Chapter 3 OSTROGOZHSK-ROSSOSHANSKAYA AND VALUYSK-KHARKOV OPERATIONS After the end of the Kozelsk operation, formations of the 3rd Tank Army were withdrawn to the Kaluga region in the second half of September 1942. The troops were supplemented with personnel and military equipment,

After the success of the Soviet armies at Stalingrad became obvious, the Supreme High Command Headquarters gave the order to the Red Army to launch a general strategic offensive on the front from Leningrad to the Main Caucasus Range. In this offensive, the Voronezh Front was tasked with defeating the enemy on the Upper Don, and then developing success in a western direction, creating conditions for liberation Kharkov.

The Supreme High Command headquarters ordered the troops of the Voronezh Front with the forces of the 3rd Tank Army, the 40th Army and the 18th Separate Rifle Corps to defeat the remnants of the 8th Italian and the main forces of the 2nd Hungarian Army, as well as the forces of the German divisions supporting them in the areas Ostrogozhsk And Rossoshi.

Decisive role in carrying out Ostrogozhsko-Rossoshanskaya (January 13-27, 1943) the offensive operation was assigned to the 3rd Tank Army of General Rybalko P.S. The army had the task, advancing in a 30-kilometer strip (from Pasekovo to Yasinovataya), with a strike from the main forces from the area northwest of Kantemirovka to break through the defenses of the enemy’s 24th Tank Corps in a 10-kilometer area and develop an offensive in the northwest direction.

By the end of the fourth day of the offensive, the army had to reach the line with tank corps Kamenka, Alekseevka, where to connect with the troops of the 40th Army and the 18th Rifle Corps, advancing from the northeast, encircle and destroy the Ostrogozh-Rossoshan enemy group, and the 7th Cavalry Corps to develop success in a western direction, capture Valuyki and Urazovo and cut the railway Kastornaya - Kupyansk. The depth of the army's mission was 150 km, the average daily rate of advance of tank corps was 40 km, and that of rifle divisions was 20 km.

During January 5, Army Commander General Rybalko P.S. carried out reconnaissance of the area with the commanders of tank corps, rifle divisions, chiefs of military branches and army headquarters officers. The army commander decided to break through the enemy's defenses with three rifle divisions and a rifle brigade, reinforced with direct infantry support tanks and artillery, and use tank corps and cavalry corps to develop success.

Considering that in the army’s offensive zone the enemy’s defenses were underdeveloped and their depth did not exceed 4 km, tank corps were planned to be brought into battle after the rifle divisions had advanced to a depth of 3 km.
The 180th and 48th Guards Rifle Divisions were advancing in the center, and on the flanks were the 37th Rifle Brigade and the 184th Rifle Division with reinforcements. At the same time, the 180th Division received the 173rd Separate Tank Brigade for reinforcement, the 184th Division received the 179th Separate Tank Brigade, and the 48th Guards Rifle Division received the 97th Tank Brigade of the 12th Tank Corps.

12 The 1st Tank Corps, reinforced by the 1172nd Anti-Tank Artillery Regiment and the 319th Anti-Aircraft Artillery Regiment, as well as the 40th Engineer Battalion, was tasked with entering the breakthrough at the junction of the 48th Guards and 180th Rifle Divisions, leading to the end day to capture Rossosh and Lizinovka and then advance on Kamenka.

15 The 1st Tank Corps, reinforced by the 368th Anti-Tank Artillery Regiment, the 71st Anti-Aircraft Artillery Regiment and the 47th Engineer Battalion, was supposed to make a breakthrough at the junction of the 48th and 184th divisions and capture Ekaterinivka by the end of the day. and further advance on Varvarovka and Alekseevka. The army artillery group (then called the “long-range group”) included the 38th and 129th cannon regiments of the 8th breakthrough artillery division, and the mortar group included the 15th and 16th Guards Mortar Brigades.

In the middle of the day on January 6, Deputy Supreme Commander-in-Chief Army General G.K. Zhukov arrived at the headquarters of the tank army, located in Kantemirovka. , Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army, Colonel General Vasilevsky A.M. and the commander of the Voronezh Front, Lieutenant General Commander, reported his decision on the operation, and the formation commanders reported on the state of the troops and the progress of preparations for the offensive. The offensive was planned for January 12. However, due to the delay in the regrouping of troops by rail, it was postponed to January 14.

It was a harsh winter. Severe frosts were accompanied by frequent snowfalls and strong blizzards. In some places the snow was more than a meter thick. Therefore, the 130-170-kilometer march from the unloading station to Kantemirovka was not easy for the army troops. It was especially difficult for rifle troops and motorized infantry, who walked on foot, since all vehicles were used to transport ammunition, fuel and food.

By the time the tank army arrived at the unloading station, it consisted of 493 tank, and by the end of January 13 only arrived in the Kantemirovka area 371 tank. The remaining 122 tanks remained en route due to technical faults. For example, the 15th Tank Corps was forced to begin combat operations without two tank brigades, having only 74 tanks in service. Due to the delay in regrouping the rear, there was not enough fuel and ammunition.

During January 7-13, work was underway at all military levels to prepare for the offensive. On January 8, the army's rifle divisions began reconnaissance in force of the enemy's defenses, allocating one reinforced rifle battalion for this purpose. To achieve a stealth offensive, they were assigned the numbering of the battalions of the 350th Infantry Division of the 6th Army defending here, which covered the concentration of the tank army.

By the end of January 13, the army troops had taken up their starting position for the offensive and were ready to strike the enemy. By this time, the army had in service 371 tanks, 1,588 guns and mortars (without anti-aircraft artillery), of which 355 anti-tank guns of 45 mm caliber, 47 BM-8 and BM-13 anti-tank guns. In order to create the necessary artillery densities for artillery preparation, anti-tank artillery was also involved.

Before the troops Voronezh Front, the left wing of the Bryansk Front and right wing of the Southwestern Front The enemy Army Group B was defending, consisting of the 2nd German, 2nd Hungarian and 8th Italian armies, which numbered about 30 divisions. Directly in the Kantemirov direction, where the 3rd Tank Army was to attack, he defended 24 1st German Panzer Corps, 27th Panzer Division and several separate infantry regiments. This corps suffered significant losses in December 1942 and did not have time to create a continuous defense front. 57 thousand Italians who were part of the Alpine Corps occupied positions on the Upper Don.

To their left was the 2nd Hungarian Army, to the right was the 24th German Corps, covering the section of the front abandoned by the Italian divisions during the December retreat. In January 1943, attacks from the Voronezh Front were directed against them. This offensive was carried out as the first encirclement operation after Stalingrad.

According to the operation plan, the Soviet offensive was scheduled for January 14. Already on January 12, the command of the Voronezh Front undertook reconnaissance in force. The subsequent attack by the main forces brought immediate success; the Hungarian divisions quickly rolled back; The German divisions of the 24th Corps were also unable to contain the attacks of the Soviet units.

By the end of January 14, the 15th Tank Corps under the command of Major General of Tank Forces V.L. Koptsov. captured Zhilin on the move, defeating the headquarters of the 24th German Tank Corps and the headquarters of its 385th and 387th infantry divisions. Among the dead was the commander of the 24th Tank Corps, Lieutenant General Vandel. Continuing the offensive, by the morning of January 15 the corps captured Aleksandrovka, and by the end of the day - Eremovka, cutting off the road Rossosh - Rovenki.

The advance of the main forces of the 12th Tank Corps was soon delayed in the area of ​​Mikhailovka and then Mitrofanovka. Only his 106 - I tank brigade. Without getting involved in protracted battles for strong points, on the night of January 15, she captured Lizinovka and found herself deep behind enemy lines. Brigade commander Colonel Alekseev I.E. decided to take advantage of the favorable moment and capture Rossoshya, which was only 5 km away. At dawn on January 15, Soviet tank crews suddenly appeared in Rossosh, where the headquarters of the Italian Alpine Corps was located.

However, the enemy, realizing that only a handful of Soviet tanks had broken into the city, began to offer stubborn resistance. A fierce battle ensued, during which the brigade personnel showed steadfastness, courage and massive heroism. By mid-day, the German command sent aircraft from the Evstratovsky airfield, located 3 km east of the city, to help its garrison. Under its attacks, tanks began to fail one after another, and those remaining in service were running out of ammunition and fuel. The brigade was forced to leave Rossosh and retreat to the railway station, which was to be captured.

At the end of the day, when the critical moment arrived, the brigade commander Colonel himself went on the attack Alekseev. His tank burst into the station. But then an enemy shell hit him, and the car burst into flames. The death of the brigade commander caused a new surge of hatred towards the enemy among the tankers. They captured the station, capturing several echelons of the enemy there, and held it until the main forces of the corps arrived. At the same time, tankers under the command of Senior Lieutenant Tsyganka V.N. captured the Evstratovsky airfield, destroying several enemy aircraft there.

By the end of January 15, the 30th and 97th tank brigades of the 12th Tank Corps, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel L.I. Kurist, approached Rossoshi. and Colonel Potapov I.T. However, they were unable to break into the city and provide assistance to the 106th Brigade, since the enemy by this time had taken up a strong defense on the left bank of the Chernaya Kalitva River and was offering stubborn resistance. Only with the approach of the 13th Motorized Rifle Brigade and one regiment of the 180th Infantry Division on the morning of January 16 was enemy resistance broken, and in the afternoon the city was liberated from German and Italian troops. During the battles for Rossosh, the corps destroyed up to 2 thousands of Germans and captured 1,2 thousands of enemy soldiers and officers.

After the liberation of the village of Eremovka, the 15th Tank Corps continued to advance in the direction of Martynovtsy and Shelyakino. But since all the forces of the 12th Tank Corps were aimed at Rossosh, on the morning of January 16, the army commander ordered the 15th Tank Corps to advance in the direction of Girla, Prikhodin and capture Olkhovatka. The strong enemy garrison defending Olkhovatka offered stubborn resistance to the corps. Then the corps commander, General Koptsov, sent a group of tanks with machine gunners to bypass Olkhovatka from the west.

The group immediately took possession of Maryevka. With the fall of this settlement, the enemy garrison of Olkhovatka, fearing encirclement, began to retreat to the northwest. By the end of January 16 Olkhovatka was liberated, although its clearing of individual enemy groups continued until 7 o'clock on January 17. During the battles for it, up to 500 were destroyed and up to 2 thousand Germans, 15 thousand cars and 300 carts were captured.

