, 1 to 3 PTOP were created in the areas of rifle regiments. and in the depths of the defense of PT areas. Sometimes PTOPs were organized in populated areas. On the approaches to PTOP, posts of reconnaissance observers and reconnaissance illuminators were set up. warning posts about tank attacks In the defense zone of the famous 316th Infantry Division of General Panfilov, from October 12 to October 21, 1941, PTOPs destroyed up to 80 tanks. Near Rostov, in the Dyakovo region, 11 PTOPs were created in the 136th Infantry Division. united in a PT node up to 6 km deep - as a result, attacking Dyakovo, the enemy lost about 80 tanks.

In the autumn of 1941 tank destroyer groups began to be created in all rifle units of the Red Army. The group included 9-11 people and, in addition to small arms, was armed with 14-16 anti-tank grenades. 15-20 incendiary bottles”, in battle it acted together with armor-piercing troops - it was assigned 1-2 PTR crews. The PTR crews themselves were an example of the use of a complex of close combat weapons - at the position they also prepared anti-tank grenades and incendiary bottles for battle, the second number of crews sought equip with a submachine gun for firing at infantry accompanying tanks or evacuating crews of damaged tanks. Such measures allowed rifle units “during the period of a tank attack not only to cut off enemy infantry, but also to take an active part in the fight against the tanks themselves. The importance of tank destroyers in the battle of Moscow is evidenced by the documents of the Western Front. The directive of the Front Commander, Army General G.K. Zhukov, dated October 19 ordered the deployment of anti-tank detachments on the rear lines and rear roads, consisting of 1-2 anti-tank guns, a platoon of fighters with grenades and KS bottles a platoon of sappers with mines, a company of riflemen.” This is how they tried to compensate for the weakness of the front edge anti-tank missile defense system when the front was extended and had large gaps. And two days later, the Military Council of the front ordered the formation of “in each rifle regiment - one anti-tank fighter squad consisting of one middle commander and 15 fighters, including a sapper squad... 150 anti-tank grenades, 75 bottles of KS. PPSh – 3, anti-tank mines, semi-automatic rifles. All rifle cartridges are armor-piercing... Each rifle division has two fighter squads... three army mobile squads... The squads must be especially mobile, maneuverable to act suddenly, daringly, and short-handedly.” The detachments were supposed to be boarded on trucks, but there was a great shortage of transport at that time. PT regions were created in regiments. In the 316th Infantry Division, for example, regimental anti-tank areas included from 4 to 20 guns of different calibers.

Schematic diagram of the organization of VET of a rifle division in defense near Moscow (December 1941)

In the order to all army commanders. commanders of divisions and regiments of the Western Front were told “anti-tank rifles are also assigned to strong points, and it must be taken into account that the greatest effectiveness of their fire is obtained when used in groups (3-4 guns).. Tank destroyers with anti-tank grenades, bundles of ordinary fans and bottles with flammable liquid are an effective means of close combat against tanks. Groups of tank destroyers must be prepared at each strong point." On November 1, the Military Council of the Front proposed rewarding fighters for destroying a tank with a grenade or bottle with 1,000 rubles, for three tanks they should be nominated for the Order of the Red Star, five of the Red Banner, ten or more - for title of Hero of the Soviet Union. calculation of PTR for the destruction of three tanks - towards the medal “For Courage” and a monetary reward.

The isolated location of anti-tank guns still did not ensure proper coordination of the actions of tank destroyers and artillery. Meanwhile, the enemy changed offensive tactics, used deeper battle formations, bypassed anti-tank stations and blocked them with artillery and infantry. And this required increasing the fire of anti-tank guns. The first months of the war showed that it was advisable to use artillery anti-tank guns. in cooperation with the infantry, massing them within the battalion defense area in the most likely directions of movement of enemy tanks. The experience of organizing anti-tank defense on the Western Front spread to the troops of other fronts.

In July 1942, the General Staff developed instructions for anti-tank training of troops. According to it. the organization of VET was entrusted to general-arms commanders (from then on, the organization of VET became their primary responsibility), and its basis in regiments was VET in rifle companies, united into battalion AT units, and in divisions and higher - AT lines. Defense at all levels was subject to categorical requirement - it had to be primarily 'Anti-Tank'. Therefore, PTOPs should now coincide with company strong points, and PT nodes - with battalion defense areas. This simplified the management of the VET. increased its stability, improved the interaction of artillery and sappers with the infantry PTS, which solved the main tasks in battle. Just as battalion units were the basis of the entire defensive position, so the anti-tank units created in them became the basis of anti-tank defense. These provisions were included in the Battle Manual of the Red Army Infantry of 1942 (BUP -42. part 2) and in the draft Field Manual of 1943. One of the company defense areas or a battalion unit could be turned into a PT node or area if they were in a forward position and in tank-accessible terrain.

By definition BUP-42. anti-tank defense consisted of a combination of artillery fire and infantry anti-tank weapons with extensive use of natural and artificial obstacles “-The infantry destroys enemy tanks with anti-tank rifles, grenades, mines, and incendiary agents.” Recognition of the role of anti-tank infantry fire was a very important step compared to pre-war views. Note that BUP-42 introduced anti-tank land mines and mines into the number of infantry fighting weapons.

The depth of anti-tank fire increased; it had to be organized throughout the entire depth of the area or sector of defense with the concentration of the bulk of the staff and assigned anti-tank vehicles in the main directions. Particular attention was paid to the organization of anti-tank fire at the junctions and fire communications of anti-tank stations and anti-tank areas when conducting maneuver defense and large gaps between anti-tank units. Ambushes of anti-tank guns and anti-tank missiles were organized, reinforced by anti-tank mines, and the regimental reserve was strengthened.

In 1942 the magazine “Military Thought” wrote: “Anti-tank artillery... is better to have groups of 2-6 guns in the so-called. anti-tank strongholds, reliably covered by anti-tank obstacles..., provided with armor-piercing troops and tank destroyers.” Positions for anti-tank guns and anti-tank guns had to be chosen so that they, “without changing their location, could fire at the entire area assigned to them and tank-accessible directions primarily with flank fire,” reinforced by artificial obstacles and anti-tank mines. The most advantageous position was considered to be the location of PTS (anti-tank guns, anti-tank guns, flamethrowers), which made it possible to take enemy tanks into “fire bags”, allowing for the sudden opening of fire from ambushes when enemy tanks approached obstacles in front of the front line of defense.

The PTS fired independently in designated areas (sectors). After repelling an attack by PTR and PT tanks, the guns that discovered themselves firing had to change position. Both in the offensive and in the defense, part of the anti-tank guns and 45-mm anti-tank guns could be allocated to the regiment commander's reserve; during battles in a populated area or forest, the allocation of a reserve was considered mandatory.

Anti-tank areas consisting of rifle and artillery units were created outside infantry combat formations to cover tank-dangerous areas and roads. Anti-tank artillery and anti-tank missiles were also allocated to the anti-tank reserve, which was to be used together with the mobile engineering reserve of minefields. We note the strengthening of PT reserves, which contributed to the activity of PT.

These principles were tested during the Battle of Stalingrad. Company PTOPs here already included 4-6 guns and an anti-tank rifle platoon - this met the standards of BUP-42 (rifle company, 35 guns, 1-2 anti-tank rifle platoons, mortars and machine guns). More attention had to be paid to anti-tank weapons in the offensive, since the enemy often resorted to counterattacks with tanks and assault guns - especially in the battle for the second position.

Schematic diagram of the organization of anti-tank missile defense of a rifle division in the defense of Stalingrad in the summer of 1942.

Schematic diagram of the organization of VET of a rifle division in the Battle of Kursk

Armor-piercers on a counterattack. Southwestern front. Summer 1942. Let's pay attention to the 12.7 mm single-shot anti-tank rifle on the left.

In each company, 2-3 groups of tank destroyers were created, usually consisting of 3-6 soldiers under the command of a sergeant, sometimes with 1-2 anti-tank missile crews. Each fighter had a rifle or carbine (later they tried to equip everyone with submachine guns), two hand-held anti-tank grenades, and 2-3 incendiary bottles. Fighters - and even more so armor-piercing fighters - operated under the cover of fire from submachine gunners or light machine guns, and snipers. Fighter groups were trained at special training sessions in the army rear, during which the most determined, dexterous and quick-witted fighters were selected.

By the end of the first period of the war, anti-tank rifles became the main vehicles in company defense areas, and anti-tank guns and artillery pieces in battalion areas. On a broad front, the defense was made up of separate company areas, which bore the brunt of the anti-tank forces. When tanks appeared, the lead one was hit first, then the fire was transferred to the next one (the exception was ambushes against tank columns, when the first and last ones were hit first). Tanks that broke through into platoon and company strong points were ordered to be “destroyed with all anti-tank weapons” (BUP-42). In winter, the anti-tank weapons were further strengthened by obstacles in the form of icy slopes, slopes and embankments, reinforced by mines and land mines hastily placed in the snow, and the infantry anti-tank vehicles were placed on skis, drags, and sleds.

The expansion of military production and the increase in the production of PTS created the basis for saturating the troops with them. Together with the experience of the first period of the war (from June 22, 1941 to November 18, 1942, i.e. the end of the Stalingrad defensive operation), this created the basis for improving the VET in the second period, calculated from the beginning of the offensive at Stalingrad to December 31, 1943 to end of the Kiev offensive operation Since during this period the enemy increased the massing of tanks and self-propelled guns in the direction of the main attack (30-50 or more units per 1 km of front), Soviet troops had to increase the depth of the tactical defense zone and improve its battle formation. Changes also occurred in the states rifle units According to the 1942t staff, the rifle division was supposed to have 30 anti-tank guns and 117 anti-tank guns.

In the defensive battle of Kursk in the summer of 1943, rifle formations created a deeply echeloned anti-tank unit. The density of PTS has increased. In the practice of troops, the organization of PTS is increasingly being established, based on a kind of “network” - a system of PTS strongholds, nodes and areas. The battle formation of a rifle division in defense included from 4 to 8-13 PTOPs, which had fire communication with each other. In the 15th Rifle Corps, for example, 24 PTOPs were created (15 in the main line of defense and 9 in the second), united in 9 PT areas . However, experience has shown that it is more correct to transfer the center of gravity of anti-tank guns to battalions, uniting 2-3 company anti-tank guns into battalion anti-tank units (4-6 in the division zone), covering their anti-tank guns with barriers and obstacles. PT units interacted with PTOPs and PT areas in the depths of the defense. PTOP usually included 4-6 guns (up to 12 in the main directions), 6-9 or 9-12 anti-tank guns. 2-4 mortars, 2-3 heavy and 3-4 light machine guns, a platoon of machine gunners and a squad (sometimes a platoon) of sappers with anti-tank mines, sometimes tanks and self-propelled guns. The commanders of companies and battalions were appointed as chiefs (commandants) of the PTOP. The saturation of the Active Army with anti-tank artillery increased - if in November 1942 there were 1.7 anti-tank guns per 1,000 soldiers. then in July 1943 - 2.4 In addition to anti-tank guns, PTOP artillery could include 85-mm anti-aircraft guns and even 152-mm howitzers and howitzer-guns to combat new heavy German tanks. Direct fire at tanks with heavy M30 and M3 rockets was also used.

Note that the high densities of artillery and infantry PTS near Kursk were explained not only by the rather long time it took to organize the defense, but also by the fact that the defense was actually occupied by offensive groups. This made it possible to “divide” armored targets between different PTS not only by range, but also by type. Since German combat formations in the main attack direction included heavy tanks in the first echelon and on the flanks, and medium tanks, assault guns and infantry on armored personnel carriers in the middle. The fight against heavy tanks and well-armored assault guns was taken on by guns with a caliber of over 76 mm. and the anti-tank rifles and 45-mm cannons located in the infantry positions were medium tanks, passing heavy areas onto the anti-tank tanks.

Thus, in the battle for the village of Cherkasskoye on July 5, armor-piercing soldiers of the 196th Infantry Regiment knocked out 5 enemy tanks. The PTR crew, consisting of Sergeant P.I. Bannov and Junior Sergeant I. Khamzaev, destroyed 14 tanks during July 7.8 and 10. The commander of the German 19th Panzer Division recorded the battle on July 8 with units of the 81st Infantry Division in the Melekhovo area: “North of the collective farm” Harvest Day, “the Russians settled in the trench system, knocked out our flamethrower tanks with anti-tank rifle fire and offered fanatical resistance to our motorized infantry. On the night of July 9, this group managed to retreat.” The most effective anti-tank rifles on the Kursk Bulge and later were against armored personnel carriers, light reconnaissance and command armored vehicles. Without the support of artillery and anti-tank reserves, armor-piercing and tank destroyers still suffered heavy losses. So on July 13, near the village of Avdeevka, a platoon of anti-tank rifles of senior lieutenant K.T. Pozdnev knocked out an anti-tank rifle with fire. , grenades and incendiary bottles, 11 tanks were almost completely destroyed in position.

The enemy began to practice night tank attacks more widely, and this only increased the importance of close combat PTS and anti-tank minefields. Groups of tank destroyer sappers in all types of combat tried to install explosive barriers directly in front of the advancing enemy tanks, using for this standard TM-41 mines, "mine belts" and other means In defense, fighter sappers often took up positions near rifle units and installed anti-tank mines on sleds or boards pulled up by ropes. Although anti-tank mines were an engineering tool. It was no coincidence that BUP-42 mentioned land mines and mines among the “infantry means of combat.” The increasing role of anti-tank mines and explosive barriers with a chronic lack of sapper specialists in the staff of rifle units and formations made it necessary to train infantrymen in handling anti-tank mines and constructing land mines (using mines) and hand grenades). This practice paid off and was maintained after the war.

BUP-42 required every soldier to be able to hit tanks. If tanks advance without infantry, it is necessary to hit them with anti-tank grenades, petrol bottles, and fire through viewing slits. throw bunches of grenades and anti-tank mines under the tracks. destroy tank crews with fire... If tanks advance with infantry, only specially appointed soldiers should fight the tanks, and everyone else is obliged to hit the infantry with fire and grenades. As we can see, the organization of anti-tank weapons in units has become more specific.

In BUP-42, the actions of armor-piercing soldiers were also analyzed in detail. At night, shooting at tanks was allowed only when they were clearly visible. The return in defense to a developed system of trenches and communication passages increased the survivability of infantry PTS and the effectiveness of tank destroyers. They gained the opportunity to quickly and covertly maneuver within the defense area of the unit and unit, without running across under enemy fire, almost any section of the trenches could become a firing position Although the movements of crews PTRs in the trenches were hampered by the size of the PTRs. PTR positions often became the basis of a platoon strong point. PTR crews interacted in battle not only with infantrymen - tank destroyers and anti-tank artillery crews, but also with sappers and with units of tank destroyer dogs. The effectiveness of the actions of tank destroyers and armor-piercing soldiers was largely determined camouflage of their positions and endurance of the fighters. To get closer to the tanks, fighters sometimes set up smoke screens using RDG hand-held smoke grenades or small DM-11 smoke bombs. When tank destroyers were included in assault groups to attack enemy firing points, setting up smoke screens was almost mandatory. Even more often flamethrowers used smoke screens; chemical troops were also in charge of smoke agents.

PT areas were created within the regimental areas. The mobile regimental PT reserve included 2-3 PT guns, before the platoon of anti-tank guns and before the platoon of submachine gunners. The reserve of units also included platoons of tank destroyer dogs - they were located in tank-hazardous directions near the positions of anti-tank artillery. Such platoons also included crews of anti-tank rifles and light machine guns.

When strengthening PTOPs and PT areas, much attention was paid to PT obstacles, the construction of hidden firing positions of PT guns and rifles, and positions for tank destroyers with PT grenades and incendiary bottles. observers and machine gunners who covered the approaches to PTS positions and prevented the enemy from clearing obstacles. They tried to place the bulk of the fire PTS on the reverse slopes of the heights. BUP-42 determined the procedure for organizing anti-tank guns and in the offensive, anti-tank guns and anti-tank guns had to move in the offensive in the combat formations of units. The rifle regiment was allocated a PTS reserve. which stayed in a tank-dangerous direction. especially for covering flanks and joints. When their tanks or self-propelled guns supporting the infantry fell behind or failed, the PTS switched to supporting it, destroying firing points. PTS of the enemy, but remaining ready to repel a tank counterattack. Armor-piercers and tank destroyers operated in the first echelon of the landing force during crossings and securing a bridgehead - they took on the main role in repelling enemy counterattacks in the most dangerous initial period of the fight for the bridgehead. PTR crews. flamethrowers with backpack flamethrowers. The riflemen, abundantly supplied with anti-tank grenades, bundles of grenades and incendiary bottles, were also brought together as part of assault groups when attacking bunkers or fortified buildings. Groups of machine gunners with anti-tank grenades and incendiary bottles were also used to identify and destroy enemy tanks in ambush, crews of anti-tank guns and “faustniks”, facilitating the advancement of their tanks.

When marching, units of anti-tank guns and anti-tank guns were usually distributed along the length of the column. At the command “Tanks”, the battalion columns were divided into companies, guns and anti-tank rifles took up firing positions in front of the infantry, sappers threw mines in front and on the flanks of these positions, and rifle units, using existing obstacles and shelters, were prepared to repel tanks with their own means. Anti-aircraft weapons, depending on the situation, were made for firing at aircraft or firing at tanks. Anti-tank rifles and anti-tank guns were assigned to cover groups when rifle units left the battle and broke through the encirclement.

Infantry and artillery anti-tank weapons were brought together and organizationally. In the spring of 1E42, the anti-tank fighter division was returned to the staff of the Red Army rifle division, but already consisting of twelve 45-mm anti-tank guns and an anti-tank rifle company (36 guns). Let's compare - an infantry regiment of the US Army already at the end of the war had a standard anti-tank battery (company), armed with nine 57-mm anti-tank guns and nine Bazooka RPGs, and in Korea the Americans developed this experience, using joint crews of bazookas and recoilless rifles in anti-tank strongholds.

The third period of the Great Patriotic War (January 1944 - May 1945) was characterized mainly by offensive actions of the Red Army. However, the enemy constantly carried out counterattacks with tank units, and repeatedly tried to launch a counteroffensive in certain areas (East Prussia in August-September 1944, the Balaton region in January-March 1945). During the Berlin operation, Soviet rifle units had to fight off an average of 4-5 enemy counterattacks with tanks and self-propelled guns. This required the Soviet troops to quickly create a layered, highly stable all-round anti-tank missile system. It continued to rely on the system of TVET and PT nodes and PT districts.

The company PTOP in the Red Army in the last period of the war included 3-5 guns (both 57-mm and 100-152-mm caliber), an anti-tank rifle platoon, 1-2 tanks, a rifle unit, and a mortar platoon. In addition to anti-tank weapons, the battalion tank had up to 12 guns of various calibers and an anti-tank rifle unit. Moreover, anti-tank rifles already played a supporting role in the fight against light armored vehicles, firing at viewing slots - like ordinary rifles at the beginning of the war.

The hasty transition to defense often did not allow the organization of anti-tank stations, and the main burden fell on anti-tank areas, which were created throughout the entire depth of defense in the most tank-dangerous directions at the expense of anti-tank units. In the anti-tank area there could be up to 14 guns and self-propelled guns and up to 18 anti-tank guns.

PTS during this period became common in assault operations - the assault group was assigned an anti-tank rifle squad, 1-2 anti-tank guns, and assault detachments were reinforced by a platoon of sappers with anti-tank mines, a battery of 45-mm guns, and backpack flamethrowers.

The average density of PTS in the tactical defense zone (including guns, tanks and self-propelled guns) by the end of the war increased to 20-25 units per 1 km of front, i.e. 5-6 times compared to the initial period. The bulk of them continued to be artillery. Moreover, the density of guns not only increased during the war, but also differentiated depending on the importance or danger of the site. The average density of anti-tank guns in the first period of the war was 2-5, in the second - 6, in the third - 8 per 1 km of front. The depth of the fire system of anti-tank weapons in defense increased from 2-3 to 6-8 km, and taking into account the second defense line - to 15-20 km. The system of anti-tank fire from company anti-tank stations, battalion anti-tank units and regimental areas was joined by fire from various reserves at the lines of their deployment. At the lake Balaton, for example, anti-tank areas included 8-14 guns and self-propelled guns, 6-18 anti-tank rifles, and the reinforcement of anti-tank missiles was carried out by maneuvering artillery from the depths and from unattacked areas. This in itself showed that artillery turned out to be the only real basis for anti-tank weapons in the conditions of the weakness of infantry anti-tank vehicles. At Lake Balaton, as in the initial period of the war, soldiers again threw themselves under tanks with grenades. It is no coincidence that captured Panzerfausts were popular among the Soviet infantry. So, in the same Hungary on December 3, 1944. two companies of the 1st battalion of captain I.A. Rapoport 29th Guards. airborne regiment, repelling a counterattack of German tanks and infantry near the town of Meze-Komar, in addition to two 45- and two 76-mm guns, they used Panzerfausts captured the day before, knocking out 6 tanks, 2 assault guns and 2 enemy armored personnel carriers during the battle.

Schematic diagram of the organization of VET of a rifle division in the third period of the Great Patriotic War (Balaton operation, March 1945)

Let us note that the principles of anti-tank warfare developed during the war years remained fundamental in the Soviet Army until the mid-50s, when, in connection with the development of nuclear and high-precision weapons, a fundamental revision of methods of combat and combat formations of offensive and defensive began.

PTR, anti-tank grenades and mines were successfully used by the partisans. From June 20, 1942 to February 1, 1944 The Soviet Central Headquarters of the partisan movement handed over 2,556 anti-tank rifles, 75 thousand anti-tank missiles and 464,570 fragmentation hand grenades to the partisan detachments. The partisans made especially extensive use of incendiary bottles and homemade “moving” mines. Soviet partisans used PTRs to fire at enemy trains - at steam locomotives or fuel tanks.

As for the German army, here the issues of VET were sufficiently worked out by the beginning of the Second World War - especially since it was the Germans who happened to become the pioneers of VET. A characteristic feature of the German anti-tank artillery was the close interaction of infantry and anti-tank artillery - the advance of the infantry was always accompanied by anti-tank guns with wheels. However, clashes with Soviet troops in 1941 and sensitive, albeit scattered, counterattacks by Soviet tankers in the initial period of the war forced the German command to clarify the statutory provisions for anti-tank troops. So, already in the fall of 1941. instructions were sent to the troops “On methods of fighting heavy Soviet tanks.” The main countermeasures were recognized as: suppression of tanks by artillery in their initial positions, direct fire on attacking tanks with individual extended guns, as well as the destruction of tanks by “shock detachments” of infantry, i.e. tank destroyers. VET of German troops in the winter of 1941/42. was organized inside strong points (“hedgehogs”), created in important directions and adapted for all-round defense. Already in the spring of 1942. The Headquarters of the Main Command of the Ground Forces sent out “Instructions for infantry combat training.” They paid special attention to firing - including anti-tank - at short ranges.

In the second half of 1942 The Wehrmacht moved from focal defense to positional defense, accordingly returning to a system of continuous trenches and increasing the depth of defense. Most of the fire weapons were located in the first position. Special soldiers with tracer bullets in ammunition and lighting pistols were allocated by observers to signal the appearance of tanks, illuminate the area and target anti-tank weapons. In the counteroffensive at Stalingrad, Soviet troops had to face densely occupied defenses consisting of strong points connected by trenches. The basis of anti-tank weapons was artillery fire and engineering barriers; advanced infantry units were abundantly supplied with anti-tank weapons. Populated areas adapted to all-round defense - again, primarily in relation to anti-tank weapons.

Near Kursk in the summer of 1943, the German defense was even deeper (the first position, for example, no longer included two, but three trenches), and anti-tank fire weapons were located inside strong points in open positions and in long-term structures, including transportable shelters, etc. n. “crabs” are dome-shaped metal structures with embrasures around the perimeter. Specially appointed officers were responsible for the organization of anti-tank weapons within the units - as a rule, these were artillerymen and commanders of anti-tank battalions.

In 1944-1945. German units created quite high densities of PTS in defense. The main line of defense consisted, as a rule, of three positions, 2-3 trenches each. Strong points and nodes of resistance were created at the positions, with a “crab” system in certain directions. PTS were echeloned throughout the entire depth of the defense, but the bulk of them were located in the main zone (depth 6-8 km), and up to 80% - in the first two positions. Given the massive use of tanks by Soviet troops, the Wehrmacht command attached great importance to infantry PTS. In the German defense opposing the 2nd Ukrainian Front during the Uman-Botosha operation, the density of close combat PTS was 6.4 per 1 km of front, against the 1st Ukrainian and 1st Belorussian fronts during the Vistula-Oder operation - 10, Berlin - 20 per 1 km of front.

At the last stage of the war, the Germans practiced “mobile tank-destroying groups” of infantrymen with “Panzerfausts”, designed to compensate for the lack of anti-tank weapons on the extended front. “Faustniks” became the main element of the nearby VET.

German units were created in cities that were strong in anti-tank defense. In Berlin, for example, they included tanks or assault guns dug in near houses, anti-tank guns on the first and second floors and numerous positions of machine gunners and “faustniks” on all tiers, and mortar batteries in the courtyards. Colonel General B.C. Arkhipov wrote later: “The paratroopers positioned on tank armor find themselves in a particularly difficult position... but the tanker cannot do without them, because they protect him from grenade launchers, faustniks and other tank hunters.”

Units were also created that united almost all anti-tank weapons of the ground forces. So, in April 1942. The formation of anti-tank fighter brigades began in the Red Army. The brigade included an anti-tank artillery regiment (76-, 45-mm anti-aircraft guns and 37-mm anti-aircraft guns), 2 anti-tank rifle battalions of 3 companies each, a mortar division, mine engineering and tank battalions, and a company of machine gunners. Such brigades, in groups of three, were combined into anti-tank fighter divisions, which served as a mobile anti-tank reserve for the fronts. During the war, ideas were repeatedly expressed about the “enlargement” of both purely infantry units and tank destroyer units - on the model of anti-tank artillery units. So, according to the memoirs of N.D. Yakovlev, in March 1943. commander of the Volkhov Front K.A. Meretskov proposed introducing special “grenadier” units in the rifle troops, armed with anti-tank guns and anti-tank grenades. On the other hand, the German army formed tank destroyer brigades armed with close combat PTS. G. Guderian recalled that on January 26, 1945. Hitler gave the order to form a “tank destroyer division.” Given the formidable name, it was supposed to consist of companies of scooter riders (cyclists) with “panzerfausts”, i.e. become another improvisation of the end of the war.

Japanese troops on the Pacific islands (for example, on Guadalcanal) and in Manchuria widely used suicide fighters who threw themselves under a tank with grenades or a powerful explosive charge. Although cases of being thrown under a tank at particularly tense moments of battle occurred in all armies, perhaps only the Japanese made “teishintai” (“special shock squads” of suicide bombers) a permanent element. The 1st separate “special forces” brigade of suicide bombers was formed in the Kwantung Army. During the Japanese counterattacks in the Madayashi area on August 13-14, 200 such suicide bombers were thrown against Soviet tanks, but the results of their actions were small. More dangerous were groups of “regular” fighters with grenades, mines and smoke weapons.

"Panzerfausts" became a mass infantry PTS. The picture shows a sniper and a submachine gunner of the SS troops in a trench, with a Panzerfaust pipe visible between them, March 1945)

American crew of RPGM1 "Bazooka" in defense. Normandy, July 1944

RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS

Some conclusions can be drawn regarding the development and combat use of anti-tank infantry weapons during the Second World War:

1. Combat experience has shown the urgent need to saturate infantry units (squad-platoon-company) with weapons capable of effectively hitting all types of tanks and armored vehicles at ranges of up to 400-500 m. The development of PTS, of course, went in parallel with the development of armored vehicles. During the war, the tactical maneuverability of tanks (speed on the battlefield, acceleration, agility, maneuverability) changed slightly, but firepower and protection increased qualitatively - the tanks became stronger, “long-armed” and “thick-skinned”. The scale of the use of tanks and their massing in the directions of the main attacks has increased. At the same time, the range of armored vehicles grew and self-propelled guns entered the battlefield. transport and combat armored vehicles. Accordingly, the requirements for PTS changed - at the same ranges they had to reliably hit much better protected targets, while having the flexibility and stealth of infantry weapons. With the growing maneuverability and dynamics of combat operations, the PTS was required to have high combat readiness, a higher probability of hitting a target with the first shot, and maneuverability in all conditions. The weapon, which required more than two (with ammunition - three) people to maintain and carry in battle, was too cumbersome for the infantry. At the same time, the requirements for ease of development and handling, speed and low cost of production have become more stringent.

2. During the war, the range of PTS grew significantly - both due to special types of anti-tank weapons (PTR, RPG), and due to the adaptation of “multi-purpose” weapons (flare pistols, rifle grenade launchers, flamethrowers) to the needs of PTS. At the same time, anti-tank weapons differed: in the principle of destructive action (kinetic energy of a bullet, cumulative effect, high-explosive or incendiary effect), the principle of “throwing” action (small and rocket weapons, hand grenades), range (PTR - up to 500, RPG - up to 200, hand grenades - up to 20 m). Some means were in service at the beginning of the war, others appeared during it and rapidly developed subsequently, while others (incendiary bottles, “sticky bombs”, ampulomet) were only wartime improvisations. On the other hand, they tried to use special PTS to solve other problems - this is clearly seen in the example of PTRs and RPGs (which were also used to combat fortified firing points and fortifications) and indicates the need for a certain “universalization” of even “special” military weapons . One can see an analogy with the last two decades of the 20th century, when multi-purpose warheads (cumulative fragmentation, penetrating, thermobaric) for RPGs and ATGMs were created. allowing them to be used as light fire support for small units.

In the second half of the war, German specialists most fully developed the new infantry anti-tank weapon system (they were encouraged to do this primarily by the quantitative and qualitative growth of the armored and mechanized forces of the Red Army), but the rapidly depleting industrial resources and the rapid actions of the Red Army did not give the German army the opportunity to fully use it advantage. Regarding the anti-tank weapons system of the Red Army, it is worth noting that the rifle units at the end of the war, as at the beginning, had hand grenades as their main means, used at ranges up to 20-25 m. The PTR was not replaced by new weapons with the corresponding firing range. The fight against enemy tanks was once again entrusted entirely to artillery. This was facilitated by the adoption in 1942-1943. new anti-tank guns (45-mm cannon model 1942, 57-mm model 1943, 76-mm model 1943), as well as changes in ammunition. In 1943 accepted 45-, 57- and 76-mm sub-caliber (“special armor-piercing”) shells, and regimental 76-mm guns mod. 1927 and 1943 and a divisional 122-mm howitzer mod. In 1938, cumulative (“armor-burning”) shells were introduced. The sub-caliber projectile allowed the “magpies” to fight the new medium and heavy German tanks; the regimental gun could fire a cumulative projectile at a range of up to 600 m, although its accuracy was low. However, neither a quantitative increase in anti-tank artillery, nor its closer interaction with the infantry (in 1943, for example, a platoon of anti-tank guns was returned to the staff of a rifle battalion), nor the inclusion of light self-propelled guns and anti-tank batteries in the staff of rifle units and formations, nor an increase in anti-tank capabilities regimental and divisional artillery did not solve the problem of close anti-tank missiles at the unit level and did not relieve the infantry from the need to fight enemy tanks with their own means. This led to large losses in conditions where the enemy often resorted to counterattacks with the participation of tanks, armored vehicles and self-propelled guns, and the time to organize defense and bring up artillery was extremely limited. An example of this is heavy fighting in the lake area. Balaton in February-March 1945. When artillery was concentrated in battalion defense areas or regimental PT areas, forward units were left without PTS.

3. The infantry anti-tank weapon system began to change dramatically from mid-1943. - the main role passed to models with a cumulative warhead, primarily to RPGs. The reason for this was a change in the armored armament system of the armies - the removal of light tanks from combat units, an increase in the thickness of the armor of medium tanks and self-propelled guns to 50-100 m, heavy ones - to 80-200 mm. The cumulative warhead not only made it possible to significantly increase armor penetration without increasing the mass and speed of the projectile, but also created high overpressure and high temperature behind the armor more often than kinetic armor-piercing projectiles, causing detonation of the ammunition. The new infantry PTS complex, which developed in the post-war decades, was basically formed almost by the spring of 1945: hand and rifle cumulative grenades, disposable and reusable RPGs with cumulative rounds, mounted anti-tank grenade launchers and light recoilless rifles, hand-held incendiaries, still experimental experienced ATGMs. Infantry close-combat vehicles have filled niches in all echelons - short-range as an individual weapon and a means of separation and with an effective firing range of up to 200 or up to 500 m in companies, battalions and special anti-tank units.

4. The increased saturation of troops with light close-combat anti-tank vehicles operating in infantry combat formations increased the survivability, independence and maneuverability of subunits and units, and strengthened the overall anti-tank missile system.

Table 5 CHANGE IN THE NUMBER OF ANTI-TANK WEAPONS IN THE STAFF OF INFANTRY (RIFLE) DIVISIONS IN 1941 -1945

Year	1941		1943		1944		1945
Compound	rifle division	infantry division	rifle division	infantry division	rifle division	infantry division	infantry division	rifle division	infantry division	infantry division
A country	USSR	Germany	USSR	Germany	USSR	Germany	USA	USSR	Germany	USA
Personnel, people	11 626	16 859	9 435	13 155	11 706	12 801	14 253	11 780	11 910	14 248
Anti-tank rifles	89	96	212		107**			111
Grenade launchers *	-	-	-	98	-	108	510	-	222	557
Total guns	66	148	92	124	118	101	128 ***	112 ***	103	123
of which VET	18	75	48	50	54	24	63	66	31	57

* Rifle (gun) grenade launchers are not taken into account

** The decrease in the number of PTRs in the Soviet rifle division after 1943 is associated with a decrease in their role in the PTO system

*** Including self-propelled guns

The importance of infantry PTS can be judged at least by the fact that throughout the war tanks retained front-mounted machine guns, and tank crews developed a whole range of techniques to combat tank “destroyers” and tried not to go into battle without infantry. The standards for the saturation of PTS in infantry combat formations turned out to be significantly higher than envisaged before the war, which was determined by the scale and methods of using BTT. The role of infantry PTS increased in all types of combat. These changes in the system and nomenclature of weapons and military equipment determined the beginning of the transition from “anti-tank defense” as an important type of combat support to “fighting tanks and armored vehicles” as one of the main components of combat operations, and for the infantry this task became the most urgent.

5. The effectiveness of PTS in battle was determined not only by their performance characteristics, but also by the complex use of these means, the organization of close interaction between infantry, anti-tank, regimental and divisional artillery, their own tank units, sappers and “chemists” (flamethrowers) in both defensive and offensive combat , the degree of preparedness of unit personnel. Special training for tank destroyers and armor-piercing fighters paid off not only when fighting tanks, but also, say, when storming fortified firing points. At the same time, the presence of trained “fighters” did not relieve the remaining infantrymen of the task of fighting tanks (at least with the help of grenades). The need emerged to complicate infantry training - in particular, training in handling anti-tank mines and incendiary weapons. The complex use of various PTS in combination with the dynamism of combat required better training of combined arms commanders at all levels.

Daily life of the Wehrmacht and the Red Army on the eve of the war Veremeev Yuri Georgievich

Field manual of the Red Army of 1939 (PU-39) on defense

One of my democratic opponents said that the orders of the People's Commissar are orders, training, this is training, but defensive actions were still not provided for in our charters. This is what he writes: “...you didn’t pay attention to the fact that everywhere it is written that the chapter “Defense” was thrown out of the regulations in favor of Stalin’s guidelines, which means that the commanders did not know how to properly conduct defensive battles.”

The assertion, widely used in Russian historical circulation, that in the pre-war years the “Defense” section was completely removed from the combat manuals, is built, to put it mildly, on sand. To put it more bluntly, this statement is simply false.

And in general, it’s interesting - on what sources do modern Russian professional historians of a democratic bent base their statements and evidence? I thought that they should do this, first of all, on the basis of indisputable archival documents, documented facts and their unbiased objective analysis.

So no. The point here is completely different.

First, the social order is studied. And today he is like this - to prove by all means that in the Soviet period of Russian history everything was wrong, everything that the Soviet leaders did was harmful to the country and the people.

Then all publications in which this is stated are selected. Moreover, it does not matter that the statements are not supported by anything significant. All publications that do not confirm this are simply ignored, even if they contain undoubtedly genuine documents.

And finally, the third stage - a new publication is written, where, based on previous publications, it is stated that it is in full accordance with the social order. And if this is at odds with the truth, then so much the worse for the truth.

From the author. In general, this trick is very interesting. The very first liar does not rely on anything at all. He simply launches a duck. The second, in his statements, relies on the original liar, the third on the first and second. Then something like a chain reaction occurs. And, in the end, the Nth historian can already calmly write “well known...” or “generally recognized...”. And indeed, the ordinary reader, encountering the same statement in books all over the place, believes that this is really so.

Sorry, but such writings can already be called ideological publications; they are “volleys” of an ideological war against Russia as a country (and no matter what political regime). And there is nothing worse for history than turning it into a servant of one or another ideological movement.

And usually, such “historians” really don’t like documents and never definitely refer to them. And if they do refer, then in the most general form. So that it would be more difficult to catch them in a lie. For example, “from all Soviet pre-war regulations any mention of defense in general was removed.”

Which ones exactly?

If you take the charter of the internal service, the charter of the garrison and guard service, the disciplinary charter, the drill regulations, then it’s true that you will not find anything about defense there, since these charters do not consider combat operations at all.

This, defense, is what combat and field regulations deal with. Let’s take a look at one of them, namely the 1939 Field Regulations.

They must be followed by military leaders at the level of commanders of regiments, divisions and corps. Chiefs of lower levels are guided by the Battle Regulations. In general, this is the same thing, but considering the combat operations of units. I’ll say right away that there is nothing good for democratic historians there - defense is provided for there too.

But for military leaders at the level of army commander and above, no regulations have ever existed at all. Not in any army in the world. These are already the highest forms of military art, which are impossible to put into any framework. Figuratively speaking, creating a Field Manual for front commanders is the same as writing a textbook for chess grandmasters. There are textbooks for beginner chess players, books on chess theory for experienced chess players too, but for grandmasters, alas...

So, Field Manual 1939 PU-39, let’s go through the table of contents:

Chapter first. General basics.

Chapter two. Organization of the Red Army troops.

Chapter three. Political work in a combat situation.

Chapter Four. Troop control.

Chapter five. Basics of battle formations.

Chapter six. Combat support for troop actions.

Chapter seven. Material support for military operations of troops.

Chapter eight. Offensive battle.

Chapter nine. Meeting engagement.

Chapter ten. Defense.

Chapter Eleven. Actions in winter.

Chapter twelve. Actions in special conditions.

Chapter thirteen. Joint actions of troops with river flotillas.

Chapter fourteen. Joint actions of troops with the navy.

Chapter fifteen. Movement of troops.

Chapter sixteen. Rest and its protection.

So, there is still defense in the Field Manual. Well, what do you say now, gentlemen, democratic historians?

Let's return to the charter. Let's look at the first chapters of the charter, which usually briefly and concisely outline the basics of military doctrine.

Chapter first. General Basics

“...2. The defense of our Motherland is an active defense.

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics will respond to any enemy attack with a crushing blow with the full might of its armed forces.

Our war against the attacking enemy will be the most just of all wars known in the history of mankind.

If the enemy forces war on us, the Workers 'and Peasants' Red Army will be the most attacking army ever.

We will wage the war offensively, with the most decisive goal of completely defeating the enemy on his own territory.”