In the battle for Olkhovatka, the personnel of the 52nd motorized rifle brigade under the command of Lieutenant Colonel A.L. Golovachev especially distinguished themselves. The sailors who staffed this brigade bravely fought the enemy, showing courage and heroism.

Following the tank corps, rifle divisions advanced. 180th Infantry Division, Major General Maloshitsky I.Ya. and the 173rd Tank Brigade of Lieutenant General of Tank Forces V.A. Mishulin. defeated the enemy in the Mitrofanovka area and by the end of January 16 entered Rossosh, the 37th Infantry Brigade captured Morozovka (5 km northeast of Mitrofanovka), covering the right flank of the army from enemy attacks from the east.

48th Guards Rifle Division, Major General I.M. Makovchuk with the 179th Tank Brigade of Colonel F.N. Rudkin. was moving to Olkhovatka, and the 184th Infantry Division of Colonel Koida S.T. advanced to the northwest.
The offensive also developed successfully on the left flank of the army. On the morning of January 15, the 7th Cavalry Corps of Major General S.V. Sokolov was brought into the battle. Without meeting any serious resistance along the way, the corps, by the end of January 16, broke the resistance of the 5th Italian division and captured Nagolnaya and Rovenki.

On the night of January 17, the army resumed its offensive. A blizzard was raging. The road to Podgornoye, along which the main forces of the 12th Tank Corps were to move, was covered with snow and became impassable. The corps was forced to advance on Kamenka through the village of Postoyaly, where there was a road cleared by the enemy. Thundering the rear of the enemy and its individual groups on its way, the 106th Tank Brigade, commanded by Colonel Dagilis I.M., liberated Tatarino by the morning of January 18. By the morning of January 19, the main forces of the corps captured the village of Karpenkovo.

By this time, the corps had only 44 tanks in service. Therefore, having reached the line Karpenkovo, Tatarino, he went on the defensive, repelling continuous attacks by enemy troops trying to break through to the west to avoid encirclement. On the morning of January 20, the 192nd Tank Brigade approached Karpenkovo ​​from the northeast, followed by the 161st Rifle Division of the 18th Rifle Corps, commanded by Major General P.M. Zykov. As a result of the connection of the 12th Tank and 18th Rifle Corps at Karpenkovo, the Rossoshan enemy group, which included the Italian Alpine Corps, the 7th Hungarian Corps and the remnants of the 24th Wehrmacht Tank Corps, was surrounded. Surrounded 8 divisions: 4 Italian, 2 German and 2 Hungarian.

The 15th Tank Corps also advanced successfully. At 18 o'clock on January 17, his 88th tank brigade (20 tanks) under the command of Colonel Sergeev I.I. burst into Alekseevka. But then a counterattack by superior enemy forces followed, and the brigade, not having the necessary amount of infantry, was forced to retreat to the southern outskirts of the city. Only with the approach of the 52nd motorized rifle brigade, Colonel L.A. Golovachev. enemy resistance was broken, and by 15:00 on January 19, the corps captured Alekseevka. 4,030 enemy soldiers and officers were captured, 700 vehicles, 300 carts, and 9 railway trains with cargo were captured.

Alekseevka was a major road junction in the direction of retreat of the Ostrogozh enemy group. Therefore, the Germans soon brought up new forces and began to counterattack the brigades of the 15th Panzer Corps, intending to drive them out of the city. Having repelled the enemy's onslaught, the corps resumed the offensive and on January 21 united with the 305th Infantry Division of Colonel A.P. Krutikhin. from the 40th Army of General Having united, the troops of the 15th Tank Corps and the 40th Army completed the encirclement of the Ostrogozh enemy group consisting of five divisions.

During these days, the 7th Cavalry Corps acted boldly and decisively. On January 19, he captured Valuyki with an attack on the move, and on January 20, Urazov. Developing the offensive, the 156th Cavalry Regiment, reinforced by a tank company of the 201st Tank Brigade, captured Volokonovka on the morning of January 22. In the battles for these cities, the corps defeated the 5th Alpine Mountain Division of the Italians and the 619th Grenadier Regiment, as well as enemy rear units and institutions.

The enemy lost over 2 thousand people killed, about 5 thousand people were captured. The corps captured several dozen serviceable aircraft, 98 guns, 8 locomotives, a large number of vehicles, and many different warehouses and military equipment. Having captured Valuyki and Urazov, the corps protected the main forces of the tank army from enemy attacks from the west and deprived it of the opportunity to use the railway line. For successful actions in the operation, it was reorganized into the 6th Guards Cavalry Corps.

As already noted, with the entry of the 12th Tank and 18th Rifle Corps into the Karpenkovo ​​area, the encirclement of the enemy’s Rossoshan group was completed. However, due to the fact that most of the rifle divisions of the tank army were advancing in a western direction, the encirclement front was not continuous. Taking advantage of this, the enemy began to retreat to the west, mainly through Podgornoye to Postoyaly. In order to prevent the enemy from breaking out of the encirclement, the commander of the tank army on the night of January 19th threw his reserve towards him - the 113th and 195th tank brigades, which by that time were in Rossosh, having 8-10 tanks in service.

By the morning of January 19, tank brigades commanded by Colonels A.G. Sviridov. and Levi S.V., having passed Postoyoy, went to the area of ​​the settlement of Bolshoye Skororyba and to the south of it. But they were unable to hold back the enemy’s columns of thousands and were forced to retreat to the village of Postoyaly.

The retreat of the Italian Alpine Corps lasted 15 days. Huge crowds of people of different nationalities, suffering from cold and hunger, moved west. They walked through the snow-covered steppe, along roads clogged with abandoned cars and carts. Wherever the Alpines went, they invariably ran into Soviet troops or partisans, under whose attacks the retreating columns thinned out. This march ended in Shebekino, more than 300 km from the Don. From 57 thousands of people who were surrounded barely managed to escape 27 thousands. During the retreat, the Alpine Corps lost 90% of horses and mules, 99% of vehicles, 100% of artillery, automatic weapons and materiel.

On January 20, regiments of the 180th Infantry Division of the Red Army began to arrive in the area where the enemy’s Rossoshan group had broken through, but they were unable to hold back the onslaught of superior enemy forces. On January 21, to fight the breaking through enemy troops, the army commander sent the 62nd Guards and 160th Rifle Divisions of Major General G.M. Zaitsev. and Colonel Sedulin E.Zh. These divisions of the 6th Army were reassigned to the 3rd Tank Army on January 20. However, several enemy columns managed to escape from the encirclement.

With the Rossoshan and Ostrogozh enemy groups encircled, the 3rd Tank Army received the task of part of its forces, in cooperation with the 18th Separate Rifle Corps, to complete the destruction of the encircled Rossoshan enemy group, and the main forces, primarily tank corps, to regroup in the Valuyki area in readiness in the morning On January 27, go on the offensive against Kharkov.

However, at the indicated time, the army was unable to go on the offensive, since the fight against the enemy’s Rossoshan group dragged on for a long time and for this it had to involve both tank corps. Until the end of January 25, the 15th Tank Corps participated in the liquidation of the Ostrogozh enemy group north of Alekseevka and only began regrouping on the morning of January 27. Having completed a 120-kilometer march, he concentrated in the Valuyek area by the morning of January 29.

The 12th Tank Corps, having completed a 150-kilometer march, concentrated in the Valuyek area also by the morning of January 29, since during the regrouping it was forced to repeatedly engage in battle with individual enemy groups that had escaped from encirclement. The regrouping of the corps took place in difficult conditions: severe snowstorms raged for several days, and the roads became impassable for vehicles. The rear fell behind. Due to the lack of fuel, the tanks stood idle for a long time.

The regrouping of most of the rifle divisions was also delayed, since during the advance to Valuyki they also fought with enemy units that had escaped from encirclement. Most of them arrived in the Valuyek area only on January 29-31. Only the 184th Infantry Division arrived in the Valuyek area on January 24 and went on the defensive 4-6 km west of the city, ensuring the concentration of the main forces of the army. For these reasons, the attack on Kharkov was postponed to February 2.

The army's January offensive was marked by major successes. Behind For 16 days, the army fought about 300 km and liberated a significant territory from the enemy. The enemy lost 28,254 people killed, including 3 generals and 43 senior officers. 28 tanks, 13 armored vehicles, 764 motor vehicles and 79 guns were destroyed, 73,176 enemy soldiers and officers were captured, including 3 generals and 209 senior officers, 44 tanks, 13 armored vehicles, about 5,000 vehicles, 272 motorcycles, 39 aircraft, 196 guns, 605 machine guns, 3,500 horses and a large number of various warehouses. 3rd Tank Army lost 11 902 people, of which 3016 people were killed, and 58 tanks.

After the defeat of the Alpine Corps, there were no combat-ready Italian divisions left on the Soviet-German front. By order of the German command, on February 1, the Italian army left its sector, and the remnants of the defeated divisions went on foot to the reorganization zone, northeast of Kyiv. According to official data from the Italian General Staff, from December 11, 1942 to January 31, 1943, the Italian army on the Soviet-German front lost 84,830 people killed, missing and captured, and 29,690 wounded and frostbitten. This was equal to 60% of the officers and 49% of the rank and file of the army before the start of the offensive.

The article was written based on the materials of the book Moshchansky I.B., Isaev A.V. “Triumphs and tragedies of the Great War”, M., “Veche”, 2010, p. 224-232.

Ostrogozh-Rossoshan offensive operation

Preparations for the operation began on November 23, 1942, the day the encirclement of Paulus’s army near Stalingrad was completed, when the commander of the 40th Army, General K. S. Moskalenko (received the army in October from Major General F. F. Zhmachenko, who, in connection with thereby returning to fulfill his direct duties as deputy army commander) appealed to the Supreme Commander-in-Chief with a request for permission to begin military operations on the Upper Don. Stalin was very interested in this proposal. A few days later, he sent a representative of the Supreme Command Headquarters, Army General G.K. Zhukov, to the 40th Army, who was at first very skeptical. But, having visited the army command post, and then the Storozhevsky bridgehead at the location of the 25th Guards and 107th Rifle Divisions, he finally stated: “I will report to the Supreme Commander-in-Chief about everything I saw and heard during my stay in the 40th Army. I will support the proposal to conduct an offensive operation.”