So, from this article it is clear that the Red Army does not plan aggressive wars at all, that it will only fight against the enemy who attacked the country. Yes, it will defend itself by attacking. There are different forms of defense. Defense is not a primitive sitting in the trenches.

Well, the fact that it didn’t work out at first to fight as expected was not a fault, but a misfortune. War is not a one-sided game against an imaginary enemy. The Wehrmacht also planned to win back the war in 2-3 months, and also with one offensive.

"…4. The tasks of the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army are international; they have international, world-historical significance.

The Red Army will enter the territory of the attacking enemy as a liberator of the oppressed and enslaved.

Winning the broad masses of the enemy army and the population of the theater of military operations to the side of the proletarian revolution is an important task of the Red Army. This is achieved by the political work carried out in the army and outside it by all commanders, military commissars and political workers of the Red Army.

5. All personnel of the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army must be brought up in the spirit of irreconcilable hatred of the enemy and an unyielding will to destroy him.

Until the enemy lays down his arms and surrenders, he will be mercilessly destroyed.

However, the Red Army personnel are generous towards the captured enemy and provide him with all possible assistance, saving his life.

Formidable in battle, our army is a friend and protector of the working masses of the attacked country, protecting their lives, homes and property.”

Yes, the Red Army intends to invade enemy territory, but only in response to an attack.

Digging a little from the topic, I would like to draw attention to the fact that the Soviet Field Manual prescribes generosity towards prisoners. Can anyone find similar lines in the statutes of other countries?

How was the Wehrmacht instructed to treat Soviet prisoners?

I quote: “ ...the Bolshevik soldier lost all right to claim to be treated as an honest soldier in accordance with the Geneva Agreement. Therefore, it is entirely consistent with the point of view and the dignity of the German armed forces that every German soldier should draw a sharp line between himself and Soviet prisoners of war... The use of weapons in relation to Soviet prisoners of war is, as a rule, considered legal.”

Let's return to the charter. Below in the same chapter:

“...10... Every battle is offensive and defensive- aims to defeat the enemy.

But only a decisive offensive in the main direction, completed by encirclement and relentless pursuit, leads to the complete destruction of the enemy’s forces and means.

Offensive combat is the main type of action of the Red Army. The enemy must be boldly and swiftly attacked wherever he is found.

…14. Defense will be needed whenever defeating the enemy by attack in a given situation is impossible or impractical.

The defense must be indestructible and insurmountable for the enemy, no matter how strong he may be in a given direction.

It must consist of stubborn resistance, exhausting the physical and moral strength of the enemy, and a decisive counterattack, inflicting complete defeat on him. Thus, the defense must achieve victory with small forces over a numerically superior enemy.”

What can I say? It is quite obvious that in the Field Manual of 1939 defense is considered one of the main types of combat. Yes, the main type of combat is offensive, and defensive combat is forced. One should defend only when an offensive is impossible or impractical.

Here is what Army General S. M. Shtemenko, who was Deputy Chief of the General Staff during the war, writes about this:

“Elementary ignorance of military affairs apparently explains the fact that some comrades declare erroneous the well-known provision of the pre-war regulations of the Soviet Army about the subordinate role of defense in relation to the offensive. These need to be reminded that this situation is still valid today.

In a word, in a number of cases, people who talk about war have, in our opinion, taken the wrong path, without taking the trouble to properly study the essence of the matter that they undertake to criticize.”

Let's return to the charter. Let's step back from the topic again. This is also in relation to the very widespread assertion that it is possible to fight not according to the regulations, that the regulations can be thrown aside. Usually such statements come from the mouths of those who have never held combat manuals in their lives and have absolutely no idea what it is.

“...22. The variety of combat conditions has no limit.

In war, no two cases are the same. Each case is special in war and requires a special solution. Therefore, in battle it is always necessary to act strictly in accordance with the situation.

The Red Army may face different opponents, with different tactics and different theaters of war. All these conditions will require special methods of combat….

23. During the war, the conditions of the struggle will change. New means of struggle will appear. Therefore, the methods of fighting will also change. Tactics must be changed and new methods of combat must be found if the changed situation requires it.».

It is impossible and impossible to fight outside the regulations, if only because the regulations require strict compliance with the real situation and organizing the battle in such a way as to achieve success. But the decision-making commander must be tactically competent so as not to lead his subordinates to disaster.

Figuratively speaking, the combat regulations are the alphabet, but what words and sentences a person puts together from this alphabet depends on his literacy. Just as a person who does not know the alphabet cannot form words, so a commander who does not know the combat regulations will not be able to competently organize a battle.

Chapter two. Organization of the Red Army troops

And in the second chapter of the charter we find a mention of defense. And very often.

Chapter Four. Troop control

“...25. The infantry is the main branch of the military. With his decisive advance in the offensive and stubborn resistance in defense Infantry, in close cooperation with artillery, tanks and aviation, decides the outcome of the battle. The infantry bears the brunt of the battle. Therefore, the purpose of the remaining types of troops participating in a joint battle with the infantry is to act in its interests, ensuring its advancement in the offensive and tenacity in defense.

26... No actions of troops on the battlefield are possible without the support of artillery and are unacceptable without it. Artillery, suppressing and destroying the enemy, clears the way for all ground troops - in the offensive and blocks the enemy's path - in defense.

27… Tanks on defense are a powerful counterattack...

…33. Fortified areas, being a system of long-term fortifications, provide long lasting resistance they contain special garrisons and combined arms formations. By pinning down the enemy along their entire front, they create the possibility of concentrating large forces and means to inflict crushing blows on the enemy in other directions. Troops fighting in fortified areas require special tenacity, endurance and endurance.

Taking defense decision, it is necessary to determine...

…75. In a defensive battle the decision must determine where and in what way the enemy will be defeated, and what needs to be held in order to solve its problem as a whole.

...that commanding section of the terrain, on whose retention the stability of the entire defense depends. This area will be the main one.

That's why defense is also based on concentrating your main efforts in the chosen direction.

Main defense area must be defended by the bulk of forces and means.

Defense decision must provide for the careful use of terrain conditions, its engineering and chemical reinforcement, the skillful organization of a system of infantry, anti-tank and artillery fire, and the preparation of decisive counterattacks from the depths to destroy the enemy who has broken through.

At any favorable opportunity, the decision must include going on the offensive to inflict a general defeat on the enemy.”

And here we see that due attention is paid to defense issues.

Chapter five. Basics of battle formations

“...104. The defensive order of battle consists of holding and striking groups.

The holding group constitutes the first echelon of defense and is intended to firmly hold the area of terrain given to it. It must, by its stubborn resistance, inflict such a defeat on the enemy that it will completely exhaust its offensive power. In the event of a breakthrough of enemy tanks and infantry into the depths of the defense, the pinning group must, through a skillful combination of fire destruction and private counterattacks, stop the enemy’s advance and make him unable to continue the offensive.

The main part of forces and means is included in the restraining group in defense.

The strike group of the defensive battle formation constitutes the second echelon, is located behind the pinning group and is intended to destroy the breaking through enemy with a decisive counterattack and restore the situation.

Under favorable conditions, the successful development of a counterattack by a strike group should develop into a general counteroffensive against a weakened and frustrated enemy.

105. Defense must be deep. The depth of the defense is the main condition for its success. The width of the front of the defensive battle formation is determined by the width of the front of the pinning group.

The division can defend a strip along a front of 8–12 km and in depth of 4–6 km.

The regiment can defend an area along a front of 3–5 km and a depth of 2.5–3 km.

The battalion can defend an area along a front of 1.5–2 km and the same depth.

When defending an SD, the fronts can be wider, reaching 3–5 km per battalion.

In important directions, defense fronts can be narrower, reaching up to 6 km per division.

…107. Combat distribution of artillery...

PP (PC) groups (infantry and cavalry support), designed to support the combat of infantry (cavalry) and tanks, are organized from the entire divisional artillery and quantitative reinforcement units of the ARGC assigned to the division.

PP groups are organized first...

- in defense- for the rifle regiment of the division’s holding group defending in the main direction, and for the rifle regiment of the division’s strike group...

After the end of artillery preparation...

- in defense supporting artillery, in the absence of communication with the senior artillery commander, becomes subordinate to the supported infantry units.”

Well, this is where the specifics begin. Is it possible to correctly set the task and determine to the subordinate commander how many kilometers of front he will have to hold? No, of course, we can deviate from these figures, based on the real situation and the availability of forces. But a commander who knows these standards is able to correctly assess the capabilities of his defending regiments and make the right decision - whether to defend in one or two echelons, whether to allocate a reserve, and what to pay special attention to. Or defense is impossible at this line, and it is better to withdraw in an organized manner in time and take the battle to a more advantageous line. Those who don’t know will simply destroy people and regiments to no avail, and will never hold the line.

Chapter seven. Material support for the activities of troops

"…9. Home front work in defense.

…233. During the transition to defense, along with ammunition, the supply of troops with engineering and chemical equipment becomes of great importance. Skillful use of local funds will significantly reduce the supply from the rear.

234. In the process of preparing defense, portable and transportable supplies must be replenished. In each battalion area, in case of a battle when surrounded, reserves of combat supplies must be created in the trenches in excess of the established norms. A reserve of engineering property is required. The size of supplies stored on the ground is established by the commander of the formation.

235. The large area of the rear areas allows for a greater number of transport and evacuation routes, and it is more convenient to locate rear institutions, using natural camouflage and areas inaccessible to tanks.

236. To restore the damaged front line after a successful counterattack, the following are organized: a) replenishment of all reserves to normal; b) transport of property to restore defensive structures destroyed by the enemy.

237. During defense on a broad front, a characteristic feature in the work of the rear is the fragmentation of rear institutions to provide separate directions. Additional additional operations are organized for each regiment separately. 2–3 DPM are being deployed.

238. In mobile defense, all rear establishments that are not necessary to directly support the battle are withdrawn in advance to the main defensive line. The remaining institutions operate in two echelons and are withdrawn by riffles according to a pre-developed plan.

239. In case of forced withdrawal, it is necessary to plan in advance the withdrawal of rear institutions (units) to the rear.

240. When leaving encirclement, rear institutions (units) follow in the center of the formation (unit) battle order. All available transport is used to transport the wounded.”

As we can see, the charter also provides for the organization of logistical support for defense.

Well, and finally, chapter ten, which is entitled - Defense.

Without further ado, let us quote this chapter in full. It is not necessary to read it, although an attentive and thoughtful reader will find a lot of interest in these lines. Well, for the rest, it’s enough to make sure that the head of “Defense” was in PU-39 after all.

Chapter ten. DEFENSE

1. Basics of defense

This is achieved by fighting to hold a certain territory (line, strip, object) for the required time.

Defense is used for the following purposes:

a) gaining the time necessary to concentrate and group forces and assets and go on the offensive or organize defense in a new zone;

b) pinning down the enemy in a secondary direction until the results of the offensive in the decisive direction are obtained;

c) saving forces in a given direction to concentrate overwhelming forces in the decisive direction;

d) retention of certain areas (objects) that are important.

Defense, depending on the task, forces, means and terrain, can be stubborn, on a normal or wide front, and mobile.

370. The strength of the defense lies in the combination of an organized system of fire, counterattacks from deep and skillful use of terrain, reinforced by engineering equipment and chemical barriers.

The defense must withstand the superior forces of the advancing enemy, who has powerful means of suppression and attacks in full depth. Therefore, the defense must be deep. Modern technical means of warfare allow troops to create an insurmountable defense even in a short time.

2. Defense on a normal front. Defense organization

371. A developed defense on a normal front consists of:

a) from the main (first) line of defense, including the entire depth of the division’s battle formation;

b) from a combat outpost position moved forward 1–3 km from the front edge of the main defense line;

c) from a strip of engineering-chemical barriers, with the removal of the barriers closest to the enemy up to 12–15 km from the front edge of the main defense line, and under favorable conditions, further;

d) from the second defensive line created in the rear of the main defense line.

When going on the defensive from close contact with the enemy, there may not be a barricade line or a combat outpost position; in this case, they can only be created if the main strip is appropriately assigned to the rear of its location.

a) make it difficult for the enemy to successfully use large masses of artillery, depriving him of convenient observation points and artillery position areas;

b) mislead the enemy regarding the location and outline of the front line, the placement of fire weapons, the depth of the defensive line, etc.;

c) enable the defense to concentrate the bulk of all types of fire directly in front of the forward edge;

d) have natural obstacles both in front of the front edge and in depth, so that, in combination with artificial obstacles, eliminate or limit the enemy’s use of tanks;

e) have natural boundaries and local objects inside, the retention of which even with small forces will allow the defense to conduct a successful battle when the enemy breaks through into the depths of the defense;

f) give the defense the opportunity to advantageously locate artillery observation posts and echelon placement of artillery in depth;

g) allow the entire battle formation, and especially strike groups and artillery, to be hidden from ground and air surveillance.

The leading edge, as a rule, should be placed on the slopes facing the enemy, avoiding pronounced and characteristic local objects.

The location of the leading edge on the reverse slopes can only take place in cases where the terrain in front of it is under crossfire from neighboring areas.

374. When placing troops on the defensive, you should:

a) avoid placing them in sharply defined islands on sharply defined lines and points, filling the latter with false trenches;

b) select artillery positional areas behind tank-inaccessible lines and in tank-inaccessible areas: place strike groups in areas that provide shelter from observation from the ground and from the air and ensure ease of use.

375. Troops for defense occupy: a rifle corps and a rifle division - defensive zones, rifle regiments - areas consisting of battalion areas, the borders of which are in contact.

The defensive order of battle consists of: a rifle division and a rifle regiment - consisting of a pinning and strike group; rifle battalion - from the first and second echelons. A corps strike group is usually created during a defensive battle.

A pinning group, a division, may consist of two or three regiments. In the latter case, separate battalions may be assigned to the strike group.

The width of the defense front is determined by the width of the front of the restraining group.

On a normal front, a rifle division can successfully defend a zone 8–12 km wide along the front and 4–6 km deep; rifle regiment - a section along the front of 3–5 km and a depth of 2.5–3 km; battalion - an area along the front of 1.5–2 km and the same depth.

In particularly important areas, the defense dandies can be narrower, reaching up to 6 km per division.

376. The position of a combat guard serves to warn against a surprise attack by the enemy, making it difficult for him to conduct ground reconnaissance, and to mislead him regarding the actual position of the front line. The combat outpost position consists of a system of separate fortified points that are in fire communication and covered by obstacles and barriers. One platoon from a battalion, reinforced with machine guns and infantry guns, is usually deployed as a combat guard. The combat guard position should not be occupied evenly and should be stronger in the directions of the enemy’s probable attack. In those directions (sections) where it is necessary to create the impression of a front line, the combat guard is strengthened, and its position is equipped with anti-personnel and anti-tank obstacles.

377. A line of engineering-chemical barriers is created to delay the advancing enemy in order to gain time necessary for organizing and constructing a defensive line.

Barriers are prepared according to a certain system, in the most important directions and on advantageous boundaries and areas of terrain (forests, fashion shows, etc.).

The number and strength of barriers are determined by the availability of forces and means for this and the time during which it is necessary to detain the enemy.

Barriers must be used massively.

The strongest barriers are created in areas where the enemy is likely to start an attack and on the most important approaches to the front line.

The location of the obstacle line should mislead the enemy as to the actual outline of the front edge of the main defense line.

The barriers are covered by barrage detachments (OB). Their task is to exhaust the enemy and force him to waste time fighting to overcome obstacles.

378. The second defensive line is created by order of the corps commander in the rear of the main defensive line.

Its main purpose:

a) block access to the depths of enemy mobile units that have broken through;

b) stop the spread of the enemy who has broken through in certain directions;

c) serve as an advantageous starting point for launching decisive counterattacks from the depths.

It is advantageous to locate the second defensive line behind a natural anti-tank obstacle and connect it to the main defensive line with a system of cut-off positions covering the most likely directions for an enemy breakthrough.

Removing the second defensive line from the front edge of the main one should exclude the possibility of a direct attack after breaking through the main defensive line and force the enemy to regroup forces and move all artillery.

Depending on terrain conditions, this distance will usually be up to 12–15 km.

The corps reserve is usually located in the area of the second defensive line.

379. The stability of the defense largely depends on the degree of engineering support for the troops and on the equipment of the area with defensive structures.

Engineering support for troops and terrain equipment includes:

a) preparation together with chemical parts. obstacle strips in front of the front edge, obstacle sections in front of the combat outpost position, and if there is an open flank, then on the open flank;

b) arrangement of anti-tank areas and various anti-tank obstacles throughout the entire depth;

c) equipping main and reserve positions for riflemen, machine guns, artillery, clearing fire, establishing command posts (main and reserve), installing obstacles against infantry, constructing hidden communications, shelters, decoy structures and obstacles;

d) preparation of cut-off positions, second line and rear defense;

e) restoration and construction of bridges, repair and construction of roads, arrangement of landing sites, equipment of warehouses, etc.;

f) camouflage of defensive structures, locations of troops and institutions, roads, etc.;

g) organization of water supply for troops (drilling wells, raising and purifying water, equipping a water point).

380. Engineering equipment of the area is carried out, depending on the situation, in the following order.

First stage works:

a) by forces of the troops - clearing visibility and shelling, building full-profile trenches for riflemen, machine guns, grenade launchers, mortars and guns with slots for cover and reserve positions; construction of anti-personnel obstacles, adaptation of local objects to defense, construction of hidden firing points for heavy machine guns and infantry artillery, provision of hidden communications in the most important areas;

b) engineering units - installation of the most important command and observation posts, anti-tank obstacles, installation of searchlights, provision of troops with water, construction of field roads necessary for combat and economic supply of troops, and correction of existing ones.

Second stage works:

a) by the forces of the troops - the construction of communication passages with the rear, the construction of spare trenches, the development of the first stage of work;

b) engineering units - construction of various types of shelters and reserve command and observation posts.

The works of the third stage are the development of the works of the first and second stages.

All engineering work is carried out under conditions of careful camouflage of both the work process itself and the buildings being erected. Defense camouflage as a whole is checked by control photographs from the ground and air.

In the case of long-term defense, the defensive zone is strengthened with reinforced concrete structures and deep lines of artificial obstacles.

381. Particular attention should be paid to creating a system of anti-tank obstacles both in front of the front edge and throughout the depth.

First of all, natural obstacles should be used - ravines, forests, rivers and streams, swamps and lakes, gorges, populated areas, steep slopes, etc.

In areas devoid of natural obstacles, artificial anti-tank obstacles must be created - minefields, obstacles, stripes of inconspicuous obstacles, ditches, etc.

Strengthening natural obstacles (swamping, increasing steepness by cutting, etc.) significantly increases their barrier properties.

From a combination of natural and artificial obstacles, anti-tank lines and areas can be created as a target.

It is necessary to strive to create “anti-tank bags” from anti-tank areas and lines, so that enemy tanks, having broken through into the gap between two anti-tank areas, are met by fire from a third and destroyed in the “bag”.

When creating a system of anti-tank obstacles, it is necessary to take into account that anti-tank obstacles can play their role only if they are under actual direct fire from artillery.

382. When equipping a defensive zone in engineering terms, commanders of military units and subunits organize and manage defensive work and bear full responsibility for camouflage and timely completion of work to strengthen their sector and area. Engineering parts. as a rule, they are used to perform complex and responsible work of explanatory and divisional significance and to manage engineering work of other branches of the military.

To create a second lane, repair, restore and build roads in the military area, units located in the rear and the local population are involved.

383. Chemical means of combat in defensive combat are used:

a) to create independent UZs and to strengthen engineering barriers;

b) to infect areas in front of the combat outpost position and the front edge of the main defense line;

c) to infect probable areas of enemy artillery positions and observation posts, as well as to blind the latter with smoke;

d) to infect hidden approaches from the enemy to the front line;

e) to destroy enemy military concentrations and suitable reserves;

f) to repel the attacking enemy with flamethrower fire both in front of the front line and during the battle inside the defensive line;

g) to disguise the maneuver of strike groups with smoke;

h) to provide for their troops in case of a chemical attack by the enemy.