By that time, the 40th Army included four rifle divisions - 100, 159, 206, 141st, one tank brigade (14th), two fighter brigades and a number of reinforcement artillery and mortar regiments. With such a composition of the army, its defense on a 60-kilometer front, naturally, was stretched out in one line and had no depth. However, already at the beginning of November 1942, some changes occurred in the position of the army. By order of the new front commander, Lieutenant General F.I. Golikov (he replaced N.F. Vatutin in this post on October 22), the section of the front from the northeastern outskirts of Voronezh to the village of Kremenchug was transferred to the neighbor on the right - the 60th Army, along with the troops defending this sector - the 100th, 159th and 206th rifle divisions. The 40th Army on the left cut off part of the 6th Army's strip, including the so-called Storozhevsky bridgehead, which later played an important role in delivering the main blow in the Ostrogozh-Rossoshan operation.

The Storozhevsky bridgehead was located on the western bank of the Don, 25 km north of the city of Korotoyak and represented an area measuring 13 km along the front and 8 km in depth. The settlements of Titchikha, Selyavnoye, the eastern part of the village of Storozhevoye 1st and Uryvo-Pokrovskoye were located here. They were released when the bridgehead was captured at the end of July by the 25th Guards Rifle Division of Major General P. M. Shafarenko and other troops of the 6th Army. With the transfer of the Storozhevsky and - to the south - Uryvsky bridgeheads to K. S. Moskalenko, the troops defending it entered the 40th Army, including the guards of General P. M. Shafarenko, as well as the 107th Infantry Division, commanded by Colonel P. M. Bezhko.

In the defense zone of the 40th Army there were other bridgeheads, for example in the area of ​​Alexandrovka, Arkhangelsky, and the Cherpetsky farm. But they were insignificant in area and provided only a slight positional advantage. The Storozhevsky bridgehead, being in the hands of Soviet units, posed an operational and tactical threat to the German command. Therefore, after repeated fruitless attempts to eliminate it, the German command was forced to keep more than two infantry divisions on the defensive here.

Most of the troops opposing the 40th Army were the 2nd Hungarian Army (6, 7, 9, 10, 12, 13, 19, 20, 23rd infantry divisions, ski battalions of the 8th and 22nd cavalry divisions and 1 1st Hungarian Armored Division), and in its ranks there were many soldiers and officers who did not want to fight for the interests of Germany, and this to a certain extent made the solution of the problem easier.

By that time, Hungary, drawn by its government into the war on the side of Germany, had already suffered heavy losses on the Soviet-German front. Only in the period from October 1941 to September 1942 were the 102nd, 108th and 109th Hungarian infantry divisions almost completely destroyed, and four others - the 6th, 7th, 9th and 20th - lost about half of their personnel.

In September, the Horthy Hungarian troops opposing the 40th Army received large reinforcements. But, despite the calm that lasted here throughout the autumn and part of the winter, they continued to suffer heavy losses, especially from Soviet snipers. This increased the demoralization of the Hungarian soldiers and their depressing mood. The troops opposing the 40th Army were located like this: in the first echelon - Hungarians, in the second - Germans, and the latter were there not so much for joint action and to provide assistance to the ally, but to intimidate the Hungarian soldiers who did not particularly want to fight.

The 24th German Tank Corps included 5 infantry divisions (19, 213, 298, 385, 387th), the 27th Wehrmacht Panzer Division, as well as several separate infantry regiments. In December 1942, this corps suffered significant losses and, in fact, by the beginning of 1943 did not have time to create a continuous defense front. To the right of the 2nd Hungarian Army was the Italian Alpine Corps (a total of 57 thousand people), as well as the 24th Wehrmacht Tank Corps, which covered the section of the front abandoned by the Italian divisions during the December retreat.

The Hungarian and, in some places, German troops opposing the 40th Army reached the western bank of the Don in early July 1942 and since then, for more than five months, they have been creating and improving defenses. Its front edge ran along the right bank of the Don, which rises almost a hundred meters above the left. This allowed the enemy to view the location of Soviet troops to great depth and create a system of flanking fire along the river bed and on the slopes of the steep bank.

At the front line, the enemy command concentrated the bulk of automatic weapons. For machine guns, a system of bunkers was built, interconnected by trenches with rifle cells. Communication passages branched off from the trenches into the depths of the defense. The intervals between the bunkers, as well as the distance from them to the machine-gun crews located behind the dugouts, did not exceed 75–100 m. All this was supplemented by three rows of wire barriers arranged in front of the front edge, and in some areas - Bruno spirals and hedgehogs. When it got dark, security groups of 5-6 people with a light or heavy machine gun were posted at the wire fences. Patrols of 2–4 people moved between them. Both were quite clearly visible, since observers, equipped with signal pistols and rockets, illuminated the approaches to their front line every 1–2 minutes.

According to Soviet intelligence, the enemy's second line of defense was a system of strongholds located at heights, in populated areas and individual groves. Each of them, depending on its size and tactical importance, had a garrison consisting of a platoon, company or battalion. The terrain deep in the enemy defenses was crossed by ravines, small river beds, and copses. These natural obstacles were used to strengthen the defense.

The strongest strongholds were established in the villages of Storozhevoye 1st and Uryvo-Pokrovskoye, as well as in the so-called Orekhovoy Grove. The walnut grove was located at height 185 not far from the enemy’s front line. The strong point created there was a key one, and its capture would have undermined the entire defense of the troops opposing the 40th Army on the Storozhevsky bridgehead. It was also significant that in Orekhovoy Roshcha and in Uryvo-Pokrovskoye units of one formation were defending, and in neighboring Storozhevoy 1st - of another. It was the Walnut Grove that was thus located at the junction of two formations, which to some extent made it easier to break through their defenses. The strong point located at height 185 was a key position.

On December 21, when a rather dense ring was created around the encircled enemy group near Stalingrad, and the attempt to unblock it ended in failure, the Supreme High Command Headquarters again returned to the plan of defeating enemy troops in the area of ​​Ostrogozhsk and Rossosh. The start of the offensive was scheduled for January 12, 1943. To carry it out, two combined arms (6, 40) and 3rd tank armies were involved, as well as the 18th separate rifle corps. By the beginning of the operation, the strike group of Soviet troops consisted of 210 thousand soldiers and officers, 3,155 guns and mortars, 797 tanks and 208 aircraft. The enemy Ostrogozh-Rossoshan group, which included more than 21 divisions - six German, ten Hungarian and five Italian, numbered at least 260 thousand soldiers and officers and had over 300 tanks, 900 guns, about 8,400 machine guns and more than 800 mortars.

Attaching great importance to this operation, the Headquarters at the beginning of January 1943 again sent G.K. Zhukov and A.M. Vasilevsky to the Voronezh Front. Together with the front command, they clarified her plan and provided assistance in preparation. The plan of the operation was to deliver the main attack on the directions converging on Alekseevka with the forces of the 40th Army of General K. S. Moskalenko and the 3rd Tank Army of General P. S. Rybalko, by the end of the fourth or fifth day - the encirclement of enemy troops in the area of ​​Ostrogozhsk, Rossoshi and in a short time the completion of their defeat. An auxiliary frontal attack from the Shchuchye bridgehead in the direction of Shchuchye and Karpenkovo ​​was to be delivered by the divisions of the 18th separate rifle corps of General P. M. Zykov. It was assumed that the actions of the 40th Army on the flanks would be supported by the 4th Tank Corps, and the offensive of the 3rd Tank Army by the 6th Army of the Southwestern Front. It was planned to create internal and external encirclement fronts. By the end of the operation, it was planned to capture the line of Repyevka, Valuiki, Pokrovskoye.

Such a plan best suited the current situation and made it possible to make the best use of the operational advantage of the troops of the Voronezh Front - a bridgehead on the Don, covering the position in relation to the enemy, as well as his weakness. At the same time, the experience of the Stalingrad operation was also taken into account, but unlike the latter, the attack on converging directions here was to be delivered not by front-line, but by army formations. It is impossible not to mention such an advantage of this plan as carrying out, simultaneously with the encircling actions, a frontal dissecting strike by the forces of the 18th Rifle Corps, which created favorable preconditions for the rapid defeat of a large enemy group.

In preparation for the operation, many complex operational measures were envisaged. First of all, this is a regrouping from the depths and along the front of eight rifle divisions and six tank brigades, then the withdrawal of the arriving cavalry and three tank corps, five rifle divisions, tank and three ski-rifle brigades, as well as three artillery divisions to the initial areas of attack. At the same time, concentration and regrouping were carried out in difficult conditions: up to 40% of formations and units made long night marches in blizzards and blizzards, along impassable roads at a distance of 100 to 175, and sometimes up to 350 km. Due to endless breakdowns, many tanks did not reach the front line. Thus, in the 3rd Tank Army, only 306 out of 428 tanks arrived from the unloading station to the designated area. Some formations, such as the 4th Tank Corps, were not able to approach the start of hostilities at all.

Considering that an enemy offensive in the front line was unlikely, the command boldly went to weaken the secondary directions and, due to this, created strike groups that, due to their combat capabilities, could break through the defenses and develop success into operational depth. In total, 12 rifle divisions and 2 tank corps were concentrated in three breakthrough areas 34 km wide (12% of the total offensive front). This made it possible to achieve superiority over the enemy in personnel by 2.7–3.2 times, in artillery by 5–8 times, and in tanks by 1.3–2 times. Lines and positions in secondary sectors of the offensive were occupied only by individual units and subunits. The density here was one battalion per 10 km of front.

Artillery played an important role in the upcoming offensive. With massive fire, it was supposed to ensure a breakthrough of the enemy defense to the entire tactical depth, prevent enemy counterattacks on the flanks, especially on the right, and in every possible way contribute to the destruction of his reserves, and then the dissection and destruction of the entire group. In the 40th Army and the 18th Separate Rifle Corps, in the offensive zones of which, according to reconnaissance data, the enemy’s defense was the deepest, army and corps artillery groups were created. 120 minutes were allotted for artillery preparation of the attack. A large number of guns were planned to be used for direct fire.

The decisive role in the Ostrogozh-Rossoshan offensive operation was assigned to the 3rd Tank Army under the command of the old cavalryman General P. S. Rybalko. It consisted of the 12th (30, 97, 106th brigade; 13th motorized rifle brigade, 13th mine engineering company, 6th reconnaissance battalion, 88th and 93rd mobile repair bases) and the 15th (88th, 113, 195 Tank Brigade; 52nd Motorized Rifle Brigade, 5th Reconnaissance Battalion, 71st and 96th Mobile Repair Bases) tank corps and 39th Reconnaissance Armored Battalion. Before the offensive, the army additionally included the 7th Cavalry Corps with the 201st Tank Brigade, the 180th and 184th Rifle Divisions, the 173rd Separate Tank Brigade, the 8th Artillery Division, the 15th and 16th Guards mortar brigades, 97th Guards Mortar Regiment, 46th and 47th engineering reserve battalions of the Supreme High Command Headquarters.

According to the staff, the heavy tank brigade of the tank army consisted of 24 heavy KV tanks and 27 light T-60/T-70 tanks (as of January 3, 1943, the 3rd Tank Army had only one 97th heavy tank brigade of the 12th Tank Corps .- Note auto), and in the rest - 20 medium tanks T-34 and 26 light tanks T-70/T-60. As of January 12, 1943, the 201st Tank Brigade included 49 English-made tanks: 6 MK II Matilda and 43 MK III Valentine. On January 15, 1943, the 173rd Tank Brigade had 5 KVs, 21 T-34s and 20 T-70/T-60s.

The army had the task, advancing in a 30-kilometer strip (from Pasekovo to Yasinovataya), with a strike from the main forces from the area northwest of Kantemirovka to break through the defenses of the enemy’s 24th Tank Corps in a 10-kilometer area and develop an offensive in the northwest direction. By the end of the fourth day of the offensive, the army had to reach the Kamenka-Alekseevka line with tank corps, where it would unite with the troops of the 40th Army and the 18th Rifle Corps, advancing from the northeast, encircle and destroy the Ostrogozh-Rossoshan enemy group, and the 7th m cavalry corps to develop success in a western direction, capture Valuyki and Urazovo and cut the Kastornaya - Kupyansk railway. The depth of the army's mission was 150 km, the average daily rate of advance of tank corps was 40 km, and that of rifle divisions was 20 km.

To support the army's combat operations, the 227th assault and 205th fighter aviation divisions, the 646th and 715th night aviation regiments (U-2) of the 2nd Air Army were allocated.

During January 5, Army Commander P.S. Rybalko, with the commanders of tank corps, rifle divisions, heads of military branches and army headquarters officers, carried out reconnaissance of the area. The army commander decided to break through the enemy's defenses with three rifle divisions and a rifle brigade, reinforced with close support tanks and artillery, and use the tank corps and cavalry corps to develop the success. Considering that in the army’s offensive zone the enemy’s defenses were underdeveloped and their depth did not exceed 4 km, tank corps were planned to be brought into battle after the rifle divisions had advanced to a depth of 3 km.

The 180th and 48th Guards Rifle Divisions were advancing in the center, and on the flanks were the 37th Rifle Brigade and the 184th Rifle Division with reinforcements. At the same time, the 180th Division received the 173rd Separate Tank Brigade for reinforcement, and the 48th Guards Rifle Division received the 97th Tank Brigade of the 12th Tank Corps.

The 12th Tank Corps, reinforced by the 1172nd anti-tank artillery and 319th anti-aircraft artillery regiments, as well as the 40th engineering battalion, was tasked with entering the breakthrough at the junction of the 48th Guards and 180th Rifle Divisions, to by the end of the day, capture Rossosh and Lizinovka and then advance on Kamenka. The 15th Tank Corps, reinforced by the 368th Anti-Tank Artillery Regiment, the 71st Anti-Aircraft Artillery Regiment and the 47th Engineer Battalion, was supposed to make a breakthrough at the junction of the 48th and 184th divisions and take possession by the end of the day Ekaterinivka and further advance on Varvarovka and Alekseevka.

The army artillery group (then called the “long-range group”) included the 38th and 129th cannon regiments of the 8th breakthrough artillery division, and the mortar group included the 15th and 16th Guards Mortar Brigades.

By the time the tank army arrived at the unloading station, it consisted of 493 tanks (with the 173rd and 201st tank brigades attached to it), and by the end of January 13, only 371 tanks had arrived in the Kantemirovka area. The remaining 122 tanks remained en route due to technical faults. Most of them were from the 15th Tank Corps, and primarily from the 113th and 195th Tank Brigades. This was explained by the fact that, planning the offensive of the Voronezh Front, the Supreme High Command Headquarters initially decided to strengthen it only with the 12th Tank Corps of the army, ordering the commander of the tank army to fully staff it with personnel and military equipment at the expense of the 15th Tank Corps. At the same time, it was ordered that all tanks of the 12th Tank Corps, which had the smallest supply of engine hours, be transferred to the 15th Tank Corps, and new tanks from the 15th Corps were transferred to the 12th Tank Corps. This was done at the expense of the 113th and 195th tank brigades. But soon it was decided to involve the entire tank army in the operation. Therefore, the regrouping of the 15th Panzer Corps began much later than the 12th Panzer Corps and it had significantly less time to prepare for the offensive. Moreover, the 113th and 195th tank brigades arrived in the concentration area only towards the end of January 12, having 10–12 tanks in service, the rest were on the way due to technical faults. By order of the army commander, all serviceable tanks of these brigades were transferred to the 88th tank brigade of the corps, and the brigades were transferred to the army reserve with the task of organizing the collection and repair of lagging tanks. Thus, the 15th Tank Corps was forced to begin combat operations without two tank brigades, having only 74 tanks in service. Due to the delay in regrouping the rear, there was not enough fuel and ammunition.

During January 7–13, work was underway at all military levels to prepare for the offensive. On January 8, the army's rifle divisions began reconnaissance in force of the enemy's defenses, allocating one reinforced rifle battalion for this purpose. To achieve a stealth offensive, they were assigned the numbering of the battalions of the 350th Infantry Division of the 6th Army defending here, which covered the concentration of the tank army.

By the end of January 13, the army troops had taken up their starting position for the offensive and were ready to strike the enemy. By this time, the army had in service 371 tanks (with the 201st tank brigade attached to the 7th Cavalry Corps), 1,588 guns and mortars (without anti-aircraft artillery), of which 355 anti-tank guns of 45 mm caliber, 47 RS BM-8 installations and BM-13. In order to create the necessary artillery densities for artillery preparation, anti-tank artillery was also involved.

Another feature of the use of tanks in this operation was that for direct support of the infantry, 7 separate tank brigades and a tank regiment were assigned to the first echelon rifle formations. This made it possible to create a tactical density of 10–15 tanks per 1 km of front, which made it possible to deliver a strong blow to the enemy. Moreover, tank brigades were not distributed among rifle regiments and battalions, but were used centrally. The tank corps of the 3rd Tank Army were planned to be brought into battle on the first day to complete the breakthrough of the main line of defense, and subsequently they were to develop an offensive with the aim of encircling the enemy group.

Aviation of the 2nd Air Army (commander - General K.N. Smirnov) was planned to be used in two groups in each direction. The northern group supported the fighting of the 40th Army and the 18th Separate Rifle Corps, and the southern group supported the offensive of the 3rd Tank Army and the 7th Cavalry Corps. The tasks of aviation are to support infantry and tanks when they break through defenses, cover mobile troops, and strike at enemy reserves, airfields and railways.

Regarding the achievement of surprise in the offensive, A. M. Vasilevsky later recalled: “We developed and implemented a whole system of measures to camouflage and keep secret all regroupings of troops and preparatory work. Much attention was also paid to measures to disinform the enemy.” False regroupings of troops, secret placement of equipment models, and clearing of roads from snow drifts in secondary directions were carried out. In the zones of the 38th and 60th armies, the concentration of artillery was simulated by equipping firing positions, zeroing in individual guns, etc. However, the covert deployment of strike forces was complicated by the limited area of ​​the bridgeheads from which the 40th Army and the 18th went on the offensive separate rifle corps. Therefore, almost all formations during the day moved along those roads that led to passive sectors of the front, and then, at night, to actual regional concentrations.

In general, operational camouflage had a positive effect. As the captured commander of the 3rd Hungarian Army Corps, General Sztom, later showed, the Hungarian command, although it foresaw the offensive of the Soviet troops, was on a much smaller scale. This is understandable: after all, it determined the composition of the Soviet troops in the area of ​​the Storozhevsky bridgehead by only a third. And the command of the 24th German Tank Corps in the direction of the main attack of the 3rd Tank Army in the Kantemirovka area did not reveal two tank and cavalry corps at all. In turn, the command of Army Group B expected the Soviet troops to go on the offensive from the areas of Liski and Pavlovsk, and therefore concentrated their reserve on the direction of the auxiliary, and not the main attack of the Voronezh Front.

Due to the great distance between the strike groups from each other, the front command assigned a special place to the organization of command and control of troops and close interaction between them. For this purpose, front headquarters officers were sent to armies and corps, and auxiliary command posts for combat aviation groups were created at army headquarters. Since the front command was located 180 km from the southern sector of the breakthrough, an auxiliary front command post was also deployed in the 3rd Tank Army. The command posts of the armies and corps were close to the first echelon formations.

Issues of material support for the operation were not left without attention. According to the decision of the commander of the Voronezh Front, it was planned to accumulate 3–3.5 rounds of ammunition and 5 refills of fuel and lubricants. Despite all the desire, it was not possible to achieve this by the beginning of the operation, especially in the 3rd Tank Army. After all, for the supply of material resources, it had a total of about 270 vehicles and 88 tank trucks, and there was no horse-drawn transport at all. The commander had to use part of the combat vehicles for this, which entailed the dismounting of the motorized infantry and could lead to it falling behind the tank brigades in battle. By the beginning of the offensive, the army managed to accumulate only 1-2 rounds of ammunition.

Measures were also taken to increase the mobility of troops in snowy winter conditions. For each division, 400–500 sleds were prepared to transport soldiers with heavy weapons. Units were provided with skis, vehicles - with sets of chains.

During preparations for the offensive, special attention was paid to strengthening the 40th Army of General K. S. Moskalenko. The army, consisting of five rifle divisions, one rifle, three tank and two fighter brigades, artillery and mortar divisions, was the northern attack group of the front and did not have a numerical superiority over the enemy in either strength or means along its entire front. However, on the Storozhevsky bridgehead the ratio of the number of battalions was 2.7:1, guns and mortars - 5:1, tanks - 1.3:1 in favor of the Soviet troops. This was the result of a decisive massing of the main forces and means in the breakthrough area.