The main task of air defense in defense is to prevent the enemy from attacking from the air the strike groups of the division and corps, the main group of artillery and the most important gorges and crossings, if they exist in the location of the defensive zone.

Air defense is carried out:

a) parts of the restraining groups of the defensive zone - by their own means;

b) strike groups of a regiment, division, corps reserve and main artillery grouping - by means of units and anti-aircraft artillery assets of the division and corps. Air surveillance and communications patrols (VNOS) are set up in such a way as to ensure all-round surveillance.

VNOS patrols are deployed: in troops (detachments) covering barriers, in combat outposts, in each battalion, at the headquarters of regiments, divisions and corps, and in all special units.

385. Defense reconnaissance must determine the strength, composition of the main group and the direction of the enemy’s main attack.

While still approaching, aerial and ground reconnaissance must detect enemy columns and, constantly monitoring them, establish an area for their concentration and deployment.

During the period of enemy concentration, the main attention of all types of reconnaissance should be paid to detecting a group of artillery and tanks.

In the future, reconnaissance clarifies the area of artillery firing positions, waiting positions of tanks, positions of chemical units (mortars), the main grouping of infantry, as well as the location or approach of mechanized and mounted units.

In view of the fact that the enemy will strive to concentrate, deploy and take the initial position for an offensive (attack) at night, night reconnaissance is of particular importance.

24-hour commander observation in all branches of the military, organized by the combined arms headquarters, should play a major role in obtaining information about the enemy.

386. Control in a defensive battle should be based on a widely developed network of command posts. In addition to the main one, each unit and formation must have one or two reserve command posts.

Technical communication in defense is established:

a) from the depths (in directions) - from the main command post of the senior commander to the main command post of the subordinate commander through the western command posts of the latter;

b) along the front (between neighbors) - from right to left through the main and reserve command posts.

General and private communications reserves are located at main and reserve command posts.

Wire communications in defense are established, if possible, bypassing tank-dangerous directions, directions of counterattacks of friendly troops and, in any case, outside areas of anti-tank and anti-personnel obstacles. Wire communication lines are laid if there is time (and in tank-hazardous directions it is necessary) in ditches 10–15 cm deep.

The secrecy of communications, especially before the start of an enemy attack, takes on particular importance in defensive combat. All negotiations must be conducted with the mandatory use of negotiation tables, codes, radio signals, etc.

With the withdrawal of the military outpost and before the start of the enemy attack, even coded telephone conversations should be limited.

Radio transmission work is used with the beginning of an enemy attack and when fighting in the depths of the defensive zone to deny the use of wire weapons.

Without limitation, radio communication is used:

a) in reconnaissance units;

b) for air defense and VNOS service.

Within artillery for fire control and with aviation at airfields, radio communication is used only when wire communications fail.

Communication between infantry, tanks, artillery and aviation during a battle is carried out as during an offensive.

Communication between artillery and units of the pinning and strike groups is established in advance through the forward OP and means of the divisions' special forces. Calling for artillery fire, as provided for in the defense plan, according to pre-established infantry signals - rockets and radio signals.

387. The order of work of the command and staff in organizing defense depends on the time that the troops have for this purpose.

If there is enough time, the senior commander, having solved the problem on the map and given preliminary orders to the troops, together with the headquarters commanders, chiefs of military branches and commanders of subordinate units, carries out personal reconnaissance of the main defense line, paying special attention to its most important sections.

During reconnaissance, the senior commander clarifies his preliminary decision and personally assigns tasks on the ground to subordinate commanders of units (formations), establishes the basis for interaction between the military branches, and gives instructions on the construction of main defensive structures and the construction of barriers.

If there is a lack of time, division and unit commanders, in any case, must reconnoiter the most important directions (areas) and establish in place: the front line, the area (area) of defense of the pinning group, the area where the strike group is located and the most important tank-accessible areas.

In both cases, tasks for subordinate units must be assigned in such a way that the troops, having entered the defense areas (sectors) without delay, can immediately begin defensive work and organize interaction.

388. When organizing the defense, the senior commander announces the plan of his decision, sets tasks for the troops and indicates:

Rifle Corps Commander:

a) defensive zones of divisions;

b) the period by which the defensive zone must be occupied and the period for defense readiness;

c) general outline of the leading edge;

d) what units of corps artillery are assigned to divisions as DD groups if a corps DD group is not created; tasks for DD groups and, if necessary, artillery of PP divisions in the interests of the corps;

e) tasks of supporting aviation;

f) whether and where a strip of engineering-chemical barriers is created, by what forces and means, the period of its readiness and the duration of the fight on it;

g) the line of the second defensive line, its most important sections, where support areas should be created first, who is appointed as the head of engineering work, time, forces and means for the construction of the second defensive line;

h) your reserve, its composition, tasks and location;

i) combat support activities;

j) your CP.

Division commander:

a) areas for regiments, the composition of artillery groups of PP and other reinforcements;

b) outline of the leading edge;

c) the line of combat guards and where to have reinforced combat guards;

d) locations of barriers, if barriers are created, units allocated to cover them, and methods of supporting the latter;

e) the composition, tasks, location of the strike group and the line it adapts to defense;

f) the tasks of the artillery to prepare the DON and LEO sections in the most important directions, to support counterattacks of the strike group; tasks of the strike group's PP for the period of battle in front of the front line, positional areas of the division's artillery;

g) main anti-tank areas;

h) tank-dangerous directions and, accordingly, the tasks and grouping of anti-tank artillery, its own anti-tank reserve (if its formation is possible);

i) the procedure for the engineering equipment of the strip and the location of anti-tank obstacles, the period of defense readiness;

j) combat support activities;

k) your CP.

Regimental commander:

a) battalion areas of the holding group and means of strengthening them;

b) an exact outline of the front line of defense and combat outpost positions;

c) tasks, strength and composition of combat security units;

d) tank-dangerous directions, lines of anti-tank obstacles and places of additional anti-tank areas;

e) the area where the strike group is located, the probable directions of its counterattacks, local objects and points that it adapts to defense, and fire missions within the defensive zone;

f) organizing anti-tank artillery fire in front of the front edge of the defensive line and in depth;

g) the tasks of the artillery group of the PP to support the battalions of the pinning and shock groups, combat outposts and areas of stationary barrage artillery fire on the terrain;

h) organization of engineering strengthening of the defense sector, specifying where and what work will be carried out with the help of the division and regiment, and the deadlines for readiness;

i) what first-stage work should be carried out in the area of the regiment’s strike group and how many people should be assigned to work in the battalions of the holding group from the strike group;

j) the procedure for transporting or bringing necessary materials to the site of engineering work;

k) measures in case of prolonged chemical attack;

l) measures for other types of combat support;

m) your CP.

Battalion commander of the holding group:

a) on the dispatch of military guards and on the organization of observation;

b) tasks and areas of defense for rifle companies of the first and second echelons;

c) on the organization of an anti-personnel and anti-tank fire system by assigning fire missions to rifle companies of the first and second echelons (fire lanes), a machine gun company (long-range and direct fire), dagger machine guns, mortars and anti-tank artillery;

d) tasks of supporting artillery;

e) on the volume and timing of completion of work on area engineering equipment;

f) on measures in case of a prolonged chemical attack by the enemy;

g) your CP.

The infantry and its fire weapons should be dispersed forward and in depth. The most effective infantry fire is crossfire from the forward edge, reinforced by fire from the second echelons of infantry.

To cut off enemy infantry from his tanks, it is necessary to have camouflaged dagger mounted machine guns both in front of the front edge and in the depths.

Infantry defending against tanks must be confident that the tank poses little threat to them as long as they are hidden in the trenches. On the other hand, infantry is capable of successfully fighting tanks with its own means (grenade and other means). But she must always remember that her main enemy is the enemy infantry advancing behind the tanks. Therefore, the infantry, repelling an enemy attack, must distribute its forces and means in such a way that, while defeating tanks, the bulk of its firepower is directed at the attacking infantry.

Infantry must be aware that the tank has limited observation and encounters great difficulty in maintaining contact with its infantry. This should be used for the main task of the defending infantry: to separate the advancing enemy infantry from the tanks and engage them with fire.

All commanders are obliged to organize controlled fire in defense so that, starting from long distances, it increases as the enemy approaches the front line and reaches its highest intensity at the decisive distance of up to 400 m. Every point of the terrain within a strip of up to 400 m from the front edge should be under destructive fire - flank, oblique and frontal. At the junctions the fire should be especially powerful.

At the same time, it must be remembered that infantry fire will be especially effective if it comes as a surprise to the enemy. Therefore, sometimes it will be advantageous to let the enemy get within close range and inflict heavy losses on him with sudden, destructive fire.

a) carries out long-range fire attacks on enemy columns as they approach the defensive line;

b) maintains military outposts;

c) disrupts the orderly deployment of enemy troops and their occupation of the starting position for the offensive;

d) by decision of the senior commander, carries out counter-preparation;

e) during the enemy’s offensive, he hits his infantry and tanks on the approaches to the front line of defense, especially in areas inaccessible to fire from infantry weapons;

f) places fire barriers inside the defensive line;

g) supports counterattacks of strike groups;

h) cuts off the enemy’s rushing infantry from his second echelons;

i) suppresses the most damaging enemy batteries;

j) disrupts the control and normal operation of the enemy rear.

Artillery in defense is echeloned in such a way that even the most deeply located batteries hit enemy infantry and tanks with actual fire on the approaches to the front edge of the defensive line.

From the book Zhukov vs. Halder [Clash of Military Geniuses] author Runov Valentin Alexandrovich

State of the Red Army by the beginning of 1941 Rearmament of the Red Army. By the end of the 30s of the twentieth century, the Soviet Union had a huge economic base of its own, independent of the economies of other countries. There was a constant increase in industrial production. If in a country in

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Chapter 4 The Suomussalmi Factor (December 26, 1939 - January 7, 1940) The first phase of the Russian-Finnish war had already ended with the repulsion of all Russian attacks between the Arctic Ocean and Lake Ladoga. Thus, Finland is temporarily free from disturbances in the north, and the Russians,

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Alternative Supreme Command of the Red Army and the Red Army from 1939 to 1945: People's Commissar of Defense - Hieronymus Petrovich Uborevich. In real history in 1930 - acting. People's Commissar for the duration of a long vacation K.E. Voroshilov. Previously served as army commander since 1919 at various

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Reports of the People's Commissar of Defense on the state of affairs in the Red Army in 1939 These documents should not be read, but studied. Study, laying out a bunch of reference books around you, armed with a pencil, paper, maps. And even so, these reports themselves to a person not very knowledgeable in

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THE CHARTER OF 1874 AND ITS PREDECESSORS In the last period of the existence of serfdom, all classes of society that were somewhat elevated above the level of the masses were exempted from compulsory military service. This exemption extended to nobles, merchants,

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CHANGES MADE TO THE CHARTER OF 1874 The Charter of 1874, like the Recruitment Charter of 1831, protected the family of the father or, in his absence, the family of the grandfather, but not the family of the conscript himself. This is explained by the following reasons. Now after the liberation of the peasants from serfdom

to Favorites to Favorites from Favorites 10

The strategic plans of the command are expressed in orders from headquarters and the general staff, illustrated for clarity with large-scale maps with beautiful arrows and lines. The same maps with the real position of the troops after the operation are already the result. Between these extreme points of life of soldiers and officers is the mechanism that forced them to make certain decisions in fulfillment of the Plan. A single algorithm that sets regiments, divisions and corps in motion - the Field Manual. It is this that military leaders at this level must be guided by. Chiefs of lower levels are guided by the Battle Regulations.

Field Manual of the Red Army (PU-39) - State Military Publishing House of the People's Commissariat of Defense of the USSR, Moscow, 1939 - is the fundamental document of the Red Army. It was developed to replace the outdated Field Manual of 1936 (PU-36).

With him, the Red Army took the first blow on the border on June 22, 1941. With him she retreated to Moscow and the Volga. I won with him.

It is this document that shows how the military leadership of the USSR imagined modern war directly on the battlefield and what it was preparing for.

1939

Field regulations of the Workers 'and Peasants' Red Army (PU-39, 1939)

Ship's Charter of the Workers' and Peasants' Navy of the USSR (1939)

1940

The combat regulations of the bomber aviation of the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army, (BUBA-40, 1940, put into effect by order of the People's Commissar of Defense of 1938 No. 24)

Combat regulations for fighter aircraft of the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army, (BUIA-40, put into effect by order of the People's Commissar of Defense of 1938 No. 25)

Battle regulations of the tank forces of the Workers 'and Peasants' Red Army, part II (1940)

Disciplinary Charter of the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army (put into effect by order of the People's Commissar of Defense of October 12, 1940 No. 356)

1942

Combat regulations of the infantry of the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army (part 1). Soldier, squad, platoon, company) (1942, approved and put into effect by Order of the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR No. 347 of November 9, 1942)

Combat regulations of the infantry of the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army (part 2). Battalion, regiment) (1942, approved and put into effect by Order of the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR No. 347 of 11/9/42)

1944

Combat regulations of the armored and mechanized troops of the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army (Part 1). Tank, tank platoon, tank company (1944) (introduced by Order of the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR dated February 13, 1944 No. 10)

Combat regulations of the armored and mechanized troops of the Workers 'and Peasants' Red Army (Part 2) (1944) (introduced by Order of the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR dated February 13, 1944 No. 11)

Combat regulations of the anti-aircraft artillery of the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army (Part 1, Book 1) (1944) (introduced by Order of the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR dated May 29, 1944 No. 76)

Combat regulations of the anti-aircraft artillery of the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army (Part 1, Book 2) (1944) (introduced by Order of the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR dated May 29, 1944 No. 77)

Battle regulations of the artillery of the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army (Part 1, Book 1) (1944) (introduced by Order of the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR dated October 18, 1944 No. 209)

Battle regulations of the cavalry of the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army (Part 1) (1944).

Field Manual of the Red Army (PU-39).

Chapter first. General Basics

Chapter two. Organization of the Red Army troops

Types of troops and their combat use

Military units

Controls

Chapter three. Political work in combat situations

Chapter Four. Troop control

Management Basics

Management organization

Issuance of orders and operational documents

Chapter five. Basics of battle formations

Chapter six. Combat support for troop actions

Intelligence

Security

Air defense of troops (air defense)

Anti-chemical defense of troops (ACD)

Anti-tank defense of troops (ATD)

Chapter seven. Material support for the combat activities of troops

Logistics organization

Supply service

Sanitary service

Staffing

Evacuation of prisoners of war

Veterinary service

Rear work on the march and in oncoming battles

Rear work in the offensive

Rear work in defense

Chapter eight. Offensive battle

Basics of offensive combat

Approach to the enemy's defensive zone and its reconnaissance

Organization of the offensive

Interaction between military branches on the offensive

Leading the offensive

Advance against heavily fortified positions

Advance at night

Offensive crossing the water line

The pursuit

Chapter Nine. Meeting engagement

Counter Combat Basics

Features of the march in anticipation of an oncoming battle

Starting a counter battle in columns

Actions of the main forces

Control in oncoming combat

Chapter ten. Defense

Basics of Defense

Defense on a normal front

Conducting a defensive battle

Features of defensive combat at night

Defense of fortified areas

River defense

Defense on a broad front

Mobile defense

Exit from battle and withdrawal

Chapter Eleven. Winter activities

Chapter twelve. Actions in special conditions

Actions in the mountains

Actions in the forests

Actions in the desert steppes

Fights for populated areas

Chapter thirteen. Joint actions of troops with river flotillas

Chapter fourteen. Joint actions of troops with the navy

Chapter fifteen. Troop movements

Marching movement (march)

Marching guard

Trucking

Chapter sixteen. Rest and its protection

Holiday location

Sentry security.

CHAPTER FIRST

GENERAL BASICS

1. The Workers' and Peasants' Red Army is the armed force of the workers and peasants of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. It is called upon to protect and defend our Motherland, the world's first socialist state of working people.

The Red Army is a stronghold of peace. She is brought up in the spirit of love and devotion to her Motherland, the party of Lenin - Stalin and the Soviet government, in the spirit of international solidarity with the working people of the whole world. Due to historical conditions, the Red Army exists as an invincible, all-destructive force. This is how she is, this is how she will always be.

2. The defense of our Motherland is an active defense.

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics will respond to any enemy attack with a crushing blow with the full might of its armed forces.

Our war against the attacking enemy will be the most just of all wars known in the history of mankind.

If the enemy forces war on us, the Workers 'and Peasants' Red Army will be the most attacking army ever.

We will wage the war offensively, with the most decisive goal of completely defeating the enemy on his own territory.

The fighting of the Red Army will be carried out for destruction. The main goal of the Red Army will be to achieve a decisive victory and complete destruction of the enemy.

3. The great power and indestructible strength of the Workers 'and Peasants' Red Army lies in its selfless devotion to the great cause of Lenin - Stalin, the Motherland and the Bolshevik Party; in moral and political unity with the people and close connection with them; in high revolutionary military discipline; in the courage, determination, bravery and heroism of its entire personnel; in constant combat readiness; in excellent combat training and in rich equipment with the most modern and most advanced weapons; in the sympathy and support that she will find among the working masses of the attacked countries and the whole world.

4. The tasks of the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army are international; they have international, world-historical significance.

The Red Army will enter the territory of the attacking enemy as a liberator of the oppressed and enslaved.

5. All personnel of the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army must be brought up in the spirit of irreconcilable hatred of the enemy and an unyielding will to destroy him. Until the enemy lays down his arms and surrenders, he will be mercilessly destroyed. However, the Red Army personnel are generous towards the captured enemy and provide him with all possible assistance, saving his life. Formidable in battle, our army is a friend and protector of the working masses of the attacked country, protecting their lives, homes and property.

Being the most cultural army in the world, the Red Army spares and protects all cultural values and avoids unnecessary destruction where this is not caused by battle conditions.

6. The most valuable thing in the Red Army is the new man of the Stalin era. He plays a decisive role in battle. Without him, all technical means of struggle are dead; in his hands they become formidable weapons.

All personnel of the Red Army are brought up in the Bolshevik spirit of activity, bold initiative, unshakable impulse, indestructible perseverance and constant desire to defeat the enemy.

The entire composition of the Red Army must persistently cultivate an iron will and a steely character. He must be ready for selfless dedication and exceptional exertion of all his physical and moral forces in the 6th.

A fighter must be a conscious performer of his combat mission and must understand it. Familiarizing the fighters with the mission and analyzing their actions after the end of the battle are therefore the most important responsibilities of all commanders and military commissars.

7. Caring for the human fighter and all his subordinates is the primary responsibility and direct duty of commanders, military commissars and political workers.

The chief - leader, senior comrade and friend - experiences with the troops all the hardships and difficulties of combat life. Maintaining the strictest discipline, he must know his subordinates very well, have constant personal communication with them, show special attention to their needs and be an example in everything.

He must especially highlight and encourage the exploits of his subordinates, cultivating in them readiness for heroic actions.

In battle, all commanders must be guided by one goal - to destroy the enemy; To achieve this goal, they are obliged to demand full effort from their subordinates. But the more care they are obliged to take about them. Uninterrupted food, provision of rest according to the situation, constant care for the wounded so that not a single one of them is left on the battlefield - all this is the most important condition for maintaining the combat effectiveness of the troops.

Only this will ensure the commander and commissar the political stability and combat cohesion of the unit, and therefore its success in battle.

8. High revolutionary vigilance, strict preservation of military secrets and an irreconcilable fight against spies and saboteurs should be the constant concern of the Red Army personnel.

On vacation, on a campaign, in battle, in any position and in any situation - everywhere and always to keep military secrets and to observe everything vigilantly - such is the duty of a revolutionary soldier of the Red Army, sold and loyal to his Motherland. Neither danger nor the threat of death can stop him from his duty to fulfill his oath and stop the enemy’s criminal business.

9. The Red Army is armed with numerous and advanced equipment. Its combat weapons are constantly multiplying and developing.

The more complex and numerous the equipment, the more difficult it is to use and the more trained personnel must be.