Reinforcement units promised by the Supreme Commander-in-Chief began arriving in the army in December. The headquarters gave the army the 10th artillery division, led by Colonel V.B. Khusid, the 4th Guards Mortar Division, Colonel S.A. Bordin, and the 5th Anti-Aircraft Artillery Division, Colonel V.M. Shevelev. The army had never received such reinforcement with artillery even in August and September at Stalingrad. Now, in only three divisions there were eight artillery regiments, two guards mortar brigades, two guards mortar regiments and four anti-aircraft artillery regiments.

Thanks to this, as well as the concentration of military artillery, the army command was able to mass artillery weapons in the breakthrough area on the eve of the Ostrogozh-Rossoshan offensive operation. Here it had 108 guns and mortars per 1 km of front, and the long-range army artillery group consisted of eleven divisions with six guns of 122 mm caliber and higher. In addition to the above-mentioned rocket artillery division (4th), K. S. Moskalenko also had four separate regiments and one separate rocket artillery division at his disposal.

At the same time, there were fewer tanks in the army than planned. This was due to the fact that the 4th Tank Corps was unable to arrive in the 40th Army zone in a timely manner and did not take part in the Ostrogozh-Rossoshan operation. K. S. Moskalenko had only three separate tank brigades at his disposal (86, 116, 150 tank brigades). According to the list, they had 133 combat vehicles (in reality - 89), which were used for direct support of the infantry. Due to the delay of the 4th Tank Corps, the army had only slightly more tanks than the enemy, who had in the second echelon, north-west of the Storozhevsky bridgehead, the 700th combined tank battalion, numbering 10 medium tanks Pz.Kpfw.38(t) , 10 self-propelled guns StuG.III.Ausf.F/F8 from the 201st assault gun division and 40 light tanks of Czech production Pz.Kpfw.38(t).

Combat composition of the tank forces of the Red Army in the Ostrogozh-Rossoshan operation (January 13–27, 1943)

The beginning of the Ostrogozh-Rossoshan front offensive operation. In early January 1943, representatives of the Supreme Command Headquarters, front and army headquarters conducted an offensive readiness check directly in formations and units. It turned out that not everything planned could be completed by the deadline set from above. In a report to the Supreme Commander-in-Chief dated January 7, G.K. Zhukov and A.M. Vasilevsky reported: “The concentration of troops, despite the assurances of Comrade. Khrulev, things are going exceptionally poorly: not a single echelon has arrived from the 4th Mortar Division, 15 echelons are still on the way from the 3rd TA, 10 echelons from the 7th KK have still not arrived today, from the three rifle divisions given to the front for reinforcement, only 5 echelons arrived. The supply of supply transports (ammunition, fuel) is even worse. Taking into account the disruption of railway transportation, we were forced to add plus two to the deadline known to you.” So, the start of the operation was postponed to January 14. But two days before the scheduled date, it was decided to conduct reconnaissance in force with the help of advanced detachments.

On January 12, at 11.00, a barrage of fire hit the front line of the troops defending against the group of troops on the Storozhevsky bridgehead. Following the salvo of rocket launchers, there were deafening explosions of 33 extended charges placed by sappers under the enemy's wire barriers. Following this, the leading battalions immediately entered the battle: they had to reveal the true outline of the front line of its defense.

Reconnaissance in force achieved its greatest success in the zone of the 40th Army, whose commander took a certain risk.

It must be said that back in early December, the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, in an order concerning the preparation of offensive operations of the Southwestern and Voronezh fronts, indicated: “... Since the Germans know about our M-30s, blowing up the entire front line of defense, they have therefore learned the tactics the following: - only security is left at the front line, and the front line of defense itself is moved to a depth of 4–10 km. We must counter this German tactics with our own countertactics, and it lies in the fact that before going on the offensive, we need to do combat reconnaissance in order to reveal the front line of the defense, and we must get to the front line of the enemy’s defense at all costs. Conduct a series of active reconnaissance, take prisoners and find out everything through them, so as not to waste ammunition in vain. Conduct reconnaissance in force, in separate battalions, two days before the start of the operation.”

K. S. Moskalenko knew the contents of this order, and he fully understood its validity. At the same time, it was clear that it concerned those areas where the front line of the enemy’s defense had not been opened, therefore, this order could not apply to the zone of the upcoming breakthrough of the 40th Army, since here the front line of the enemy defense had been carefully studied. The army command knew the organizational structure of each German, Hungarian or Italian division, its weapons, combat and numerical strength, the location of command and observation posts of divisions, regiments and battalions, the location of artillery and mortar firing positions. Army intelligence even knew the names of the commanders of enemy units and formations.

But no matter how much K. S. Moskalenko proved this to the front commander, Lieutenant General F. I. Golikov and his staff, nothing helped. The conversation was short:

Follow the order.

Of course, I had to do it. But the commander of the 40th Army decided to do this in such a way that the enemy, even if he guessed the plans of the attackers, would not have time to bring up reserves.

Since the offensive of the main forces was scheduled for January 14, it means that reconnaissance in force by the forward battalions had to be carried out on the 12th. Without devoting the commander and the front headquarters to his intentions, K. S. Moskalenko ordered - of course, verbally: by January 12, to change troops on the bridgehead so that the first echelon divisions would occupy the initial areas for the offensive; the main forces should be ready to immediately go on the offensive in the event of successful advance of the forward battalions.

The decision was risky. The enemy could accidentally discover the appearance of new Soviet divisions at the front line. However, this risk could not be compared with the serious threat that could arise if the army command, having carried out reconnaissance in force, then gave the enemy two days to organize a rebuff to the attack.

In accordance with this intention, the task was set for the forward battalions allocated by all four rifle divisions of the first echelon - 141st, 25th Guards, 3rd, 40th and 107th. They were ordered, along with identifying the actual outline of the front line, to capture the most important enemy strongholds. The conversation was primarily about Orekhovoy Grove, height 185, as well as the settlements of Uryvo-Pokrovsky and Goldaevka.

The attack by the leading battalions on January 12 was preceded by an hour of artillery preparation. It started at 11.00. A barrage of fire fell on the enemy's front line. It ended with a powerful salvo from two battalions of BM-13 rocket artillery. During this hour, enemy positions were bombed by bombers of the 291st Attack Aviation Division.

Exactly at 12.00 the forward battalions of the 107th Infantry Division set out together with units of the 86th Tank Brigade under Lieutenant Colonel V. G. Zaseev (6 KV, 12 T-34). The rifle units of Colonel P. M. Bezhko launched an attack in the direction of the main attack. They quickly covered the distance to the first trenches of the stunned enemy. A short battle ensued for Goldaevka and the dominant heights located half a kilometer to the west of it. The battle ended with the capture of the village and heights.

There was resistance only in places. As for the Hungarian soldiers, they preferred to lay down their arms in entire units. Two hours after the start of the attack, more than a thousand soldiers and 32 officers surrendered to the two leading battalions of the 107th Infantry Division. Among the captured trophies were 20 artillery pieces, 75 machine guns, and over a thousand rifles and machine guns. The losses of the 40th Army in this sector were 5 killed and 42 wounded.

The attack by the two advanced battalions of the 25th Guards Rifle Division under Major General P. M. Shafarenko was also successful. With the support of artillery and mortar fire, they, together with the 116th Tank Brigade of Lieutenant Colonel A. Yu. Novak (5 T-70, 23 KV, equipped with siren whistles for conducting psychic attacks), after a two-hour battle, captured the Walnut Grove, defeating the enemy stronghold.

On this day, reconnaissance in force was also carried out in the offensive zones of the 18th Rifle Corps and the 3rd Tank Army. But since the forward battalions there were only tasked with identifying the true front line of defense and opening the enemy’s fire system, then, having achieved this goal, they retreated to their original positions.

In front of the Storozhevsky bridgehead, in the offensive zone of the 40th Army, a different situation developed. As a result of the actions of the advanced battalions, the enemy defense was thoroughly disorganized. True, the worried enemy urgently transferred his 700th combined tank battalion here from Ostrogozhsk. Nevertheless, the troops, wedged 6 km along the front and more than 3 km in depth, firmly entrenched themselves on the achieved lines. Moreover, the attack by infantry with tanks, combined with the preceding fire strike from artillery and mortars, led to such a development of events that ours themselves did not expect, namely: an enemy infantry division, to which the 700th consolidated tank battalion hastened to the rescue, despite to this, it could not withstand the onslaught and by the end of the day on January 12 it began to roll back to the west.

Thus, the risk turned out to be more than justified, and K. S. Moskalenko then decided to use the current situation to quickly bring the main forces of the first echelon of the army into battle. During the night, the troops were pulled forward to new starting positions. At the same time, the army command amended the artillery offensive plan: since the strong points on the front line were already captured by army troops, the artillery received new targets located in the depths of the German defense.

Late in the evening, K. S. Moskalenko reported to the front commander the situation in the army zone. Lieutenant General F.I. Golikov approved the decision to launch an offensive with the main forces the next morning.

At dawn on January 13, artillery preparation was carried out - even more powerful than the day before.

An important role in its success was played by the distribution of tasks and all targets between artillery groups. For example, an army artillery group, led by the commander of the 10th Artillery Division, Colonel V.B. Khusid, first launched fire strikes on headquarters and communications centers. Having thus disrupted command and control of the troops, she transferred fire to enemy artillery and mortar positions. The bulk of the fire weapons of the German units were not able to respond, since they had ceased to receive these firing instructions.

Artillerymen found opportunities to further enhance the power of a fire strike against the enemy through the use of various innovations. Thus, 120-mm mortars, of which there were about 50, usually operated in separate divisions (12–18 mortars in each). On the same day they were all united into one group. Its fire swept away wire fences along with stakes, blew up entire minefields, destroyed the ceilings of dugouts, dugouts, trenches, literally sweeping the enemy out of them.

One of the prisoners spoke of the death of two-thirds of his company within 2-3 minutes while it was under Soviet mortar fire. An extraordinary effect was also produced by 40 guns that fired direct fire on a half-kilometer front in the offensive zone of the 107th Infantry Division.

The results of the artillery barrage, revealed after the breakthrough of the enemy’s defenses, confirmed its high effectiveness. At the front line and in the depths, many bunkers, dugouts, observation posts, communication centers, trench junctions and communication passages, mortar and artillery firing positions were destroyed.