Only in experienced hands do combatants become formidable weapons. Therefore, constant study of them, the ability to master them perfectly and their careful preservation as in peacetime. so in battle they are the main responsibility of fighters, commanders and commissars.

The more skillful the use of a weapon, the more it can give in battle.

The use of new weapons should also be studied in battle, seeking the most effective ways of using them to achieve victory.

10. Constant readiness to engage in battle with the enemy should be the basis of the preparation of the Red Army. Combat is the only means to achieve victory.

The battle achieves:

Destruction of enemy manpower and materiel;

Suppression of his moral strength and ability to resist.

Every battle - offensive and defensive - has the goal of defeating the enemy. But only a decisive offensive in the main direction, completed by encirclement and relentless pursuit, leads to the complete destruction of the enemy’s forces and means.

Offensive combat is the main type of action of the Red Army. The enemy must be boldly and swiftly attacked wherever he is found.

11. You cannot be equally strong everywhere. Victory is achieved by decisive superiority over the enemy in the main direction. Therefore, the overwhelming majority of forces and means in an offensive battle must be used in the direction of the main attack.

The constant desire to achieve superiority over the enemy at a decisive point through secretive regrouping, speed and surprise of actions, as well as the use of night and terrain, is the most important condition for success.

In secondary directions, forces are needed only to pin down the enemy.

12. The concentration of superior forces and means alone is not enough to achieve quinoa.

Modern combat is conducted by different types of troops and requires careful organization of their joint actions.

It is necessary to achieve interaction between the types of troops fighting in one direction and coordination of the actions of units in different directions in order to achieve the defeat of the enemy with a united blow.

13. The interaction of military branches is the main condition for success in battle and must ensure the complete defeat of the enemy’s battle formation to the full depth. Modern technical means of combat provide this opportunity.

The range and destructive power of fire from the ground and air have increased; conditions have been created for a deep penetration into the depths of the enemy’s battle formation; the possibility of quickly exposing the enemy’s flanks and suddenly bypassing them with the aim of attacking in the rear has increased.

In the interaction of all types of troops, an offensive battle should lead to the encirclement and complete destruction of the enemy.

The interaction of all types of troops is organized in the interests of the infantry, which plays the main role in battle.

14. Defense will be needed whenever defeating the enemy by attack in a given situation is impossible or impractical.

The defense must be indestructible and insurmountable for the enemy, no matter how strong he may be in a given direction. It must consist of stubborn resistance, exhausting the physical and moral strength of the enemy, and a decisive counterattack, inflicting complete defeat on him. Thus, the defense must achieve victory with small forces over a numerically superior enemy.

15. Showing initiative is one of the most important conditions for successful actions in battle.

The willingness to take responsibility for a bold decision and persistently carry it through to the end is the basis of the actions of all commanders in battle.

The initiative of subordinates should be fully encouraged and used to achieve common success. The manifestation of initiative should not run counter to the general plan of the superior and should contribute to better performance of the task.

A reasonable initiative was based on an understanding of the task and position of its unit (part) as a whole and its neighbors. It consists of: the desire to find the best ways to complete the task in the current situation; in taking advantage of all suddenly emerging favorable opportunities and in immediately taking measures against the emerging threat.

Bold and reasonable daring must in all cases guide the superior and subordinates when entering into battle and during its conduct.

What deserves reproach is not the one who, in an effort to destroy the enemy, did not achieve his goal, but the one who, fearing responsibility, remained inactive and did not use all the forces and means at the right time to achieve victory.

16. All actions of troops must be carried out with the greatest secrecy and speed.

Suddenness has a stunning effect. It is achieved by speed and secrecy of actions, rapid maneuver, skillful use of terrain and reliable air cover.

Troops that can quickly carry out orders, quickly regroup in a changed situation, quickly rise from rest, quickly make marching movements, quickly deploy into battle formation and open fire, quickly advance and pursue the enemy - can always count on success.

Surprise is also achieved by the unexpected use of new forms and methods of combat and new technical means of combat by the enemy.

The enemy will also use surprise. Units of the Red Army must never be taken by surprise and must respond with a decisive blow to any surprise on the part of the enemy.

Therefore, high vigilance and constant combat readiness are a must.

17. The variety of modern technical means of combat and the complexity of their interaction place extremely high demands on combat management.

The clarity and precision of the assigned task most of all ensures the coordination of actions of subordinate units and the interaction of military branches. The decision made must be firmly and with the greatest energy carried out. During a battle, unforeseen circumstances and unexpected difficulties usually arise. The commander must quickly perceive all new data from the situation and immediately take appropriate measures. Management must be continuous. The commander is obliged to keep control of the battle firmly in his hands. He must take measures to ensure that all his subordinates understand their maneuver and know what their superiors require of them and where the enemy is.

18. Successful battle management requires constant combat support for troops. Vigilant guarding and continuous reconnaissance protect troops from surprise attacks by enemy ground and air and provide them with constant awareness of the location, grouping and intentions of the enemy.

The increased speed of movement, the range of modern means of combat and the possibility of their sudden impact make the combat support service especially important and require unconditional continuity of its performance in all cases of combat activity and the life of troops.

19. The battle is largely a fire competition between the fighting parties.

Modern fire has reached enormous power and long range. The approach to the battlefield, deployment and all actions in battle must always be covered by powerful fire.

The actions of the Red Army must be based on an understanding of the power of modern fire, on its skillful application and on the ability to overcome enemy fire.

Underestimating the destructive properties of fire and the inability to fight it will lead to unnecessary losses.

Therefore, suppressing enemy fire is one of the most important tasks in battle.

However, solving this problem is only a means to defeat the enemy.

20. The saturation of troops with artillery and automatic weapons causes a high consumption of ammunition. Careful handling of each shell and each cartridge and their skillful use in battle should be an immutable rule for all commanders and soldiers of the Red Army.

It is necessary to educate every commander and soldier in the firm consciousness that only well-aimed, organized, disciplined fire will defeat the enemy. Indiscriminate fire, causing wasteful consumption of ammunition, is only an indicator of inept combat and lack of confidence in one’s strength.

High fire training of all branches and troops is therefore the main guarantee of quickly crushing the enemy in battle.

21. Every battle must be provided with food and the necessary material resources. The best combat decision may prove unsuccessful if the material conditions for its implementation are not prepared. The organization of material support for battle is therefore the most important responsibility of commanders, military commissars and headquarters in battle.

Modern means of warfare place the rear and material bases for combat supply of troops under the constant threat of influence from the enemy. Continuous concern for the organization of the rear, its self-defense and defense is an indispensable condition for achieving victory over the enemy.

The rear and supply must fully provide combat nutrition for troops in any situation.

22. The variety of combat conditions has no limit.

In war, no two cases are the same. Each case is special in war and requires a special solution. Therefore, in battle it is always necessary to act strictly in accordance with the situation.

The Red Army may face different opponents, with different tactics and different theaters of war. All these conditions will require special methods of combat. The Red Army must be equally ready for rapid action in maneuverable clashes and for breaking through a fortified front when the enemy switches to positional combat.

23. At different stages of the development of the war, methods of warfare will not remain the same. As the war progresses, the conditions of the struggle will change. New means of struggle will appear. Therefore, the methods of fighting will also change.

Tactics must be changed and new methods of combat must be found if the changed situation requires it.

In any conditions and in all cases, powerful blows of the Red Army must lead to the complete destruction of the enemy and the rapid achievement of a decisive victory with little bloodshed.

CHAPTER TWO

ORGANIZATION OF THE RED ARMY TROOPS

1. Types of troops and their combat use

24. The Red Army consists of various branches of the military. No one branch of the military replaces another. Only through joint use and united efforts can all branches of the military ensure the achievement of victory.

In a joint battle, all types of troops must act in close connection. Some of them can perform independent tasks. However, in all cases their efforts must, together with other branches of the military, lead to the achievement of a common goal.

The use of each type of military force must be based on the use of all its capabilities, taking into account its strengths and special properties.

The capabilities and technical stress limits of each type of weapon should be strictly taken into account.

25. Infantry is the main branch of the military. With their decisive advance in the offensive and stubborn resistance in defense, the infantry, in close cooperation with artillery, tanks and aviation, decides the outcome of the battle. The infantry bears the brunt of the battle.

Therefore, the purpose of the remaining branches of the military participating in joint combat with the infantry is to act in its interests, ensuring its advance in the offensive and stability in defense.

The actions of the infantry must be supported by the full power of firepower, its own and other branches of the troops, and must be reliably covered from the air.

The combination of movement and impact of manpower with powerful fire from all fire weapons is the basis of infantry actions in battle.

26. Artillery has the greatest power and range of fire of all ground forces.

Falling with its destructive fire on the entire depth of the battle formation, artillery suppresses and destroys the enemy's manpower, artillery and fire weapons, his reserves, command and control units and combat rear. It hits aircraft and, together with tanks, is the main means of destroying enemy tanks.

Artillery is the only reliable and powerful means of destroying long-term fortifications and defensive positions.

No troop actions on the battlefield are possible without the support of artillery and are unacceptable without it. Artillery, suppressing and destroying the enemy, clears the way for all ground combat arms - in the offensive and blocks the enemy's path - in the defense. The most decisive and rapid results in battle are ensured by massive, sudden and flexibly controlled artillery fire.

According to its purpose, caliber, range and power of fire, artillery is divided into: infantry, light, heavy, high power and special - anti-aircraft and coastal.

27. Tanks have high mobility, powerful fire and great impact power. They are protected from enemy infantry fire.

The use of tanks should be massive.

The main task of tanks is to directly support the infantry and pave the way for them during the offensive. With the successful development of an offensive and in mobile combat, tanks can be used for a deeper strike on the enemy’s battle formation in order to destroy his artillery, reserves and headquarters. In this case, they can play a decisive role in encircling and destroying the enemy. Tanks are a valid means of fighting against enemy tanks. In defense, tanks are a powerful counterattack weapon.

The main type of action of tanks is a tank attack. A tank attack must in all cases be supported by organized artillery fire.

Tanks can be used not only in joint operations with infantry, but also to solve independent tasks in large numbers together with motorized artillery, motorized infantry and aviation.

Types of tanks vary depending on their weight, armor, armament, maneuverability, speed and range.

The Red Army is armed with tanks: small, light, medium and heavy.

Using all the capabilities of tanks, it is necessary to take into account their properties, the limits of technical stress of the material part, the physical condition of the crews and the conditions for powering and restoring the vehicles.

28. Cavalry has high mobility, powerful fire and great striking force. She is capable of independently conducting all types of combat. It should not, however, be used against fortified enemy positions.

Cavalry, together with tanks and aviation, is used in cooperation with other branches of the military and to solve independent tasks in operational communication with them.

Quick maneuver, powerful fire and rapid attack are the basis of cavalry actions in battle. An attack on horseback must be undertaken whenever the enemy is not ready for organized fire resistance and when his fire system is disrupted. In all cases, attacks by mounted units must be supported by powerful artillery and machine gun fire, as well as by tanks and aircraft. However, the force of modern fire will often require cavalry to fight on foot. The cavalry must therefore be ready to conduct infantry combat.

The biggest threat to cavalry is enemy aircraft.

29. Aviation has powerful weapons, high flight speed and a long range. It is a powerful means of destroying enemy manpower and equipment, destroying enemy aircraft and destroying important facilities.

Aviation operates in close operational-tactical connection with ground forces, carries out independent air operations against deep targets in the enemy country and fights its aviation, ensuring air supremacy.

The primary mission of air power is to contribute to the success of ground forces in combat and operations.

Assisting troops and protecting them from enemy air attacks, aviation strikes and destroys: enemy combat formations and fire weapons on the battlefield; reserves, headquarters, transport and warehouses - in the rear; enemy aviation - in air combat and at airfields.

Aviation is the main means of operational and tactical reconnaissance. It also monitors the battlefield and serves as a means of communication.

In addition, aviation can be used to transport troops and combat equipment over long distances.

30. Based on their purpose, armament and flight performance, aviation is divided into various types.

Fighter aviation has the main purpose: the destruction of all types of enemy aircraft, combat in the air and at its airfields; air protection of one’s “troops and important facilities in the rear; ensuring the combat operations of its aviation and its airfields and, in special cases, defeating enemy personnel on the battlefield and in its rear, as well as performing reconnaissance in the interests of the combined arms and aviation command.

Long-range bomber aviation has the main purpose: the destruction of enemy aircraft at its airfields, the destruction of large targets of military-industrial significance, naval and air bases and other important objects deep behind enemy lines; destruction of the linear forces of the fleet on the high seas and at bases; cessation and disruption of rail, sea and road transport.

In special cases, long-range bomber aircraft may be called upon to engage enemy forces in the area of the battlefield and on the battlefield.

Short-range bomber aviation has its main purpose: direct tactical and operational interaction with ground forces on the battlefield and in the operational rear of the enemy.

Its goals are: enemy battle formations on the battlefield; troops on the march, during transportation and in areas of concentration; headquarters and command and control facilities; enemy sea and river forces; enemy aircraft at airfields and bases; enemy rear areas, supply stations and bases; railway junctions, stations and technical structures.

In some cases, short-range bomber aircraft may be involved in independent actions to destroy important enemy targets in the enemy's rear.

Attack aircraft have the main purpose of destroying enemy manpower, aircraft and materiel on the battlefield and in the rear.

Operating depending on the situation from low, medium and high altitudes, attack aircraft strike: enemy troops on the battlefield, in concentration areas, on the march, during transportation by rail and by road; aviation at its airfields; headquarters and command and control facilities, transport and military warehouses; railways and bridges.

Reconnaissance aircraft are intended to conduct aerial reconnaissance in the operational depths and deep behind enemy lines.

Military aviation performs reconnaissance, surveillance, artillery fire and communications missions and is used in special cases to carry out combat missions in the interests of its military formation.

Each type of aviation must be used in accordance with its purpose.

However, during decisive periods of the struggle, all types of aviation must concentrate their efforts on the battlefield to destroy enemy manpower and combat assets in the main direction.

Ground troops must be ready to carry out combat missions without the direct assistance of aviation, if its concentration in other areas or poor weather conditions do not allow the use of aviation in this direction.

31. Parachute units, as a new type of air infantry, are a means of disrupting the enemy’s control and rear. They are used by high command.

In cooperation with troops advancing from the front, air infantry helps to encircle and defeat the enemy in a given direction.

The use of air infantry must be strictly consistent with the conditions of the situation and requires reliable support and compliance with measures of secrecy and surprise.

32. Special troops: anti-aircraft, engineering, chemical, communications, automobile, transport, railway and others - are intended to support the combat activities and life of troops in their specialty.

The variety and complexity of means of combat make modern combat impossible without the constant active assistance of special troops.

The use of all the maneuverability of troops is possible only with the clear and proactive work of special troops, and first of all, engineering, communications and transport (road and railway).

Therefore, special troops perform an extremely important and responsible task in the army.

33. Fortified areas, being a system of long-term fortifications, provide long-term resistance in them for special garrisons and combined arms formations.

By pinning down the enemy along their entire front, they create the possibility of concentrating large forces and means to inflict crushing blows on the enemy in other directions.

Troops fighting in fortified areas require special tenacity, endurance and endurance.

34. On the sea coast and along large river lines, the navy and military river flotillas can operate together with ground forces.

The Navy consists of: ships of various classes operating as part of maneuverable formations; naval aviation; coastal defense systems. Along with independent operations, the fleet assists ground forces fighting on the sea coast by defeating the enemy with artillery fire, landing troops in his rear, and securing the flank of its troops against the sea.

Ground forces interacting with the navy must be prepared for amphibious and anti-amphibious operations.

Military river flotillas, consisting of various classes of ships and aircraft, are used, in addition to performing independent tasks, in close connection with ground forces.

With their maneuver and fire, they support the troops on the rivers flowing in the direction of their operations, and participate in their struggle for river boundaries, water barriers and crossings.

2. Military units

35. The Red Army troops form formations and units that differ in their composition, weapons, tactical use and operational purpose. The troops are:

a) formations - rifle, cavalry, tank and aviation;

b) separate units - the Reserve of the High Command (RGK) and special branches of the military.

36. Rifle formations are rifle divisions and rifle corps.

A rifle division is the main combined arms tactical formation.

It consists of units of different types of troops, has a permanent composition and is capable of independently conducting all types of combat.

The main component of a rifle division is the infantry.

As a rule, an infantry division is indivisible. However, to carry out individual tactical tasks, temporary detachments may be allocated from the rifle division, consisting of units and subunits of different types of troops (advanced detachments, vanguards, rearguards, etc.).

Several rifle divisions (from 2 to 4) make up a rifle corps.

The rifle corps has its own standard means of reinforcement and is the highest tactical formation, capable of operating independently for a long time.

Rifle formations, depending on the task being performed, are supported by aviation and reinforced by units of the High Command Reserve - artillery, tank, chemical, engineering and others.

37. Cavalry formations consist of cavalry divisions and cavalry corps.

The cavalry division is the main tactical cavalry unit.

It consists of cavalry units and other types of troops and has a permanent composition. Several cavalry divisions (from 2 to 4) make up a cavalry corps.

The cavalry corps is the highest cavalry formation and can perform independent operational tasks in cooperation with other branches of the military and in isolation from them.

Depending on the task performed, the cavalry corps can be reinforced by other branches of the military and, in particular, by tank formations and aviation.

Cavalry formations capable of quick maneuver and decisive strike must be used to carry out active missions to defeat the enemy.

It is most advisable to use cavalry formations together with tank formations, motorized infantry and aviation - ahead of the front (in the absence of contact with the enemy), on the advancing flank, in developing a breakthrough, behind enemy lines, in raids and pursuit.

Cavalry formations are able to consolidate their success and hold the terrain. However, at the first opportunity they should be relieved of this task in order to preserve them for maneuver.

The actions of a cavalry unit must in all cases be reliably covered from the air.

38. Tank formations consist of tank units, motorized artillery, motorized infantry and other special branches of troops.

The main tactical tank formation is the tank brigade.

Several tank brigades can form a tank group, which is the highest tank formation.

Tank formations are a powerful maneuverable means of striking. They must be used to decisively defeat the enemy in the main direction and can carry out tactical tasks in direct interaction with other branches of the military and independent operational tasks in isolation from them. Tank formations are not adapted to independently hold conquered terrain, and therefore, when operating in isolation from other branches of the military, they must be supported by motorized infantry or cavalry. It is most advisable to use tank formations together with cavalry, motorized infantry and aviation - ahead of the front (in the absence of contact with the enemy), on the approaching flank, in developing a breakthrough and in pursuit.

39. The Red Army Air Force consists of aviation formations and units of fighter, long-range bomber, short-range bomber and attack aircraft and individual units of reconnaissance and military aviation.

Aviation formations are the highest tactical unit, capable of solving individual tasks in operational-tactical interaction with ground forces and in independent air operations.

Aviation formations consist of several aviation units (from 2 to 4).

The aviation unit of combat aviation, whether part of an air force or operating independently, is the main tactical unit.

Several aviation formations can form an aviation group, which is the highest aviation formation. Aviation formations can be mixed - from parts of different types of aviation, and homogeneous - from parts of the same type of aviation.

Air units are used, as a rule, centrally in the hands of the high command. In special cases, air units may be temporarily transferred to the subordination of rifle and cavalry corps and teak groups.

Military aviation remains in all cases within its military formations.

40. Separate units of the High Command Reserve consist of powerful and special means of combat (artillery, tank and others). They are intended for the quantitative and qualitative reinforcement of troops operating in the main directions, and are assigned to them depending on the importance of the tasks being performed.

Special troops consist of separate units - engineering, chemical, communications, anti-aircraft, automobile, transport, railway, sanitary and others. They are assigned to military units as needed to ensure the accomplishment of combat missions or are used independently.

41. To conduct joint combat operations, military formations of various branches and the RGC units and special units attached to them form armies that conduct operations in individual operational directions.

Several armies and large air formations can be united in a theater of operations under the control of a front-line command to accomplish a common strategic mission.

Chapter 14 Table of contents

PART 1
(TANK, TANK PLATOON, TANK COMPANY)

ORDER
PEOPLE'S COMMISSIONER FOR DEFENSE

1. Approve and put into effect this Combat Manual of the armored and mechanized forces of the Red Army of 1944, part 1 (tank, tank platoon, tank company).

2. This Battle Manual must be studied by all officers of the armored and mechanized forces of the Red Army. Officers of other branches of the military must know the basic tactical and technical data of combat vehicles and the provisions of this Charter, ensuring the correct use of tanks and interaction with them of the corresponding branch of troops. NCOs and rank and file of the armored and mechanized forces of the Red Army must study those provisions of the Charter that relate to their duties.

3. When conducting joint actions with armored and mechanized forces, officers of all branches of the Red Army must be guided by this Charter.

4. The instructions of the Charter must be applied strictly in accordance with the situation. Each commander and ordinary soldier is given independence in performing the task assigned to him. He must take the initiative, acting in accordance with the changed situation, without waiting for orders from a senior superior, in the spirit of the requirements of this Charter.

5. The Charter of the Armored Forces of the Red Army, part one (UTV-1-38), - cancel.

People's Commissar of Defense
Marshal of the Soviet Union
I. STALIN

Chapter first

GENERAL PROVISIONS

1. PURPOSE AND COMBAT PROPERTIES OF ARMOR AND MECHANIZED FORCES

1. Armored and mechanized troops are one of the main branches of the military. They have great striking power, as they combine powerful fire with speed of movement and armor protection. The main striking force of armored and mechanized forces are tanks.

2. Armored and mechanized troops can be used in all types of combat. They are a decisive means of attack and a powerful means of counterattack in defense.

Their tasks:

- in an offensive battle- destroy the enemy with a swift and decisive attack, capture the objects of attack and hold them until the approach of your infantry;

- in defensive battle- with powerful and accurate fire from the spot and sudden counterattacks, inflict heavy losses on enemy infantry and tanks, repel enemy attacks and retain the defended terrain.

3. Armored and mechanized troops are intended for joint operations with infantry or cavalry and for performing independent tasks.

4. Tanks, reinforcing the infantry (cavalry) in the main direction, act in close cooperation with it as direct infantry support tanks(cavalry) and have the main task of destroying enemy infantry and tanks and ensuring the forward movement of the combat formations of their advancing infantry (cavalry).

5. When performing independent tasks, armored and mechanized troops are usually used to develop offensive success.

6. Combat properties of armored and mechanized forces:

high operational and tactical mobility, ensuring speed of maneuver, swiftness and attack power, the ability to move off roads and overcome obstacles;
the power of close-range artillery and machine-gun fire on the move, from stops and from behind cover, allowing the destruction of enemy personnel, firing points and tanks located in open areas or in light shelters;
the ability to exert a strong moral influence on the enemy;
invulnerability from enemy rifle and machine gun fire, from shell fragments, mines and aircraft bombs and from single hand grenades; relative invulnerability from fire from anti-tank guns and artillery batteries.

2. TYPES OF MACHINES

7. Depending on their purpose, machines are divided into:

combat;
drill;
transport;
special.

8. Combat are called vehicles designed for combat and carrying weapons.

9. Drillmen are called standard vehicles designed to transport personnel and weapons of motorized troops.

10. Transport are called vehicles designed to transport non-motorized troops and military cargo.

11. Special are called vehicles that have a special purpose: gas tankers, water and oil tankers, camping workshops, etc.

12. Combat vehicles are serviced by crews, combat vehicles, transport and special vehicles - by drivers.

The combat vehicle is commanded by its commander. The commander of a combat vehicle unit is at the same time the commander of his own combat vehicle. The commander of a combat, transport and special vehicle is the senior-ranking person riding in the vehicle. If there are no officers or non-commissioned officers among the passengers, the responsibilities of the vehicle commander are performed by the driver.

13. The commander of the vehicle, along with its driver, is responsible for strict adherence to the rules of operation of the vehicle, as well as for compliance with traffic rules.

14. Combat vehicles include:

tanks - medium, heavy and special;
armored vehicles - light and medium;
self-propelled guns;
armored personnel carriers;
special combat vehicles:

15. Medium tanks. Weight up to 30 tons. Armament - one cannon, from two to four machine guns. Average speed is 15-20 km/h, range is 200-300 km. Designed to destroy manpower and firepower of enemy infantry (cavalry), to combat enemy tanks and to conduct combat and tactical reconnaissance.

16. Heavy tanks. Weight over 30 tons. Armament - one cannon and three or four machine guns. Average speed is 8-15 km/h, range is 150-250 km. They are used when attacking a strongly fortified enemy. They are intended to destroy enemy personnel and firepower, as well as to combat his tanks and artillery.

17. Flamethrower tanks. They are armed, in addition to a cannon and a machine gun, with a flamethrower. Designed to destroy enemy personnel and their firing points in shelters.

18. Light armored vehicles. Weight up to 4 tons. Armament - one or two machine guns. Average speed is 25-30 km/h. Power reserve - 450-600 km.

19. Medium armored vehicles. Weight up to 8 tons. Armament - one cannon, one or two machine guns. Average speed is 20-25 km/h, range is 450-600 km.

20. Light and medium armored vehicles are intended to destroy enemy personnel and firepower and are used for reconnaissance, security, and as a means of transportation for liaison officers in combat.

21. Armored personnel carriers. Weight 3-5 tons. Armament - machine gun, heavy machine gun or anti-tank rifle. Average speed is 20-25 km/h. Power reserve - 120-180 km. They are intended for transporting infantry to the battlefield, performing combat support tasks, conducting combat - supporting dismounted infantry with their fire.

3. TANK POSITIONS

22. In accordance with the plan of use and combat mission, tank forces can be located:

in the area (point) of concentration;
in a wait-and-see position;
in starting positions;
in the collection area (point).

23. Tanks are located in the concentration area (point) before the start of the battle. The concentration area must be outside the influence of enemy artillery fire, have shelter from air and ground surveillance, as well as convenient transportation routes and routes for movement towards the front.

24. The wait-and-see position engages tanks while the battle is being organized, before moving to their original positions. It must be selected in the area of upcoming operations, in a place that ensures the secret location of tanks and prepares them for battle and has hidden approaches towards the front. The removal of the waiting position should provide protection from actual enemy artillery fire (10-15 km).

25. Tanks take their starting position before the attack, being in full combat readiness. The starting position should allow tanks to be placed in battle formations. It must be located in the direction of attack, have hidden approaches from the rear, convenient routes to attack, and shelter from air and ground surveillance. If there is time, tank trenches are opened at the initial positions even before tanks occupy them. The distance from the starting position should provide protection from actual machine-gun fire and direct fire from enemy anti-tank guns (1-3 km). In some cases, deployment lines are assigned instead of starting positions. Moving from a wait-and-see position, tanks at the deployment lines are rearranged on the move into battle formation for attack.

26. To assemble tanks in battle, the following are assigned:

collection area (point);
intermediate collection area (point);
alternate collection area (point).

27. A collection area (point) is designated for collecting tanks after they have completed a combat mission, for receiving further tasks, putting the materiel in order and replenishing them with ammunition and fuels and lubricants.

28. An intermediate assembly area (point) is assigned to assign additional tasks to tanks on the battlefield, to restore contact with the infantry and supporting branches of the military, to replenish ammunition and evacuate seriously wounded from tanks. Intermediate collection areas (points) are designated in places sheltered from enemy fire.

29. A reserve assembly area (point) is assigned behind the location of friendly infantry, in case it is impossible for tanks to enter the intended assembly area (point).

30. The axis of communications, combat supply and restoration is designated in units and formations that have their own rear, and serves as the direction for the transport, evacuation of the wounded and emergency tanks, as well as for the movement of mobile communications equipment and the movement of observation posts.

31. Platoons and companies are assigned concentration and collection points, while battalions, regiments and brigades are assigned areas.

4. COMBAT READINESS

32. Combat readiness is the readiness of a combat vehicle, unit, or unit for combat operations.

33. The full combat readiness of a combat vehicle consists of:

availability of a full crew;
availability and full serviceability of the material part of the vehicle, weapons, surveillance devices, communications equipment and tools;
fully equipped with fuels and lubricants, ammunition, spare parts, chemical protection equipment, food and water;
correct combat position.

34. Depending on the situation, the crew of a combat vehicle may be in a state of combat readiness No. 1, 2, 3.

35. Combat readiness number 1. The entire crew is placed in the tank and is ready to open fire. All tank hatches are closed. The engine is ready for immediate starting. Combat readiness No. 1 is accepted:

in starting positions;
upon a combat alarm signal when positioned on the spot, in defense and on the march.

36. Combat readiness number 2. One crew member remains in the tank turret (as directed by the tank commander); he is observing and is ready to open fire. The rest of the crew is located near the tank. The tank hatches are open. Combat readiness No. 2 is accepted:

when positioned in defense (according to special instructions);
in collection areas (points);
in a wait-and-see position (according to special instructions).

37. Combat readiness number 3. The entire crew is located near the tank in crevices, dugouts and other shelters. The tank hatches are open. Combat readiness No. 3 is accepted:

when stationed on site as part of the duty unit;
in a wait-and-see position;
at rest stops during the march.

38. The degree of combat readiness of crews is established by an order or signal.

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1. Basics of defense

369. The defense pursues the goal of stubborn resistance to break up or tie up the advance of superior enemy forces with smaller forces in a given direction, in order to ensure freedom of action for its troops in other directions or in the same direction, but at a different time.
This is achieved by fighting to hold a certain territory (line, strip, object) for the required time.
Defense is used for the following purposes:
a) gaining the time necessary to concentrate and group forces and assets and go on the offensive or organize defense in a new zone;
b) pinning down the enemy in a secondary direction until the results of the offensive in the decisive direction are obtained;
c) saving forces in a given direction to concentrate overwhelming forces in the decisive direction;
d) retention of certain areas (objects) that are important.
Defense, depending on the task, forces, means and terrain, can be stubborn, on a normal or wide front, and mobile.
370. The strength of the defense lies in the combination of an organized system of fire, counterattacks from deep and skillful use of terrain, reinforced by engineering equipment and chemical barriers.
The defense must withstand the superior forces of the advancing enemy, who has powerful means of suppression and attacks in full depth. Therefore, the defense must be deep.
Modern technical means of warfare allow troops to create an insurmountable defense even in a short time.

2. Defense on a normal front. Defense organization

371. A developed defense on a normal front consists of:
a) from the main (first) line of defense, including the entire depth of the division’s battle formation;
b) from a combat outpost position moved forward 1-3 km from the front edge of the main defense line;
c) from the zone of engineering-chemical barriers, with the removal of the barriers closest to the enemy up to 12-15 km from the front edge of the main defense line, and under favorable conditions, further;
d) from the second defensive line created in the rear of the main defense line.
When going on the defensive from close contact with the enemy, there may not be a barricade line or a combat outpost position; in this case, they can only be created if the main strip is appropriately assigned to the rear of its location.

372. The main (first) line of defense serves to decisively repel the enemy; it receives the greatest engineering development and includes all the main forces and means of defense of the division.
In a battle for it, the advancing enemy must be defeated or stopped. Therefore she must:
a) make it difficult for the enemy to successfully use large masses of artillery, depriving him of convenient observation points and artillery position areas;
b) mislead the enemy regarding the location and outline of the front line, the placement of fire weapons, the depth of the defensive line, etc.;
c) enable the defense to concentrate the bulk of all types of fire directly in front of the forward edge;
d) have natural obstacles both in front of the front edge and in depth, so that, in combination with artificial obstacles, eliminate or limit the enemy’s use of tanks;
e) have natural boundaries and local objects inside, the retention of which even with small forces will allow the defense to conduct a successful battle when the enemy breaks through into the depths of the defense;
f) give the defense the opportunity to advantageously locate artillery observation posts and echelon placement of artillery in depth; g) allow the entire battle formation, and especially strike groups and artillery, to be hidden from ground and air surveillance.

373. The forward edge of the defense is formed by the infantry weapon firing positions closest to the enemy, which are included in the integrated defense fire system; the rear border is determined by the depth of the division's strike groups.
The leading edge, as a rule, should be placed on the slopes facing the enemy, avoiding pronounced and characteristic local objects.
The location of the leading edge on the reverse slopes can only take place in cases where the terrain in front of it is under crossfire from neighboring areas.

374. When placing troops on the defensive, you should:
a) avoid placing them in sharply defined islands on sharply defined lines and points, filling the latter with false trenches;
b) select artillery positional areas behind tank-inaccessible lines and in tank-inaccessible areas: place strike groups in areas that provide shelter from observation from the ground and from the air and ensure ease of use.

375. Troops for defense occupy: a rifle corps and a rifle division - defensive zones, rifle regiments - areas consisting of battalion areas, the borders of which are in contact.
The defensive order of battle consists of: a rifle division and a rifle regiment - consisting of a pinning and strike group; rifle battalion - from the first and second echelons. A strike group of a corps is usually created during a defensive battle.
A pinning group, a division, may consist of two or three regiments. In the latter case, separate battalions may be assigned to the strike group.
The width of the defense front is determined by the width of the front of the restraining group.
On a normal front, an infantry division can successfully defend a strip 8-12 km wide along the front and 4-6 km deep; rifle regiment - a section along the front of 3-5 km and a depth of 2.5-3 km; battalion - an area along the front of 1.5-2 km and the same depth.
In particularly important areas, the defense dandies can be narrower, reaching up to 6 km per division.

376. The position of a combat guard serves to warn against a surprise attack by the enemy, making it difficult for him to conduct ground reconnaissance, and to mislead him regarding the actual position of the front line. The combat outpost position consists of a system of separate fortified points that are in fire communication and covered by obstacles and barriers.
One platoon from a battalion, reinforced with machine guns and infantry guns, is usually deployed as a combat guard.
The combat guard position should not be occupied evenly and should be stronger in the directions of the enemy’s probable attack.
In those directions (sections) where it is necessary to create the impression of a front line, the combat guard is strengthened, and its position is equipped with anti-personnel and anti-tank obstacles.

377. A line of engineering-chemical barriers is created to delay the advancing enemy in order to gain time necessary for organizing and constructing a defensive line.
Barriers are prepared according to a certain system, in the most important directions and on advantageous lines and areas of terrain (forests, fashion shows, etc.).
The number and strength of barriers are determined by the availability of forces and means for this and the time during which it is necessary to detain the enemy.
Barriers must be used massively.
The strongest barriers are created in areas where the enemy is likely to start an attack and on the most important approaches to the front line.
The location of the obstacle line should mislead the enemy as to the actual outline of the front edge of the main defense line.
The barriers are covered by barrage detachments (OB). Their task is to exhaust the enemy and force him to waste time fighting to overcome obstacles.

378. The second defensive line is created by order of the corps commander in the rear of the main defensive line.
Its main purpose:
a) block access to the depths of enemy mobile units that have broken through;
b) stop the spread of the enemy who has broken through in certain directions;
c) serve as an advantageous starting point for launching decisive counterattacks from the depths.
It is advantageous to locate the second defensive line behind a natural anti-tank obstacle and connect it to the main defensive line with a system of cut-off positions covering the most likely directions for an enemy breakthrough.
Removing the second defensive line from the front edge of the main one should exclude the possibility of a direct attack after breaking through the main defensive line and force the enemy to regroup forces and move all artillery.
Depending on terrain conditions, this distance will usually be up to 12-15 km.
The corps reserve is usually located in the area of the second defensive line.

379. The stability of the defense largely depends on the degree of engineering support for the troops and on the equipment of the area with defensive structures.
Engineering support for troops and terrain equipment includes:
a) preparation together with chemical parts. obstacle strips in front of the front edge, obstacle sections in front of the combat outpost position, and if there is an open flank, then on the open flank;
b) arrangement of anti-tank areas and various anti-tank obstacles throughout the entire depth;
c) equipping main and reserve positions for riflemen, machine guns, artillery, clearing fire, establishing command posts (main and reserve), installing obstacles against infantry, constructing hidden communications, shelters, decoy structures and obstacles;
d) preparation of cut-off positions, second line and rear defense;
e) restoration and construction of bridges, repair and construction of roads, arrangement of landing sites, equipment of warehouses, etc.;
f) camouflage of defensive structures, locations of troops and institutions, roads, etc.;
g) organization of water supply for troops (drilling wells, raising and purifying water, equipping a water point).

380. Engineering equipment of the area is carried out, depending on the situation, in the following order.
First stage works:
a) by forces of the troops - clearing visibility and shelling, building full-profile trenches for riflemen, machine guns, grenade launchers, mortars and guns with slots for cover and reserve positions; construction of anti-personnel obstacles, adaptation of local items for defense, construction of hidden firing points for heavy machine guns and infantry artillery, provision of hidden communications in the most important areas;
b) engineering units - installation of the most important command and observation posts, anti-tank obstacles, installation of searchlights, provision of troops with water, construction of field roads necessary for combat and economic supply of troops, and correction of existing ones.
Second stage works:
a) by the forces of the troops - the construction of communication passages with the rear, the construction of spare trenches, the development of the first stage of work;
b) engineering units - construction of various types of shelters and reserve command and observation posts.
The works of the third stage are the development of the works of the first and second stages.
All engineering work is carried out under conditions of careful camouflage of both the work process itself and the buildings being erected. Defense camouflage as a whole is checked by control photographs from the ground and air.
In the case of long-term defense, the defensive zone is strengthened with reinforced concrete structures and deep lines of artificial obstacles.

381. Particular attention should be paid to creating a system of anti-tank obstacles both in front of the front edge and throughout the depth.
First of all, natural obstacles should be used - ravines, forests, rivers and streams, swamps and lakes, gorges, populated areas, steep slopes, etc.
In areas devoid of natural obstacles, artificial anti-tank obstacles must be created - minefields, obstacles, stripes of inconspicuous obstacles, ditches, etc.
Strengthening natural obstacles (swamping, increasing steepness by cutting, etc.) significantly increases their barrier properties.
From a combination of natural and artificial obstacles, anti-tank lines and areas can be created as a target.
It is necessary to strive to create “anti-tank bags” from anti-tank areas and lines, so that enemy tanks, having broken through into the gap between two anti-tank areas, are met by fire from the third and destroyed in the “bag”.
When creating a system of anti-tank obstacles, it is necessary to take into account that anti-tank obstacles can play their role only if they are under actual direct fire from artillery.

383. Chemical means of combat in defensive combat are used:
a) to create independent UZs and to strengthen engineering barriers;
b) to infect areas in front of the combat outpost position and the front edge of the main defense line;
c) to infect probable areas of enemy artillery positions and observation posts, as well as to blind the latter with smoke;
d) to infect hidden approaches from the enemy to the front line;
e) to destroy enemy military concentrations and suitable reserves;
f) to repel the attacking enemy with flamethrower fire both in front of the front line and during the battle inside the defensive line;
g) to disguise the maneuver of strike groups with smoke;
h) to provide for their troops in case of a chemical attack by the enemy.

384. Defense cannot be considered secure if it has not provided for repelling enemy aircraft with all the means available to it for this purpose, and if it has not taken measures to conceal its location.
The main task of air defense in defense is to prevent the enemy from attacking from the air the strike groups of the division and corps, the main group of artillery and the most important gorges and crossings, if they exist in the location of the defensive zone.
Air defense is carried out:
a) parts of the restraining groups of the defensive zone - by their own means;
b) strike groups of a regiment, division, corps reserve and main artillery grouping - by means of units and anti-aircraft artillery assets of the division and corps. Air surveillance and communications patrols (VNOS) are set up in such a way as to ensure all-round surveillance.
VNOS patrols are deployed: in troops (detachments) covering barriers, in combat outposts, in each battalion, at the headquarters of regiments, divisions and corps, and in all special units.