The accuracy of the artillerymen and mortarmen can be judged by the fact that they achieved such high results and at the same time completely met the established norm for ammunition consumption. Although, by the way, the army was provided with shells and mines so well that its artillery could afford to overspend them if necessary. Finally, the results of the artillery preparation at dawn on January 13th say a lot about the fact that after its completion, the Soviet infantry was able to go on the attack at full speed.

The troops of the first echelon of the army went on the offensive from the lines reached by the leading battalions. This made it possible to attack on level ground, and not from the lowlands where the initial areas for the attack were previously located. In addition, by entering the battle from a new line, the Soviet units avoided the need to fight through a deep ravine north of the village of Uryvo-Pokrovsky.

Thus, the good results of the actions of the forward battalions and highly effective artillery preparation contributed greatly to the success of the offensive of the main forces.

Here it is necessary to say about the tasks that were assigned to them. In accordance with the directives of the Headquarters and the front, it was decided to build the army's battle formations in two echelons. The first of them included the 141st, 25th Guards, 340th and 107th rifle divisions, 116th, 150th and 86th tank brigades. They were ordered to break through the enemy’s defenses on a 10-kilometer front and by the end of the first day of the offensive to reach the line of settlements Storozhevoye 1st - Boldyrevka - Devitsa.

The second echelon - the 305th Infantry Division and the 253rd Infantry Brigade - was supposed to enter the battle on the morning of the second day of the operation. The first of them was ordered to advance in the direction of the villages of Krasnoe and Alekseevka, the second - to the north-west in order to secure the right flank of the army’s strike group.

The problem of securing the right flank became of paramount importance. The fact is that to the right of the breakthrough line, in a 47-kilometer passive sector, the 40th Army held its occupied line with the forces of only one rifle regiment, training and machine-gun battalions. And they were opposed by the enemy army corps. In addition, to the north and northwest, in the area of ​​Voronezh and Kastorny, the 2nd German Army was located. The above-mentioned rifle regiment and two battalions continued to demonstrate the concentration of troops to go on the offensive. But the enemy could take this on faith for the time being; and it was to be expected that it was there that he would try to act in response to the attack from the Storozhevsky bridgehead.

The threat from this side was more than real, since K.S. Moskalenko began the offensive operation without the 4th Tank Corps, which, according to the plan, was supposed to strike precisely on the right flank of the strike group. Therefore, the army command decided to leave one of the two destroyer brigades, reinforced by an army battalion of anti-tank rifles and a training battalion of the rifle division, in defense east of the village of Storozhevoye 1st, to the south of which the breakthrough site was located. In addition, a strong strike group consisting of the 141st, 25th Guards Rifle Divisions, 253rd Rifle and 116th Tank Brigades was advancing on the right flank of the army. Moreover, the line they reached during the operation was supposed to be consolidated by the second fighter brigade.

Finally, on top of all this, the front commander, at the request of K.S. Moskalenko, sent the 322nd Infantry Division from his reserve to the area east of the Storozhevsky bridgehead, so that it would participate in parrying a possible counterattack from the right.

The threat to the left flank, where only a few combat units and two training battalions remained on the 28-kilometer front, was prevented by the actions of the 107th Infantry Division and the 86th Tank Brigade. After breaking through the defense, they were supposed to cover themselves with a screen from Korotoyak and strike south, towards Ostrogozhsk. They had to liberate this city and thereby cut through the encircled enemy group before interacting with the units of the 18th Rifle Corps and the 3rd Tank Army advancing to the left.

Previously, it was already mentioned about the planned measures to dissect the entire Ostrogozh-Rossoshan enemy group, in the implementation of which the 107th Infantry Division and the 86th Tank Brigade took part. At the same time, the army troops advancing to their right were to reach the line Storozhevoye 1st - Kasyanov - Novaya Soldatka - Prudki - Ilovskoye by the end of the fourth or fifth day. There, near the city of Alekseevka, they were to link up with the 15th Tank Corps of the 3rd Tank Army and thereby close the encirclement ring around the Ostrogozh-Rossoshan enemy group.

These were the tasks of the troops of the 40th Army in the operation to encircle and dissect this group. Their implementation, as has already been shown, began successfully. However, since on January 13 only the 40th Army went on the offensive, the enemy directed its countermeasures against it.

In addition to the 700th combined tank battalion, on the same day he transferred here two infantry regiments of the German 168th Infantry Division from the 18th Rifle Corps zone. This made it easier for the latter to launch offensive operations from the Shchuchensky bridgehead the next day, January 14. In the 40th Army sector, the arrival of enemy reinforcements slowed down the pace of the defense breakthrough.

In the first hours of the battle, the success of the offensive in the center and on the left flank was clearly evident. The 340th Rifle Division of Major General S. S. Martirosyan together with the 150th Tank Brigade of Lieutenant Colonel I. V. Safronov (4 T-60, 10 T-70, 29 T-34) and the 107th Rifle Division operated there respectively. division of Colonel P. M. Bezhko with the 86th Tank Brigade of Lieutenant Colonel V. G. Zaseev. With powerful artillery support, which provided continuous fire to attack infantry and tanks, the attackers quickly moved forward.

Approximately a third of the artillery, located in battle formations behind the infantry chains, accompanied the attack of infantry and tanks. It destroyed enemy anti-tank weapons and firing points that impeded the infantry's advance. The other third, using indirect fire, cleared the further path for infantry and tanks, and the last third, changing firing positions, approached the attackers.

Artillery control was centralized, concentrated in the hands of the army artillery commander. He had a well-established connection at his disposal - wired and radio. Thanks to this, it was possible at the right moment to organize massive fire at enemy concentrations both at the front line and in the depths of the defense. By thus creating a preponderance of powerful firepower, the army command could influence the outcome of the battle and ensure the army's troops continued advancement.

Units of the 340th Infantry Division, having captured Uryvo-Pokrovsky, advanced on Boldyrevka. In this area, the 150th Tank Brigade encountered counterattacking units of the German 700th Composite Tank Battalion. A fierce battle ensued. Having lost 14 tanks and about 200 prisoners, the enemy abandoned Boldyrevka.

Among the prisoners was one of the officers of the 700th battalion, whose tank was rammed by our T-34. He reported that his unit had about 60 tanks and 10 assault guns. From him, the Soviet command also learned that the first echelon of 30 tanks, which had the task of restoring the situation in the area of ​​the Storozhevsky bridgehead, took part in the mentioned battle. It followed from this that the German command still did not have a clear idea of ​​the scale of the Soviet offensive. Further, from the testimony of the prisoner, it was clear that the Red Army units still had to deal with the second echelon of the enemy’s 700th battalion, located 5 km west of Boldyrevka. The liberation of this settlement and the nearby height 177 meant, among other things, that the Voronezh-Ostrogozhsk road was cut and thus the maneuver of German troops along the front was hampered.

By this time, the 107th Infantry Division had captured the enemy stronghold in the village of Devitsa. About 200 prisoners were captured here.

Units of the 25th Guards Rifle Division began to move forward only in the afternoon. Using the successful offensive of the 340th Infantry Division, they bypassed the right flank of the opposing enemy formation and began the battle for Dovgalevka. There they met one of the two infantry regiments of the 168th German Infantry Division that had arrived as reinforcements. The enemy's fierce resistance was broken only by the morning of January 14.

In general, the army troops achieved significant success during January 13th. Its strike group broke through the main line of German defense 10 km along the front and in depth, liberating the settlements of Dovgalevka, Boldyrevka, and Devitsa. The task of the first day of the operation was almost completely completed. The 18th Rifle Corps and the 3rd Tank Army also began breaking through the enemy defenses on January 14.

The 40th Army continued its offensive that day. Its further task was to deepen the breakthrough and capture the second line of German defense, which the army troops had entered in separate directions the day before. Thus, it was intended to prevent the enemy from gaining a foothold on it with his retreating troops and reserves transferred here, and to complete the defeat of the opposing group. This task was complicated by the fact that some sections of the enemy’s second line of defense were already occupied by units of three German infantry divisions - the mentioned 168th, as well as the 68th and 88th, which had managed to reach the breakthrough front.

To strengthen the onslaught and increase the pace of the offensive, on the morning of January 14, the command of the 40th Army brought into battle the 305th Infantry Division and the 253rd Infantry Brigade from the second echelon.

The 253rd Rifle Brigade, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel M. N. Krasin, was staffed by cadets from military schools. It was one of the best formations in the 40th Army and brilliantly lived up to the hopes placed on it. The brigade was brought into battle at the junction between the 141st and 25th Guards Rifle Divisions, which formed a group that also included the 116th Tank Brigade. Two battalions of the latter worked closely with the 141st, and the other two with the 25th Guards Rifle Division.

This group was very successful. Units of the 141st Infantry Division, bypassing the main forces of the opposing German division, struck it from the west in the flank and rear. By the end of the day, they captured a strong resistance center in Storozhevoy 1st and began a battle for the village of Arkhangelskoye. The 253rd Rifle Brigade, advancing to the left, breaking enemy resistance, advanced 8 km in battles. As a result of the successful actions of these two formations, the breakthrough was expanded to the right, and the actions of the main forces of the army were reliably supported from the north.

Meanwhile, the 25th Guards Rifle Division advanced 5 km westward and captured the village of Mastyugino.

Between the 340th and 107th rifle divisions operating to the left, which were advancing in a southwestern direction, the 305th rifle division under the command of Colonel I. A. Danilovich entered the battle. She thus found herself in the direction of the main attack of the army, where the greatest success was achieved. Units of this division acted skillfully and contributed to its further development. By the end of the day, they had advanced 5 km and reached the second line of enemy defense in the area of ​​​​the village of Prilep. The 107th Infantry Division south of this area captured the settlements of Soldatskoye, Peskovatka, Kalinin, as well as the dominant bank of the Potudan River.

Thus, in two days of offensive, the army expanded the breakthrough to 50 km along the front and deepened it to 17 km, reaching the second line of enemy defense. Since it was not possible to capture it on the move, further attacks were postponed until the next morning.

The onset of the Soviet offensive, as evidenced by a number of documents, came as a complete surprise to the German command. “We thought that this was a small-scale offensive, with the aim of improving positions and to expand the breakthrough of the Italian front. It was believed that this offensive would only be in the south. They did not expect an attack to the north. By the time of capture it was a disorganized mass of infantry and artillerymen. Of the entire corps, up to 3 thousand people remained, the rest dispersed in small groups to no one knows where,” said the captured artillery chief of the 3rd Hungarian Corps, General Dezhe, who in the pre-war years was a military attaché in Moscow for four years.