385. Defense reconnaissance must determine the strength, composition of the main group and the direction of the enemy’s main attack.
While still approaching, aerial and ground reconnaissance must detect enemy columns and, constantly monitoring them, establish an area for their concentration and deployment.
During the period of enemy concentration, the main attention of all types of reconnaissance should be paid to detecting a group of artillery and tanks.
In the future, reconnaissance clarifies the area of artillery firing positions, waiting positions of tanks, positions of chemical units (mortars), the main grouping of infantry, as well as the location or approach of mechanized and mounted units.
In view of the fact that the enemy will strive to concentrate, deploy and take the initial position for an offensive (attack) at night, night reconnaissance is of particular importance.
24-hour commander observation in all branches of the military, organized by the combined arms headquarters, should play a major role in obtaining information about the enemy.

386. Control in a defensive battle should be based on a widely developed network of command posts. In addition to the main one, each unit and formation must have one or two reserve command posts.
Technical communication in defense is established:
a) from the depths (in directions) - from the main command post of the senior commander to the main command post of the subordinate commander through the western command posts of the latter;
b) along the front (between neighbors) - from right to left through the main and reserve command posts.
General and private communications reserves are located at main and reserve command posts.
Wire communications in defense are established, if possible, bypassing tank-dangerous directions, directions of counterattacks of friendly troops and, in any case, outside areas of anti-tank and anti-personnel obstacles. Wire communication lines are laid if there is time (and in tank-hazardous directions it is necessary) in ditches 10-15 cm deep.
The secrecy of communications, especially before the start of an enemy attack, takes on particular importance in defensive combat. All negotiations must be conducted with the mandatory use of negotiation tables, codes, radio signals, etc.
With the withdrawal of the military outpost and before the start of the enemy attack, even coded telephone conversations should be limited.
Radio transmission work is used with the beginning of an enemy attack and when fighting in the depths of the defensive zone to deny the use of wire weapons.
Without limitation, radio communication is used:
a) in reconnaissance units;
b) for air defense and VNOS service.
Within artillery for fire control and with aviation at airfields, radio communication is used only when wire communications fail.
Communication between infantry, tanks, artillery and aviation during a battle is carried out as during an offensive.
Communication between artillery and units of the pinning and strike groups is established in advance through the forward OP and means of the divisions' special forces. Calling for artillery fire, as provided for in the defense plan, according to pre-established infantry signals - rockets and radio signals.

387. The order of work of the command and staff in organizing defense depends on the time that the troops have for this purpose.
If there is enough time, the senior commander, having solved the problem on the map and given preliminary orders to the troops, together with the headquarters commanders, chiefs of military branches and commanders of subordinate units, carries out personal reconnaissance of the main defense line, paying special attention to the most important sectors,
During reconnaissance, the senior commander clarifies his preliminary decision and personally assigns tasks on the ground to subordinate commanders of units (formations), establishes the basis for interaction between the military branches, and gives instructions on the construction of main defensive structures and the construction of barriers.
If there is a lack of time, the commanders of divisions and units must, in any case, reconnoiter the most important directions (areas) and establish in place: the front line, the area (area) of defense of the pinning group, the area where the strike group is located and the most important tank-accessible areas.
In both cases, tasks for subordinate units must be assigned in such a way that the troops, having entered the defense areas (sectors) without delay, can immediately begin defensive work and organize interaction.

388. When organizing the defense, the senior commander announces the plan of his decision, sets tasks for the troops and indicates:
Rifle Corps Commander:
a) defensive zones of divisions;
b) the period by which the defensive zone must be occupied and the period for defense readiness;
c) general outline of the leading edge;
d) what units of corps artillery are assigned to divisions as DD groups if a corps DD group is not created; tasks for DD groups and, if necessary, artillery of PP divisions in the interests of the corps;
e) tasks of supporting aviation;
f) whether and where a strip of engineering-chemical barriers is created, by what forces and means, the period of its readiness and the duration of the fight on it;
g) the line of the second defensive line, its most important sections, where support areas should be created first, who is appointed as the head of engineering work, time, forces and means for the construction of the second defensive line; h) your reserve, its composition, tasks and location;
i) combat support activities;
j) your CP.
Division commander:
a) areas for regiments, the composition of artillery groups of PP and other reinforcements; b) outline of the leading edge;
c) the line of combat guards and where to have reinforced combat guards;
d) locations of barriers, if barriers are created, units allocated to cover them, and methods of supporting the latter;
e) the composition, tasks, location of the strike group and the line it adapts to defense;
f) the tasks of the artillery to prepare the DON and LEO sections in the most important directions, to support counterattacks of the strike group; tasks of the strike group's PP for the period of battle in front of the front line, positional areas of the division's artillery;
g) main anti-tank areas;
h) tank-dangerous directions and, accordingly, the tasks and grouping of anti-tank artillery, its own anti-tank reserve (if its formation is possible);
i) the procedure for the engineering equipment of the strip and the location of anti-tank obstacles, the period of defense readiness;
j) combat support activities;
k) your CP,
Regimental commander:
a) battalion areas of the holding group and means of strengthening them;
b) an exact outline of the front line of defense and combat outpost positions;
c) tasks, strength and composition of combat security units;
d) tank-dangerous directions, lines of anti-tank obstacles and places of additional anti-tank areas;
e) the area where the strike group is located, the probable directions of its counterattacks, local objects and points that it adapts to defense, and fire missions within the defensive zone;
f) organizing anti-tank artillery fire in front of the front edge of the defensive line and in depth;
g) the tasks of the artillery group of the PP to support the battalions of the pinning and shock groups, combat outposts and areas of stationary barrage artillery fire on the terrain;
h) organization of engineering strengthening of the defense sector, specifying where and what work will be carried out with the help of the division and regiment, and the deadlines for readiness;
i) what first-stage work should be carried out in the area of the regiment’s strike group and how many people should be assigned to work in the battalions of the holding group from the strike group;
j) the procedure for transporting or bringing necessary materials to the site of engineering work;
k) measures in case of prolonged chemical attack;
l) measures for other types of combat support;
m) your CP.
Battalion commander of the holding group:
a) on the dispatch of military guards and on the organization of observation;
b) tasks and areas of defense for rifle companies of the first and second echelons;
c) on the organization of an anti-personnel and anti-tank fire system by assigning fire missions to rifle companies of the first and second echelons (fire lanes), a machine gun company (long-range and direct fire), dagger machine guns, mortars and anti-tank artillery;
d) tasks of supporting artillery;
e) on the volume and timing of completion of work on area engineering equipment;
f) on measures in case of a prolonged chemical attack by the enemy;
g) your CP.

389. The strength of the infantry in defense lies in its courage, stamina and destructive fire for enemy infantry, in decisive counterattacks, in its ability and constant readiness to destroy the enemy in close combat with fire, grenades and bayonets. To preserve their firepower until the decisive moment, riflemen and light machine guns should not open fire prematurely and reveal their position. Early detected infantry fire weapons are easily suppressed by enemy artillery fire, so long-range fire is carried out by specially designated groups (batteries) of heavy machine guns from temporary positions.
The infantry and its fire weapons should be dispersed forward and in depth. The most effective infantry fire is crossfire from the forward edge, reinforced by fire from the second echelons of infantry.
To cut off enemy infantry from his tanks, it is necessary to have camouflaged dagger mounted machine guns both in front of the front edge and in the depths.
Infantry defending against tanks must be confident that the tank poses little threat to them as long as they are hidden in the trenches. On the other hand, infantry is capable of successfully fighting tanks with its own means (grenade and other means). But she must always remember that her main enemy is the enemy infantry advancing behind the tanks. Therefore, the infantry, repelling an enemy attack, must distribute its forces and means in such a way that, while defeating tanks, the bulk of its firepower is directed at the attacking infantry.
Infantry must be aware that the tank has limited observation and encounters great difficulty in maintaining contact with its infantry. This should be used for the main task of the defending infantry: to separate the advancing enemy infantry from the tanks and engage them with fire.
All commanders are obliged to organize controlled fire in defense so that, starting from long distances, it increases as the enemy approaches the front line and reaches its highest intensity at the decisive distance of up to 400 m. Every point of the terrain within a strip of up to 400 m from the front edge should be under destructive fire - flank, oblique and frontal. At the junctions the fire should be especially powerful.
At the same time, it must be remembered that infantry fire will be especially effective if it comes as a surprise to the enemy. Therefore, sometimes it will be advantageous to let the enemy get within close range and inflict heavy losses on him with sudden, destructive fire.

390. Artillery in defense, supplementing infantry fire, fights enemy infantry, tanks and artillery during all periods of battle and disrupts the work of command and control and its combat rear. It performs the following tasks:
a) carries out long-range fire attacks on enemy columns as they approach the defensive line;
b) maintains military outposts;
c) disrupts the orderly deployment of enemy troops and their occupation of the starting position for the offensive;
d) according to the decision of the senior commander, carries out counter-preparation;
e) during the enemy’s offensive, he hits his infantry and tanks on the approaches to the front line of defense, especially in areas inaccessible to fire from infantry weapons;
f) places fire barriers inside the defensive line;
g) supports counterattacks of strike groups;
h) cuts off the enemy’s rushing infantry from his second echelons;
i) suppresses the most damaging enemy batteries;
j) disrupts the control and normal operation of the enemy rear.
Artillery in defense is echeloned in such a way that even the most deeply located batteries hit enemy infantry and tanks with actual fire on the approaches to the front edge of the defensive line.
The main condition for successful artillery operations in a defensive battle is hiding its actual grouping from the enemy. For this purpose, during the period of organizing the defense, a system of temporary firing positions (FP) is installed, from which batteries (platoons, individual guns) fire during the period of the enemy’s approach and organization of the offensive. The system of temporary OPs must ensure the implementation of the main tasks assigned to the artillery. If there are signs of an impending enemy attack, the batteries occupying temporary OPs move to the main ones.
Artillery control in defense is usually centralized.
But when defending a division on a front of more than 8 km, and on very rough terrain - even on narrower fronts, the artillery groups of the PP artillery group of the pinning group are usually subordinate to rifle regiments. The strike group's PP remains subordinate to the division commander for fire maneuvers.
The interaction between PP artillery groups and infantry is structured in the same way as during an offensive.
Corps artillery is usually distributed among the main divisions, forming DD groups or reinforcing PP groups with separate divisions.
When defending a corps on a narrow front, corps artillery can form a corps group of DD.
When choosing the OP and DD artillery, every possibility of covering the batteries with natural and artificial obstacles must be taken into account. From each closed firing position of a battery, an observer is posted to monitor the approaches to it for timely warning of the appearance of tanks.
Each OP battery must meet the requirements of firing at tanks at direct fire from direct shot distances. If it does not satisfy these requirements, then to repel a tank attack, separate guns are assigned, which are rolled out on alert for direct fire. In special cases, the entire battery on the front ends moves to anti-tank positions.
Anti-tank artillery is the main means of combating tanks both in front of the front line and in the depths of the defensive zone. Its grouping is determined by the degree of tank accessibility of individual sections of the defensive zone.
It is useful for the division commander to have a mobile reserve of anti-tank guns (and anti-tank mines) at his disposal for use in the direction of the enemy's main tank attack.

391. Tanks significantly strengthen the defense and are a reliable means of defeating an enemy who has broken through into the depths of the defense.
The great maneuverability, fire and striking power of tanks must be fully used for active operations.
Tanks should be part of the anti-tank defense system as one of the decisive active weapons. The main tasks of tanks in defense are:
a) the defeat of the enemy who broke into the defensive zone, and first of all his tanks;
b) destruction of the enemy bypassing the flank (flanks) of defense.
When defending on a normal front, tanks, as a rule, are the striking weapon of the rifle division commander. When dividing regimental sectors by difficult-to-reach obstacles (swamps, rivers, ravines, etc.) and when reinforcing a division with tanks, tanks can be assigned to commanders of rifle regiments. However, even in this case, a sufficient tank reserve must remain in the hands of the division commander.
In order to ensure close interaction between tank units and the strike group, their commanders must take part in reconnaissance of the area and in developing a plan for joint actions.
The personnel of tank units must know the locations of anti-tank obstacles, anti-tank guns and batteries intended for direct fire at enemy tanks.
Commanders of all branches of the military must be well aware of the distinctive features of their tanks.
Waiting positions for tanks are indicated by the combined arms commander in the depths of the defensive zone in areas that allow for a covered position.
The initial positions of the tanks are equipped with special masks, and sometimes with ditches for their hidden placement and for firing from the spot at attacking enemy tanks. Similar camouflaged firing positions for tanks can be prepared in the most important areas deep in the defense.

392. Combat aviation in defense is a powerful fire reserve of the high command.
Great mobility and maneuverability allow it to be concentrated in the threatened direction in the shortest possible time. It begins its combat activities with air attacks on enemy troops as they approach the defensive zone, attacks the enemy day and night in areas of concentration with the aim of demoralizing the enemy and defeating him, and takes direct part in the battlefield.
During combat, combat aviation supporting combined arms formations performs the following tasks:
a) participates together with artillery in counter-preparation, destroying manpower, artillery and tanks in the initial position for the offensive, before the start of the enemy’s artillery preparation;
b) fights enemy aviation opposing and attacking our troops;
c) during the offensive period, attacks the second echelons, artillery and suitable mobile assets;
d) during counterattacks, directly participates in the destruction of the enemy who has broken through, together with strike groups and tanks;
e) destroys enemy tank, motorized and horse units that have penetrated into the depths.

3. Conducting a defensive battle

393. Defensive combat with an advancing enemy begins at long distances - on the approach, while the enemy is overcoming a strip of engineering and chemical obstacles, and continues throughout the entire enemy offensive. The defensive battle reaches its greatest tension during the enemy’s attack on the front edge of the main defense line, where heavy losses must be inflicted on the enemy. In the event of a breakthrough of the front line, the enemy must be completely destroyed by bringing into battle all the forces and means of defense.
As the enemy approaches, more and more forces and means are brought into battle.
As the enemy approaches, he is exposed to the combat effects of aviation and long-range artillery. During the battle on the barriers, aviation and long-range artillery are reinforced by the fire of light and medium-caliber artillery and infantry covering the barriers.
In the initial position, the enemy is exposed to the fire of the main mass of artillery, aviation and, in special cases, tanks.
In a battle for the main defensive line, the defender contributes all his forces and means.

394. In order to disrupt an enemy attack, counter-preparation may be carried out by decision of the corps commander. It is carried out by a powerful artillery fire strike, unexpected for the enemy, in cooperation with aviation and, in special cases, tanks (if attached). Countertraining against concentrated enemy forces (infantry in the starting position for the attack, tanks in the starting positions, discovered headquarters, OP and communications centers, etc.) is carried out in a sector, the width of which is determined by the number of artillery involved in this. Counterpreparations should be directed against the main enemy group.
The moment of the beginning and duration of counter-preparation are determined by the corps commander.
Artillery, as a rule, conducts counterpreparation from temporary positions and, upon completion, moves to the main ones. Counterpreparation must be carried out before the start of the enemy’s artillery preparation and will produce the greatest results during the period when the enemy occupies the starting position for the offensive. Regardless of counter-preparation, during the same period it is advisable to systematically exhaust the enemy in various ways (poisonous smoke, fires, systematic bombing by small aviation units, artillery fire raids, etc.).

395. The battalion commander defends his area, always ready for battle when surrounded, remembering that the senior commander above him will be able to organize the destruction of the enemy who has broken through, relying on the resilience of the battalions stubbornly defending their areas.
The main task of the first echelon battalion is to prevent the attacking enemy infantry and tanks from breaking through the front edge of the defensive line.
For this purpose, the battalion commander uses long-range fire from his machine guns, trying to hit the enemy infantry while still in the starting position for the attack. As the enemy infantry approaches, the battalion commander increases the force of fire by successively introducing new fire weapons into battle and, finally, at a decisive distance, brings down all infantry fire weapons and supporting artillery fire on the attacking infantry and, separating them from the tanks and pressing them to the ground, shoots them down with massive fire. and finishes her off.
If individual enemy groups penetrate into the defense, the battalion commander pins them down with fire, destroys them with a short bayonet strike and restores the situation.
Anti-tank guns open fire on tanks independently. Having repelled the attacks of the tanks and immediately changed their firing positions, they open fire on the machine guns and guns accompanying the tanks.
The battalion commander must always remember that the success of the battalion’s battle determines the success of the regiment and division.

396. The regiment commander influences the battle of the battalions of the pinning group by concentrating artillery fire on the battle formations of the attacking enemy.
In the event of a breakthrough of enemy tanks through the front line, the regiment commander, entrusting the fight against them to anti-tank and additionally allocated artillery and his own tanks, directs his main efforts to destroying the directly attacking and enemy infantry advancing from the depths.
If the enemy infantry breaks through the front line and moves into the depths of the defense, the regiment commander, in the sector of one of the battalions, creates a barrier in its path with the full power of his fire and counterattacks it with his strike group.
In the event of a simultaneous breakthrough of the entire holding group and in other cases when restoring the situation with the forces of the regiment is impossible, the regiment commander goes over with his strike group to the defense at a prepared line, thus ensuring the attack of the division's strike group.

397. The division commander concentrates barrage fire from the division's artillery on the enemy's main attacking forces, trying to prevent them from attacking the front line.
If enemy tanks break through into the depths of the defense, the division commander throws his mobile anti-tank reserve against them and attacks the enemy tanks with his tanks, preventing them from reaching artillery positions. Having thrown back the enemy's tanks and achieved the disorder of his infantry, the division commander, relying on the fire of battalions and counterattacks of regiments, in turn organizes a counterattack with his strike group, destroys the enemy who has broken through and restores the disturbed situation.
All available forces of the division must be used for a counterattack.
In the event of an enemy breakthrough along the entire defensive front, the division commander, depending on the situation, may abandon the counterattack and go on the defensive at a line prepared in advance by the strike group.

398. A counterattack is carried out both on the orders of the senior commander and on the initiative of the commander of the strike group, if there is no communication with the commander during the period of increasing battle crisis. The final success of the defense depends on the timeliness and strength of the counterattack of the strike group.
A counterattack must be prepared with all the power of fire and carried out covertly, decisively and quickly.
The commander of the strike group, having made a decision, immediately sets the task for both his PP artillery and those additionally assigned for this purpose. The artillery concentrates fire on the enemy infantry that has broken through, and the strike group quickly moves out, deploying on the move, to the starting line for the counterattack, having support in the direction of the threatened directions.
Before the strike group attacks, its heavy machine guns pin down the enemy infantry with fire, and infantry artillery destroys its machine guns and tanks. At the beginning of the attack, PP artillery cuts off the invading infantry from its second echelons.
In a joint attack with tanks, the strike group acts with them as in an offensive battle.
Defensive actions of the strike group when breaking through the enemy along the entire front are carried out on the lines it has prepared.
Having quickly taken prepared positions, the strike group covers the withdrawal of parts of the pinning group with all its firepower.

399. All PP and DD artillery, as well as artillery from neighboring unattacked areas, takes part in repelling an enemy attack on the front edge of the defensive line.
The main task of light and heavy artillery in that period was to separate the attacking infantry from the tanks. Tanks approaching the front line are destroyed by anti-tank artillery fire. The destruction of tanks that have broken through the front line is completed in the depths of the defensive zone using all means at the defender’s disposal, and primarily artillery and tanks.
From the moment the tanks come within range of actual anti-tank artillery fire, the bulk of the artillery transfers fire to the enemy infantry and tank escort guns.
PP artillery batteries continue to fight against enemy personnel until the moment when a given battery needs to open fire on tanks for self-defense.
Immediately after the destruction of tanks in the area of its location, the battery switches to infantry support.

400. The corps commander in most cases has only a reserve. As the most dangerous direction of the enemy's breakthrough is identified, the corps commander, using supporting aviation to strike, forms a strike group from his reserve, reserves assigned to him by the high command, as well as from those infantry and artillery units of the defending divisions that can be attracted during the battle and which can arrive in a timely manner to the threatened area for a counterattack.
If the corps commander's reserve is small, the corps reserve can be used to strengthen divisions or for independent active actions in order to temporarily delay the further development of the enemy's offensive.
A successful counterattack, as a result of which the enemy is defeated, the corps commander must always strive to develop into a counteroffensive, going beyond the corps’ defensive line. The corps commander reports the decision to counterattack to the army commander and notifies his neighbors.

401. In the event of a breakthrough through the main defensive line of large mechanized enemy units, the corps commander must take over the fight against them. Division commanders should not be distracted from the fight for the main line of defense. All actions of the corps commander should be aimed at delaying the breakthrough area when using the second defensive line, and cut-off positions in order to stop the enemy from spreading in depth and towards the flanks.
To combat the enemy's mechanized units that have broken through, the corps commander uses all his forces and means and supporting aviation.
All rear institutions and units must be ready to take refuge in the nearest points (areas) inaccessible to tanks and defend there on their own.
The deep breakthrough of mechanized units is eliminated by army reserves and aviation.

402. The fight against enemy landing forces is carried out by mobile detachments formed by the commanders of the formations and units at whose location the landing force landed. Aviation attacks the landing force in flight and during its landing, monitors its movement and directs mobile units at it. To combat landings, by order of the high command, if necessary, special detachments with high mobility can be created.

4. Features of defensive combat at night

403. Night, making it difficult to observe, conduct actual fire, and control troops, makes it easier to achieve surprise and increases the impressionability of troops. Therefore, when moving from daytime defense to nighttime, it is necessary to take a number of measures to weaken the negative influence of the night on the conduct of defensive combat.
At night, it is necessary to strengthen reconnaissance and security, as well as some areas of barriers, especially on the flanks and junctions of battalion areas, to prevent possible surprise attacks from the enemy.
Infantry firepower and artillery must prepare data before dark for firing at various lines and points at night.
Systematic lighting should ensure continuous observation of the terrain ahead of the front line and in the enemy's position.
Strike groups must be pulled forward and positioned in such a way that they are provided with the best conditions for counterattacks.
To avoid losses, the machine guns of the pinning groups should be placed in new positions; machine guns located in the depths during the day should be brought closer to the front edge to increase the fire in front of it.

404. Reflecting the enemy’s night offensive is carried out according to a pre-developed plan, providing for:
a) intelligence activities;
b) the locations of the guard units deployed at night;
c) selection of firing positions for night installation of heavy and light machine guns and organization of machine gun fire with and without artificial lighting;
d) places for night deployment of strike groups;
e) organizing the lighting of the area with searchlights and rockets;
c) measures to repel a chemical attack;
g) preparation of artillery fire on individual areas and targets;
h) additional sections of wire and other barriers.

405. During the day, the artillery prepares all the data for opening fire. Fire on the advancing enemy is opened at the request of the infantry and its signals (colored rockets, etc.), which are established by the division commander and supplied from the areas being attacked. The terrain ahead of the forward edge is divided into areas plotted on the map; data for opening fire, but artillery prepares these areas in advance (in the afternoon). It is useful to occupy open positions with individual guns for direct fire at enemy searchlights.

406. Artificial lighting is provided by flares, luminous projectiles and searchlights. Floodlights are placed in such a way as not to illuminate the location of friendly troops. The searchlights blind the advancing enemy and at the same time expose him to concentrated fire from machine guns and artillery. Searchlight illumination begins at the signals set to call for artillery fire.
Spotlights typically have multiple positions; they are changed if necessary.

407. The success of night defense depends on the composure of the commanders, the stamina of the fighters, fire prepared before dark and decisive counterattacks carried out even by small forces.
The attacking enemy must be met with organized fire, especially at obstacles, and upon further approach - shot at point-blank range, pelted with hand grenades and finished off with a bold bayonet strike.
If the enemy captures part of our positions, the strike groups and reserves must knock him out with decisive counterattacks, not giving him the opportunity to gain a foothold.
The repulsed enemy must be pursued by fire and the advance of individual units to establish his actual withdrawal to his location.
Until it is definitely established that the enemy has retreated to his position, not a single unit has the right to go to rest.
The disrupted situation must be immediately restored, reconnaissance and security must be sent out again, destroyed artificial obstacles must be corrected and prepared to repel new attacks.
At dawn, in compliance with all camouflage measures, units, by special order of their commanders, must move to a daytime position.

5. Defense of fortified areas

408. Fortified areas are created in advance for the purpose of:
a) retain economically, politically and militarily important points and areas in their hands;
b) provide space for the deployment and maneuver of troops;
c) cover the flanks of the formations striking in the main direction, providing them with freedom of maneuver.
The purpose of a fortified area is to force the enemy to launch a frontal attack, forcing him to waste time concentrating large forces and powerful means of suppression. The stubborn defense of long-term fortifications makes it possible to inflict heavy losses on the enemy by fire and defeat him with a blow to the flank.
Military formations of a sector (section) of a fortified area part of the forces occupy areas of the long-term defensive zone, part of the forces occupy field defensive structures that create greater strength and depth of defense, and part of the forces form a strike group.
The defense of fortified areas and the procedure for interaction of field troops with them are provided for by special instructions.

6. River defense

409. The river makes it difficult to attack and strengthens defense.
The strength of a river boundary as an obstacle depends on the width, depth, speed of the current, the nature of the banks, the properties and width of the valley, the presence of fords, channels, islands, the tortuosity of the riverbed, the properties of the bottom, etc.
Depending on the time of year and weather conditions, even a small river can be a serious obstacle for an attacker, especially for tanks, if it has sufficient depth, a marshy bottom, and steep banks.
The defensive properties of the river border can be strengthened, in addition to artificially raising the water level, by a system of artificial barriers (increasing the steepness of the banks, placing mines and wire barriers in the water, etc.).

410. When defending a river, usually the leading edge of the main line is chosen on its side of the river.
If the river has a wide open valley, the leading edge of the defense is pulled back to an advantageous line that provides observation and fire, and only the guard is advanced to the river bank.
Otherwise, the leading edge, as a rule, should be chosen along the river bank.
If necessary, the defensive zone along the river is equipped with camouflaged roads and a communications network, ensuring the maneuver of troops both for counterattacks and for going on the offensive.
In secondary sections of the river, in order to save forces, troops can receive sections and stripes wider than normal for defense.
In this case, the defense of the river is organized on the basis of defense on a broad front.

411. When organizing the defense of a river, it is necessary to establish areas that give the enemy the greatest benefits for crossing and allow him to carry out preparatory work secretly.
The defense must be organized in such a way that the bulk of artillery fire is concentrated along the approaches to areas of probable crossings, in areas of probable enemy concentration, and the bulk of fire of all types, and especially flanking, is concentrated along the approaches to the river, at probable places of preparation and aiming of crossings and along the river itself. The fords must be mined.
Potential crossing areas should be closely monitored day and night.
Infantry fire must be organized in such a way that fire weapons do not reveal themselves until the main enemy forces have crossed. To combat small groups of enemy crossing, special rifle and machine gun units are assigned.
To provide artillery fire on large-scale maps or plans, the river bed is divided into squares. The artillery must be prepared to open fire on any of them at the request of the infantry.
When organizing defense on one's own bank, the bridges are destroyed, local crossing facilities of the opposite bank are collected and transferred to their own shore.
The strike groups are positioned so as to be able to quickly approach any possible crossing point and immediately throw the enemy units that have crossed into the river.
In repelling an enemy offensive, it is advantageous to use aviation to strike enemy units, especially at the moment of their crossing, and on bridges.

412. When organizing the defense of a river, in anticipation of going on the offensive, bridgehead fortifications (tete-de-ponts) are created on the opposite bank against existing or newly constructed crossings and are firmly engaged in defense. The removal of bridgeheads and their number are determined by the number of troops assigned to defend the bridgeheads.
The shortest distance of the bridgehead should ensure crossing from enemy infantry fire and artillery observation.
The relative position of the bridgehead fortifications must be such that launching an offensive from them leads to advantageous tactical interaction.
The location of the artillery should correspond to the idea of going on the offensive and provide fire support for the bridgehead from its shore.

7. Defense on a broad front

413. Defense on a wide front is used in the case when a military formation is given a front for defense that exceeds the normal one.
It is used mainly in secondary areas.
The organization of defense on a broad front depends entirely on the length of the defensive front and the nature of the terrain.
On terrain that is accessible everywhere, defense on a broad front is based on occupying and holding tactically advantageous individual areas that are in fire communication with each other.
Depending on the length of the front, fire communication can be carried out by machine gun and artillery fire or only artillery fire.
The defended areas in their entirety must represent a single system of firmly occupied local points that block enemy access, especially in the most important directions.
The gaps between the areas are occupied by small units with machine guns and filled with false structures in order to mislead the enemy as to the actual location of the defense.
In addition, the gaps between areas are blocked by engineering and technical obstacles.
Defense on a wide front and on terrain accessible everywhere is organized:
a) a rifle battalion on a front 4 - 5 km;
b) rifle regiment 8 - 10 km;
c) rifle division 18 - 20 km.
On the ground, not everywhere accessible defense is carried out only by those areas that intercept the most important directions of the enemy’s probable offensive. Under these conditions, defense can be stable even in the absence of fire communications between areas.

414. The basis of defense on a broad front is the battalion area. The defense of the battalion area must be structured in such a way that it ensures the battalion’s successful fight even if it is completely surrounded for the entire time required by the senior commander to organize a counterattack.
The struggle of a battalion surrounded during defense on a wide front is a frequent occurrence, therefore, in order to give the defense greater stability and independence, it is advisable to strengthen the battalion with divisional artillery, infantry artillery guns, engineering and chemical units.

415. When defending on a wide front, the creation of a strong strike group in a regiment, division and reserve in a corps is of particular importance.
The regiment's strike group, located 5-6 km behind the first-line battalions in the most dangerous direction, must be constantly ready to support them. In the event of a breakthrough of the defended front or encirclement of certain areas, the regiment's strike group, relying on the surviving areas, restores the situation with bold counterattacks on the flank and rear of the broken through enemy, and, if impossible, delays the development of the enemy's offensive until the division's strike group approaches.
The regiment's strike group in defense on a wide front, in order to most successfully repel unexpected enemy attacks, especially at night, will equip its location for all-round defense under all conditions. For the same reasons, the regimental headquarters is located together with the strike group.
The division's strike group must have high mobility and be located at one or several points, but always near road junctions leading to all or the most important sections of the defense front. The division's strike group should include infantry in vehicles, artillery, tanks and cavalry.

416. The management and selection of communications means during defense on a broad front are of particular importance. It is difficult to prevent the penetration of small enemy groups and individuals into defense positions through poorly occupied spaces between areas. Therefore, eavesdropping on telephone conversations and wire snatches, especially before an offensive and during a battle, will be quite frequent. In addition, there may be cases when certain areas will have to fight in complete encirclement.
Therefore, the main means of communication in defense conditions on a wide front will be radio communication, duplicated by pigeon, optical and dogs. Combat vehicles and aircraft should be widely used for communications.

8. Mobile defense

417. Mobile defense is used in cases where the overwhelming superiority of the enemy precludes the conduct of a stubborn defense on a normal, as well as on a wide front. Mobile defense pursues the goal of gaining, by losing space, the time necessary to organize defense on a new line, to ensure the concentration of troops in a given direction, or to ensure freedom of action for troops in other directions.
Mobile defense is carried out in a designated zone and is carried out in a series of successive defensive battles at predetermined lines.
The number of defensive lines in a given zone and the duration of resistance at each of them depend on the time required to delay the enemy and are set by the senior commander.
The main line is designated by the division or corps commander. This line is the limit of mobile defense, and once the troops reach it, they switch to stubborn defense.
Intermediate lines are usually appointed by the division commander, and in some cases by unit commanders.
The distance of intermediate lines from each other is determined in such a way that the enemy, after capturing one of the lines, is forced to advance his entire battle formation forward, changing artillery firing positions, and re-organize the offensive to capture the next line.
When choosing a line, the presence of hidden escape routes from it and open terrain towards the enemy is of great importance.

418. The formation (unit) conducts a mobile defense, occupying intermediate lines in echelons. The strength and composition of these echelons vary depending on the mission, the nature of the enemy's actions, terrain, etc. during a mobile defense.
The control of divisional artillery in mobile defense is usually decentralized, and artillery is distributed among regiments and even battalions. In some cases, it is advisable to reinforce some units with tanks. Basically, tanks are used massively and are a mobile strike weapon for the formation commander.
The defensive line is held by the first echelon until the second echelon is fully prepared for battle on its line.
The first echelon, having crossed the line of the second echelon, follows to the next line, where it immediately organizes defense or forms a strike group if the withdrawal is made to the main line.

419. The troops defending the intermediate line must inflict losses on the advancing enemy, force him to turn around, lose time organizing the offensive and, without engaging in a stubborn battle with him, escape from the attack.
The troops defending the intermediate line begin to hit the enemy at long and extreme distances with artillery and machine-gun fire. As the enemy approaches, the defense brings all its firepower into the fight. Aviation, with concentrated strikes and actions of small groups, inflicts losses on the enemy and delays his movement. Tanks, independently and together with cavalry and infantry, deliver short blows to the enemy.

420. In mobile defense, in order to gain the greatest amount of time for organizing resistance both at intermediate lines and at the main line, the sequential arrangement of engineering and chemical barriers in the strips between the lines and at the most important approaches to them acquires special importance. For this purpose, troops conducting mobile defense are reinforced with engineering and chemical means.

421. The basis of the communication system in mobile defense is the communication axis of the military formation throughout the entire depth of the defense line with reporting collection points (PS) on the axis.
Radio, mobile equipment, and signaling are widely used in mobile defense. The use of wire agents is limited.
For timely preparation of communications at subsequent lines of defense, communications reserves are echeloned. Reserves must be strong and mobile. In the axial direction, it is necessary to have movable units to collapse the axis lines and at the same time to lay new ones in depth.
Report collection points (RS) are deployed in areas designated for command posts and carry out their service on successively defended lines until subordinate headquarters (CP) withdraw to a new line.
The initial PS is established in the area of the headquarters (CP) of the formation (unit) on the first line of defense. At the same time, the PS is deployed at the next frontier.
The PS is leaving in leaps and bounds.
In addition to mobile equipment, a substation may have a radio station and signaling equipment.

9. Disengagement and withdrawal

422. The decision to withdraw is made when further continuation of the battle is pointless and unprofitable and when only withdrawal can the threat of defeat be avoided. You can decide to retreat only as a last resort, when all means to achieve victory have been exhausted. In all cases, withdrawal should pursue the goal of achieving freedom of action, gaining time and occupying the most advantageous position.
The withdrawal of a military unit can only be carried out by order of the senior commander. The commander of a military formation, on his own initiative, can withdraw only some parts of his formation in order to accept the most advantageous grouping to continue the battle with the enemy, in accordance with the task previously set by the senior commander.
Only the lack of communication gives the commander of a military unit the right to make a decision to withdraw ahead of the deadline set by the senior commander.
When making an independent decision to withdraw, the commander of a military formation withdraws units to such a distance that the neighbors will not be put in a critical situation.

423. Any withdrawal must be organized and carried out according to a specific plan. Retreat is one of the most difficult types of maneuver.
The withdrawal plan includes:
a) occupation of a new defensive zone with the distribution of forces and means for defense on it;
b) routes and order of withdrawal for each part of the military formation;
c) routes, order, areas of withdrawal of rear institutions, order of evacuation of the wounded, sick and property;
d) assignment of units to ensure disengagement from battle;
e) the composition of the rearguard (in separate columns), the lines at which the rearguards must stay and for how long;
f) organization of air defense and chemical warfare;
g) measures to combat parallel prosecution;
h) measures to correct escape routes, bridges and destroy them behind them; i) communication during withdrawal and its destruction behind itself;
j) general measures for obstruction and major destruction of the escape route; k) relocation of airfields and landing sites.

424. In case of close contact with the enemy, withdrawal is preceded by disengagement from the battle.
Disengagement from combat is possible in various environmental conditions.
It can be carried out: under pressure from the enemy, during a period of calm in the battle, unexpectedly for him.
Disengagement from combat can be carried out in day or night conditions.
In all cases, disengagement from battle must be systematic, which is most easily achieved after dark; Therefore, even in difficult conditions, it is necessary to strive to hold out in place until dusk.

425. When organizing a withdrawal from a battle, a combined arms commander, regardless of the time of day, is obliged, first of all, to ensure the separation of troops engaged in battle from the enemy. To do this, he occupies a rear defensive line, which is intended to take over the retreating units and cover their withdrawal with his fire.
To occupy this line, second echelons (strike groups, reserve) are used, and in their absence, parts of the battle formation, which can be removed during the battle, as well as all the artillery that can be brought in for this purpose.
During the day, in open areas, the separation and exit from the battle of retreating units is carried out simultaneously on a wide front and in rolls, under the cover of both their own fire and especially fire from the rear line and combat aircraft.
Tank units can be used for private counterattacks against an advancing enemy.
When leaving the battle at night, you can limit yourself to cover with small reconnaissance units and patrols and individual units reinforced with machine guns and individual infantry artillery guns. The cover left behind, in order to mislead the enemy, displays the same activity that preceded the withdrawal.

426. Having passed the rear line, the retreating troops quickly gather in designated areas, put themselves in order, roll up into columns and, without delay, continue their retreat, under the cover of rearguards, which are mainly created from parts of the rear line.
In the event that, due to the conditions of the situation, units that have left the battle, having passed the rear line, cannot continue further withdrawal under the cover of the rearguards, they carry out this using mobile defense methods.

427. When organizing a retreat, it is necessary to take measures to repel attacks by enemy aircraft and mobile units.
To do this, it is necessary to: regroup anti-aircraft artillery and machine guns in advance, strengthen the air defense of gorges on the escape routes, and prevent accumulations of troops, artillery, and convoys in open areas. At the same time, anti-chemical measures must be provided. Degassing affinities follow at the head of the departing parts in readiness for rapid degassing of passages in case of encountering chemical contamination along the escape routes.
The orderly withdrawal is facilitated by the absence of delays along the way, for which it is necessary to take timely measures to clear the rear routes.
The fight against parallel pursuit is carried out by moving on the flanks of retreating units of detachments from all branches of the military, as well as cavalry and tanks, by constructing barriers and destruction.
Combat aviation assists the rearguard in detaining the advancing enemy and ensures the withdrawal of the main forces from aerial reconnaissance and attack. During the period of withdrawal, it attacks and delays the outflanking and parallel pursuing units. Tanks, cavalry and motorized infantry should be the main targets of air attack.

428. In order to delay the movement of the pursuing enemy, bridges, roads and structures are destroyed according to the general plan of the senior commander. The plan indicates a list of structures subject to destruction, whose order the destruction is carried out and the time of destruction. To destroy railway stations and their structures, crossings and tracks, special teams are allocated from the main forces if railway units have not been allocated or are missing. The bridges over which the rearguard must pass are left unexploded, but are prepared for explosion. The teams left on these bridges produce an explosion after the rearguard crosses the bridge. Small parts can be withdrawn to the other side along bridges from light transport equipment, if the explosion of the bridge must be carried out in advance.

429. Departure management must be particularly flexible and requires extensive use of mobile communications equipment and communications delegates. Short private orders are given to disengage from battle.
To organize a general retreat after leaving the battle, a general order can be given.
Senior commanders and their staffs personally supervise the exit from battle, the passage of troops through the rear line, and putting them in order.
The headquarters are removed only after the withdrawal has been organized and the main forces have begun to move.
Subsequently, depending on the course of events, the headquarters withdraw either in columns or in riffles from line to line, if the withdrawal takes on the character of a mobile defense.

430. The basis of communication when leaving battle and during withdrawal is the communication axis of the formation (unit) with collection points and intermediate communication stations located on the axis.
Disengagement and withdrawal require the use of radio communications, mobile equipment, signaling equipment, and high maneuverability of communications equipment and reserves.
Radio communication, used primarily through radio signaling, is the main means of communication.
The use of wire means is limited by the presence of a communication axis and individual directions at intermediate boundaries.
Particular attention is paid to ensuring communication between rearguards and flank detachments with the combined arms commander and organizing communication of interaction with assigned and supporting reinforcement units.

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