Development of the offensive and encirclement of the Ostrogozh-Rossoshan group. On January 14, the rest of the front forces went on the offensive, as well as the 6th Army of the Southwestern Front under the command of Lieutenant General F. M. Kharitonov. But in the directions of their attacks, the Germans put up strong resistance. Thus, the 184th Rifle Division of the 3rd Tank Army was left without the tanks assigned to it, which, when moving to their original positions, got stuck in a ravine covered with snowdrifts, suffered heavy losses and was stopped in front of the front line of the enemy defense. Neighboring divisions attacked the enemy equally unsuccessfully. After a three-hour battle, army formations were wedged into the main defense line only 1–3 km. When the commander of the 3rd Tank Army, General P. S. Rybalko, brought parts of the 12th and 15th Tank Corps into battle, the situation changed dramatically. By the end of the day, the corps had advanced to a depth of 25 km, defeating the headquarters of the 24th German Tank Corps in the Zilina area. The advance of tank formations was facilitated by the offensive of the 6th Army of the Southwestern Front. As a result, his German command was not only unable to regroup its reserves from the south to the breakthrough site of the tank army, but was also forced to bring the reserve 27th tank and 320th infantry divisions into battle against the 6th Army of General F. M. Kharitonov.

It was no less difficult to break through the defense in the offensive zone of the 18th Separate Rifle Corps. Not only because of the deep snow, but also due to poor coordination, the escort artillery pieces, and partly the direct support tanks, lagged behind the infantry. By the end of the day, the corps had not completed its task. In the morning, the 26th German Infantry and 1st Hungarian Tank Divisions (20 Pz.Kpfw.IV.Ausf.F1, Pz.Kpfw.38(t), 19 Toldi I/IIa light tanks were introduced into the battle in this direction , 18 armored vehicles "Csaba"). These operational reserves delayed parts of the corps for three days in front of the second line of defense.

On January 15, the 141st Rifle Division and the 253rd Rifle Brigade of the 40th Army operated most successfully. They advanced another 10 km, reached the Maslov Log - Yablochnoye line and created a real threat of reaching the rear of the 2nd German Army in the Voronezh region. As a result of this, the German command hastily began to withdraw its divisions located along the Don, intending to throw them against the advancing troops of the 40th Army.

The 25th Guards and 305th Rifle Divisions broke through the second line of enemy defense in the direction of the settlements of Repyevka and Krasnoe, advanced 20 km and captured the line Skoritskoye - Fabritskoye - Komsomolets - Svistovka - Bogoslovka. The enemy retreated in disarray, abandoning weapons and equipment. On that day, 620 soldiers and officers of Hungarian units surrendered to the 25th Guards Rifle Division alone. The division also captured 75 guns of various calibers, 120 tractors, 37 motor vehicles, 49 machine guns, 37 mortars, 1,123 rifles, 120 carts, 54 anti-tank rifles and three warehouses.

On this day, the enemy offered the strongest resistance in the sector of the 107th Infantry Division. As a result, she moved more slowly than in the previous days. To strengthen the onslaught in the southwestern direction, General K. S. Moskalenko also transferred the 340th Infantry Division here, leaving cover in its previous sector. By the end of the day, units of this division liberated the village of Ternovaya. The 150th Tank Brigade, still operating together with them, simultaneously broke through the enemy’s battle formations and captured the village of Lesnoye Ukolovo.

By the end of January 15, army troops had broken through the enemy’s defenses to the entire tactical depth. On the right flank, the army troops moved forward 20 km, on the left - by 16, in the center - by 35. Thus, conditions were created for developing an offensive to encircle and dismember the enemy group in cooperation with the 18th Rifle Corps and the 3rd Tank army. The operational situation for solving this problem was quite favorable, because the German command brought all its reserves into the battle, but it did not have defensive lines prepared in the depths in these directions. Taking advantage of the situation, the 107th Rifle Division broke through to Ostrogozhsk on January 17, where, joining forces with units of the 18th Rifle Corps, it encircled the 10th Hungarian Infantry Division. At the same time, the 88th tank brigade of the 15th tank corps of the 3rd tank army under the command of Colonel I. I. Sergeev, without getting involved in protracted battles for individual strong points and resistance centers, broke into Alekseevka at 18.00 on January 17. A day later, the 309th Infantry Division of Colonel A.P. Krutikhin established fire contact with her. Units of the 8th Italian Army, 7th Hungarian Army and 24th German Tank Corps were surrounded.

At the same time, the 12th Tank Corps rushed towards the city of Rossosh. In the ensuing street battles, the personnel of the 106th Tank Brigade, Colonel I.E. Alekseev, acted boldly, swiftly and courageously. A tank platoon of Lieutenant D.S. Folomeev, sent to conduct reconnaissance, defeated the headquarters of the 156th Italian Infantry Division west of the city and captured its banner. With the approach of rifle formations, the city of Rossosh was liberated. Developing the offensive, units of the corps captured the village of Karpenkovo ​​on January 19, but at the same time they themselves suffered heavy losses: only 44 serviceable tanks remained in the 12th Tank Corps. Therefore, he was forced to go on the defensive, repelling the attacks of the enemy, who was trying to break through to the west. On the morning of January 20, units of the 18th separate rifle corps of General P. M. Zykov approached Karpenkovo. As a result, the entire Ostrogozh-Rossoshan Wehrmacht group was cut into two parts. Part of the German and Hungarian formations, as well as the entire Italian Alpine Corps (4 divisions), were surrounded.

Elimination of the Ostrogozh-Rossoshan group. Results of the operation. By January 18, the troops of the Voronezh Front not only completed the encirclement and dissection of the Ostrogozh-Rossoshan group, but also created an internal encirclement front. The total area of ​​the encirclement area, where 13 enemy divisions were located, was about 2.5 thousand square meters. km. By the time the internal front was formed, the Soviet command managed to create an external front of encirclement with the forces of rifle formations and the 7th Cavalry Corps. Introduced into the breakthrough on the morning of January 15, this corps fought more than 100 km. On January 19, he captured the village of Valuiki, where he captured over 3,000 German and Italian soldiers and officers, captured large food warehouses and other military trophies. The corps itself lost 203 people killed. On the same day, for excellent combat operations in the deep operational rear of the enemy, for the courage and valor of the personnel, the corps received the honorary title of Guards. Partisans played a significant role in the liberation of Valuyki. On the instructions of the commander of the cavalry corps S.V. Sokolov, they blew up the railway tracks in the Valuiki-Urazovo and Valuiki-Volokonovka sections, which did not allow the enemy to remove food and other material assets from the city.

It should be noted that both the internal and external fronts of the encirclement were not continuous. Soviet troops occupied only road junctions and settlements on the most likely breakthrough routes, and 75% of the front forces that took part in the operation were concentrated on the internal front of the encirclement. This created the preconditions for the defeat of enemy troops in a short time. But it was necessary to hurry, since the threat was growing that the encircled German troops would try to break through the ring.

To avoid unnecessary bloodshed, the Front Military Council issued a leaflet with an appeal to the encircled enemy troops on behalf of the captured officer. “I, Natale Antonio, Colonel of the Royal Italian Armed Forces, decorated for military services during the World War 1914-1918, participant in the war of 1911-1914. in Libya and the wars of 1935–1936. in Albania, commander of the 27th Infantry Regiment of the 156th Division “Vincenza”, I am now captured by the Russians and I urge you to stop fighting... Soldiers, save your life and the honor of Italy. Surrender yourself. I assure you that the Russians will treat you well." But the command of the encircled troops did not heed these prudent calls. A desperate attempt was made to escape from the encirclement.

Then the commander of the front troops gave the order to defeat the enemy. On the morning of January 19, fighting began to eliminate groups in Ostrogozhsk and in the forest northwest of Alekseevka. Subsequently, the regiment commander from the Vincenza division testified: “On the morning of the 17th, chaos reigned in Podgorny (north of Rossosh). Fires, robberies, chaotic and feverish movement of vehicles... Little by little, streams of units leaving the front merge into one river, forming one huge column; this increases the danger and makes the march more difficult... How many skirmishes, how many fierce fights to force the weak to yield! Everyone is in a feverish hurry, trying to get away from danger.”

Trapped in the forest, Italian and German troops made desperate but unsuccessful attempts to break through to Novy Oskol. By January 24, the defeat of the main enemy forces was completed. Only a small part of them moved to the Oskol River. The chief of staff of the 2nd Hungarian Army reported on the general situation in Budapest: “Undoubtedly, the situation is terrible... What I saw was the greatest disappointment in my life... Some of the senior commanders behaved disgracefully, retreated, abandoned the units leading the battles.” On January 21, the commander of Army Group B, Field Marshal M. Weichs, reported to Hitler: “Due to losses in manpower and equipment, this section of the front can no longer be firmly held in our hands.”

The liquidation of the Rossoshan group was carried out consistently. At first it was cut off, and by January 20 its southern part, consisting of almost four divisions, was destroyed. A week later, the liquidation of the troops that escaped from the cauldron and retreated to the area east of Valuyki was completed. The commanders of the Italian divisions of the Alpine Corps “Cuneense”, “Julia” and “Vincenza”, along with their headquarters, were captured. Of the Italian Alpine Corps, only 6,200 people escaped the encirclement.

The Ostrogozh-Rossoshan operation lasted 15 days. During these fortnight, the German defense was broken through a 250-kilometer area. Soviet troops advanced 140 km, liberating an area of ​​22.5 thousand square meters. km. Favorable conditions were created for the further offensive of the Red Army units in the Kharkov direction and in the Donbass. During the operation, more than 15 of the 21 enemy divisions were defeated, and 6 divisions were severely defeated. From January 13 to 27, the irretrievable losses of Wehrmacht troops exceeded 123 thousand people, of which only 97 thousand were prisoners (including about 11 thousand people who surrendered in the offensive zone of the 6th Army). Soviet troops captured 160 tanks, 3,160 guns and mortars, and 11,424 vehicles. A significant amount of enemy military equipment and property was destroyed during the fighting. At the same time, the losses of Soviet troops turned out to be relatively small. For example, the 3rd Tank Army lost less than 12 thousand people, and the 40th Army lost 4,500 soldiers and officers.

At the same time, despite the fact that the operation was carried out in conditions favorable to the Soviet troops, not all available opportunities were fully used. The destruction of the encircled group in the area of ​​Ostrogozhsk and Rossoshi continued until January 27, that is, 9 days. This was mainly due to the fact that by the time the internal encirclement front was formed, there were not enough forces in its western section to cut off the enemy’s escape routes. As a result, some German units managed to break out of the ring and avoid capture. Nevertheless, as a result of the operation, the preconditions were created for delivering even more powerful blows to the enemy.

"Daughter of Stalingrad" and the largest defeat of the Hungarian army

On January 27, 1943, the surrender of the remnants and headquarters of three Italian divisions became a symbol of the completion of the Ostrogozh-Rossoshansk offensive operation of the Soviet troops.
The operation lasted from January 13 to January 27, 86 thousand soldiers and officers from 28 completely defeated Hungarian, Italian and German divisions were captured. In the fifteen days of January 1943, Hungary received a legitimate reason to join the “Stalingrad” mourning of its German allies, as it suffered the largest military defeat in its entire history.
But all the prerequisites for this demonstrative defeat of the troops of the then “Reich-European Union” took shape in the steppes near Stalingrad...
The conditions for conducting the Ostrogozh-Rossoshan operation arose after the destruction of the Nazi troops at Stalingrad and the defeat of the group that was trying to come to the rescue of the troops of Field Marshal Paulus, surrounded in the city on the Volga.
As a result of these events, the right flank of the Nazi Army Group B hung in the void. Soviet troops of the Southwestern Front deeply captured the flank of the Italian Alpine Corps defending on the Don from the 8th Italian Army. Having encircled and defeated it, Soviet troops would have reached the flank of the 2nd Hungarian and 2nd German armies south of Voronezh.
The prospect of the consistent destruction of the enemy armies located on the southern flank was not only tempting, but also obvious. The Ostrogozh-Rossoshan offensive operation became the first of a series of operations to alternately “devour” the German front in the south of the USSR.
It is worth noting that Supreme Commander-in-Chief J.V. Stalin gave the first orders on the development of operation plans with the aim of capturing this area on December 21. The fact was that the section of the Liski-Kantemirovka railway located there made it possible to significantly improve the supply of troops of the Voronezh and Southwestern fronts, and therefore increase their combat capabilities.
Another important component of future events was the decision to use the 3rd Tank Army in this operation, which was reserved for developing the success of Operation Mars on the central sector of the Soviet-German front.


But when “Mars” turned into a classic positional meat grinder, P. S. Rybalko’s 3rd Tank Army became one of the main “trump cards” of the Soviet command in the south. Its two tank corps, coupled with the forced passivity of the enemy, did not promise anything good for the Italians, Hungarians and Germans. During the transfer of the army by rail, as a result of a Luftwaffe air raid at the Buturlinovka station, the commander of the 12th Tank Corps, M.I. Chesnokov, was killed, but this did not prevent the timely concentration of Soviet tanks on the poorly covered flank of the 8th Italian Army between Novaya Kalitva and Kantemirovka. Rybalko's tank army became the southern strike group, the northern one was made up of the 40th army of K. S. Moskalenko.
The idea of ​​the Ostrogozh-Rossoshan offensive operation was to flank attacks in converging directions, encircling and destroying the enemy. The enemy had 28 Italian, Hungarian and German divisions against 23 rifle divisions of the Voronezh Front. The Soviet troops did not have a numerical advantage; their artillery was weak. 51% of the artillery were mortars; 122-152mm howitzers, so necessary for offensive operations, accounted for only 12.5% ​​of the total artillery. The Voronezh Front did not have independent railway supplies at that time; it was poorly provided with motor transport. Therefore, the front troops began an offensive operation, being provided with ammunition at the level of 1-2 rounds of ammunition instead of the required 3-3.5.
These circumstances forced us to concentrate not only 70% of the artillery on the attack directions, but also to actually expose other sectors of the front. For example, for the defense of the 156-kilometer line along the Don River, only 12 rifle battalions were left, which was 10-12 times less than the statutory requirements.
This risk was completely justified, since the enemy had the task of passive defense and could not launch preemptive strikes.
Due to such a decisive concentration of forces in the attack directions, an overwhelming advantage in infantry and artillery was created. In addition, the Soviet command compensated for the lack of heavy artillery and ammunition with a large number of tanks allocated to support infantry when breaking through enemy defenses. Numerous tanks became the main advantage, fully used by the Soviet command. Tank brigades took part in breaking through the defense, and larger tank formations were supposed to enter the breach and quickly complete the encirclement of enemy troops, intercepting their escape and supply routes.
The offensive was supposed to begin on January 14, 1943, but the two advanced battalions of the 107th and 25th Guards Divisions of the 40th Army, which carried out reconnaissance in force on January 12, unexpectedly for the command achieved significant success, wedging into the enemy’s defenses to a depth of 3.5 km. The front commander immediately ordered to build on this success and deliver the main blow to the 40th Army a day earlier, on the morning of January 13. As a result, the offensive of the main forces of the northern strike group began from the line captured the day before by the advanced battalions. By the end of the day on January 13, the defenses of the 7th Hungarian Infantry Division had been completely broken through on a front 10 km wide. On the same day, the enemy tried to counterattack with the forces of the 700th separate tank detachment, which had 10 Pz.IV and 40 Pz.38(t). The 150th Tank Brigade of Colonel I.V. Sofronov, armed with 29 T-34 medium tanks and 14 T-70 and T-60 light tanks, completely defeated it, taking the detachment commander prisoner.


One should not think that events in other areas of the breakthrough developed just as successfully. The 18th Rifle Corps, striking from a bridgehead on the Don River, although it broke through the defenses of the 12th Hungarian Infantry Division on the very first day, but after that it encountered enemy reserves in the form of the 26th Infantry and 1st Tank Hungarian Divisions. They resisted corps units on the second line of defense for three days.
In the attack area of ​​the 3rd Panzer Army, instead of the thin and hastily occupied defense of the battered 27th Panzer Division of the XXIV German Tank Corps, Rybalko’s tankers encountered the 385th and 387th German infantry divisions transferred here in December 1942 and the arriving units of the motorized division "Greater Germany". After a three-hour battle, P.S. Rybalko decided to strengthen the three rifle divisions leading the battle with them with the 12th and 15th tank corps, which were originally intended to develop operational success. A massive tank attack broke through the German defenses along a 10-kilometer front. On the same day, tankers of the 15th Panzer Corps destroyed the headquarters of the XXIV German Panzer Corps, and its commander, General Martin Wandel, was killed. However, this caused a delay in the operation. The tank corps of Rybalko's army, having used up fuel and ammunition during the day of battle, spent the entire night of January 15 transporting and replenishing them.
Thus, the stage of breaking through enemy defenses in three directions of attack lasted from January 13 to 15. For the next three days, Soviet troops carried out a maneuver to encircle and dismember the enemy group, as well as to form an external front of encirclement in order to stop attempts to relieve the encircled. At this stage, tank brigades and corps were separated from the main forces of the front by 25-30 km, operating in the depths of the enemy.
It cannot be said that the German command indifferently followed the developments. The 68th and 57th infantry divisions were urgently transferred from near Voronezh, and began to counterattack the advance of the troops of the 40th Army of K. S. Moskalenko, which was the northern strike force of the offensive.
Enemy countermeasures forced the command of the Soviet troops to change their original plans, but the main idea of ​​the operation did not suffer from this. For example, the pressure of the German reserves arriving from near Voronezh on the 40th Army did not force its command to “break through the wall with its head” and “fill up the enemy with corpses.” Having deployed one rifle division and a rifle brigade to defend against them, K. S. Moskalenko sharply strengthened another direction with the liberated troops and thereby accelerated the capture of Ostrogozhsk and the encirclement of the 8th Italian Alpine Corps. At the same time, the 18th Rifle Corps, having overcome the resistance of the Hungarian reserves, closed the encirclement of the German 385th Infantry Division. All this was all the more sad for the Italians and Germans because, in parallel, the 7th Cavalry Corps of S.V. Sokolov was creating an external encirclement front. Advancing at a pace of 30 km per day, the cavalrymen created an external encirclement front, 75 km distant from the internal one, which reliably ensured actions to eliminate the encircled.


Let us remember that all this happened during heavy snow drifts and low air temperatures. Therefore, Soviet troops occupied only the most important road junctions and probable routes of movement of the enemy.
By January 18, the encircled enemy troops were divided into three groups: In the Rossoshi area there were three divisions of the Italian mountain corps, two Hungarian infantry divisions, units of the XXIV German tank corps and the 385th infantry division.
In Ostrogozhsk the 10th and 13th Hungarian and units of the 168th German infantry divisions were blocked.
The main forces of the 1st Hungarian Tank Division, 168th and 26th Infantry Divisions tried to fight their way to the west between Ilovskaya and Alekseevka.
By this time, the troops of the Voronezh Front had already reported 52 thousand enemy soldiers and officers taken prisoner.
From January 19 to 27, battles continued to destroy the encircled enemy troops. The Hungarians and Germans were eliminated most quickly in Ostrogozhsk. By January 20, the city was taken by storm. Most of those surrounded surrendered or were destroyed; small groups managed to escape to the Alekseevka area. In this area there were ammunition and food depots of the 2nd Hungarian Army, so about 30 thousand surrounded Hungarians and Germans had the opportunity to actively resist. By January 24, the group in the Alekseevka area ceased to exist. Nine thousand died during the fighting, nine thousand surrendered, another 12 thousand people were able to break out of the cauldron to the west.
The highlight of the Ostrogozh-Rossosh operation was the surrender of the remnants of the group surrounded in Rossosh.


Most of it tried to break through to the west, but died under the tracks of tanks of the 3rd Tank Army, which were already regrouping towards the Oskol River. Having escaped this joy, the “Reicho-European” occupiers were able to reach the outer front of the encirclement, where they were destroyed by the cavalrymen of the 7th Cavalry Corps of S.V. Sokolov.
In terms of the number of enemy soldiers and officers captured, this operation is quite comparable to the results of the Stalingrad encirclement.


It is also worth noting that in this case the main victims were Germany's allies - Italy and Hungary. As for the latter, the events of January 1943 put an end to the active participation of Hungarian troops in the war against the USSR. From that time on, Hungarian units disappeared from the front line, preferring security service in the rear and participation in punitive operations. The regular troops of the Red Army would meet them only at the end of 1944, having entered the territory of Hungary, the most loyal ally of Nazi Germany.

P.S.: Dedicated to the “Young Europeans”...